Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Samuel Graham Wilson, Modern Movements among Moslems, bahai-library.com.
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Modern Movements Among Moslems
Modern Movements Among
Moslems

By

SAMUEL GRAHAM WILSON, D.D.

Thirty-two Years Resident in Persia
Author of “Persian Life and Customs”
“Bahaism and Its Claims,” etc.

NEW YORK CHICAGO TORONTO
Fleming H. Revell Company
LONDON AND EDINBURGH

Copyright, 1916, by

FLEMING H. REVELL COMPANY

New York: 158 Fifth Avenue
Chicago: 125 N. Wabash Ave.
Toronto: 25 Richmond St., W.
London: 21 Paternoster Square
Edinburgh: 100 Princes Street

PREFACE

THE Western world is showing increasing inter-
est in Moslems. The great movement which
has developed so marvellously in Eastern Asia
affects Moslem peoples as well. Recent political up-
heavals in the Near East resulted in the proclamation
of Constitutional governments in Turkey and Persia.
In one year three autocratic Moslem rulers were de-
throned. A spirit of Nationalism is growing. Events
have followed in quick succession, leading up to the
participation of Turkey in the World War. Her call
has gone forth to all Islamic peoples to engage in a
Holy War of deliverance. The Ottoman Empire
occupies a unique position in the great contest of arms.

Study of Islam as a religion has made great prog-
ress in recent times; critical examination of its his-
tory and traditions by eminent scholars has thrown
much new light upon it. Its present remarkable ad-
vance in Africa and Indonesia and the entrance into
it of modernist influences from Western civilization
have engaged the attention of all students of religion.
The awakening of the Christian Church to its duty
to evangelize the Moslems and its undertaking work
to this end is enlisting another large element to con-
sider Islam. So it has come about that the statesman,
the historian, the sociologist, the theologian, the mis-
sionary give thought to the affairs of the Islamic

world as never before. Contemporary literature indi-
cates the spread of this interest, especially new period-
icals in different European languages which are de-
voted exclusively to Islam. Even fiction is seeking
its themes and plots among the followers of Mo-
hammed.

Residence in the Near East, for a generation, in
personal contact and converse with Moslems, with
opportunities of travel among them in Persia, Russia,
Turkey, Syria, and Egypt, and study and observation
of contemporary events, supplementing knowledge of
the history and doctrines of Islam, have given Mos-
lem peoples a large place in my vision and thought.
For this reason, when I was elected to deliver the
course of lectures on the L. H. Severance Founda-
tion before the Western Theological Seminary of the
Presbyterian Church, at Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, I
chose a subject connected with Islam. These lectures
on “Modern Movements Among Moslems,” in a
much enlarged form, constitute the present volume.
Study about the Moslem world has a fascination for
me, and I trust this review of present-day events and
movements in the life, thought, religion, society, and
politics of Mohammedan lands may arrest attention
and inspire efforts for the welfare of these millions
of our fellow-men.

S. G. W.

CONTENTS

I. INNOVATIONS IN ISLAM 11

Is Islam Inflexible? Opinions of Fairbairn,
Muir, Cromer, Palgrave—Modifications: In
Lifetime of Mohammed; by Sufiism, Panthe-
ism, Darvishes—The Stages—Zikr—Sheikhs
—Saint-worship—Veneration of Tombs—
Intercessors—Apotheosis of Mohammed—
Uncreated Koran—Development of Clergy
—Their Orders—Pirs—Marseyakhans—The
Shariat, Law—Its Growth—Adaptation from
Romans and Christians—Urfi in Persia—Code
Napoleon in Turkey—Accommodations about
Commerce, Jihad, Caliphate, Superstitions—
Caste—Rites—Present-day Question: Shall
Islam be Modified?—Possible Methods—Dif-
ferent Parties—Subjects to be Treated.

II. THE REVIVAL IN ISLAM 52

Eighteenth-century Decline—“The Revival”:
Its Cause—(1) Wahabism: Its Founder—
Doctrines, History, Influence; in India;
Faraiis; Danfodio; Revival in Turkey—(2)
Pan-Islamism: Its Purpose—Racial Divisions
—Osmanli Caliphate—Qualifications—Not
Character—Attitude of Arabs—Its Propa-
ganda—Khojas—Dallals—With Shiahs—
Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din—From Mecca—Hajis—
In Malaysia, China, Russia, India, Africa—
Repression of Christianity—Armenian Mas-
sacres, as a Victory for Islam—Triumph over
Greece—Anger at Christian Aggression—
Holy War—Its Doctrinal Basis—Dar-ul-Harb
—Recent Jihads—The Present Jihad—Mili-
tary Pan-Islamism a Failure.

III. ISLAMIC MISSIONS 94

Zeal in Propagating Faith—Darvish Orders—
Conversions by Sword, by Persuasion; in
Africa—Methods—Their Spirit—The Sanusi-
yahs: Founder, Organization, Zeal, Principles,
Results—Other Islamic Missions—Russia—
India—Malaysia—Japan—Mission Societies
and Congresses.

IV. Mahdiist Movements 112

Expectation of a Mahdi—Traditions—History—
Modern Mahdis—(1) The Bab: His Claim;
the Name; Life; Imprisonment; Insurrec-
tions; Doctrines—Abrogation of Islam;
Morals; Effect; Offshoots of Babism—(2)
Subh-i-Azal—(3) Baha Ullah; Their Quar-
rel; Baha’s Claim; Doctrines; an Incarna-
tion; “Return”; Allegorizing; Symbolism;
Rites; Laws; Quarrel over the Succession;
Propaganda in America; Pilgrimage; Abdul
Baha; Visits Occident—(4) Gulam Ahmad:
Ahmadiyas; His Claim; Teaching About
Christ; Peaceful Mahdi; Prophecies; Propa-
ganda; Results; Mission in England; Com-
parison with Bahaism—(5) Mohammed Ah-
mad of the Sudan: His Preaching; Egyp-
tian Rule; Mahdi’s Conquests; Doctrines and
Laws; Character; Death; Khalifa Abdullah;
Gordon at Khartum; Overthrow; Results.

V. Modernism in Islam 149

Neo-Islam. Source of—Influence—Repressed in
Turkey—Later Liberalism—Sheikh-ul-Islam
—In Persia—Restrictions—Mullah Sadra—
Sheikh Ahmad—Sigat-ul-Islam—Haji Hadi—
Egypt—Sheikh Mohammed Abdu—El Bakri
—“Back to the Koran”—Actual Reforms—
Malaysia—Society of Islam—Russia—Con-
forming in Social Life—Gasparinski—Among
the Tartars—Congress at Petrograd—India—
Advanced Position—Ahmad Khan—Aligarh
—Justice Amir Ali: On Inspiration; the
Supernatural; Right of Private Judgment—
Ali Hasan—Khuda Bakhsh—Mulvi Abdullah
—Reformers on Assassination—Loyalty to
Mohammed—Mutazalis—Influence of Neo-
Islam.

VI. The New Education in Islam 172

Modernism in Education—Mosque Schools—
Curriculum—Arabic a Hindrance—Madressas
—Al Azhar—Its Conservatism—Influences
from Europe—Students Abroad—Aspirations
—Persia—Shah’s College—Modern Schools—
Turkey—Schemes of Reforming Sultans—
New Vernacular Literature—Under Abdul
Hamid—Under Constitution—Turkish Boy
Scouts—Egypt—Khedive’s Schools—Girls’
Education—French Africa—India—Con-
gresses—Aligarh College—The New Educa-
tion, a Reflex of the Christian Learning—Not
under Mullahs—Is Liberalizing—The Press
—Newspapers—Translating of Koran.

VII. Neo-Islam and Society 194

In Social Life—Islam and Society—Woman
before Islam, in Arabia, Africa, East In-
dies—Marriage Law—Seclusion—Neo-Islam
against Polygamy and Harem—Review of
Countries—Under Young Turks—Slavery—
Decreasing—Abolition of Slave Trade—Neo-
Islam Concerning Religious Liberty—Disap-
pointing—Advance in Practice—Can Modern-
ism Change Islam?—Opinions.

VIII. Political Movements Among Mos-
lems 217

Christian Rule over Moslems—Extent—Process
—Influence of Opposition to—Expatriation—
Legal Adjustments—Attitude of Christian Gov-
ernments; Partial; Favourable to Its Prog-
ress—Moslems Unreconciled—Nationalism—
Influence of Japan on—In India—In Egypt
—Khedive Ismiel—Arabi Rebellion—Assassi-
nation of Poudros Pasha—Young Egyp-
tians—Roosevelt—Kitchener—National As-
sembly—British Protectorate—Sultan Husain
—In North Africa—Russia—Arabia—Al-
bania—Moslem Countries Influenced by
Christian Civilization—Dependent Economic-
ally—Persia—Reformers—Amir-i-Nizam—
Malcom Khan—Jamal-ud-Din—Tobacco Mo-
nopoly—Assassination of Shah—Constitution
—Revolution—Causes—Participation of Mul-
lahs—Effects, Religious, Civil—Economic
Conditions—Political Outlook.

IX. Political Reforms in the Turkish
Empire 255

Reforming Sultans—Hatti Sherif—Humayun—
Constitution of 1876—Abdul Hamid—Reign—
Armenian Massacres—Young Turks—Revo-
lution—Constitution—Mutiny—Sultan Mah-
mud V—New Régime—Italian and Balkan
Wars—Ottomanization—Abolition of Capitu-
lations—Of Privileges—Of Millats—Of Lib-
erty of Religious Instruction—The Holy War
—Germany and England—The Jihad in Per-
sia—In Egypt—British Protectorate—Sultan
Husain—Attempts on His Life—Results of
War on Turkey—Armenian Atrocities—Need
of Christian Missions.

Index 293

INNOVATIONS IN ISLAM

THE modern age is one of movement and change.
The Moslem world is swept by currents of
thought and life. The action and reaction of
influences local and worldwide are affecting Islam.
The Faith, to the Moslem, has intimate relation to all
affairs, whether political, social, or religious. I wish
to review Modern Movements among Moslems,
whether these have been set in motion within Islam or
from without, whether they have resulted in its de-
terioration or reform, in its decline or progress.

As a preliminary question, it is well to inquire how
far it is possible to influence Islam by new forces,
external and internal, and to what extent this has
occurred. Is Islam changeable or not? Do Moslems
vary their belief and worship? Has the mode of in-
terpreting and executing their Law remained station-
ary? True conceptions of the past and the present
will show what it is reasonable to expect in the future.

It is a common conception that Islam is fixed and
stationary. It is said to be its boast that “it is always
the same,—inflexible, neither requiring adaptation nor
capable of it.” Concerning this, Principal Fairbairn
says: “It is the most inflexible of all positive religions.
A religion, to be permanent, must be progressive,—

capable of formal without essential change. But a sys-
tem in which the form is as divine as the spirit, the
institution as the truth, is a system which can allow
no change, no progress. Islam is an elastic spirit
placed in an iron framework. The progressive is sacri-
ficed to the stationary” (Contemporary Review, Vol.
XL, p. 806). In accordance with this opinion are the
words of Sir William Muir (“Caliphate,” p. 594):
“Swathed in the bands of the Koran, the Moslem
faith, unlike the Christian, is powerless to adapt itself
to varying time and place, keep pace with the march
of humanity, direct and purify the social life, and
elevate mankind.” And with the philosopher and the
historian agrees the statesman. Lord Cromer writes
(“Modern Egypt,” Vol. II, p. 202): “The Moslem
stands in everything on the ancient ways, because he
is a Moslem, because the customs which are inter-
woven with his religion forbid him to change.”
Lastly I quote the opinion of the great traveller in
Arabia, Palgrave (“Arabia,” Vol. I, p. 372): “Islam-
ism is in itself stationary, and was framed thus to
remain. It justly repudiates all change, all develop-
ment. To borrow the forcible words of Lord
Houghton: ‘The written book is there, the dead man’s
hand, stiff and motionless; whatever savours of vitality
is by that alone convicted of heresy and defection.’”

Undoubtedly these views state correctly the genius
of Mohammedanism. Such has been the orthodox
position. It asserts that “no advance, no change has
been admitted into orthodox Islam during the past
thousand years” (Stanley Lane-Poole). Islam, as
settled from the traditions by the great Imams, Abu

Hanifa, Shaft, Ibn Malik, and Ibn Hanbal, must re-
main fixed.

But this is only one side of the shield. Historically
and actually these dicta of our great writers are but
partially true. Let it not be considered strange that
I should take as a subject, “Movements Among Mos-
lems.” For remarkable modifications have taken
place in Islam in the past, and conspicuous changes
are occurring and are being attempted at the present
time. It is all the more interesting to consider these
movements because of the idea that is in many minds
that Islam is immovable.

In his own day the Prophet exercised his authority
to make modifications, such as changing the Kibla
from Jerusalem to Mecca and introducing the semi-
idolatrous and superstitious rites of the pilgrimage
around the Kaaba. After his death many things were
added on the authority of traditions,—reputed sayings
of the Prophet, created to suit circumstances. The
details of the system had not been fixed, and disputes
over doctrines, forms, and polities culminated in fierce
and bloody struggles. Persecution fixed the religion
and made disputes dangerous. The spirit arose which
is shown in the story told of Omar, that he appointed
a commission of six to settle certain points and decreed
that the minority, if any, should be decapitated. Under
such persuasion to agreement, unanimity would doubt-
less prevail. But notwithstanding the often arbitrary
rule of the Caliphs, Islam has been influenced and
modified. Some changes have been wrought from
within; more have come through the influence of con-
verted races; not a few from the creeds and philoso-

phies of rival and alien peoples. Most modifications
have been received unconsciously by accommodations
and adaptations. Doctrines and rites have been as-
similated which seem even contrary to the spirit and
to the letter of the Faith. The conceptions of Mo-
hammedans have varied and do vary. So much is
this the case that “The Report on the Special Prepara-
tion for Missionaries to Moslems in the Near East”
says: “One cannot obtain a complete knowledge of
Mohammedanism from books, especially those that
deal with its early history and the claims and contents
of its Faith. The modern missionary meets and deals
with a modified Mohammedanism, and it is this he
should know and understand.”

Only from a knowledge of what changes Islam has
undergone in the past, can it be rightly estimated
what may be the effects of the present-day move-
ments. And only from the knowledge of the latter
and the conditions that prevail can the agents of the
Christian propaganda rightly direct their efforts and
exert their influence.

SUFIISM MODIFIES ISLAM

One element which has permeated and modified
Islam is Sufiism. This is universally recognized.
Sufiism is a pantheistic mysticism. It is a philosophy,
almost a religion, which has been added to and mixed
with the religion of the Prophet and wrought a strange
transformation. Its first great development was in
Persia. Persian thought and literature are imbued and
permeated with it. And the influence of Persia on
Mohammedan thought has been without measure.

The Arab historian Ibn Chaldoun says: “The ma-
jority of those who taught and preserved the sacred
traditions were Persians, and the same is true of our
systematic theologians and commentators on the Ko-
ran.” Many of these were pantheists in philosophy,
and they sought to find a basis for it in the new re-
ligion by explaining texts of the Koran in accordance
with it. By Sufiism the rigid monotheism of Islam
has received a pantheistic mode among millions of its
votaries. The simple creed, “There is no God but
God” has come to mean to them, God is the only be-
ing,—the universe is but a mode of God’s existence.
As the poet Jami says (Browne, in “Religious Sys-
tems of the World,” p. 327),

“Thou art absolute being, all else is but phantasm,
For in thy universe all things are one.”

The absolute supreme Being, perfect Goodness, per-
fect Beauty, manifested the world that he might be
known and loved, according to the saying of the
Koran, “I desired to be known, therefore I created
the world.” The first creation was the Primal Intelli-
gence or Will, and from it and through it came into
being all spirits, intelligences, and the elements.
Man’s soul is from God and “verily unto Him do we
return.” Belief in the tohid, or unity of God, means
to hold to, and to desire to attain to, union with Him
as the aim of all things. Man is God. Mullah Jalal-
ud-Din exclaims to his spiritual Guide, “Oh, my
Master, you have completed my doctrine by teaching
me that you are God and that all things are God.”
The waves when they settle down become the sea,

so men are the waves of God and after death return
to His bosom. Hence the injunction, “Adore God in
His creatures” (J. P. Brown: “The Dervishes,” p.
333). Since all is God, there is no idolatry, for all
worship is rendered to the One, though maybe with
imperfections.

Sufiism gives allegorical and mystical interpreta-
tion to the doctrines and rites of Islam. It delights
to picture the relation of the soul to God as that of
Lover and Beloved, the enraptured, entranced one con-
templating the Supreme Beauty. All the imagery of
love and the thrill of amorous passion set forth spiritual
communion. The delights of the senses, the intoxica-
tion of wine and hasheesh, are symbols of divine things.
The great Persian poets, Fardusi, Saadi, Hafiz, and
Nizami, abound in praises of wine and love. One party
considered them unorthodox. Fardusi was on account
of this accusation refused his reward for his poem
and burial in the public cemetery. A Shiah Mujtahid
destroyed the first monument erected over Saadi’s
grave at Shiraz. Hafiz, now regarded as a saint and
his tomb as a shrine, was at first refused burial by
Mohammedan rites. Finally they drew lots to settle
it. A child opened at random upon the following
verse of Hafiz:

“Withhold not thy foot from Hafiz;
For though he be drowned in sin,
He fareth to heaven.”

He was considered a libertine, fond of wine, women,
and music. Sufis pretend that his amorous and bac-
chanalian poetry is allegorical. He has the fortune
to be “adored by both saints and sinners.” It requires

much credulity to believe that their antinomian verses
relate to spiritual desires. Even this summer, a Mos-
lem writer (Islamic Review, July, 1915) interprets
the secularism and pessimism of Omar-i-Khayyam as
spiritual and orthodox. In truth, Sufis are free from
the Law, and not only from its rites but from its re-
strictions on conduct. Shams-i-Din says (quoted in
Canon Sell’s “Sufiism,” p. 64):

“The man of God is beyond infidelity and religion,
To the man of God infidelity and religion are alike.”

The “Masnavi” of Jalal-ud-Din says: “When one is
out of the Kaaba, he looks towards it, but for him who
is in the Kaaba, it imports not what direction he
turns.” One in God’s love need not fulfil the Law.

Sufiism involves a different conception of salvation
from Islam. Salvation, according to it, is to be freed
from self, to be in union with God, by means of in-
crease in the knowledge and love of Him. Man the
seeker after the Truth is a traveller on life’s journey.
The goal is God. The Way has various stages or
degrees. Beginning with the Law, obedience to the
Shariat, the traveller passes to the Path of Mystic
Rites, bringing purity, then to Knowledge, immediate
communion with God, and further on to the stage
when he is in Truth itself, united to God. The last
stage is called fana, which is usually translated “anni-
hilation.” The word is interpreted by Al Sarraj, a
philosophic mystic (R. A. Nicholson, Roy. Geog. Soc.,
1913, p. 61), to mean a “passing away,” in opposi-
tion to the word baga, “continuance,” a passing away
of conscious thought of self, a passing away from pas-

sions and desires and even perceptions and the concen-
tration of all entirely on God. Others regard it as
such an entire absorption of self in God that the
individual can say, “I am God.”

The means of progress in the Way are contempla-
tion, meditation, adoration, remembrance of God, in-
duced and aided by rites peculiar to Sufiism. After
the first stages, ordinary forms of prayer and worship
and reading of the Koran are neglected, and emphasis
is placed on the inner light, “the eye of the heart,” as
the instrument of direct communication with God.
The ritual used to incite this condition is called the
Zikr. This includes various recitations, repetitions,
and physical and mental gymnastics, by which the mind
is fixed on God and the emotions and nerves excited.
The formula for repetition is varied, but the most
common words are the name Allah, repeated 1,001
times, or the ninety-nine names of God, or the first
clause of the Creed, the kalima, “La ilia ill Allah.”
These words are repeated until an ecstatic or hypnotic
stage is reached. This zikr is pronounced by no less
an authority than Professor Margoliouth to be a com-
pound of “various hysterical and hypnotizing proc-
esses.” The zikrs are of two kinds, silent and vocal.
They are sometimes accompanied by a variety of mo-
tions, as swaying, whirling, dancing, or by ejacula-
tions, singing, or howling like a dog. Musical instru-
ments are used either for the soothing effect or to give
vivacious movement. The order of the Maulavis have
a band of six or more instruments. This is a striking
innovation, for tradition says that Mohammed stopped
his ears when he heard the music of a pipe. Some

orders prepare for the zikr1 by long periods of soli-
tude, fasting, and vigils. The disciples, who are called
darvishes or fakirs, when in this state of trance see
visions, experience ecstasies, are excited to frenzy, or
fall into unconsciousness. In this state some of them
perform wonderful feats, such as eating, without pain,
red-hot coals, handling and placing in their mouths
red-hot irons, eating live snakes and scorpions, pound-
ing their bodies with rocks, or lying prostrate to be
trodden upon by the Sheikh’s horse.

ORDERS OF DARVISHES

The one who has passed through the stages and at-
tained oneness becomes a Sheikh or Murshid, to guide
others to attain. The disciple must submit his will to
the Sheikh’s will, vow to obey him and forsake self,
surrender all control of his thought and personality
to the Sheikh. Certain classes of darvishes take vows
of poverty and beg from door to door. From this the
name is derived, dar meaning door in Persian. There
are many Orders. A very few of them have the vow
of celibacy as the Baktashi had at first. But this is
contrary to the genius of Islam. Tradition reports
that Mohammed said: “When the servant of God

1 Some students of Islam attach considerable value to its mys-
ticism and to more spiritual forms of the zikr as a means of
soul-uplift. Among these are Prof. D. B. Macdonald and Rev.
G. Swan of Egypt. The latter (Moslem World, 1912, p. 380) ex-
presses the conviction that the study of the aims and effects
of the zikr might aid the evangelistic missionary, and that
Christians, by imitating it or by finding a substitute for it, might
disclose a source of satisfaction to the heart. He puts the query
whether it is not in it that the secret power of Islam lies. Most
observers despise the zikr as a religious rite of little value.

marries, he perfects half his religion,” and “One
prayer of a married man is worth seventy of a
bachelor.” Sheikh Abdul Kadir, the founder of the
Kadiris, had four wives, some concubines, and forty-
five children. A Nakshbandi Sheikh told Dr. Hughes
that he had wished to remain celibate, but his disciples
insisted that he should perfect his religion by taking a
wife. Asceticism is practised by neglect of the body
and indifference to worldly comforts. A Persian dar-
vish, half naked, covered with rags and vermin, suf-
fering from hunger and exposure, said to me: “Will
not this subjection of my body purify my soul?” It
is common for darvishes to live in takias or lodges,
sometimes in the crowded city, sometimes in solitary
spots.

The traditions attributing the founding of orders
of darvishes to Abubekr or Ali are no doubt apoc-
ryphal. But Sufiism certainly manifested itself early
in the history of Islam. By the second century this
innovation began to creep in. Perhaps the first order
was that founded by Sheikh Alwan, a Sufi celebrated
for his knowledge and worth ( A.H. 149, A.D. 766).
The movement met with great opposition as contrary
to the orthodoxy of Islam. Some Sufis were punished
as heretics. In A.D. 923 Al Hallaj, a disciple of Al
Junaid and of Imam Reza, uttered the celebrated
words, “I am the Truth, I am God,” and was put
to death for blasphemy. But Al Junaid claimed that
they were not breaking with Islam, and said: “Our
system of doctrines is firmly bound up with the dog-
mas of the faith, the Koran, and the Traditions.”
Imam Al Gazzali, called the Plato of Moslems, se-

cured recognition in Islam for Sufi mysticism as a
system in opposition to scholasticism. Ibn Tufail ac-
complished the same in the West, i.e., Spain and North
Africa. Palgrave says (“Essays on Eastern Ques-
tions,” p. 52): “The Darvishes, secretly subverting
the very foundations of Islam, have nevertheless,
thanks to legists like Abu Hanifa, doctors like Ahmad
al Ghazali, and Sultans like Bayazid II, succeeded in
vindicating to themselves a sufficient though not an
unquestioned reputation for Orthodoxy. Different
orders were organized from time to time and spread
throughout Islam. Each founder gave a distinct prac-
tice and rules to his order. The coming to the throne
of Persia of a Sufi dynasty, in 1501, was the signal
for an effort to suppress the darvish orders in the
Ottoman empire, as the enemies of Sunniism. In
1656 the suppression of the orders was again at-
tempted, by the government combined with the Ulema,
and aided by the popular passion of the orthodox
Sunnis. Again on the destruction of the Janisaries,
1826, the darvishes of Constantinople were exiled and
some of the Sheikhs of the Bektashi executed. But
all these attempts came to naught.

Of late years the growth of the darvish orders in
number and influence has been striking. Dozy says:
“The influence which Sufiism has exercised over the
Moslem world, and which in our day is rather in-
creasing, has been extremely great.” Since his time
there has been a greater increase. Now Von Kremer
says: “Sufiism is the preponderating element in Mos-
lem civilization.” The system is spreading in Turkey
and Syria. Abdul Hamid is said to be a member of

the Rufai, or Howling darvishes, as well as of the
Sanusiyah, and to have often attended the zikrs
(Ramsay: “Impressions of Turkey,” p. 150). The
present Sultan, Mohammed V, is of the Maulavi or-
der. There are two hundred lodges in Constantinople.
Professor Macdonald says, in “Aspects of Islam”:
“To the bulk of the population of Egypt, their real
religion is Sufiism as represented in the zikr.” Simon
says: “Nearly every devout Mohammedan in the
Dutch East Indies is a member of such an order”
(“Progress, etc.,” p. 145). In North Africa public
sentiment strongly insists on every person being a
member of some order, and pressure is used to ac-
complish this end. In some provinces every one is an
initiate. The majority of the people of the Sudan
belong to a darvish order. The opposition of the
mullahs has been silenced and conquered, for as Dr.
Hughes says (“Dictionary of Islam,” p. 116):
“There is scarcely a maulavi or learned man in Islam
who is not a member of some religious order.” The
separate orders number well-nigh a hundred.

If Sufiism was a natural expression of religious
conception among the Aryans and owes its origin to
Hindu, Greek, and Persian philosophy, its propaga-
tion in Islam is a striking instance of Persian con-
quest over the religion of its conquerors. The
Semitic races, as well as the Turanian, African, and
Malay, have adopted Sufiism. Even if it did not
spread from Persia as a reaction against Islam, but
took its inception subsequently and independently in
Islam, it is anyhow a foreign element and one that
has influenced the whole fabric of the religion, its

doctrines, its worship, its life. It shows how foreign
elements have been and can be introduced into the
system of Mohammed. It shows that the need was
felt of something more than Islam provided; that
Islam had not that which would satisfy the religious
instincts of the heart, that man desires to draw near
to God and to find a Path, a Way of Approach, and
that he knows that the performance of rites and the
merit of his own works do not secure him this access.
It shows that the Moslem heart yearns for that which
the Christian finds in his union with Christ and com-
munion with the Holy Spirit and in his worship of
the Father in spirit and in truth, not in a formal
prayer-ritual.

SAINT-WORSHIP

Another modification and corruption of Islam is seen
in the prevalence of saint-worship. Veneration of
the Imams, regarding them as manifestations of God,
and rendering them honours as semi-divine, has pre-
vailed among Shiahs and their sects; the development
of creature worship among the Sunnis is connected
with the spread of the darvish orders. Many Sheikhs
or Pirs are regarded as Valis, blessed spirits, possess-
ing superhuman powers, capable of working miracles
of healing by the touch, the breath, or the saliva. Vo-
tive offerings are brought to them to procure their
intercession for blessings. Kissing their hands, with
the expression “I repent on your hands,” is
common, with accompanying trust in their media-
tion. It is believed that pardon is secured through
them for the living suppliant and for the dead.

Ill-gotten gains receive purification through their pro-
nouncement, a percentage being retained. These
Sheikhs are friends of God; they see -visions and
dream dreams for the guidance of the people. Sheikh-
al-Akbar Ibn Arabi claimed that his book was re-
vealed to him in a dream by the Prophet Mohammed.
They are credited with interpreting dreams, exorcis-
ing evil spirits, empowering charms and talismans
against witchcraft, sickness, theft, snake-bite, and all
calamities. Some are supposed to have spiritual
power over souls as kings have over temporalities.
God makes known to them His will with regard
to the actions of men and all the purposes of men
come under their cognizance previous to their being
carried out in deeds (Brown’s “Dervishes,” pp.
80-81).

The takia of the order, the cave or hut of the dar-
vish, or especially the tomb of the venerated Sheikh,
becomes a shrine. For example, Bagdad is called the
City of Saints. In that seat of the Abbasides are
many sacred tombs, including that of Sheikh Abdul
Kadir Jilani. Professor Siraj-ud-Din refers (“Vital
Forces,” p. 168) to the “divine honours paid to this
great Pir,” and adds, “There is nothing more soul-
stirring in Mohammedan worship than to hear these
prayers and hymns chanted in the service of the Pir
Sahib,—continued until early morning.” These dead
Sheikhs are invoked everywhere; vows are made to
them; healing is expected from them. Especially the
pilgrim expects the blessing. He salutes the grave,
prostrates himself, kisses it, holds sacrificial feasts at
it, endows the shrine, carries earth away from the

grave to rub on the sick or a pressed cake of it to
place under his forehead, when he prostrates himself
in prayer. These shrine tombs are very common.
For example, near my home, at Tabriz, on a ridge of
the mountain, there is one called Ainal-Zainal, the
reputed grave of two descendants of Ali. To visit
this on seven successive Fridays is said to be equal
to a pilgrimage to Mecca. So in the surrounding vil-
lages, at Sofian, Sardarud, Ilkachi, on the Ujan, on
Mt. Sahend there are others. So everywhere in trav-
elling one sees Imamzadahs and zayaretgahs. So not
only in Persia, but all over the Islamic world, these
centres of superstition and creature-worship are scat-
tered. Though unauthorized by the Koran or
Shariat, this innovation has spread far and wide in
Islam. The transformation wrought in the religion
by this doctrine of human mediation and intercession
is striking. On the part of the Shiahs it is very deep-
rooted. Imam Husain is deemed a real atoning medi-
ator who by his death at Kerbala has merited the
position of availing intercessor. (See writer’s article,
“The Atoning Saviour of the Shiahs,” Presbyterian
and Reformed Review, V. 1891.) This is constantly
kept in mind by the Muharram month of mourning,
the Passion Play, and the Readers of Lamentations.
The saint-worship has spread everywhere among the
Sunnis in Turkey and Arabia. In Afghanistan
“adoration of the Pirs is universal and constitutes the
religion of the masses.” In Beluchistan Pir worship
at pre-Islamic shrines is widespread. In truth, shrines
of pagan saints are usually turned into Moslem ones.
In Algeria and Maghrib and among the Berbers

Maraboutism is a special characteristic of Islam.
Revered marabouts swarm everywhere and the tend-
ency to deify men and worship saints has eclipsed
the primitive faith (“Encyclopedia of Islam”; Arts.:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Beluchistan). In other parts
of Africa the same is true. There, as well as in
Malaysia, these Sheikhs and the maalims or teachers
have a powerful influence. They are representatives
of God and inherit the reverence given to the heathen
sorcerers. In Java the drosky driver, even with a
European passenger, dismounts when he meets one of
them. Says Mr. Simon: “They are worshipped as
demi-gods. Many people look upon them as their
god. For they are Allah’s friend and work miracles
before one’s very eyes; their curse brings misery;
their blessing happiness. They know the hearts of
all men.” Their supposed influence as intercessors
is very real. As Professor Macdonald says, “In the
lives of the saints we find them exercising again and
again flat pressure upon Allah” (“Vital Forces,” p.
234). To many a Moslem the Vali has become more
real than the Prophet; the Sheikh more powerful than
the mullah; the zikr more efficacious than the namaz
(prayer-rite); the Path more holy than the Law; the
brotherhood of the Order more intimate than the fel-
lowship of the Faith.

THE GLORIFICATION OF MOHAMMED

Another modification of Islam is seen in the glori-
fication of Mohammed. Wahabis, stating the primi-
tive doctrine of Islam, deny Mohammed’s pre-exist-
ence, his power of present intercession, and the law-

fulness of the reverence given to his person and his
tomb. The majority of Moslems, disregarding the
accusation of sacrilege, are increasing in this tend-
ency. The traditions which have grown up may be
seen in the “Life of Mohammed,” the Hiyat-ul-
Qulub, translated by my predecessor in Tabriz, the
Rev. J. L. Merrick. The traditions referring to the
creation and the pre-existence of Mohammed are re-
ceived by Sunnis as well as by Shiahs. According to
these the first creation was the Light of Mohammed—
the Nur-i-Mohammed. Before all else it was created
from the Light of God. This Light of Mohammed
existed alone through several periods of seventy
thousand years and its dwelling-places and experiences
are described with the details of a Milton. When
God decided to make the worlds, He divided the Light
of Mohammed into four portions and from these cre-
ated the Word, the Tablet, the Throne, and from the
fourth portion the angels, the heavens and the earth,
and all intelligences. So Mohammed was before all
things and from him were all things made. It is the
Sufi doctrine of the Primal Will, the Arian doctrine
of Christ, of which it is an evident imitation. In
Shiah Islam, Ali and the other Imams are exalted
almost to the rank of divinity, but orthodox Islam has
not been content without the apotheosis of Moham-
med. Not only is there ascribed to him an unparalleled
glory in the pre-existent state, but there is an idealiza-
tion of his earthly life. His sinlessness is taught,
contrary to the plain statements of the Koran itself
and of the Traditions, which, in the deathbed scene,
among his last words report prayers for pardon. That

which would be sin in other men is made to be only
a sign of divine favour to him, who was granted every
privilege, even though contrary to the Law. He is
regarded as the mediator not only at the Day of Judg-
ment but now and under all conditions,—the inter-
cessor, supreme and all-efficient and availing for his
sinful followers. One cry for pity in the name of
Mohammed blots out the sins of two hundred years.
“Ya Mohammed,” says Dr. Zwemer, “is the open
sesame to every door of difficulty—temporal or spirit-
ual. Sailors sing it while hoisting their sails; ham-
mals groan it to raise a burden; the beggars howl it,
to obtain alms; it is the Beduin’s cry in attacking a
caravan; it hushes babes to sleep, as a cradle song;
it is the pillow of the sick and the last word of the
dying; it is written on the doorposts and in their
hearts as well as since eternity on the throne of God;
it is to the devout Moslem the name above every
name (“Islam: A Challenge,” p. 47). Professor
Siraj-ud-Din, a convert from Islam, now professor in
Forman Christian College, Lahore, says: “No Mo-
hammedans, except perhaps the Wahabis, are truly
unitarian; all others have been led to deify Moham-
med more or less. … Hymns to the Prophet are
sung most enthusiastically and devotionally. Their
whole nature is stirred up and their whole heart goes
out in worship and adoration when these hymns are
sung. The entire popular religion as well as litera-
ture is filled with the deification and glorification of
Mohammed. One popular hymn runs thus:

“‘In every flower and in every plant,
The Light of Mohammed is reflected.’”

(“Vital Forces,” pp. 167-68; comp. pp. 228-30). Pro-
fessor Simon testifies that a similar exaltation of the
personality of Mohammed has occurred in Malaysia.
The same is seen also in the manner of celebrating the
birthday of Mohammed (molud) with increasing en-
thusiasm and devotion. Prof. Stewart Crawford de-
clares that in Syria (International Missionary Review,
1912, p. 608) it amounts to “a practical deification of
the Prophet.” The worshipper, “with all the florid
rhetoric of Oriental imagery,” in direct address sa-
lutes Mohammed “with enthusiastic expressions of
loyalty and devotion, and associates himself with the
heavenly beings in adoration for his person.” Thus
that which we see in Persia occurring with reference
to Ali is occurring all over the Moslem world in refer-
ence to Mohammed.

Besides all this, which seems so like an imitation
of Christianity, there is that other importation into
Islam, in an earlier age, of the doctrine of the uncre-
ated Koran, on the Eternal Tablets—an eternal Word
which was made a book and stayed among us,—a
doctrine which caused such fierce and bloody con-
tests and which finally became a criterion of ortho-
doxy. It is an innovation in Islam as strange as it
is embarrassing to the unitarian Moslem who
would find fault with the Logos doctrine of John’s
Gospel.

MOHAMMEDAN CLERGY

Another modification of Islam in the course of its
history is the development of a clergy—of various
ranks and classes. It is the claim that there are no

priests in Islam. This was true, as it was true also
of primitive Christianity.1

Islam was modelled on the synagogue as was the
Church. Islam has developed a clergy, with grada-
tions and ranks. These vary in different countries.
In Persia there are first the talabas, theological stu-
dents; then the mullahs, who, if assigned to be leaders
of prayers, are called peesh-namaz, or, if preachers,
vaiz. Many mullahs are connected with the local
mosque in the village or the ward of the city, and
act like pastors in performing marriages, funeral
services, as well as tending to matters of divorce and
inheritance. One lucrative portion of their work is
the writing of deeds and contracts. They also solve
questions of conscience for the people. Of higher
degree is the Kazi, who is a judge in matters coming
under the Canon Law. Still higher in rank is the
Mujtahid, who preaches in his special mosque, is pro-
fessor for the talabas, decides questions of the Canon
Law, and judges in civil and criminal suits which per-
tain to it. Over the Mujtahids of each city and prov-
ince are the Chief Mujtahids who reside at Kerbala
and Najef, the centres of the Shiahs, direct the re-
ligious affairs of the sect, issue binding fatvas or de-
crees, and train the mullahs in higher studies. The
Persian Mujtahid has more independent influence and

1 The word hieros is not once used of ministers of the Church
in the New Testament. The Christian presbyter is only a
“priest” in the way that the latter word is a contraction of the
former. The word used by Mohammed in Surah V, 85, for the
Christian clergy is kassisin, the equivalent of presbyter, elder,
Syriac Kashish-a,kasha, Persian Kashish. The word kohen,
priest, was used by the Arabs as the equivalent of sorcerer.

power than the Ulema of Turkey. The Shah has no
religious authority over him, and he is not dependent
on the state for authorization. He has more control
over property right, endowments, and tithes, and is
less accountable for religious funds than in Turkey.
In Turkey the grades of the Mohammedan clergy are
even more numerous. (See H. Dwight’s “Constanti-
nople,” pp. 213-14.) The softas, or students, are
trained in theology and Canon Law in many schools,
the chief of which are at Damascus, Aleppo, Brusa,
and Adrianople. Over all these are one at Constanti-
nople and the Al Azhar at Cairo. In Constantinople
the mosque schools have from ten thousand to twenty
thousand students, half of whom are studying Sacred
Law. Grades whose duties are almost wholly reli-
gious are the Imam, the leader of prayers, and the
Khatib or mudarris, the mosque preacher. Four de-
grees higher than the Khatib is the Mufti, who re-
sembles the lawyer among the Jews in New Testament
times. From this grade are appointed the Kadis;
seven ranks higher is the Grand Mufti, Chief Judge
according to Canon Law; and five grades higher yet
is the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the head of the religious clergy
and of the religio-civil judges. The Sheikh-ul-Islam
is ex-officio Minister of Public Worship and does not
change with the other ministers of the Sultan. He is
also official Interpreter of the Shariat. His decision
for the time is effective, even if it be a fatva deposing
a Sultan. But decisions by him have not binding
force on others of the Ulema. He continues to wear
a long white robe and a yellow turban with a grey
aba, cloak, though the viziers have changed to Euro-

pean dress. All these higher grades are called Ulema,
Doctors, the alim or learned. There is in Turkey no
ordination. The diploma is the authorization and pre-
pares one for appointment, but in Central Asia the
binding of the turban on the head is a sign of author-
ization. In Turkey the duties of many of the Ulema
are both religious and civil, but in Persia as well as
in countries like Russia, where their civil duties are
more restricted, it is more easily realized that their
prime function is religious. In the thought of the
people they are the clergy. Dr. Dwight facetiously
refers to them as “the Ulema who deny that they
are priests, yet act like them.” Palgrave, after stoutly
maintaining the non-priestly character of the Moham-
medan mullahs, says: “Still social fact recognizes
what dogmatic theory denies. Gradations and classi-
fications exist and the functions are intimately con-
nected with and even essential to the religion.” And
as regards India he regretfully admits (“Essays, etc.,”
p. 138) that “Sacerdotal superstition, so proper to
the Hindu, has re-arisen and afflicted Islam with its
taint, so that we see the Indo-Mohammedan investing
the Kazi with a semi-priestly character and function.”
Mr. S. Khuda Bakhsh of India says (quoted by Dr.
Zwemer in Missionary Review): “In its decadence
Islam is priest-begotten and priest-ridden.” Mr.
Simon says: “The Moslem has been delivered over
bound hand and foot to his priesthood in matters that
concern his welfare equally in this world and in the
next” (“Vital Forces,” p. 87). “They have an un-
holy power over the masses of the people. A quiet nod
from these masters of Islam is quite sufficient for an

outbreak of fanaticism in the name of God” (“Prog-
ress of Islam, etc.,” p. 164). Justice Amir Ali con-
tinually refers to the mullahs as clergy. He specially
refers to those of the Shiahs as the “Expounders of
the Law who have assumed the authority and position
of the clergy in Christendom.” Professor Becker of
the Hamburg Colonial Institute (“Christianity and
Islam,” pp. 50-51) says: “The force of Christian
influence produced a priestly class in Islam. …
This influence could not create an organized clergy,
but it produced a clerical class to guard religious
thought and to supervise thought of every kind.” In
Malaysia and Africa, and among the ignorant in many
Moslem lands, the custom is prevalent for the mullah
or mualim to write charms, talismans, and amulets,
use incantations, divination, astrology, and magical
arts, thus degenerating into the status of the kohen
or soothsayer of Mohammed’s times. Besides all this
the mullahs have in some countries added the last
resort of priestcraft, selling indulgences for cash. The
mualim of the East Indies (Simon, p. 82) has a list
of fees for the ransom of the souls of the dead. For
a fee of thirty dollars he will testify on the Day of
Judgment that the dead man has been to Mecca; for
another fee certify that he was a blameless Moslem;
for ten dollars all his sins will be blotted out; for the
“instruction fee” a certificate is given that the man
knew the entire Koran, though the fact be otherwise;
another fee will insure the dead man an animal to
ride on in the Day of Judgment; for five dollars re-
demption-money a son who died a heathen can be
received into Islam and paradise after his death. For

all these fees, amounting to about seventy-five dollars,
salvation is assured to the departed and protection to
the survivors from being tormented by his ghost. So
far has Islam changed in Indonesia. That the re-
wards of priesthood are enjoyed by some of them is
seen in the High Sherif of Mecca. It is said that
this functionary has a paltry income of $400,000 a
year with an added mudakhil or graft of $1,200,000,
and that his Vali has $800,000. Every guide must
pay them a fee of $250 a year. The drawers of the
water from Zem-Zem; the doorkeepers of the Kaaba,
the cameleers who transport the pilgrims,—each pays
his fee. Though most of this money must be passed
up to the coterie at Constantinople to secure the tenure
of their positions, yet when the Vali was arrested by
the Young Turks in October, 1908, and taken to Con-
stantinople, he had amassed a million in money and
an untold treasure in jewels (Simon, p. 121).

Besides the regular mullahs, Islam has a kind of
priest in the Sheikhs of the darvish orders, whom I
have described above. Palgrave confirms what I have
already said, that they “not infrequently arrogate to
themselves supernatural and mystical powers.” They
act as mediators of God’s blessings. They introduce
the murid or neophyte to communion with God,
taking, as it were, for a time the position of God to
him. The Shiahs have, in addition to these, a clerical
class called Marseyakhans, who are influential and
numerous. Their business is to tell stories of the
martyred Imams during Muharram, Ramazan, and at
funerals. Tears that are shed at the recital of these
lamentations are very meritorious, bringing forgive-

ness. These tears are sometimes caught in bot-
tles.

In all these we see large additions to original Mo-
hammedanism. They show how it has been greatly
modified. Bosworth Smith says (“Mohammed and
Mohammedanism,” p. 211): “As instituted by Mo-
hammed it had no priest and no sacrifice. In orthodox
Islam there is no priestly caste, and therefore no fic-
tions of apostolic succession, inherent sanctity, indis-
soluble vows, or powers of absolution.” How
changed it is! We now have an apostolic succession
in the line of Imams, inherent sanctity in the Sayids,
or Sherifs, vows and absolutions connected with the
Pirs, offerings at the tombs to secure the mediation
of the living or of the dead saints, and even the sale
of indulgences in Islam. Kuenen says (quoted in
Missionary Review, 1889, p. 302): “The Moslem
seeks what his faith withholds from him, and seeks
it when the authority which he himself recognizes
forbids him to look for it.”

THE CANON LAW, OR SHARIAT

The Sacred Law was for a thousand years the re-
ligious, civil, and criminal code of Islam. It purports
to be founded on the Koran and the Traditions, which
are reports of the life, conduct, and words of Mo-
hammed,—what he said, what he did, and what he
allowed to be done without rebuke. Traditions are
regarded as authoritative by all sects of Islam, Sunnis,
Shiahs, and Wahabis, but they receive different collec-
tions of traditions as valid. Out of 500,000 traditions
from 4,000 to 6,000 are selected as true, and about

the authenticity of these, even Doctors of the same
sect differ. A third foundation of Law is the ijma,
the agreement or unanimous consent of the Mujtahids
in a decision or interpretation of what is Law. A
fourth foundation is kiyas or inference, reasoning
from analogy from what is in the accepted law.

A small portion of the Law is found in the Koran
itself. Only two hundred verses out of six thousand
are about legal matters. It has no elaborate system.
Stanley Lane-Poole says (“Studies in a Mosque,”
pp. 152-58): “Mohammed never attempted to ar-
range a code of laws. His scattered decisions are few
and often vague. It is surprising how little definite
legislation there is in the Koran. Mohammed had no
desire to make a new code. He seldom appears to
have volunteered a legal decision, except when a dis-
tinct abuse had to be removed; and the legal verses
of the Koran are evidently answers to questions put
to him.”

