Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Udo Schaefer, Some Aspects of Baha'i Ethics, bahai-library.com.
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The 20th Hasan M. Balyuzi Memorial Lecture

Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics
UDO SCHAEFER

I am really overwhelmed and deeply touched by your warm-hearted wel-
come and introduction. It is an unexpected, great honor to have been cho-
sen by the Association to present the Hasan M. Balyuzi Memorial Lecture.
I would like to express my sincerest gratitude and that of my wife for this
invitation.
The material that I am presenting—some aspects of Bahá’í ethics—is
taken from the draft of a forthcoming book, Bahá’í Ethics in Light of
Scripture.1 A systematic presentation of the new standard of values is, as
I feel, not only timely, it is rather a matter of urgency in the face of the
increasing disintegration of traditional morality and the truly apocalyp-
tic dimension of spreading immorality all over the world. When choosing
my topic for this conference I had to decide between an outline of the new
morality which, in the given time frame, could not have been more than a
general survey, or some few central issues that can be dealt with more in
depth. I chose the latter option, inasmuch as I can refer to my article pub-
lished in the Bahá’í Studies Review, “The New Morality: An Outline.”
Let me start with a few general remarks on ethics: The term derives
from the Greek ethikos which pertains to ethos (character). Ethics as part
of practical philosophy is also called “moral philosophy,”2 and, if it is a
religious ethics based on revelation (a revelatory ethics like Bahá’í ethics),
one can call it “moral theology,” as it is termed in Catholicism.
The subject of ethics is the human character and human conduct, so far
as they depend on general principles commonly known as moral principles.

2 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006

It is the study of standards of conduct and moral judgment. This field is
vast, highly complex, and intricate, as the following groups of issues may
indicate, the enumeration of which is by no means exclusive. One group
refers to the a priori structures of the moral subject, to the anthropolog-
ical presumptions and metaphysical objectives. It deals with the image of
man: his freedom, moral responsibility, and dignity. The subject is
expressed in the question: What is human nature, what is the purpose of
life? What is the highest good of human conduct and what are its sanc-
tions?
Another group refers to the central issue of the origin, derivation, and
vindication of moral values. In the focus are questions such as: What is
the ultimate standard of right or wrong? What is the categorical quality
of ethical demands, the unconditioned nature of “ought”? Are there uni-
versally recognized values, unconditioned norms, moral principles of
good and evil, right and wrong? Where do they come from, how are the
recognized, and why should I follow them?
A major part of ethics is dedicated to concrete norms, values, and
duties. Ethics tries to find answers to questions such as: What shall I do,
how should human beings live in order to become happy? What is virtue;
what are the motives which prompt right conduct?
Revelatory ethics raises some additional questions such as the relation-
ship between reason and revelation, the concept of liberty and its relation-
ship to obedience, the concepts of sin and conscience, the virtues and their
relation to concrete divine commandments.
My lecture has three parts. Its major part is part 2 in which I will dis-
cuss the origin and vindication of moral values in the light of
Bahá’u’lláh’s revelation. The introductory part 1 will deal with the cen-
trality of ethics in the revelation of Bahá’u’lláh, and the final part, part 3,
will conclude the lecture by outlining some features of Bahá’í ethics that
conflict with moral positions which are dominant in Western societies.

I

The Bahá’í Faith is not interested in metaphysical speculations or dogmat-
ic definitions.3 The emphasis is, rather, on moral orientation and education,
Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics 3

on right action and right motivation. The main purpose of the divine mes-
sage is the transformation of the human being. Consequently, ethics is the
central theme in Bahá’u’lláh’s writings. The divine ordinances “which con-
cern the realm of morals and ethics” are, as ‘Abdu’l-Bahá stated, “the “fun-
damental aspect of the religion of God” (Promulgation 403).4
Moral instructions and directives in the Bahá’í revelation which can be
taken as a point of departure for detecting the underlying system of
Bahá’í ethics are scattered throughout Bahá’í scripture. Not even the
Kitáb-i-Aqdas, the kernel of Bahá’í law and ethics, is a systematic code of
laws and of moral prescriptions.5 It is not organized logically, section by
section, point by point, as are treatises and manuals on Islamic law. The
Book of God has never come down in the form of a logically developed
system of intellectual exposition; its laws and commandments have never
been established in the form of a systematically structured design of gen-
eral, abstract norms. Nor have they appeared in a rational form, that is,
with appended reasons and explanations. The Word of God is, as I have
already pointed out elsewhere,6 an eruptive, visionary, and emphatic out-
pouring. It is neither systematically structured nor an arid instruction in
plain terms; as Shoghi Effendi put it: “All Divine Revelation seems to have
been thrown out in flashes. The Prophets never composed treatises. This
is why in the Qur’án and our own Writings different subjects are so often
included in one Tablet. It pulsates, so to speak. That is why it is ‘Reve-
lation’” (Unfolding Destiny 454).
This is why the Kitáb-i-Aqdas “jumps from one subject to the next
without any obvious logical connection” (Lewis 123). The Holy, the
Divine is in its very essence beyond the rational and its categories of
thought. At all times, it has been up to man to order the laws of God sys-
tematically, an essential precondition for their later application.7 My forth-
coming introduction to Bahá’í ethics is intended as an attempt to system-
atically analyze the multifarious moral imperatives of Bahá’í scripture and
to detect their inner architecture.
The eminent function of man’s character, of his behavior, his actions,
deeds, and works in Bahá’u’lláh’s scheme of redemption becomes evident
from His definition of the Covenant of God, the major constitutive prin-
ciple of all Bahá’í theology. The initial verse of the Kitáb-i-Aqdas clarifies
4 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006

the basic issue as to the relation of faith to works, which was the central
controversy between Catholicism and Protestantism: Faith, that is, the
recognition (‘irfán) of the Manifestation, is the foundation, whereas
works and deeds are “the essence of faith” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 10:13).
Faith and works are “inseparable” (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 1).
Without faith man goes astray, “though he be the author of every right-
eous deed” (Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 1); but faith without works is, according
to the Gospel, like a tree that “bringeth not forth good fruit”: its destina-
tion is “to be hewn, and cast into the fire” (Matt. 7:19). Divine grace is
not, as Martin Luther asserted, granted through personal faith alone
(sola fide), but through both faith and righteous deeds. How essential
man’s works are becomes evident from Bahá’u’lláh’s definition of “faith”
in His Words of Wisdom: “The essence of faith is fewness of words and
abundance of deeds” (Tablets 10:13) and from His admonition: “Let deeds,
not words, be your adorning (Hidden Words, Persian 5)8 . . . Let your acts
be a guide unto all mankind, for the professions of most men . . . differ
from their conduct” (Gleanings 139:8).
In numerous passages Bahá’u’lláh enjoins His followers to “strive . . .
with heart and soul” (Hidden Words, Persian 76) to distinguish them-
selves from others by their deeds.9 They should conduct themselves in
such a manner that they may stand out “distinguished and brilliant as the
sun among other souls” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Selections 35:5):10 “Strive to be shin-
ing examples unto all mankind, and true reminders of the virtues of God
amidst men” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 9:4).
What matters is right being (“a good character,” Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets
4:1311) and right acting (“good works,”12 “good deeds” [Kitáb-i-Aqdas par.
59, 70])13 for they are “the fruits of the tree of man” (Bahá’u’lláh, Epistle
26). Those that “yield no fruit on earth . . . are verily counted as among
the dead” (Bahá’u’lláh, Hidden Words, Persian 81).14 Thus the emphasis
lies more on orthopractice than orthodoxy. However, this does not mean that
religion is reduced to morals alone, as philosophers of the Enlightenment
did in their endeavor to keep an equal distance between unbelief and
superstition. The morality in religion is not above the mystery in it.15
The Bahá’í ethos is based on the individual’s participation in God’s new
Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics 5

