Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Leila Rassekh Milani, Baha'i Fundamentals for Bioethics, bahai-library.com.
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Bahà’i Fundamentals for Bioethics
Leila R. Milani and Kavian S. Milani
Abstract
The recent unprecedented explosion of advances in the biological and medical
sciences, especially in the arena of technology, has produced a plethora of new
bioethical challenges with significant moral, economic, and public policy
implications. Inherent in the Baha’i Revelation is the claim that it contains a
universal moral code. The rich field of Bahd’i bioethics has not been studied to
date. This article attempts to establish a framework and to open a dialogue
within which medical ethical dilemmas may be addressed and analyzed in light
of the Bahd’i Faith. Bahd’i psychology (science of the soul) is examined, as it is
a prelude to ethical questions. The authors suggest a possible Bahd’i scriptural
understanding o f suffering, theodicy, and the purpose o f creation. The
definitions of life and death, as well as the purpose of human life, are also
explored. Finally, a number o f principles from the Bahd’i writings are
examined for use in formulating a Bahd’i approach to bioethical dilemmas. It
must be noted that this article does not represent the definitive Bahd’i stance on
any of the issues discussed; rather, these preliminary observations are only
intended to serve as a prelude to a Bahd’i bioethical dialogue.

Résumé
Le foisonnement récent et sans précédent que l ’on constate dans les sciences
biologiques et médicales, tout particulièrement dans le domaine technologique, a
entraîné une pléthore de nouveaux défis bioéthiques ayant des répercussions
morales, économiques et sociétales. Au coeur même de la révélation baha’ie, il y
a l ’affirmation qu’elle renferme un code moral universel. Le riche domaine de la
bioéthique baha’ie n ’a pas encore fait l ’objet d ’études. Cet article cherche donc à
établir un cadre et à amorcer un dialogue où les dilemmes médicaux et éthiques
peuvent être examinés et analysés à la lumière de la foi baha ’ie. La psychologie
baha’ie (ou science de l ’âme) y est examinée, puisqu’elle est un prélude aux
questions éthiques. Les auteurs proposent une compréhension scripturale baha ’ie
de la souffrance, de la théodicité et du but de la création. L ’article explore
également la définition de la vie et de la mort, de même que le but de l ’existence
humaine. Enfin, un certain nombre de principes tirés des écrits baha’is sont
examinés en vue de form uler une approche baha’ie face aux dilemmes
bioéthiques. Il faut noter que cet article ne représente pas la position baha’ie
définitive au sujet des questions à l ’étude. Plutôt, ces observations préliminaires
se veulent un point de départ à un dialogue de la bioéthique baha ’ie.
48 THE J O U R N A L OF B A H Á ’ Í S T U D I E S 8.2.1998

Resumen
La reciente explosion sin precedentes en las ciencias médicas y biológicas,
especialmente en el campo de la tecnología, ha resultado en una abundancia de
retos nuevos bioéticos que insinúan significativamente ante la politico pública,
la moral, y la economiá. Inherente en la Revelación Bahďí estd la afirmación
de contener dentro de si pautas universales sobre la moral. El campo
abundante de la bioética bahà Y hasta la fecha no ha sido estudiado. Este
artículo tratarâ de establecer un marco de referenda y comenzar un diâlogo
que permitirà analizar dilemas médicos tocantes en la ética a la luz de la Fe
Bahâ’i. La sicologia bahâ’i (la ciencia del alma) se investigarápor ser preludio
a los asuntos éticos de actualidad. Los autores sugieren una comprensión en los
escritos sagrados bahá ’ís referente al sufrimiento, la teodicea, y el propôsito de
la creaciôn. Se exploran las defïniciones de la vida y la muerte, y también el
propôsito de la vida humana. Por ultimo, se sondean algunos principios de los
escritos bahá’is que sirven para elaborar un enfoque bahďí referente a los
dilemas bioéticos. Vale anotar que este artículo está lejos de ser la màxima
posiciôn bahd’i sobre los temas que se presentan; mas bién, con estas
observaciones preliminares se busca solamente adelantar un preludio a un
diálogo bioético bahá Y.

eginning in the 1950s and 1960s, a distinct new field emerged in relation to
B the ethical ramifications of medical advances. The first heart transplants,
the first clinical use of kidney dialysis and respiratory support, the increased
technological ability to prolong life, the capability to control human fertility and
reproduction, and the new ability of genetics to orchestrate the creation of a
“desirable” human being were among the many issues that prepared the way for
a new set of discussions. Although the different fields of theology, philosophy,
law, and sociology had independently confronted issues arising from medicine
and the life sciences, rarely had this been done in terms of an interdisciplinary
dialogue. By the 1970s, these dialogues gave rise to the field of bioethics
(Encyclopedia of Bioethics xxi).
The field of philosophy consists of the four major branches of metaphysics,
epistemology, logic, and ethics. Ethics is the study of moral conduct and leading
a good life. The term bioethics is derived from the Greek words bios (life) and
éthiká (ethics). It has hence been defined as :

. . . the systematic study of the moral dimensions—including moral vision, decisions,
conduct, and policies—of life sciences and health care, employing a variety of ethical
methodologies in an interdisciplinary setting. (Encyclopedia xxi)
B a h à ’i F u n d a m e n t a l s f o r B i o e t h i c s 49

Biomedical ethics has now emerged as a new field of human endeavor.1 The
general questions in the field of bioethics are those same questions raised in
other ethical inquiries; however, bioethics asks more specific questions related
to the ethics of the health sciences. The following questions are raised in the
realm of bioethics: Should the lives of the terminally ill be indefinitely
prolonged? Should fetal abnormalities in utero be diagnosed? To what extent
should society provide and encourage alternative means of conception for those
otherwise not capable? Should scientists engage in germ-line gene therapy,
altering the genetic endowment of the human race? At what point, if ever,
should abortion take place?
It is not the purpose of this article to address specific ethical problems.
Therefore, those searching for a definitive Bahà’f response to controversial
issues such as the ethical aspects of abortion, euthanasia, or the patenting of the
human genome will be disappointed. For instance, rather than addressing
euthanasia specifically, BaháT guidelines regarding death as a means of escaping
suffering are examined. In our study of selected topics, the operative texts are
extracted and presented. These texts allow for the development of a common
ground towards initiating dialogues in Bahá’1 bioethics. Such a study is long
overdue and of interest for a variety of reasons. First, individual Bahà’fs from
within or outside the medical field may face ethical dilemmas. This article
establishes a framework that may be considered in management of such
dilemmas. Second, it may prove of interest to scientists and healthcare providers
who may be dealing with Bahá’1 scientists or patients. Third, and most
important, as in many fields of human endeavor, global dialogues may eventuate
in an emerging global consensus on the issue of bioethics. Jewish, Christian, and
Muslim scholars of biomedical ethics have been heavily involved at the forefront
of the global dialogue in the field. Buddhism and Hinduism have also made
substantial contributions to the current scholarship in biomedical ethics
(Encyclopedia xix-xx). The BaháT' Faith is the only major religion that has not
participated in these dialogues. The BaháT' Faith, as the youngest and fastest-
growing major religion in the world, has the right to contribute to the current
dialogues in the field of biomedical ethics, alongside its sister religions.

Contemporary Approaches to Bioethical Decision-Making
Deontology
To familiarize the reader with the new field of bioethics, a cursory survey of
some contemporary approaches to bioethical decision-making is necessary.

1. Annually, more than 3,000 books and articles are published that contribute to this field. A large
number of university centers have designed post-graduate degree programs in bioethics. Courses
and electives are now offered by a large number of medical schools, and ethics questions are now
standard on National Boards, Steps I, II, and III, as well as FLEX and specialty Board examinations
(see La Puma and Scheidermayer, Ethics Consultation 58).
50 TH E J O U R N A L OF B A H À ’ Î S T U D I E S 8.2. 1998

Deontological, or obligation-based theory, as developed by Immanuel Kant
(1742-1804), is one of the earliest normative theories of ethics. It advances the
notion that moral judgments must rest on reasons that can be generalized for
others who are similarly situated. Kant maintained that human beings have a
rational power to resist desire and possess the capacity to act according to
rational considerations. He went on to argue that it is in reason, not tradition,
intuition, conscience, emotions, or attitudes that morality is grounded. A natural
extension of this theory lends itself to Kant’s assertion that moral obligation
depends on the rule that determines the individual’s will. In other words, an
action is only morally worthy if it is performed by an agent who has a good
will.2 Kant’s categorical imperative followed: “I ought never to act except in
such a way that I can also will that my maxim become a universal law”
(Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 56-57).

Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism, or consequence-based theory, determines the rightness or
wrongness of an act based on the balance of its good and bad consequences.
“The right act in any circumstance is the one that produces the best overall
result, as determined from an impersonal perspective that gives equal weight to
the interests of each affected party” (Beauchamp and Childress, Principles 48).
While the proponents of utilitarianism generally agree that moral actions are
valued based on their production of maximal value, there is disagreement as to
which values are most important. The agent-neutral utilitarian asserts that goods
are valuable in themselves regardless of their further consequences. Jeremy
Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-73), two well-known
utilitarians, envisioned utility in terms of happiness or pleasure (also known as
hedonistic utilitarians). Some of the more recent philosophers have argued that
values such as friendship, knowledge, health, beauty, autonomy, understanding,
enjoyment, and success have intrinsic worth as well. Finally, there are
utilitarians who would look more at the individual’s preferences as the
determining factor (Beauchamp and Childress, Principles 48).

Feminine Ethics
Noting a sense of alienation that many women have experienced in trying to
work within the structures of contemporary moral theory, Carol Gilligan, in a
detailed study, identified distinct masculine and feminine voices in ethical
reasoning. She maintained that mainstream ethical theory has been carried on in
a voice that is overwhelmingly masculine and that the voices of women have

2. Cf. 'Abdu'1-Bahá, Some Answered Questions 300-305.
B a h a ’i F u n d a m e n t a l s f o r B i o e t h i c s 51

been largely excluded or ignored.3 Claiming that women speak with a different
voice, Gilligan discovered “the voice of care.” Not based on the universality of
individual rights, but rather on the strong sense of responsibility, this ethics of
care deals with emotional commitment to and willingness to act on behalf of
persons with whom one has a relationship (Beauchamp and Childress,
Principles 85-87).

Principle-based Common Morality Theory
One of the most prevalent and contemporary approaches to ethics is the
principle-based, common-morality theory. Developed in 1994 by Tom L.
Beauchamp and James F. Childress, it is embedded in the common morality,
and it uses principles as its structural basis. Although Beauchamp and Childress
acknowledge that such a theory does not need to be principle-based, they treat
the theories together to develop their tradition of ethics. For instance, a
principle-based ethic argues that an ethical question or dilemma may be
discovered by applying the correct ethical theory (e.g., utilitarianism) or
principle (e.g., autonomy) to the case (Encyclopedia 406). The common-
morality aspect of the theory takes its basic premises from the morality shared
in common by the members of a society—what Beauchamp and Childress call
unphilosophical common sense and tradition. Similar to utilitarianism and
Kantian ethics, the principle-based theories have an emphasis on principles of
obligation. However, it is important to note that common-morality theory is
pluralistic.4 Moreover, it relies a great deal on ordinary shared moral beliefs for
its content. This is in contrast to a heavy reliance on reason, natural law, or a
special moral sense. Finally, the principles fundamental to the shared moral
beliefs are usually accepted by rival ethical theories (Principles 100). Of
particular interest to the BaháT tradition is the fact that “analogous to beliefs in
the universality of basic human rights, the principles of the common morality
are universal standards” (Principles 101). Beauchamp and Childress enumerate
four: respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice.

Respect for Autonomy
Respect for autonomy, although embedded in common morality, carries with it
different interpretations and strengths. To prevent any misunderstanding,
Beauchamp and Childress define it as:

3. Gilligan, cited in Sherwin, No Longer Patient 46. In her empirical study, Carol Gilligan found that when
women are presented with moral conflicts, they are prone to focus on details about the relationships among
the concerned parties. The solutions sought by women are usually those that protect the interests of all
participants. In contrast, she maintained that men have a tendency to identify the relevant rules that govern
the particular situation. Gilligan called the women’s approach an “ethics of care.” The men’s approach she
titled “ethics of justice.” This study has been documented in Gilligan’s In a Different Voice (1982).
4. This term is defined on page 53 of this article, in footnote 9.
52 TH E J O U R N A L OF B A H À ’ Î S T U D I E S 8.2.1998

The autonomous individual freely acts in accordance with a self-ch osen plan,
analogous to the way an independent government manages its territories and sets its
policies. A person o f diminished autonomy, by contrast, is in at least some respect
controlled by others or incapable o f deliberating or acting on the basis o f his or her
desires and plans. (Principles 121)

Stated in a negative form, the principle of respect for autonomy is:
“Autonomous actions should not be subjected to controlling constraints by
others” (Principles 126).5 The individual’s right to self-determination, carrying
with it other rights such as confidentiality and privacy, is also correlated to this
obligation. While there is a wide disagreement as to the scope of an individual’s
confidentiality and privacy rights, there is little disagreement that this sacred
right of autonomy can be legitimately curtailed by the rights of others. In
summation, the principle of respect for autonomy has only prima facie standing
and can be constrained by overriding moral obligations (Principles 126).6

Beneficence and Nonmaleficence
Closely associated in medical ethics with the maxim Primům non nocere
(Above all, do no harm), the principle of nonmaleficence puts forth an
obligation not to inflict harm intentionally. The implications of this principle are
many and cover the following range of ethical quandaries: distinctions between
killing and letting die, intending and foreseeing harmful outcomes, withholding
and withdrawing life-sustaining treatments, and extraordinary and ordinary
treatments. Although there are many who would and do join nonmaleficence
and beneficence as a single principle, Beauchamp and Childress make a
significant distinction between the two. They indicate that while
nonmaleficence means that “one ought not to inflict evil or harm” (Principles
192), beneficence dictates that “one ought to prevent evil or harm; one ought to
remove evil or harm; and that one ought to do or promote good” (Principles
192). The main distinction between the two is that the three forms of
beneficence require taking action by helping, whereas nonmaleficence only
requires intentionally refraining from actions that cause harm (Principles 192).

Justice
Justice is the final principle put forth in the dialogue of principles promoted by
Beauchamp and Childress. It is a principle by which the inequalities in access to
health care and health insurance are addressed. The diverse approaches to

5. The principle asserts a broad, abstract obligation that is free of exceptive clauses such as, “We
must respect individuals’ views and rights ‘so long as their thoughts and actions do not seriously
harm other persons’.”
6. For example, if our choices endanger the public health, potentially harm innocent others, or
require a scarce resource for which no funds are available, others can justifiably restrict our exercise
of autonomy.
B a h à ’i F u n d a m e n t a l s f o r B i o e t h i c s 53

justice—egalitarian, communitarian, libertarian, and utilitarian theories—only
partially capture the range and diversity of the moral life, emphasizing the need
for a coherent and complete theory of justice. Beauchamp and Childress assert
that in the absence of a social consensus about these competing theories of
justice, public policies will shift, emphasizing different theories at different
times. Nonetheless, one point which cannot be ignored is that reliance on a
theory of justice is essential to addressing current ethical issues.
The above paragraphs outlined some of the contemporary approaches in
ethics.7 BaháT' fundamentals of ethics, or moral theology, however, are based
on ethical reflections in light of the BaháT' Revelation. In moral theology,
metaphysical and theological considerations provide the moral framework in
which actions and policies are to be evaluated.8 The authors maintain that the
BaháT' Revelation presents a distinct ethical theory.9 However, this article will
neither engage in discussions of ethical theory based on BaháT principles, nor