It has been commonly supposed that the traditions
upon which the Mujtahids founded their codes were
at least of Arabic origin, however much or little may
have been founded on Mohammed’s instruction. But
as the result of scientific research and modern study of
the origin of Mohammedan Law, it is coming to be
clearly recognized that Roman Law lies at the basis
of and is the source of the Shariat. The learned Dr.
I. Goldziher, professor in Vienna University, whom
I had the privilege of hearing discuss Islam at the
Congress of Arts and Sciences at the St. Louis Ex-
position, has made a study and exposition of this
subject. The laws in the Koran and Arabia were

utterly insufficient for the new Arab theocratic em-
pire. In taking charge of the conquered provinces,
the Arabs adopted from and incorporated with their
ordinances the system in vogue among the people over
whom they were ruling. The substance of the Law
was from “alien sources—from contact with foreign
elements” (“The Historians’ History of the World,”
Vol. VIII, p. 296). “The first impulse to the crea-
tion of a Mohammedan system of law was given by
contact with the great spheres of civilization—the
Roman and the Persian. The influence of Roman
Law on the sources of a legal system in Islam is wit-
nessed by the very name given to jurisprudence in
Islam in the beginning (fikh equals prudentia; fakih
equals prudens, lawyer). The influence extended both
to the principle of legal deduction and to particular
legal provisions. In regard to property the new gov-
ernment had to take over many ordinances of Roman
Law, not only particular laws but principles of law.”
Among such principles, he instances that of legal de-
duction from analogies, kiyas, the opinion of the
jurists or rai, which is a literal translation of opinio,
and regard for public utility and interests or istalah,
the equivalent of utilitas publico. “The influence ex-
ercised by Roman legal method in the system of legal
deduction in Islam is more important than the direct
adoption of particular points of law” (Goldziher,
quoted in Khuda Bakhsh: “Essays Indian and Is-
lamic,” p. 393). Professor Macdonald, another inves-
tigator in this department, agrees with these opinions.
He says that the Moslems “learned willingly of the
people among whom they had come. Roman Law

made itself felt. It was the practical school of the court
that they attended. These courts were permitted to
continue in existence till Islam had learned from them
all that was needed. We can still recognize certain
principles which were so carried over. That the duty
of proof lies upon the plaintiff and the right of de-
fending himself with an oath upon the defendant; the
doctrine of invariable custom and that of the different
kinds of legal presumption. These as expressed in
Arabic are almost verbal renderings of the frequent
utterances of Latin Law” (“Development of Muslim
Theology, etc.,” p. 84). An eminent jurist writes
in the Moslem World (1912, p. 354): “The Law of
Justinian lies at the base of the Moslem shariat.” The
latter “resembles in a most striking manner the com-
mon principles and even the specific rules of Roman
Law.” Some of the words are almost translations of
it. The methods of judicial procedure were adopted
from it. “The more developed rules of intestate
succession resemble it; the inheritance is divided legally
into parts similar to the Roman;—in the developed
law of contract we find echoes of the Roman Law;
even vakf, endowment, contains much that resembles
it.” It is even shown that the foundations of the
Shariat to which we referred, namely the Ijma or
Consensus of the Mujtahids and Kiyas, or Deduction
by Analogy, had their counterpart in Roman Law.

Thus, says Professor Becker, of the Hamburg
Colonial Institute (“Christianity and Islam,” p. 34),
“In a few centuries Islam became a complex religious
structure, accurately regulating every department of
human life from the deepest problems of morality to

the daily use of the toothpick and the fashions of dress
and hair. It had high faculties of self-accommoda-
tion to environment, was able to enter upon the heri-
tage of the mixed Greco-Oriental civilization in the
East” (ibid., p. 98). Professor Becker discovers also
a large influence of Christian doctrine and ritual. He
says (p. 73): “The state, society, the individual
economics and morality, were thus collectively under
Christian influence during the early period of Moham-
medanism. Christian ideas came into circulation
among Mohammedans … as utterances given by
Mohammed himself.” “The development of ritual
was derived from pre-existent practices which were
for the most part Christian” (p. 83): such are the
ceremonies of marriage, funerals, preaching, and the
niche in the mosque wall. We have been long accus-
tomed to recognize that Islam received its philosophy
and science, medicine and art from the Greeks, Syrians,
and Persians, and was greatly influenced by Neo-
Platonism and by the dialectics of Aristotle, in its
theology. To these we must add this conviction also,
that its Canon Law, the Shariat, so holy and sanctified
in their eyes, is largely the result of borrowing from
the Romans and Persians.1 Laws and usages adopted
from them were made to appear a part of original Is-
lam. And traditions were invented to suit the circum-

1 Goldziher says further that “contact with the people and
religion of Persia had an influence which was very important in
the development of its legal system. It is hardly possible to over-
estimate the importance of the part played in the development
of Islam by Persia.” Von Kremer mentions Rabbinical Litera-
ture as an influence on Islam, besides the Roman-Byzantine Law
and daily intercourse with the subject nations.

stances and words put into the mouth of Mohammed
or an incident narrated as occurring in his life to give
the sanction of authority to them. After several cen-
turies this Shariat became crystallized and stereotyped
and came to be regarded by the Ulema and by
the whole Islamic world as the unalterable divine
law.

The nineteenth century witnessed remarkable action
regarding the Shariat. Several Moslem states broke
away from its observance, and introduced modern
civil and criminal codes. In Persia the common law,
called the urfi, has been determined by the Shah, his
ministers and custom, and administered by Hoikims,
the judge-governors of the provinces and the districts.
These have regard to the provisions of the Shari but
do not follow it. Indeed a condition of friction and
opposition has existed between the governors and the
Ulema, the Shah’s government trying more and more
to restrict the operation of the Shariat.

In Turkey the reforming Sultans, as they are called,
Sultan Mahmud and Sultan Abdul Mejid, largely set
aside the Shariat. Under the influence of European
civilization and chiefly through the “Great Ilchi,” the
British ambassador, Lord Strafford de Redcliffe, the
Hatti Sharif of Gulkhana was promulgated in 1839
and the Hatti Humayun in 1856. These decrees were
designed to turn the face of Turkey toward progress
and granted a large measure of civil and religious lib-
erty. These were followed by the promulgation of
codes, modelled on the Code Napoleon, and by the
establishment of civil courts. This inaugurated a sys-
tem foreign to Islam, and brought the administration

of law largely under direct control of the state. It
limited the courts of the Ulema, the Mahkama, to
such special subjects as are treated in the Koran, as
marriage, divorce, and inheritance. The Ulema were
greatly dissatisfied. But even when Sultan Abdul
Hamid, in his strong reaction, abolished the Constitu-
tion of 1876, he confirmed the secular Courts and
Codes. “The greater part of the new law,” says
Jurist, “is not in accordance with the Shari.” In re-
gard to penalties, the change is strikingly evident. The
old penalties are simply disregarded. Modern ideas
are conformed to. Instances of conflict between the
Kazis and the judges are not uncommon. For exam-
ple, a Moslem was found guilty of eating food during
the fast of Ramazan. The Kazi condemned him to
have melted hot lead poured down his throat. The
governor declined to inflict the penalty, and referred
the case to Constantinople, where it was pigeonholed
and forgotten. In another case the penalty decreed
was that the man’s tongue should be pulled out. Com-
pliance was refused by the Executive. The only re-
source of the Kazi was to say, “My duty is to decide
according to the law, yours is to execute. My responsi-
bility ends.” An example in the change of law is seen
in commercial transactions. The Shari forbids not
only usury, but all interest, profit on loans and de-
posits, insurance, annuities, conditional contracts, deal-
ing in futures and even a bona-fide sale of crops before
the harvest time or advanced payment on the same.
Even certain exchanges of one commodity for another
are illegal. In accordance with this I have known
Moslems to deposit money solely for safety and re-

fuse to take any interest on it. In Egypt in 1901
the postal deposit law was put into operation by Great
Britain. Of the depositors 3,195 refused to take in-
terest. Following this the Grand Mufti issued a
decree that it was permissible. The next year 30,000
Moslems, including 94 mullahs and Sheikhs, took ad-
vantage of the privilege (Gairdner’s “Reproach of
Islam,” p. 200). Though this antiquated law does
not fit into modern commercial life, yet the banking
business flourishes. The law is the cause of all kinds
of disguises and subterfuges and of fictitious transac-
tions having the appearance of the real. Even a
usurious rate of twenty-four or thirty-six per cent is
collected. Some person desired to sell a future crop
of wheat; a cat was brought in, around the neck of
which a stalk of wheat was tied. A bill of sale of
the cat was written out in due form and phrase, it
being understood that in the transfer of the cat, the
crop was made over to the purchaser. Not only in
Persia and Turkey but practically everywhere the
Shari is being set aside. Even in Afghanistan the
process has begun. A decree of Amir Habibullah
has been issued abolishing the punishment of cutting
off the hand. The reason assigned for this change
was that he had been in danger of the loss of his
hand from blood poison and it had been saved to
him by an English surgeon. In Egypt, between 1876
and 1883, the French Codes and Courts were estab-
lished. Throughout the whole of North Africa the
Shari is superseded. In India it is only applied in a
certain defined sphere. Such is the case in other
countries under European jurisdiction.

Aside from the action of governments there is a
tendency among the Ulema to accommodate the Shari
to existing conditions. By strict construction every
non-Moslem land or land under non-Moslem rule is a
Dar-ul-Harb, a land of war, and it is the duty of
Moslems to attack and fight against it. But in India
the Ulema have decreed that a country in which some
of the peculiar customs of Islam prevail can be con-
sidered a Dar-ul-Islam, and the Muftis of Mecca have
confirmed the principle. Regarding the jihad they
have decided that it is not to be entered upon “unless
it is likely to be successful.” When there is no proba-
bility of victory, proclamation of a jihad is unlawful.
Strictly the law forbids Moslems to have Christian
troops as their allies, but not only now but at other
times Moslems have fought “Holy Wars” against
Christians with the help of Christians. Even in By-
zantine times this was so, and Egyptian Moslems
helped the Crusaders in their invasion of Palestine
(Margoliouth’s “Mohammedanism,” p. 86). Strictly
the proclamation of the jihad was the prerogative of
the one caliph, but it has become a power attached to
each independent Moslem ruler in conjunction with
his Sheikh or Mujtahid. The law of the succession to
the caliphate is in abeyance. It was restricted to the
Arab tribe of the Koreish. But victory of the Osmanli
Sultanate has given to a Turk the name, prerogative,
and prestige of the caliphate—by the power of the
sword—as one of the spoils of war. So it has con-
tinued four hundred years, abrogating the Law and
Traditions in so fundamental a matter.

MODIFICATIONS IN RELIGIOUS CUSTOMS

There are a large number of modifications in Islam
which affect its religious customs among millions of
its adherents. These also show that Islam is not the
fixed, uniform, and inflexible thing it has been deemed.
I shall briefly indicate some of them. It was the law
of Islam that idolaters should be exterminated, while
peoples of a Book, as Jews, Christians, and possibly
Zoroastrians, might be tolerated as zimmis or rayats,
subjects. According to this law idolatry was extermi-
nated from Arabia. But in India, Moslem rulers finally
tolerated idolatry in their subjects, though after perse-
cutions. Moslems also marry Hindu women who have
not accepted Islam. Moslem Emperors married Hin-
du, Rajput, ladies. The Sunnis of the Turkish Empire
regard the people of the Book as pure and will buy
bread and meat from them, but the Sunnis of India,
following the Shiahs, regard Christians as unclean
ceremonially and contact with them and eating their
food as an abomination. The Law is changed accord-
ing to environment. In China Moslem women do not
wear the veil and do bind the feet; men wear the
queue. They include the old Chinese feasts in their
calendar.

In India Islam has taken up many elements of
Hinduism. Not only is this seen in the sects like the
Sufis, who mingle the fire-worship of the Persians
and the Pantheism of the Hindus with some tenets of
Islam, look upon AH and Mohammed as incarnations
of the Supreme Spirit, and acknowledge the Koran
only in a spiritualized sense (C. R. Haines: “Islam

as a Missionary Religion,” p. 93), but among the
more orthodox Moslems. Even the caste system has
affected them. Tribes of Hindus and other races have
accepted Islam, but retained their caste, with their cus-
toms, and do not intermarry with Moslems of other
castes. Moslems of a certain caste will draw water
from a well with Hindus of the same caste, but not
permit Moslems of a lower caste to use the well (Dr.
Wherry: “Christianity and Islam, etc.,” pp. 108-09).
There are Mohammedan castes which refuse to eat
beef, stick to certain trades, wear Hindu dress, rarely
go to the mosque, but take part in Hindu festivals
and openly worship idols and many gods. The Mo-
hammedan Rajput Hindus preserve unaltered the so-
cial customs of the clan (T. W. Arnold: “Interna-
tional Congress of History and Religion,” Vol. I, p.
314). The sayids of India are as strict to maintain
the purity of their blood as the Brahmans and exclude
intermarriage with other Moslems. In the Punjab,
the Shariat regarding marriage is a dead letter. There
is no dowry and no inheritance for daughters. One-
sixth of the Moslem widows remain widows through
the influence of Brahmanism (Arnold: ibid., p. 314).
Moslem villagers may be seen utilizing the Hindu
astrologer and even praying to the idol god to give
his wife a son. Not only the accustomed saint-worship
but demonology and witchcraft have corrupted the
original faith (Imperial Gazetteer of India, p. 435).
The sect of Pachpiriyas is a fusion of Islam and
animism, worshipping five local saints or gods. The
Egyptian fellahs celebrate the cult of Bubastis as if
honouring a Moslem saint. In Algeria the Moham-

medan law has failed to replace the old tribal customs.
Superstition, magic, and relics of paganism hold sway.
Circassians, too, retain much of the old heathen re-
ligion and worship gods many (“Encyclopedia of
Islam,” p. 835). In the East Indies, Islam has mixed
with animism to such an extent as to be thoroughly
corrupt and is called Javanism. Magic has become as
a divine institution. Spiritualism has been adopted
and ancestor worship and angels and prophets have
been substituted for their ancestors. The worship of
spirits is not abolished. The Shariat has become mixed
up with animism. Mr. Simon says: “The old and
new jurisprudence have been amalgamated. Malay
common law was given elbow-room, with unscrupulous
adaptation” (pp. 200 and 66). In some respects, as
in regard to slavery and the treatment of women,
Malay custom has improved Islam. The mode of
receiving new converts has been modified. As the
heathen tribes often have circumcision, it has no fur-
ther significance. The kalima is not even committed
to memory, though but a sentence in length. The
convert is asked, “Do you wish to become a Moslem?”
On his answering “Yes,” a lemon is squeezed over
his head as a rite of purification (Simon, p. 110). Re-
garding Islam in Annam, M. Doutte says (Margo-
liouth: “Mohammedanism,” p. 40): “In our colonial
empire we have a good example of Islam entirely
changed and brought back to quite primitive belief,
among the Chams.”

ISLAM DOES UNDERGO MODIFICATIONS

It is evident, therefore, that Islam has in the course
of its history undergone many modifications. These
changes have been of varying degrees of importance,
from simple accommodations to the customs and ways
of peoples to such beliefs and practices as compromise
the monotheism of the Faith. Of some things we
have been able to see the origin and the process by
which they obtained admission. Of others this is not
possible, only it is evident that they were not in primi-
tive Islam. Islam has shown power of adaptation.
And in order to get a true conception of it as a re-
ligion this needs to be emphasized. This fact has been
obscured, though students of Islam have not over-
looked it. T. W. Arnold calls attention (“The
Preaching of Islam,” p. 371) to “the power of the
religion to adapt itself to the peculiar characteristics
and the stages of development of the people whose
allegiance it seeks to win”; and Oscar Mann (“Great
Religions,” p. 58) speaks of it as showing a mar-
vellous adaptability in shaping its religious ordinances
to old customs. Stanley Lane-Poole (“Studies in a
Mosque,” p. 169) makes the emphatic statement that
“the faith of Islam has passed through more phases
and experienced greater revolutions than perhaps any
other of the religions of the world.” Professor Gold-
ziher (“Historians’ History,” p. 298) says on this
theme: “The first step which Islam took on its vic-
torious career taught it to accommodate itself to an
alien spirit and to mould its intellectual heritage by
influences which seem absolutely heterogeneous to a

superficial observer. It was a borrower. That it
makes inflexible protest against the influence of for-
eign elements is an illusion.” Bosworth Smith (“Mo-
hammed and Mohammedanism,” p. 255) says: “It
may be safely said that there is nothing more extraor-
dinary in the whole history of Islam than the way
in which the theory of … the stereotyped and un-
alterable nature of its precepts, have by ingenuity, by
legal fictions, by the Sunna, and by responsa pru-
dentum, been accommodated to the changing circum-
stances and the various degrees of civilization. …
It is quite possible that where so much has been done
already, more may be done in the future and means
be found of reconciling the laws … with the re-
quirements of modern society.”

THE PROCESS OF CHANGE

What are we to expect will be the process of
change in Islam? One possible method that lies open
is by Ijma, the consensus of opinion of the Ulema.
The Shiahs follow the interpretations of their Muj-
tahid, and there is no legal reason why this method
cannot be utilized among Sunnis, for tradition affirms
that Ijma cannot err. This is a legitimate way of
escape from the bonds of tradition and the Shariat.
Professor Macdonald, while believing that this may
be the solution, suggests that a more probable alter-
native is for Moslems to take refuge more fully in
the mystical way and follow Islam as an abstraction
but Sufiism as the reality to live by (“Aspects of
Islam,” p. 112). Some have suggested that Islam
may undergo change by revelations through Pirs,

Sheikhs, and Valis, since they profess to have this
power, and belief in them is increasing. Professor
Margoliouth finds a loophole for progress in the Mos-
lem simply allowing to pass into desuetude any unde-
sirable rites or injunctions; for to formally deny or
reject a law is regarded as infidelity, but simple dis-
obedience or neglect is pardonable (“Mohammedan-
ism,” p. 129). Judging by past history, the causes
of change will be varied. Some changes, as the as-
sumption of the caliphate by the Turks and the modi-
fication of the doctrine of the jihad in India, have
been the result of conquest. At other times they have
come through compromise with the conquered. Most
modifications, whether due to Greek philosophy, Ro-
man Law, Persian Sufiism, to Christianity or to the
Aliites, whether from internal or external influences,
have been received without formal action or decision.
It is possible that Islam may be changed by definite
revolts and reforms, which shall cause schisms from
the orthodox Sunnis. There are some indications of
this.

In the present age Islam is undergoing further
changes. There is movement. There is a condition
of unrest and dissatisfaction, of misgivings, fear, and
anxiety. New thoughts, ideals, and aspirations are
clashing with old tenets, prejudices, and superstitions.
It is a period of controversy. Doctrines and policies
are in debate. Many are moving from the old moor-
ings. Contentment with their condition, civilization,
and environment have passed away. Old-time arro-
gance and pride are gone. Self-assurance is weak-
ened. Many lament the conditions of the Moslem

world as one of decadence and of material, social, and
intellectual inferiority. They feel that Islam and
Moslem peoples are both at a low ebb. Different par-
ties assign diverse reasons for these conditions and
propose different remedies according to their various
attitudes toward the modern age.

Some cry out: Hold to the Old Faith! Observe
the Law and the Traditions and Almighty God will
bless our people and give our armies victory as of old.
Our weakness comes from ignoring the Shariat.

Others cry out: Back to Mohammed! Back to the
Koran! The Traditions have led us astray.

Others, with a free use of criticism and of rational-
ism, would interpret in accordance with the spirit of
Islam and reconstruct it in conformity with modern
ideas and twentieth-century conditions and culture.

Others again, counting themselves superior to creed
and law, and setting them aside by allegorical inter-
pretations, would have all to walk in the divine Path
by means of mystical communions and hypnotic ex-
ercises.

Others, feeling that only a new divine Guide and
a new revelation can solve the perplexities and right
the wrongs of the age, have fixed their faith and hope
on Mahdis, Imams, and so-called Lights.

Others would adopt Western political institutions
and learning as the framework for a reformed Moslem
state, subordinating affairs of Islam to national prog-
ress and civilization. With a secularistic spirit, they
would side-track religion, unless perchance it be to
use it for nationalistic purposes.

None of these parties are animated by a spirit of

friendliness to Christianity, though all of them are
willing to take advantage of Western military and
industrial science and some of them of all the Chris-
tian world can furnish, except the Gospel.

Lastly there are some, all too few, in the Moslem
world who are earnest inquirers and who are learning
to look to the Lord Jesus Christ as the panacea for
their ills. This day of unrest in Islam is a special
opportunity for Christian missions. It is a fit time to
bring the impress of the Gospel, the impact of Chris-
tian truth to bear on Islam. We cannot rely on our
civilization to Christianize it. Islam, be assured, will
find a way to adopt our civilization and remain Islam.
Special and mighty and immediate efforts are neces-
sary if we wish to draw them Christward. This day
of Movement is a crisis in their spiritual history.

I wish to present to your consideration Modern
Movements among Moslems. I will consider:

First, those movements which spring from and are
inspired by doctrines or aspirations within Islam itself,
as Wahabism, Pan-Islamism, and Moslem Missions,
especially as carried on from Mecca and by the Dar-
vish Orders.

Secondly, those connected with eschatalogical hopes,
as the Return of the Imam, or Mahdiism.

Thirdly, those movements inspired by or due to the
impact of Christian civilization, as Neo-Islam.

Fourthly, Political Movements in Moslem Lands.

II

THE REVIVAL IN ISLAM

I HAVE referred to the fact that Islam is being
moved by opposing currents of thought. Zealous
leaders have come forth, antagonistic to each
other, yet all professing the purpose to assist the
Faith and the Faithful. I will first of all describe a
vast conservative movement.

A remarkable phenomenon of the last century was
a revival in Islam. As a religion, Islam, at the end
of the eighteenth century, was like a palsied, decrepit
old man. It showed signs of disintegration and
decay. No less an authority than Palgrave (“Essays
on the Eastern Question,” pp. 114, 115), describing
its condition, writes: “Where the Caliph and the
Koran retained their apparent, they had lost their real
supremacy. Throughout the Turkish Empire, the
most distinctive precepts of the Book were publicly
set at naught, nowhere more than in Constantinople
itself. Nor were the sacred cities themselves, Mecca
and Medina, much better. The wine taverns of the
janisaries, the raki shops of the citizens, the prosti-
tutes of the Hejaz, the Bi-lillahs of Bagdad and Cairo
had become recognized institutions; opium-eating, too,
was next to universal; the mosque stood unfrequented
and ruinous, while the public schools and Colleges of
Mohammedan Law had fallen into dreary decay. An

eclipse, total it seemed, had spread over the crescent,
foreboding disaster and extinction.”

But this expectation was not fulfilled. On the con-
trary, there came about a renewal of religious loyalty
and zeal, manifested in a closer adherence to the
Shariat, the Sacred Law, a more strenuous mainte-
nance of its creed and observance of its rites, an ag-
gressive propaganda and a determined effort to renew
and strengthen the power of Islam, both religious and
political. The reasons for this awakening were partly
religious, arising from regret for the low condition
of the Faith; and partly political, from chagrin on
account of the weakness and inferiority of Moham-
medan peoples and determination to yield no further
to the influence or the pressure of Christian govern-
ments. The result was, writes Palgrave (ibid., p.
123), “that Mohammedan fervour has been thor-
oughly rekindled within the limits which its half-
extinguished ashes covered and the increased heat has
by natural law extended over whatever lies nearest
but beyond the former circumference.” Claude Field,
the author of “Mystics and Saints in Islam,” de-
scribes the movement as the “almost miraculous
renaissance in Islam which is now proceeding in Tur-
key and other Mohammedan lands.”

WAHABISM

The impetus co this awakening came from Wahab-
ism. The influence of this puritanic reformation has
been deep and widespread. It deserves study. It is
the judgment of Oscar Mann (“Great Religions of
the World,” p. 58) that “almost the whole of the

modern progressive movement of Mohammedans may
be traced directly or indirectly to it.”

Wahabism took its name from its founder, Mo-
hammed Ibn Abdul Wahab. He was the son of a
village Sheikh in Central Arabia and was thoroughly
educated in Islamic theology at Basra and Medina.
The divergence of Moslems from the primitive stand-
ards of rigid monotheism and simplicity of life had
deeply affected him. He started his career by a pro-
test against the cult of Sad, at Inayah, where saint-
worship prevailed. His cry was back to the Koran
and the primitive Law of the Sunna. He even re-
jected the interpretations of the orthodox schools of
the Sunnis. He stood for a literal interpretation of
the Koran and affirmed the right of interpreting it,
even contrary to the Imams. He abhorred Sufiism.
He demanded the strict observance of the prayer-rite,
fast, and tithes-giving. He denounced the reverence
paid to the saints, the Sheikhs, and even to Mohammed,
and all invoking of their mediation as well as making
pilgrimage or offerings to their shrines or perambulat-
ing their tombs and all the superstitions connected with
them, and the use of the rosary. He limited the festi-
vals and forbade the celebration of Mohammed’s birth-
day. He denounced luxury in dress and habits and
the use of silk, jewels, gold and silver ornaments, and
strictly prohibited wine, tobacco, gambling, and Ori-
ental vice. In a word, he aimed to reform doctrines,
purify worship, and purge out innovations and cor-
ruptions. He protested against the liberty granted to
the infidels, that is, the Christians, whom he pro-
nounced unclean abominations. The ordinary Mos-

lems were no better, being musrik, polytheists, even as
the Christians. He thoroughly approved of and made
use of the primitive Islamic method of promoting re-
form, namely, by the power of the sword. All un-
believers, even Moslems, who did not reform were to
be killed. The jihad was indeed holy and the war-
rior, dying fighting for the faith, passed into Para-
dise; and to make firm the soldier’s assurance a written
order on the gate-keeper of the heavenly mansions
was put into his hand, with the injunction, “Kill and
strangle all infidels who give companions to God.”

The message of the reformer was at first rejected.
He was driven from place to place. But finally Ibn
Saud, the ruler of Daraiyah, believed. Ibn Abdul
Wahab gave promise to Ibn Saud that if he would
draw the sword in the cause of pure Islam, he would
make him sole ruler in Najd and the first potentate in
Arabia. Sheikh Saud accepted the terms, married the
reformer’s daughter, and became the commander of
the new jihad and the founder of a conquering dy-
nasty. He and his successors, from 1760 onward,
brought into subjection the neighbouring tribes, of-
fering conversion or extermination. Kerbala, the
shrine of the Shiahs, was despoiled of its treasures
and destroyed, with its relics and the golden dome over
the tomb of the Imam Husain. Mecca and Medina,
the sacred cities, were subdued, 1803-04, and compelled
to reform, the dome of Mohammed’s grave and all
the objects of veneration were destroyed, and cere-
monies which were innovations on primitive Islam
were prohibited.

The desecration of the holy cities and the inhibition

of pilgrimage to all who were not of his sect, aroused
the Sunni Caliph or Sultan. At his command, Me-
hemet Ali, the Khedive of Egypt, and Ibrahim Pasha
subjugated the Wahabis, and their Sheikh, Abdullah
II, was sent to Constantinople and beheaded in front
of St. Sophia (1819). Two small Wahabi states sur-
vived, one with a capital at Riyad, another at Haiel
in Najd, with a population of 1,500,000.

The influence of the Wahabi movement extended
beyond Arabia and was greater in its religious than
in its political aspect. It was introduced into India
by Sayid Ahmad of Oudh, who claimed to be the
Mahdi. His propaganda to purge out Hindu super-
stitions from Islam excited fierce fanaticism. He
raised a jihad against the Sikhs, captured Peshavur
in 1830, and maintained an insurrection for four
years. He declared that India was a Dar-il-Harb, a
land of warfare, and that jihad against the British
government was obligatory. The influence of Wa-
habis is still felt in India and the sect continues near
the northwest frontier. Another sect, called the
Faraisis, arose in India, animated with the same spirit.

In Sumatra a like movement was started about 1837
by a pilgrim returned from Mecca. He began the
correction of the errors and abuses of Moslems, es-
pecially striving to abolish the use of opium, tobacco,
and betel nut. From this propaganda grew up the
Padri sect. They proclaimed the jihad against the
heathen Bataks, destroyed their villages, outraged
their women, sold their children into slavery, and killed
every male who would not accept Islam.

Wahabism bore fruit in Africa. Osman Danfodio,

chief of the Fulahs, learned the doctrine at Mecca,
and on his return preached it. He succeeded in arous-
ing the people, founded Sokoto and the Fulah king-
dom, subdued several heathen states and forced them
to embrace Islam. Wahabism was also the inspira-
tion of the Sanusi, of whom I shall speak later (Ar-
nold: “Preaching of Islam,” pp. 230, 265, 299).

Wahabism greatly influenced the whole Islamic
body. Just as the Protestant Reformation was fol-
lowed by a counter-reformation in Roman Catholi-
cism, so Wahabism was the instrument for arousing
the Sunni Moslems. Its influence, true to its own
spirit, has been thoroughly reactionary. That return
to primitive Islam is the hope of the world’s regenera-
tion has been the inspiration of modern conservative
movements. Of it T. W. Arnold (ibid., pp. 345-46)
says: “It has given birth to numerous movements
which take rank among the most powerful influences
in the Islamic world. It is closely connected with
many of the modern Moslem missions; the fervid zeal
it has stirred up, the new life it has infused into ex-
isting religious institutions, the impetus it has given
to theological study and to the organization of devo-
tional exercises, have all served to awaken and keep
alive the innate proselyting spirit of Islam.” Sim-
ilarly Canon Sell says (Missionary Review, October,
1902, p. 732): “Its religious teaching, and still more
its narrow fanatical spirit, have spread into many
lands and influenced many peoples.” Palgrave, who
lived and travelled in Turkey and Arabia in close con-
tact with Moslems, writes: “The whole school of Is-
lamic teaching has been modified by it; not only the

common people but also many of the highest and best
educated classes, even the Sultan (Abdul Aziz) him-
self, are distinctly inclined to the stricter school, and
so are most of the principal Ulema.” He finds in it
a principal cause of the “Mohammedan revival—a
worldwide movement, an epochal phenomenon, before
which the lesser laws of race and locality are swept
away or absorbed in unity, which we can no more
check nor retard than we can hinder the tide from
swelling” (“Essays,” p. 140). He declares that in
the middle of the last century “the energy and breadth
of the revival embraced every class from the Sultan
Abdul Aziz down to the poorest hammal or porter
on the wharves and every Mohammedan race in the
Ottoman empire” (ibid., p. 123), “with the public
adhesion of all and the sincere adhesion of the
masses.” This was evidenced by a repair of the
mosques and madressahs, schools, a stricter observ-
ance of the fasts and prayers, a thronging of the
shrines, and increase of pilgrimage to Mecca. There
was also a reform of the habits of drunkenness among
the soldiers.

This spirit was also a reaction against the introduc-
tion of European laws and customs by the reforming
Sultans, Mahmud II and Abdul Aziz in his first years.
A strong feeling of opposition to these measures ex-
isted not only among the Ulema on account of the
Western code, but also among the beys and pro-
prietors, because they had been deprived of their lands
and feudal privileges by the new regulations. So
political conservatism and zeal for Islam went hand
in hand. Dissatisfaction with the new codes led to

a partial return to the jurisdiction of the Mahkamah
or Courts of the Sacred Law. Opposition to the
patronage given to the infidels led to the casting out
from employ of many Europeans who about 1850 had
overrun the Turkish service, and the employment in
their places of Moslem doctors, civil engineers, and
administrators. Rushdi schools which had been
started for the whole population, including Christians,
were transformed into strictly Mohammedan schools,
with teaching of Islam and Islamic languages. The
Sultan Abdul Aziz became sympathetic with the reac-
tionaries. The Grand Vizier, Ali Pasha, said to a
British official: “What we want is an increase of
fanaticism rather than a diminution of it.” Notwith-
standing these symptoms, the political reformers re-
tained superior influence in the government till the
promulgation of the Constitution of 1876. After its
abrogation by Sultan Abdul Hamid, he openly became
the chief of the reactionaries, and made it his whole
aim to strengthen the Moslem element of his empire.
This aim soon assumed a wider scope and developed
into a movement to which is given the name Pan-
Islamism.

PAN-ISLAMISM

Pan-Islamism is a movement with the purpose and
endeavour to unite for defensive and aggressive ac-
tion. It aims to combine by the ties of the religion
Moslems of every race and country, in the work of
conserving and propagating the faith and of freeing
it by means of political and military force from alien
rule and thus making it again a triumphant world

power. It has a religious side and a political side.
On the religious side it is conservative and would
strenuously maintain Islam. Yet it would have a plat-
form broad enough to include all sects and parties.
On the political side it would weld into an alliance
all Moslem peoples and governments.

This scheme is in accordance with the nature of
Islam. Mohammed apparently designed that all be-
lievers should constitute one nation, not intending that
racial or national aspirations should assert themselves.
Great effort even was made to spread the Arabic and
make it a universal language. Islam has much to
draw it together in unity:—a simple creed formula—
La illah ill’ Allah, Mohammed rasul Allah—No God
save God; Mohammed is the Apostle of God—A com-
mon Koran, Kibla and Kaaba; a Capital, Mecca, the
centre of Pilgrimage, with its unifying influence; a
common language of worship, a common prayer
ritual, a common calendar—a sense of brotherhood
which excludes distinctions of race and colour.

By including military action in its programme, Is-
lam was acting entirely according to its nature. The
Crusades were contrary to the Gospel of Christ, but
an organized movement for warfare is harmonious
with the genius and history of Islam. Such a move-
ment is facilitated in this age by the very civilization
introduced by the infidels, for ease of communication
and transit bring the widely separated sections of
Islam into closer contact, and even the peace main-
tained by Christian governments in Asia and Africa
gives opportunity for the spread of ideas and plans.
Uniting Islam in a great final struggle is in accord-

ance with its alleged prophecies, and the ever-present
hope of its complete triumph. A Holy War is ex-
pected to precede the judgment and by means of it all
authority is to pass into the hands of Moslems. The
year A.H. 1300 (1882) was regarded from these
prophecies as a crisis destined to bring greater weak-
ness or renewed strength.

DIVISIONS OF ISLAM

One difficulty to be overcome was the condition of
division into sects and nationalities. Islam has not
been a unit since the twelfth year after the Prophet’s
death, nor since the second century of the Hegira has
it maintained outward unity. It has abounded in op-
posing sects whose hostility ofttimes unsheathed the
sword. There is an erroneous impression abroad
about the unity of Islam. Few people recognize the
multiplicity of sects there are in it. Mohammed is
reported by tradition to have said that the Jews have
71 sects, the Christians 72, and the Moslems would
have 73. It would excel even in the number of sects,
and in truth more than twice the above number have
been listed. The Mohammedans are no solid mass
of severe monotheists. Besides the sects of Aliites
or Shiahs, such as Ismieliyahs, Borahs, Zaidis, Fa-
timites, Sufis, Usulis, Akhbaris, Sheikhis, Nusairis,
Kuzil Bashis, etc.; Sunnis include Kurds who do not
keep the law; Arab tribes who worship jinns; Indians
who worship idols; Africans and Malays who are
still fetish-worshippers; Rationalists and free-thinkers;
Dunma Jews and Stavoirite Christians. Islam is a
heterogeneous mass whose divisions hold to their

differences as tenaciously as do any sects in Christen-
dom. New movements have led to new schisms. The
Wahabis, the Babis, the Sudan Mahdiists each in its
turn created antagonisms. The enthusiasm, courage,
and fanaticism of their followers, which urged them
on to war and conquest, were expended largely in hos-
tility to the governments of Islam, for each of them
regarded the authority of its leader as supreme and
called upon Sultan and Shah to submit to them.

Overcoming racial jealousies and hatred was also
a problem. These exist among Islamic peoples just
as between Christians. By race Moslems have been
divided into 80,000,000 Caucasians, 70,000,000 Mon-
gol-Turks, 44,000,000 Malay-Dravidians, and 36,-
000,000 Negros or Negroids. Arabs, Turks, and
Kurds have their racial and political antagonisms.
Iran and Turan did not forsake their age-long war-
fare by accepting Mohammed. The national ambi-
tions of the Albanians and Egyptians are in opposi-
tion to those of the Ottomans. Berbers and Arabs
fought through centuries and the Berbers twelve times
threw off the yoke of Islam. Even in Central Africa
Islam has not had influence enough to overcome the
national peculiarities of the races who have adopted
it. Professor Westermann declares (International
Review of Missions, October, 1912, p. 648) that “the
national consciousness of the Sudanese is stronger
than their religious attachment. The Hausa and
Fulah have lived together for centuries side by side,
but their relations continue to be entirely strained,
while the Tuareg are equally unfriendly to them
both.”

Pan-Islamism aimed by a spirit of accommodation
to smooth over differences. It was not reformatory,
it did not emphasize doctrinal unity, but rather con-
federation for action—a union for the defence, propa-
gation, and glory of the Faith.

These difficulties did not seem insuperable and the
task was entered upon with strong determination. The
leader of this movement was Abdul Hamid, Sultan
and Caliph. It is said that during the first years of
his reign he hesitated as to whether he should support
the liberal or the reactionary side. But soon it became
evident that he had determined to make his govern-
ment a Moslem administration, to magnify Islam and
repress Christians. The rebellion of Arabi Pasha in
Egypt and the claims of the Mahdi in the Sudan had
a tendency to accentuate Moslem desire for supremacy
and to lead them to deplore Christian prestige. Ab-
ul-Huda, the chief of the Rafai darvishes—the Sul-
tan’s astrologer,—gave advice to revive and strengthen
the influence of the caliphate. So around it the prop-
aganda was made to revolve so as to throw the shield
of religion over the political aims.

THE CALIPHATE

The office of Caliph, or supreme Head of the Mos-
lems, has pertained to the Osmanli Sultans for four
centuries. In 1517 Salim I conquered the Mamelukes
of Egypt. Living in subordination to the latter,
treated as underlings and at times almost as prisoners,
and used to further their political ends, were the suc-
cessors of the Abbaside Caliphs of Bagdad, who were
permitted religious authority only. The last of these

Mutavvakul ceded to Sultan Salim his rights and titles
as Caliph of the Prophet of God, Commander of the
Faithful, Imam of Moslems, Refuge of the world, and
Shadow of God, which the Sultan now bears in addi-
tion to King of kings, Arbiter of the world’s destinies,
Lord of the Two Continents and Two Seas, and Sov-
ereign of the East and West. The insignia of the
office, the possession of which has high significance,
were transferred to him, namely, the standard or cloak
of the Prophet, some hair of his beard, and the sword
of the Caliph Omar. At the same time the Sherif of
Mecca tendered his allegiance and brought to Salim
the keys of Mecca and Medina and transferred to him
the guardianship of the Sacred Cities.

Thus, by the power of the sword, the Osmanli Sul-
tans became caliphs, ignoring however two essential
requisites according to accepted Sunni tradition,
namely, that the Caliph should be of the Arab tribe of
Koreish, and, secondly, that he should be elected to
the office. The latter is fulfilled nominally at the ac-
cession of each Sultan, when the form of an election
is observed by the Ulema of Constantinople and the
Sultan is invested with the Caliphate. The other con-
dition is ignored, though a list, which named descent
from the Koreish as among the qualifications, re-
mained posted in all the great mosques, even of Con-
stantinople, until ordered removed by Abdul Hamid.
The Khavarij held that it was not necessary that the
caliph should be of the Koreish (“Spirit of Islam,”
Amir Ali, p. 525). By legists and scholars generally
the Sultans are regarded as usurpers, yet they are
acknowledged practically because they are the most

powerful defenders of the faith. Still considerable
bodies of Moslems have never acknowledged them, as
the Shiahs, and the subjects of the Sultans of Mo-
rocco, Zanzibar, and Oman, and of the Wahabi
Sheikhs of Arabia. Before the time of Abdul Ha-
mid, Chinese Moslems cared nothing for the Turkish
caliphate nor did they recognize the Sherif of Mecca.
Yet such distant rulers as the Amirs of Bokhara and
Khotan, the Sultans of Atchin and Panthay have sent
envoys during the last century. European govern-
ments with Moslem subjects have acknowledged him
as supreme, and the United States has seen fit to send
an envoy to consult about the Sulus of the Philippines.
The greatest strength of the caliphate is with the
ignorant populace. Some of them regard him as the
emperor of all Europe, holding in subjection to him-
self all Christian states, who acknowledge his sover-
eignty by sending him tribute and keeping delegates
at his Court. The kings of Europe cannot be crowned
without first obtaining his permission and sometimes
have to come in person to obtain it; not even the em-
perors of Russia and Great Britain are exempt from
this necessity. The Emperor of Germany came to do
obeisance to the Sultan and brought presents of horses
in token of his subjection. The Sultan will one of
these days overthrow these Christian governments
(Simon: “Progress of Islam, etc.,” p. 28; “Turkey
and Its People,” by Pears, pp. 75, 86; “Turkey and
the Armenian Atrocities,” E. M. Bliss, p. 75). A
Moslem, and he not a fellah but a mullah in St. Sophia,
told Sir Edwin Pears that Queen Victoria was a faith-
ful servant of their Padishah, but it was not plain

why he allowed the governor of England to be a
woman.1

Among the qualifications for the caliphate, char-
acter scarcely finds a place. He is to be a “just per-
son” and supposedly God-guided. Yet Abdul Hamid
had the astrologer Abul Huda as his constant ad-
viser. This astute magician is said to have worked
in collusion with Izzat Pasha, who showed him tele-
grams from various quarters before the Sultan had
seen them. He thus many times astonished his Pa-
dishah. Morality has not been required nor expected
as a qualification of the caliph. Of course, without
question, he has legally the privilege of having three
or four hundred concubines in his haram, and can
even count the massacring of tens of thousands of
Christian subjects as a holy work. But even Moslem
law cannot justify the horrible practice which many
Sultans successively followed of celebrating the bind-
ing on of the sword of Osman by putting to death all
the royal brothers. Mahmud II ordered his seventeen
brothers to be bowstrung. They were interred in St.
Sophia around the newly made grave of their father.
This practice was general (Pears: ibid., pp. 8-10) and
was continued without concealment until the middle
of the nineteenth century. How Moslems can look
upon such a line of assassins as their religious chiefs
can only be accounted for by their habit of divorcing
religion from morality. Justice Amir Ali says

1 This ignorance is equalled by that in Persia which attributes
to the Shah’s visit to Queen Victoria a matrimonial purpose, as
their traditions do to the coming of the Queen of Sheba to
Solomon.

(“Spirit of Islam,” p. 470) that the Sunnis do not
demand that the caliph be just, virtuous, or irreproach-
able; that neither vices nor tyranny justify his deposi-
tion. But some of them, as the Omayyad Walid and
the Abbaside Mutavakul, have been deposed by pop-
ular revolt against their iniquities. It had happened
among the Osmanlis several times before Abdul
Hamid.

Sunnis claim that there can only be one caliph at
a time, regarding as unlawful the existence of con-
temporary caliphs as the Omayyads at Granada, the
Abbasides at Bagdad, and the Fatimites at Cairo.

The claim of the Sultan, weak legally and his-
torically, was rendered more insecure and ineffective
at the beginning of his reign, by the fact that the
Sherif of Mecca and the Arabs were inclined to re-
pudiate him. After the Russo-Turkish war some of
the Arabs declared that the Sultan had forfeited his
claim through his defeats and that the caliphate should
return to the Koreish tribe (H. H. Jessup: “The Mo-
hammedan Missionary Problem,” p. 21). The Sherif
Sheikh Husni, an Anglophile, was ready to make good
his claim, and it was supposed that he was encouraged
to do so by the British. The Sherif was disposed of
in true Oriental style by means of an assassin, and a
supporter of the Sultan was put in his place. Hence-
forth the religious side of Pan-Islamism was pro-
moted from Mecca as a second centre (“Fall of Abdul
Hamid,” F. McCallagh, p. 23).

Abdul Hamid carried on his propaganda in no half-
hearted way. He put his untiring energy into it both
in his own dominions and in the whole Islamic world.

He called together in secret session many Sheikhs and
planned schemes. His agents were sent everywhere on
secret missions. They were liberally supplied with
funds. Generous presents were sent with them to the
heads of various sects, orders, shrines, and holy places;
pensions were given to mullahs, sayids, and influential
darvishes. It is asserted by Salib el Khalidi that the
Sultan spent half his revenues for Pan-Islamism. In-
fluencing and intriguing with the subjects of other
governments was no small part of the effort, which
included not only the preaching of union but the en-
couraging of fanaticism and rebellion. Hurgronje
says (“The Holy War, etc.,” p. 29): “It secretly
worked as a disturbing element; it often would oppose
the normal development of a mutually desirable rela-
tion between the governing and the governed.” The
agents used were at one time the able diplomat, at
another the learned mullah, or again the darvish
mendicant or the Khoja, dressed as a darvish. Turk-
ish consuls were established at many points, whose
manner of life, however, somewhat interfered with
the scheme, for it was often an offence against Mos-
lem morals. In Turkey the Ulema were urged to
engage yet more zealously in strengthening the faith
of the people, proclaiming the waxing of the Crescent
and the increasing glory of the caliphate. Above all
they were urged to be diligent in convincing the faith-
ful concerning the merit to be acquired before heaven
by robbing and killing the Christians. The dallals or
guides to the pilgrimage were made efficient agents.
Formerly they had been ignorant and untrained men
who came from Mecca, collected the dues for the

Kaaba, guided the pilgrim caravan to Mecca, and acted
as guides while there. At this time a different type of
men, ably trained propagandists, were assigned to this
service and went everywhere preaching.

The press was enlisted in the cause. Not a few
journals were its advocates. These papers and books
fostered disloyalty to other governments, proclaiming
the triumph of the Crescent. Abdul Hamid even went
so far as to have denunciations of Great Britain
printed in his palace and distributed in Afghanistan
and Arabia. A part of the propaganda consisted in
taking children of prominent families from India,
Java, and Sumatra to Constantinople to be trained in
loyalty to the Ottoman caliphate. This was forbidden
by the colonial governments. The result of “this skil-
fully planned agitation, carefully engineered from the
Palace (Sir William Ramsay: “Impressions of Tur-
key,” pp. 136-39) was all through Turkey a further
increase of Moslem power and fanaticism.” As Pal-
grave had noticed it in the previous reign, so Sir Wil-
liam Ramsay speaks of it under Abdul Hamid. Sir
Charles Elliot also says: “In this decade, 1880-90, a
tendency prevailed to accentuate the Sultan’s position
as caliph—to make it a vital reality. There was kept
before the minds of the Moslems the idea that the
Sultan was the head of all Islam on the one side as
opposed to all Christians on the other” (Sir Charles
Elliot: “Turkey in Europe”). Abdul Hamid made
his Moslem subjects believe that their misfortunes
were due to the interference of Europeans. Hur-
gronje testifies to the spread of this propaganda, say-
ing: “There is certainly a very pronounced Pan-

Islamic tendency in all classes of Mohammedan so-
ciety.”