Covenant, that is, the recognition of Bahá’u’lláh as a Manifestation of
God and obedience to his teachings and laws (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas
par. 1).
The aim of religion is to guide man towards perfection through morals,
and the aim of all morals is felicity and happiness, which is the ultimate
desire of all human beings: “Homo naturaliter desiderat beatitudinem,” as
Thomas Aquinas put it—“Happiness is man’s natural desire” (Summa I-II,
1.69, a1).16 The scripture’s moral instructions are “the everlasting torch
of divine guidance” Bahá’u’lláh, Hidden Words, Persian 35), the “Straight
Path” (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 184)17 to an “ultimate aim” (‘Abdu’l-
Bahá, Selections 225:5), to “human happiness.”
What is happiness? How can it be defined? In his Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle defines “happiness” (eudaimonia), the prime mover of human
actions, as living a life that is determined by reason (not by feelings, not
by emotions!), as the activity of the soul which is in accordance with
virtue (1097a 6–18).18 It is a fundamental doctrine of Socrates, Plato, and
Aristotle that a good man and a happy man are the same. According to
‘Abdu’l-Bahá human happiness “consists only in drawing closer to the
Threshold of Almighty God” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Secret 60). On the level of the
individual, this means here on earth “a tranquil heart;” and, ultimately,
“happiness in the after-life.” 19 On the level of the political world it means
“the illumination of the world of humanity” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Selections
225:3) and “securing the peace and well-being of every individual mem-
ber, high and low alike, of the human race” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Secret 60). The
virtues required for the human being are “the supreme agencies for accom-
plishing these two objective.” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Secret 60).
Bahá’í ethics is not merely descriptive, it is normative and prescriptive
in nature. The scripture contains a wealth of different kinds of normative
statements relating to ethics: passages that elucidate its doctrinal founda-
tions, commandments, and prohibitions, catalogues of virtues,20 praise of
virtues, warnings against wrong-doing and the consequences of evil deeds,
against a life spent in lust, passion, and vice; instructions and appeals to live
a life of virtue and service pleasing to God, of service to one’s neigh-
bor,21 to mankind (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 109:2),22 and of service at the
6 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006

“Threshold of Holiness” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Will and Testament 3:3). Thus, the
scripture is not at all a mere textbook of religious and ethical doctrines,
of abstract moral propositions, but rather a work of moral admonition, of
general directives which have a driving power, a compelling force motivat-
ing people to pursue the moral good. Bahá’u’lláh’s ethical instructions
should not be misconstrued as a dry, bloodless philosophy under the yoke
of the law. Bahá’í ethics is rather a methodical way of life according to the
Word and the Law. Bahá’u’lláh assures us that he who takes upon himself
the “yoke” will find “days of blissful joy . . . in store” (Gleanings 153:9).
Those who have been spiritually reborn and tread this path are on the way
to becoming a “new man.”23 In the Suratu’l-Haykal Bahá’u’lláh promises
that in the fullness of time a “race of men, incomparable in character, shall
be raised up” (Summons 1:8).

II

1. The discussion of the ontological status of moral norms and values,
their philosophical or theological justification, is the cardinal issue of
ethics and the starting point of all reflection about it. The discussion of
this subject is as old as philosophy. Positions deduced from the Bahá’í
scripture can be more easily recognized and interpreted in the context of
views which have been developed in the past by theologians and philoso-
phers.
It was Plato who, in his early dialogue Euthyphro, raised the decisive
question: “Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is
it holy because it is loved by the gods?” (A10), which he clearly answered:
“The holy is loved because it is holy, and it is not holy because it is loved”
(E10). This judgment became the foundation of the philosophy of natu-
ral law. Over the millennia, from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz,
and beyond, the idea prevailed that God is not the world’s legislator, that
the categories of good and evil, just and unjust, are not decisions of the
divine will, but are rather objective realities, eternal truths preceding the
will of God like the numerical proportions. God is bound to these eternal
Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics 7

truths, which can (at least to a certain extent) be recognized by human
reason.
Another strain of thought in Christian theology, that of ethical volun-
tarism, can be traced back to St. Paul24 and St. Augustine, and was formu-
lated by the Franciscan monk John Duns Scotus (1270–1303) in categori-
cal language: God is not subject to any principle or law. There is no high-
er law above Him, no moral law independent of Him, no preceding idea of
good and evil, no a priori system of values, no lex aeterna, no natural law
that can be deduced from the order of creation that God would be bound
to. Not the law is eternal, but the lawgiver. It is God’s will that creates
every law there is. That is why His action is, as He proceeds, always and
necessarily right and just. As His commandments are ordinances of His
contingent will, God acts, wherever He does, always justly.25 William
Ockham followed on this path, as did later on Luther and Calvin, who saw
the origin of all morals and all law in God’s unfathomable will: “The
supreme rule of justice is the Will of God, and every thing that he wills
must be accepted as just because he wills it.”26
In Islam the study of ethical principles, the discussions of the sources
of law and ethics, started in the eighth and ninth centuries A.D. Here the
two antagonistic strains of thought are recognizable as well in the schools
of the Mu‘tazila27 and of the Ash‘arites.28 The Mu‘tazilites were the pro-
ponents of rationalistic ethics. For them ethical value has an objective
reality and cannot be reduced in essence to the will of God and his com-
mandments. ‘Abdu’l-Jabbár (935–1025)29 and his predecessors stated that
man has the natural ability to know what is right independently of any
command or revelation. They allow “a place for revelation as an indispen-
sable supplement to reason. It tells us some important truths on values that
reason unaided could not have discovered although reason can recognize
and accept them as rational once they have been revealed—e. g. the value
of prayer in building character” (Hourani 18; author’s emphasis).
The predominant theory in classical Sunni Islam was that of ethical
voluntarism.30 Traditionalists, in particular Sháfi‘í, Ibn H. anbal, al-Ash‘arí,
Ibn H. azm, al-Ghazálí and Shahrastání, stated that justice is nothing but
8 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006

obedience to the revealed law of the sharí‘a: right action is that which God
has commanded. They objected to the belief that revelation was merely
supplementary to human reason, and argued that “if God’s command-
ments followed objective principles of value, such as a real justice, these
would be something fixed pre-eternally and beyond His control, which
would thus limit His power and make Him less than omnipotent”
(Hourani 28). If man could judge what is right and wrong, he could rule
on what God could rightly prescribe for man, and this would be presump-
tuous and blasphemous. Furthermore they objected “that the judgements
of reason were arbitrary, based only on desire; that such judgements in
fact always contradicted each other; and lastly they arrogated [to them-
selves] the function of revelation and rendered it useless” (Hourani 17).
For them, the primary source of ethics was the divine revelation and tra-
dition or their derivatives. Whereas a small stream of Mu‘tazilí rational-
ism survived in the Imámí Shí‘a, the orthodox view has prevailed in Sunni
countries until the present time (Hourani 19).