7. For an excellent survey of religion and morality and their implications for bioethics, see the
Encyclopedia o f Bioethics 758-64.
8. This has been the basic approach in the formulations of religious bioethics. For an introduction
to Islamic bioethical thought, see Encyclopedia o f Bioethics, s.v. “Islam” by Abdulaziz Sachedina.
The interesting study by ‘A ttár, Islamic Medicine (75-79 and 173-82) translates theological
reflections into practice. For examples of Christian bioethical studies, see Hauerwas’s Suffering
Presence and A Community o f Character.
9. ‘ The authors have hesitated to engage in outlining a BaháT' moral philosophy. This choice will
undoubtedly raise criticisms, and with some justification. However, this is a task clearly beyond the
goals of this article and the intention of its authors. W e maintain, however, that any ethical
philosophy based on BaháT' principles must be pluralistic along the lines suggested by Barukh
Brody, as detailed in Life and Death Decision Making (9-11), where Brody advances the virtues of
pluralistic theory. He acknowledges that there are weaknesses and strengths in each of the ethical
formulations. He maintains that there is a need to recognize that each moral theory has failed
because it has recognized only one of the many legitimate moral appeals. Instead of looking at the
history of competing theories among which a choice must be made, Brody puts forth the proposal
that it would be more beneficial to view it as a series of attempts to articulate different moral
appeals, all of which will have to be combined to frame an adequate moral theory to help deal with
difficult cases. Following Brody, Beauchamp and Childress (in Principles o f Biomedical Ethics)
assign to themselves the title of pluralists in that they accept as legitimate various aspects of several
different theories advanced in the history of ethics. A parallel in pluralism may be the comparison
and contrast that Shoghi Effendi provides between diverse political theories and the BaháT'
Administrative Order, where the BaháT Administrative Order is said to contain some features of
existing political theories:
A word should now be said regarding the theory on which this Administrative Order is based and the
principle that must govern the operation of its chief institution.. . .
The BaháT' Commonwealth of the future, of which this vast Administrative Order is the sole framework, is,
both in theory and practice, not only unique in the entire history of political institutions, but can find no parallel
in the annals of any of the world’s recognized religious systems.. . .
This new-bom Administrative Order incorporates within its structure certain elements which are to be found
in each of the three recognized forms of secular government, without being in any sense a mere replica of any
one of them, and without introducing within its machinery any of the objectionable features which they
inherently possess. It blends and harmonizes, as no government fashioned by mortal hands has as yet
accomplished, the salutary truths which each of these systems undoubtedly contains without vitiating the
integrity of those God-given verities on which it is ultimately founded. (Shoghi Effendi, World Order o f
Bahdu'lldh 152-53)
54 T H E J O U R N A L OF B A H À ’ Î S T U D I E S 8.2.1998

present a comparison and contrast with competing ethical theories.10 As this
article intends to open the bioethics dialogue within the Bahà’i religion,
attention will be given prim arily to the metaphysical and theological
considerations that must precede such dialogue.

Bioethics and the Bahà’i Faith
Religion serves a unique function in the Bahà’i worldview. ‘AbduT-Bahá
argues that humanity is in need of three distinct forms of education. He
enumerates the three as material, human, and spiritual education—these
covering the full spectrum of human activity (Some Answered Questions 7-11).
‘AbduT-Bahá states that all three can only be found in the universal Educators,
who are divine teachers. He equates the universal Educators with holy
Manifestations (Some Answered Questions 11). Divine revelation then becomes
a unique and most excellent source of guidance for humanity in all aspects.
According to ‘AbduT-Bahá, religion is the pathway of the acquisition of
perfections and attributes.11 Elsewhere, ‘AbduT-Bahá writes the following
regarding religion:

Religion, moreover, is not a series o f beliefs, a set o f customs; religion is the
teachings of the Lord God, teachings which constitute the very life o f humankind,
which urge high thoughts upon the mind, refine the character, and lay the groundwork
for man’s everlasting honour. (Selectionsfrom the Writings of ‘Abdu'1-Bahá 52-53)

In this, ‘AbduT-Bahá is reiterating the thesis regarding the purpose of religion
that Bahà’uTlàh had already advanced in the first Ishráq:

They that are possessed o f wealth and invested with authority and power must show
the profoundest regard for religion. In truth, religion is a radiant light and an
im pregnable stronghold for the protection and w elfare o f the p eop les o f the
world. . . . Should the lamp o f religion be obscured, chaos and confusion will ensue,
and the lights o f fairness and justice, o f tranquillity and peace cease to shine. (Tablets
of Bahà’uTlàh 125)

In the second leaf of the Kalimát-i-Firdawsíyyih, BaháVlláh writes:

Religion is verily the chief instrument for the establishment of order in the world and
o f tranquillity amongst its peoples. The weakening o f the pillars o f religion hath
strengthened the foolish and emboldened them and made them more arrogant. Verily
1 say: The greater the decline of religion, the more grievous the waywardness of the
ungodly. (Tablets of Baha'u'llâh 63-64)

10. There are, however, a few instances where a comparison and contrast is pointed out, as in the
section on truthfulness. These are enumerated to support the thesis that an ethical theory based on
Bahà’i principles must be pluralistic.
11. Cf. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Promulgation o f Universal Peace 179, 152.
B a h a ’i F u n d a m e n ta ls f o r B io e th ic s 55

Bahà’u’Ilàh is thus the divine physician, as the mouthpiece for the Creator,
whose every diagnosis and remedy is critical to the well-being of humankind:

The All-Knowing Physician hath His finger on the pulse o f mankind. He perceiveth
the disease, and prescribeth, in His unerring wisdom, the remedy. Every age hath its
own problem, and every soul its particular aspiration. (Gleanings from the Writings
ofBahá ’u 'lláh 213)

Therefore, inherent to the Bahà’i Faith is the claim that it possesses solutions to
the manifold problems facing humanity, including those in the realm of
bioethics. On this ground, we hold that the developing field of biomedical ethics
stands to benefit from the incorporation of BaháT teachings.

Bahà’i Psychology and the Purpose of Creation
The chief endowment that distinguishes a human being from all else is the
human spirit, which ‘AbduT-Bahá identifies with the rational soul (Some
Answered Questions 208-9). It is not within the scope of this article to examine
fully the concepts of rúh (spirit) and nafs (soul) in BaháT sacred texts.
However, it is necessary to establish the nomenclature in order to generate a
functional framework. Every human being is by definition endowed with the
human spirit, as explained by ‘AbduT-Bahá. Rúh (usually translated as spirit) is
divided by ‘AbduT-Bahá into five categories, consisting of vegetable, animal,
human, spirit of faith, and the Holy Spirit. ‘AbduT-Bahá states that the human
spirit has proceeded from God through emanation and that it is a simple (basit)
substance, i.e., not composed of parts (Some Answered Questions 241).12 This
spirit is not bound by time and place.13 The consummate ontological attainment
for a human being is to acquire the spirit of faith (rúh-i-ímání) through
recognition of and obedience to the Manifestation of God.
Nafs (generally translated as soul) represents a related but different entity in
psychology. ‘AbduT-Bahá, in Some Answered Questions, identifies the rational
soul (nafs-i-nátiqah) with the human spirit (rúh -i-insání). However, when these
collective works are considered, the classic distinction between rúh and nafs is
maintained. In Paris Talks, for example, ‘AbduT-Bahá states, “There are in the
world of humanity three degrees; those of the body, the soul, and spirit” (96).14
According to ‘AbduT-Bahá in that same talk, the soul “is the intermediary
between [the] body and [the] spirit” (96). A particular soul may or may not
acquire the life of spirit (rúh-i-ímání)}5 The degree of acquisition of the rúh-i-
ímání is described in terms of stations of na/s.16 For example, the Qur’àn

12. Also see ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks 91.
13. See ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions 241.
14. Cf. the Persian record of that same talk, Khitábát-i-‘Abdu’l-Bahá 174.
15. See ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks 97.
16. For example, see Khitábát-i-‘A bdu’l-Bahá 174-75.
56 TH E J O U R N A L OF B A H À ’ Î S T U D I E S 8.2.1998

classifies nafs along a spectrum from amárah (concupiscence) to mardiah (one
that has attained divine good-pleasure). The stages of nafs between the two
above includes lavvámah (irascibility), mutma’inah (confirmed), and rádíah
(content) as mentioned in the Qur’ân.17 Islamic mysticism and theosophy have
built upon the quranic terminology and developed a rather complicated science
of the soul.18 The qualities of the soul change as it increasingly gains and is
influenced by the rúh-i-ímání and traverses through stages towards perfection.
Bahà’u’ilàh has acknowledged these diverse stations of the nafs in numerous
tablets.19 He has also considerably simplified Bahà’i fundamentals for
psychology:

Much hath been written in the books o f old concerning the various stages in the
development of the soul, such as concupiscence, irascibility, inspiration, benevolence,
contentment. Divine good-pleasure, and the like; the Pen o f the Most High, however,
is disinclined to dwell upon them. Every soul that walketh humbly with its God, in
this Day, and cleaveth unto Him, shall find itself invested with the honor and glory o f
all goodly names and stations. (Gleanings from the Writings o f Baha’u ’lláh 159)

The human spirit is a divine “trust” according to Bahà’i writings (‘AbduT-Bahá,
Some Answered Questions 200). In a tablet revealed by Bahà’u’ilàh for
recitation at the bedside of a dying person, the spirit (rúh) is acknowledged as
both a trust (amdnah) and the agent that manifested life to the world (Ishráq
Khávarí, Tasbih va Tahiti 238). This divine trust (human spirit or rational soul)
is located at an ontological crossroads. ‘Abdu’l-Bahà states that the physical
realm ends the “arc of descent” and that humankind is the beginning of the “arc
of ascent,” which initiates spirituality. This ascent involves the acquiring of the
rúh-i-ímání (spirit of faith), the best form of acquisition of virtues and
perfections (‘AbduT-Bahá, Some Answered Questions 285-86).
The Bahá’1 writings teach that the mystical purpose underlying the creation
of human beings is twofold: That humankind should know and worship God.
An example occurs in the Short Obligatory Prayer, “I bear witness, O my God,
that Thou hast created me to know Thee and worship Thee” (Bahà’i Prayers 4).
Another cogent example is the following, where Bahà’uTlàh establishes a link
between this purpose of creation and human ontological self-understanding:

Having created the world and all that liveth and moveth therein. He, through the
direct operation o f His unconstrained and sovereign Will, chose to confer upon man
the unique distinction and capacity to know Him and to love Him— a capacity that
must needs be regarded as the generating impulse and the primary purpose underlying

17. See the following quranic references: 12:53, 89:27, and 75:2.
18. For a brief synopsis, see Nasr, Islamic Spirituality 1:294-307.
19. For example, see M ajmú’iy-Alwah-i-Mubárakiy-i-Hadrat-i-Bahá’u'lláh 97.
B a h à ’i F u n d a m e n ta ls f o r B io e th ic s 57

the whole of creation. . . . Upon the inmost reality o f each and every created thing He
hath shed the light o f one o f His names, and made it a recipient o f the glory o f one of
His attributes. Upon the reality o f man, however, He hath focused the radiance o f all
o f His names and attributes, and made it a mirror o f His ow n Self. A lone o f all
created things man hath been singled out for so great a favor, so enduring a bounty.
(BaháV lláh, Gleanings 65)

According to the Bahà’i writings, all divine attributes are fully manifested in the
Primal Will or First Intellect.20 These same attributes are also latent in every
human being. The purpose of physical reality is that humankind should traverse
this plane of existence, and actualize these potential virtues (Some Answered
Questions 200). ‘Abdu’l-Bahà states that these perfections are at once limited
and without limit (Some Answered Questions 230). They are limitless in
themselves, yet they are limited with respect to the ontological sphere within
which humans exist. Bahà’i theology holds that the virtues and perfections that
one acquires in the physical realm are essential and needed for an ontologically
happy existence after the dissociation of the human spirit from the body, just as
limbs and organs developed by an embryo are utilized after birth (Fádil-i-
Mazandarání, Amr va Khalq 1:120).

The Best of All Possible Worlds?
In the BaháT Faith, physical reality is considered to be a field for the acquisition
of perfections. Questions may be asked at this point: Is this the best of all
possible worlds? Could God have created a different mechanism for developing
virtue? Why is physical reality plagued with earthquakes, disease, famine,
suffering, and numerous other hardships? The question that this line of
argumentation poses is one of theodicy, i.e., the justice of God.
BaháT sacred scripture examines the question of theodicy in substantial
detail. For the purposes of this article, a cursory examination of divine justice is
imperative. Regarding the design of the universe, ‘AbduT-Bahá states that it is
perfect:

This Nature is subjected to an absolute organization, to determined laws, to a
complete order and a finished design, from which it will never depart. . . . (Some
Answered Questions 3)

This statement is repeated on many occasions by ‘AbduT-Bahá. Early in Some
Answered Questions, in the argument for the existence of God, ‘AbduT-Bahá
poses the following question, “Can the creation be perfect and the creator

20. The Primal Will is the first emanation from God, as described in Baha’i writings, which exercises
creative powers and begets all that exists. See ‘AbduT-Bahá, Some Answered Questions 203.
58 TH E J O U R N A L OF B A H Á ’ Í S T U D I E S 8.2.1998

imperfect?” (Some Answered Questions 5). The passage quoted below is equally
emphatic:

For all existing beings, terrestrial and celestial, as well as this limitless space and all
that is in it, have been created and organized, composed, arranged and perfected as
they ought to be; the universe has no imperfection, so that if all beings became pure
intelligence and reflected for ever and ever, it is impossible that they could imagine
anything better than that which exists. (Some Answered Questions 177)

Admittedly, the most interesting Bahà’i response to the question of theodicy
is to be found in what one may consider Bahà’uTlàh’s response to a debate that
had engaged Muslim theologians for more than nine centuries.21 The great Abú
Hámid al-Ghazálí (d. 1111 c.E.) is generally credited with writing a statement
that proved very problematic for Islamic theologians. He states, in his best-
known book, Ihyá ul-'ulum ud-din, as well as in other texts, the following:
“There is not in possibility (imkán) anything whatever more excellent, more
complete, or more perfect than it is” (Theodicy in Islamic Thought 37).
Bahà’uTlàh acknowledges this debate and responds to the dispute in clear
terms. He closely follows al-Ghazálí even in the grammatical structure. He
writes that there is nothing in possibility (imkán) more wonderful (abda') than
that which is.22 The statement clearly indicates that, according to Bahà’i
theology, existence, as it exists, is simply the best contingent possibility.
Neither BaháVlláh nor ‘AbduT-Bahá is expressing naïveté, nor are they
denying the reality of suffering. Both readily acknowledge that the physical
world is replete with sorrows, wrongs, and suffering. For instance, ‘AbduT-
Bahá writes the following to a wife who has lost her husband:

Such is this mortal abode: a storehouse o f afflictions and suffering. It is ignorance that
binds man to it, for no comfort can be secured by any soul in this world, from
monarch down to the most humble commoner. ( Selections from the Writings of
‘Abdu 'l-Bahá 200)

According to the BaháT Faith, the corporeal world is absolutely real, yet with
respect to the spiritual realms and the existence of God, it may be said to be an
illusion (Some Answered Questions 278). The following passage by Bahà’uTlàh
merits close examination with regards to both theodicy and the reality of the
physical world:

Follow not, therefore, your earthly desires, and violate not the Covenant o f God, nor
break your pledge to Him. With firm determination, with the whole affection of your

21. This dispute is comprehensively examined in Theodicy in Islamic Thought by Ornsby.
22. See Ulúhiyyat va Mazhariyyat 104. This is the second volume of the collected works of ‘Ali-
Murad Dávúdi, the late BaháT' martyr and philosopher.
B a h a ’i F u n d a m e n ta ls f o r B io e th ic s 59

heart, and with the full force o f your words, turn ye unto Him, and walk not in the
ways of the foolish. The world is but a show, vain and empty, a mere nothing, bearing
the semblance o f reality. Set not your affections upon it. Break not the bond that
uniteth you with your Creator, and be not o f those who have erred and strayed from
His ways. Verily I say, the world is like the vapor in a desert, which the thirsty
dreameth to be water and striveth after it with all his might, until when he cometh
unto it, he findeth it to be mere illusion. . . . Sorrow not if, in these days and on this
earthly plane, things contrary to your wishes have been ordained and manifested by
God, for days o f blissful joy, o f heavenly delight, are assuredly in store for you.
Worlds, holy and spiritually glorious, will be unveiled to your eyes. (Bahà’uTlàh,
Gleanings 328-29)