COMBINATION OF SUNNIS AND SHIAHS

An important factor of the scheme was the bring-
ing of the Shiahs of Persia into co-operation. This
was the more important owing to the geographical
position of Persia, lying between the Moslems of
India and Afghanistan and those of the Turkish Em-
pire. For both political and military reasons Persia’s
co-operation was most desirable. The agents of Pan-
Islamism showed marked activity, and their presence
was continually reported in the bazaar rumours.
Their chief was a remarkable man named Sheikh
Jamal-ud-Din, whose life-story is a marvellous ex-
hibition of a powerful personality—a man who left
his mark on the political and religious life and history
of Afghanistan, India, Egypt, Turkey, and Persia.
He was a sayid born at Asadabad, near Hamadan.
At the age of ten he began his wanderings, studied
in various cities, and became erudite in almost the
whole range of Moslem learning. As a youth he
passed some time in Afghanistan and a year or two
in India, where he acquired some knowledge of Eng-
lish and Western science. After making the pilgrim-
age to Mecca, he returned to Afghanistan and, rising
to the surface in one of the civil wars, became Prime
Minister during the brief reign of Amir Mohammed
Azam. Fleeing thence, he led a life of varied experi-
ences, influential in many places among the literary
and official classes. Expelled from India as a precau-
tion against his political intrigues, and from Constan-

tinople through the jealousy of the Sheikh-ul-Islam, he
settled in Egypt and gave lectures on Mohammedan
theology, philosophy, law, and science, having great
influence and fame. He was driven thence by the
Khedive at the instigation of the orthodox mullahs
and of the British Consul, in 1879, who objected to
his activities in connection with the Egyptian Nation-
alists. After the defeat of Arabi Pasha, he was ex-
pelled from India, and came to America to obtain
naturalization, but did not remain to carry out this
plan. Next he became an editor in Paris, and carried
on controversy with Renan and also with the British
Government. After residing as a diplomat-at-large at
Petrograd, he accepted in 1886 the invitation of Nasr-
ud-Din Shah, came to Persia, and was made Minister
of War. Later he organized a reform movement and
preached much about it at the mosque of Shah Abdul
Azim. In this he offended the Shah, so he took refuge
at the sanctuary of this mosque. Dragged from there
by order of the Shah, he was expelled to Turkey.
After a visit to London and various negotiations with
its cabinet, he finally took up his residence in Constan-
tinople, where he was a guest and favourite of Abdul
Hamid and the active Apostle of Pan-Islamism. In
this, he did much, says Professor Browne (“Persian
Revolution,” p. 30), “to awaken the independent Mos-
lem States to the imminent peril and the urgent need
of combination to withstand the aggressions of the
great European Powers,” and “to create a sense of
brotherhood and community of interest among them.”
His Arabic biographer says of him: “The goal to-
wards which all his actions were directed and the

pivot on which all his hopes turned, was the unanimity
of Islam and the bringing together of all Moslems
in all parts of the world into one Islamic empire under
the protection of one supreme Khalifa. He raised up
a living spirit in the hearts of his friends and disciples.”
He founded at Mecca a Pan-Islamic Society, called
Umm ul Kura. It printed and circulated its rules and
constitution, but was suppressed by Abdul Hamid, be-
cause it suggested Kufa as an alternative seat of the
caliph (Browne: ibid., pp. 2-14). The plan was laid
to bring the Shiahs into harmony with the Sunni Ca-
liph. This was a bold and difficult scheme. The age-
long alienation and bitter enmity, the bloody wars be-
tween the adherents of the Imam Ali and those of the
four “rightly directly caliphs” made reconciliation
seem impossible. Yet the lessening of Shiah hatred
in latter years gave hope, and it was by smoothing
over of differences rather than by a change of con-
victions that they expected to bring about concord.
There was an example before them; for a union of
Sunnis and Shiahs had been accomplished in the
Muridism of Mullah Mohammed and Sheikh Schamyl
of Daghestan. Both Persia and Turkey felt the neces-
sity of doing something in the face of the aggressive
Christian Powers who were pressing in on both sec-
tions of Islam. Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din corresponded
with the Shiah Mujtahids of Kerbela and Persia. He
also sent envoys to work secretly among the Persians,
especially among the officials of liberal tendency, upon
whom distinctive Shiahism sat lightly. His plea was
stated in these words: “If all the Mohammedan na-
tions would only unite, all the nations on earth could

not prevail against them.” One of these envoys was
Mirza Hasan Khan, with whom I had conversation in
Tabriz at the house of Yusuf Khan, Mustashar-i-
Doulah. Another promoter of Pan-Islamism was
Prince Haji Sheikh-ur-Rais, the author of “Ittahad-
ul-Islam” (“Union of Islam”).

The effects of these negotiations were evident.
Some of the influential Shiah Mujtahids of Kerbala
and Najef, as well as officials like Amin-i-Doulah and
Mustashar-i-Doulah, the Foreign Agent at Tabriz, be-
came advocates of the scheme, and of an arrangement
whereby the Persians should recognize the caliphate
of the Sultan and the Turks recognize the Shah as
head of all the Shiahs, and that both should work
in harmony. An account of these negotiations is given
in a poem by Mirza Aga Khan. Of the answer of
the Mujtahids, he writes (Browne: ibid., p. 412):

“From Persia and Irak they wrote: ‘We have washed from our
hearts the dust of dissension;
We will all sacrifice our lives for the Holy Law, we will all
swear allegiance to the King of Islam.’”

To allay antagonism and promote unity of feeling,
all customs which tended to perpetuate enmity should
be discontinued. In accordance with this, Shiahs were
to be no longer molested in their pilgrimages. They
in observing the mourning of Muharram and the Pas-
sion Play, though they might curse Yezid, would not
transfer the rancour to the modern Turks. They
would drop the festival of Omar and no longer dress
up an effigy to represent that caliph and heap indig-
nities upon it. They would no longer make any one
to represent this enemy of Ali and treat him with

contumely and maledictions, as Omara laanat olsun
(“Cursed be Omar”). The effect of these efforts
at reconciliation were plainly observable in Persia in
better relations between Sunnis and Shiahs and were
felt in Russia and India as well. But the Shah of
Persia did not take kindly to the scheme. It was
doubtless evident to him that the prominent negotiators
were Old Babis and that they and Jamal-ud-Din did
not wish him good. In passing it may be remarked
that the Sultans of Morocco and Zanzibar, too, re-
fused to listen to the envoys of Pan-Islamism.

HAJIS AS PROPAGANDISTS

Besides all this, the propaganda was carried on
from Mecca by the Sherif and the Ulema. Abdul
Hamid cultivated the friendship of the Arabs. As an
aid in binding them and the holy cities to the Osmanli
caliphate the Hajaz railway was planned and com-
pleted to Medina. It was made by the labour of 7,000
soldiers. The Khedive of Egypt and the Shah of
Persia joined in the enterprise. A Prince of India
spent $200,000 on the Medina Station. Popular in-
terest was aroused and personal subscriptions solicited.
Large contributions were received from India, Java,
and the whole Moslem world. Lucknow sent $140,000
and Rangoon and Madras $300,000. Peculations
from the fund were put at $3,000,000. Yet in spite
of this and the Beduin robbers, it was carried to com-
pletion. One specialty of its trains is the prayer-car
for the pilgrims. The idea of Pan-Islamism is one
congenial to the Arabs, for Mecca is a hotbed of
Islamic fanaticism and its atmosphere is surcharged

with hatred of Christianity and with assurance of the
final triumph of Islam over the Christians, even though
it is the present kismat that the infidels oppress the
faithful. The new High Sherif was in communion
of purpose and idea with the Sultan. The power
which lay in the schools of Mecca and of the mullahs
who went forth from them was more actively exerted
to revive Islam. Increasing effort was made to incite
the Hajis. These pilgrims come from all parts of the
Mohammedan world to be present at the annual feast
of sacrifice, and to perform the rites around the Kaaba
and other sacred places. Each race and language has
its special groupings and mosques, and are brought
under instruction with an aim to indoctrinate, inspire,
and excite them to stronger faith and fanaticism.
Every year one hundred thousand of these devoted
pilgrims kiss the black stone and, notwithstanding the
fact that they are fleeced unmercifully, swindled and
deceived at every turn, notwithstanding the fact that
exposure to the broiling sun, cholera, plague, and the
treachery of the Beduins prevent thirty-eight per cent
from returning to their homes (see Keane’s “Six
Months in Mecca”), yet the Haji is more than all
others a fanatic. Even among the Persians, though
they have suffered specially as Shiah heretics, the
most fanatical class of the population are the Hajis.
They are most ready to treat with scorn and con-
tumely the Armenians or Nestorians, to revile them as
infidels, and to gather their honourable robes about
them lest they be defiled by their touch. The Hajis
return to their Sunni communities, bound as never
before to Mecca, with a deep idea of the unity of Is-

lam and a determination to promote it and to defeat
and destroy the Christians. This is strikingly true
of the Malays, of whom Simon and Hurgronje testify,
saying that “every Haji is an agent of Moslem propa-
ganda; they return home inspired with the idea of
living and dying for the realization of that unity.”
They are permeated with the thought of the greatness
of Islam, of their position and blessedness in being
members of it. They are firm in their belief in its
power and its unparalleled influence in the world.
They have caused Pan-Islamic principles to penetrate
the Moslem millions of Java and Sumatra and even
the most remote mountain villages. They are assured
that the Supreme Caliph, the Rajah of Stamboul, will
one day deliver them. Christians are helped by the
devil, their science is of the devil, their machine-guns
are called the devil’s guns, and they will go to the
devil. Their destruction is at hand by the power of
the Prophet, for they are inferior in power as well
as cursed in their faith, being like unclean beasts. In
some such words is described to us (Rev. G. Simon
in “Islam and Missions,” p. 87) the attitude of
East-Indian Moslems. No wonder that its outcome
is disloyalty and insurrection.

In Russia Pan-Islamic influence is widespread. A
journal advocating it is published in Petrograd, called
“The World of Islam,” and another is issued by the
Academy of Kazan. Agents have travelled far and
wide among the Tartars along the Volga. Others
have gone through the Crimea, Caucasus, the Kirghiz
Steppes, and Turkestan, and inflamed the bigotry of
the Moslems, inculcating hatred of Christians and col-

lecting funds for the Sultan. In Bokhara the propa-
ganda is reported to have been very successful and the
Amir to have become a leader in the movement. The
twenty millions of Moslems in Russia are united and
desirous of attaining to the religious and political
ideals of Pan-Islamism. In India the propaganda has
been active. Abdul Hamid sent his emissaries. A
paper was printed in his palace, called Peik-Islam, for
circulation in India. The Sultan’s name was intro-
duced into the Khutbas, or prayer service, in some
provinces.

In Africa, the propaganda had wide ramifications.
Lord Cromer saw its activities and describes it in his
reports and in his “Modern Egypt.” The great dar-
vish orders to which I shall again refer, are active
advocates of its main principles, and have won the
people to adhesion to them. One of Sultan Abdul
Hamid’s special agents was Sheikh Jaffar, chief of the
Madaniyah darvishes in Tripoli and Algeria. He was
a strong supporter of Pan-Islamism and had his head-
quarters at Stamboul, whence he sent out his mes-
sengers (“Islam and Missions,” p. 66). The Sanusi
Sheikh at first denounced the Osmanli Sultans for
their friendliness to and imitation of Christians, but
later was reconciled and strove for the same pro-
gramme. Regarding North Africa, Canon Sell affirms
(Missionary Review, 1912, p. 739) that “the Pan-
Islamic movement is having a power such as has not
been seen since the early days of the Arab conquest.”
Dr. Washburn wrote in 1909: “There seems to be a
general movement in North Africa and all over Asia,
even in China, the full significance of which We cannot

understand. But one thing is clear … a determina-
tion to maintain their faith on the part of Moslems.”

PAN-ISLAMISM AN ANTI-CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT

The Pan-Islamic movement aimed to oppose and
conquer Christianity. It strove not only to promote
things Moslem but abolish and destroy things Chris-
tian. Its policy of repression was evident in the Sul-
tan’s dominions. The condition there was well de-
scribed as “an increasing stringency directed against
Christian education, and increasing hostility to the use
of books by the Christians” in order to “cripple their
intellectual powers, … an increasing vigilance to
prevent Christians from exercising their religion …
and to restrain Christianity.” (Quoted in E. M.
Bliss: “Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities,” p. 367.)
The censorship of Christian books was made very
strict, not only on certain kinds of books but even on
words and ideas. The censor prohibited the use of
the word rasul, apostle, for Christ’s disciples, claiming
that the title should be used exclusively for Moham-
med; that the phrase “guidance of God” should not
be used in reference to Christians, for they had not that
blessing. Even books coming in transitu to Persia
were seized. Some volumes of the “Life of Henry
Martyn” in English were burnt at Trebizond by the
Turkish officials, who thus showed an oversight of
the interests of their Islamic neighbour. Books such
as Shakespeare, “Universal History,” and encyclo-
pedias were taken from our cases. But while zeal for
the law led to their confiscation, the higher law of
self-interest often led to their being sold in the bazaars

of Trebizond. In search for these unclean books, it
chanced that once a ham was discovered. What should
be done with this abomination? While officials were
deliberating on this, the question was settled by a dog
snatching it and running away with it. Once an agri-
cultural machine was landed at a certain port. Accom-
panying it was a description of it which fell into the
hands of a Turk who could read English. He was
struck with horror and rushed off to report to the
police that the machine was a terrible one guaranteed
to make “eighty revolutions a minute.” A panic fol-
lowed. Guards were posted and a telegram for in-
structions sent to Constantinople. The machine was
ordered out of the country instanter.

Interference with and repression of Christian work
in Turkey was reflected in Persia. Not seldom some
action of the Shah’s officials could be traced to a re-
port received of some anti-Christian action of the
Osmanli government.

Repression of the worship and education of Chris-
tians was not enough; Christian officials were dis-
missed by the Sultan. It is definitely stated that they
were offered continuance in their civil and diplomatic
posts on condition of accepting Islam; that those in
arrears of taxes were tendered remission on the same
condition. All this was a part of Abdul Hamid’s pro-
gramme to convert the Christian rayats.

Massacres of the Christians had a religious end.
They were inspired by religious fanaticism, as well
as designed to repress political and revolutionary ac-
tivity. The latter were not sufficient cause for gen-
eral massacre. Indeed the forcible conversion to Islam

of seventy or more villages of Yezidees or devil wor-
shippers of Kurdistan was carried out, though there
could not be any political danger from them. Sir
William Ramsay declares his belief that the Armenian
massacres were part of the plan of Pan-Islamism—a
deliberate plan to crush Christianity. In any case
they were promoted and carried out as an anti-
Christian campaign. Not only in Turkey but else-
where the whole spirit of the movement was against
the religion as well as against the governments of the
Christians. It may readily be admitted that there is
much in the political dealings of Christian Powers,
their aggressions and selfish diplomacy, to excite ha-
tred, but there is very little in their conduct towards
Islam as a religion to call for reprisal. They have
treated it impartially and justly, sometimes favoured
it. Nevertheless the Pan-Islamic propaganda increased
the hatred for Christians as well as the desire to over-
throw Christian domination everywhere. Sheikh
Abdul Hak of Bagdad but voices the feeling of the
multitude when he fulminates a defiance, saying:
“Christian peoples! The hatred of Islam is irrecon-
cilable! We abhor you more than we did in the early
period of history. Our most ardent desire is that the
day may soon dawn when we shall wipe out the last
traces of your supremacy.” The Ijtihad, a Moslem
journal, says (Dr. Howard Bliss in International Re-
view of Missions, 1913, p. 647) the Christian is “the
curse of the world. To reason with him, to lead him
back to salvation, and when that is impossible, to re-
move his existence, is the most sacred duty and the
holiest piety of the faithful. Oh, Christian nations!

We are now hating you. We want you to understand
that we hate the civilization and the extraordinary de-
velopment which has made you so wealthy and so
powerful.”1

TURKISH MASSACRES OF CHRISTIANS

The idea is said to prevail in England that “the
Turk always showed a contemptuous toleration for
his Christian subjects.” Of the contempt there can
be no doubt. Sir William Ramsay says (“Impres-
sions, etc.,” p. 206): “Armenians and Greeks were
regarded as dogs and pigs; their nature was to be
Christians, to be spat upon if their shadow darkened
a Turk, to be outraged, to be mats on which he wiped
the mud from his feet. The Turk then did not mind
what religion these dogs belonged to and he was as
far as possible from the wish to make them Moham-
medans.” But with this contempt was also persecu-
tion. Sir Edwin Pears says (“Turkey and Its Peo-
ple,” p. 350): “Until the nineteenth century the policy
was one of constant worry with occasional Bartholo-
mew massacres” (ibid., p. 42): “I doubt whether at
any time since Mohammed conquered Constantinople
a quarter of a century has passed without a big mas-
sacre.” In another place this close student of Turkish
history writes (The Nineteenth Century, 1913, p.
278): “I assert that ever since the Turk entered Eu-

1 This abhorrence is revealed in the incident that Sheikh
Othman of Batavia was severely criticised for praying for the
Queen of Holland at the time of her coronation. Another cele-
brated sayid, Salim ibn Ahmad of Arabia, defended him with
the remark that it was merely an external performance to con-
ciliate the infidels, but God knew what was in his heart.

rope, say five hundred years ago, the whole course of
Turkish history … was a period of Mohammedan
fanaticism, during which tens of thousands of Chris-
tians died for their faith. The persecutions under
which the Christians suffered after the capture of
Constantinople, in 1453, were so continuous and strik-
ing as to terrorize the sufferers. They were far
greater in each century before 1800 than during the
last century. Their history under Turkish rule was
a long and terrible persecution for their faith. On
three occasions every Christian in Constantinople was
threatened with death. In 1512 Salim I proposed to
kill them all unless they would accept the Mohammedan
faith. The Grand Vizier averted it. One-half of the
churches of Constantinople were left to the Christians
at the conquest, but before a century all but one were
taken from them.” Some were bought back with
money. Or if instead of the ones of which they were
dispossessed, they were permitted to build, they must
be of wood that they might quickly decay or be burnt
down.

A mere recapitulation of the massacres in the nine-
teenth century fills one with horror; such infernal
brutality and devilish lust, rapine, murder, and bar-
barity surpass description. In 1822 the Greeks of
Chios were almost exterminated. The Turkish rabble
hurried to the scene and enjoyed the slaughter as a
picnic. Thirty-two thousand boys and girls were sold
into slavery, 30,000 of the people were killed, and
30,000 fled into other lands; but 15,000 remained in
this most prosperous island. In 1844 10,000 Nes-
torians were massacred by the Kurds; in 1860

30,000 Christians of the Lebanon were slaughtered
by the Druses; in 1876 the massacre of 40,000 Bul-
garians aroused the indignation of Europe and brought
about the Russo-Turkish war; in 1894-96 200,000
Armenians perished either by slaughter or consequent
deprivations. In 1909, under the Constitution, oc-
curred the massacre of Armenians at Adana. “Every
man that could be found was shot, hacked to pieces,
or thrown into the flames of the burning houses and
shops. No Christian woman’s honour was spared.”
Churches were destroyed. In city and villages all
were hunted down. Twenty-eight thousand were
slain. Twenty-one out of twenty-five trained Protes-
tant pastors were massacred. It was more fiendish
than the preceding massacre.

MASSACRES CAUSED BY RELIGIOUS FANATICISM

Moslem fanaticism was the fundamental cause of
these massacres. They were ordered by the Sultan,
the Caliph of Islam, instigated by harangues of the
mullahs declaring the merit of killing and outraging
Christians. They were enjoined by proclamations in
the mosques. The Moslems robbed, desecrated, and
burnt the churches as well. When they made a holo-
caust of the Urfa Cathedral, within which were eight
thousand innocent victims, many of them women and
children, the Moslems “mockingly called on Christ to
prove himself a greater prophet than Mohammed.”
In the time of trial, tens of thousands were compelled
to choose between death and Islam. Tens of thou-
sands chose death. Thousands, alas, denied the faith
especially to save their wives and daughters from the

vile hands of the wretches who maltreated them in a
horrible manner or carried them off to their harams
or sold them as slaves and even compelled them to
become promiscuous concubines. In the midst of all
the slaughter and rapine, all that was required of a
man was to raise one finger as a sign of acceptance
of the Moslem creed and he was safe. At least forty
thousand under compulsion became Moslems in
1894-95.1

Such is a brief summary of Turkish atrocities
against the Christians; a record which well qualifies
him to be called the unspeakable Turk. Yet we are
assured, by one who knows, that the Turk shows im-
provement. Sir Edwin Pears, for forty years the
sterling representative of Great Britain in Constanti-
nople, after condemning the Sultan and these massa-
cres in burning words, assures us that there has been
a decrease in the fanaticism of the Turks. The bru-
tality, bloodthirsty savagery, monstrous cruelty, bestial

1 E. M. Bliss: “Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities,” chap,
xxvi. Dr. Bliss gives details. At Chunkush, in the province of
Diarbekr, there were 6,000 Christians; 880 were butchered, the
rest were compelled to become Moslems. At Senerek nearly all
the grown men, 750, were killed, and all the women and children
were distributed to the Moslem harams. At Urfa most of the
Christian men were compelled to become Moslems and to put up
a white flag as a sign of it. After a month, some houses were
found without the white flags and 1,500 were killed as apostates.
At Albislaw nearly all accepted Islam; at Adianam out of 800 all
were slain but 20 who denied the faith. At Arabkir, of 18,000
Christians, all were plundered and burned out of house, 4,000 were
killed, the rest accepted Islam. At Tadem, of 1,800, 250 were
killed, the rest became Moslems. In all, 100,000 to 200,000 per-
ished; 40,000 accepted Islam.

sensuality from which Christians suffered in our day
were exceeded in the atrocities of the sixteenth, sev-
enteenth, and eighteenth centuries. Even the mas-
sacres of the Greeks in the beginning of the nineteenth
century surpassed in inhumanity and horror the inde-
scribable massacres of the Armenians. This being so,
we might hope, at such a rate of progress, that after
several millenniums the lives of Christians, were any
left, would be safe under the Turks. Victor Hugo
has an expressive line which runs

“The Turks have passed here: All is ruin and mourning.”

These unpunished massacres of Armenian Christians
were exulted over as a victory for Islam. Even in
far-off Mandaling, the Moslems announced that they
would treat the Batak Christians in exactly the same
way (Simon, p. 39).

THE HOLY WAR

An instrument was ready at hand for Pan-Islamism.
This was the Jihad, or Holy War. Abdul Hamid
counted on making effective use of it. The Law of
Mohammed, both in the Koran and the Traditions,
commands fighting for the Faith. War is a religious
duty. Their prophet enjoins: “Kill those that join
other Gods with God wherever ye shall find them: but
if they shall convert, then let them go their way”
(Surah IX, 5). Some would interpret this to mean
only the heathen of Arabia, but this is untenable, for
verse 29 says: “Make war upon such of those to
whom the Scriptures have been given, i.e. Jews and
Christians … who profess not the profession of the
truth until they pay tribute out of hand and be hum-

bled.” Surah VIII, 40, commands: “Fight against
them until religion be all of it God’s.” Mohammed
declared: “Fighting in the way of God is a divine
duty. When your Imam orders you to go forth to
fight, then obey him.” By command of Mohammed,
says Bosworth Smith (“Mohammed and Moham-
medanism,” p. 177), “religion became warlike and
war became religious, with the whole world for a
battlefield.” Islam conquered and spread by the
sword. All Moslem historians affirm it. The Per-
sians call themselves “guluj mussalmani” (“Mussul-
mans by the sword”). It remained for European
apologists, like T. W. Arnold, to attempt, however
unsuccessfully, to show the contrary. In the jihad
the Moslem warrior gave the option of (1) Islam,
(2) Subjection, (3) Death. Under the second con-
dition Christians must live in abject submission, under
the lordship of the Moslem, inferior in legal status,
paying a special tax, regarded as zimmis or rayats
(cattle). If they assert themselves, seem desirous of
freedom, or are supposed to be planning release or to
be sympathizing with the enemy, they come under the
ban of the jihad and they and their families can be
killed and maltreated without mercy. Dr. G. Herrick,
a lover of the Turks as a race, condemns their jihad
in these words (“Christian and Mohammedan,” p.
119): “These orgies of carnage and arson, attended
by treachery and falsehood, by infernal cruelty and
beastly lust, are the natural fruit of Mohammed’s
ethical teachings and example at Medina.”

The Holy War is in force “till the resurrection,”
and only expediency limits it while non-Moslem gov-

ernments exist in the world. It is a permanent statute
of Islam for aggression and propagation as well as
defence. According to the Shari, it should always
exist against non-Moslem countries “until they sub-
mit,” and until every Dar-ul-Harb is converted into a
Dar-ul-Islam, an abode of Islam. Submission to Eu-
ropean rule is abnormal, unlawful, only a temporary
trial. The “Moslem Dictionary,” published in India
(quoted by Dr. Zwemer, Missionary Review, 1913,
p. 102), says: “This is an abode of Islam, although
it belongs to the accursed ones and authority belongs
externally to these Satans.” Only expediency holds
them in check. For a new interpretation has been
given to the law by the Ulema of North India, that
the jihad is lawful only when there is “a probability
of victory to the armies of Islam.” This accords with
the saying of the Koran: “Ye are in no wise bound
to rush upon your destruction.” Fear and not loyalty
prevents the jihad, for, as Professor Petrie says of
Egypt (“Ten Years in Egypt,” p. 180), “the fellah
looks upon the unbeliever as a miserable minority; and
it is the unpleasant fact that they cannot be crushed at
present which prevents his crushing them and assert-
ing the supremacy of Islam.”

The jihad is invoked not only against non-Moslems
but also against heretics, as the Shiahs and the Wa-
habis. The Shiahs claim that there can only be a
true jihad when the Imam appears to issue the call:
Sunnis ascribe the authority to the caliph. In prac-
tice, the Shiah Mujtahids proclaim it and even mullahs
in Africa and Indonesia declare local jihads. It has
been invoked in the Atchin and other insurrections and

in frequent fanatical uprisings; in the rebellions in
China; in the Wahabi campaigns in India; by Sheikh
Abdul Kadir and Schamyl in their stubborn defences
in Algeria and the Caucasus; by the Sudan Mahdi; in
every important war of Turkey, except possibly the
Balkan War. The Sheikh Sanusi issued a call to the
jihad against Italy in Tripoli, 1912. In it salvation
and blessing are promised to all “who extend the
dominion of the Faith with the sword’s sharpness, as
the Koran has commanded, ‘Battle with unbelievers.’
For Paradise lies under the shadow of swords; the
martyr feels death only as the light pressure of the
finger when he is filled with the hot desire for it. By
God’s grace, it is the last step to the presence of God.
The breath of Paradise fans him and the houris seek
to draw his gaze on themselves when he lies wound-
covered. Up then, worshipper of God! pour wealth
and blood into the fight! God has commanded the
jihad! Endurance! Endurance! God is near to
help” (Missionary Review, 1912, p. 790).1

The effect of such proclamations is to excite reli-
gious fanaticism in a superlative degree, filling the
soldier with fiery zeal to slay as God’s service, for
has not the Prophet said “the fire of hell shall not
touch the legs of him who shall be covered with the
dust of battle in the way of God”? Indifference to
death and dauntless courage are engendered. The

1 Mr. Simon (p. 141) tells of a Javanese, bent on suicide,
who rushed in and wounded several Dutch soldiers and shot
the sentry. Suicide would have been accounted a great sin
for him, but killing Christians was a merit, deserving a heavenly
reward, so he committed this act of holy warfare to enter
Paradise.

jihad is a tremendously effective weapon, as in days
of old.

With such a propaganda, such principles, such a
following, and such a weapon, Pan-Islamism loomed
large. The ideal of the Caliph Abdul Hamid seemed
to have borne fruitage. The successful campaign
against Greece in 1897 sent a thrill of joy through
the vast body of Moslems to the farthest extremity.
Every mosque was illuminated throughout India, even
to the smallest village in the Deccan (Aga Khan:
Edinburgh Review, 1914, p. 3). It was one cause
of the Tirah rising. The Greeks were conquered; the
Armenians decimated; the Arabs brought into order
and conciliated; the Sanusiyahs working in harmony;
the Shiahs friendly; the Moslem leagues fanatically
active; the Christian Powers flouted; the Colossus of
the North humbled by Japan; the Sultan’s prestige
among Moslems was at its zenith. Pan-Islamic ideals
seemed to them about to be realized. Even European
writers did not regard their military aspirations as
impossible. Edward Dicey viewed as reasonable
(“The Egypt of the Future,” quoted in C. R. Watson’s
“In the Valley of the Nile,” p. 218) the “widespread
Moslem belief that the time is at hand when Islam
might resume her career of conquest and might fulfil
her mission of exterminating all unbelievers, no matter
what creed they may profess.” Oscar Mann wrote
(“Great Religions of the World,” p. 58): “We see
a fermentation going on in Islam from one end to the
other. What is not possible if some gifted man suc-
ceeds in inspiring these tremendous masses!” Some,
on the other hand, called it a “rope of sand” (Dr.

G. Herrick), a “chimera” (Dr. W. S. Nelson), an
“impossibility” (Prof. E. G. Browne), “with no
prospects of realization” (J. Simon). These esti-
mates seem undoubtedly true from a military point of
view. But its possibilities could not be accurately de-
termined and Christian Powers cautiously watched
developments.

Events which followed revealed its failure as a po-
litical power but its reality as a religious conviction,
and intensifies its anti-Christian bitterness. The ap-
parent purpose of Russia and Great Britain to divide
Persia, the annexation by Austria of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the declaration of independence by Bul-
garia, the Italian war and the loss of Tripoli, the
Balkan War and its direful consequences, the seizure
of Morocco,—all together impressed Moslems with
the thought that Christian governments had formed a
plot to destroy all Moslem governments. In conse-
quence Turk and Arab emissaries were sent through
India and Russia. Intense feeling was created. Sym-
pathy with Turkey was profound, for, as the London
Times said (April 19, 1913), “the Moslem looks upon
Turkey as the embodiment of the temporal power of
Islam and does not desire to see Islam reduced to the
position of Israel, a religion without temporal status.”
A Mohammedan graduate of an English University
was so affected by the news of the battle of Lulu
Burgas that he felt like committing suicide. In India
inflammatory speeches were made, bombs were pur-
chased, fatvas for boycott were issued, large sums were
subscribed to help Turkey. Popular meetings passed
indignant resolutions. Protests and petitions were sent

from the London Colony and from the Transvaal
Moslems. The Indian Moslem press denounced the
conspiracy to overthrow Islam, the British policy in
Persia, the aggressions of Russia, Italy, and France.
Egypt seemed a hotbed of sedition. Moslem Leagues
were multiplied. A thrill of sympathy and excite-
ment went even to the remotest corner of Zanzibar
(“Vital Forces,” p. 197). Agitation and discontent
were manifested everywhere. Pan-Islamic feeling was
tense and aggressive. Remembering the Crusades,
who can tell but some spark might set on fire the
Islamic world? We soberly and rightly calculate that
the devotees of Islam cannot prevail in warfare against
the armouries of Europe. Without our science, Islam
is hopelessly outclassed as a fighting power. But Is-
lam might find her opportunity in a divided Christen-
dom. Even some great Dreibund might equip and
finance Pan-Islam. Besides this, the point is not as
to where the final victory would be. It is rather as
to the purpose and possible attempt of the Moslem
world. They await the time to strike. God is great!
Victory is His! “A consciousness of victory,” says
Mr. Simon (p. 223), “pervades the whole Moham-
medan world. Islam’s unfavourable position politically
has not affected it, because the feeling has its origin
in the religious conceptions of Islam, more especially
in the doctrine of the holy wars which are to usher in
the Last Day. It has a feeling of invincibility.” Not-
withstanding its collapse, at present, it is Julius
Richter’s judgment that “the deep and strong convic-
tion that has grown up into the very fabric of Moham-
medanism, through thirteen centuries of victory and

success, of a call to world-wide dominion, cannot be
uprooted by the reverses” it has met. The Comrade,
the Moslem journal of Calcutta, voices their sense of
unity and strength when it says (quoted by Dr.
Zwemer, Missionary Review, 1914, p. 176): “Mus-
sulmans have just begun to perceive that Islam is a
living source of spiritual and social cohesion, binding
all Moslems in an indissoluble unity of hope, purpose,
duty, and endeavour. Moslems have never felt its
vital strength as keenly as they feel it to-day. The
sufferings of the parts have revived in the whole its
sense of organic unity.” Palgrave (“Essays,” p. 125)
writes: “So strong indeed is the bond of union that in
the presence of the infidel the deep clefts which divide
Sunni and Shiah are for a time and purpose oblit-
erated,” and it is “roughly welded into one formidable
weapon of attack on the common foe, the uncircum-
cised foe, governed and governing.” Aga Khan, who
is loyal to Great Britain, writes (Edinburgh Review,
1914, p. 4): “All sections of the Moslem world are
moved. There is between them and their fellow-
believers in other lands an essential unity which breaks
through differences of sect and country.” The Tanin
of Constantinople, even after the failure of the call
to the jihad, expresses its belief in the reality of Pan-
Islamism as follows:

“The wish to abolish existing misunderstandings
between the various Mohammedan elements and to
establish as between them a defensive force that will
permit them to give reciprocal protection to each
other, is not anywise the result of vast and chimerical
schemes, but rather the outcome of most natural neces-

sity and most convincing logic. The movement among
the Moslems toward union and solidarity, which had
as its object the respect of the political and national
rights of others, the respecting of the national fron-
tiers, and a united effort against common enemies, has
taken during these late years as a result of events a
form so serious as to make it most illogical for cer-
tain indifferent individuals to shrug their shoulders
over it. The spread of ideas of this sort among
elements that have for centuries looked askance at
each other, has proved that a new and very powerful
movement is manifesting itself in Islam.

“Thus it happens that Turkey, who in the campaign
of 1877-78 was compelled to guard her Persian fron-
tier, on this occasion beheld the whole of Persia, as
soon as the jihad was proclaimed, rise to her feet with
her Ulemas, khans, and tribes. The Moslems have for
a long time been awake, but the movement will have
to be progressive, for the time necessary for them
to prepare to move in common at a given moment,
has not yet passed by. Everybody in the Moslem
world has been awaiting a time that should strengthen
this current and hasten its development. This chance,
which we were hoping for in heaven, we have at last
found on this earth.”

III

ISLAMIC MISSIONS

ANOTHER aspect of the Islamic revival is a re-
newal of zeal in propagating the Faith. Islam
has always been a missionary religion, and it
retains this characteristic in a marked degree and both
by the sword and by the word it continues to increase
its numbers. True its opportunity to use force has
largely passed from its hand. The restraint of Chris-
tian governments prevents it. But numerous exam-
ples have occurred in modern times. Some thousands
of Greeks in Chios and of Armenians in Turkey were
made Moslems under threat of death. The Kaffirs
were forced into Islam by the Afghans. The jihad
against the Battaks in 1821-28 became “a bloody and
savage war of conquest” in which they tried to impose
their faith on the heathen (Arnold, ibid., p. 300).
But in Achin and Sumatra some regions were kept for
centuries from becoming Moslems that they might
continue to be legitimate fields for slave trade, for it
was considered that they had a God-given right to make
plundering raids on the defenceless heathen and sell
them into slavery (Simon, p. 206). Osman Dan-
fodio, to whom I have already referred, led his army
(1830-40) against the heathen Hausas, the tribes
around Sokoto, Yoruba, and Senegambia, compelling
them all to embrace Islam. He carried the faith to

the Gulf of Guinea and to the West as far as the At-
lantic. Four powerful Mohammedan kingdoms of
the present day owe their religion to his sword (Ar-
nold, pp. 265-67). The Tijaniyah Darvishes, a militant
order founded by Sidi Ahmad of Tijani, Algeria, have
forced Islam by the sword upon tribes from Nigeria
to the Gold Coast. A number of pagan states were
converted by their jihads. The Tijaniyah appear now
to be reconciled with France. The Sheikh receives a
salary and wears the badge of the Legion of Honour.
The Sheikh of the Tabbiyah order, the Sherif of
Wassan, is the son of an Englishwoman and was
educated in a French school. Yet Professor Wester-
mann declares that “Even now among the ruling races
of the Sudan, the Holy War—that is, force—is re-
garded as the natural and normal means of conver-
sion and as more effective than preaching (Interna-
tional Review of Missions, 1912, p. 285). Mungo
Park narrates (Arnold, p. 285) that the following
message was sent by the Moslem king of Futa Toro
to his pagan neighbour: “With this knife Abd-ul-
Kadir will condescend to shave the head of Damel, if
Damel will embrace the Mohammedan faith; and with
this other knife Abdul Kadir will cut the throat of
Damel, if Damel refuses to embrace it.” A young
Arab said to Captain Burton at Abeokuta: “Give guns
and powder to us, and we will soon Islamize those
dogs.” The Mohammedan ruler in Bambara sent out
teachers with an armed force to convert the heathen
to Islam and, in case they did not receive it, to lay
waste their villages. On receiving it, a fifth of the
spoils was to be paid to the ruler.

But now, for the most part, Moslem propaganda
is carried on by persuasion. The two movements men-
tioned, Wahabism and Pan-Islamism, have stirred up
a fervent missionary spirit, the former by renewing
primitive faith; the latter by strengthening the solidar-
ity of believers, giving them a sense of their unity and
so inspiring them with boldness in witnessing for their
religion. The geographical situation now favours the
spread of Islam more than Christianity. The latter
has converted all the races in contact with it in Europe
and in contact with its colonies in America and Aus-
tralia. Now separating us from the African pagans
and the heathen nations of Asia stretches the great
mass of Mohammedanism. Only in South Africa does
Christianity have the advantage of close contact. The
advantage of peaceful penetration and gradual assimi-
lation through proximity lies with Islam. Influence
across the seas is not so intimate and effective.

The most striking and, from a Christian point of
view, critical progress of Islam has been made in
Africa. I have described the warlike advance. Much
also has been accomplished in a peaceable way. Mos-
lem traders and shepherds are in the habit of settling
down in new locations, marrying among the people,
and gradually acquiring an influence among the ne-
groes. Their somewhat higher culture and the social
standing and dignity which come from the possession
of property, create admiration. Marabouts or teach-
ers go about, write charms, use magic, work faith
cures, and adapt themselves to the superstitions and
habits of the tribe. They ingratiate themselves with
the chief, acquire a standing with him, marry his

daughter; or, if not, on the contrary, if he is obdurate,
they instigate rebellion against him and supplant him.
Merchant and marabout alike enter into relationship
with the different families by marriage and soon a
community is established. If there is a European
sovereignty, they sympathize with the black man
against this new oppressor and tax-collector, counting
themselves fellow-sufferers, and the negro, soon for-
getful of the rapacity and cruelty of the slave-traders,
feels grateful. Above all, the Arab or North African
adopts the newly converted negro into the brother-
hood of Islam, in which there is no colour line.

Then, too, the Christian missionary, if there is one,
is of the same race and religion as the foreign sub-
jugator. If the Moslem were the ruler, he would take
advantage of it to further his religion, but the Euro-
pean administration is neutral in principle, and so
upright at times that he leans backwards. Or per-
chance he thinks Islam a better faith for the black
man or is simply careless and indifferent. He is sur-
rounded by Moslem secretaries, clerks, interpreters,
and agents. They have some education and more
clothing than other natives. Through them all gov-
ernment business is transacted. The subaltern army
officers are Moslems, and new recruits are circumcised
to make them acceptable to the older ones. If a
school is established, it teaches Arabic and the books
of Islam. So in court, in camp, in school, the heathen
sees the Moslem preferred and the Christian ignored.
He finds it to his advantage to become a Moslem. Be-
sides all this the Moslem appears to a better advan-
tage under Christian rule than usually, for he is re-

strained from showing his bad qualities, such as op-
pression, violence, slave-trading. To some provinces
the Christian missionary is prohibited entrance, but
the Moslem goes everywhere and has the roads and
safety of Christian administration to assist him. In
the Sudan for many years missionaries were prohib-
ited, but Gordon College at Khartum, the memorial
of that Christian saint, is a Moslem institution, in
which Islam is taught by Sheikhs from Al Azhar.
The Koran is a text-book, and Friday, not Sunday,
the school holiday. Professor Westermann says:
“The College exerts a powerful influence in favour
of Islam.”

The strongest influence in Africa for Moslem
propaganda is wielded by the orders of darvishes. I
have already told of their origin. As an offshoot of
Persian Sufiism, they should be latitudinarian and
friendly to Christians. So were the Kadiriyah, and
they continue somewhat so in Africa. The Bektashi
of Turkey are Alivis, and were very tolerant, teach-
ing that “the paths leading to God are as numerous
as the breaths of His creatures.” Sir Edwin Pears
tells of one of their Sheikhs who said he regarded the
Christians as brothers, and removed his turban and
showed the sign of a cross embroidered upon it. Yet
even Bektashi joined in massacring the Armenians.
Another darvish Sheikh was a member of a Masonic
lodge in Constantinople. Yet the new orders of dar-
vishes are actively hostile to everything Christian and
European. Some of them are fighting orders, as the
Tijaniah and the Mahdiists of the Sudan; some hold
to non-intercourse and opposition to foreign influ-

ences. Among these are the Sanusiyah, who adhere to
puritanic practices like the Wahabis. Of them Canon
Sell says: “The object of the founder was to erect
an impassable barrier to the progress of Western civil-
ization and to the influence of Christian Powers in
Moslem lands” (Church Missionary Intelligencer,
January, 1899). They are ardent adherents of Pan-
Islamic principles and are notable as the most zealous
and powerful propagators of Islam, by peaceable
means, that the world has ever seen. The future of
their large and influential organization may yet show
more wonderful development.

The founder of the order of Sanusiyah was Sidi
Mohammed Ibn Ali as Sanusi, an Arab of Morocco.
He studied theology at Fez and other madressas. He
was initiated into many orders,—“finally acquiring
the degree of Master Sufi and passing through the
ordeal of fire” (Achmad Abdullah, a Sanusiyah,
Forum, 1914, p. 679). He lectured at various places
in North Africa and latterly at Cairo. Here his
teachings offended the Ulema by their mystical and
puritanical tendencies. He was anathematized and
narrowly escaped death by poison. Proceeding to
Mecca, he received instructions from the Mufti and
had as his Murshid or Guide the Grand Sheikh of the
Kadiriyah, Al Fussi. On the latter’s death, Sanusi
was disappointed in not succeeding to the headship,
so he founded a school and order of his own and
taught in Mecca till 1843. Forced to leave there by
theological disputes, he returned to Africa and propa-
gated the order called after him Sanusiyah.

Sheikh Sanusi strove for a return to primitive Is-

lam. Following Ibn Abdul Wahab, his great aim was
to purify and revive Islam and correct abuses. He
denounced prayers to the Valis or saints, pilgrimages
to their shrines and undue honour to Mohammed.
He rejected the use of tobacco, coffee, and music, rich
clothing and ornaments, but his conscience found no
offence in tea and perfumes. Yet he held on to
Sufiism and to worship by means of the zikr. His
formula for producing the hypnotic trance is by the
repetition first of “Allah” 100 times; secondly, the
kalima or creed, with additions, 300 times; and
thirdly, the prayer, “O God! Bless our Lord Mo-
hammed, his family and friends,” 1,000 times. Their
oath is “By the Truth Sidi-es Sanusi.” The book of
the Sheikh is described as a frenzied writing, recount-
ing the stages of ecstasy which lead to oneness with
God. “In the first stage the adept will see 7,000,000
green stars of surpassing loveliness; in each succeed-
ing stage there will be different-coloured stars, until
in the bliss of oblivion he beholds constellations of a
glory beyond words” (Salib ul Khalili, in Spectator).
The Sanusiyah are classed by Goldziher as a fifth
school, distinct from the four orthodox schools of the
Sunnis.

The centre of the order was established at Jagbub,
where the Sheikh procured large estates and had as
many as 2,000 slaves to work them. There also was
at one time a college, with 750 students preparing
for religious work, under Sheikh Mohammed ash
Sherif. Settlements or colonies of the darvishes were
made in many places in those semi-civilized Moslem
countries, the lands were cultivated, and schools for

boys and even girls established. The chief of each
zawiya, or lodge, became governor of the district
round about, combining temporal and spiritual au-
thority, receiving tribute and offerings to such an
extent that large funds were accumulated. The order
has increased greatly. Zawiyas exist in all countries
from Morocco to Egypt, in the Sudan, around Lake
Chad, and, it is said, even in Turkey, Arabia, and
Malaysia. The entrance of Sultan Ali of Wadai and
Sultan Say id Baldas of Krej into the order has added
to its influence. The populace about the zawiyas is
initiated as adherents, so that six million are estimated
to be affiliated. To call these zawiyas monasteries
gives a wrong impression, for though they may prac-
tise austerities, yet celibacy is not commanded. They
are bound by a secret oath and have passwords and
signs.

Mohammed-as-Sanusi first married a woman named
Manna, whom he received as a present at Mesaad and
soon afterwards divorced. Another wife was Fatima.
Their son was called Mahdi, and he had this sign at
least that he was the son of Mohammed and Fatima,
as tradition says the Mahdi should be. He was also
credited with the physical marks which were requisite.
He refused to accept appointment from the Sudanese
Mahdi as one of his Khalifas. He died without ful-
filling a mission, but rumour says that he is in con-
cealment and will appear to fulfil his work as Mahdi.
Another son was a diplomat, but a debauchee. After
the death of the founder in 1859, the seat of the order
was moved farther into the interior, to Gouro or
Borku, beyond Wadai. The present Sheikh is re-

ported to have made arrangement with the Italian
Government, whereby he will have autonomy within
his sphere, paying tribute to Italy, and having the
title and emoluments of Governor-General and at the
same time be the Sultan’s religious representative.