2. Bahá’í ethics has its roots in the divine revelation. It is based on the
scripture, that is, on the doctrines of God’s absolute sovereignty and the
infallibility of the Manifestation, of God’s Covenant and of human nature
(Bahá’í anthropology). God is the supreme source of all values. Thus, the
Bahá’í value system is not a philosophical set of moral standards, not the
outcome of methodical human endeavor to formulate concrete norms
solely by means of argumentation and rational discourse (no “discourse
ethics”), rather (as in other religions) guidance under the authority of an
enlightened Teacher who claims that his book is the standard for good and
evil, the “unerring Balance established amongst men” (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-
i-Aqdas par. 99).31
Bahá’í ethics is theocentric and theonomous32 in its nature: Hence, God
is the creator of the world and the lawgiver of mankind. He is the primal
cause “of all good” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 10:2), the supreme source of all
morals. His commandments (prescribed by the Manifestation) are “the
essence of justice and the source thereof ” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 88:1).
The highest criterion in moral judgment is recourse to God’s arbitrary
will and to the infallibility of the divine messenger who mediates this will
Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics 9

to humanity. To this will (which is arbitrary in the sense of unlimited,
absolute, depending on volition, not governed by principle), man owes
absolute obedience.
Thus, the moral order is not, as Plato saw it, anchored in a preceding
idea of good and evil, in eternal truths that can be identified by reason,
nor in a rational concept of man, defining for all eternity the idea of the
good, nor in a rationally recognizable “nature of things.” but rather in the
decisions of God’s arbitrary will. God alone is anarchos, absolutely free:
not submitted to any law or principle. Therefore He can never be unjust.
He is “the Lord of all things and is the vassal of none” (Bahá’u’lláh,
Prayers and Meditations 4:1). His Will has no reason to will as He wills,
other than that He wills it so. His sovereign, unfathomable free will is the
foundation of all moral obligations. There is no criterion of moral recti-
tude independent of His will: “Know thou for a certainty that the Will of
God is not limited by the standards of the people. . . . Verily He is to be
praised in His acts and to be obeyed in His behests. He hath no associate
in His judgement nor any helper in His sovereignty. He doeth whatsoev-
er He willeth and ordaineth whatsoever He pleaseth” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets
8:19). A preceding idea of the moral good, the existence of a moral order
binding upon God, would limit his sovereignty and amount to shirk,33 the
association of a companion with God.34
Thus, the norms set by divine legislation are absolute, independent
from all empiricism, authoritative, categorical, apodictic, and not in need
of rational justification. This is a clear confirmation of what is called “eth-
ical voluntarism.”
One could object that moral values are universal and perennial and not
confined to any historical outpourings of divine truth. St. Paul had to deal
with this problem when he promulgated the message of the Gospel to the
“Gentiles, which have not the law” (Rom. 2:14). He could not ignore that
they knew moral standards and that the Greeks were in possession of a
highly developed ethics. According to St. Paul, the gentiles “do by nature
the things contained in the law” (Rom. 2:14) because the law is “written in
their hearts” (Rom. 2:15). This doctrine had a far-reaching impact on the
development of ethical thought in Christian theology.
The Bahá’í Faith does not support the idea of an innate moral law.
10 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006

‘Abdu’l-Bahá states that there is no “innate sense of human dignity” that
prevents “man from committing evil actions and insure[s] his spiritual . . .
perfection” (Secret 97). Bahá’u’lláh’s new paradigm36 of divine revelation
as a progressively unfolding process, and of salvation history (Heils-
geschichte) as a continuum that is open to the future, opens a new dimen-
sion in ethical thought. The fact that values, virtues, and vices have exist-
ed in all human cultures from time immemorial, that they are basically
identical and are taken for granted in the scripture,37 does not contradict
the ontological status of these values as emanations of the divine Will.
For God has revealed His Will and behest to man “from time immemori-
al” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 87:6). He has sent prophets to all peoples:38
“Unto the cities of all nations He hath sent His Messengers, whom He
hath commissioned to announce unto men tidings of the Paradise of His
good-pleasure. . . .” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 76:1).39 The mission of the
prophets was always “to summon mankind to the one true God,”
(Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 98:6) to guide it “to the straight Path of Truth”
and to “educate all men” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 81:1) morally.
Thus, in its religious traditions humankind has a common supply, a
reservoir, of normative principles of good and evil,40 of basic values
embodied in virtues and vices, of fundamental standards41 (such as the
Golden Rule, which exists in all religions42), even though the specific
accentuation of the values and their mutual relationship in the respective
religious context and in the hierarchy of values might vary in different
cultural contexts,43 and though the origin of values in divine revelation
is often not apparent. These common values constitute the eternal law
“revealed unto the Prophets of old” (Bahá’u’lláh, Hidden Words, Arabic
preamble), which “does not change nor alter,” which has been confirmed
and renewed in all religions and which “will never be abrogated” (‘Abdu’l-
Bahá, Some Answered Questions 11:9).44 One could call this law a lex aeter-
na, but it is not a natural law, derived from an order of being, but rather
one that has its origin in the divine Will. It belongs to the core of God’s
“one and indivisible religion” (The Báb, Selections 2:24:2), as the Báb
called it, and, as Bahá’u’lláh put it, the “changeless Faith of God, eternal
in the past, eternal in the future” (Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 182); it belongs, as
Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics 11

‘Abdu’l-Bahá formulated, to the “Holy of Holies” (Some Answered
Questions 11:9). The values governing society, however, such as the social
norms and laws on the family, inheritance, trade, and criminal law as well
as the forms of worship (‘ibádát), vary greatly in the different religions
according to the varying conditions and demands of a steadily changing
world and an “ever-advancing civilization” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings
109:2).45 This is why, according to Bahá’u’lláh, “in every age and dispen-
sation all divine ordinances are changed and transformed according to
the requirements of the time, except the law of love46 which, like a foun-
tain, always flows and is never overtaken by change.”47