The Purpose of Suffering
The purpose of suffering lies at the heart of the BaháT approach to theodicy.
According to BaháT theology, suffering is an integral part of corporeal
existence, and it is essential to spiritual well-being. Let us consider the
statement by ‘AbduT-Bahá from Paris Talks in response to this interesting
inquiry: “Does the soul progress more through sorrow or through the joy in this
world?”:

The mind and the spirit o f man advance when he is tried by suffering. The more the
ground is.ploughed the better the seed will grow, the better the harvest will be. Just as
the plough furrows the earth deeply, purifying it o f weeds and thistles, so suffering
and tribulation free man from the petty affairs o f this worldly life until he arrives at a
state o f com plete detachment. His attitude in this world w ill be that o f divine
happiness. (178)

In fact, according to ‘AbduT-Bahá, it is impossible to attain true happiness
without suffering. He states, “To attain eternal happiness one must suffer”
(Paris Talks 179). Suffering and pain are an integral part of the journey of the
human soul towards its “heavenly homeland” and nearness to the creator as
detailed in BaháT mystical theory. BaháVlláh explains the role of suffering in
the “Valley of Love” as follows:

Now is the traveler unaware o f himself, and o f aught besides himself. He seeth
neither ignorance nor knowledge, neither doubt nor certitude; he knoweth not the
mom o f guidance from the night of error. He fleeth both from unbelief and faith, and
deadly poison is a balm to him. Wherefore ‘Attár saith:
For the infidel, error — for the faithful, faith;
For ‘Attár’s heart, an atom o f Thy pain.
The steed o f this Valley is pain; and if there be no pain this journey will never end.
(Bahà’uTlàh, Seven Valleys 8)
60 TH E J O U R N A L OF B A H À ’Î S T U D I E S 8.2.1998

The transforming and necessary nature of suffering is a prominent motif in
Bahà’i mysticism. They may be harsh and painful, but in fact tests and trials are
blessings in disguise:

O SON OF MAN! My calamity is My providence, outwardly it is fire and vengeance,
but inwardly it is light and mercy. Hasten thereunto that thou mayest become an
eternal light and an immortal spirit. (Bahà’u’ilàh, Hidden Words 15)

Suffering and hardships are especially necessary for spiritual development, as it
is only in this world that we can experience them:

As to the second question: the tests and trials o f God take place in this world, not in
the world of the Kingdom. (Selections from the Writings o f ‘Abdu 'l-Bahá 194)

The BaháT Faith teaches that suffering facilitates spiritual development. This
essential understanding of suffering, however, does not translate to a disregard
for the human body, nor does it imply passive acceptance of an illness. In fact,
it is the duty of everyone to try to reduce the suffering of others:

Those souls who during the war have served the poor and have been in the Red
Cross Mission work, their services are accepted at the Kingdom o f God and are the
cause of their everlasting life. (Selections from the Writings o f ‘Abdu'1-Bahá 116)

Medicine in the Bahà’i Faith
The topic of medicine as seen through BaháT' scripture is an incredibly
intriguing and challenging one. The spectrum is very broad, covering
everything from nutrition to future developments in pharmacology. In recent
years, BaháT scholars have generated a number of very interesting studies in
health and healing as taught in the BaháT Faith.23 A thorough examination of
medicine and healing in the BaháT' Faith is yet to be done and is beyond the
scope of this article. However, a few general comments are offered.
That medicine is a praiseworthy profession may be gathered in that
BaháVlláh most frequently conveyed his relationship to humanity in terms of
two worldly occupations: the teacher and the physician. In the Lawh-i-Tibb
(Tablet of Medicine) Bahà’uTlàh writes that medicine is the most exalted of all

23. See “Health and Healing” by H. Danesh and “International Health W ork” by Alfred K.
Neumann and Irvin M. Lourie in World Order 13.3, as well as “The Application of Bahá’1
Teachings on Health” by A. K. Neumann and L. Femea in the same journal. There have been some
attempts to establish dialogue between the Western medical tradition and non-Westem traditions, in
light of the BaháT teachings on the subject. See “Maharishi Ayurveda: A BaháT Perspective” by
Felicity Rawlings in the Journal o f B aha’i Studies. A relatively recent addition of substantial
importance is Health and Healing compiled by the Research Department of the Universal House of
Justice.
B a h à ’i F u n d a m e n ta ls f o r B io e th ic s 61

sciences (Majmuih 225). In that same Tablet, the science of medicine is given
priority over all other branches of learning (ulúm va’l-hikam) (Majmti’ih 225).
‘AbduT-Bahá has also paid high tribute to the science of medicine.24 BaháT'
history tells us that ‘AbduT-Bahá would frequently urge his companions to
study modem medicine.25
The purpose of medicine is to alleviate suffering and restore health. The
BaháT Faith obligates its members to seek medical treatment. In fact,
Bahà’uTlàh always sought medical advice when indicated.26 Moreover, the
BaháT' Faith demands that one seek the best possible medical treatment.27 The
following example is of particular interest with regard to this point. BaháT'
historians note that ‘AbduT-Bahá knew old Oriental medicine and occasionally
used to practice medicine as a youth. Later BaháVlláh asked ‘AbduT-Bahá not
to treat the believers so that they would not develop the habit of seeking
treatments from other than formally trained physicians.28 This is in accordance
with the explicit text of the Kitáb-i-Aqdas:

Resort ye, in times of sickness, to competent physicians; We have not set aside the
use o f material means, rather have We confirmed it through this Pen, which God hath
made to be the Dawning-place of His shining and glorious Cause. (Kitáb-i-Aqdas 60,
paragraph 113)
•

‘AbduT-Bahá has confirmed the same advice in many tablets. It is worth noting
that no one is spared this duty:

According to the explicit decree o f B aháV lláh one must not turn aside from the
advice o f a competent doctor. It is imperative to consult one even if the patient
himself be a well-known and eminent physician. In short, the point is that you should
maintain your health by consulting a highly-skilled physician. (Selections from the
Writings o f ‘Abdu’l-Bahd 156)

The obligation to maintain physical health to the extent possible is clearly
unequivocal. BaháVlláh explains that the preservation of health is imperative,
in part because health is a prerequisite for the application of the laws and
ordinances of God (Fádil-i-Mázandarání, Amr va Khalq 3:10-11).29 The BaháT

24. For example, see Ishráq Khâvari. Mďidiy-i-Ásmáni 5:23-26. Here ‘Abdu’l-Bahá comments on
the following prophetic tradition: Knowledge consists of two sciences, the Science of medicine and
science of religion.
25. For example, see Khdtirat-i-nuh Sdlih (the Nine Year Memoirs) by Afnikhtih 435.
26. For an example, see Sulaymání, Masábíh-i-Hidáyat 1:165.
27. That seeking a skilled physician is necessary may be gleaned from many Baha’i writings. Of
particular interest is the first line of the Lawh-i-Tibb (the Tablet of Medicine) where it is explicitly
stated that the medical advice B aháV lláh provides will suffice in absence <ehavbat1 of a physician.
28. Afrukhtih. Khátirát-i-Nuh Sdlih 327.
29. Also see Ishráq Khávarí. M ďidiy-i-Ásmání5:23-26.
62 TH E J O U R N A L OF B A H À ’ Î S T U D I E S 8.2.1998

writings also provide further reasons for the duty to maintain a healthy life.30 A
noteworthy example conveying the importance of life is the response by
Bahà’u ’Uàh to a peculiar request by Jamál-i-Burújirdí. He had written
Bahà’uTlàh and asked for one of these three wishes to be granted: permission to
return to ‘Akká, death, or an alteration in his miserable condition. Bahà’uTlàh
wrote in response that it is not becoming for any soul to wish for death in this
Day. He elaborates that the concourse on high and the near ones who have
passed away are begging to return to the physical realm to serve the Cause and
render it victorious, even through the utterance of a single word (Fádil-i-
Mazandarání, Amr va Khalq 3:12). Thus, according to Bahà'uTlàh, it is not
acceptable for a Bahá'1 to seek an early termination of life.
One last issue must be addressed at this time. The limited resources available
to present-day society have led to a highly divisive current debate in biomedical
ethics and public policy. The following question lies at the core of this debate:
Is healthcare a right, or should it be considered a privilege? The issue is
admittedly a highly complex one. However, we hold that in the light of Bahá’1
teachings healthcare can be considered to be a right, one to which every human
being is entitled.31 As BaháVlláh has ordained that every sick person must
seek medical treatment, it follows that healthcare must be available for all.
Certainly the Bahá’1 principles concerning justice, mercy, and compassion
imply the same:

O SON OF MAN! If thine eyes be turned towards mercy, forsake the things that
profit thee and cleave unto that which will profit mankind. And if thine eyes be turned
towards justice, choose thou for thy neighbour that which thou choosest for thyself.
(BaháV lláh, Tablets of Bahà'u’ilàh 64)

The Bahá’1 solution, as taught by both BaháVlláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahà, to the
problem of scarcity of resources is both innovative and challenging. It concerns
the establishment of the practice of muvását (voluntary sharing) as opposed to
forced equality, musávát:32

To state the matter briefly, the Teachings o f B a h á V llá h advocate voluntary
sharing, and this is a greater thing than the equalization of wealth. For equalization
must be imposed from without, while sharing is a matter o f free choice.
Man reacheth perfection through good deeds, voluntarily performed, not through
good deeds the doing o f which was forced upon him. And sharing is a personally

30. For example, see Selections from the Writings o f the Báb 95.
31. This a point on which Baha’i scholars generally agree. See for example “Towards a World
Economy” by John Huddleston, Journal o f B ahá’1Studies 3.3 (1991): 32.
32. For a summary of Baha’i scripture on this topic, see Fádil-i-Mazandarání, Am r va Khalq
3:256-58. The Lawh-i-Muvását is available in BaháVlláh, Daryáy-i-Dánish 14046. For a different
theoretical and practical approach to the same concept, see Fárábťs Ará-i-Ahl-i-Madiniy-i-Fádilih 331.
B a h à ’i F u n d a m e n ta ls f o r B io e th ic s 63

chosen righteous act: that is, the rich should extend assistance to the poor . . . but of
their own free will, and not because . . . the poor have gained this end by force. For
the harvest o f force is turmoil and the ruin o f the social order. On the other hand
voluntary sharing, the freely-chosen expending o f o n e’s substance, leadeth to
society’s comfort and peace. It lighteth up the world; it bestoweth honour upon
humankind. {Selections from the Writings of ‘Abdu ’l-Bahá 115)

Life as Seen in Bahà’i Theology
As physical entities, life and death are at the same time both spiritual and
physical realities. According to the Bahà’i teachings, physiological life and
death, as physical entities, are natural phenomena:

Nature is that condition, that reality, which in appearance consists in life and death,
or, in other words, in the composition and decomposition o f all things. ( ‘Abdu’l-
Bahá, Some Answered Questions 3)
*

Bahà’i theology defines physiological life in terms of the association of the
human spirit with the physical body. That this association of spirit and body
defines life is clearly borne out in the Bahà’i scripture. For example, ‘Abdu’l-
Bahá states that “the spirit of man is the cause of the life of the body” (Some
Answered Questions 201). He reiterates the same in the following passage:

The spirit does not need a body, but the body needs spirit, or it cannot live. The soul
can live without a body, but the body without the soul dies. (Paris Talks 86-87)

In a tablet to be recited at the bedside of the dying person, Bahà’uTlàh confirms
that physiological life is of the human spirit.33 Another notable example is one
of the verses in the Kitáb-i-Aqdas that prohibits murder:

What! Would ye kill him whom God hath quickened, whom He hath endowed with
spirit through a breath from Him? (46, para. 73)

‘AbduT-Bahá alternatively defines life in terms of composition. He, for
instance, states that life is an “expression of composition”:

Life is the expression of composition; and death, the expression of decomposition.
In the world or kingdom o f the minerals certain materials or elemental substances
exist. When through the law o f creation they enter into composition, a being or
organism comes into existence. For example, certain material atoms are brought
together, and man is the result. (Promulgation of Universal Peace 306)

33. Ishráq Khávari. Tasbîh va Tahiti 238.
64 TH E J O U R N A L OF B A H À ’ Î S T U D I E S 8.2.1998

This seemingly materialistic explanation underlying human life may appear to
contradict understanding humans as spiritual beings. However, in Some
Answered Questions (201) ‘A bduT-Bahá further elaborates that this
com position becomes- a “m agnet for the [human] spirit.” The “noble
combination” of the human body is moreover, “compared to a mirror, and the
human spirit to the sun” (Some Answered Questions 144). Thus, the human
spirit becomes associated with the human temple. It must be noted that the
creation of life is an act of God, one which humankind can never perform.34
‘AbduT-Bahá states that the human spirit “can manifest itself in all forms” of
the physical frame, and in different stages of development. For instance,
‘AbduT-Bahá clearly argues that the human embryo is endowed with the human
spirit:

In the same way, the embryo possesses from the first all perfections, such as the
spirit, the mind, the sight, the smell, the taste— in one word, all the powers— but they
are not visible and become so only by degrees. (Some Answered Questions 199)

The attributes and powers of the spirit are, according to ‘AbduT-Bahá, in a
less developed form in the embryo, that is, potentially (bi’l-quwah) present,
but not actually. He uses the classic philosophical example of the seed and the
tree to differentiate between the potential and the actual. It is in light of the
above teachings that the Bahá’1 tradition maintains that the human soul
appears at conception.35
‘AbduT-Bahá teaches that human beings have five physical (outer) powers
and five intellectual (inner) powers.36 The five outer powers are sight, hearing,
smell, taste, and feeling. One can utilize these powers to “perceive outward
existences.” The five inner powers are imagination, thought, comprehension,
memory, and the common faculty. The common faculty is considered to be the
interface or intermediary between the inner and outer powers (‘AbduT-Bahá,
Some Answered Questions 210-11). Life, i.e., the association of the human
spirit with the physical frame, results in these ten powers. In the following
passage, ‘AbduT-Bahá defines death, as a state wherein these powers are
absent:
In the time of sleep this body is as though dead; it does not see nor hear; it does not
feel; it has no consciousness, no perception— that is to say, the powers of man have
become inactive, but the spirit lives and subsists. (Some Answered Questions 228)37

34. For example, see Some Answered Questions 181-82.
35. See Lights o f Guidance 345. This understanding is clearly rooted in Bahà’i writings. Cf. the
Lawh-i-Rais cited in Fádil-i-Mazandarání, Amr va Khalq 1:230.
36. This classification is foreign to modem Western psychology, however, it closely parallels
classical philosophy and psychology. See Aristotle, On the Soul, Book 3, and Fárábí, Ará-i-Ahl-i-
Madíniy-i-Fádilih 181-92, for two contrasting classifications. The system presented by ‘AbduT-
Bahá is closest to that of Ibn-i-Khaldún in his Al-Muqadamih 1:178-80.
37. See also ‘AbduT-Bahá, Promulgation o f Universal Peace 415-17.
B a h a ’i F u n d a m e n ta ls f o r B io e th ic s 65

The human brain is the center to which the five senses relay their output. The
mind and the brain then assume a unique function with regard to physical life.
In the BaháT teachings, the mind is described as such:

But the mind is the power o f the human spirit. Spirit is the lamp; mind is the light
which shines from the lamp. Spirit is the tree, and the mind is the fruit. Mind is the
perfection of the spirit and is its essential quality, as the sun’s rays are the essential
necessity of the sun. (Some Answered Questions 209)

‘Abdu’l-Bahá writes the following regarding the unique position of the mind in
the human experience:

The mind force. . . . doth direct and co-ordinate all the members o f the human body,
seeing to it that each part or member duly performeth its own special function. If,
however, there be some interruption in the power o f the mind, all the members will
fail to carry out their essential functions, deficiencies will appear in the body and the
functioning o f its members, and the power will prove ineffective. (Selections from
the Writings of ‘Abdu ’l-Bahá 48)
•
The mind, however, is not to be found within any of the sense organs. ‘AbduT-
Bahá states that “the mind has no place, but it is connected with the brain”
(Some Answered Questions 242). According to ‘AbduT-Bahá, the mind is
connected to the brain, much in the same way that love is connected to the
human heart (Some Answered Questions 242). In fact, ‘AbduT-Bahá states that
the brain is the “chief member” of the human body and the cause of its
perfection (Some Answered Questions 178). It may therefore be suggested that
the presence of an intact brain is an integral part of the BaháT' definition of life.