The influence of the Sanusiyah has been very great
in strengthening the faith and arousing the zeal of the
Moslems of North Africa, awakening within them a
spirit of intense loyalty and devotion. All through
that vast region many Moslems were ignorant of their
religion, steeped in superstition, and addicted to prac-
tices contrary to Islam. Many had retained their
heathen practices and beliefs mixed with Moham-
medan rites and conceptions. These they have in-
structed and confirmed and developed into strong
Moslems. Among these were many tribes or parts of
tribes that had remained heathen. Sanusiyah preach-
ers and schools have converted them. In some in-
stances they have bought slaves, educated and Islam-
ized them and sent them back to their own tribes. At
a single time they purchased from the Moslem slave-
dealers two thousand persons. Thus their influence
as a proselyting agency has been very effective
through a wide stretch of territory. The results of
their labours and of the Kadiriyah order and similar
peaceful orders, as well as the militant ones, coupled
with the influence of traders, teachers, and soldiers,
penetrating from the North, from Egypt, from the
Arabian seacoast and Zanzibar, and even in Cape
Colony itself, have been to give Islam such victories in
Africa—such progress in numbers and in power as
to startle the Christian Church. The campaign has

been aggressive, rapid, successful. Thousands of
square miles, numerous and powerful tribes as well
as millions of the weak and unorganized masses, have
been brought under the banner of Mohammed. Vast
regions which for centuries lay beyond Arab influence
have lately been brought under it, and this has come
about owing to the peace and security which Euro-
pean domination is maintaining. This Mohammedan
awakening and advance in Africa has created a verita-
ble crisis which calls loudly to the Christian world to
be up and doing. For though Islam in Africa is an
inferior and degraded system, adapting itself to the
passions and superstitions of the heathen, yet it fills
them with zeal, bigotry, and pride and makes the task
of the Christian Church in accomplishing their evan-
gelization a herculean one. Hear what Achmad Ab-
dullah writes (Sunset Magazine, 1915, p. 99): “Now-
adays when Christian missionaries discover a new
and very pagan tribe in Central Africa, and return
after a year or two with money collected at home to
distribute the blessings of Christianity and a sam-
ple line of cheap gin, they discover that the Mos-
lem has been there ahead of them and the pagans
greet them with the resounding shout of La ilia ill’
Allah.”

Another principle taught by Sheikh Sanusi was in-
tense hostility to everything foreign to Islam. He
inveighed against the innovations brought in from
Christian civilization. He forbade all intercourse
with Christians and Jews. Because Sultan Abdul
Aziz was friendly to Christians and was adopting
Western ways he rejected his caliphate and denounced

him and the Turks as bad Moslems. He is said to
have affirmed that he would crush out the Christians
and Turks in one common destruction (Pears: “Tur-
key, etc.,” p. 300). But when Abdul Hamid took up
a fanatical policy, the Sanusiyahs united with him in
the Pan-Islamic propaganda. In 1886 the Sultan was
received into the order and in 1898 was acknowledged
as caliph by the Sheikh, who sent his official repre-
sentative to Constantinople (A. R. Colquhoun: North
American Review, 1906, p. 910).

The Sanusiyahs do not make converts by the sword,
but they undoubtedly have as one of their objects to
use the sword, if opportunity offers, to deliver Mo-
hammedan lands from the infidels. The Sheikh is
ready for the jihad when victory seems assured. He
is striving to unite Africa against the white man’s
supremacy. His zawiyas are storehouses of ammuni-
tion. Supplies of rifles and some cannon have been
received from some unknown European sources. He
has large funds, the offerings of his followers, which
are used for the purchase of arms. The Sanusiyahs
are encouraged to enlist in colonial regiments and
secure European drill. Much intrigue is carried on
among Mohammedan regiments of European Powers
in Algeria, Egypt, Tripoli, and the Sudan, to make
them disloyal. Youths are sent to Europe for edu-
cation in military art. Reports even say that there
are manufactories of arms in the oases in charge of
graduates of European technical schools. The Sheikh
has a devoted intelligence department in his strolling
fakirs. (Compare “The Moslem Menace,” Nine-
teenth Century, September, 1907, by Capt. H. A.

Wilson of the British army.) The centre of African
Pan-Islamism, Wadai, was taken by the French in
191 o and can no longer be used as a base for prepara-
tion against European rule. They may not listen to
the call to the jihad by the caliph in Constantinople,
but they will listen when the call goes forth from
their own Mahdi. M. Hanataux, former French
Minister of the Interior (Zwemer’s “Islam, etc.,” p.
170), says: “The religious orders of Islam are yet
keeping their powder dry for the day of the great
slaughter and the great victory.” Achmad Abdullah
(Sunset Magazine, 1915, p. 99) says on this point;
“Another invisible force at work is the incredible
number of Mohammedan lodges with which Asia,
North and Central Africa are honeycombed. Call
them darvishes, call them Sanusiyah or gentle dream-
ing Sufis, they all work towards the same object.
Some of them experiment in practical magic, some of
them are mystics, some of them are literati, poets,
grammarians; some of them are beginning to make
powder, bullets, and guns.”

The Mohammedan awakening is showing itself in
the propagation of the Faith in other countries. In
Russia the mullahs are carrying on a widespread and
continuous itinerary, confirming those who need it
and drawing in new converts, to whom pecuniary as-
sistance is given ungrudgingly. Not only heathen
Votiaks, Voguls, and Tsheremis on the west of the
Ural Mountains are being converted, but even some
Christians. At Atomva ninety-one families of the
Orthodox have embraced Islam and fifty thousand
who had joined the Russian Church have returned to

Islam since the proclamation of religious liberty.
New mosques and schools are being built (“Islam and
Missions,” p. 257). A great mosque has been erected
at Petrograd, the Moslem press is active, Moslems
sit as members of the Duma; new rights and privileges
are being petitioned for and received.

In China, agents from the West have been visiting
all the Moslem communities, preaching in the mosques
and trying to revive Islamic faith and enthusiasm.
There has been much stir. Training schools for prop-
agandists have been organized, and the one at Peking
has as its head a graduate of Al Azhar. An impetus
has been given to the study of Arabic. The relation-
ship with Western Asia is drawing closer. A Turkish
missionary has gone to China to reside and preach
Islam, but the effort to establish Turkish consulates
failed. Yet success is not altogether unalloyed. Sev-
eral mullahs some years ago returned from Mecca
and began a revival. But the movement was opposed.
The mullahs organized a New Sect. Strife and bit-
terness arose. The conservatives made complaint
against the New Sect and the Viceroy put them under
the ban. When China was at war with Japan, 1896,
the Old Moslems took advantage of the confusion
to proclaim a Holy War against the Chinese. Then
the New Sect took their revenge and were instru-
mental in bringing about the execution of thousands
of the others. Yet the slaughter was small compared
with that meted out to the Moslem rebels in 1862-74.
Despite these rebellions, the usual attitude of the Mos-
lem Chinese is to practise conformity, and to worship
in the Confucian temples and to take part in the

service to the idols. Now under the Republican gov-
ernment they have cut off their queues (H. H. Rid-
ley: Moslem World, 1913, pp. 386-90; Missionary Re-
view, 1912, p. 722 ff.).

In India a striking fact is the awakening of the
Moslem community to its own backward condition.
They are showing a feverish desire to make up for
their past neglect of privileges of modern civilization,
and to regain a status superior to the Hindus. They
are gaining in numbers much faster than any religion
except the Christians, partly because they are more
prolific than the Hindus, and also by the remarriage
of their widows. They are gaining converts from the
Hindus, to win whom they are showing much zeal.
However, many of the conversions of Hindus to Islam
are what are named by Mr. Takle (“Islam and Mis-
sions,” p. 213) “love episodes—either elopements of
Hindu girls or the taking of Hindu widows into Mos-
lem harams.” Moslems are also beginning to work
among the low-caste people, not without success.
This is not the work of individuals only, but societies
or anjumans have been formed who work through
paid agents. The Moslem League promotes religious
and political interests alike, supporting schools and
preachers, and publishing literature. They have spe-
cially requested collectors to inform them of any Mos-
lem orphans, that they may not allow them to fall
into other hands. In Lahore a Society for the Assist-
ance of Islam was formed in 1885. It maintains
schools, orphanages, and the Islamic College, repairs
mosques, strengthens the wavering, strives to win
back converts to other faiths, and interferes in every

possible way with the work of missions. It is also
directed against Hinduism, which in the form of the
Arya Samaj has been receiving some converts from
Islam. This society, as well as those at Lucknow,
1894, at Cawnpore, and at other points, is making
special efforts to educate the mullahs and to prepare
them for the controversy and to propagate the Faith.
The apologetic of Islam,1 including the history of
Christianity, are added to the curriculum, with Eng-
lish and the sciences. At Lahore there is also the
Mohammedan Book and Tract Depot to distribute
publications in defence of the Faith and the Koran
in cheap popular editions. English books in favour
of Islam or which lend themselves to Moslem propa-
ganda, as Carlyle’s “Hero as Prophet,” are published
and sold. Magazines are issued by different societies.
Some journals have made a business of publishing all
the evil reports about Christians which are to be
culled from the press (Farquhar’s “Modern Reli-
gious Movements in India,” pp. 347-52). In a word,
the Moslems in India are alert for defence and ag-
gression. They are active in the use of modern meth-
ods for the propagation of their religion.

In Malaysia, the conversion of the heathen to Islam
goes forward continuously. It has been marvellously
successful in point of numbers, though lacking in
transforming or elevating influence. The modern
roads open up the way. Darvishes and traders pene-
trate on them to the heathen interior heretofore un-

1 In a new program of study for softas in Stamboul the
“Szhar-ul-Hak,” a criticism of the Bible and apologetic for
Islam, is included.

approachable. One method of the Moslem is to adopt
an overbearing and lordly air, despising and scorning
the heathen, so the latter becomes a Moslem to rise to
the level of him, considering it a favour to be re-
ceived. The heathen also sees that Islam is the one
thing with which the Dutch Government does not
interfere. He interprets this fact to mean that the
Christian is afraid of Islam. The Moslem assures
him that this is true and that the Sultan is greater
than six kings. The converted pagan is full of pride,
fanaticism, and craftiness. However, the Dutch mis-
sions have given Islam a check and converted thirty
thousand Mohammedans. Islam has, I believe, never
converted any considerable body of Christians except
those who were subject to its government. But curi-
ously enough, at the present time, such conversions
are occurring to a limited extent. I refer not to the
Wofing, England, movement, which is almost negligi-
ble. But in Abyssinia some Christian tribes have
partly gone over to Islam and are in danger of being
won over entirely. In South Africa, too, Malay and
Indian Moslems through marriages with white women
by the Moslem rite, which in law is regarded as con-
cubinage, and through the adoption by them of Chris-
tian children and orphans, are making a noticeable
increase to the Moslem community. These half-breed
children are all raised as Moslems. Again East-
Indian coolies who have come to British Guiana and
Jamaica have become a danger to the Christian and
heathen coolies in these places and attentive efforts are
necessary to prevent Islam from propagating itself in
the New World. Already these immigrant Moslems

number 158,000. Most of them are in Brazil. They
have seven Arabic newspapers.

Another sign of the times is the organization among
Moslems of foreign missionary societies. In Egypt
the “Society for Invitation and Instruction” has
opened schools for the training of missionaries to go
to heathen and Christian lands to invite to Islam. A
similar attempt in Constantinople, called “The So-
ciety for Knowledge and Instruction,” failed because
the founder wished the language of the school to be
Arabic, but the government decided it should be Turk-
ish. Islamic congresses to consider the advancement
of Islam have been held in Mecca, Egypt, Russia, and
India. The Mecca congress was wise enough to con-
sider the ailments of the religion. Fifty-seven reasons
are said to have been mentioned for its decay, with
the object of finding remedies for them. That in
Cairo, 1907, was called by Dr. Gasprinski to “promote
the moral, social, and spiritual regeneration of Is-
lam” by a non-political, non-military movement. In
India, with delegates from Turkey and Egypt present,
1910, the congress approved of missions in China and
Japan. Missionaries were located in these lands. A
deputation was sent to Japan headed by a professor of
Lahore Government College. The first Japanese con-
verts were Baron Hiki, his wife and daughter, who
took the names Ali and Fatima. A Japanese officer,
Jama-Oka, has been converted through his admira-
tion of the warlike spirit of Mohammed. He made
the pilgrimage to Mecca and a prolonged stay in Con-
stantinople (Missionary Review, October, 1910, p.
722). Another convert started a monthly journal,

Al Islam. Professor Barakat Ullah started the Is-
lamic Fraternity, published by Chinese Moslem stu-
dents in Tokyo. Both were soon discontinued (Mos-
lem World, 1914, p. 312). The press in all Moslem
countries has a wide and strong influence. A number
of weekly journals have been started for the propa-
ganda; two important ones are in Constantinople.
“The Spirit of Islam,” by Sayid Amir Ali, is being
translated into Japanese. The latest sceptical and
liberal literature is being distributed to show that
Christianity is undermined. The Taarifi Moslemin
has sent a delegation around the world to report on
what will further the interests of Islam. It has a
world-wide vision as never before.

What a powerful aggressive opponent Islam is! It
is the greatest anti-Christian force in the world to-
day. It is vigorous, active, determined. It is making
progress, winning victories, planning other victories.
No easy work lies before the Church if it would stem
the tide of Mohammedanism and convert these masses
to Christ. Christians should appreciate the greatness
of the task. It is indeed a challenge to faith and only
a faith which overcomes will undertake it. Such a
faith will not falter.

The aggressiveness of Islam and its increase are
calls to us to immediate and all-embracing efforts. A
revived Islam, newly incited by the spirit of Moham-
med, must be met by a revived Church inspired by
the Spirit of Christ. Who can doubt the issue!

IV

MAHDIIST MOVEMENTS

THE coming of the Mahdi is a living hope in Is-
lam. Mohammed foretold the advent of one
who would “fill the earth with equity and jus-
tice, even as it has been filled with tyranny and op-
pression.” This Mahdi, “a guided or directed one,”
and therefore able to be the Guide of men, “will
reign over the earth seven years” (“Dictionary of
Islam”). All Moslems await his coming. The
Sunnis hold that he has never yet appeared. But
Shiahs believe that he has appeared once and his re-
turn is imminent. All believe that Jesus will accom-
pany him. The Tradition runs that Mohammed said:
“The Mahdi will descend from me … a man of
my tribe and of my name.” The followers of Imam
Ali, the fourth caliph, believe that he was by right
the first caliph and that the office was hereditary in
his line. His descendants in succession were recog-
nized as Imams or caliphs by the Shiahs until the
twelfth, but some recognized these only until the sev-
enth, Jaffar-i-Sadik, and followed his son Ismiel, hence
were called Ismieliyah. The Ismieliyahs expected the
return of Ismiel as the Imam Mahdi and the Fatimides
of Egypt regarded Obeidullah as that return. The
former, who now prevail in Persia, are called the Sect

of the Twelve. Under the oppressive caliphs of Bag-
dad the doctrine of the Mahdi developed among the
Aliites. The first one who was acclaimed Mahdi
was Mohammed, son of Ali by the Hanifite
wife, and his Khalifa was Mukhtar. His fol-
lowers, accounting that he had not died but
simply disappeared, remained at Radwa near Me-
dina, and awaited his return until their death.
Husain, the grandson of Zaid, raised a standard as
Mahdi, but the caliph had him hanged on a gibbet.
The Abbasides came into power as caliphs with the
aid of Ali Muslim and the Aliites, who believed they
were aiding the Mahdi. Caliph Mansur named his
son Mahdi either to engage the loyalty of the Mahdi-
ists, or possibly to deride their claims. Each of the
twelve Imams was hailed with expectation by his se-
cret followers, till poison carried them off one by one.
The last one, Mohammed Abul Kasim ( A.H. 329,
A.D. 940), at Suraman Ra near Kufa disappeared into
a grotto, departing to a land called Jubulsa or Jabulka.
Expecting his immediate return, his faithful followers
day by day went forth from their villages, armed and
on horseback, to meet him. At midday prayer one
hundred horsemen led forth a horse saddled and
bridled to the shrine at Hillah, with trumpets and
drums sounding. At the door they cried out: “In
the name of God, come forth, O Lord of the Age!”
Till the time of evening prayers they voiced their ap-
peal,—but returned disappointed (Darmesteter: “The
Mahdi,” p. 42).

So have they waited. The Sarbedarian kings of
Khorasan in the fourteenth century, the Safavian

Shahs at Ispahan, the Kajars at Teheran, have kept
two horses in the royal stables, splendidly caparisoned
and in readiness for the appearing of the Mahdi and
his lieutenant Jesus the son of Mary, who is to de-
stroy Dajjal the Anti-Christ. The new Constitution
of Persia was established to last only till the appear-
ing of the Imam Mahdi. At the mention of his name
the pious Shiah adds a prayer: “May God hasten his
glad advent.” The dynamic of these movements is
hope,—hope that springs eternal in the human breast,
—a hope of amelioration, of material good, bound to
a coming deliverer.

Through the Moslem centuries, this hope has
caused the appearance of many claimants, followed by
numerous wars, the downfall and rising of kingdoms,
and the establishment of various sects. Conceived in
the religious enthusiasm or maybe the ambition of the
leader, born of the traditional expectation, nurtured
in the discontent and unhappiness of the people, de-
veloping soon into a military struggle, characterized
by fierce fanatical warfare, they have ended either in
subjugation through fiery persecution or in a triumph,
bringing political supremacy to the Mahdi or his suc-
cessor, who continued the same old tyrannical oppres-
sion with no social amelioration. The Ismieliyahs, the
Karmatians, the Druses, the Assassins, and the Nu-
sairiyahs reaped their crop of fanaticism from the soil
of Mahdiism. The dynasties of the Fatimides and
of the Almohayes were founded by Mahdis. After a
claimant by lack of success had proved himself an im-
postor the hope revived again in a succeeding genera-
tion; though some, as the followers of Sayid Moham-

med of Jeypore (“Dictionary of Islam,” Art.:
“Ghair-i-Mahdi”), may declare that the Imam Mahdi
has come and gone in the person of their leader and
no other is to be expected.

Our own age has seen Mahdis not a few. Such a
one was Sayid Ahmad of Punjab, who fought against
the Sikhs in 1826. Another was Sayid Mohammed
Husain of Persia, who appeared among the Ali Al-
lahis. I had an appointment to receive him as a
visitor. My tea-urn was boiling and I awaited him
four hours before sundown. It reached the third hour
and passed on towards sundown. Still no heavenly
visitant deigned to take off his sandals in my hallway.
On the morrow I was informed that the Governor-
General had the intention to seize this divinity and he
had escaped. His followers fought against the Shah’s
forces in Mezanderan, believing themselves invulnera-
ble till cold lead convinced them. Another such divine
leader was Sheikh Kadir Agha of Maragha. A Mahdi
lately rose in Somaliland; the Sheikh of the Sanusi-
yahs was regarded as another. Mahdis or their fore-
runners are constantly rising in Malaysia, making at-
tempts against Christian rule. In 1882 the people of
Borneo expected the Imam and cut in pieces all the
Christians and heathen. Schamyl of Daghestan had
much the same character. In Syria, living in restraint
at Acca, is Sheikh Ali Nur-i-Din, called Insan-i-Kamil
(“the perfect man”), who is regarded as a manifesta-
tion of Mohammed and his essence as divine. Intox-
icated by Sufiism, he led his followers into Pan-
Theism, saying: “There is nothing but God.” He
claimed to possess all the divine attributes and was

honoured as a Vali by Moslems (Missionary Review
of the World, 1914, p. 200). These and other at-
tempts to move the Islamic world by the fulfilment
of its hopes need not detain us, for they failed to
have a conspicuous and lasting influence. Leaders
of rebellions are fond of taking this title and giving
a religious aspect to their political schemes. But sev-
eral of these movements have been remarkable in
themselves and have made or are making a place in
the religious and political life of Islam.

THE BABI MOVEMENT

The first of these is the Babi movement. The
Sheikhis (of whom I shall speak, p. 155) had aroused
keen expectation of the manifestation of Imam
Mahdi. Haji Sayid Kazim of Resht, successor
of Sheikh Ahmad Ahsai, is said to have discoursed
much of the promised appearing, the signs which
would precede it, and his characteristics. Announcing
the “True One,” he said: “I see him as the rising
sun” (“Trav. Narrative,” p. 239; “New History,”
pp. 31-32, 341). Shortly afterwards Mirza Ali Mo-
hammed announced himself as the Expected One.
Born at Shiraz, the son of a cloth-seller, he served
his apprenticeship in a shop at Bushire. After receiv-
ing an ordinary primary training, he afterwards at-
tended the lectures of Haji Kazim at Najef and Ker-
bala. He did not acquire the correct use of the Arabic.
He was of dreamy and devout disposition. His first
book, the “Ziyaret-Nama” (“Pilgrim-Guide”),
shows no consciousness of a mission, but deep venera-
tion for the Imams and longing for the Return (Pro-

fessor Browne, in Journal of Royal Asiatic Society,
1899, p. 901). From such longings and contempla-
tions developed the idea that he had communion and
communication with the Imam. In the “Best of
Stories,” a homily on the Surah-i-Yusuf, he definitely
announces himself, at the age of twenty-four, as the
Bab, the Door of communication. This was in 1844,
A.H. 1260, about one thousand years from the disap-
pearance of the Imam. Though he did not then break
with Islam nor declare the Koran abrogated, he af-
firmed that God would accept no one except he came
to the Bab by the Bab; and he called himself “This
well-favoured Arabian youth in whose grasp God has
placed the kingdoms of heaven and earth” (ibid., p.
907).

In announcing himself as the Bab, Ali Mohammed
was using a term familiar to Shiahs. It had been
applied to several representatives of the absent Imam,
after his occultation or disappearance. Abu Jafar
Mohammed, who had assumed the title Bab, was put
to death in the reign of Caliph Razi. In the numerous
trinities of the Nusairiyah, the third person is called
the Bab; as Maana, meaning; Ism, name; Bab, door.
One of the trinities is Ali, Mohammed, and Salman
Farsee (“Asian Mystery,” pp. 57, 111, 131). It was
a term applied to Ali, also, in the Traditions as in the
one cited by the Bab himself at his examination sub-
sequently at Tabriz. He was asked, “What is the
meaning of the name Bab?” He answered, “The
same as in the holy tradition, (in which Mohammed
said) ‘I am the city of knowledge and Ali is the gate
thereof.’” From this name the followers were called

Babi. The first disciples, full of zeal and devotion,
spread the message of the advent far and wide through
Persia. Their assurance of faith and enthusiasm kin-
dled responsive fire in many hearts. Soon the Bab
made more exalted claim for himself and at the
shrine of Mecca announced himself as the Mahdi or
Kaim, the long-absent Imam, and finally as the Nukta,
the Point of Divinity, in some sense a Manifestation
of God. The number of his disciples grew apace.
Some were dreamers, mystics, religious enthusiasts
who had lived in expectation of the Advent; others
were the discontented in whose hearts the oppressions
and injustices of the rulers and the clergy had caused
a longing for that reign of righteousness in which
iniquities would be righted. These were reinforced
by those who hoped in some change to serve their
own interests. (See Mirza Kazim in Journal of Asia,
1866.) By the time the Bab had returned from
Mecca to Bushire the news had been carried to the
bounds of Persia. In Shiraz even the call to prayer,
azan, had been made in the Bab’s name. The gov-
ernment was alarmed. The Bab’s apostles, sent from
Bushire, August, 1845, were forbidden to preach.
The tendons of their feet were cut. The Bab was
brought to Shiraz in chains. Thence he escaped to
Ispahan, where the Governor, Minuchihr Khan, be-
lieved on him and befriended him. The Shah’s Gov-
ernment was supremely interested in these develop-
ments. If the claim of the Bab were admitted, the
Shah had nothing to do but to lead forth the waiting
steed from the royal stables, mount Ali Mohammed on
it, resign his throne to the Imam, and enlist under his

banner. Instead of this the Shah and his government
determined to treat him as a self -deceived and dan-
gerous enthusiast. He was conveyed under guard to
the extreme northwest of Persia and confined in the
fortress of Maku and afterwards at Chirik in Salmas,
1847-50, but during the greater part of the time per-
mitted to write his books of Revelation, called the
“Bayan,” and to correspond with his followers. (See
writer’s article, “The Bayan of the Bab,” Prince-
ton Theological Review, 1915, pp. 633-55.)

The death of Mohammed Shah was a signal for
revolts and disturbances in many parts of Persia, on
the part of claimants for the throne and dissatisfied
noblemen. In this confusion the Babis, incited by
persecutions and anxious to take immediate advantage
of disturbed conditions to bring about the triumph of
their cause, collected in armed bands. Collisions soon
occurred with the Persian authorities, which devel-
oped into insurrections at Sheikh, Tabarsi in Me-
zanderan, at Zen j an, and at Niriz in Fars. The Babis
fought with fierce courage, undaunted by the over-
whelming odds and superior arms of the troops who
attacked them. They threw up fortifications and,
aided by their women, endured sieges for some
months. Savage brutalities were enacted by both
parties, the cruelties and barbarities of the Shiahs sur-
passing those of the Babis only from the fact that vic-
tory gave opportunity to the Shah’s forces. The
Babis massacred the captive soldiers and unarmed vil-
lagers at Dih-i-Nazar Khan (“New History,” p.
362). They cut off the heads of the slain enemies
and placed them on posts around the rampart of their

fortress, by order of their leader, Janab-i-Kuddus
(ibid., p. 73). Prisoners of war were put to death
by them at Zen j an, the Shah’s officer being skinned
alive and then roasted (ibid., p. 155).

Meanwhile the government, thinking to bring the
contest to a close by removing the cause, determined
on the execution of the Bab. He was brought to
Tabriz, and condemned to death by the clergy and
government. In the Jabbar-khana, when he and one
of his disciples were bound and placed for execution,
a marvel occurred. After the soldiers had fired and
the smoke had cleared away, the dead body of the
disciple was seen but not that of the Bab. His fol-
lowers were ready to shout, “A miracle! A miracle!”
and the populace to acclaim him. But unfortunately
for the cause, though the shots had freed him from
the ropes, the shop into which he fled had no outlet.
He was discovered, led back, and executed. The in-
surrection continued for a time, with fierce reprisals
and barbaric cruelties on both sides. Finally the
Babis were overcome and slain, many of them after
they had surrendered. Later a plot by some Babis
and an attempt to assassinate the Shah led to the ex-
ecution of several score Babis in most cruel ways.
Each one was separately allotted to a guild or class
of the population of Teheran that all collectively might
be liable to any revenge the Babis might see fit to de-
vise. The repression and persecution failed to oblit-
erate the sect. Some fled into exile. Many adopted
the practice of dissimulation, which, under the name
of tagiya, deems legitimate the denial of one’s faith
and conforming to the dominant religion for safety.

Babism as fully developed was intended to be a
substitute for Islam. The Bab superseded Moham-
med; and the Bayan, the Koran. The new law abro-
gated the old, and the Bab was rightful king entitled
to supplant the Shah. As to his personality the Bab
declared himself to be the manifestation and revela-
tion of God—the Primal Will, the first and eternally
created, the mirror of God, the Mukta or Point of
Divinity. This Primal Will had been manifested in all
the great prophets in an ascending scale of perfection
and excellence. This manifestation said of himself:
“I am God, and there is no other God than me, the
Master of the Universe.” In this theology the Babis
resembled the Batinis or Ismielis. In teaching the
eternity of matter, the emanation of the Primal Rea-
son, giving esoteric meanings to the precepts of the
Koran, declaring the resurrection to mean the Advent
of a new Imam, they but followed Abdullah Ibn
Maimun, the leader of the Batinis (“Spirit of Islam,”
pp. 489-92).

The Bab has been called a reformer, and he has,
maybe, a slight claim to that title. In social matters
he made scarcely an improvement, for while he taught,
with the Sunnis and Sheikhis, that men of other re-
ligions could be associated with and were ceremonially
clean, yet he ordained that no unbelievers should dwell
in the five chief provinces of Persia, and this prohi-
bition excluded Moslems as well as Armenians and
Jews. He was illiberal, discouraging the acquire-
ment of sciences and foreign or ancient languages, and
prohibiting the study of grammar, philosophy, law,
and logic, and ordering the destruction of books on

these subjects. He looked with some favour on the
elevation of women and maintained Kurrat-ul-Ayn,
his celebrated disciple, when she at times threw aside
the veil and instructed men in the religion. He en-
joined marriage as obligatory, favoured monogamy,
yet allowed bigamy. In practice the Babis continued
polygamy. He allowed divorce for any cause, such
as a quarrel; but the divorced should wait a year
before seeking another partner. But a man should
not divorce and marry more than nineteen times. A
woman may go unveiled before the members of the
family in which she grows up; she may even talk
with a man outside of her own household, if neces-
sary; but if the conversation is limited “to twenty-
eight words it is better for the woman and the man.”
He prohibited alcohol, tobacco, opium, and begging,
and enjoined the golden rule, with kindness to chil-
dren and animals. It is remarkable how little he has
to say about morals, yet how much about dress, baths,
and burial. Moslem rites, as the prayer postures, fast
and pilgrimage, are modified as to time and place but
with no essential difference. The zikrs or vain repe-
titions of the name of God are continued. The sym-
bolism of numbers and letters was greatly elaborated,
and many doctrines were explained away by alle-
gorical interpretations. Politically the Bab proposed
no reform. Supposedly the substitution of himself
and disciples or “Letters,” as he called them, for the
old Persian rulers would bring about a reign of
righteousness. He had assigned governorships to dif-
ferent ones of his followers. That of Constantinople
was promised to the Governor of Ispahan when he

pretended to be a Babi. The value of the Babi move-
ment for Persia lay not in its ideas, for neither the-
ologically nor socially did it afford any panacea. But
it shook and shattered the power of the Shiah Muj-
tahids. It helped to awaken modern Persia, to bring
about independence of thought. It prepared some to
break the bonds of traditions who were far from ac-
cepting Babism.

BAHAISM

The one outstanding result of Babism is Bahaism,1
which sprang from it and won over almost the entire
Babi community. The Bab taught that no revelation
is final and that another dispensation was to be
founded by “Him whom God would manifest.” It
is quite certain that the Bab expected an interval to
elapse between himself and the next dispensation sim-
ilar in extent to that which had passed between former
dispensations. This interval is understood by Pro-
fessor Browne to be either 1,511 or 2,001 years. It
is irrational to suppose that the Bab delivered a revela-
tion of several volumes and a detailed ritual to last
only 19 years.

The Bab appointed, as his successor and head of
the sect, Mirza Yahya, called Subh-i-Azal, the Dawn
of the Eternal. At this time a number of the Babis
laid claim to be “incarnations.” A sort of hysteria
or mania seized these men and led them to assert their
deity and the divine inspiration of their words.
Finally Azal, who had fled to Bagdad, was acknowl-
edged as caliph of the religion. He had a half-brother,

1 See writer’s “Bahaism and Its Claims,” Fleming H. Revell Co.

Mirza Husain Ali, called Baha Ullah. Both were
sons of Mirza Buzurk, steward of the household of
a vizier of the Shah. They were born in Nur, Me-
zanderan. Azal was son of the wife and Baha of the
concubine. Baha Ullah acted as Azal’s assistant for
a time, but later repudiated his supremacy and an-
nounced that he himself was in reality “He whom
God should manifest,” and that by a secret arrange-
ment with the Bab, they had put forward Azal to act
as chief for a time that the risk and danger might
come upon his brother, and he himself escape the per-
secution of the enemies. This rival claim resulted in
a quarrel between the brothers which waxed hot at
Bagdad, then at Adrianople, whither they were trans-
ferred at the request of the Persian Government to
remove them from the frontier and from the pilgrim
highway. At Adrianople the quarrel reached a climax.
They even plotted to assassinate each other. So Azal
was sent to Cyprus, and Baha Ullah and his party to
Acca, Syria. Baha waxed stronger and his preten-
sions were accepted by the great majority of the
Babis. A score of the leading Azalis who refused to
follow him were assassinated. Azal became a negligi-
ble quantity, though his few followers in Persia have
been rather conspicuous. Baha worked over the ma-
terials of Babism and evolved a system which he set
forth as a new religion and universal dispensation.
This is Bahaism. The two religions are essentially
the same in theology, eschatology, hermeneutics, as
well as in rites and ceremonies. They differ in some
social and political principles and of course in substi-
tuting Baha for the Bab.

Bahaism is a dogmatic religion, imposed by au-
thority as a “revelation” to be received uncondition-
ally and without question. It claims to be rational, but
has as much mystery as any religion, with elements of
pantheism and mysticism. Baha Ullah is regarded as
a manifestation of the Deity—a higher one than the
Bab, possibly of the Divine Essence itself. As God,
he is the former of the Universe from eternal matter
and rules over it. He is worshipped as the supreme
God, the Father, a dignity and degree which he him-
self assumed and which is granted him by his fol-
lowers. The doctrine of incarnations is an old one
among Persians. They regarded their ancient kings
as divine and expected such an one in their deliverer,
Saoshyant. They transferred their hopes and ideas
to the line of Ali and the Imams. According to
Makrisi, even in the lifetime of Ali there were those
who exalted him to the divine rank. Afterwards Ab-
dullah Ibn Wahab taught that “Ali was not dead but
living, and that in him was a particle of the divinity”
(“Asian Mystery,” by Lyde, p. 31). The doctrine of
hulul prevailed, that God descends into human form
without ceasing to be a unity. Shahristani describes
it as “a descent of God’s essence or of the whole
Deity, or of a partial descent or of a portion, accord-
ing to the degree of preparedness of the person.”
This doctrine appeared all through Mohammedan his-
tory, among the Ismieliyahs, Fatimides, Druses, As-
sassins, and others called in general Ghulats or ex-
ceeders. One representative of these sects is the Ali
Alahis of Persia, the same as the Alivi or Kuzul-
Bashi of Asia Minor and the Nusairiyahs of Syria,

who altogether number some two millions. The
Catechism and Manual of the latter says: “Who cre-
ated us?” “Ali, son of Abu Talib.” “Is not Ali
your God?” “He is the creator of heaven and earth.
Besides him there is no God, the living, the self-
existent” (“Asian Mystery,” pp. 234-52). To Ali
ascription is made as follows:

“Mysterious Being! None can tell
The attributes that in thee dwell;
None can thine essence comprehend;
To thee should every mortal bend.”

The persistence and wide acceptance of this doctrine
is interesting as showing that the cold Moslem creed
which puts God at a distance as an inaccessible ruler
did not suffice for the human heart. This doctrine,
and that of the Trinity, counted among the Christian
mysteries, are not foreign to the thought of Moslem
races nor uncongenial to their minds. These sects,
in some measure perhaps remnants of Christian peo-
ples, are found not only in Persia and Turkey, but
among the Kurds, Syrians, Arabs, and Egyptians.
This doctrine is again emphasized in Bahaism. It
teaches that divinity was manifested in Moses, Jesus,
Mohammed, Zoroaster, and others, but in greater ful-
ness in Baha Ullah, who is set forth to the Jews as
the fulfilment of the prophecies of the Messiah; to
the Christians as the Second Coming of Christ; to
the Moslems as the Mahdi or Husain; to the Parsees
as Shah Bahram; to Brahmans as the Avatar. He is
“It” with a capital letter, as I have seen printed in
their books.

Another doctrine emphasized by Bahais is “Rijat,”

the Return of the prominent believers of the former
dispensation. It is akin to metempsychosis, but is ex-
plained to mean rather a reappearance in the spirit
and power of the former Imam or apostle. Another
aspect is allegorical interpretation. This method is
said to have been first applied to Islam by Mohammed
son of Ismiel, son of Imam Jafar-i-Sadik. It is called
tavil or elm-i-batin, and its adepts were called Batinis.
By setting forth the inner meaning they explain away
the precepts and doctrines of Islam. In accordance
with this, Baha, following closely the Bab and his
predecessors, explained the general resurrection as the
rising and appearance of a new manifestation, the
judgment as condemnation or acquittal by the mani-
festation, and receiving spiritual life from him. The
“Questioning by the angels in the tomb” is the sum-
moning by the messengers of the manifestation to
those in the tomb of ignorance to believe; and the
return of the angels to God is the report of the mis-
sionaries; the “bridge of Sirat” is the testing at the
call of faith; paradise is the condition of belief and
hell is unbelief.

Bahaism makes much of the symbolism of num-
bers. It takes over the sacredness of 19 from Babism
and establishes a new calendar of 19 months of 19
days each, abolishing the week. Baha also sanctifies
the number 9 because the letters in Baha add to 9 in
abjad counting. Much is made of the name Baha
as a charm and talisman; it is inscribed on rings and
breastpins.

The “Revelation” is contained in the “Ikan,”
“Kitab-ul-Akdas,” and numerous other writings

which surpass, it is claimed, all previous scriptures.
Faith in Baha is now the supreme duty and the means
of salvation. Baha condemned Sufiism and darvishes,
yet his book, “The Seven Valleys,” shows how to
follow the Sufi Path; he commends the zikr or repe-
titions of the divine name and his messengers travel
as darvishes in their rounds. The chief rites are the
same as in Islam, with variations; prayer has similar
ablutions, postures, and genuflections, with prescribed
words, but is made with face towards Acca and ad-
dressed to Baha Ullah; the fast is for a month of
nineteen days, with total abstinence from food during
daylight; the pilgrimage to Acca includes bowing be-
fore Baha’s image and kissing the shrines. There are
imitations of baptism and of the Lord’s Supper; ablu-
tions of the dead are minutely prescribed. There is an
effort to be different from Islam, but Bahaism has
nothing new nor superior to it in regard to worship.

Baha also attempted to lay down laws, criminal,
civil, and social. Among the punishments prescribed
are execution for murder, branding on the face for
theft, small fines for adultery, and burning alive for
arson. Mohammed never prescribed punishment by
fire, saying it was God’s instrument. As to woman,
she should be educated and more social freedom al-
lowed her. Marriage is enjoined, monogamy recom-
mended, bigamy allowed. Baha himself took two
wives and a concubine, all of whom bore him children
and survived him. Loose divorce is allowed. War,
the jihad, slavery, wine, and opium are condemned.
Baha’s contact with the West at Adrianople and in
Syria somewhat modified the theories he had learned

in Babism. He revoked the condemnation of learning
and travel, commended intercourse with all men, gen-
eral education, and a universal language. The agita-
tion connected with the great peace-movements of the
first half of the nineteenth century influenced him to
advocate peace and arbitration. He bound up the
Bahai theocracy to a system of constitutional mon-
archy substituting local and national councils for one-
man power. But he declared that all members of
these councils should be Bahais and taxes collected
and distributed according to Bahai law. It is quite
evident that in such a newly constituted state Chris-
tians and Moslems alike would have few rights.

As a pensioner of the Turkish Government and
restricted in residence to the neighbourhood of Acca,
Baha spent the last twenty years of his life in a fine
house and beautiful garden, surrounded by his dis-
ciples, receiving the pilgrims and their gifts and freely
carrying on his propaganda by letters and messengers.
His efforts at reconciliation with the Persian Govern-
ment brought relief to his disciples, and their condi-
tion was rendered more secure by Baha’s permission
to practise tagiya, concealment or conformity to the
Shiah religion.

Baha Ullah died in 1892. After his death a bitter
quarrel occurred between his sons and wives regard-
ing the succession. It was full of cursings and male-
dictions, anathemas and lawsuits. It resulted in a
second schism and in both leaders being put under
renewed restrictions by the Turkish Government.
Finally Abbas, the oldest brother, became chief of the
sect, with the title of Abdul Baha, the Servant of

Baha. He claimed to be the Centre of the covenant,
the Interpreter and Expounder of the Faith and Lord
of the New Dispensation. Under him Bahaism has
begun a wide propaganda, and aspires to be the uni-
versal religion. The zeal of a Christian convert to
Bahaism, a Syrian named Khairalla, who had come
to America on business, gave an impetus to this idea.
He was able in 1894-98 to make some eight hundred
converts to Bahaism in Chicago and its neighbour-
hood. The credulity of Americans inspired great
hopes of success. These American converts began
to make pilgrimages to Acca, recognizing, in Abdul
Baha, Christ Jesus in his Second Coming and worship-
ping and adoring him as Lord and Master. This is
described by one of the pilgrims, Mrs. Getsinger, in
the following words (Isaac Adams: “Persia by a
Persian,” p. 479): “I was waiting for the king to
come. I reached Him first and knelt down before
Him, kissing the hem of His robe. He helped me to
my feet and keeping my hand walked with me into
the house. He led me into the room where lies the
most brilliant jewel that ever shone on the earth,
Baha Ullah. … He led me down a flight of stairs
and I pressed His hand to my lips.” In another letter
she describes the meeting with Abdul Baha: “My heart
gave a great throb and I held out my arms, crying,
‘My Lord! my Lord!’ and rushed to Him, kneeling
at His blessed feet, sobbing like a child. I sat down
at His blessed feet, while He took my hand. … He
allowed me to kiss His blessed hand.” An English-
woman, Mrs. Khairalla, of the same party wrote, “I
threw myself on my knees before Him and sobbed

aloud from the emotion that filled my soul. He gave
me His dear hands to kiss, such fine delicate hands
they are, and patted me tenderly on my cheeks and
shoulders.” But this party of pilgrims became af-
fected by the schism. Khairalla became the leader of
the sect of the younger brother, Mohammed Ali, in
America. Though retarded by this, Bahaism has
gained 2,000 or 3,000 converts in 17 States, compris-
ing 27 congregations. It has a publication society,
has issued Baha’s “Revelations” in English, and has
a monthly paper—i.e. published every 19 days. It has
a missionary society called the Orient-Occident Unity,
which sends missionaries to Persia and aids Bahai
schools there.

In 1908 Abdul Baha was freed by the Turkish revo-
lution from all restriction as to residence and spent
several years in Egypt. Afterwards he made mission-
ary journeys to Europe and America, being received
to the pulpits and platforms of the United States with
friendly cordiality as an honoured guest. His visit
of eight months showed no special results. The prop-
agandists have extended their journeys to India,
Burma, South Africa, and Hawaii. They have
gained small groups of believers in England and Ger-
many. Though its success is very limited, and even
in Persia its numbers have not reached beyond
one or two hundred thousand, yet the fact that such
a revolt from Islam has been able to establish itself
among a Moslem people and to start a partially suc-
cessful propaganda among Christian people consti-
tutes it one of the interesting movements in the Mos-
lem world of to-day. Its failure in Persia to co-

operate with and assist the Constitutional movement
and the struggle for the liberties of the people shows
that expediency rather than the good of mankind
guides its policy. In relation to Christian missions
it is a hindrance. One aid that it has incidentally ren-
dered is in breaking the solidarity of Persian Islam,
and thus by its struggle to gain religious freedom for
itself it has promoted freedom for converts to Chris-
tianity.

THE AHMADIYAS

A new religion, similar to Bahaism, was promul-
gated in India in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century. Its founder was Mirza Gulam Ahmad, a
moghul by lineage. He was chief of the village of
Qadian in the Punjab. From him the sect is called
Ahmadiya.1 He was a man of some property and
respectable family. His father was a physician of the
old Greek school and Mirza Ahmad professed to be
proficient in the same art. In religion they inclined
to Sufiism. In his earlier years he was brought into
contact and controversy with Christian preachers, and
was perplexed by his inability to answer their argu-
ments. He became a recluse and cogitated on reli-

1 It has been investigated and described by Dr. H. D. Gris-
wold, in a tract named “Mirza Gulam Ahmad.” I have con-
sulted also his article, “The Ahmadiya Movement” (Moslem
World, 1912, pp. 373-79); Professor Siraf-ud-Din, “Mirza Gulam
Ahmad” (Missionary Review, 1907, pp. 749-56); Dr. J. Murray
Mitchell, “A New Sect in India” (Missionary Review, 1904, pp.
97-100); J. N. Farquhar, “Modern Religious Movements in
India,” pp. 137-48; Dr. E. M. Wherry, “Christianity and Islam,
etc.,” pp. 178-82.

gious themes, till he at last reached the conclusion
that he himself was a “revelator.” When about forty
years of age Ahmad laid claim to being the Mahdi,
according to Sunni traditions, and at the same time
Jesus Christ who should accompany the Mahdi. In
1880 he issued his “Barahin-i-Ahmadiya,” the Argu-
ments of the Ahmadiya. Among his works is “The
Teachings of Islam” in English. He seems to have
identified the Mahdi with Mohammed, and thus he
was the “return” of both Jesus and Mohammed, not
literally, but exactly as has been explained in the
teachings of Baha Ullah. He thus claimed to be the
fulfilment of the hopes of these religions, professing
to reform and unite them. He also claimed to be a
manifestation of God in a certain sense. This he
states thus: “The mantle of divinity is cast upon the
person who is thus favoured of God, and he becomes
a mirror for the image of the Divine Being. This is
the secret of the words spoken by the holy prophet,
‘He that hath seen me hath seen God.’ … I shall be
guilty of a great injustice if I hide the fact that I
have been raised to this spiritual pre-eminence.”
(Quoted from “Teachings of Islam,” Moslem World,
1912, p. 319.) As such he is the Lord of the Age,
Mediator, Intercessor, Revealer, and Reformer.