3. The doctrine of divine voluntarism should not be misconstrued. God is
not a tyrant; His actions are not the result of a senseless, capricious,
despotic arbitrariness. Man has not been created as an addressee of whim-
sical injunctions, but as a recipient of God’s love, grace, and mercy.48
According to Bahá’u’lláh, God’s commandments and all the duties pre-
scribed for His servants are “but a token of [His] grace unto them, that
they may be enabled to ascend unto the station conferred upon their own
inmost being” (Gleanings 1:5). They are, as it is said in the Kitáb-i-Aqdas
“the lamps of My loving providence among My servants, and the keys of
My mercy for My creatures” (par. 3), and constitute “the highest means for
the maintenance of order in the world and the security of its peoples”
(par. 2). Thus, the “fundamental purpose animating the faith of God,”
according to Bahá’u’lláh’s definition, is “to safeguard the interests and
promote the unity of the human race, and to foster the spirit of love and
fellowship amongst men” (Tablets 11:15). Bahá’u’lláh assures us that the
one God “hath wished nothing for Himself. The allegiance of mankind
profiteth Him not, neither doth its perversity harm Him” (Tablets 11:2).
“He enjoineth upon you that which shall profit you. . . . Your evil doings
can never harm Us, neither can your good works profit Us” (Kitáb-i-
Aqdas par. 59).
Consequently, the chosen way under the “yoke” (Matt. 11:29) of the law
is not “an evidence of self-effacement,” of “self-estrangement,” of “slav-
ery” (Nietzsche no. 54) and of “hetero-determination,” but rather the path
12 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006

to man’s true self. Tertullian, a father of the church living in the third cen-
tury, was referring to this way of life, which is the right response to God’s
grace and salvation, when he spoke of the “anima naturaliter christiana”:
“The human soul is Christian by its nature” (Apologeticum 17). Man has
been created for this manner of existence.

4. God is “hidden from the sight and minds of men” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets
8:31).49 His knowledge can only be attained through knowledge of the
Manifestations, the “Repositories of celestial wisdom” (Bahá’u’lláh,
Gleanings 19:3). God’s sovereign will is mediated to humanity through
them, who are essentially50 infallible,51 “free of error” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets
8:17) in their judgment: “Whatever emanates from Them is identical with
the truth, and conformable to reality” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered
Questions 45:6), for each one of them is the “representative and mouthpiece
of God” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 28:2) and “doth incarnate the highest, the
infallible standard of justice unto all creation” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings
88:1).
The Manifestation’s charisma of inherent infallibility (al-‘is. ma) is a log-
ical precondition, an “essential requirement” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered
Questions 45:2) for being God’s representative.52 By this means God safe-
guards and protects His laws and ordinances from all error, all later ques-
tioning and all attempts to modify or to annul them. The doctrine of the
“Most Great Infallibility” (al-‘is. matu’l-kubrá)53 has been formulated by
Bahá’u’lláh in captivating and powerful language in the Kitáb-i-Aqdas54
and in His Tablet, Ishráqát,55 culminating in the formula: “He doeth what
He pleaseth. He chooseth, and none may question His choice” (Kitáb-i-
Aqdas par. 7).56
This formula is a frequently recurring motif throughout Bahá’í
scripture. It is the very touchstone of man’s faith. Its implications for
the justification of moral values have been categorically formulated in
challenging language:

Blessed is the man that hath acknowledged his belief in God and in
His signs, and recognized that “He57 shall not be asked of His
Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics 13

doings.”58 Such a recognition hath been made by God the ornament
of every belief and its very foundation.59 . . .
Were He to decree as lawful the thing which from time immemori-
al had been forbidden, and forbid that which had, at all times, been
regarded as lawful, to none is given the right to question His author-
ity. Whoso will hesitate, though it be for less than a moment, should
be regarded as a transgressor.
Whoso hath not recognized this sublime and fundamental verity,
and hath failed to attain this most exalted station, the winds of doubt
will agitate him, and the sayings of the infidels will distract his soul.
He that hath acknowledged this principle will be endowed with the
most perfect constancy. (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 161–63)

God’s laws must be obeyed even if they were to be “such as to cause the
heaven of every religion to be cleft asunder” (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas
par. 7) or to “strike terror into the hearts of all that are in heaven and on
earth,” because they are “naught but manifest justice” (Bahá’u’lláh,
Gleanings 88:1). By anchoring the system of values in God’s sovereign
Will, in the infallibility of the Manifestations and the authenticity of the
scripture, Bahá’u’lláh made it an Archimedean Point60 of knowledge, a
“sure handle” (‘urwatu’l-wuthqá) (Tablets 8:48)61 for the individual as well
as for society, an absolute framework of ultimate values. It is thus above
all criticism and indicates the goal and the path, the “Straight Path”;62 lim-
its arbitrary human behavior; and offers society and culture a stable bal-
ance for the variety of diverging interests. This is the theological bedrock
of divine legislation, a doctrinal foundation of all ethics and law that is
unique in the annals of religious history.

5. The tablets of a new law with its categoric commandments, “Thou
shalt!” revealed to a humanity that Bahá’u’lláh deemed “feeble and far
removed from the purpose of God”63 are taken as an “offence,”64 as a
“stumbling block” by those who still believe, and as “foolishness”65 by
those who desire to decide what is right and what is wrong according to
their own promptings, to choose their own way of life, their own
14 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006

lifestyle.66 A concrete religious law with its binding rules, injunctions,
prohibitions, and ordinances, with its demand for absolute obedience, is
deeply challenging for a secular society with its political philosophy,
according to which religion is exclusively a private matter and man an
autonomous individual, wholly self-determined and morally responsible
only to himself. For Western thought which has been shaped by the
Enlightenment it is hard to accept the claim that the newly revealed word
of God is the standard of all morals and not, as Bahá’u’lláh put it, “man’s
fanciful theories.”67
Bahá’u’lláh has foreseen the commotion His law will provoke, as He
speaks about “the fears and agitation which the revelation of this law pro-
vokes in men’s hearts.”68 He nevertheless insists: “Were His law to be such
as to strike terror in the hearts of all that are in heaven and on earth, that
law is naught but manifest justice” (Gleanings 88:1).
The commandments of the Manifestation must not be judged accord-
ing to human standards. They derive from the lógos (which the philoso-
phers called the “primal reason,” al-‘aql al-awwal), from the “divine, uni-
versal mind, whose sovereignty enlighteneth all created things”
(Bahá’u’lláh, Seven Valleys 52). They are “absolute wisdom,” and are in
accordance with “the reality of things” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered
Questions 40:6; 45:6), a reality known to the Manifestation not through
knowledge gained by reflection or experience, but a knowledge that is
immediate, innate, and unacquired (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions
40:6). This knowledge, by which the Manifestation is “aware of the reali-
ty of the mysteries of beings” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions
40:4, 7)69 is termed “existential knowledge” (‘ilmu’l-wujudí).
Through the divine ordinances human reason partakes of the divine
wisdom. Therefore the laws of God are above human wisdom70 and not
in need of rational justification. They are ta ‘abbudí;71 they must be
accepted as they are. For that reason Bahá’u’lláh admonishes His people to
“[c]ast away the things current amongst men and to take fast hold on that
whereunto ye are bidden by virtue of the Will of the Ordainer” (Tablets
6:56). He warns them not to “cavil” at the “Testimony of God” (Gleanings
129:5)72 and not to judge the law of God according to human standards,
Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics 15

which are the result of historical processes and are essentially relative.
Rather, everything which is taken for granted today and considered to be
immune to criticism—secular society has its dogmas as well!—must be
judged according to the infallible balance (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par.
148, 183): “Weigh not the Book of God with such standards and sciences
as are current amongst you, for the Book itself is the unerring Balance
established amongst men. In this most perfect Balance whatsoever the
peoples and kindreds of the earth possess must be weighed, while the
measure of its weight should be tested according to its own standard. . .
.” (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 99). And in the same book the warning:
“Hold ye fast unto His statutes (ah. wamir) and commandments (ah. kam),
and be not of those who, following their idle fancies and vain imaginings,
have clung to the standards (h. udúd) fixed by their own selves, and cast
behind their backs the standards (us. úl) laid down by God” (17).