Death as Seen in the Bahà’i Faith
Death and dying are processes with which both the science of medicine and
people in general are uncomfortable. As such, our society permits allocation of
vast resources to postpone death. According to the BaháT writings, death is an
event to be welcomed, not feared. Using the common mystical metaphor of the
bird and the cage, ‘AbduT-Bahá notes that at the moment of death the bird of
the human spirit is freed from the cage of the world (Some Answered Questions
228). BaháVlláh states that death is the gate through which one may attain the
presence of God (Ishráq Khávarí. M á’idiy-i-Ásmání 8:95). In another tablet,
BaháVlláh refers to death as a gate among the gates of mercy (Ishraq Khávarí.
Mďidiy-i-Asmání 8:95). The following well-known example from the Hidden
Words conveys the same concept:
O SO N OF THE SUPREM E! I have made death a m essenger o f jo y to thee.
Wherefore dost thou grieve? I made the light to shed on thee its splendor. Why dost
thou veil thyself therefrom? (11)
66 TH E J O U R N A L OF B A H À ’ Î S T U D I E S 8.2.1998

‘AbduT-Bahá teaches that physiological death represents the “severance” of
the human spirit “of its connection with the body of dust” (Some Answered
Questions 240). Elsewhere, ‘AbduT-Bahá elaborates that the human spirit does
not enter into the physical frame; rather, it is associated with this physical body.
He then defines death as the severance of this association. He adds that this
association may be severed gradually, or it may occur suddenly (Fádil-i-
Mazandarání, Amr va Khalq 268). This concept requires careful, more extensive
study; however, it may be beneficial here to recall the ten powers that defined
life, as mentioned in the preceding section. The complete impairment of those
ten faculties may be taken to be a sign of death. The onset of these impairments
may be sudden (as in a car accident) or gradual (as in a prolonged death in an
intensive care unit setting).
The severance of the spirit from the body itself appears to be synchronized
with another process, which is the dissolution of the physiological body.
‘AbduT-Bahá writes regarding death, “Those souls who are pure and unsullied,
upon the dissolution of their elemental frames, hasten away to the world of God,
and that world is within this world” (Selections from the Writings of ‘Abdu’l-
Bahd 195). This dissolution exemplifies the reversal of the process that resulted
in life, i.e., composition. ‘AbduT-Bahá states that death is an expression of
decomposition (Promulgation o f Universal Peace 306). Elsewhere, ‘AbduT-
Bahá says that death is a manifestation of decomposition (Promulgation 87).
Currently, three clinical definitions of death prevail.38 The classical
definition of death is the heart-lung definition that has been used for decades.39
In the 1960s, a number of philosophers and physicians began advocating
“whole brain death” as an alternative definition of death.40 Most recently, there
has been a movement to recognize higher-brain death or cortical death as well.
This movement has been supported by the growing need for organ
transplantation. The definition using the heart-lung criteria is clearly acceptable
according to the BaháT writings. The whole-brain and the higher-brain
definitions are clearly not as straightforward but may also find some
justification in the BaháT scriptures, as discussed below.
The pivotal position of the mind and brain in the BaháT definition of life and
death clearly requires further consideration. In a tablet addressed to Dr. Auguste
Henri Forel, ‘AbduT-Bahá remarks that the mind, whose proper functioning is

38. For a concise review of the clinical definitions of death, see American Journal o f Critical Care
4.6 (Nov. 1995).
39. This definition requires the “cessation of breathing and the absence of an audible heartbeat or a
pulse” (Fletcher, Introduction to Clinical Ethics 118).
40. In 1968, the Ad Hoc Com mittee of the Harvard M edical School studied the issue and
published a report endorsing whole brain definition of death in JAMA (Journal o f the American
Medical Association). Their criteria included coma, absence of spontaneous breathing, absence of
reflexes, and a flat-line electroencephalogram (Introduction to Clinical Ethics 119).
B a h à ’i F u n d a m e n ta ls f o r B io e th ic s 67

associated with the brain, is the “all-unifying agency” necessary for the unity of
“all the component parts” of the human body:

Consider the body o f man, and let the part be an indication o f the whole. Consider
how these diverse parts and members o f the human body are closely connected and
harmoniously united one with the other. Every part is the essential requisite o f all
other parts and has a function by itself. It is the mind that is the all-unifying agency
that so uniteth all the component parts one with the other that each dischargeth its
specific function in perfect order, and thereby co-operation and reaction are made
possible. All parts function under certain laws that are essential to existence. Should
that all-unifying agency that directeth all these parts be harmed in any way there is no
doubt that the constituent parts and members will cease functioning properly. . . .
{Baha'i World 15:42)

Therefore, there may be room for inclusion of some brain-death criteria in the
BaháT' definition of death. ‘AbduT-Bahá teaches that existence is an
evolutionary process, and a gradation of life. BaháT' philosophers have followed
this argument closely. A contemporary BaháT' philosopher suggests that a
persistent vegetative state may therefore be considered a form of death:

However, the vegetable has the power o f growth, which is absent in the mineral.
And the animal is alive, when it is compared to the vegetable, whereas the vegetable
is dead, if it is compared to the animal. For example, a human being affected by a
deep coma because o f a severe trauma is said to live a vegetative life, and by this is
meant that his life is quite different from a normal human life. (Savi, Eternal Quest
fo r God 59)

The BaháT Faith does not permit one to seek an early termination of life.
Suicide, for instance, is strongly forbidden.41 A passage by Bahà’u’Uàh
addressed to Jamál-i-Burújirdť was referenced earlier with a similar unequivocal
teaching. Moreover, ‘AbduT-Bahá clearly forbids one from seeking an early
termination of life, even when one encounters situations “which one cannot
bear” {má lá yutáq). One is called upon to manifest patience and endure, when
encountering situations of unbearable hardship and to exemplify thankfulness
(Fádil-i-Mazandarání, Amr va Khalq 3:14).

41. It must be noted that there are cases of early Baha’is who had committed acts of self-
annihilation during the lifetim es of Bahà’u ’ilàh and ‘A bdu’l-Bahá, and who are m entioned
reverently and praised in the corpus of Baha’i writings. For example, Siyyid Ismá’íl-i-Zavárih,
entitled Dhabih. is praised in the Lawh-i-Rats as the “beloved of martyrs and their king.” The
actions of these individuals are generally understood in terms of their mystical relationship to
Bahà’u ’ilàh, considered acts o f sacrifice rather than suicide. Therefore, in this context, the
statements of praise are not as problematic as they may otherwise appear to be.
68 TH E J O U R N A L OF B A H À ’ Î S T U D I E S 8.2.1998

Principles of Bahà’i Bioethics
Moral and ethical dilemmas are inherent to the technological revolution in
modem medicine. The remainder of this article elaborates on principles that can
guide the decision-making process when one is faced with such dilemmas.
Obviously, any such list can only touch on the highpoints and is certainly not
intended to be perceived as exhaustive. It must be noted that by “principles” the
authors intend teachings gleaned from the BaháT writings that may be utilized
in bioethical decision-making and not principles along the lines suggested by
Beauchamp and Childress.