Regarding Christ he taught that he was born of a
virgin, that his miracles were not real but spiritual.
He held to the swoon theory of Christ’s death, de-
claring that he was crucified, seemed to be dead, was
buried in a state of unconsciousness. He cited as
proof of this the Gospel of Barnabas. The wounds of
Jesus were quickly healed by a salve called the

Marham-i-Isa, the ointment of Jesus whose wondrous
powers, he asserts, are extolled in a thousand medical
books, Christian, Moslem, Jewish, and Persian.
After coming out of the tomb and appearing to his
disciples, Jesus went to Afghanistan and Kashmir.
This departure is the ascension. The inhabitants of
these lands were the lost ten tribes to whom Jesus
preached. Finally he died a natural death and was
buried in Srinagar, Kashmir. The tomb and shrine
of a certain Yus Asaf is pointed out as that of Jesus.
In reality it is the tomb of some obscure Moslem Pir
of several centuries ago. In proof of his assertion he
cites the fictitious story of the “Unknown Life of
Christ,” by N. Notovich, in which an imaginary ac-
count is given, ostensibly from a Buddhist manuscript,
of a journey of Jesus to India before his ministry in
Judea. Mirza Ahmad adds another imaginary jour-
ney after the crucifixion, and on it, as a basis, refutes
the Christian religion. He is specially desirous to get
rid of the doctrines of the atonement and the resur-
rection. In other ways he condemns Jesus, as for
associating with evildoers. He denied his “power,
wisdom, and moral perfection.” He was extremely
hostile to Christianity, and it was the progress of mis-
sion work that incited him. He declared Christianity
to be corrupted. Its great errors were the deification
of Christ and belief in his expiatory death and literal
second coming; its corrupting practices are drunken-
ness, prostitution, and gambling. God has sent Gulam
Ahmad to rebuke them and call them to a new faith.
His message to Islam was that they receive him as
a peaceful Mahdi. The traditions about a warrior

Mahdi are pronounced forgeries; he, the Mahdi-
Messiah, had come to bring peace among nations and
to reconcile religions. The jihad he abolished and de-
clared it to have been a curse to Islam. His followers
should be peace lovers and submit to British rule.
One of the sect, writing in the Review of Religions,
says: “I do not wish for any Islamic government or
empire. What I do long for is this, that whoever be
the ruler, the whole world may turn Moslem.” He
denounced the tomb-worship and immoralities of Is-
lam; discountenanced polygamy, yet practised it him-
self. He excused Mohammed for allowing polygamy,
divorce, and the seclusion of women, as a preventive
of greater evils such as appear in Christendom. He
explained the pleasures of Paradise figuratively. He
claimed to be the exponent of true Islam and to propa-
gate it. It is the true religion, as wide in its con-
ception as humanity itself. It embraces all the in-
spired religions, and prompts us to love and reverence
not only for Mohammed, Moses, and Jesus, but for
Rama Chandra, Krishna, and Buddha. He appealed
to the Hindus to accept him as an Avatar. Needless
to say Moslems denounce him as a heretic and im-
postor.

The proofs of his mission submitted by Gulam
Ahmad were from the former scriptures, from mira-
cles, and from his own prophecies. For example from
the analogy of John the Baptist being Elijah, from
the teaching about the Second Adam, from the
apocalyptic signs of the Millennium, and from the
prophecy of the paraclete (John xvi, 7), which the
Koran refers to in the words (Surah LXI): “Jesus

the son of Mary said ‘I … announce an apostle to
come after me whose name is Ahmad.’” Gulam
Ahmad’s predictions frequently took the form of fore-
telling the death of the individual with whom he was
displeased. When some of these died a violent death,
suspicion was aroused. His followers were supposed
to have helped to bring about the fulfilment. One
of the men thus threatened, a prominent Christian,
named Abdullah Atham, took precautions to have
bodyguards, and the prophecy in his case failed.
When these predictions of calamity had reached the
number of one hundred and over, they merited the
attention of the government and the Mahdi-Messiah
gave his pledge to refrain from such imprecations.
In view of these vindictive predictions, the Moslems
composed a couplet, which I may paraphrase as fol-
lows:

The true Christ’s power was such
He made the dead revive;
The false Christ’s fatal touch
Brings death to those alive.

Ahmad had correspondence with Dowie, the Elijah of
Zion City, Illinois, and challenged him to a discussion.
He also proposed a test of the truth of their respective
dispensations, namely, that whichever one of them
died first should be proved a false prophet. Dowie,
whether because he was much the senior in years or
mistrusted Oriental providence, declined the test as
irrelevant. In some cases where Ahmad predicted a
son for his devoted follower, the advent of a daughter
taxed his ingenuity for an explanation. One of his
prophecies was that his village would be immune from

plague without inoculation. He also prepared the
marham-i-Isa “solely under the influence of divine
inspiration” and set it forth in a pamphlet as “the
Revealed Cure for Bubonic Plague.” Neither proph-
ecy nor ointment exempted his people from the
scourge. The government also thought best to inter-
fere with this divine quack-medicine. This latest Mes-
siah was cut off in 1908 by the cholera.

Mirza Gulam Ahmad’s method of propaganda was
vigorous. He was well acquainted with Arabic, Per-
sian, and Urdu. In words he was an aggressive dis-
putant. He favoured education and established mid-
dle and high schools at Qadian. He made much use
of the press, issuing more than fifty tracts, books, and
memorials, and two magazines, one in Urdu called
‘Al Hakam and one in English called The Review of
Religions. He organized his congregations with
weekly meetings and conferences and with the chief
society at Qadian. The membership has increased in
the last decade. The Imperial Gazetteer of India,
which calls it “the wildest development of recent sec-
tarianism,” reported 10,000 in the Bombay Presi-
dency in 1911; in the Punjab the census gave 18,695
as against 1,113 m 1901. There is a branch in the
Deccan. Dr. Griswold of Lahore, a special authority
on the sect, estimates the total at 50,000. Some of
the members are men of respectability and intelli-
gence, even university graduates. Nearly all are from
the Moslems, and they regard it as a reform of Islam.
It certainly works towards the disintegration of ortho-
dox Islam. Some disciples are reported to be in
Afghanistan, Persia, Arabia, and Egypt. An inter-

esting phase of the movement is its propaganda in
England. Mr. Khoja Kamal-ud-Din, an advocate, has
established himself at Woking at the mosque erected
by Dr. Leitner. By lectures and through a magazine
called The Islamic Review, the doctrines are promul-
gated. A new translation of the Koran is being is-
sued. Free literature is distributed. The mission has
been encouraged by the conversion of Lord Headley
to its faith.

In this effort to propagate itself in Christendom, it
is like Bahaism. In not a few points there is a strik-
ing resemblance between these offshoots from Moham-
medanism. Some of these may be accounted for by
their springing up in a similar soil, a Mohammedan
soil impregnated with Sufiism and Mahdiism, and in
which some elements of nineteenth-century Christian
thought had found lodgment. Both claim that a new
revelation is needed because Christianity is dead and
Islam needs reforming. Both claim to be in some
sense divine manifestations, in another sense the “re-
turn” of Jesus, of Mohammed, and of Krishna. Both
propose to unite all religions. Both do away with the
jihad and advocate peace principles. Both, after the
example of Mohammed, sent letters to kings announc-
ing their coming and inviting them to faith. Both
practised polygamy and praised Mohammed and the
Koran. Both belittled Jesus Christ, denying his mira-
cles, his resurrection, his ascension and literal Second
Coming. Both have some followers in foreign lands
even among Christians. Both failed to bring about
moral reformation in the conduct of their disciples,
who have divided into sects on the death of the found-

ers. Both claimed as signs of their mission their
eloquence in the Arabic tongue, the writing of spon-
taneous verses, fulfilled predictions, their success in
winning converts, and the good effects as seen in the
conduct of their followers. Both made large use of
the press; Baha Ullah sent his books to Bombay to
be published owing to lack of liberty in Turkey and
Persia; Gulam Ahmad had a press of his own at
Qadian. The teachings of Ahmad are free from some
extravagances and inanities of Bahaism. Neither
sect appears to have any great future before it. Their
chief usefulness has been to help towards the break-
ing down of scholastic Islam—the one among the
Shiahs, the other among the Sunnis of India. Baha-
ism has definitely broken with Islam, while the Ah-
madiya movement continues within its fold.

THE MAHDI OF THE SUDAN

Exceedingly interesting is the Mahdiist movement
of the Sudan. It has been a present-day example
before our eyes of what has occurred many times in
the centuries of Islam. It would undoubtedly have
issued in success and triumph but for the terrible
machine-gun of the Christians which turned the tide.

Mohammed Ahmad of Dongola, in 1878, pro-
claimed himself the long-expected Mahdi. He was
descended from Mohammed through Husain and was
of a family of successful boat-makers and worked at
this trade in his youth. He received religious educa-
tion at Khartum and at twelve is said to have been a
hafiz, able to say the Koran from memory. He be-
came a hermit at Abba, an island in the White Nile,

and acquired a reputation for austerity and asceticism
and was venerated as a saint. Moving about among
tke people, he described to them with thrilling elo-
quence their oppressions and their wrongs and re-
called to them the promise of a deliverer who should
bring in the reign of righteousness. This guide was
at hand, he declared, right would triumph, and the
accursed Turks and Egyptians be driven from the
land; their cruelties would be brought to an end. His
magnetic appeal to the people, giving hope of release
from injustice, had a powerful effect. It is said
(Colonel Wingate: “Mahdism,” pp. 13-14) that
“men wept and beat their breasts at his moving
words; even his brother fakirs could not conceal their
admiration. With rapid, earnest words he stirred
their hearts and swayed their heads like corn beneath
a storm. … In every hut and thicket echoed the
longing for the coming saviour. At last a band said
to him, ‘You are the promised leader,’ and in solemn
secrecy he said, ‘I am the Mahdi.’”

The time was ripe. Conditions facilitated the ac-
ceptance of such a claim. Half a century before,
Mohammed Ali, Khedive of Egypt, after establishing
his power in semi-independence of the Sultan, turned
covetous eyes on the great south land of the Blacks—
called the Sudan. He was urged on partly by greed
of power, partly by the desire to extend the bounds
of civilization. But instead of gold mines, the revenue
to enrich him and his successors was from inhuman
trade in human beings, and the grinding cruelties of
unjust and oppressive taxgatherers. The rapacity and
inhumanity of the slave-dealers cried out to God and

became a stench in the nostrils of Europe. The Khe-
dive Ismiel saw that to retain a reputation as a civil-
ized ruler he must suppress the slave trade. Hence
Colonel Baker and General Gordon and others were
commissioned for this work. Their service, ham-
pered while it lasted, was cut short, then the Sudan
lapsed into a condition of oppression, corruption,
rapacity, cruelty, and inhumanity,—creating in the
hearts of the people a soil fit for the springing up of
Mahdiism.

The suspicions and fears of the Egyptian governors
were aroused by the claims of the new Mahdi. They
made several unsuccessful attempts to seize him, but
their forces were defeated. He retired to the Nuba
mountains, Kordofan. This was called his hegira or
flight. Here he enlisted the powerful Sheikhs of the
Baggaras. The religious enthusiast declared to them:
“God himself came near to me and said, ‘Go, reform
the Moslems and found a kingdom which shall be
followed by everlasting peace.’ The Prophet came to
me, laid his sword in my hand, and said, ‘With this
sword conquer; for Azrael will go before thee and
terror shall fall upon thy foes.’” The warlike Bag-
gara professed their allegiance largely to secure power
for themselves and the gain of the slave trade. They
provided the Mahdi with wives and concubines from
among their daughters. Abdullah of their tribe be-
came his Khalifa. People flocked to his standard.
The Mahdi subdued the forces of the Egyptians,
bringing into subjection province after province. The
defeat of Hicks Pasha and the annihilation of his ten
thousand men carried conviction to all the land that

this was the True Guide. Gordon was sent to with-
draw the garrisons. He was entrapped in Khartum.
Too late his rescue was attempted. The Mahdi did
not wish the death of Gordon. He seems to have
wished him to occupy the place of Jesus, who, accord-
ing to tradition, should reign with him side by side.
He sent Gordon the costume of a believer, and a com-
mand to accept the faith. But Gordon was formed
in a more heroic mould and had a finer fibre to his
character than Lupton Pasha, commander of Bahr-il-
Ghazal, and Slatin Pasha, who denied their faith to
save their lives. Gordon knew that he that loseth his
life for the Truth’s sake shall find it unto life eternal.
So that peerless Christian knight, saint, and soldier
of immortal fame fell in the final assault of Khartum.

Victory had certified the Mahdi. The predicted
marks, the V-shaped space between the teeth, the pos-
session of Abdullah for a father and Fatima for a
mother, were not fortuitous; Mohammed Ahmad ruled
over nearly a million square miles. Before him lay
the assured conquest of the Turks, the Christians, all
the world.

As a religious movement Mahdiism professed to
be a reform. It was a pitiable attempt. The Mahdi
gave revelations and laws of his own. The Koran
was also retained. Belief in the Mahdi was the first
duty; unbelief the greatest sin. He ruled with a rod
of iron. A terrible inquisition held sway. Criticism
of his administration was punishable with mutilation
or death. Special emphasis was laid on asceticism in
food and raiment. A costume was prescribed. All
must wear this jubba or coat to avoid distinction be-

tween rich and poor. Feasts at funerals or weddings,
and riding a horse, except in war, if able to walk, were
not allowed. When riding a donkey, attendants must
not walk in company. Wearing long hair, wailing for
the dead, writing with cursive letters were prohibited.
Three vices were to be avoided—envy, pride, and neg-
lect of prayer: two virtues to be practised—poverty
and the Holy War. Of ten commandments, five were
specifically about women, that they should cover their
heads and faces, should not go to the graves at
funerals, not have a dowry above ten dollars, and
that men should oblige them to pray. The old Is-
lamic laws of mutilation for theft and beating for
wine-drinking were retained, but the use of tobacco
was punishable with a hundred lashes while the wine-
bibber escaped with eighty. The two most remarkable
aspects of the régime were a sort of communism of
property and an abnormal indulgence of sensual pas-
sions. The property of all men had to be placed in the
Bet-ul-Mal, the Community House, to be distributed
by the Mahdi. To accomplish this the inquisition
worked barbarously. Of this Colonel Wingate says:
“The last Khali fate has been under European ob-
servation, its propaganda has been studied most care-
fully, and the whole may be summed up in the phrase,
‘Your money or your life.’ At Khartum the Mahdi
changed into a sensuous voluptuary, luxurious and
uxurious. He ate of all dainties, wore the finest ma-
terials, was profusely perfumed. Instead of the
straw mat on which he had hitherto sat and slept, he
had the finest Persian rugs and an imported bedstead.
He changed to his former uncouth costume to appear

in public as the leader of prayers, where seventy thou-
sand men bowed before him on the grass and even
stooped to kiss the dust he trod upon, and gathering
it up kept it as a treasure. His bath water was car-
ried away as a means of grace. Yet so great was his
hypocrisy that, as Slatin says (“Fire and Sword in
the Sudan”), “No man is more irreligious. I have
never seen him say a prayer in his own house—only
in public.” Making a show of piety before the peo-
ple, he was guilty of the wildest excesses in private.
His haram consisted of four hundred wives and con-
cubines. By divorce he changed his four legal wives
as often as his fancy suggested. His concubines were
booty captured in war, mostly from the tribes which
at the point of the sword had been forced to acknowl-
edge him as Mahdi. As the result of his voluptuous
life, he became debauched and effeminate, and at last
met the reward of his prodigal excesses. A girl who
had lost family, property, and all in the siege, “sub-
mitted to outrage and obtained a terrible revenge.
She gave the Mahdi a deadly poison, and after linger-
ing in great agony, he died in 1885, but six months
after the capture of Khartum. … The people stood
round as though stunned. He could not die; he was
immortal” (“Mahdism,” p. 228). Thus perished
this contemporaneous example of a Mohammedan
prophet. The Khalifa Abdullah succeeded to power
and crushed the people beneath a heavier yoke. If
the Mahdi had beaten them with whips, the Khalifa
chastised them with scorpions. They were reduced
to such a degree of ruin that they might well long for
the oppressions of the Egyptians. Their deliverance

came by means of the Anglo-Egyptian force under
Kitchener, at the battle of Omdurman in 1898. The
bravery of the darvishes won the admiration and pity
of their foes. Intrepid and undaunted, they charged
again and again in the face of machine-guns, only to
fall. Eleven thousand were killed, and 16,000 fell
wounded out of 40,000 engaged in the battle. Sir
Garnet Wolseley says: “I am sure our men would
prefer to fight the best European troops rather than
the same number of warriors who were under the
influence of Mohammedan fanaticism.” (Quoted from
Public Opinion, Vol. VII, p. 210, in Atterbury’s “Is-
lam in Africa,” p. 101.) In view of the devotion of
these darvishes, Dr. C. R. Watson exclaims: “What
magnificent Christians these men might have made!
Why should they not be given the True Guide who
will lead them not to death but to life?” The Mahdi’s
tomb had become a shrine as sacred as that at Mecca.
It was said to be indestructible—a place of pilgrimage
to last forever. The body was treasured as that of
a deity. The tomb was destroyed, the body burnt,
and the ashes cast into the Nile (Shoemaker: “Islam
Lands”).

The result of the Mahdi’s rule was calamitous.
The aspirations of the people for economic betterment
were sadly disappointed. War, famine, and disease
had wrought terrible havoc. Countless towns had
been devastated, myriads of men and women had
perished. Of a population of 8,500,000, three and a
half millions were destroyed by famine and disease
and three and a quarter millions by the wars. The
country had diminished seventy-five per cent (“En-

cyclopedia Britannica,” Article: “Mohammed Ah-
mad”). The battle of Omdurman is an important
event in the history of Africa. Great Britain’s defeat
and withdrawal would have meant the throwing back
of civilization in a large section of the Dark Con-
tinent. Gordon’s death has been made fruitful in
good for humanity in bringing the Sudan under the
influence of European civilization, and the opening of
the way sooner or later for the inculcation of Gor-
don’s faith, even though at present the Memorial Gor-
don College has been perverted from that holy pur-
pose.

CAUSES OF THESE MAHDIIST MOVEMENTS

What are the reasons for these Mahdiist develop-
ments in Islam? One reason is the condition of de-
generacy, corruption, injustice, and weakness. The
Bab inveighed against the corruptions: the Sudanese
Mahdi against the injustice. One sign of the Mahdi’s
coming was decadence in Islam. Decline is not to
them a proof of its falsehood, for traditions clearly
state that this is to be expected before the coming of
the Imam Mahdi. Thus the Bahar-ul-anvar of Maj-
lisi (quoted in “Crusades of the Twentieth Century,”
W. A. Rice, p. 424) has a tradition that Mohammed
said: “A time will come upon my people when noth-
ing will remain of Islam except its name and naught
of the Koran except its writing,” and “the mosques
of Mussulmans will be destitute of knowledge and
worship and the Ulema will be the worst people under
the heavens, and contention and strife will issue from
them and return upon them.” This will precede the

triumph of the Mahdi and Islam will be revived and
strengthened. To read “The Bahai Proofs” and its
description of the mullahs one would suppose that
such a time had come upon Islam. There is no doubt
that Islam feels its weakness even more than it ap-
pears to us, for the decline of political power and
the prosperity of the Christians weigh on their hearts.
A writer in the Mo ay ad of Cairo (Missionary Review,
1914, p. 163) says: “Where are our Ulema? Where
are our leaders? Where are those who are able to
donate funds for us to follow the example of the
Christians? Things are in a bad condition. Oh God!
send us some one to collect together our scattered
forces!” This cry for a Mahdi was noticed by
Keane, who under the name of Haj Haji Mohammed
Amin made the pilgrimage to Mecca. He says (“Six
Months in Mecca,” p. 33): “The old ideas of the
near approach of the end of the world are very preva-
lent in the East just now, which all in all is about
as ready for the reception of some darvish Peter the
Hermit as it well could be.”

SIGNIFICANCE OF MAHDIISM

Some have asked: “What is the dynamic of these
movements?” It is the belief that these hopes are
about to be fulfilled and that the glorious results which
have been promised and long anticipated are now to
be realized under the present Leader. But they come
and go—the Mahdi of the Sudan,—the Mahdi-Mes-
siah of India,—the Bab,—Baha Ullah—and still the
Moslem world awakes to disappointment and hope
deferred. These all show the sense of need, the un-

satisfied longings of heart in the Moslem world. Is
it not significant that two or three of these latest
prophets have proclaimed themselves the advent of
Christ, and preached “peace on earth” and not the
jihad? These new religions have failed, the hopes
of reform and world regeneration through them have
not reached fruition. The high aspirations and en-
thusiasms of our fellow-men have fed on husks. The
Church must make known to them Him who is the
Desire of all nations, the True Guide.

V

MODERNISM IN ISLAM

MODERNISM in Islam is a tendency and a
movement to bring the thought and life of
Moslem peoples into harmony with the pres-
ent age. Its object, in the words of one of its advo-
cates, is “to dispel the illusory traditions of the past,
which have hindered our progress, to reconcile Orien-
tal learning with Western literature and science, to
preach the gospel of free inquiry, of large-hearted
toleration, and of pure morality.” The movement
affects not only the religion but the life and customs
as well. Though some new influences have undoubt-
edly originated in Islam itself or been resuscitated
from its past, yet the chief cause is the impact of the
West on the East. It is the effect of Western civiliza-
tion and Christian thought and life on Islam. This
impact has been continuous and strong during the last
century. Contact with Europe has been through vari-
ous channels. Governments, diplomacy, jurispru-
dence, commerce, travel, education, languages, science,
arts, industries, literature, missions have each made
its impression. A chief influence has been education.
The going of young men to France and the prevalence
of French language and literature have been large
factors. Wider and deeper has been the effect of

British thought because brought to bear more directly
and on the greater number in India and Egypt. The
influence of America, through its missionaries and
their schools and the atmosphere they create, has
not been small. The “spirit of the age” has affected
Moslem peoples, and philosophical and scientific prin-
ciples, social and economic truths have awakened a
response in their minds and consciences. Modernism
as an intellectual system or a manifestation of open
protest or aspiration is not fully in evidence in litera-
ture and the press. But extensive modification in
thought and desires is evident to one who has lived
among Moslems for some years. He recognizes that
there is a great, a wondrous change in mental atti-
tudes, in social ideals, in prejudices regarding theo-
logical conceptions. The reality cannot be set forth
by statistics, nor by the examination of public or
printed utterances of Moslems, for on matters per-
taining to religion and the Sacred Law expediency
often prevents expression of views, even if there is
no actual repression. My conviction is that there is
a marvellous change in the intellectual attitude and
conceptions of intelligent Moslems. Islam for a
thousand years has been traditional and under dog-
matic authority. Reason had its place, which was to
expound and enforce that which was accepted on
authority. Logic and metaphysics were highly valued,
but nothing contrary to the Traditions must be set
forth. Now thought is being liberalized, moral con-
ceptions and customs are being modified, and this is
coming to pass through the infiltration, penetration,
the direct impact and impress of Western or Chris-

tian civilization. This trend is toward Christian
ideals and away from traditional Moslem conceptions.
Islam is in ferment. I do not believe there are signs
of religious disintegration, but there is demand for
large modifications. There is a definite trend, partly
conscious, largely unconscious, to adapt itself to the
modern age. The reason is the conviction which has
sunk into the minds of many that they are behind-
hand, retrograde, non-progressive. This conscious-
ness of inferiority has aroused a desire for improve-
ment, a spirit of emulation. It is accompanied at
times with a feeling of inability to proceed without
guidance from those who are known to be in a supe-
rior status, in spite of a prejudice which wishes to
deny such superiority. The full effects of the leaven
of modern ideas in Islam are not yet evident, and only
the initial stage of the movement can be described.
I shall present Neo-Islam in relation to religious
thought, to the intellectual revival, and to social ame-
lioration,—in other words, to theology, education, and
the family.

NEO-ISLAM IN TURKEY

In regard to theological thought, if I begin at the
seat of the caliphate, it is evident that new interpreta-
tions of doctrine could not be made the subject of
public discussion in Turkey, in the time of Abdul
Hamid. There was no liberty of the press. There
was expressed some sympathy with the reactionary
doctrines of Wahabism; Pan-Islamism was main-
tained, but liberalism in theology had no opportunity
to find expression. Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din’s book re-

garding the caliphate was suppressed. Yet it is plain
that Western thought was continuing to permeate the
minds of the educated classes of Constantinople and
of the port-cities such as Smyrna, Beirut, and Sa-
lonica. Those who received the modern education,
whether at home or abroad, became tinged with
liberalism in theology. They have broken in many
points with the old creed and ceased the observance
of the fast of Ramazan and such rites. Secularism
and scepticism often have taken the place of faith.
Some of the Young Turks, in exile, even drifted
away from all religion and became scoffers. Re-
ligion with many persons is but an outward cloak,
kept on for the sake of popular opinion. They have
zeal for Islam traditionally as against any other creed,
partly from pride, partly from race prejudice, or as
the embodiment of national aspirations because it is
a bond of popular unity. These modifications in prac-
tice and in mental attitude are evident to all. The
report on the “Preparation of Missionaries to the
Near East” (p. 14) emphasizes the fact that the
Mohammedanism of Constantinople differs materially
from that of other regions, due to Europeanizing in-
fluences and the “inroads of Western scientific,
philosophical, and religious teachings.” These in-
fluences have been felt, though in a less degree, in
smaller cities and in Anatolia and Irak, but even
there they have found deep lodgment and borne fruit.
Even the wilds of Kurdistan have been penetrated by
the modern ideas.

Since the establishment of the Constitution, liberty
has increased and reforms in Islamic social life have

been advocated, but the stormy years have not in-
vited men to the discussion of theological themes.
The Sheikh-ul-Islam, the State Minister of Religion
in Turkey, has made many decisions which do not
coincide with traditional views and has expressed
many liberal and modern opinions. In them he has
followed the habit of attributing to Mohammed
traditional sayings or finding in the Koran the basis
for modern political and social reforms. The Sheikh-
ul-Islam declared to Sir Edwin Pears that it was in
accordance with the teaching of Mohammed and his
example that Christians be treated as the equals of
Mohammedans (“Turkey, etc.,” p. 330), that Moham-
med had proclaimed unity and equality and that all
who accepted the Unity of God were to be treated as
brothers. Some Turkish Ulema have come to the
point of admitting the right to examine and investi-
gate matters of religion and to criticise and investi-
gate the Koran and the Law. New explanations and
new expositions are made possible by emphasizing a
verse or tradition which may have been passed over
previously but is now seized hold of because it suits
the new purpose. The further consideration of mod-
ern influences in Turkey I defer till the discussion of
political movements, as they are closely associated.

MODERNISM IN PERSIA

In Persia liberty of thought and writing has been
much restricted. The assumption by Babism of a po-
litical and revolutionary attitude probably increased
the restrictions. The publication of criticisms of the
faith has not been permitted. A pamphlet describing

the mullahs, their faults and opposition to progress,
was published in Baku, Russia. When copies of it
were distributed through the book-room of the school
of Mirza Husain Kamal in Tabriz, the antagonism to
him was so fierce as to close the school and drive him
from the city. The illustrated weekly Mullah Nasr-
ud Din, published at Tiflis, which cleverly criticised,
often with striking cartoons, the foibles of the clergy
and state in Persia, was excluded from distribution
through the mail. Even after Constitutional govern-
ment was established, Sayid Hasan, editor of the
Hablul Matin, who with his brother, the editor of the
prominent paper of the same name in Calcutta, had
given strong support to the Constitution, was ad-
judged guilty of a serious offence because he referred
with pride and regret to the condition of Persia before
Islam and spoke of the Arabs as “lizard-eaters,” us-
ing this expression of the poet Fardusi. For this of-
fence he was brought to trial and sentenced to prison
(Browne’s “Persian Revolution,” pp. 244, 234). In
Tabriz, at the same time, Mirza Husain Khan, an
editor, referred to the tradition of Mohammed in
which he said that “Woman was made out of a
crooked rib of Adam. If you try to straighten it, it
will break; if you leave it alone, it will remain
crooked.” He semi-humorously advocated freedom
for woman and the amelioration of her condition,
even an attempt to straighten the crooked rib. So
much excitement was caused by the article that the
editor was in danger, and was called to Teheran os-
tensibly to answer for his offence, really for his pro-
tection.

Modernism among the Shiahs may be said to have
its rise with Mullah Sadra of Shiraz, Mohammed bin
Ibrahim, an eminent theologian of the time of Shah
Abbas the second. He revived the study of philoso-
phy and science. He maintained liberal principles of
the interpretation of the Koran and of judging tradi-
tions rationally. His system strove to reconcile phi-
losophy, Sufiism, and the Shariat. He and Abdu
Razzak revived the study of Avicenna and his philoso-
phy and set in motion currents of liberal thought. He
no doubt had influence on Sheikh Ahmad of Ahsa, the
founder of Sheikhism—which is an example of mod-
ernism among the Shiahs. He was the source of the
influence which led on to Babism and Bahaism, but
while the latter both broke with Islam, the Sheikhis
remained within the fold and strenuously opposed the
Babis as anti-Islamite. The Sheikhis themselves suf-
fered from the suspicion and hatred of the more ortho-
dox Mutasharis. Their views have the virtue or taint
of Neo-Islam. Sheikh Ahmad explained away the
miracles of Mohammed. The two mentioned in the
Koran,—namely, the cleaving of the moon and the
miraj or ascent to heaven,—he did not deem super-
natural. The latter he regarded as a dream or vision
of the night, not a real journey. He denied the resur-
rection of the body, teaching that man has an astral
or spiritual body which accompanies the soul into the
other world, and this is the resurrection. He directed
his disciples to regard Christians as clean and not as
a contamination ceremonially. He taught that there
is always in the world a “perfect Shiah,” the repre-
sentative of the Imam and his medium of communi-

cation. Through him is given the opportunity for
the modification of interpretations. This overcomes
the chief difficulty to the renovation of the creed in
accordance with modern ideas and needs. The lib-
erality of the Sheikhis is noticeable in their relation
to Christians. The Sheikhi Mujtahids of Azerbaijan
maintained social relations with the missionaries, and
even sent their children to Europe and to the schools
of the mission for education. One of these was the
Sigat-ul-Islam. He would visit us, drink tea with us,
discuss questions of science with us. He had a
library of considerable size, received magazines from
various countries, and was engaged in preparing an
historical chronology. He did not express himself
freely on religious themes and rather avoided discus-
sion. I remember on one occasion when, seated in
my parlour, I was discussing certain points with one
of the mullahs who accompanied him, the Sigat-ul-
Islam finally said: “Won’t you two stop trying to
convert one another?” He was an open and sincere
friend of the Constitution and did much to further
the cause of popular liberties. He tried to bring about
peaceful settlement with Mohammed Ali Shah, hold-
ing telephonic conversations with him at Teheran to
settle Tabriz troubles. Those were indeed troublous
times. He fell under the suspicion of instigating and
abetting the riot in Tabriz against the Russian gar-
rison, and was hanged on the tenth of Muharram, by
order of the court-martial, in the mashk-madan—
the drill grounds. His last words were: “I have
done my duty. I have tried to serve my country.
Long live the Constitution.”

Another modernist Mujtahid of Persia was Haji
Sheikh Hadi, Nazmabadi (Browne’s “Persian Revo-
lution,” p. 406). Pie was of first rank among the
Ulema of Teheran, learned, incorruptible, a counsellor
and instructor of all. He was somewhat of a recluse
and ascetic, sat on the ground outside of his house,
and was visited by high and low. Viziers and princes
were received by him without ostentation. He rose
to receive no one save Nasr-ud-Din Shah. Sheikh
Hadi’s influence was very great. He, a liberal-minded
thinker, was branded as a heretic, but his influence
was rather increased by this. He opposed popular
superstitions, denounced prevailing abuses, led the
minds of his hearers away from old beliefs. He had
some of Tolstoi’s conviction of the dignity and neces-
sity of manual labour and insisted on his sons and
disciples working at a trade. His influence was very
great in bringing about what is called the awakening
of Persia. Men of all classes and creeds were helped
to break with the traditional past through his criticism
and instruction.

Though many mullahs were held in high repute and
honour both for their learning and their faithfulness
to their religion, yet it may be said that one character-
istic of the age in Persia has been the contempt and
obloquy heaped upon the mullahs. Dissatisfaction
with the condition of religion has been great and has
voiced itself in denunciation of the mullahs as the
cause of the degeneracy of the times and of religious
life. One cause of this was that many of them op-
posed progress. Another and greater cause was that
many of the Mujtahids are large landlords and were

supposed to look kindly upon if not to assist in cor-
nering wheat.

MODERNISM IN EGYPT

In Egypt, modernism has come in as a result of
Western education as well as from the influence of cer-
tain progressive mullahs. Among these was Sheikh
Jamal-ud-Din, who has been described in the chapter
on “The Revival in Islam.” He had much influence
on the Egyptians by applying philosophy to theo-
logical discussions. From 1871 to 1879 he was lec-
turer-extraordinary with a salary from the govern-
ment. He influenced young writers who became emi-
nent in the presentation of modern thought in new
literary style. His most conspicuous pupil was Sheikh
Mohammed Abdu, afterwards Grand Mufti (1875-
1905). The latter is called the founder of Neo-Islam
in Egypt (Browne, ibid., pp. 3, 7, and Cromer’s
“Modern Egypt,” pp. 174-77). He steered a middle
course between the Europeanized Egyptians and the
conservatives. He wrote books such as the “Amud-
ul-Muslimin,”in which he protested against vari-
ous laws and usages of Islam. He tried to reform
divorce laws and the corrupt practices of the courts as
well as the system of education. His freedom in deal-
ing with traditional theology and law left him under
the ban of the orthodox. His opposition to the ex-
travagances of the Court of the Khedive and his sym-
pathy with the aspirations of his own people made
him at times unacceptable to the authorities. Lord
Cromer describes another of these modern Sheikhs,
El Bakri, who “boasted of his acquaintance with

Gladstone and Salisbury, quoted Rousseau on the
Rights of Man in excellent French; indulged in plati-
tudes about the blessings of parliamentary govern-
ment, and borrowed books to study the French Revo-
lution,—a compound of Mecca and the Paris Boule-
vard, the latest development of Islam” (“Modern
Egypt,” Vol. II, p. 177).

With the Grand Mufti and the reformers who have
succeeded him the cry is “Back to the Koran.” This
cry, says Rev. F. Wurz, “is heard in addresses, read
in books, pamphlets, and daily papers, and has be-
come rather universal” (“Islam and Missions,” p.
58). With some “Back to the Koran” and “Back to
Mohammed” mean the same thing, namely, a desire
to get away from the traditional law. S. H. Leeder
(“Veiled Mysteries of Egypt”), a friend of Islam,
expresses Sheikh Mohammed Abdu’s position as fol-
lows: “Back to the Koran and the simple godliness
of the Prophet; away from the superstitious inven-
tions and fables of later men; let Islam be true to the
spirit of its great founder and his friends.” Some
who are saying “Back to Mohammed” are mean-
ing rather to an idealized Mohammed, a prophet
with the incarnated divine Light—not the prophet of
history. Some there are who make a distinction, re-
jecting Mohammed as an example and simply accept-
ing him as the revealer of the Koran. A young re-
former said to Mr. Gairdner (“Vital Forces,” p.
23): “The important thing is to accept the Koran;
it is no part of the mission of the Prophet to give a
moral ideal. Accept the Koran and then let Jesus,

if you like, be better than Mohammed.” These
quote the Ulema as saying, “The Koran contains all
that is necessary to salvation.” In this movement the
Koran is being made more use of for ethical study.
It is also being examined and commented on as litera-
ture and its finest selections published separately for
devotional uses (“Vital Forces,” p. 136).

This modernist call to go back to primitive Islam
means a different thing from what it did as the cry
of the Wahabis. The latter wished a puritanical
reformation, rejecting all foreign influences. With
the New Moslems it is a method of discarding anti-
quated customs and laws and bringing Islam into har-
mony with Western thought. They feel the necessity
of appearing to be good Moslems and have a desire
to maintain such a position with their own people.
By a loose exegesis they hope to hold what they wish
and discard what is unacceptable to them. They think
thus to revitalize Islam and inspire it with a spirit of
progress. They nominally stand in the orthodox posi-
tion and cannot be classed as Mutazalites, as the New
Moslems in India can. Lately some actual reforms
have been brought about in Egypt, through the ef-
forts of Sayid Ahmad Al Bakri and the heads of the
darvish orders. They have regulated and limited the
zikrs of the darvishes, their extreme gesticulations,
hypnotic rites, and excitement. The ceremony, called
Dozeh, at Cairo, in which the Sheikh of the Saadiyah
on horseback rode over the prostrate bodies of the
devotees, has been abolished. The attributing of su-
pernatural powers to the tombs of the Sheikhs is
being discouraged. (See Dr. J. Giffin: “Islam and

Missions,” p. 295; Dr. C. R. Watson: “In the Val-
ley of the Nile,” p. 219; Professor Macdonald: Inter-
national Review of Missions, 1913, p. 596.)

IN MALAYSIA

In Malaysia the influence of New Islam has been
felt. Moslems in Java, conscious of their backward-
ness, have inaugurated a movement looking towards
progress and education. The “Society of Islam,”
sympathetic with modernism, held a congress in
Java attended by thirty thousand people. Among the
questions discussed were the education of women, the
freedom of the press, and self-government. A resi-
dent reports that “Within the past year greater
changes have come into the minds of the Javanese
than in the past twenty-five years.” (Quoted by Dr.
Zwemer: Missionary Review, 1914, p. 182.)

NEW ISLAM IN RUSSIA

Modernism is represented among the forty-two
races of Moslems in Russia. This may be noted in
external things. Men and women, too, are adopting
Christian modes of dress, living in the Christian quar-
ters of the cities, and conforming to their customs.
Some of the women no longer live in seclusion nor
wear the veil. Mullahs complain that the people are
lax in their religious duties, even increasing their use
of alcoholic drinks. Boys and even girls are attend-
ing Russian government schools. The young Mos-
lems enter the army and civil service as officers. In
the Caucasus the movement is advanced. In Tiflis,
Mullah Nasr-ud-Din, the journal already referred to,

makes sport of the foibles of the mullahs, holds up
to ridicule old notions and customs and does ef-
fective work by its bright cartoons. There is a weekly
journal for Moslem women, edited by a Moslem
woman. Besides these there are two dailies, the
Hakikat and the Shariat, and a monthly called the
Maktab. In Baku, Tagief, a petroleum millionaire
has built a large school for girls. A society carries on
other schools. Tracts and books have been published
advocating reforms, and especially inveighing against
the mullahs. Liberal education is progressing in
Kazan and the interior of Russia. A prominent
leader in Neo-Islam is Ismiel Bey Gasparinski. His
organ, the Tarjuman, circulates through Russia and
Central Asia. At Tomsk in Siberia a Moslem society
for reform and progress has been organized (Mis-
sionary Review, 1910, p. 738). In 1904 Mohammed
Fatah Gilmani published a book in the Tartar lan-
guage (Professor Vambery: Nineteenth Century,
February, 1905), called “A Travel to the Crimea,”
in which he commends to the Tartars the acquisition
of European science, laments their backwardness,
blames it on the mullahs and the old education, de-
mands a vernacular version of the Koran, and that
polygamy and divorce be discouraged, that women be
allowed freedom, permitted to attend school, become
teachers, preachers, and authors, and participate in
public life. He declares that this desire for awaken-
ing is a national feeling, born and fostered by their
societies. Professor Vambery affirms that the move-
ment has extended its influence to Eastern Turkistan
and to many of the nomadic tribes of Central Asia,

and that it has a political and revolutionary side as
well as literary and religious. It is certainly a notable
fact that Tartars have developed their language, are
preparing a modern scientific and general literature,
and giving a corresponding education. A congress
of Moslems met at Petrograd in 1914 with forty-two
delegates, representing all parts of the Russian empire,
even Tartary and Central Asia. They discussed the
care of schools, the maintenance of high schools and
colleges for Moslems, the need of women doctors,
and general amelioration of moral and economic con-
ditions of their co-religionists in Russia. They also
formulated demands for equal rights with Christians.
Concerning this, the Moslem members of the Duma
are also alert to seek action.

NEO-ISLAM IN INDIA

It remains to consider Moslems in India with refer-
ence to the influence of modernism among them.
Here the movement has been more open and more
widely extended, and from there has influenced other
lands.

Neo-Islam in India received its great impulse from
Sayid Ahmad Khan of Aligarh, 1818-98. He was
distinguished in the Indian civil service, served the
Crown well in the mutiny, was received in royal audi-
ence in 1870 on his visit to England and knighted.
His aim was to bring his co-religionists into harmony
in doctrine and life with the modern age. To this
end he encouraged English education, especially by
founding Aligarh College, edited a magazine called
The Reform of Morals, wrote a Commentary on the

Bible, admitting its truth and authenticity and trying
to reconcile it with the Koran. He interpreted Islam
according to rationalism and denied miracles. He
recognized a human element in the Koran and ad-
mitted the fallibility of both it and Mohammed. He
declared that Islam in its traditional and exclusive
mould had no future and strove to bring it into con-
formity with the times and so strengthen it. Because
he wrote much in regard to natural religion his fol-
lowers were called Naturis. He started conferences
among Moslems and was the founder of the Moslem
League, which had for its aim social, economic, edu-
cational, and religious reforms.

His influence was increased still further by his
successors, who developed the same policy. One of
these is Sayid Amir Ali, a graduate-in-law in London
and a Justice in the Indian Courts. He is the author
of “The Life of Mohammed,” “Mohammedan Law,”
“The Legal Position of Woman in Islam,” “The
Spirit of Islam,” etc. His attitude is that of a
special pleader. He would explain away and gloss
over the defects of Mohammed’s character and by
strained interpretations show that the Sacred Law is
in conformity with twentieth-century ideals. His
teaching in regard to inspiration is evident from his
saying (“Life of Mohammed,” 1873, p. 25) that
Mohammed’s knowledge of Jesus was received from
floating traditions in Arabia, prevalent in his time,
part of the folklore of the country, and that the law
regarding spoils in war was promulgated by Moham-
med and incorporated in the Koran. He knows noth-
ing of revelation from eternal tablets preserved in

heaven. The Koran comes by a lower form of in-
spiration. He suppresses the supernatural and mi-
raculous in the miraj, in the flight to Medina, or an-
gelic action at Bedr (p. 83), rejects a personal devil
and the jinns (p. 86). As to the facts of Moham-
med’s history, he utterly disregards all that the ancient
Moslem historians tell against his character, so that
Dr. W. St. C. Tisdall is led to say: “A great modern
discovery of the Neo-Mohammedan is that no reliance
is to be placed on the earliest and most celebrated Mus-
lim historians, traditionalists, and commentators,
when they relate anything which a modern apologist
deems discreditable to Mohammed, but that the very
same writers are thoroughly reliable when they state
anything in his favour” (Moslem World, 1913,
p. 408).

As to the Shariat, Amir Ali states his far-reaching
principle in the following words: “Commands and
prohibitions have invariably been in consonance with
the progress of humanity, and the law has always
grown with the growth of the human mind” (“Mo-
hammedan Law,” p. 13). “The elasticity of laws is
their great test, and this test is pre-eminently possessed
by those of Islam. Their compatibility with every
stage of progress shows their founder’s wisdom. In-
quiry will evince the temporary character of such
rules as appear scarcely consonant with the require-
ments or prejudices of modern times” (“Life of Mo-
hammed,” pp. 227, 157). Many sumptuary regulations,
precepts, and prohibitions of Mohammed were called
forth by temporary circumstances. With the disap-
pearance of the circumstances, the need for those laws

has also disappeared. The people, whether Moslem
or not, who suppose that every Islamic precept is
necessarily immutable do injustice (p. 194). With
such views he relegates to a secondary position verses
and passages of the Koran and Traditions which have
held the field, and gives emphasis to other verses. He
claims the right to ignore verses and to change inter-
pretations, as he says the Christians have done. And
further, as Bosworth Smith says (“Mohammed
and Mohammedanism,” p. 257), “There are some
among the New Moslems who see now, and there will
be more who will soon see, that there will soon be an
appeal to the Mohammed of Mecca from the Moham-
med of Medina.” Amir Ali affirms the right of pri-
vate judgment and, with special interpretations, re-
jects from the Koran all that does not accord with
his own ideas. He shows, to his own satisfaction at
least, that Mohammedan “law itself may be consid-
ered a prohibition of the plurality of wives,” and that
slavery, intolerance, and war for the propagation of
the Faith are not parts of Islam. It is at least a grati-
fication to find an expounder of Islam who repudiates
such practices. He does not accept the decisions of
the Imams on traditional law as unchangeable nor
exempt them from criticism. The Imams have in-
jured Islam by making it fixed, reactionary, and un-
able to adapt itself. Their decisions must be disre-
garded. The fatvas of the Ulema, too, are without
authority. Even the Koran can be criticised. All
provisions of the Shariat not suited to the present age
can be discarded. Reason is to be the judge and con-
temporary sense of fitness the criterion. The Imams

have rejected five hundred thousand traditions and
only found eight thousand authentic. Let us throw
all overboard that do not suit us. Such is the atti-
tude of this representative reformer.

Another writer of Neo-Islam is Maulvie Chiragh
Ali, an officer of the Nizam’s government. He has
published “Reform Under Moslem Rule” and
“Critical Exposition of the Jihad.” Another of the
group, Ali Hasan, has published a life of Mohammed,
“The Last Prophet,” in which he discards the miracu-
lous. The Light of Mohammed is simply the light of
conscience with inspiration; the miraj or midnight
journey was in vision only, jinns are but bad men,
jihad is only to be in self-defence. Mohammed’s in-
tercession, sinlessness, and miracle-working are not
mentioned. The example of the Prophet has not the
binding force of law on his followers.

Controversy has occurred among the Hanifites over
the use of the vernacular in prayer and of translations
of the Koran. The modern party take the ground
that worship should be in a language understood by
the participants. Besides the arguments of reason,
they appeal to the tradition that Mohammed allowed
his Persian converts to make their prayers in their
own tongue (“Spirit of Islam,” p. 522).

Another New Moslem is S. Khuda Bakhsh. In his
“Essays Indian and Islamic” he quotes with approval
the teachings of Von Kremer and Goldziher regard-
ing the relation of Roman law to the Shariat. He
cites Nawaur as saying: “By far the greatest por-
tion of the Muslim law is the outcome of true inquiry,
for the actual passages of the Koran and Sunna

have not contributed a hundredth part of it. The
Board of Nazar-ul-Mazalim had to decide not ac-
cording to the letter of the law, but according to the
principles of equity.” “Islam, stripped of its
theology, is a perfectly simple religion. The Koran
is a spiritual guide, not a body of civil laws. It was
never the intention of the Prophet to lay down immu-
table rules or to set up a system of laws which was to
be binding apart from changed conditions.” He laid
down rules of marriage, etc., intended to meet the
then existing conditions. Muslim jurisprudence grew
by the adoption of foreign rules (“Essays Indian
and Islamic,” pp. 284-86). These principles give
scope for a complete modernizing of Islam.