7. If the origin of all morals is God’s sovereign will, embodied in the reve-
lation of the Manifestations, the primary source of ethical knowledge is
revealed scripture. The question arises as to the part assigned to reason in
Bahá’í ethics. Unfortunately this issue of Bahá’í epistemology cannot be dis-
cussed here because of the lack of time. I have to refer to my forthcoming
book (Bahá’í Ethics 1:257–311) and to confine myself to a summary of the
results of my research.
In the realm of values human rationality is limited insofar as it is
dependent on a preordained framework, a God-given standard, an hier-
archy of supreme values, which is not subject to reason—fixed points
that constitute an immovable yardstick. Human beings cannot cognize
the moral order by reason; they are dependent on divine revelation.
Nevertheless, reason can under certain conditions attain such “discern-
ment” that man “will discriminate between truth and falsehood even as he
doth distinguish the sun from shadow” (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-íqán 217).
The conditions are

• that reason is not directed by “natural impulse and desire” (‘Abdu’l-
Bahá, Promulgation 41) and not guided by vital interests;
16 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006

• that the human being has internalized the normative injunctions of
the revelation, including the normative image of human nature pro-
claimed therein;
• that the individual is illumined by “the spirit of faith” (ar-rúh. u’l-
imání)”73 and has burned away “the veil of self ” (Bahá’u’lláh,
Gleanings 147:1) that obscures his understanding, “with the fire of
[God’s] love” (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 132, 171).74

Bahá’u’lláh has elucidated the condition that can be attained through rea-
son in another passage: “They whose sight is keen, whose ears are reten-
tive, whose hearts are enlightened, and whose breasts are dilated, recog-
nize both truth and falsehood, and distinguish the one from the other”
(Epistle 10).75
“Whose breasts are dilated” is a Qur’ánic metaphor for embracing the
faith.76 With the guidance of the absolute standard of revelation and its
normative anthropology, rational thought can independently recognize
what is permitted and what is forbidden in all concerns and situations,
even if these are not mentioned in the holy texts. When it is stated in the
scripture that “man should know his own self and recognize that which
leadeth unto loftiness or lowliness, glory or abasement, wealth or pover-
ty” (Bahá’u’lláh Tablets 4:8), or when the scripture refers man directly to
his power of reason: “Approach not the things which your minds con-
demn” (Gleanings 128:8), it becomes clear that reason illumined by faith is
granted a wide scope to distinguish good and evil within the framework
of the revealed moral order. Without reason, moral judgment and a moral
life are not possible at all. In this sense, Thomas Aquinas’s judgment is
valid that it is “reason that guides us to the works of morality,” as is also
demonstrated in the emphasis Bahá’u’lláh has placed on the cardinal
virtues of h. ikma: wisdom and prudence.

III

I think I have already made it clear that the “Book of God” establishes a
value system of its own77 which is “not limited by the standards of the
people” since “God doth not tread in their ways” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 8:19).
Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics 17

The Book is the divine law for the whole of humanity: no wonder it con-
flicts in some respects with moral views which are dominant in Western
societies, which are no longer molded by the Christian faith and Christian
morals. Let me conclude this lecture by outlining some features of the
new morality that differ from moral positions which are current in secu-
lar society.
One fundamental difference can be seen in the concepts of liberty that
underlie the two moral systems. In secular society the supreme authority
as regards morals is reason, and reason draws the limits to personal free-
dom at the point where one person’s liberty infringes on the rights of
another. This idea that goes back to Immanuel Kant is expressed, for
instance, in Article 2 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Germany: “Everyone shall have the right to free development of his per-
sonality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others.”
The unlimited freedom of each individual is thereby both legally con-
strained and legally guaranteed within the bounds of its compatibility
with the liberty of every other individual. The same article mentions the
“moral law” as a further limit of personal freedom. The fathers of the
German Constitution (enacted in 1949) considered the moral law as an
objective, absolute barrier that restrains the freedom of the individual.
Today, half a century later, it is interpreted by jurisprudence and jurisdic-
tion as something relative, as “the moral consciousness of our society”
(Maunz and Dührig, art. 2, §1, n.16)—a vague concept, since this con-
sciousness is subject to social change and in constant flux.
In contrast to this, Bahá’u’lláh approves of liberty within “the limits of
moderation” (Tablets 11:19; 6:31), “the moderate freedom which guaran-
tees the welfare of the world of mankind” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Selections
227:27). Unrestrained liberty “causeth man to overstep the bounds of
propriety, and to infringe on the dignity of his station” (Bahá’u’lláh,
Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 123). It is unbridled liberty, licentiousness, that
Bahá’u’lláh is speaking of when He states that liberty will ultimately
“lead to sedition, whose flames none can quench” (Kitáb-i-Aqdas par.
123). His concept of “true liberty” that “consisteth in man’s submission
unto My commandments” (Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 125) is the liberty that
results from obedience to the Will of God as manifested in the divine
18 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006

laws. It is liberty in submission to God. Bahá’u’lláh’s concept of “true lib-
erty” is a rejection of revolutionary anarchy as well as of permissive soci-
ety, of a society where there are no taboos and whose goal is emancipa-
tion from all traditional patterns of behavior; a society where everyone
is allowed to do as he likes provided he does not violate the rights of
others.
There is another basic difference between the two ethical systems.
Whereas secular moral standards are based on the doctrines of individu-
alism and liberalism,78 the Bahá’í value system is balanced; it is—and in
this point more similar to Islamic and Confucian ethics—less individual-
istic, less focused on the interests and rights of the individual and more
concerned with the common weal. The Bahá’í position derives from the
basic political concept according to which the common weal and the secu-
rity of the public have priority to the rights of the individual, notwith-
standing the community’s duty to respect and protect the unalienable
rights of the citizen.79 Strong emphasis is placed on the “security and pro-
tection of men” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 7:32), the “common weal”80 and the
“prosperity, wealth and tranquillity of the people” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets
7:29). The different emphasis in the two moral systems may be elucidated
by Bahá’u’lláh’s provisions relating to sexual ethics and to penal law.
In our largely hedonistic societies the idea prevails that the bounds of
sexual freedom are usually set by the prohibition of violent sexual acts
and the abuse of children and wards of court. All sexual behavior between
mutually consenting adults that does not directly infringe on the rights of
third parties is today generally regarded as morally permissible, analo-
gous to the Roman legal formula “Volenti non fit iniuria” (No injustice is
done to him who consents). Moreover, the idea is generally accepted that
it is up to the individual to determine his own sexual orientation. Conse-
quently, so-called ethical minorities have been placed under legal protec-
tion. Marriage between homosexual partners has recently been made law-
ful in Germany and other European countries.
In Bahá’u’lláh’s revelation marriage is the exclusive place of legitimate
human sexuality. Pre- and extramarital sexual activity is morally stigma-
tized as unchastity, and pre- and extramarital intercourse penalized as
Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics 19