1. Justice
Justice is clearly a preeminent element in any ethical consideration. According
to BaháVlláh, justice is “the best beloved of all things . . .” (Hidden Words 3).
‘AbduT-Bahá has stated that “justice is to give to everyone according to his
deserts” (Some Answered Questions 266). The definition provided by ‘AbduT-
Bahá in The Secret o f Divine Civilization is in the context of political
philosophy, with significant implications for bioethics:

The second attribute o f perfection is justice and impartiality. This means to have no
regard for one’s own personal benefits and selfish advantages, and to carry out the
laws o f God without the slightest concern for anything else. . . . It means to consider
the welfare of the community as one’s own. It means, in brief, to regard humanity as a
single individual, and one’s own self as a member o f that corporeal form, and to know
of a certainty that if pain or injury afflicts any member o f that body, it must inevitably
result in suffering for all the rest. (39)

2. Moderation
Moderation is a central theme within the corpus of BaháT writings. Bahà’uTlàh
has repeatedly emphasized moderation as a guiding principle, as the following
text illustrates:

It is incumbent upon them who are in authority to exercise moderation in all things.
Whatsoever passeth beyond the limits o f moderation will cease to exert a beneficial
influence. Consider for instance such things as liberty, civilization and the like.
However much men of understanding may favourably regard them, they will, if carried
to excess, exercise a pernicious influence upon men. (Tablets of Bahà’u’llâh 169)

The BaháT understanding of moderation as a virtue closely follows the
Aristotelian view of virtues as the mean between two evils:42

If haste is harmful, inertness and indolence are a thousand times worse. A middle course
is best, as it is written: “It is incumbent upon you to do good between the two evils,”

42. Cf. Nichomachean Ethics, Books 3 and 4.
B a h à ’i F u n d a m e n ta ls f o r B io e th ic s 69

this referring to the mean between the two extremes. “And let not thy hand be tied up to
thy neck; nor yet open it with all openness . . . but between these follow a middle way”
[Qur’àn 17:31; 110]. ( ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Secret of Divine Civilization 108-9)

B aháV lláh has obliged Bahà’is to observe moderation in all things. He
especially reiterates this theme with respect to civilization and technology. The
following passage is of particular interest with regard to the pivotal role of
moderation in the advancement of technology:

In all matters moderation is desirable. If a thing is carried to excess, it will prove a
source of evil. Consider the civilization of the West, how it hath agitated and alarmed
the peoples of the world. An infernal engine hath been devised, and hath proved so
cruel a weapon o f destruction that its like none hath ever witnessed or heard. ( Tablets
of Bahá 'u 'lldh 69)

3. Truthfulness
Lying is explicitly forbidden according to BaháT writings. It is obligatory that a
human being should always utter the truth. In fact, it is better to utter a
blasphemy than to utter a lie (Ishráq Khávarí. Má'idiy-i-Ásmání5:169):

Consider that the worst o f qualities and most odious o f attributes, which is the
foundation of all evil, is lying. No worse or more blameworthy quality than this can
be imagined to exist; it is the destroyer o f all human perfections and the cause of
innumerable vices. There is no worse characteristic than this; it is the foundation of
all evils. (Some Answered Questions 215)

The BaháT Faith thus obligates all to speak the truth. Notably, BaháT
scripture allows for only one possible exception to this ordinance. ‘AbduT-Bahá
in the continuation to the above passage writes the following:

Notwithstanding all this, if a doctor consoles a sick man by saying, “Thank God you
are better, and there is hope o f your recovery,” though these words are contrary to the
truth, yet they may become the consolation o f the patient and the turning point o f the
illness. This is not blameworthy. (Some Answered Questions 215-16)

The ethical component of this teaching needs further analysis. It is clear,
however, that an untrue statement may be uttered by a physician as part of
medical therapy if said with the intent to cure.

4. Consultation
BaháVlláh states that consultation is a prerequisite for the welfare and well­
being of humankind.43 It would indeed be difficult to overemphasize the role of

43. Cf. The Prosperity o f Humankind, section 3.
70 TH E J O U R N A L OF B A H À ’ Î S T U D I E S 8.2.1998

consultation in the development of Bahà’i fundamentals for bioethics. We
identify ethics consultation services, ethics committees, and institutional review
boards as bodies that will benefit from the Bahà’i perspective on consultation.44
The following passages serve to convey the necessity for consultation:

The Great Being saith: The heaven o f divine wisdom is illumined with the two
luminaries o f consultation and compassion. Take ye counsel together in all matters,
inasmuch as consultation is the lamp o f guidance which leadeth the way, and is the
bestower of understanding. (Tablets of Bahà’u’llâh 168)45

And furthermore:

In all things it is necessary to consult. This matter should be forcibly stressed by thee,
so that consultation may be observed by all. The intent o f what hath been revealed
from the Pen of the Most High is that consultation may be fully carried out among the
friends, inasmuch as it is and will always be a cause o f awareness and o f awakening
and a source o f good and well-being. (Consultation: A Compilation 1)

5. Compassion and Love
According to Bahà’uTlàh, love is the principle underlying creation (Daryáy-i-
Dánish 154). Both compassion and love are essential ingredients to the Bahá’1
approach to any ethical dilemmas. Love is an element that is frequently omitted
and often ignored in academic formulations of bioethics. The following passage
concerns compassion and consultation:

Not long ago this most sublime Word was revealed in the Crimson Book by the
All-Glorious Pen: ‘The heaven of divine wisdom is illumined with two luminaries:
consultation and compassion.’ Please God, everyone may be enabled to observe this
weighty and blessed word. (Tablets of Bahá 'u Tláh 242)

Love may be an overarching principle in Bahá’1 bioethics. The following
exhortations from the Lawh-i-Hikmat indicates the importance of love in the
BaháT worldview:
O ye beloved o f the Lord! Commit not that which defileth the limpid stream of love
or destroyeth the sweet fragrance o f friendship. By the righteousness o f the Lord! Ye
were created to show love one to another and not perversity and rancour. Take pride
not in love for you rselves but in lo v e for your fellow -creatures. (Tablets of
Bahâ’u ’llâh 138)

44. Ethics committees and ethics consultation services are relatively recent developments in the
clinical setting. In 1991, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO) required the establishment of mechanisms that addressed the ethical issues related to
patient care (cf. Fletcher and Hoffmann in Annals). Institutional review boards, however, deal with
the ethical dilemmas pertaining to research.
45. Similar exhortations are found in Tablets 126 and 242.
B a h à ’i F u n d a m e n ta ls f o r B io e th ic s

6. Good Will
The Bahà’i Faith obligates one to possess a good intention (niyyat). Good
intentions are to actions, as roots are to the branch. Only actions that are based
on good intentions have an everlasting effect in the world (Badáyi ‘ul-Athár
1:331-32):

The third virtue of humanity is the goodwill which is the basis o f good actions.
Certain philosophers have considered intention superior to action, for the goodwill is
absolute light; it is purified and sanctified from the impurities o f selfishness, o f
enmity, o f deception. ( ‘AbduT-Bahá, Some Answered Questions 302)

Although good will is “praiseworthy,” it is not complete and perfect in itself. In
other words, it is necessary, but not sufficient. For ‘AbduT-Bahá, good will has
two prerequisites: the knowledge of God and the love of God (Some Answered
Questions 302). The agent is obliged to have a pure motive and intention in the
Bahà’i bioethics; however, this good intention occurs in a different moral
framework than would the good intention of a Kantian agent.46

Conclusion
A comprehensive study of the BaháT fundamentals for ethics (akhláq) in
general, and BaháT' fundamentals for bioethics in particular, has not as yet been
undertaken. It would have been both premature and impossible to examine the
whole spectrum in this article. For the purposes of this article, the authors did
not discuss BaháT' fundamentals for ethical theory, but instead presented a
metaphysical framework within which bioethical dilemmas can be considered.
Relying on primary sources, in Persian, Arabic, and English, the authors
examined some major concepts such as life, death, the role of medicine, and the
role of suffering, within the BaháT religion. A number of principles gleaned
from the BaháT' writings and intended for bioethical problem-solving were
offered.
Much work remains to be done. The authors hope that the common ground
established in this article will serve to initiate much-needed dialogues in the
BaháT' religion. Many of the issues and questions that were introduced in this
article call for further examination. It is the task of BaháT bioethicists to
introduce the BaháT teachings into the current dialogues.

46. See page 50, above.
72 TH E J O U R N A L OF B A H À ’ Î S T U D I E S 8.2.1998

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