Another Indian reformer is Mulvi Abdullah of
Chakrel, somewhat of an ascetic and a voluminous
writer. His teachings are described by Canon Sell
as a wide departure from orthodox Islam. He would
return to the Koran, rejecting all traditions. Polyg-
amy and the jihad are declared to be against the
Koran, the azan or call to prayer and the rosary are
rejected, as well as all pilgrimages except the one to
Mecca, which must be limited to simple ceremonies
and be without the kissing of the black stone. Neither
Mohammed nor any other man can be mediator at
the Day of Judgment. The intermediate state is one
of unconsciousness.

Another new sect is the Ahli Koran, the People
of the Koran, who have some following in the Pun-
jab. They reject traditions entirely, denounce polyg-
amy, and affirm that neither Mohammed nor any
other of the prophets had more than one wife

(“Vital Forces,” p. 173).1 In general it may be said
of these Indian Moslem reformers, in the pertinent
words of Mr. Gairdner (“Reproach of Islam,” p.
206;: “They read into the Koran almost everything
they have come to like, and out of it almost every-
thing they have come to dislike.”

Such are the principles of Neo-Islam. Have its
expounders forsaken the Faith? By no means.
They are strenuous Moslems. They proclaim the
greatness and glory of Mohammed, whitewash his
record, expurgate from Islam all blemishes, and make
it the possessor of every excellency demanded by
public opinion of the twentieth century. Justice Amir
Ali2 is bitterly and scornfully anti-Christian and
scours the history of Christendom from age to age
to find crimes to set against those of Mohammed and

1 It is curious how the reformers of Islam cling to some of the
old Oriental ideas. This is noticeable in regard to assassination.
Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din said in an interview with Professor Browne
(“Persian Revol.,” p. 45): “No reform can be hoped for until
six or seven heads are cut off,” and specified Nasr-ud-Din and
Amin-i-Sultan. Both these were afterwards assassinated. Jamal-
ud-Din also proposed that Khedive Ismiel should be assassinated
and Sheikh Mohammed Abdu says (quoted by Lord Cromer, Vol.
Ill, p. 181, from W. S. Blunt’s “Secret History,” p. 489): “I
strongly approved of it, but we lacked a person capable of tak-
ing lead in the affair.” We are reminded of the assassination of
the Azali Babis by the Bahais. The attempts to assassinate the
new Sultan of Egypt are also instigated and applauded by high
religious authorities of Constantinople. See Chapter V.

2 The historical attitude of this learned representative of New
Islam may be seen in his lament over three things (p. 342):
1. The failure of the Persians to conquer Greece. 2. The failure
of the Arabs to conquer Constantinople in the eighth century.
3. The unfortunate results of the battle of Tours. “Each of
these has prevented the growth and progress of civilization.”

primitive Islam. (See “Life of Mohammed,” last
chapter.) Principal Morrison of Aligarh College
says: “They believe that in their Faith are enshrined
the great truths of religion and morality; but that in
the past they have misread the word of God, and
that the narrow-minded mullahs have expounded it
amiss.” (Quoted in “Crusaders of the Twentieth
Century,” p. 49.)

It must be borne in mind that this rationalistic
method of interpreting Islam is not new. This In-
dian school of thought is a revival of the Mutazalis,
who existed under the Abbaside caliphate of Bagdad.
Then Persian thought and influence were prevalent
and exercised a strong tendency to free Islam from
the fetters which were fast being bound upon it. Vic-
tory was apparently with this party of free thought.
Orthodoxy seemed to have lost the adhesion of the
learned. But Al Askari, using as his weapon the dia-
lectics of Aristotle and teaching Greek logic to the
orthodox, gave them the victory and established rigid
legalism and traditionalism in Islam (Stanley Lane-
Poole: “Studies in a Mosque,” pp. 171-74; Geden’s
“Studies in the Religions of the East,” p. 831).
Again the disciples of free thought take the same
name. Amir Ali says (preface to “Mohammedan
Law,” p. x): “Belonging myself to the little known
but not unimportant philosophical and legal school
of the Mutazalis, and thus occupying a vantage ground
of observation, I cannot but observe the movement
that has been going on for some time among them.
The advancement of culture and the growth of new
ideas have begun to exercise the same influence on

them as on other races and peoples. The young gen-
eration is tending unconsciously to Mutazalite doc-
trines. It must not be supposed, however, that this
movement results from a weakening of the Islamic
faith. It originates more from the desire to revert to
the pristine purity of Islam and to cast off the excres-
cences which have marred its glory in later times.
To me it appears that great changes are imminent in
the social institutions and personal laws of Indian
Mussulmans.” But we need not expect much to re-
sult in the way of uplift to Islam from rationalizing
and intellectual defence and pruning. No Erasmus
can set on fire a genuine reform. Still as Persian in-
fluence had great results in the old time, the foreign
civilization in India will show effects on Islamic
thought and conscience.

VI

THE NEW EDUCATION IN ISLAM

MOSLEMS, especially in the Near East, have
had considerable intellectual life. But educa-
tion long ago became stereotyped. For cen-
turies it has been clerical. Its centre was the mosque,
its teacher the mullah or mudarris. Generally there
is a mullah in each village and a mud-walled, adobe
mosque, unceiled and unfloored, without furniture
save the membar or pulpit and a bastinado in the
corner for refractory boys. The father on bringing
his boy into view of this instrument of torture, would
say to the mullah, “The bones are mine, the skin and
flesh are yours, only teach him letters.” The pupils
gave fees and presents to the mullah. These were not
large nor abundant, as is evidenced by the story of
a father who brought his boy to the mullah and said:
“Ay, mullah, what will you take to teach my boy to
read?” “I want ten tomans,” answered the mullah.
“That’s too much,” exclaimed the father; “I can buy
a donkey for that sum.” “Buy,” retorted the mullah,
“and then you will have two.” (See author’s “Per-
sia; Western Missions.”) The income of the mullah
was supplemented by writing deeds, contracts, letters,
and charms for the people. The pupils sit on reed
matting without desks. They are unclassified, and

when one recites alone the rest of the pupils learn
their lessons aloud in a singsong tone. In cities these
schools are in different wards, and some of them in
the bazaars, separate from the mosques.

The basis of the curriculum is learning to read the
Koran. In countries in which Arabic is not the ver-
nacular, this is injurious to the pupils. Many of
them spend all of the few years which it is their lot
to attend school learning to read Arabic by rote and
often very imperfectly. This schooling is of no prac-
tical use to them. Many who read fluently do not
understand its meaning, yet they have their reward
in the great merit of simply reading the holy words.
This has been a great hindrance to popular education
even in Persia and Turkey. In less civilized lands it
has been nothing short of a calamity. In Sierra
Leone and Central Africa, Moslem education is de-
scribed as an unintelligible learning by rote of the
Koran and committing to memory of a few prayers,
to which is added a course in witchcraft, making
charms and fetishes. In Malaysia the instruction has
a stupefying rather than an enlightening effect. It
is mechanical and parrot-like. They learn neither the
tribal language nor the Malay. Mr. Simon says:
“They acquire a number of Arabic formulae and
facility in rattling off a few Malay phrases of which
they practically do not understand a word.” For-
tunately common sense and race pride asserted them-
selves in Persia. So after some time spent in reading
Arabic, the pupil is permitted to learn his vernacular,
and a course in Saadi, Hafiz, and other poets has
developed many Persians of good literary ability.

Private instruction at home has been a sub-
stitute for good schooling for the nobles and the
scribes. Even in Arabic-speaking lands the old sys-
tem hampers education by confining education to
the dialect of the Koran and not using the modern
dialect.

Higher education, under the old system, was con-
fined to training for the Ulema. The course of in-
struction included theology and law, the Koran and
the Traditions and their exposition, with grammar,
rhetoric, and logic, and possibly some mathematics.
It excludes modern sciences and languages. These
madressas are supported by tithes and vakf, endow-
ments. They develop acute and well-trained faculties,
and have served their purpose through the medieval
period of Islam. But a spirit of narrowness and big-
otry rules in them. Many of them are hotbeds of
fanaticism. They train up their talabas or softas to
be reactionary, not only hard-bound to traditionalism
in the sphere of religion, but adverse to the progress
which modern science brings to mankind.

THEOLOGICAL SCHOOLS

The theological-law schools of Islam have continued
on the ancient basis. Shiah madressas at Kerbala and
Najef, Sunni ones at Mecca and chief cities of Turkey
and Central Asia, have changed but little. One of
the most celebrated of these is Al Azhar at Cairo.
Time was when a Christian was not even permitted
to enter its precincts, but fortunately for the members
of the Cairo Missionary Conference that rule no
longer holds. I was greatly interested in walking

through its crowded cloisters, and seeing its multitude
of students, sitting on the floor, in circles around their
Sheikhs and Muftis. As we passed from group to
group I kept imagining what ones might be from
Kazan or Bukhara, what ones from Morocco or Java,
from Cape Town or Peking, and where they will be
scattered after years of training in the lore of Islam.
This famous theological school was founded by the
Fatimide Jowhar, vizier of Sultan Muiz, A.D. 969,
at the time Cairo was laid out. It has as high
as 325 professors and 11,095 students from many
lands. Each nation has its section or dormitory. The
Italian Government lately established a hostel with
150 students from Erithrea and Tripoli “to train
students to teach the coming generation in Tripoli the
Islamic doctrine, the Arabic tongue, and love of
Italy.” Al Azhar has large endowment from which
a daily dole of bread is given to the students. It is
noted specially for instruction in theology and Arabic.
Rev. F. Wurz points out that it is a mistake to refer
to Al Azhar as a great foreign missionary centre, for
it does not send out missionaries to non-Moslem lands.
It is rather an international theological seminary. It
is intensely conservative. The Grand Mufti, Moham-
med Abdu, tried to modernize its curriculum by intro-
ducing some secular learning into the preparation—for
example, geography and history. The necessity for
this may be seen from an incident related by Dr. Wat-
son (“Egypt and the Christian Crusade,” p. 48). A
graduate of Al Azhar was teaching Arabic to a mis-
sionary and came upon the word Asia. He asked,
“Where is Asia? Is it a part of Europe?” The

Mufti’s plan was not accepted by the professors,
caused difficulty, and the Khedive secured his resig-
nation. Al Azhar continued to illustrate the stagna-
tion of Moslem conservatism. The Khedive tried his
hand at reforming it, and as an inducement increased
its revenues from forty to two hundred thousand
pounds. But owing to dissatisfaction with its spirit
and management, he ceased to patronize it. A ninth
attempt to modernize it failed in 1910. A new regula-
tion was that all students who had been in the uni-
versity more than seventeen years should leave if they
failed in the coming examinations. I believe that it
still teaches the Copernican system. A similar school
in Constantinople, used, until a few years ago, a text-
book for physical science which was a thousand years
old. There is much dissatisfaction with such institu-
tions. This is voiced by a Moslem, Mushir Husain
Kidwal, who wrote in the Hindustan Review: “Even
the educational institutions stink of the old decaying
smell.”

The old system of education reached only a small
proportion even of the boys. Illiteracy prevailed in all
Moslem lands. For example, take the Persians—a
people with a literary classic tongue and masterpieces
which have merited the admiration of the world.
Travellers who report about the proportion of the
population who can read fail to consider the village
and nomad people. In many villages scarcely one in
a hundred can read. Probably the estimate made
about Moslem lands for the Cairo Conference is ap-
proximately correct,—namely, that ten to fifteen per
cent are literate, though in India, where the census

gives the correct figure, not more than five in a hun-
dred of the men can read and only four in a thousand
of the women.

Discontent with these conditions has led to a move-
ment for modern education. The desire is to do away
with this antiquated system, and to substitute modern
methods and curricula. This is one of the significant
movements—one that is having large influence on
their lives and religious conceptions. The new educa-
tion is Western and carries with it a large element of
Christian truth.

In the Near East the modern ferment of ideas
began at the time of Napoleon. After his invasion of
Egypt and Syria, those lands continued in closer and
more constant contact with Europe. After that time
European influence is continually evident. It was at
the same time that ambassadors from France, Britain,
and Russia began special efforts to influence the Shah
of Persia; and the people of Persia began to know
something definite about Christian civilization. A
powerful influence was exerted by Europe on the Near
East during the nineteenth century by the coming of
young men in considerable number from Turkey,
Syria, Egypt, and Persia for education. They re-
turned much changed in religious belief and practice
and with ideas and purposes out of harmony with the
old conditions. They especially felt the need for their
own people of the literary and scientific culture which
they had seen in Europe. This need was made more
prominent and a general impulse was given to new
education among Moslems by the mission schools and
by those of the Oriental churches among their own

people as well as in some countries, as India, by the
government schools.

NEW EDUCATION IN PERSIA

I shall begin a review of this educational movement
with Persia. The first Persian students who returned
from Europe to Persia about the middle of the nine-
teenth century were not well received and were viewed
with suspicion (Markham’s “History,” p. 19). But
in the subsequent period, many of the most enlight-
ened men have had the benefit of European training.
Such was Hasan Ali Khan, Amir-i-Nizam, the able
though unscrupulous governor of Azerbaijan, who did
so much to overthrow the tobacco monopoly. The
late regent Abul Kasim Khan, Nasir-ul-Mulk, a grad-
uate of Oxford, and different members of the family
of Riza Kuli Khan, Lala Bashi, were prepared by it
to take a prominent part in organizing the Constitu-
tional government. Many members of the medical
profession were of the modern school, and not a few
of them received the foreign training. What is true
of Persia is more the case with reference to other
countries of the Near East. The visit of the Shah
Nasr-ud-Din to Europe led him to encourage Western
learning. He founded the Shah’s College, with a cur-
riculum on European models. When I visited it in
1881 it was doing fairly good work, but it did not
develop rapidly in standard and efficiency. A few
other schools were established in the chief cities of
the country. The teachers and graduates of these
schools were, for the most part, liberal-minded and
progressive, with a lighter sense of the obligation of

the Shariat and a less bigoted attitude towards Chris-
tians. There was a tendency towards secularism and
scepticism which seemed to endanger religious char-
acter, and threatened to bring about a condition where
young men of culture would be freed from the re-
straints of Islam and have no faith in Christ to take
its place. A term, Frangi mahab, was applied to a class
of men who were imitators of foreign ways and often
without substantial character back of it. Spasmodic
but for the most part unsuccessful efforts were made
to establish schools. The Constitutional movement
gave a vigorous impetus to new effort, but no systems
could be organized owing to disturbed conditions.
Within a year twenty schools were opened in Tabriz
and a correspondingly larger number in Teheran,
where the education of girls took a good start. But
all these schools only accommodated a few hundreds
in the smaller cities and a few thousands in the larger
places. The reactionaries under Mohammed Ali Shah
showed their attitude towards the new education by
looting and burning the schools, the libraries, and
breaking in pieces the printing-presses. A remarka-
ble opportunity came to the Missions to educate the
Moslem youth. They came by the hundreds to their
schools, taking the religious lessons because of their
desire for the science and languages. Impetus was
given to plans for higher education and projects were
initiated to develop colleges for Moslem students in
Teheran, Tabriz, and Ispahan.

EDUCATION IN TURKEY

On Turkey the influence of Western education has
been marvellous. Many young men have gone to
France and some to England and Germany. French
to a great extent became in the nineteenth century the
language of diplomacy and business. It became also
a means of literary culture. A European movement
set in strongly, especially from 1850 to 1870. Lit-
erature took on new life and developed under the
stimulus. The literary style and taste of Osmanli
scholars were transformed. Of Turkish poetry previ-
ous to that time Gibbs says (“Turkish Poetry,” Vol.
V, pp. 1-21): “It was Persian in its inception, Per-
sian in substance it remained.” Thereafter the litera-
ture of Turkey no longer followed the Persian models
but those of France. The intellectual life of the edu-
cated was changed as were their political ideals. Re-
markable modifications are noticeable in their ideals
and forms. The language itself was remodelled and a
new prose created by Shanasi Effendi, Namik Kamal
Bey, and Ziya Effendi. Abd ul Hak Hamid Bey
acquired fame as a vernacular poet, though the Sultan
prohibited his works from circulation. Literature
ceased to be an adjunct of the work of the clergy.
The drama was introduced. French drama and
Shakespeare were translated. Ideas of patriotism and
liberty permeated literature.

The reforming Sultans favoured popular education
as a means of bringing Turkey into accord with Eu-
ropean life. About the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury schools were established in which children of all

races were to be educated without distinction. These
were elementary, middle or rushdiya, and lyceums or
colleges, including normal, agricultural, technical,
medical, law, military, and naval schools. The pri-
mary schools were fairly numerous in the provinces,
and high schools in the cities. Some few were for
girls. The School of Commerce did not prosper, be-
cause the Turks do not take to business life. After
a score of years it has only a handful of stu-
dents.

The Christian population did not take kindly to these
mixed schools, preferring to have schools distinctive
for their own language, literature, and religion. Nor
were they acceptable to the Moslems. They were
changed in 1870 to schools for Moslems only, in which
their religion was specially taught and foreign lan-
guages abandoned. Of this period Charles Dudley
Warner wrote: “Signs enough are visible in the
Levant of a transition period, extraordinary but hope-
ful; with the existence of poverty, oppression, super-
stition, and ignorance, are mingled Occidental and
Christian influences, the faint beginnings of a revival
of learning and the strong pulsations of awaking com-
mercial and industrial life.” Later Abdul Hamid re-
stricted the schools, for he would have kept the people
in ignorance, and especially would have prevented the
spread of liberal ideas. But he knew the necessity
of education for officers, so he supported some good
military and medical schools. He even let some
students go to Europe to learn military science, but
prevented all others even from travel, as much as he
could. He allowed more freedom for the education

of girls, not apparently dreading their influence on
politics or perhaps despising it as of no account. Yet
many young men escaped to Europe, and were edu-
cated there and the Young Turks are largely men of
this class. Since the Constitution was established,
Turkey has talked much about promoting education.
Indeed, some of them attributed their defeat by the
Balkan states to their lack of education. The Ikdam
(quoted in The Orient) says: “Why have we been
beaten? Because our adversaries have even in their
villages primary schools.” They have given liberty
to scientific, and philosophic study. They have
planned much, but accomplished little. One reason is
that the prosecution of or preparation for war has
exhausted their funds. The appropriation for public
instruction is 65,000,000 piastres, about $3,000,000,
while that for war, navy, and pensions is 1,400,-
000,000 piastres (more than $60,000,000) in time of
peace. Even the schools with a religious endowment,
or avkaf, are in a pitiable condition and have been
decreased from 325 to 250. Another difficulty has
arisen from mixing politics with the educational plans,
and pursuing the policy of Turkifying the subject
races, and compelling the Albanians, Arabs, and others
to learn the Turkish. In spite of all, some progress is
being made. Female education is being encouraged.
Girls are being prepared as teachers; some have been
placed by the government in the normal course of the
(American) Constantinople College and others sent
to Europe. A significant incident occurred at Nico-
media in February, 1914. Moslem boys and girls took
part in school exercises together. Girls of twelve and

thirteen made recitations and addresses before an
audience of two thousand people. The governor made
a stirring appeal for general education and especially
for the culture of the future mothers. Another sig-
nificant event was the inception by the Sheikh-ul-
Islam, Hairi Bey, of a new “Theological Madressa of
the Great Khali fate,” at Constantinople,—to be a
training-place for the Ulema of the whole Islamic
world, to rival and eclipse Al Azhar. Its distinctive
feature is that it will give instruction in all modern
science and philosophy, and turn out Ulema who shall
be progressive leaders in intellectual life (The Orient,
October 7, 1914). A Moslem university has been
started at Medina. The cornerstone was laid No-
vember 29, 1913. An address was made by Sheikh
Abdul Aziz Shawish. The irade of the Sultan de-
clares that its object is the teaching and spread of the
eminent truths of Islam; all Christian influence is to
be excluded. It will also teach agriculture and en-
gineering. Its central committee will be in Constan-
tinople, but superintendence in the hands of a com-
mittee at Medina.

At Jerusalem, the Madressa-i-Kulliyah has been
founded to prepare religious leaders in theology, with
scientific and sociological training. It is under the
direction of Sheikh Shawish, who says it is a restora-
tion of an institution founded by Salah-ud-Din, but
which became a Roman Catholic school, but now re-
verts to the Turkish Government. Its programme is
broad. It starts with one hundred boarders, free in-
struction, and government endowment. Secular uni-
versities are announced for Bagdad and Damascus.

The Committee of Union and Progress is at least in
some respects true to its name.

Since the increase of liberty, Moslems showed a
desire to attend the mission colleges. The largest
representation has been at the Syrian Protestant Col-
lege at Beirut, but there has been a disposition to shirk
the religious instruction.

A curious development has been the organization of
Turkish Boy Scouts. It was initiated at the War
Office, with Enver Pasha as Chief Scout. It has a
definite military object, to draw the wealthy Turks into
military life, and secondly to promote a Neo-Turanian
spirit,—to develop Turkish nationalism, to use the
Turkish language by discarding Persian and Arabic
words. For example, in the oath Allah is not used,
but Tengri, not Sultan or Padishah, but Khakan. It
is an attempt to link themselves with the great Turk-
ish race which extends to the border of China.
Maybe it is prophetic of the fact that Byzantine and
Arabian connections are about to cease.

IN EGYPT

In Egypt the influence of Europeanized Moslems
has been specially felt. Even Khedives and the present
Sultan of Egypt were educated in Europe. The Khe-
dives opened schools, normal, polytechnic, medical
and military, and for girls. They had in 1880, before
British occupation, 5,000 schools with 111,800 pupils.
Under British superintendence the system has been
enlarged on European methods. The traditional re-
ligious teaching is given to the classes. Some Mos-
lems are held firm by it, others tend to scepticism.

Some Coptic pupils under the influence of the lessons
have accepted Islam (Gairdner: “Methods, etc.,” pp.
62-63). To crown the system the National Uni-
versity has been founded on Western models. It has
considerable grants of land and endowments from
Princess Fatima Khanum. The cornerstone was laid
April 10, 1914. It is without a religious foundation.
Schools of engineering and agriculture have been
opened at Giza. At Tanta success seems to have been
attained in modernizing the Sheikh’s Mosque School.
There 3,400 students have the benefit of a course of
study including geography, history, physics, drawing,
and hygiene (S. A. Leeder, in “Veiled Mysteries of
Egypt”). Young men seem to care little for higher
education except as a means to official appointment.
Six hundred youths are in Europe for education at
their own expense, the majority of them in England.
They do not seem to attend to study, and a committee
has been appointed to have oversight of them.

Striking progress has been made in female educa-
tion. Lord Kitchener wrote in 1912: “There is noth-
ing more remarkable than the growth of public opinion
among all classes of Egyptians in favour of the edu-
cation of their daughters. The girls’ schools are
crowded, and fresh schools are to be constructed. In
1900 there were 1,640 girls in Kutabs (common
schools); in 1910, 22,000.” (Quoted by Dr. Sailer
in Woman’s Work.) In 1899 no girl presented her-
self for the primary certificate, in 1911 there were 43.
A Woman’s Educational Union was founded under
the patronage of the Khedive’s mother and with the co-
operation of the ladies of Cairo, with the aim of

developing education among married women. Special
lectures for them were given in the University. In
1907, in order to start a certain school, the govern-
ment enjoined its employees to send their daughters.
Now the attendance is over three hundred, and six
women teach unveiled in the presence of the male
principal (Sailer: ibid.). But all this is only a begin-
ning, for as yet only three Moslem women in a thou-
sand can read in Egypt.

NORTH AFRICA

In the French possessions in Africa primary schools
have been opened in which French and Arabic are
taught, with the usual course of European schools. A
Frenchwoman conducts a school largely attended by
wealthy Moslem girls, in which nothing is said of
religion. A significant incident was a strike of the
students of the Mosque of the Olive Tree at Tunis
against lazy professors and a demand for a scientific
course with geography, physics, chemistry, and like
studies. Regarding the education of Moslems in
Russia I have spoken in a former section.

IN INDIA

Moslems under these Christian governments have
come more directly and without their own initiative
under the influence of the new education. This is
especially so in India. But there the Moslems for a
long period failed to take advantage of government
schools and consequently fell behind in culture and
preparation for life. They clung to the Arabic and

Persian learning and were distanced by the Hindus.
Now they have awakened and acknowledge the value
of Western science and learning, but they are trying
to obtain the benefits without departing from Islam.
They would separate the civilization of the Christians
from their religion, take the former and repudiate
the latter. They are entering into the educational
competition with some eagerness with regard to boys,
but with luke warmness with regard to girls. Female
education is advocated by them in conferences, but no
efficient system has been organized by them, while
they still hesitate to patronize government or mission-
ary schools “as not fit places for the training of Mos-
lem girls” (The Comrade, quoted in the Moslem
World, 1914, p. 310). Among the schools opened for
girls is one at Lucknow in charge of a Canadian
woman, a convert to Islam. The Anjuman at Lahore
has nine girls’ schools and shows some zeal for female
education. The Moslem Educational Conference for
Southern India passed a resolution requesting the gov-
ernment to start schools “with purdah or curtained
conveyances for pupils.” In India but four women
in a thousand can read. Ninety-five per cent of In-
dian Mohammedans are illiterate. What a commen-
tary on a “Religion of a Book” that sixty million
Indian believers cannot read the Koran!

ANGLO-MOHAMMEDAN COLLEGE

I have already referred to the one notable attempt
of Moslems in India to promote modern learning,
the Anglo-Mohammedan College at Aligarh. It was
founded by Sayid Ahmad Khan, the promoter of

Neo-Islam, with the avowed object of “reconciling
Oriental with Western literature and science and to
make the Mussulmans of India worthy and useful
subjects of the British Crown.” Lord Lytton, viceroy,
laid the foundation in 1877 and the government aided
it. Its principal and some of its teachers are English-
men, its courses in Western sciences and languages
are standard. It gives instruction in both Sunni and
Shiah law and theology. The attendance is eight hun-
dred. Its influence on the students is liberalizing.
Dr. Murray Mitchell says (“The Great Religions of
India,” p. 240): “Under the instructions they receive,
the pupils cannot long retain their intense bigotry and
narrowness. If the college continues to prosper an
immense change must gradually take place in the Mo-
hammedans of India.” The college has been success-
ful in having a succession of intelligent and forceful
men who have elevated its position. With headquar-
ters here, there has been organized the All-India Mos-
lem Students’ Brotherhood. A project was set on
foot to develop the college into a great Moslem uni-
versity with affiliated colleges in other provinces.
Much enthusiasm was manifested. Generous sub-
scriptions were made towards the fifty lakhs of rupees
desired, of which Agha Khan of Bombay gave one
lakh. Some dissensions arose as to the place religious
instruction should have. Some claimed that “the
function of a Mohammedan university should be to
make a Mohammedan a genuine one, well grounded
in the doctrine and principles of Islam.” Others
claimed that “the comparative study of other reli-
gions could be safely introduced into the university.”

While they disputed and planned, the British Govern-
ment vetoed the scheme as likely to aid Pan-Islamism
without benefiting education. Subscriptions were in
part sent to the Turkish war fund. Among other
advances made by Moslems is a scientific college at
Karachi, to give technical and industrial training.
The attempt has also been made to modernize the-
ological education. A Mohammedan Educational
Conference aims to promote the cause of learning.
Of Indian Mohammedans, Professor Siraj-ud-Din
says (“Vital Forces,” p. 160) that “through their
political and educational condition, they have been
more thoroughly leavened by Western civilization
than the Mohammedans of any other community in
the world, not excepting even Turkey in Europe.”

Of Afghanistan it may be noticed that the Habibiya
or Chiefs’ College has been established in spite of
the opposition of the mullahs, and a modern hospital
opened, following the introduction of the telegraph
and telephone.

MODERN MOSLEM PRESS

Islam had and continues to have considerable intel-
lectual life of its own kind. Its old presses issue many
books by the lithographic process. Bookstores are in
all large cities, with general literature, but with a
special output of theological books. The Mujtahids
have good-sized libraries and considerable general in-
telligence. All over the Moslem world the press is
taking on new life. In Persia after the Constitution
was established, newspapers sprang up like mush-
rooms. A similar manifestation occurred in Turkey,

where 747 newspapers were started after the new ré-
gime. In Constantinople there still exist eleven dailies.
The circulation of the chief ones is the Sabah (Morn-
ing), 20,000; the Tanin (Echo), 15,000; the Ikdam
(Progress), 13,000; the Yani (New Gazette),
10,000. In India Moslem newspapers abound and
many of them have a strong reform tendency.
Monthly magazines, literary and religious reviews,
and even novels are widely circulated. Egypt has 39
dailies in Arabic, 17 literary reviews, 3 law magazines,
3 of medicine, 2 for women, 11 for religion specially.
Yearly 2,500,000 Moslem newspapers were posted
from Egypt to other Moslem lands (Zwemer). In
Russia, Moslems have journals in their various dia-
lects as they have in Algeria. Even Tunis has its
daily and an organ for the Young Tunis or National-
ist party. In South Africa and in South America like-
wise they have their journals. The press of Islam has
a powerful influence,—anti-Christian of course, often
anti-government, so that even India and Egypt have
their regulative press laws. But on the whole the
papers are instrumental in spreading new modern ideas
of life, of civilization, of science, of social and po-
litical reform. They have a great deal of fanaticism,
but they carry to all Islam convincing news of Mos-
lem defeats and increasing weakness; their accusa-
tions against their enemies and their laments telling
the tale.

TRANSLATIONS OF THE KORAN

Of some significance is the desire of the New Mos-
lems to have the Koran in the language of the people.

Mr. Farquhar says (“Modern Religious Movements
in India,” p. 439): “The Christian contention that
sacred books can be of no value unless understood
by the people has led all the movements, Jain, Sikh,
Parsee, and Moslem, as well as Hindu, to produce
translations of the sacred books they use and to write
all fresh books in the vernacular.” It is true that the
Koran has been translated in the past by Moslems
into their own tongues, though objected to by the
Hanafi School. These are interlinear translations of
a literal, non-idiomatic kind, in Persian, Urdu,
Pushto, Javanese, Malayan, Turkish, and other
tongues. Now the effort is being made to have freer
popular vernacular translations. One of these has
been made in Urdu by a well-known novelist, Mulvi
Nazir Ahmad (Canon Weitbrecht: “Moslem World
of To-day,” p. 197). A new version in Turkish was
in part published in Constantinople lately, but it was
quickly suppressed, as likely to lead to unbelief. A
similar fate overtook the Turkish translation forty
years ago.

Regarding this educational and literary movement,
several things are worthy of attention. It is caused
by the example of the Christian world. The stimulus
is the knowledge of the benefits accruing to Christian
lands and even to the Christian subjects of Moslem
rulers. Not a little of the latter is due to missionary
institutions. Another fact is that the new education
is out of the hands of the mullahs and ignores their
dicta. As to method, it grounds primary training
on the plain vernacular,—on the modern Persian, not
on that of Saadi and Hafiz, on the Turkish of the

people, Osmanli, Azerbaijani, Tekki as the region may
require. It teaches the colloquial Arabic, using even
the readers of the Beirut Mission Press. It strives to
reform the chirography and make correspondence and
business easy. It teaches European languages, disre-
garding the old saying of the mullahs that “he who
learns the language of the Frank is an infidel.” It
gives the enlightening benefit of physical science. It
quotes approvingly a tradition attributed to Moham-
med: “Go forth in search of learning, even if you
have to go as far as China.” It is founded on the
belief that knowledge is power and that they should
share with the Christians the secret of this power.
Their eagerness makes them apt pupils. The effect on
their condition and religious attitude is marked. It
results in discontent with their social and political en-
vironment and almost as certainly in a modification in
their religious thought. Young Moslems are liberal-
ized. The bonds of religious tradition are loosened.
Yet some Moslems scorn the possibility of any injuri-
ous effect as far as their faith is concerned. M. T.
Kadirbhoy writes: “It is possible that religious en-
thusiasts may cry that science, and especially Western
science, may exercise a sceptic influence on the Moslem
mind. The possibility is too remote to cause any ap-
prehension. So fast does the Moslem hold to the word
of the Prophet and the Koran that no amount of
sceptical influence will ever serve to lessen his devo-
tion to his religion and to his God. Youths may
put the new wine of the West into the old bottles of
the East, keeping the colour and quality of the bottle
unimpaired” (Moslem World, 1912, p. 304). Of

more weight is the opinion of Lord Cromer (“Mod-
ern Egypt,” Vol. II, p. 230), who declares that the
Europeanized Moslem loses his Islamism, cuts adrift
from his creed while retaining its lax morality, does
not approach Christianity, is intolerant, hates Chris-
tians as rivals and because those who are in contact
with him deserve to be hated. “European civilization
destroys one religion without substituting another.”
What a strong argument this is that the Church should
give them the truth of Christ along with our civiliza-
tion. Dr. J. A. Oldham, in a review of the condition
of the Islamic world (International Review of Mis-
sions, 1914, p. 46), says: “The disintegration of Is-
lam and the growth of unbelief among the educated
classes are proceeding at an accelerated rate and
are likely to increase with the growth of foreign
influence.”

VII

NEO-ISLAM AND SOCIETY

BY general agreement Islam is a failure as a
social system. Those familiar with the con-
ditions it has brought about, and especially
with the low position of woman and the estimate put
upon her, are frankly hopeless of any true reform
unless these conditions are changed. Stanley Lane-
Poole says (“Studies in a Mosque,” p. 101): “As a
social system Islam is a complete failure. The degra-
dation of woman is a canker which has eaten into the
whole system; it has misunderstood the relation of the
sexes, and by degrading woman has degraded each
successive generation of their children down an in-
creasing scale of infamy and corruption.” Lord
Cromer asks: “Can any one conceive of the existence
of true European civilization, on the assumption that
the position which woman occupies in Europe be de-
ducted from the general plan? As well can a man
blind from his birth be made to conceive the exist-
ence of colour. The position of woman in Moham-
medan countries is therefore a fatal obstacle to the
attainment of that elevation of thought and charac-
ter.” Intelligent Moslems have arrived at the same
judgment. An educated Turk said to Sir Edwin
Pears (“Turkey and Its People,” p. 57): “No re-
form is possible, because we have no family life. You

may believe in the possibility of Turkish reforms
when you see Turkish husbands and wives, arm in
arm, on Galata bridge,—that is, when we Turks re-
spect and trust our women.”

The hopelessness of the case lies in this, that this
dark blot has been indelibly stamped on Islam by the
Koran and the example of the Prophet. He has
fixed the standard. It is a man-made religion for
man.

WOMAN’S POSITION BEFORE ISLAM

There is much to show that Islam brought woman
into a more degraded and debased condition. Her
social status under the Arabs in the “time of igno-
rance” was higher than after Mohammed. Prof.
Robertson Smith says (“Kinship and Marriage
in Ancient Arabia,” p. 100): “It is very remarkable
that the place of woman in the family and in society
has steadily declined under his [Mohammed’s] law.
… The Arabs themselves recognize that the posi-
tion of woman has fallen.” Similarly Stanley Lane-
Poole testifies (“Studies in a Mosque,” p. 23): “In
the desert woman was regarded as she has never since
been viewed by Moslems. The modern haram sys-
tem was undreamt of; the maid of the desert was un-
fettered by the ruinous restrictions of modern life
in the East. She was free to choose her husband and
to bind him to have no other wife than herself. She
might receive male visitors, even strangers, without
suspicion.” Dr. Zwemer corroborates this, saying
(“Islam, etc.,” p. 6): “The use of the veil was almost
unknown in Arabia before Islam, nor did the haram

system prevail.” At the present time the same fact
is seen. In the East Indies and some parts of Africa
the advent of Islam brings further degradation to
woman. Professor Westermann says: “The posi-
tion of woman among the Shilluks [heathen of the
Sudan] is no doubt a higher one than with most
Mohammedan people of the Sudan. She is shown re-
markable respect. Women sometimes take part in
public assemblies with the men, discuss affairs, share
in the dances and religious ceremonies.” In these the
young men and girls meet each other face to face
and eye to eye, dancing in harmony. Dr. C. R. Wat-
son testifies that the position of woman seems in-
variably to be lowered (“The Sorrow and Hope of
the Sudan,” p. 189): “In pagan communities a
woman, especially an unmarried woman, may go about
and be quite safe from all molestation. Not so after
the introduction of Islam … her person is safer
under paganism than under Islam.” In the Dutch East
Indies woman was held in higher esteem in pre-
Islamic days. This is evident among the recent con-
verts. It has lowered the privileges of women and
disintegrated family life. Where tribal customs
punished adultery, frowned on divorce, and confined
polygamy to the higher classes, Islam has relaxed
these beneficial customs. Especially loose divorce
has injured the position of woman. “Contempt for
woman has fallen to a point even below the zero of
moral esteem for woman in heathenism” (Simon,
p. 184). Another witness is Sir William Ramsay.
He says (“Impressions of Turkey, etc.,” p. 49):
“The Turkish tribes originally did not practise the

seclusion of women. They learned the custom from
the Arabs and the Koran.”

POLYGAMY AND DIVORCE UNDER ISLAM

What is the position of woman under orthodox
Islam? What is the attitude of the New Moslems?
The orthodox claim superiority for their law in this
as in all matters. The Muslim Review asserts that
Islam “sets a purer and more divine standard of do-
mestic life” than any other. Specifically it is claimed
that Mohammed limited polygamy, prohibited mar-
riages within certain degrees, made women heirs, pro-
hibited widows from being regarded as part of the
estate to be disposed of as chattels, gave them power
over their own property brought at the time of mar-
riage, provided for the maintenance of children and
abolished infanticide.1 Allowing due credit for what-
ever good it wrought, the facts are that Islam per-
petuated and sanctioned the degradation of women
and increased it. It allows a man four wives and as
many concubines and slave women as he can obtain.
The wives can be divorced at the whim or caprice of
the man on condition of paying over a dowry, usually
small. According to his desire he may take the di-
vorced wife back twice without condition, but after
the third divorce he cannot take her back until she
has been married and divorced by another man.
Loose divorce works more evil than polygamy. In
the street near me in Tabriz lived two men, one rich,

1 Stanley Lane-Poole (“Studies in a Mosque,” p. 24) says,
“Infanticide, which is commonly attributed to the whole Arab
race, before Islam was exceedingly rare in the desert.”

the other poor. The former, a sayid, was in the habit
of marrying pretty young girls and sending them
away with their dowry, when his fancy tired of them.
He had reached the thirtieth when I left Persia. The
poor young man astonished us more by the facility
with which he yearly took and divorced a new wife.
He only kept one at a time and apparently most of
the time had to go in debt to pay the dowry. Of
this feature of Islam, Lane in his “Modern Egyp-
tians” says (chap, vi): “While no more than one hus-
band in twenty has two wives at the same time, there
are many men who in the course of ten years have
married as many as twenty, thirty, or more wives;
and women not far advanced in age who have been
wives of a dozen or more men successively.” A Mos-
lem of prominence has affirmed that ninety-five per
cent, of Mohammedan wives in Egypt are sooner or
later divorced; in other words, only five women in a
hundred remain with their first husband. In that
same country there is one divorce to three marriages,
even though a man may keep the wife and take three
others. There is a Moslem saying that “a woman is
like an old pair of shoes; a man throws her away
and buys another as long as his money lasts.” One
youth divorced his twenty-eighth wife. He justified
himself by saying, “Why not? My father divorced
thirty-eight.”

A disgrace of Shiahism is the temporary marriage,
mutaa. Under the sanction of religion and with the
blessing of the mullah the contract wife is taken for
a day or for a year. (See author’s “Persian Life and
Customs,” p. 263.) Mrs. Major Sykes, who lived at

Meshed, brings new testimony to the prevalence of
this abomination at the Holy Shrine of the Imam
Reza, where many temporary wives are kept for the
pilgrims. She adds: “This is common throughout
the country and is a potent factor in the degradation
of the womanhood of Persia.”

This disgrace of Shiahism is surpassed by the black
stain of forcible concubinage which lies against the
Sunnis.1 Hear these vigorous words of Lane-Poole
(“Studies in a Mosque,” p. 105): “One cannot for-
get the unutterable brutalities inflicted on the con-
quered nations in the taking of slaves. The Moslem
soldier was allowed to do as he pleased with any ‘in-
fidel’ woman he might meet in his victorious march.
When one thinks of the thousands of women,
mothers, and daughters who must have suffered un-
told shame and dishonour by this license, he cannot
find words to express his horror.” Such, sanctioned
by the example of Mohammed, has been the record
since the conquest of Persia, when slave girls were a
drug in the markets of Arabia, till the days of the
Armenian Massacres and the Holy War of 1915.

THE SECLUSION OF WOMEN

Another element in the degraded condition of the
Moslem woman is her seclusion. She is confined in
the haram, behind walls and lattices, and, if means
permit, in a separate court-yard. She is veiled when
she appears on the street. This veiling is in varying

1 The disgraceful conduct of Persian Shiahs in Urumia in ab-
ducting Christian women in January, 1915, makes it necessary to
include them in this condemnation also.

degrees, reaching its extreme in Persia, where the
whole person is absolutely covered, and neither the
hands, head, nor even the flash of the eye can be
seen. The jealousy of Mohammed caused the com-
mand of the Koran which requires the seclusion of
women and his example enforced it (Surah XXXIII,
55). Dr. Watson writes: “Where faith in chastity
ended, the seclusion of women began.” Mohammed’s
order for veiling is sometimes attributed to the Zaid-
Zainab incident. Persians say that one day Moham-
med was seated with Ayesha, when a passing Arab,
admiring her beauty, offered Mohammed a camel
in exchange for her, and this produced the order for
veiling. He formed into law customs which pertained
previously to kings and grandees, so that they became
as the will of God. Only Kurds, Beduins, and wild
tribes among Moslems have disregarded the law. In
India many women never leaves their harams. One
caliph in Egypt even prohibited the making of shoes
for women, that they might not be able to go out of
doors. A man does not allude to his wife in conver-
sation nor inquire for yours. If under some neces-
sity to mention her, he uses a euphemism as “the
mother of Zaid” or “the children.” The effect of
this seclusion is to limit the mental development of
women, to cramp and crush their lives. The inviola-
bility of the haram is even made a plea to prevent
proper sanitation and quarantine in case of cholera
and plague. It has an injurious effect on the children
and is answerable for the lower intelligence and slow
progress of the men. The mothers are incapable of
the best training of the children. Sir William Ram-

say (“Impressions, etc., p. 41) says: “In the condi-
tion of the Turkish women lies the reason for the
steady degeneration of the Turkish people. They are
poorer both in physique and mind than the Christians,
—a stunted and impoverished motherhood produces a
poor and diminishing people.”

Some Moslems maintain that the seclusion of their
women is an advantage—that it conduces to their hap-
piness, the continuance of the marriage union, re-
moves causes of jealousy, and protects females from
insult. One of them said in jocose vein, “No Mos-
lem sees any woman save his own wife, so he thinks
her the prettiest one that lives.”

NEO-ISLAM ON WOMAN

What is the attitude of New Moslems to woman
and her position in the family and in society? It is
truly remarkable and is a radical departure from
traditional Islam. The movement advocates freedom
for women. I will first notice modern interpreta-
tions and opinions with reference to woman and then
some changes which are evident in her condition in
Moslem lands.

The position of Neo-Islam in India is strongly
stated by Sayid Amir Ali in his books, “Mohamme-
dan Law” (Preface, and pp. 21, 159, 226) and the
“Legal Position of Woman in Islam.” He declares
that polygamy is not a part of Islam, that “the law
forbids a second union during the subsistence of the
former contract.” He argues that since the Koran
requires that the husband should deal justly and
equally with his several wives, and since fulfilment of

this requirement is an impossibility, it amounts to a
prohibition. He pronounces polygamy an unendur-
able and unmitigated evil, which must necessarily
cease to exist. He says (“Spirit of Islam,” p. 365):
“I look upon polygamy in the present day as an adul-
terous connection and contrary to the spirit of Islam
—an opinion which is shared by a large number of
Moslems.” He and other modernists deny the law of
divorce or repudiation as held and practised by Mos-
lems, and argue that Mohammed meant that divorce
should be founded on the charge of adultery and
should be carried out only by granting a regular bill
of divorcement and also that the seclusion of women
was a recommendation, not a law obligatory and per-
petual. A modified view is taken by Sheikh Abdul
Kadir, who says: “The Koran recommends the man
to restrict himself to one wife and imposes on the
polygamous the obligation of treating his alike and
equitably. By these difficulties which the law
throws in his way very rarely can a man venture to
do it, unless he is drawn to it by extreme necessity
such as barrenness or sickness of his wife, or his ab-
sence from home or unless he is a voluptuary or, like
the holy patriarch, through a desire to multiply the
human species. Another learned Mohammedan
leader put on the title-page of his book the words,
“Listen to me, if your ears are not deaf; on no ac-
count marry two wives, for a man has not two hearts
in his breast” (“Vital Forces,” p. 173).

A Moslem writer in the Journal of Reformed
Islam strenuously combats the use of the veil and pre-
sents many reasons for its abolition (Margoliouth’s

“Mohammedanism,” p. 136). In the female educa-
tional section of the Moslem League in India, Maulvi
Shibli maintained from an Islamic point of view
equality of rights and opportunity for woman; and
others agreed with him. Some held that seclusion in
the haram is a custom, not a command of religion;
that the Koran commanded the Prophet’s wives only
should be veiled and secluded. Though the Koran
says (Surah IV, 8): “Men are superior to women
on account of the qualities with which God has gifted
the one above the other,” yet Justice Abdur Rahim
of India says: “God has endowed women with intel-
lectual gifts as much as men. Islamic laws accord
the same status to women as men,” and that Moslems
“are proud of the liberal spirit of their religion and
laws.”

These modernist interpretations do not change our
conception of what real Islamic law is. Their casuis-
try does not alter the historic Shariat nor convince us
contrary to facts. But it is deeply significant that this
effort is made to reconcile the Shariat with modern
ideas. It indicates progress of thought in Islam.