ziná.81 Marriage is only intended as a bond between heterosexual part-
ners. Consequently, homosexual relationships and homosexual acts (liwát. )
have been condemned by Bahá’u’lláh as immoral.82 The idea that it is up
to the individual to determine his own sexual orientation is incompatible
with Bahá’u’lláh’s normative image of the human being. Bahá’u’lláh’s sex-
ual ethics correspond to the basic tenets of the other Abrahamic religions,
and also of Buddhism, though it avoids the extreme positions represent-
ed by zealots.83 Chastity does not amount to a defamation of human sex-
uality; its aim is not the suppression of the sexual urge, but the disciplined
use and control of the reproductive force and the human ability to express
love.84
As to penal law, it is today generally accepted in Europe by legal theo-
ry and jurisdiction that the supreme purpose of punishment is the reha-
bilitation of the criminal. The idea of retaliation and expiation as funda-
mental purposes of punishment, and capital punishment as well, are
denounced as expressions of subliminal feelings of hatred and revenge, as
barbaric relics of premodern times. The abolition of the death penalty has
been celebrated as a milestone on the path to the progressive humaniza-
tion of society. The abrogation of capital punishment is, so to speak, le bil-
let d’entré—the ticket of admission—for the states that want to enter the
European community.
By contrast, the penal provisions of the Kitáb-i-Aqdas are based on the
metaphysical principle of justice, “reward and punishment,” upon which
“the structure of world stability and order hath been reared” (Bahá’u’lláh,
Tablets 11:6).85 According to ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, the primary purpose of pun-
ishment is retaliation and expiation,86 as well as the protection of socie-
ty. The Kitáb-i-Aqdas ordains capital punishment in cases of intentional
killing of a person (qatl = murder and homicide) and arson (par. 62). This
raises the question as to the Bahá’í Faith’s attitude to the European
Enlightenment.
The anchorage of penal law in the metaphysical principle of justice,
and thus the reaffirmation of the idea of expiation and retribution, can-
not be denounced as a return to pre-Enlightenment positions. While it is
true that some Enlightenment philosophers emphasized the idea of crime
20 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006

prevention by deterrence and resocialization instead of retaliation, and
demanded the abolition of both torture and the death penalty,87
Immanuel Kant, who marked the epitome of European Enlightenment
thinking, and subsequently Hegel (Philosophy of Right, §§ 97–102), were
radical advocates of the principle of retribution (Kant, Metaphysics of
Morals, Doctrine of Right) and of the death penalty. This was also the
position upheld by Catholic and Protestant theology until the early
1960s.88 Even the Catholic world catechism published in 1993 (no. 2266)
justifies the death penalty under certain circumstances.
Furthermore, the message of Bahá’u’lláh can certainly be described as
compatible with “Enlightenment values” with regard to many of its prin-
ciples and demands, such as the unconditional dignity of every individual
and the equality of all before the law; equality of the sexes; freedom of
conscience, thought, and speech;89 the high esteem for human reason
(‘aql) as “the most precious gift bestowed upon man” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris
Talks 11:4);90 the abolition of the clergy; the democratic structure of the
community; the preference for democratic forms of rule; the rejection of
absolutism, tyranny, despotism, imperialism, colonialism, exploitation and
religious fanaticism; as well as the protection of religious, political, and
ethnic minorities. These are all positions upheld by Enlightenment
thinkers. The vision of a federal world commonwealth in a peaceful glob-
al order corresponds to Kant’s conviction “that at last . . . the highest pur-
pose of nature, a universal cosmopolitan existence, will at last be realised
as the matrix within which all the original capacities of the human race
may develop” (Universal History prop. 8, p. 51) and that “the perpetual
peace is no empty idea but a task” that “comes steadily closer to its goal”
(Toward Perpetual Peace 391). Kant’s definition of the Enlightenment as
“man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity” and his maxim,
sapere aude (Horace)—“Have courage to use your own understanding!”
(An Answer 54)—is remarkably similar to Bahá’u’lláh’s principle of the
independent search for truth, according to which the people are admon-
ished “to see with their own eyes and to hear with their own ears” (Kitáb-
Íqán 176) and “know of thine own knowledge and not through the knowl-
edge of thy neighbor” (Bahá’u’lláh, Hidden Words, Arabic 2). That this is
Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics 21

a fundamental principle with far-reaching implications for ethics becomes
evident from the many warnings against “vain imitation” 91 and the
implicit rejection of the Islamic principle of taqlíd,92 and of the necessi-
ty of having a “moral guide”—a mujtahid or a shaykh—without whom
human beings go astray, as al-Ghazali put it: “He who has no shaykh to
guide him will be led by the Devil into his ways” (Qtd. in Abdullah 225).
The “coming of age of the human race,” the “stage of maturity,” is a
recurring theme in the revealed scripture. In this context it is highly sig-
nificant when Bahá’u’lláh states: “No sooner had mankind attained the
stage of maturity, than the Word revealed to men’s eyes the latent ener-
gies with which it had been endowed. . . .” (Gleanings 33:2). Kant, through
whom the European Enlightenment had reached its apex, died in 1804.
Forty years later the Báb proclaimed His message.93
The conflict between the two different sets of values—that of Western
secular civilization and that of the Book of God is inevitable, and it will
be a long time before humankind will accept that not “man is the measure
of all things,” as the Greek philosopher Protagoras (d. 410 B.C.) stated, but
that rather it is God’s unfathomable will that is the “infallible standard”
(Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 88:1) of all morality.

NOTES

This lecture was presented at the 26th Annual Conference of the Association
for Bahá’í Studies–North America, 1 September 2002, Mississauga, Ontario,
Canada.
1. Volume 1 of the book (Doctrinal Fundamentals) was published in 2007 by
George Ronald, Oxford
2. From Latin mos, moris: custom, manner.
3. In this respect it resembles Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism. There is no
“rage for defining,” for “dogmatising on questions of faith,” no tendency to “high
flown speculations and sterile, abstract mysticism” such as prevailed in early
Christianity (cf. Küng, Christianity and the World Religions 115). Moreover, the
Bahá’ís are warned against “empty, profitless debates,” “useless hair-splittings and
22 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006

disputes” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Secret 106), “fruitless excursions into metaphysical hair-
splitting” (Shoghi Effendi, qtd. in Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas n. 110).
4. He emphasizes: “The most vital duty, in this day is to purify your charac-
ters, to correct your manners, and improve your conduct” (qtd. in Shoghi Effendi,
Advent 21).
5. Bahá’u’lláh does not want the book to be considered as a mere code: “Think
not that We have revealed unto you a mere code of laws (ah. kam). Nay, rather, We
have unsealed the choice Wine with the fingers of might and power” (Kitáb-i-
Aqdas par. 5).
6. Schaefer, Towfigh, and Gollmer 340ff.
7. Saiedi has dealt with this issue at length (Logos and Civilization, 235ff.,
259ff.). He detects not “a series of hierarchical arrayed categories,” but “an organ-
ic and graceful order” (236), based on “four constitutive principles that create the
hermeneutic structure of the text. Each time a principle is introduced, diverse
laws and commandments which are implications and expressions of the principle
are mentioned. The Kitáb-i-Aqdas can be seen as a discourse on the metaphysical
and spiritual principles which underlie the diverse legal and moral reflections of
these principles” (238).
8. This is in accordance with Matt. 7:21: “Not every one that sayeth unto me
Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of
my Father which is in heaven.”
9. See also Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 139:8.
10. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, in Selections, exemplifies this injunction: “Should any one of
you enter a city, he should become a centre of attraction by reason of his sincer-
ity, his faithfulness and love, his honesty and fidelity, his truthfulness and loving-
kindness towards all the peoples of the world. . . . Not until ye attain this station
can ye be said to have been faithful to the Covenant and Testament of God”
(35:5).
11. “A goodly character” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 6:3; 11:28), “a saintly character”
(Tablets 6:4; Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 127:4), “a praiseworthy character” (Tablets 6:27;
17:91, Gleanings 147:2; 158), “an upright character” (Tablets 8:56; 15:11; Gleanings
158).
12. See also Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 138:5.
13. “Goodly deeds” (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 43; Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets
15:11; 17:91, “praiseworthy deeds” (Tablets 8:56; 15:11), “pure deeds” (Tablets
Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics 23

11:28; 15:11; Gleanings 43:4; 101; Bahá’u’lláh, Hidden Words, Persian 39), “holy
deeds” (Gleanings 137:4; 43:4; 101), “deeds of stainless holiness” (Hidden Words,
Persian 35, 69).
14. See also Bahá’u’lláh, Hidden Words, Persian 81, 5, 76; Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings
128:1; 139:8.
15. As asserted by the philosopher Charles Blount in his treatise, Summary
Account of the Deist’s Religion (1695).
16. “Beatitudo ultimus finis humanae vitae” (Happiness is the last end of
human life) See also Summa q. 90, a2.
17 See also Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 4:13.
18. Baruch de Spinoza formulated in his Ethica more geometrico (1677): “Blessed-
ness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself ” (V, prop. 42).
19. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, in Star of the West, vol. 16, p. 404.
20. Cf. Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 120; Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Íqán 213–14;
Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 9:4-5; 15:2; Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 133; 134; 137:4; 139:8;
Bahá’u’lláh, Epistle 149; ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Secret 40, 55; ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Will and
Testament 1:8, 23–24.
21. See ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Selections 225:3.
22. See also ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Secret 46, 60.
23. Cf. Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 99; 106:3. On this subject see Schaefer,
Imperishable Dominion 206ff; Schaefer, Bahá’í Ethics 1:173ff.; Schaefer, Was ist der
Mensch?, 49ff.
24. Rom. 9:15, 20.
25. “Omne aliud a Deo ideo est bonum, quia a Deo volitum, et non converso . . .
Quia est bonum, ideo acceptatum” (Duns Scotus, op. Oxoniense IIId.19qu.1n.7).
On the moral theology of Duns Scotus, see Welzel 66ff.
26. “Adeo enim summa est iustitiae regula Dei voluntas, ut quidquid eo ipso
quod vult iustum habendum est” (Calvin III,23,2).
27. Cf. al-mut‘tazila, in Encylopedia Iranica 2:783–93. According to Hourani its
literature “is all the more remarkable because it owes little to the Greeks except
in an indirect and diffuse way.” It appears to him “as chronologically the second
major occurance in history of a profound discussion on the meanings and gener-
al content of ethical concepts, the first being that of the ancient Greek sophists
and Plato” (21).
28. Abu’l-Has.an al-Ash‘arí was a leading conservative theologian in Sunni
24 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006

Islam (260/873–324/935). An introduction to his work is given by Hourani
(118–123). A summary of the controversies of both schools is provided by Saiedi:
“These two schools took contradictory positions on five essential theological
questions. First, the Mutazilites believed in the validity of reason and rational
understanding. For them, the use of rational discourse to discover the hidden
meanings of the verses of the Qur’án was necessary and valid. The Ash’arites, on
the contrary, rejected the validity of reason and called for a blind and literal
understanding of scripture—that is, the Qur’án and the Islamic traditions.
Second, the rationalistic premises of the Mutazilites led them to maintain that
God is a transcendental reality devoid of attributes and determinations.
Ash’arites believed in an anthropomorphic God, with attributes taken to be real
and literal, and not metaphorical. Third, the Mutazilites believed that the Word
of God—the Qur’án—is not eternal and co-existent with God, but created and
temporal. Hence for them, the verses of the Qur’án should be understood to be
specific and applicable only to a relevant context. For the Ash’arites, however, the
Qur’án was eternal and uncreated and, therefore, valid for any time, for any situ-
ation, and in any context. Fourth, Mutazilites accepted the notion of the law of
casuality and the laws of nature, while the Ash’arite theology casuality was mere-
ly an illusion; every event in the world is directly created by the will of God, and
nothing can be explained in naturalistic terms. Finally, Mutazilite theology
admitted some freedom of will for individual human beings. Ash’arites advocat-
ed a deterministic philosophy. Unfortunately for the cause of reason, the religious
and political battle between the rationalist Mutazilites and the literalist
Ash’arites was concluded in the eleventh century by a decisive victory of the
Ash’arites” (“Faith, Reason and Society” 12). For a brief discussion of this debate,
see Rahman.
29. On “the rationalist ethics of ‘Abd al-Jabbár,” see Hourani 98ff.
30. Hourani calls it “theistic subjectivism” (17).
31. Cf. 148, 183.
32. From Greek, theos: God, nomos: law.
33. Polytheism. Cf. Qur’án 4:48, 116; 31:13. See also Shorter Encyclopedia of
Islam (SEI), 542ff.
34. A philosopher, Baruch de Spinoza, came to the same conclusion: “I confess
that this opinion, which subjects all things to a certain indifferent will of God,
Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics 25