MOSLEM WOMEN’S POSITION IMPROVING

Significant also is the modification in practice with
regard to woman. Her day of emancipation is per-
ceptibly nearer. Regarding polygamy, testimony is
practically unanimous that it is declining. Combined
with the growing feeling that it is unlawful or inex-
pedient, many extraneous circumstances are tending
to root it out from among Moslems. “Large num-
bers place in the marriage contract a formal renuncia-

tion on the part of the husband of any right to con-
tract a second contemporaneous marriage.”

In India not more than three per cent of the Mos-
lems are polygamous. In Egypt monogamy has been
gaining ground (Cromer: “Modern Egypt;” Gif-
fen: “Islam and Missions,” p. 297). Ismiel Khedive
had many wives and concubines. His successor Tew-
fik had but one. The last Khedive had but one for
many years, but later took a second, a Christian
woman whom he turned into a Moslem. The Khe-
dive Tewfik said to De Guerville: “The custom of
having several wives is rapidly disappearing. The
principal reasons are the abolition of slavery and the
increased cost of living.” Of Turkey Sir Edwin
Pears declares (p. 68): “The habit of having more
wives than one is decreasing. The influence of the
West is having its effect.” The Young Turks are
almost all monogamists. In Persia no doubt the same
tendency is at work, though I can hardly endorse the
opinion of Mrs. Major Sykes (“Persia and Its Peo-
ple,” p. 75), that “polygamy is becoming rare in
Iran. Persians speak of it as unfashionable.” This
is to be attributed partly to poverty and partly to the
worry of rival wives; according to the proverb, “Two
tigresses in a house are better than two mistresses.”

Woman is also being released from her seclusion,
slowly but surely. Fortunately in certain outlying
countries of Islam, it has not yet succeeded in shutting
up woman in the haram. This is true in Malaysia.
There primitive customs continue and woman is per-
mitted to go about freely and unveiled, and to con-
verse with men who are not relatives. In China, too,

women do not live in seclusion nor wear the veil.
Yet they do not go to the mosque. They bind their
feet like the Chinese heathen women. In Russia Mos-
lem women have greater freedom than under their
own rulers. Some have adopted certain Christian so-
cial customs, like receiving men visitors, riding about
and travelling with their husbands. They are trained
in the Russian gymnasia and normal schools and
universities, teach school, practise medicine, are ad-
mitted to the bar, hold conventions, and have the te-
merity to request the ballot in the Communes. This
movement is widely extended, on the Volga, in the
Crimea and Caucasus, and even among the Kirghiz
(International Review of Missions, 1915, p. 39; Mos-
lem World, 1914, p. 264). In India a society of
young men has been organized with the object of do-
ing away with the veil. They are making a propa-
ganda to this end. A bride and groom lately drove
off in a vehicle together, the bride with her face un-
covered. Freedom, which has become common
among Hindu and Parsee women, is scarcely allowed
among Moslems, who have been largely responsible
for much of the seclusion which has existed among
the others. Yet a Conference of Moslem ladies has
met at the same time and place as the men’s Educa-
tional Conference, to promote the education of girls.

In Egypt agitation for the freedom of woman is
active. A leader in this movement was the late
Kasim Bey Amin, whose books, “The Emancipation
of Woman,” “The New Woman,” and “The Veil,”
have been eagerly read by men and women alike. In
these writings twentieth-century ideas of woman are

advocated and the evil effects of Moslem customs are
set forth. A society for the abolition of the veil is
working. The debate in the press, pro and con, is
active and full of vim. The old and the new are clash-
ing in discussion. But as yet even those women who
have been educated in Europe must conform to cus-
tom and live in seclusion. An exception was the Prin-
cess Nazli Fazil Khanum, a descendant of Moham-
med Ali Pasha, who refused to be bound by the re-
strictions of the haram and mixed freely in the so-
ciety of men and women, yet retained the respect of
the devotees of Islam. She was very proficient in
Arabic, Turkish, English, and French. She resided
in Paris and other European capitals as wife of the
Turkish Ambassador Khallil Pasha Sherif. After
his death her house in Cairo became a celebrated
salon, where many great men and ladies were received
with honour. Her conversational powers were of a
high order and her influence on politics elevating.
She was an ardent advocate of freedom and her words
had power in Turkey as well as in Egypt.

In Persia discussion prevails, but with little change
as yet. A woman who, some years ago in Tabriz,
ventured in the street with the semi-veil of Constanti-
nople, was promptly warned by the Mujtahid that if
she did so again, she would be beaten. The girls’
schools, either native or mission, are scarcely securely
established outside of the Capital. Girls do not at-
tend with boys as in Turkey. For a girl to appear on
the platform of the Mission School, even thickly
veiled, to receive her diploma, was a great innovation
in Teheran. The contrast with the Christian girls

caused some comment in the Persian newspapers
showing that they had aspirations for freedom for
their girls. During the Revolution, Persian women
organized patriotic clubs and secret societies, a dozen
or more of them, in the Capital, and watched keenly,
even with veiled eyes, the course of events. They
were ardent supporters of liberty, acting as inform-
ants for Mr. Morgan Shuster, intriguing for the Con-
stitutional party. At the final crisis the veiled women
invaded the House of Parliament, daggers in hand,
and threatened the deputies if they yielded the liber-
ties of their country.

In Turkey the movement for the emancipation of
woman has made definite progress. Sultan Abdul
Hamid did not repress female education, evidently
thinking woman a negligible factor. In Constanti-
nople and the coast cities, the education of girls made
considerable progress. Until they are eight or ten
years of age they are allowed to go with the boys.
Some families have had European governesses from
whom the girls learned European languages and im-
bibed European ideals. For some this was a means
of excellent culture, for others the result was a mim-
icry of French styles in dress and a taste for reading
of romances. One of these governesses afterwards
opened up a private school for Moslem girls in Beirut.
It was patronized by the well-to-do of the city. The
result of the Christian spirit in the school was so
great upon the girls and their training so effective in
character, that during the period of several score
years, in which many of the girls became wives of
Moslems, not one of them was divorced and not one

of them had the humiliation of having a companion
wife brought to vex her. Constantinople (American)
College was not permitted to receive Moslem girls in
Abdul Hamid’s time. One, however, Halidah Salih,
daughter of the Sultan’s treasurer, finished her course
of study. She is proficient in French and English,
and has become a writer of distinction and the “lead-
ing woman in Turkey in popularity and influence.”
For her first book, a translation of “The Mother in
the Home,” she was decorated by the Sultan. Her
articles frequently appear in the press. She wears a
veil in public, but is unveiled before men in her own
house. She is a member of the Young Turk Com-
mittee of Union and Progress, and was marked as a
victim in the counter-revolution, but was not found
by the assassins. Another advanced Turkish woman
is Balkis Shevket Khanum, up-to-date editor of the
Kadinlar Dunyasi (The Woman’s World) of Con-
stantinople. To be up with man in everything, she
took a flight in an aeroplane with Fathi Bey. The
paper had in one issue a front-page illustration of a
group of unveiled Moslem women. Later the paper
was suppressed. The educated Turkish women took
a special part in the Revolution. Their reading had
led them to deep sympathy with liberty and progress.
Being largely exempted from the espionage from
which men suffered so much, they were able to aid
the cause greatly. After the downfall of despotism,
the women had a taste of freedom. Some appeared
unveiled, rode with open face in carriages and walked
about at the watering places and parks, made speeches
in the hall of the University, formed clubs and circles

for discussion and enlightenment, corresponded with
the newspapers, and even organized two feminist
journals. Yet, according to the best testimony (Sir
Edwin Pears, p. 66), they acted with modesty and
discretion and their speech showed remarkable cul-
ture and wisdom. Yet the shock to the conservatism
of Islam was too great, and a handle was given the
reactionaries to work against Constitutionalism. An
order was therefore issued by the Commandant of
the city: “Whereas women are forbidden to go in
public places in costumes unbecoming with reference
to national customs and Moslem morals, those who
infringe this regulation will be arrested by detective
agents and severely punished, according to the laws.”
So restraint was put upon the women but not success-
fully, as appears from the journal Tasfiri Efkiar
(Orient), September 6, 1914. It says: “Certain
of our women, not appreciating the situation, and in
spite of reiterated orders from the military authori-
ties, dress themselves in an unsuitable way and one
calculated to seriously offend the religious sentiments
and national customs. In the name of the well-being
of the country we call upon the military authorities
to make a few exemplary punishments.” Professor
Cheyne (“Reconciliation of Races and Religions,” p.
116) mentions that forty of the boldest women were
arrested and exiled to Acca. I have seen no confir-
mation of this report. When telephones were intro-
duced, of one hundred or more operators, seven
were Moslem girls. It is said they became clerks, not
because of necessity, for they were daughters of of-
ficials, but to open the way for Moslem women to en-

gage in honest labour. They do not wear the char-
shab. During the Balkan war the women held and
addressed large mass-meetings, and acted as nurses
of the Red Crescent. The establishment of homes on
Christian or Western models is set before them as a
desideratum. The old haram life is no longer con-
sidered praiseworthy nor commendable. In Syria,
too, much the same condition prevails. Men are no
longer willing to marry a bride unseen. It has be-
come the habit to advocate the elevation of women
and to strive for the amelioration of social life. The
injunction of the Koran to scourge refractory wives,
interpreted by the Shariat to mean that he shall not
give her less than three nor more than thirty lashes,
is one of which the modern Moslem is somewhat
ashamed. Already the switch has replaced the bas-
tinado—the switch itself has dry rot. Effort is also
being made in Turkey to put down the white-slave
traffic. A Turkish newspaper says (The Moslem
World, 1914, p. 268): “The East will not be elevated
until woman is elevated and restored to the position
she once occupied. The fall of Moslem womanhood
has been the great reason for the fall of the whole na-
tion, and her education and uplift are necessary if the
nation is to regain its lost position.”

THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY AMONG MOSLEMS

The Koran and the Shariat definitely ordain and
regulate slavery, yet the abolition of slavery and the
slave trade is going steadily forward in Islam. This
is largely due to the influence of Christian govern-
ments. But the effort commends itself to the con-

science of modern Moslems. In those lands directly
under Christian rule the abolition has been accom-
plished. An act of the Indian Legislature abolished
slavery in 1843. In 1877 Lord Vivian entered into
a convention with the Egyptian Government forbid-
ding the slave trade or the sale of slaves from family
to family, providing for the gradual manumission
of slaves and for the right of the slave to claim his
liberty through the government. Slave-trade in the
Egyptian Sudan was suppressed after many years of
effort; slavery is being superseded by paid service. It
was ended in Zanzibar in 1897 and nominally in Af-
ghanistan in 1895 by treaty. Persia has entered into
treaty for its abolition. Russia has accomplished the
same among her Moslem subjects and, by treaty, in
Khiva and Bukhara. The Osmanlis enslaved many
from the Christian races of the Balkans, of the Greeks
and Armenians. Less than two hundred years ago
they carried off one hundred thousand German and
Magyar woman in a single campaign. By the Consti-
tution of 1876 slavery was abolished in Turkey. In
1890 the Sultan signed the declaration of the Anti-
slavery Conference, held at Brussels, by seventeen na-
tions, “of a firm intention to put an end to the crimes
and devastation engendered by traffic in African
slaves.” Renewal of the Constitution in 1908
brought the abolition again into effect. Though slav-
ery still exists, both of concubines and eunuchs, it is
gradually being brought to an end. The auction of
slaves still continues in the public square of Mecca
and existed in Morocco till French occupation. To
supply these marts and the secret traffic the trade still

goes on in Central Africa (Professor Westermann,
International Review of Missions, 1913, p. 481).
In 1909, pilgrim caravans via Molfi, Western Sudan,
carried through nearly three thousand women and
children to be sold as slaves. It appears, however,
that slavery will be brought to a close in Islam. There
will be no modification of the Shariat, but the expense,
the cessation of war captives, the force of moral sen-
timent are all working with the influence of Christian
governments to accomplish its complete abolition.

MODERNISM AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

Neo-Islam professes to stand for religious liberty
and it is no doubt more liberal than the orthodox
party. But the words of its expounders are far from
the ideal. Justice Amir Ali, after a long defence of
Mohammedanism in an historical view, concludes:
“We deny altogether that Islam ever grasped the
sword for the purpose of proselyting. Islam never
persecuted” (“Life of Mohammed,” pp. 212-15).
If such is the decision of an enlightened, anglicized
High Justice of British India—a reformer—we may
well despair of any appeal to history in reasoning with
a Moslem. Yet notwithstanding this, there is un-
doubtedly among the New Moslems a modification
of the fanatical spirit. Practically they do have a
more friendly feeling to Christians. Not only in In-
dia, but in Teheran, in Beirut, in Constantinople, in
Cairo, there are tens of thousands who do not believe
in injuring the Moslem converted to Christianity, who
would not lift a finger to execute the law which de-
crees death to the apostate. There is a wide preva-

lence of the spirit of toleration. There has been a
marked change, a change encouraging to Christian
missions. The mental attitude of intelligent Mos-
lems has been modified. This change may be due
partly to indifference, partly to the relaxing of his
own faith, partly to his enlightenment and a real ap-
preciation of the right of the individual conscience
to decide its belief. Many Young Turks and Persian
Nationalists have personally clear conceptions of and
belief in liberty of conscience, did not questions of
politics and national aspirations get inextricably
mixed up with religion. Persian Sufis are natural
friends of religious liberty. There are many forces
working in Islam bringing about freedom of con-
science. Even the Ulema of Turkey, says Sir Edwin
Pears (p. 395), “are beginning to be under the in-
fluence of Western ideas, and the day is coming when
even the ignorant Moslem will not consider it meri-
torious to kill a Christian. … There is promise of
continued though slow improvement.”

THE FUTURE OF NEO-ISLAM

I have considered Neo-Islam in detail,—a move-
ment which aims to adopt Western science and educa-
tion, change the status of woman, and bring Moslem
law into conformity to Western civilization. What
will be the effect of this movement? Will Islam be
changed? Will it be freed from the shackles of tra-
dition and brought into conformity to modern
thought? It is impossible to reach an absolute con-
clusion. Undoubtedly there is a trend towards trans-
formation. Regarding many Islamic peoples, this

opinion rests upon impressions made upon observers.
Even in India, where there is much more public dis-
cussion and publication of views, competent witnesses
differ as to the conditions. Rev. W. A. Wilson de-
clares (“Islam and Missions,” p. 149), that the
New Islam largely moulds Mohammedan thought.
On the other hand, Canon Sell thinks that the in-
fluence of the movement is waning and conservatism
is reviving.

Lord Cromer expresses strong doubts of the pos-
sibility of Islam reforming. The difficulty of bring-
ing Islam and its ways into harmony with modern
society is comparable to squaring the circle, in his
judgment. He says (“Modern Egypt,” Vol. II, p.
184): “Let no practical politician think that he has
a plan capable of resuscitating a body which is not in-
deed dead, and which may yet linger on for centuries,
but which is nevertheless politically and socially mori-
bund, and whose decay cannot be arrested by any
modern palliatives however skilfully they may be ap-
plied.” “One could not make the Egyptian horse
drink of the waters of civilization, albeit the most
limpid streams of reform were turned into the trough
before him. It has yet to be proved that Islam can
assimilate civilization without succumbing in the
process. It is not improbable that in its passage
through the European crucible, many of the distinc-
tive features of Islam, the good and the bad alike,
may be volatilized, and that it will eventually issue
forth in a form scarcely capable of recognition.”
Thus after wavering, he reaches the conclusion that
Islam will probably change, but he adds: “It should

never be forgotten that Islam cannot be reformed,
that is to say, that Islam reformed is Islam no longer.
It is something else, and we cannot tell yet what it
eventually will be” (pp. 175, 161). Professor Mac-
Donald expects modifications in Islam, and says (In-
ternational Review of Missions, 1913, p. 597): “It
is never well to underestimate the strange power that
a religion has of transforming itself in adaptation to
new situations.” Similarly Professor Margoliouth
says (“Mohammedanism,” p. 224): “What is to be
expected is not the supersession nor the abolition of
Islam, but its accommodation to the conditions im-
posed upon the world by European science.” May
we not suppose that a reformed Islam will bear such
a relation to the Koran and the Traditions as Re-
formed Judaism bears to the Torah and the Talmud?
It will bear the name and heritage of Islam, acknowl-
edge its creed and book, and have an anti-Christian
spirit, whatever may be its change of methods and
weapons. Christianity can expect no spiritual vic-
tory by the forces of civilization. As Islam opened
its doors to take in and take on Greco-Syrian and
Persian civilizations and showed itself capable of
adapting itself to the higher condition in Bagdad and
Spain and bearing fruit by this grafted culture, so it
may do again. Whether Islam is being changed or
not, it is certain that Moslems are changing. Num-
bers of them have broken away from the old tradi-
tions and practices. They stoutly maintain that they
are Moslems, and will likely continue to do so. But
their old adherence to Islam as a body of laws for the
state, as a hard-and-fast rule for social life, is pass-

ing. The universal sway of fanaticism, the belief in
the obligation to persecute, is going. There are few
signs of the rejection of Islam as an outward profes-
sion. But more and more a condition is being reached
in which the community will divide into religious, in-
different, and irreligious—a condition in which those
who wish to, can openly neglect the rites of religion
and be unmolested, when those who allegorize or ra-
tionalize the Koran and its system shall be held ac-
countable to no court or judge and physical penalties
shall not be inflicted for unbelief nor a new belief.
There will be open toleration within Islam, to be fol-
lowed by open acquiescence in apostasy from Islam.
Popular opinion has accepted this in many places un-
der Christian rule, and is not far from accepting it
in some communities under Moslem rule. New Islam
in practice has wider acceptance than as a system of
doctrines. Dr. Young of Aden takes a most hope-
ful view (“Islam and Missions,” p. 126): “The
time has come,” he says, “for a general advance, and
when that advance begins, the cleavage in Islam will
widen and a new form of Islam will arise with subtler
doctrines and purer life,” but, he adds with mission-
ary vision, “even that must finally give way before
the higher life of true Christianity.” Expecting this
consummation, we must sow the seed of Christian
truth. It is a critical time for Islamic peoples. The
call is for strenuous effort to direct the thought and
conscience of Moslems to the Source of true reform.

VIII

POLITICAL MOVEMENTS AMONG
MOSLEMS

IN the political world of Islam the most striking
fact is the subjection of Moslem lands to Chris-
tian rule. The phrase “the disintegration of
Islam” is sometimes used, but whether Islam is dis-
integrating may be questioned, yet of the disintegra-
tion of the empire of Islam there is no doubt. This
movement had begun before the last century in the
freeing of Spain, Hungary, and Russia from Moslem
dominion, yet this was rather an escape of Christian
countries from subjection. This latter period has
been characterized not only by further liberation of
Christian peoples, but by the conquest and subjection
of Moslem peoples (see table on p. 219) by Christian
governments. Moslem lands in Africa have passed
under Christian sway; its vast territory is divided.
Its European empire has decreased to a small strip,
and the present war will likely result in pulling down
the Star and the Crescent from the last stronghold of
Islam in Europe—the beautiful, the unique city of
Constantinople. Even Persia is but semi-independent,
being divided into spheres of influence between
Russia and Great Britain. The rapidity of this de-
cline may be seen in the striking contrast between the
present condition and that existing when I went to

Persia. At that time Rev. Dr. H. H. Jessup stated
before the General Assembly that 50 millions out of
the 175 millions of Moslems, or twenty-nine per cent,
were under Christian rule. Now there are 170 mil-
lions, or eighty-five per cent, under Christian rule,
and only seventeen per cent under Moslem rule. Rus-
sia, France, and Holland each rule over many more
Moslems than does the Sultan of Turkey, and Great
Britain over five times as many. Islamic rulers hold
sway over but one twenty-second part of the earth’s
surface, while Christian Powers rule over nineteen
twenty-seconds. The sword-arm of Islam is withered,
its mighty empire has faded away. Pan-Islamism
cannot save it; the jihad cannot save it; the old battle-
cry, “Allah Akbar” (“God is Great”), cannot save
it, for God wills that its intolerant, despotic sway
should cease.

ADJUSTMENT OF MOSLEMS TO CHRISTIAN RULE

How has this condition been brought about? By
fierce and bloody wars of conquest. In this we cannot
see the spirit of Christ. Moslems have made heroic
resistance under such leaders as Sheikh Abdul Kadir
in Algeria and Schamyl in Daghestan, or of mad mul-
lahs and Mahdis. But they meet in vain the modern
armour of the European Powers. Everywhere ma-
chine-guns have been victorious against the poorly
equipped troops of Islam. Their courageous leaders,
undaunted by defeat, have either fallen in vain attack
or languished in exile as pensioners of the conquerors.
Sometimes these conquests have been made in ruth-
less disregard of the rights of humanity and with too

TABLE OF TERRITORY FREED FROM ISLAMIC RULE
SINCE 1800
DATE COUNTRY OR PROVINCE To WHOM CEDED
I. Caucasus and Transcaucasus

1800 Georgia from Persia Russia
1813 Darband, Shirwan, Baku, Karadagh from Persia
Russia
1813 Sovereignty of Caspian Sea from Persia Russia
1828 Erivan, Nakhejevan, etc., from Persia Russia
1829 Poti, Anapa, and Circassian coast from Turkey Russia
1878 Batum, Kars, Ardahan from Turkey Russia
II. Central Asia

1844 Kirghiz Russia
1864 Samarcand Russia
1868 Khohand and Bukhara Russia
1873 Khiva Russia
1881 Merv Russia
1891 Part of Khorassan from Persia Russia
III. Southern Asia

1799 Nizam's Dominions, India Great Britain
1803 Mogul Empire, India Great Britain
1824 Straits Settlements Great Britain
1830 Dutch Rule consolidated
Holland
1839 Aden and Arabian Coast Great Britain
1843 Sinde, India Great Britain
1849 Punjab and Kashmere Great Britain
1856 Oudh Great Britain
1876 Baluchistan Protectorate Great Britain
IV. Europe

1829 Greece and Servia granted independence
1858 Wallachia and Moldavia from Turkey Rumania
1878 Bessarabia from Turkey Russia
1878 Cyprus Great Britain
1878 Bosnia and Herzegovina (annexed 1908) Austria
1878 Greece, Servia, Montenegro, and Rumania en-
larged.
1878 Bulgaria formed from Turkey Bulgaria
1885 East Rumelia from Turkey Bulgaria
1898 Crete autonomous from Turkey
1912 Crete annexed Greece
1912 Ægean Islands from Turkey Italy
1913 Parts of Macedonia, Albania, and Islands Greece
1913 Parts of Macedonia, and Albania Servia
1913 Parts of Macedonia, Albania, and Thrace Bulgaria
1913 Part of Albania Montenegro
1913 Albania made independent
V. Africa
1830 Algeria France
1882 Tunis France
1882 Egypt (annexed 1914) Great Britain
1884-89 British East Africa Great Britain
1884-89 German East Africa Germany
1880-90 Eritrea, Somali coast Italy
1884-98 Sahara and Western Sudan France
1898 Eastern Sudan Great Britain
1909 Zanzibar Great Britain

1910 Wadai France
1912 Morocco France
1912 Morocco part to Spain
1912 Tripoli and Cyrenaica Italy

much imitation of the barbarous warfare of the Mos-
lems themselves. Neither the motives nor the meth-
ods of the conquests nor the morals of the diplomacy
which preceded, nor the frequent disregard of plighted
word given at the time of occupation or annexation,
have commended the religion of the Christians. Some
of the wars, as those against the Turks for the libera-
tion of the oppressed Christian races; of Italy in
Tripoli, blessed by the Pope; of the Balkan allies pro-
claimed by King Ferdinand as one of the Cross
against the Crescent; or when accompanied by the
destruction of a Mahdi’s tomb or the bombardment
of the shrine of an Imam, have seemed like religious
crusades, and the results have made the impression
of a triumph of Christianity over Islam rather than
that of Bulgaria or Italy or other European Power
over the Osmanlis. The result has been the increase
of century-long hatred and bitterness and of zeal and
fanaticism among Moslem races. It is a significant
fact that under Moslem rulers, Sultan and Shah, Khe-
dive and Amir, large sections of the population are
dissatisfied with the government and hostile to the
mullahs, who are oftentimes bribe-taking and un-
scrupulous administrators of the Shariat. The people
denounce them and are apparently ready to renounce
them. But when political power passes into the hands
of the Christian, taxation and policing become the
function of the foreign infidels, the powers of judging,
bastinadoing, and fleecing pass from the hands of the
mullahs; then people and priest are soon reconciled,
there is a drawing together in the common dislike of
the Frangis, religion becomes a bond of union, and,

reinforced by a nascent patriotism, issues in a strong
and zealous Islamic spirit. This was strikingly seen
in the contrast between the Caucasus and Persia be-
fore the late change. Under the rule of the Shah
and the Shari, the people were cursing king and
mullahs alike; whereas in the Caucasus the relation
between the mullahs and the Moslem people was
cordial.

Dislike to living under Christian rule has led to
the expatriation of large populations who, forsaking
land and property even in the winter’s cold, have
voluntarily exiled themselves rather than continue to
live comfortably under the rule of the Christian.
Thousands of Circassians, Abkhasians, Bosnians, and
Macedonians have thus followed the trail to Turkey.
Not a few Say ids have abandoned their North African
homes for Syria and Arabia.

The adjustment of Moslems to Christian rule has
legal difficulties. For Islam never anticipated such
a condition. It was to be a triumphant empire, always
to rule, and extending its sway further and further
till it became universal. All lands which had not
submitted to its law were Dar-ul-Harb, lands of war-
fare, against which the jihad was not only lawful but
obligatory. Its attitude towards Christian govern-
ments ought always to be one of hostility. But the
laws of Islam have yielded to major force. Moslems
have learned to live under Christian rule, either se-
cretly biding their time, though still rebellious in heart
or satisfying their consciences by bringing in new legal
definitions to justify their loyalty to infidel govern-
ments. With this purpose, explanation is made that

India is still a “land of Islam” because the rites and
laws of Islam can still be fulfilled with liberty; and that
the jihad is unlawful because there is not a reasonable
assurance of success. Even where part of the law
cannot be obeyed, necessity becomes a higher law, as
under the Austrian regulations for Bosnia and Herze-
govina, which forbid polygamy and slavery. But un-
doubtedly the spirit and law of Islam demand that the
sole allegiance of the Moslem should be to a ruler of
his own faith, and only expediency or necessity makes
him submissive to any other rule. To him race is
secondary; the Cretan who has become a Moslem is
no longer a Greek, the Pomak Bulgar is not a lover
of Bulgaria.

PARTIALITY OF COLONIAL GOVERNMENTS TO ISLAM

The utmost care is taken by the governments not
to offend the religious sensibilities nor to contravene
the customs and laws of Moslems—in vain as far as
winning their loyalty. Indeed, the steps of the colonial
governors have been so carefully ordered that they
have assisted Islam both in Asia and in Africa. Ka-
firistan (Abode of Infidels) resisted all the efforts of
the Afghans to bring them to Islam, till a political
agreement with Great Britain consigned them to the
tender mercies of their old enemies and they were
forced to accept the yoke of Mohammed. Similarly
in Russia, Father Macary went to Altai to begin a
mission among the Kirghiz. He was turned away
by Russian officials on the plea that they were too
wild and savage to be accessible to the Gospel. Mos-
lem mullahs were not forbidden to approach them and

were able to convert them to Islam. The care taken
not to offend Moslem susceptibilities has been inter-
preted by Africans and Malays as a sign of fear on
the part of Europeans and led them to believe in the
great power of Islam. This partiality was made the
subject of a special report and remonstrance in the
Edinburgh Conference. The attitude of colonial of-
ficials may be shown by some examples. Lord Curzon
voiced the mind of some in his advice to the students
of Aligarh College: “Adhere to your own religion.”
A British resident officer in the Sudan said: “My
influence is exerted to make the region Mohamme-
dan” (Dr. A. P. Sterritt, of Sudan Interior Mission).
Pagan chiefs are installed by putting on a turban, a
part of the Moslem dress, and this gives the impression
that the government wishes the pagans to become
Moslems. At times the heathen soldiers are circum-
cised, contrary to their desires, to make them accepta-
ble to their Moslem comrades. Assistants and sub-
alterns are allowed free privilege of converting the
people to Islam, while the commander or governor
from a Christian land preserves neutrality supposedly.
At Lagos, at the dedication of an expensive mosque,
the headmaster of the government school expressed
the satisfaction of the Moslems in these words: “The
British is the star in the heavens which guided Islam
to the shores of liberty. … By British protection
Islam has increased in numbers by thousands and
thousands with miraculous rapidity” (International
Review of Missions, 1914, p. 54). Another Mos-
lem has said: “God raised up the British Government
for the progress of Islam.” Heathen tribes which

withstood Islam and refused to admit its propaganda
have been overcome by European Powers and so
opened up to Moslem inroads. In Egypt government
offices and schools are open on Sunday and closed on
Friday. In Turkey, at Constantinople and Smyrna,
Christians are excused from work on Sunday; they
are kept at work in Egypt. More Moslems are heads
of villages under British rule than were under Turk-
ish rule and more Christians were in the civil service
under the old régime (C. R. Watson, “Egypt, etc.,”
pp. 92-93). A Moslem magazine, Arafate, says (C.
R. Watson, “The Valley of the Nile,” p. 208):
“Moslems will not wish to be under other than this
government which has shown itself determined to put
the law of the Koran into force. Who knows? It
will perhaps be the glory of Lord Cromer … to
resurrect the Moslem Law, which the majority of our
leaders declare without blinking to be utterly out of
date.” A journal in Constantinople notes the fact
that the “French have established nine hundred Koran
schools in which reading and recitation of passages
from the Koran are the only occupation of the pupils,
and negro fetish worshippers are being converted in
great numbers.” Islam is bolstered up and its intoler-
ance in Egypt and its pride throughout Africa is in-
creased by the partiality shown by the European con-
querors to Moslems over heathen and Christians.
Let me quote the finding of the great Edinburgh Mis-
sionary Conference (Vol. I, p. 209): “The lamentable
fact is that the tendency in the local representatives
of these foreign governments, not excepting the Brit-
ish Government (all of them professedly Christian),

is to facilitate and encourage the acceptance of the
Mohammedan religion, and to restrict and in some
cases to prevent the propagation of Christianity.”

In the Dutch East Indies there has been a change
of policy in late years. Formerly the spread of Islam
was aided greatly by the officials, whose clerks, inter-
preters, policemen, and other assistants were Malay
Moslems. Through the influence of this corps, and
the government schools, and the exclusive use of the
Malay language, Islam made great strides and most of
the forty millions who were heathen when the Dutch
took possession are now Moslems. A report says
(Missionary Review of the World, 1898, p. 360):
“The Mohammedans of Sumatra themselves believe
that Allah has given the rule to the Dutch in order
that all heathen tribes may become Mohammedan.”
No government official in Java was allowed to become
a Christian. The government built magnificent
mosques in Sumatra and Borneo, and allows rest-day
for Moslems on Friday but refuses it for Christians
on Sunday. Now, however, fair opportunity is being
given to the Christian propaganda. Graf von
Lunberg-Sturm told the Dutch officials that “for
years the policy of the Dutch Government had been
influenced by the fear that the spread of Christianity
might arouse the fanaticism of the Mohammedans,
but that short-sighted fear is gradually vanishing in
influential circles and is being more and more replaced
by the very opposite opinion, that for purely political
reasons no obstacle should be placed in the path of
missions” (Simon: “Progress, etc.,” p. 286).
There seems, moreover, to be an awakening among

governments to the danger of the Moslem advance in
Africa. The German Colonial Conference warned
of the danger and Emperor William spoke strongly
of the necessity of promoting Christianity and of
hindering the spread of Islam in Africa. It is to be
hoped that after this war and the humbling of Turkey
and the death of political Pan-Islamism, the fear of
Moslems will pass away, the attitude of truckling to
them disappear, and an open door and real neutrality
to Christian missions prevail.

DISLOYALTY OF MOSLEM SUBJECTS

Notwithstanding the care exercised not to give of-
fence, it is impossible for European governments to
win the Moslems, their confidence, and their heart
loyalty. I do not mean that individuals may not be
sincerely loyal and devoted. The ignorant populace
still believes that Islam is invincible and irresistible.
God in His own good time will put to naught the
power of its enemies. The fellahs of Turkey and
Persia are not convinced to the contrary. The
Javanese believe that the Sultan is all-powerful and
that the Christian rulers are under his sovereignty.
This accounts in the eyes of the negro heathen for
the way the European honours the Moslem. Edu-
cated Moslems are opposed to Christian governments,
for their education has brought in its train other as-
pirations. Even though weaned from their bigotry,
they have ideas of independence and self-government,
with an increased jealousy of the rulers both as for-
eigners and as anti-Moslem. There is a tendency
among Africans and Malays to look upon Islam as

the religion of the black and the brown men, and to
put hope in it as the power which in its future develop-
ment may free them from the dominion of the white
men. The Moslems in Africa are fellow-subjects with
the heathen, and both are now drawing near each
other in sympathy. The old-time enmities are passing
away. They intermarry and are bound together so-
cially. Mr. Simon says (“Progress, etc.,” pp. 39,
44-45): “There is an idea of far-reaching signifi-
cance in the modern Moslem movement. It means
the organization in the face of the European nations
—the rallying of the oppressed proletariat among the
nations in the face of the ruling Christian Powers.
… Islam parades before the people as the power
that can turn against the Europeans: it embodies the
hope of the brown race for freedom from European
supremacy.” He says that anti-European feeling is
so strong that the Malay fears to become a Christian
lest he be a Dutchman in the next world.

NATIONALISM AMONG MOSLEMS

Among the more cultured Moslem races there has
developed recently a spirit of Nationalism. The
genius of Islam, maybe, would merge all races in one
great people under one caliph, but that dream has
long since passed. It was natural that the spirit of
Nationalism which has shown itself so markedly in
Europe and has led to the renaissance of the Italians,
Greeks, and Balkan peoples should communicate itself
to Asiatics. The national aspirations of these subject
Christian races have deserved our sympathy and en-
couragement. We can sympathize with the aspira-

tions of subject Moslem races as soon as they learn
to treat other religions on an equality. The Christian
can sincerely wish well to all rightly directed efforts
for liberty. Patriotism, too, the love of country and
people as distinct from love of Islam, is a growing
feeling fostered by the new education and the per-
meation of Western ideas. The awakening of Asia
is a marked characteristic of the age. The movement
which has so marvellously affected Japan and which
has aroused China is evident among Moslem peoples.
The victory of Japan over Russia had a far-reaching
and marked effect on Asiatic peoples. Its demonstra-
tion of the fact that the Orient could face the Occi-
dent and win, sank deep into their consciousness, in-
spired them with hope, and roused them with deter-
mination to throw off the domination of Europe. The
impression on Moslem peoples was specially marked,
for they have regarded Russia as their inveterate and
irresistible enemy. The press and pulpits of Islam
took up an anti-Christian, anti-foreign propaganda
with new hopefulness. The modernists emphasized
the fact that Western science, military skill, and po-
litical institutions could be acquired and utilized en-
tirely apart from the Christian religion. “What
heathen Japan had done, could they not do with the
help of Allah?” This interest was universal. Battak
Moslems discussed how they could now expel the
Dutch. Those of India addressed the Emperor of
Japan and asked him to take the headship of Asia and
expel the Europeans. It may be remembered in this
connection that Japan, when it began to seek modern
civilization, sent a commission of investigation around

the world. They travelled through Persia and Tur-
key, but saw nothing in the Moslem capitals of
Teheran and Constantinople which they need tarry to
learn. On the other hand, Japan has given a startling
lesson to the Moslem world.

MOSLEM NATIONALISM IN INDIA

In passing in review political movements among
Moslems in the present day I will begin with the people
under the rule of Christian governments. In India
Moslems continued for a long while in sullen and
inactive subjection to the British crown. They re-
fused, as I have already indicated, to take advantage
of the modern education, by means of which the
Hindus forged ahead. Jealousy of the Hindus and
their predominance led the Moslems to give steady
support to the British Government, that by its aid they
might be able to hold their own against the encroach-
ments of the Hindus. The first Mohammedan leaders
adhered to a programme of loyalty to the British and
development under their ægis. The leaders following
Sayid Ahmad Khan were Justice Amir Ali, president
of the London-All India Moslem League; Ali Khan,
president of the Central League; His Highness Aga
Khan, chief of the Bohrah sect of Ismieliyahs of
Bombay; and the Prince of Arcot in Southern India.
This All-India Moslem League, intended to include
all sects, has provincial leagues and a council in Lon-
don designed to act upon the Imperial Government.
It has developed ardour and enthusiasm and mani-
fested considerable activity. It wishes to make a
common language for all Indian Moslems, possibly the

Urdu. The government, in a reform scheme, gave
representation to the people in the Legislative Council
and in other official bodies. Moslems took advantage
of these privileges and became members of the High
Councils. In order to be prepared for their new
status, they are seriously seeking modern education
and making progress. Of late many influences have
combined to arouse the political aspirations of the
Moslem people. The Pan-Islamic influences of the
Sultan, hajis and darvishes, the active press, the
critical condition of the Moslem world, and the rapid
influx of new political ideas have caused a sudden
change. A new party has been formed which is
strongly nationalistic. It is composed, for the most
part, of lawyers, editors, and teachers of the younger
generation. They have forced the adoption by the
Moslem Leagues of a programme calling for “po-
litical and religious unity with Turkey and the outer
Islamic world,” and for the freedom of Islamic races
and countries from the rule of alien and Christian
governments. This thesis is one upon which theo-
retically modernists and Pan-Islamists, politicians and
darvishes, editors and Ulema can agree. But later
the Nationalists, undeterred by the resignation of
their old leaders, and by the anarchistic tendencies and
outbreaks of the Hindus, reached an understanding
with the Hindu National Congress, sinking their re-
ligious differences and giving adhesion to the motto,
4 India for the Indians” (International Review of
Missions, 1914, p. 34). The newly organized League
passed resolutions severely disapproving of the course
of the British Government concerning Turkey and

Persia in 1910. The state of feeling was becoming
more embittered. Everything was critically regarded.
An example of this was seen just before the war. In
order to open a new street, a fountain which was used
for ablutions was removed. This was declared to be
an insult to Islam and was made the occasion of riot
and loss of life. The fountain was rebuilt by the gov-
ernment on a new level. The rapprochement of Mos-
lems and Hindus and adjustment of their programmes
does not indicate any widening of religious outlook,
but simply a temporary sinking of them for political
purposes. Indeed, the attitude of both races is reac-
tionary, rejecting the idea of the superiority of Chris-
tian civilization, except in physical science and its ap-
plications, and exalting the worth of all things Indian.
It opposes the movement of Neo-Islam to graft Euro-
pean law and ideas on Islam, but rather would renew
confidence in the old religion as in all things of their
own. At present all expression of criticism is under
the ban of the censor and the police, and what amounts
to martial law.

NATIONALISM IN EGYPT

Among those who withstood Napoleon in Egypt
was Mehemet Ali Bey, an Albanian. He became
Pasha of Egypt, subdued and massacred the Mame-
lukes, and established a hereditary vice-royalty, called
the Khedivate. His fourth successor, Ismiel, 1863,
followed his example in favouring the introduction of
European civilization. He established public utilities,
railways, telegraphs, manufactories, developed re-
sources, adorned the capital with parks and palaces,

and inaugurated a new system of education, including
medical institutions. His was the good fortune to
open the Suez Canal. With these externals of civ-
ilization, there was no real reform. All the splendour
caused enormous debts, so that he was not a real
blessing to his country. For the bondholders a com-
mission of investigation was ordered. Finances fell
under the control of French and British adminis-
trators. Economies were enforced. The notables
were restrained. Jealousy and dissatisfaction became
prevalent. A nationalist party began to form to op-
pose foreign control. The Khedive dismissed the
Controllers, and was himself deposed. Tewfik Khe-
dive, his successor, was unable to maintain political
equilibrium. The Nationalist movement increased in
power, taking in various classes. Its cry was “Egypt
for the Egyptians,” directed against Turkish officers
as well as against Europeans, for the army was under
Circassian or Osmanli officers who were as distasteful
as the European tax-collectors, who represented for-
eign bondholders. The movement culminated in a
revolt led by Ahmad Arabi Pasha, who stirred up
popular fanaticism to make demonstrations against the
British and French. He became a popular hero and
Minister of War. Riots took place in Alexandria.
The French and English fleets were fired on, and in
return bombarded the forts. Mob violence massacred
two thousand people, including Europeans. Great
Britain retaliated by bombarding the city, and quelled
the revolt at Tel-el-Kebir, July, 1882. Arabi Pasha
was exiled to Ceylon. Great Britain occupied Egypt
as temporary administrator. The British Government

strove, as Lord Cromer, its able representative, says
(“Modern Egypt,” Vol. II, p. 197), “to let the rays
of true civilization lighten with their sunshine even the
mud hut of the Egyptian fellah; to deliver them from
the thraldom of their oppressors; teach them that they
might be treated like human beings and have opened
to them the path that leads to moral progress and ele-
vation of thought.” British officials succeeded in free-
ing the Egyptians from the three C-s, courbash,
corvée, and corruption, which may be paraphrased
as the three F-s, flogging, forcing, and fleecing.
Great material prosperity and vast internal improve-
ments followed the Occupation. Egypt was fortunate
to have justice, security, and light taxation. I no-
ticed when I visited Cairo after leaving Constanti-
nople the difference between the conditions of the
people. Constantinople, under the repression of Abdul
Hamid, was gloomy in spirit, silent, fearful, requiring
a caution of speech which made it difficult for one
accustomed to the freedom of speech of Persia.
Cairo, in contrast with the Sultan’s capital, was light,
gay, and free. The people moved about, spoke, and
acted without restraint or fear. Popular amusements,
assemblies, literary activities, political theorizings were
freely indulged in. During the threatened invasion
of the Mahdi and the efforts for the reconquest of
the Sudan, agitation was in abeyance. But Britain’s
sincere efforts to be fair, even to the point of partiality
to the Moslem, did not succeed in winning their loy-
alty. The Nationalist movement broke out again after
a time. For the Moslem prefers oppression from one
of his own faith and race to justice and progress under

the infidel foreigner. Pan-Islamic agitation from
Turkey helped to revive Nationalism in Egypt and the
new spirit moving upon Asiatic peoples was felt there
also. Discontent and dissatisfaction grew apace;
partly from the agitation of those shut out from
former emoluments; partly from the exclusion of
Egyptians from high civil and military offices; partly
from the injustice of the capitulations which favoured
foreigners even when criminals; partly from hostility
to Christianity itself. This hostility was kept alive
not only by the Ulema, but by the Europeanized Egyp-
tians, who, often sceptical themselves, regarded Islam
as the rallying cry for nationalism. The demand was,
“Cessation of British occupation and Home-Rule.”
Khedive Abbas Hilmi was anti-English and the Coun-
cil was manipulated by the Nationalists. The Sardar,
Sir Eldon Gorst, tried a policy of accommodation and
conciliation.

Two parties, at least, existed among the National-
ists. The first and oldest was led by Ali Pasha Yusuf.
They advocated reforms and the gradual withdrawal
of Great Britain. Their newspaper was Al Moayad.
The other party was led by Kamil Pasha. He had
been educated in France, loudly denounced everything
British, and strenuously advocated immediate with-
drawal, saying, “Rather an unreformed Egypt than
one reformed by the British; rather the Turks, for
they at least are Moslems.” He was supported by the
Sultan of Turkey. Their organ was the Lcwa. The
newspapers had great influence in exciting patriotic
feeling, for while few of the people can read, story-
tellers in the villages read and re-read the papers to

groups. The movement was directly encouraged by
the Minister of Education. Anglophobia was ram-
pant in the schools, especially the School of Law.
The Club of High Schools, founded for educational
purposes, was turned into an organization of the Na-
tionalist party. Students were continually involved in
criminal investigations. Of the graduate Nationalist,
W. N. Willis gives the following description (quoted
in The Near East, from “Anti-Christ in Egypt”):
“He is half-educated and wholly superficial. He is
a nuisance to himself and a worry to everybody else.
Many of the foreign consuls play upon his vanity by
sympathizing with him—with their tongues well
planted in their cheeks. They simply make a tool of
him in order to breed trouble and discontent.”

Nationalist agitation reached a climax when, in
February, 1910, Boudros Pasha, the Prime Minister
and a Copt, an able supporter of British administra-
tion, was assassinated by Wardani. The power of
Moslem fanaticism appears in the fatva or decree of
the Grand Mufti, that Wardani should not be ex-
ecuted—(1) because he killed with a revolver, and
Moslem law has said nothing about such a murder,
(2) because the government entered process, and by
Moslem law it should have been done by the rela-
tives, (3) because it is not a capital crime for a
Moslem to kill a Christian. Wide sympathy for the
assassin existed among the Egyptians. It was at this
time that Former President Roosevelt passed through
Egypt on returning from Central Africa. In an ad-
dress at the University in Cairo he strongly con-
demned the murder. The Nationalists were greatly

enraged, and hundreds of them made a demonstration
against him, shouting, “Down with Roosevelt!”
“Down with the Occupation!” The Copts have
been alienated from the Nationalist party, whose cry,
“Egypt for the Egyptians,” is more truly, Egypt for
the Moslems. The Nationalism attaches itself to Islam
and does not include in its scope the real Egyptians,
the Copts, who are six hundred thousand, or one-
tenth of the people, and proportionately the more in-
telligent. Indeed, it is said that a large proportion of
the Nationalists were of Turkish, Kurdish, Circassian,
and Syrian extraction. Moslem fanaticism has even
awakened in the Christians a fear for their personal
safety. The British Government awoke to the neces-
sity of action and sent Lord Kitchener to be Sardar
with an iron policy. A press law was enforced with
severe penalties. Offending editors were dealt with.
Among these was Sheikh Abdul Aziz Shawish. He
was a graduate of Al Azhar, lecturer on Arabic at
Oxford, Inspector in the Egyptian Ministry of Edu-
cation, an able writer and editor and a contributor to
Nationalist journals. He was fiercely anti-English,
and was for a while imprisoned for libel and sedition.
Some editors fled to Geneva and Paris. There they
published a paper called El Kisas (“The Punish-
ment”). Its spirit is shown in its exalting the as-
sassin of Boudros Pasha to the rank of hero and
patriot.