and makes all things depend on his good pleasure, is nearer the truth than that of
those who maintain that God does all things for the sake of the good. For they
seem to place something outside God, which does not depend on God, to which
God attends, as a model, in what he does, and at which he aims, as at a certain
goal. This is simply to subject God to fate. Nothing more absurd can be main-
tained about God, whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause, both
of the essence of all things, and of their existence” (The Ethics [Ethica more geo-
metrico], I Proposition 33 [II/76]).
35. According to Thomas, the laws of the Decalogue belong to the natural law.
36. See Schaefer, Beyond the Clash 135ff., 147ff.
37. Cf. Baha’u’lláh, Gleanings 134:2; 133:2.
38. Qur’án 16:36; 35:24. According to Baha’u’lláh, Gleanings 87:1,6, there have
been messengers sent down to mankind who have not been mentioned in the
sacred scriptures, and revelation took place even before Adam.
39. See also Baha’u’lláh, Tablets 11:2.
40. Everywhere, even in “primitive” cultures, there are duties of parents
towards their children, of children towards their parents; everywhere kindness,
gratefulness, truthfulness, benevolence, rectitude are regarded as “good,” greed
and covetousness, envy, cruelty, malice as “evil.”
41. This truth has been expressed by the declaration of the Parliament of the
World’s Religions on 28 August 1993 in Chicago as a principle of a global ethic,
according to which “there is already a consensus among the religions which can
be the basis of a global ethic,” a “fundamental consensus on binding values, irrev-
ocable standards, and personal attitudes” (Küng and Kuschel 18 and 21). For more
on this subject, see Küng, Global Responsibility; Yes to a Global Ethic.
42. On this subject, see Schaefer, Beyond the Clash 114ff.
43. It is true that the existing religious moral systems are different in many
aspects, but what they have in common exceeds their differences by far, even if the
differences are more conspicuous because we regard their common features as self-
evident. Revelation is related to the capacity of the people to whom it is directed,
and this capacity differs according to their spiritual, cultural, and social develop-
ment: “These principles and laws, these firmly-established and mighty systems,
have proceeded from one Source, and are the rays of one Light. That they differ
one from another is to be attributed to the varying requirements of the ages in
26 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006

which they were promulgated” (Baha’u’lláh, Gleanings 132:1). On the relativity of
the revelation, see Momen, “Relativism”; Schaefer, Beyond the Clash 131ff.
44. “[I]t is faith, knowledge, certitude, justice, piety, righteousness, trustworthi-
ness, love of God, benevolence, purity, detachment, humility, meekness, patience
and constancy. . . . These virtues of humanity will be renewed in each of the dif-
ferent cycles; for at the end of every cycle the spiritual Law of God—that is to
say, the human virtues—disappears, and only the form subsists” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá,
Some Answered Questions 9–10).
45. On the horizontal dimension of the revelation see Schaefer, Beyond the Clash
137ff.
46. “The law of love” appears here as pars pro toto for the unchangeable “Law
of God” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions 11:9).
47. Bahá’u’lláh, “Lawh.-i-Umm-i-Rah.im,” qtd. from Bahá’í Scripture 248f. (see
also Esslemont 181).
48. Cf. Baha’u’lláh, Hidden Words, Arabic 3, 4-6.
49. On the “hidden God” (deus absconditus), see Schaefer, Beyond the Clash 122ff.;
Lambden, “Background and Centrality.”
50. Cf. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions 45:2, where ‘Abdu’l-Bahá eluci-
dates the two categories, “essential” and “conferred” infallibility. For more detail
on the concept of infallibility, see Schaefer, Towfigh, and Gollmer 168ff and
Schaefer, “Infallible Institutions?” 7–11.
51. Ma‘s. um, from ‘is. ma, infallibility.
52. Manifested in the verse: “Whoso recognizeth them hath recognized God.
Whoso hearkeneth to their call, hath hearkened to the Voice of God, and whoso
testifieth to the truth of their Revelation, hath testified to the truth of God
Himself. Whoso turneth away from them, hath turned away from God, and
whoso disbelieveth in them, hath disbelieved in God” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 21).
53. Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 47, 183; Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 8:17-19; ‘Abdu’l-
Bahá, Some Answered Questions 45. On this subject, see also ch. 2:4.
54 . See Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas, par. 47, 162–63, 183.
55. See Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 8:17–19.
56. Cf. Qur’án 2:254, 22:14.
57. I. e., the Manifestation.
58. Cf. Qur’án 21:23.
Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics 27

59. This doctrine is also the subject of Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 8:17-19.
60. An imaginary fixed point outside the earth, after a legendary saying by
Archimedes: “Give me a place to stand and I will move the earth.”
61. See also Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 17:34, 45.
62. Qur’án 1:6; Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 4:8, 5:17.
63. Bahá’u’lláh, qtd. in Introduction to the Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 6.
64. Cf. Luke 17:1; Mat. 18:7; Gal. 5:11. The underlying Greek word skandalon
means originally a snare, something that causes people to stumble.
65. Cf. I Cor. 1:28.
66. Refer to my essay “‘The Balance Hath Been Appointed’” 46ff. and Schaefer,
Towfigh, and Gollmer 411ff.
67. Bahá’u’lláh, qtd. in Shoghi Effendi, World Order 109.
68. These fears “should indeed be likened to the cries of the suckling babe
weaned from his mother’s milk” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 88).
69. Their knowledge is “like the cognizance and consciousness man has of him-
self ” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions 40:4).
70. “For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways,
saith the Lord” (Isaiah 55:8).
71. Cf. SEI, s.v. “Sharí‘a,” 525.
72 . See also Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 8:30; 9:11; 11:41.
73. See ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks 9:20; 17:10; 22:4-5.
74. See also Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 131:3.
75. See also ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks 31:5.
76. Sharaha; cf. Qurán 6:125; 94:2.
77. Cf. Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 5:5; 6:56.
78. Individualism is the view according to which the individual, his interests,
and rights are superior to those of the society and the state. Liberalism is the doc-
trine that individual freedom in economic enterprise should not be restricted by
government or social regulation (laissez faire).
79. Cf. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks 47:5.
80. Cf. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Secret 2, 3, 20, 32, 97, 103; ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks 47:5.
81. In the English edition of the Kitáb-i-Aqdas (par. 19, 49) reductionistically
translated as “adultery.”
82. In an unpublished tablet quoted in a letter of the Universal House of
28 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006

Justice to the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States
dated 11 September 1995.
83. Such as Cyprian, Tertullian, Hieronymus, Augustine, and others, with ref-
erence to I Cor. 7:1ff.
84. For further details, see Schaefer, Imperishable Dominion 175ff.
85. See also Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 3:25 and 8:61.
86. Cf. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Selections 152; ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions 77:2-
3, 6-10. On this subject see Schaefer, “Crime and Punishment” 51.
87. The great Italian jurist Cesare Beccaria who lived in the eighteenth centu-
ry was the first to plead for this goal in his work Dei delitti e delle pene (1764).
88. Lexicon 1986, vol. 9, col. 1097, with reference to the dictum Punitur quia pec-
catum est.
89. See ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Promulgation 197.
90. See also ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks 23:8; Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 83:1; 95:1;
‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Secret 1.
91. Cf. Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 75:1; 84:2; Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 10:23, etc.
92. SEI 562ff.; Halm 118ff., 133ff.; Momen, Introduction 175.
93. Cf. Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 189; Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 33:2.

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