The Turkish Revolution of 1908 strengthened Na-
tionalism in Egypt. The Young Turks actively pro-
moted it, and the Ottoman High Commissioner, who
represented the Sultan, had no occupation but to carry

on intrigues and to try to inflame the spirit. Though
Egypt was neutral in the war in Tripoli, yet Egyptians
helped the Turks. A significance incident showed that
Nationalism is not love for the Turks. Among those
who assisted Turkey in Cyrenaica was the Egyptian
Aziz Ali Bey. After the war he was court-martialled
in Constantinople through the jealousy of Enver
Pasha and Sheikh Shawish and condemned to death.
The unjust sentence was protested against by the united
voice of the Egyptian press and people, seconding the
efforts of the two governments, and was accompanied
by a vehement outburst of anger against the Turks
until he was freed. Lord Kitchener, with severity,
combined efforts to satisfy the people. He specially
strove to relieve the condition of the fellahs by just
laws, by supervision and restraint of the landlords,
and by postal savings banks freeing them from
usurers. A delegation of Egyptians presented in Lon-
don a petition for increase of rights. Shortly after-
wards the powers of self-government were enlarged.
In lieu of the Legislative Council, established in 1883,
a Legislative Assembly was inaugurated in 1914. It
consisted of 66 members elected by the people and 23
nominated by the government, including 6 ministers
and representatives of the Beduins, Copts, Jews, and
special classes. It has power of initiating legislation.
When the present war began, opinion was divided.
Some feared that they might fall into the hands of
Germany if England were defeated. When Turkey
proclaimed a Holy War a wave of sympathy passed
over the people. The Khedive Abbas Hilmi was in
Constantinople. He had been anti-British. He had

even refused to preside at cabinet meetings, and
through his intrigues had involved many princes, so
that they exiled themselves. His attempt to sell the
Mariut Railway to foreigners had almost brought
about his deposition. He remained in Constantinople
and accepted appointment to go with the Turkish army
against the British. In consequence of all this, Great
Britain, on December 18, 1914, declared Egypt a
British protectorate, repudiating Turkish sovereignty.
Prince Husain Kamil, second son of Ismiel Pasha,
was proclaimed ruler of Egypt, with the title of
Sultan. Martial law was declared, and the arrival
of British armies made further Nationalist manifesta-
tions inopportune. Only the students of the High
School have dared to show their spirit by “cutting”
attendance when Sultan Husain visited their institu-
tion, and some anarchists by twice attempting his as-
sassination.

ARABS AND ALBANIANS

Concerning the spirit of Nationalism in other coun-
tries of North Africa or in Russia and Central Asia,
all that is necessary has been said under the Pan-
Islamic movement. Political agitation has not been
permitted to show itself so openly in those countries.
Even Moslem countries under Moslem rulers of a dif-
ferent race have strongly manifested Nationalism.
The Arabs have been in a continual ferment against
Turkish domination and have made many revolts.
The Kurds, under Sheikh Obeidullah, in 1880, formu-
lated a programme of independence. The Albanians
have shown a strenuous resistance to Ottomanization,

even the Moslem Albanians (1,500,000) appearing to
put race before religion. It is possible some of them
are secret Christians, both men and women, and that
they maintain Christian practices secretly (Pears:
“Turkey and Its People,” p. 173). They say that
they were made Mohammedans by compulsion and
have no loyalty to Mohammed. Rev. C. T. Erickson
says (Missionary Review, 1913, p. 322): “I am con-
vinced, having it from the people themselves, that
once they are free from the Turkish yoke, off goes the
Moslem yoke also.” Dr. J. L. Barton testifies to the
same effect: “When an Albanian chief was asked if
he was not a Mohammedan, he denied the fact with
great emphasis. He said Albanians had no love for
the Turks nor for Mohammedanism, and that no rea-
son exists why they should not accept Christianity.”
But it seems doubtful whether the national spirit will
unite the Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Moslem
Albanians in political solidarity.

HOW CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATION AFFECTS MOSLEM
LANDS

I turn now to consider Moslem lands which are po-
litically independent. It is remarkable how they are
under the influence of Christian civilization. Their
economic dependence has been a prelude to their ab-
sorption of social and political ideas. Just a para-
graph about this economic relation. Turkey and
Persia look to Europe for public utilities, as railways,
tramways, telephones, telegraphs; for internal devel-
opment, as mining, irrigation, and engineering; for
weapons for the jihads—cannon, muskets, cruisers,

and aeroplanes; for gold and silver for their money,
for machines to mint it, safes to hold it,
purses to carry it, loans to replenish it; for
window glass, lamps and matches to light their
mosques, compasses to show the kibla of prayer, and
watches to tell their times of worship, and for paper
on which their Korans and prayers and charms are
written, and for stamps to send their letters; for their
spectacles and teeth and drugs and hardware and
dishes and knives and forks and an indefinite supply
of their needs. For much the Islamic world is
indebted to the Christian. It is even adopting the
style of dress, the shoes, the brushes, the kaloshes,
the umbrellas of the Christian, and the Sherif of
Mecca rides on the day of pilgrimage on a saddle,
made in Europe, of pig-skin (Keane: “Six Months
in Mecca”).

In all departments of science the Moslems are bor-
rowers from the Christian world, and very profitably
in medicine. But more remarkable is their readiness
to learn in politics, law, and statecraft, in which they
have a Koran, a Shariat, and a Khalifa to guide them.
Nothing has more surprised the world than the Con-
stitutional movements in Persia and Turkey. Even
Afghanistan is undergoing remarkable changes in
thought and “Young Afghans” are ambitious for a
liberal government. Amir Habib Ullah is inclined to
reforms in the administration. His visit to India in-
creased his desire for progress.

POLITICAL REFORMS IN PERSIA

Political reforms in modern Persia were first at-
tempted by Mirza Taki Khan, the celebrated vizier of
Nasr-ud-Din Shah (1848-52). This man, sprung
from the common people, was of sterling integrity,
scorning bribes and flattery. He succeeded for a time
in bringing about a reform of abuses and of the cor-
ruption of official life. The sale of offices was abol-
ished, the absurd civil pension roll cut down, oppres-
sion of the peasants restrained, the use of bombastic
titles discountenanced, the sea slave trade prohibited,
the interference of foreign legations in the internal
affairs of Persia was discountenanced. The power of
the mullahs in political affairs was restrained, the right
of asylum was taken away from the Mujtahids, pop-
ular fanaticism was frowned upon, especially as ex-
hibited and incited by the Muharram ceremonies. But
the jealousy and opposition of the reactionaries was
too much for him. He was dismissed and executed.
Yet the indignation caused by his death brought about
at least this reform that the custom of executing ex-
viziers ceased. Though he had no thought of con-
sulting the people and continued the old method of
autocratic rule, yet “the short period of his adminis-
tration is now looked back upon as having been the
golden age of modern Persia” and he is regarded as
the “only man who possessed the ability, the patri-
otism, the energy, and the integrity” to regenerate the
country (Watson’s “History of Persia,” pp. 366-
404).

Next in time comes the advocacy of reform by

Prince Malcom Khan, Minister to Great Britain. I
had the pleasure of calling on this intelligent and pro-
gressive man in Tabriz. When Minister and after-
wards when under the ban of the Shah, he set forth
a programme of reforms and Constitutional govern-
ment for Persia. He established a magazine, called
Kanun (Rule), which, published in London, circu-
lated in Persia, and set forth liberal ideas of govern-
ment and discoursed on the faults of the administra-
tion, especially of the Vizier Ali Askar Khan, Amin-i-
Sultan. He organized a society called the “World of
Humanity” and also, from its secrecy, “Faramush
Khana,” through which liberalism was propagated.

Other preachers of reform in Persia were Sheikh
Hadi of Teheran and Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din, of whom
I have spoken. The latter, before his work for Pan-
Islamism, associated himself with Malcom Khan in
advocating a Constitution for Persia. He expressed
regret that he had spent so much of his effort in trying
to influence sovereigns. “Would that I had sown all
the seeds of my ideas in the receptive ground of the
people’s thoughts. The sword of unrighteousness has
not suffered me to see awakening of the peoples of the
East and the hand of ignorance has not granted me
the opportunity to hear the call of freedom. The
stream of renovation flows quickly towards the East.
The edifice of despotic government totters to its fall.
Strive as far as you can to destroy the foundations of
despotism, not to pluck up and cast out its individual
members” (Browne’s “Persian Revolution,” p. 29).

These agitations were a preparation for the crisis
which came in 1891, on the occasion of the Shah

granting a monopoly of the tobacco trade to a British
company. Abetted by Russia, the liberals, the mul-
lahs, and the governors who had been overlooked in
the distribution of bribes combined to overthrow this
concession. (See writer’s “Persian Life and Cus-
toms,” pp. 290-96.) The Akhtar, the Persian journal
at Constantinople, denounced it and was suppressed.
Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din, who had been acting as a Min-
ister, was arrested and expelled. Malcom Khan tele-
graphed his disapproval. He was dismissed and re-
mained in exile. Thus he escaped the fate of his
friend, M. Yusuf Khan, Mustashar-ud-Doulah, For-
eign Agent—my next-door neighbour at Tabriz. His
correspondence was inspected. He was called to Te-
heran, but at Kasvin was met by a royal cup of coffee
which terminated his journey. Tracts were circu-
lated through the country demanding the suppression
of the monopoly, reform of the finances, religious free-
dom, and a representative government. Finally a
fatva of the chief Mujtahids of Kerbala and Najef
interdicted the use of tobacco. The people ceased to
use the weed. Strikes and riots threatened; the
monopoly was rescinded. The royal power by this
defeat received a great check. Priests and people had
learned their power when united. Of those who took
an active part in these riots was one Mirza Riza, a
disciple of Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din. He was imprisoned
and maltreated. He wreaked his vengeance by assassi-
nating the Shah in 1896, no doubt instigated thereto
by the Sheikh,1 and possibly by the Babis (Azalis).

1 See chapter on Neo-Islam. The assassin in his examination
said: “Those who share my view are many, but no one, save

Agitation was kept up during the reign of Muzaffar-
ud-Din Shah. In 1901 pamphlets, placards, and pro-
tests were distributed and even delivered on the table
of the Shah himself, directed against him and the
Amin-i-Sultan and the new loans and mortgages which
were being made for the Shah’s journeys to Europe.
Some of these agitators were arrested, imprisoned, and
exiled. Discontent grew apace during the following
years. The people felt that their situation was des-
perate. They were suffering grievously from injustice
and oppression. Their ancient country was weak, its
government corrupt, its independence threatened. The
people, rich and poor alike, were groaning on account
of their pitiable lot. Their Kismat was ill-fortune.
Bribes weighed down the scales of justice. Security
of property was at the caprice of venal judges, both
civil and religious. Men cursed their rulers with a

myself and Sayid Jamal-ud-Din, was aware of the idea of mine
to kill the Shah” (Browne’s “Persian Revolution,” p. 67). He
also said: “A tree,—meaning the Shah,—whereof the fruits
after all these years are such low-down rogues and scoun-
drels … who are the plagues of the lives of the Moslem
community, such a tree, bearing such fruits, ought to be cut
down.” Some suspected that the Babis had part in the crime,
for the two men who visited Mirza Riza at Shah Abdul Azim,
the scene of the murder, were Babis, i.e. Azalis, and the two
men whom he visited in the prison at Trebizond, en route for
Teheran, were of the same sect. These two were extradited and
executed at Tabriz on the charge of complicity. One of them,
M. Hasan Khan, Mukhbir-ul-Mulk, I had conversed with at the
Mustashar-ud-Doulah’s in Tabriz. Another of these Babis was
an editor of the Akhtar and a son-in-law of Subh-i-Azal (ibid.,
pp. 78, 92-95, 405, 415). The reform movement was not, how-
ever, a Babi movement. Those who took part did so with other
Persians of all sects desiring the good of the country.

vim and a vindictiveness which were startling. For
several decades the city people had lived on the verge
of famine, though the crops were fairly good. They
exclaimed: “Allah gives us our daily bread, but
greedy men starve us.” Princes and nobles, mullahs
and other capitalists, had their hands on the throat of
the people as effectively as if they had been a land-
lords’ trust. They doubled and trebled the price of
bread in the cities. The labourer was obliged to work
ten days for a bushel of wheat. This high price
scarcely benefited the farmer, for he had little wheat
or barley to sell after feeding his family. The rent
and taxes he paid in kind, by measure not by value.
The Crown Prince, Mohammed Ali Mirza, was the
most avaricious grain merchant. The people bitterly
resented it, saying: “Our Prince should be our Pro-
tector and Shepherd; he devours us like a hungry
wolf.” It cost him his crown. The officials, the
farmers of taxes, and the mullahs whose stipends
were collected by them from the villages in produce,
were waxing richer and the mass of the people grew
poorer and poorer. The Mujtahids are among the
greatest landlords, and wealthy because recipients of
the tithes and because in their capacity as judges they
have been corrupt. Bitterness against them was in-
tensified because, while as representatives of religion
they were expected to manifest justice and mercy, they
have so often shown avarice and hardheartedness.
Men with fair earnings were under the necessity of
pawning their household goods. Bread riots of men
and even of women failed to bring relief. With heart
and lip they cursed both priest and prince.

The corruption of the government was causing in-
tense dissatisfaction. Ministers were quarrelling, pos-
sibly poisoning one another. Loans had been con-
tracted from Russia, making possible royal jaunts in
Europe and lining the pockets of viziers and court
favourites, but with no result in public utilities. For
these loans the customs duties were hypothecated.
Foreign (Belgian) controllers were put in charge of
customs, post, and passports. Road concessions gave
control of highways into the hand of foreigners.
Bridges which from time immemorial had been public
property became toll-bridges through the connivance
of bribe-taking officials. Patriotic anger was aroused
by these circumstances and by the threatened danger
to the independent regulation of religion should for-
eign control increase. The conviction that the coun-
try, and with it the religion, was endangered by con-
cessions, loans, and the foreigners, had the deepest
influence. Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din wrote to the prin-
cipal Ulema, “By God’s life, folly and greed are
allied to destroy religion, abrogate the Holy Law,
and to hand over the home of Islam to foreigners!”

Under these conditions the outcome of the Russo-
Japanese war made a profound impression. The in-
vincible Russians were humbled. Persians began to
hope. The Constitutional struggle in Russia had a
great influence, especially in its effect on the Persians
and Shiahs of the Caucasus, who imbibed Constitu-
tional and socialistic ideas and were initiated into revo-
lutionary methods. Other Persians were influenced in
Turkey. In Persia secret agitators were working and
planning. The relation between the mullahs and the

government became more and more strained. Pru-
dence seemed to have forsaken the officials. Sayids,
mullahs, and even Mujtahids were bastinadoed. The
killing of a Sayid finally inflamed the embers of dis-
content. A great popular demonstration occurred.
People to the number of twelve thousand took refuge
at the British Legation. There the demand for a
Constitution was formulated as the panacea for their
ills. Muzaffar-ud-Din bowed to the will of the people
and granted a Constitution August 5, 1906. His suc-
cessor Mohammed Ali Shah abrogated it and dispersed
parliament at the cannon’s mouth, hanging the editors,
June, 1908. Civil war ensued, and he was forced to
abdicate, by the Nationalists, July, 1909. Ahmad
Sultan Shah succeeded him at the age of thirteen.
Mr. Morgan Shuster was called in to regulate the
finances as Treasurer-General, but his plans were in-
compatible with the purposes of Russia, which forced
his retirement and continued to hold parts of Northern
Persia with the army of occupation. The Constitu-
tion continues nominally in force; the new Shah was
crowned before the reassembled second parliament,
and the third one assembled in December, 1914.1

1 OUTLINE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT IN PERSIA.
(1) Merchants and mullahs protest against oppression, take
refuge at Shah Abdul Azim, force Ayn-ud-Doulah’s resignation,
1905.
(2) Petition for reforms, leaders exiled, April, 1906.
(3) Killing of Sayid and fifteen others by soldiers. Mullahs
and people take refuge at Kum, June 21, 1906.
(4) Great political demonstration. Twelve thousand people
take refuge at British Legation, July 19-August 5.
(5) Constitution granted by Muzaffar-ud-Din Shah August 5,
1906.

PERSIAN CONSTITUTION AND RELIGION

The adoption of a Constitution did not put much
of a strain on the relation of Persians to their reli-
gion because they had long been under the urfi or
civil law, which was largely the decisions of the Shah
and his Ministers. This urfi had often crossed the
will of the mullahs. Between them and the civil
authorities there had been much rivalry and jealousy.
This accounts in a measure for the fact that the mul-
lahs had such a conspicuous part in the Persian revo-
lution. Whereas in Turkey the movement was carried
on largely by young scholars, educated in Europe,

(6) First National Assembly inaugurated, Teheran, October
7, 19o6.
(7) Shah died, Mohammed Ali crowned, January 19, 1907.
(8) Vizier Amin-i-Sultan (Atabeg) assassinated August 13.
(9) Russian-British agreement, dividing Persia into spheres of
influence, published September, 1907.
(10) Coup-d’état June 23, 1908.
(11) Civil war. First siege of Tabriz, June-October. Royal
troops withdrew, vanquished.
(12) Second siege of Tabriz, January-April, 1909. Relieved by
Russian troops.
(13) Nationalist troops occupy Teheran, July 6th. Shah ab-
dicated. Ahmad Sultan made Shah.
(14) Second National Assembly convened November, 1909.
(15) Mr. Morgan Shuster made Treasurer-General May 12,
1911.
(16) Ex-Shah’s raid and defeat, summer of 1911.
(17) Dissolution of Parliament. Shuster dismissed on demand
of Russia.
(18) Third siege of Tabriz ends, December 25, 1911. Shuja-
ud-Doulah begins reign of terror in Tabriz.
(19) Ahmad Shah crowned, 1914. Third parliament
assembles, December, 1914. Neutrality of Persia proclaimed in
the Great War.

often irreligious and with reliance on the army, in
Persia the mullahs were the force that broke the gov-
ernment in the first place, though they were influ-
enced more than they knew by men who had drunk
from the streams of liberal and revolutionary
thought. Another class which was strong and influ-
ential were the Sayids, the descendants of Mohammed,
who are supposed to be a fanatical class. From first
to last they were prominent in the liberal ranks and
many of them suffered death for the cause of lib-
erty and progress. They demonstrated that the reli-
gious class of Islam contains a good proportion of
liberal-minded men. Because of this, the Nationalists
were constrained to allow the mullahs large influence
in drafting the written Constitution, especially as
without their aid the Shah could not be forced to
accept and sign it. Some provisions favour clerical
domination and provide for the continuance of their
power. Article I establishes Islam according to the
Shiah sect of the twelve Imams as the religion of
Persia, to which the Shah must belong and to the
spread of which he must contribute. Article II de-
clares that the National Assembly has been founded
by the help of the Twelfth Imam, and it must never
to all ages pass laws contrary to the Shariat; and a
commission of five Mujtahids shall have power to
reject all bills which their judgment decides to be
contrary to the Law. Articles LXXI and LXXXVI
seem to limit the power of the Mujtahids’ courts by
giving the final decision to a tribunal established by
the government. There is no doubt that the prin-
ciples of the Nationalist party really tended to under-

mine the Islamic courts and the traditions. It was
not long before most of their strict religionists turned
to the reactionary side. When the contest of arms
came on, mullahs and Mujtahids were generally
against the Nationalists. In Tabriz they organized a
society called the Islamia, which used all the weapons
of bigotry and religious hate in their efforts to over-
throw the cause of freedom. They branded the sup-
porters of the Constitution as Babis or heretics, dis-
loyal to Islam and worthy of extermination in a jihad.
To convince the royal army of besiegers that they
were good Shiahs, a unique demonstration was made
—one that will never fade from memory. Mounting
the flat roofs of Tabriz, the people repeated with the
mighty sound of ten thousand voices the creed, call-
ing out: “Allah akbar! Allah akbar! God is great!
There is no God but God; Mohammed is the Apostle
of God; Ali is the vicegerent of God.” Times with-
out number this creed rang out, testifying to the be-
sieging army that the city were true Shiahs. There
arose an intense feeling of bitterness against the mul-
lahs, who were denounced with hatred and contempt.
Among the few houses looted and destroyed by the
Nationalist mob were those of the Mujtahids, and
they did not venture to return to Tabriz even when
it was under guard of the Russian troops. For the
time the power of the mullahs was broken and free-
dom of speech and action regarding religion was
increased.

PERSIAN REFORMS AND LIBERTY

The provisions of the new law are a series of com-
promises. People shall enjoy equal rights except
where it contravenes the Shari. The study and teach-
ing of arts, letters, and science are free except as for-
bidden by the Shari. Publications are permitted ex-
cept when harmful to the religion of Islam. Other
articles disqualify from voting or being a candidate
any apostates from the Shiah faith and those living
in open sin, and declare that only a Mohammedan
Persian can be a Minister of State. While the banner
“Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, and Justice” was
widely displayed, the question of giving real equality
to Christians and Jews was scarcely mooted. The
smallness of their number precludes the question be-
coming one of active politics, but for this reason the
Moslems could without endangering their supremacy
in any particular have applied the principles of liberty.
Non-Moslems were not regarded as regular citizens.
As exceptional populations, the Armenians, Nes-
torians, Zoroastrians, and Jews were each allowed
one representative in parliament, and these must be
sound in their respective faiths.

Civil rights were guaranteed, reforms projected,
popular education advocated, the adoption of Western
civilization decided upon, under a Constitutional
régime. But many difficulties hindered the carrying
out of these purposes. First there were the schemes
of the reactionaries, including several insurrections
by the ex-Shah and Kajar Princes. These were sue-

cessfully put down. Two difficulties proved insur-
mountable, one internal, the other external.

CAUSES OF FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT

What was the internal cause of the failure of the
new régime? An Oriental story seems apropos. The
wise man said that three things were necessary for
the progress of the kingdom: an army, money, and
the trust of the people. He was asked which could
be most easily dispensed with. “The army,” he said,
“for with the other two, prosperity could still exist.”
“Which of these two?” “Money,” he replied, “for
the trust and confidence of the people would give
success.” But what shall we say of a country where
the army is untrained and divided under tribal leaders
and factional chiefs, united by no common patriotic
purpose nor aspiration; where money is lacking and
financial administration inadequate; in which distrust
of the leaders is keenly felt and that righteousness
which exalteth a nation is absent? Why did the
Constitutional movement fail? It failed for lack of
men, men of character and integrity. The old royalist
officials were corrupt and venal; the new men, the
would-be reformers, for the most part proved deficient
in the same way. Let me call some independent wit-
nesses. Mr. Arthur Moore came to Persia as a
representative of the Persian Committee of the British
Parliament. He sympathized with and aided the Con-
stitutionalists, even drilling their troops, and joined in
the sortie in which the devoted Mr. Baskerville was
sacrificed. After much experience, Mr. Moore said
to me: “This movement must fail. The men lack

moral stamina.” Take, for example, the hero of Ta-
briz, Sattar Khan. When Mohammed Ali Shah abol-
ished the Constitution, he sent an army of freebooters
against Tabriz to punish it for its stubborn advocacy
of liberty. These mountaineers began to loot, burn,
and destroy the homes and bazaars of the defenceless
inhabitants. Then up rose an unknown man, mounted
his horse, gathered some comrades, and rode through
the streets calling on the citizens to arm and resist.
They seized the armoury, organized the butchers and
bakers and candlestick-makers, endured two sieges,
and caused the final triumph of the Constitution.
Sattar Khan was the hero of this fight for freedom.
Shall we honour his name as a Washington or a
Garibaldi? No! He was conquered by greed and
graft, wine and women. His name became a by-word
and a reproach.

How was it when Mr. Shuster tried to put Persia’s
finances to rights? He dealt with the cabinet ministers
of the Constitutional government. What kind of men
did he find them to be? He describes them as selfish,
self-seeking, greedy, looking out for their own inter-
ests and not for those of their country (Shuster’s
“Strangling of Persia,” pp. 239, 200). A member
of the British Boundary Commission voiced the same
verdict: “We have lost hope of Persia on account of
the lack of men of character and ability to lead it.”

The external factor which controls the situation in
Persia is Russia. For many years its influence has
been gradually on the increase. It received legal
sanction when the Shah solicited loans and hypothe-
cated the custom duties as security. Its position was

rendered impregnable when the agreement with Great
Britain acknowledged its sphere of influence as ex-
tending over the largest and best part of Persia, as
far south as Ispahan and Yezd inclusive. The British
sphere extends over a much smaller section, including
Kerman and Bandar Abbas. Between these spheres
a considerable area is left as a buffer. By this ar-
rangement the Lion and the Bear lay down together,
and the Persian lamb within them. Later Russia’s
position was strengthened by stationing troops and
consular guards at various points. In the present war
the invasion of Azerbaijan by Turks and Kurds has
brought dire calamity upon the Christian population,
adding another full chapter of untold horrors to the
story of Moslem cruelty, savagery, and lust. Russia
later drove them from Persian soil, which, though
neutral territory, has suffered terribly.

IX

POLITICAL REFORMS IN THE TURKISH
EMPIRE

I HAVE already referred to the gradual weaken-
ing and dismemberment of the Turkish empire.
This disintegration impressed upon the govern-
ment and people the necessity of finding a remedy.
European civilization had gone forward by leaps and
bounds; the Turks were distanced in the race. The
consciousness of this condition aroused the Sultans,
who began to act partly on their own initiative, and
partly at the instigation of Europeans like the British
Ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and not
at all in response to any popular demand or agitation.
Mahmud II, Abdul Mejid, and Abdul Aziz are called
the Reforming Sultans. Mahmud II paved the way
for reforms by abolishing the Janissaries, who, on
mutinying, were destroyed at the cannon’s mouth.
He strove to placate European States by bringing
Turkey into the line of progress. Some of his
projects were external and did not touch the root of
the matter. He discarded long robes and the turban,
donned the European dress, and adopted the fez as a
national headdress—an article which had previously
been used by some Greeks in Turkey. His assistant in
organizing the new administration was Raif Mahmud
Effendi, who as secretary to the Ottoman Embassy in

England had imbibed some principles of free govern-
ment. Some of the changes affected in this and the
following reigns were as follows: A new Sultan
should not on his accession, openly at least, slaughter
all his brothers, nor cut off the head of a Grand
Vizier on his deposition, nor imprison ambassadors
in case of war. The Vizier thereafter deigned to
rise to a foreign ambassador; even the Sultan might
grasp the hand of such an infidel or become his guest.
One Sultan, Abdul Aziz, even visited European capi-
tals, 1875. Politeness to foreigners became the cus-
tom. Torture of criminals was prohibited, slavery-
was mitigated, the slave-trade and public slave-mar-
kets were abolished, the poll-tax on zimmis or Chris-
tian rayats was for a time removed and the evidence
of Christians was to be admitted in court. Though
done, for the most part, under the pressure of Chris-
tian governments, yet all this was encouraging. Re-
forms were summed up in two celebrated decrees is-
sued by Abdul Mejid. One in 1839 was the Hatti
Sherif of Gulkhana, called the Magna Charta of
Turkey, which systematized taxation and military
service, and guaranteed security of life, honour, and
property to all subjects, irrespective of race or religion.
The other, in 1856, called the Hatti Humayun, guar-
anteed religious freedom and abolished the death pen-
alty for apostasy from Islam. This was issued at the
demand of the Christian ambassadors, following the
public and shameful execution of an Armenian youth
who through fear and in intoxication had professed
Islam and had afterwards recanted. The decree
caused great rejoicing in Christian lands, but this in-

terpretation was subsequently repudiated by the
Porte (William Goodell: “Forty Years in the Turk-
ish Empire,” pp. 240, 292, 385, 481, 48C). It stated
that “every distinction and designation tending to
make any class whatever of the subjects of my empire
inferior to another class on account of their religion,
language, and race shall be forever effaced. … No
subject shall be hindered in the exercise of the religion
he professes, nor shall be in any way annoyed on that
account. No one shall be compelled to change his
religion.”

About the same time, following the Crimean War
(1855), the Turkish army was reorganized and the
Sultan was able to confirm his rule in the borders of
Kurdistan, Syria and Arak Arabi, and to a certain
extent over Nejd and the Persian Gulf littoral. Euro-
pean codes of law were introduced. The laws of
landed property were changed. At the conquest one-
third of the land had been assigned to the Ulema.
Donations and endowments, vakf, had increased these
properties greatly. The darvish orders also held large
endowments. The State took over the administra-
tion of these vakfs. The privileges of the nobles and
beys as landlords were revoked. These measures
caused great discontent. These powerful elements
were alienated and the salaries assigned in lieu of the
former incomes did not satisfy them. Their spirit
is seen in the act of a darvish who came before Rashid
Pasha at a public audience, reviled him, called him
dog and infidel, and invoked the vengeance of heaven
and the dagger of the Moslem upon him for introduc-
ing reforms. Because of such a spirit, an eminent

Turk remarked: “Our Ministers labour in vain, for
civilization will never enter Turkey so long as the
turbeh, shrines, of the darvishes are in existence.”
Mr. Ubicini (quoted in Browne’s “Dervishes,” p.
349) says: “The two bodies of which religious so-
ciety is composed, the Ulema and the darvishes, are
the enemies of all reform. There is conservatism in
the Ulema, who speaks in the name of Law, saying,
‘Touch nothing that is established, borrow nothing
from the infidels, because the Law forbids it.’ The
darvish Sheikh says: ‘I am the Law; all is good that
I commend, all is evil that I forbid. My sentence is
the sentence of God.’ The government may hope
from the Ulema, but not from the darvishes.”

Towards the end of his reign, Abdul Aziz became
reactionary, and persecuted, and exiled the reform-
ers. The Palace and the Porte contended. The
reformers, led by Midhat Pasha, prevailed. Abdul
Aziz was deposed and murdered. Murad V became
insane. Abdul Hamid was made Sultan, 1876.
Shortly afterwards he proclaimed a Constitution and
assembled a Parliament. Maybe he did this with no
serious purpose, but to throw dust in the eyes of
Europe. At any rate, in the midst of the war with
Russia, 1878, he suspended the Constitution.
Crushed and humiliated as the result of the war, by
the loss of large territories in the Balkans, Abdul
Hamid entered upon a career of autocratic oppres-
sion and tyrannic repression, with firm purpose to
thwart reforms among Moslems and with a fierce
fanaticism against Christians. He threw himself
heart and soul in with the reactionaries, ruled as a

despot through the Palace junta, suppressing the
Viziers at the Sublime Porte. By means of the tele-
graph he kept in personal touch with every corner of
his empire. His system of espionage was most ter-
rible; forty thousand spies, maintained at an expense
of ten million dollars a year, made life a horror for
his subjects. No one was safe. Private conversa-
tion became a dangerous pastime. In passing through
Constantinople, I was struck with the hushed serious-
ness of the whole community. Laughter and gaiety
were absent. The residents would warn me at every
turn not to talk in public. They had learned to live
in an atmosphere where free speech was denied every
one. The contrast to Persia was striking. I at-
tended the celebrated salaamlukh to see the Sultan
come in state to Friday prayers. It is a function
which can only be attended by special permission, and
tickets and places were reserved for us in the pavilion.
How near we came to falling under the suspicion of
the ever-present spies, I can never know. But just
as the Sultan passed in his carriage, our three-year-
old child piped up in a clear voice: “Papa, the
king is a great killer.” When I said “Hush,” she re-
peated the words: “Papa, the king is a great killer.”
I quickly whispered to her: “The king loves his own
little boys and girls.” This satisfied and quieted her.
She was evidently applying her knowledge of King
Herod to the first king she saw. And out of the
mouth of a babe the truth was spoken as truly as by
Gladstone when he pronounced Abdul Hamid “the
Great Assassin.” At another time, when leaving
Constantinople, our baggage was taken out and most

minutely examined. When we had come down to
breakfast in the hotel that morning we had noticed
that all the waiters were missing. We now under-
stood that they had been imprisoned on suspicion of
a plot. The police thought maybe bombs had been
concealed in our baggage to escape their inspection.
Through the reports of these spies, twenty-five
thousand of the flower of Turkish manhood suffered
death or exile, or fled, leaving their property to be
confiscated. Many were exiled to distant parts of
the empire. Many were dropped into the Bosphorus.
Apropos of this a story goes that some foreign sailors
had need to dive down near a vessel at Seraglio Point.
They found themselves among a multitude of human
corpses, whose heads were weighted down and their
legs were moving to and fro by the force of the cur-
rents (McCallagh: “Abdul Hamid,” p. 119). The
press was strictly censored. Public discussion was
prohibited. Liberal ideas were crushed. Schools for
Moslems were repressed, except primary education of
a poor quality. Foreign governesses were spied upon
as well as their pupils and their fathers. Higher edu-
cation was grudgingly allowed to officers because it
was essential and medicine was carefully taught. It
and sanitation were two things Abdul Hamid cher-
ished. But electric lights and telephones were ex-
cluded. When Dr. Jessup wrote “The Mohammedan
Missionary Problem,” just after the Treaty of Berlin
was signed, he thanked God for the bright prospects
for Turkey, because Christian England had under-
taken to see that reforms were carried out—having
taken Cyprus as a vantage ground. Alas that it was

otherwise ordered by Abdul Hamid. He became the
enemy of England, and the Armenians became the
victims of unspeakable and terrible massacres. It
seemed as if the plan was to exterminate the Chris-
tians. The liberal Turks suffered much, but there
was no general massacre of them. The number of
them killed was as hundreds to tens of thousands of
Christians.

THE YOUNG TURKS

The political reformers who had fled to Europe,
and especially to London and Paris, and had agitated
for reforms in the time of Abdul Aziz had been
dubbed “The Young Turks.” They published a
paper, called “Hurriat” (Liberty). When Abdul
Hamid abolished the Constitution of 1876, thousands
of them again fled into exile. There their eager souls
grew in longing for the freedom of their country.
Among them was Hairedin Pasha, a Circassian. He
had been governor of Tunis and Grand Vizier in the
first year of Abdul Hamid. He believed that under
Islam they could attain to the high standard of
European civilization. He dismissed the corrupt of-
ficials and started out to do justice to Moslems and
Christians alike. Unable to carry out his project he
went again into exile and became one of the reorgan-
izers of the Young Turk party. This was a secret
organization, formed to work for liberty and reform.
They published literature in Europe which they
smuggled into and distributed in Turkey. In spite of
repression many minds were permeated with modern
ideas. They became impressed with their inferiority

to Western nations and even to their subject Chris-
tian races in education and science. For years
the ferment worked actively, especially among the
younger men. Students abroad and in the govern-
ment schools imbibed liberal ideas. The officers and
surgeons in the military college were inspired with
the spirit of reform. Many of the bolder propagan-
dists suffered death, betrayed. Exiling to distant
provinces spread the reform movement in those out-
posts. The espionage system was disgusting to the
officers of the army, and the rank and file, too, be-
came disaffected by continual neglect, poor pay, and
hard service in Arabia and the fortresses.

In 1891 a committee of reformers was organized
in Geneva. Later they perfected organization in
Paris and other capitals and took the name of “The
Committee of Union and Progress.” Their policy
was to liberalize and reform Turkey by (1) preserv-
ing its integrity, (2) avoiding European or any out-
side interference in its affairs, (3) giving equality to
all races, (4) introducing parliamentary government
and if necessary deposing the Sultan.

The movement was distinctly secular in its nature.
It was a reflection of European political life. Its
moving influences, its modes of thought came from
Christian civilization. Islam was not paramount in
its aims, but the nation, the people, independence, self-
defence. The Young Turks explained away the tra-
ditions of Islam; discouraged fanaticism. They
wished to bring religion into conformity with modern
progress. They repudiated Pan-Islamism, which
even the Egyptian Nationalists encouraged. One of

their leaders said: “We Ottomans understand that
the pursuit of Pan-Islamic designs of the visionaries
would be contrary to our dearest interests” (Knight’s
“Turkey,” p. 658). Therefore membership included
Christians and Jews, who were to join Moslems in
political action as friends and brothers. The Arme-
nian and Jewish committees were persuaded to unite
with them, and later unity of action was negotiated
with the Macedonian committees of the Bulgarians,
Greeks, and Serbs. Salonica was made headquarters
of the Committee. This city had not been controlled
by the spy-system as much as some others. Besides,
according to Knight (“Turkey,” p. 101), Free-
masonry flourished there, though the name and
nature of their meeting were always secret, for to be
found to be a Mason was to incur the penalty of death.
The Committee of Union and Progress was, he tells
us, “to a large extent modelled on Freemasonry and
a considerable portion of the early associates, Mos-
lems, and some Jews, were of Masonic lodges of
Salonica.” In Macedonia the army corps and officers
were won over. There were altogether fifteen thou-
sand members enrolled in Macedonia. The soldiers
of Asia Minor were brought into harmony with the
movement. Propagandists were successful every-
where throughout the empire. The leaders were men
of education, in professional and official life, averag-
ing but thirty-two years of age.

THE REVOLUTION

The time was ripe. The plot was perfected, though
European diplomacy knew it not. On July 23, 1908,

the leaders, among whom were Niazi Bey, Enver
Bey, and Mahmud Shevket Pasha, openly revolted
and proclaimed a Constitution. From Salonica the
demands of the revolutionists were presented by tele-
gram straight to the Palace. The Sultan awoke to
find himself without resource or subterfuge. In
solemn conclave, where all the viziers knew and none
dared to say the word, the astrologer Abul Huda was
put forward and pronounced the talisman, “A Con-
stitution.” The next day Abdul Hamid issued a de-
cree re-establishing the Constitution of 1876. The
Young Turks became the rulers of Turkey. The
Macedonian Corps became the royal guard. The
Palace camarilla disappeared, the spies were dismissed,
the prisoners of liberty were released, the exiles re-
turned, separated families were united, a whole peo-
ple breathed the first free breath in thirty years. The
jubilee of liberty was sounded. Enthusiasm knew
no bounds. The entire populace went wild with a
delirium and frenzy of rejoicing. Transports of joy
thrilled all hearts. Paeans of praise and gratitude
burst spontaneously from all lips. Barriers of race
and religion were broken down. Moslems and Chris-
tians and Jews sincerely fraternized, in an ecstasy of
delight. Mullahs and priests embraced and kissed
each other in the streets; they met in mass-meetings,
speaking on a common platform and electrifying a
united people with approval and exemplification of the
motto, “Hurriyat, Musavat, Agviyat, Adalat”
(Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, Justice). Demonstra-
tions of various kinds were held. Conspicuous among

them was the memorial service of the Armenians,
killed in the massacres. The exiled Armenian Patri-
arch had returned. Ulema and Moslem people ac-
companied Greek, Bulgarian, and Armenian priests
and bishops to the Armenian cemetery and prayed
and held services for the victims of fanaticism and
hate which seemed to have passed away. At the City
Hall a mullah offered prayer for brotherhood,
and Christians and Moslems joined together in the
“Amin.” At the time of the parliamentary election
the ballot box was treated as a symbol of liberty. It
was adorned with the flag, borne on camel-back in
procession, surrounded by little girls dressed in white.
Carriages followed, in which were seated Turkish
mullahs, Greek and Armenian priests, and Jewish
rabbis sitting side by side. At the voting table a mul-
lah sat with a Greek priest on one side and an Arme-
nian on the other. All over the empire, in Asia
Minor, Syria, and Armenia, the people received the
news of freedom with boundless joy and enthusiasm.
The world read the reports with gratitude and some-
thing akin to awe.

Most wonderful of all, the veiled women of the
harams issued forth from behind the pardas and the
latticed windows, threw aside the veils, appeared in
carriages with men, attended the theatre and the
parks, wrote for the press, held public meetings and
receptions, made addresses, demanded new rights,
talked politics with men, stood in the street awaiting
election returns—open-faced and without shame.
It was decided by the government to admit women

into the University, and to have special courses in
hygiene and domestic economy. It seemed the day
of woman’s emancipation.

THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SHARIAT

The provisions of the Constitution were, in brief:
the participation of the people in their government
through representatives in parliament, thus limiting
the autocratic power of the Sultan; the right of se-
cure domicile and personal liberty; Islam to be the
established religion, but all religions and races to have
equality before the civil law; all subjects to be con-
sidered Ottomans and to serve in the army; popular
education to be promoted. Adhered to and put into
practice these principles would have made a really
new political system in Moslem lands.

There were supreme difficulties in the way of ac-
complishing all this, even after the army had been
won over and the despotic caliph cowed. On the re-
ligious side there were two great difficulties: (1) To
show the Ulema and their party that the Constitution
in general was in accordance with the Shariat; (2)
To justify the provision that non-Moslems were to
be on an equality with Moslems. The general ques-
tion was settled in a way by the decrees of the Caliph
and of the Sheikh-ul-Islam. The Sheikh proclaimed
the legality of Constitutional government, holding
that Islam was essentially democratic, that the first
four “rightly guided” caliphs had been elected by the
people, that the principles of liberty, equality, frater-
nity, and justice were compatible with the Koran and
Islam. It was shown from the traditions that it is

in accord with the Law to limit the power of the ruler
by that of the people. For example, the Prophet has
said: “Consult with them [the people] on every af-
fair”; “Take counsel”; “Any obnoxious measure
taken after consultation is preferable to a salutary
measure taken arbitrarily”; “If any one should give
you a good commandment in my name, even though
I have not given it, do it”; “I am only a man. When
I order you anything respecting religion, receive it;
when I order you anything regarding the affairs of
the world, I am only a man.” It was cited also that
the “rightly guided caliphs” and their commanders
mentioned important events in the assemblies of the
people on Fridays; that the Imam Ali even appeared
before a tribunal, like any ordinary man, in a suit
against a Christian. In an interview with some promi-
nent Englishmen (C. R. Buxton: “Turkey in Revo-
lution,” pp. 172-74), the Sheikh-ul-Islam was asked:
“Is a real Constitutional government permitted by
the law of Islam?” He replied: “Permitted! It is
more than permitted; the law of Islam is more liberal
than the Constitution itself. … Our law, rightly in-
terpreted, is in accordance with the principles of
representative government. The wisest men, chosen
by the people, are to direct the ruler, and if he rules
without their consent he is going beyond his power.
Now that this principle has been embodied in the
law of the Constitution, that law itself is included in
the law of Islam (!). Our Ulema are bound to help
actively in carrying out the Constitution. … The
law of Islam enjoins equality—not that the people
can regard a Moslem as in every way the same as a

Christian; but political equality, equality before the
law, they are bound to grant.”

The crux of the matter lies in this provision—the
equality of civil rights of Christians and Jews with
Moslems. Is this possible under Islam? As an ideal
this had been propounded in the Ottoman empire as
early as the seventeenth century by the Koprulu fam-
ily of viziers. The Christian governments had
laboured to this end in the nineteenth century, espe-
cially for equal taxation, military service, and the
right to testify. This equality of rights had been pro-
claimed in the Hatti Sherif: adopted in the Constitu-
tion of 1876, and now readopted. It said: “All sub-
jects of the Ottoman empire are called Ottomans,
whatever religion they profess.” “All Ottomans are
equal before the law. They have the same rights and
the same duties in reference to the State.” Of this
provision Jurist says (Moslem World, 1913, p. 360):
“The signing of the Constitution of 1876 was the
death-warrant of Moslem law. … The two basic
principles are essentially Christian—responsibility and
equality.” To bring the Moslem people into recon-
ciliation with this provision the Committee sent
Ulema through the land to instruct in the mosques
and harmonize constitutional equality with Moslem
ideas. After hearing the doctrine propounded, two
old mullahs rose up in a mosque and protested; and
one in Bagdad said: “Then this is the end of Islam.”
He was right as regards one of the working postulates
of Islam, that the Moslems are the ruling class, and
Christians and Jews subject races, suffered to live
only so long as they continue in subjection. The Mos-

lem regards himself as superior—not because of
wealth, intellect, education, morals, or even conquest,
but because of his religion. It is a revolutionary
change of Moslem conceptions and of the customs of
thirteen hundred years to put the Christian on an
equality. To count the Christian’s life and honour
as equal to those of a true believer, to grant him
equality before the courts in giving testimony and
receiving punishment, in taxation, in the army as pri-
vates and as officers, in the elections, and in official
life—this is a condition which the Moslem cannot
contemplate with equanimity. The Young Turks
might idealize, in the environs of Geneva or Paris,
such a consummation, and the Sheikh-ul-Islam theo-
rize about it in interviews with liberal statesmen, but
to bring it into practical working was a superhuman
task. Yet the Young Turks were sincere in their pur-
pose and the Constitution was re-established on this
ideal. They would have grafted on the Moslem state
the best results of Christian civilization. They would
have substituted patriotism for religious fanaticism.
Yet this new fundamental law guards the law of Is-
lam and leaves an opening for persecution and pun-
ishment of the apostate. For after declaring that
Islam is the religion of the State, it is further de-
clared in Article X that “individual liberty is invio-
lable. Except according to the forms and for the
causes determined by the Canon Law of Islam (Shar-
iat) and the civil code, no one can be arrested or suf-
fer penalties.”

The parliament assembled December 17, 1908. It
was a striking assemblage, with deputies from Turks

and Albanians, Kurds and Arabs, Greeks and Arme-
nians, Syrians and Jews. It met in the historic St.
Sophia. The Ulema of Islam, the Christian Patri-
archs, the Ottoman princes, the ambassadors of Mos-
lem and Christian States all gave dignity to the scene,
while Sultan Abdul Hamid in person inaugurated the
National Assembly. It was an occasion of supreme
interest.

THE REACTION

Kaimal Pasha was made Grand Vizier. Around
him was organized a party called the Ahrar, the Lib-
eral Union. With them was Prince Sabah-ud-Din, a
son of the Sultan, who had lived in exile. These
favoured decentralization, giving to the Arabs and
Albanians and such races large powers of local self-
government. They were backed by the Sultan and
the reactionaries for their own purpose. And with
this party were British diplomacy and press, sowing
the seeds they are now reaping. All were working
against the Committee of Union and Progress.

The reactionaries organized an association called
the Moslem League. Its organ was the Volcan, whose
editor was a darvish. The League had more than
five hundred agitators, of whom seventeen were jour-
nalists and a number were connected with the Palace,
with Nadir Aga, one of the Sultan’s eunuchs, as
leader. The Sultan and his treasure-chest was back
of it all. The cry of the League was, “The Sacred
Law is in jeopardy! The Shariat! The Shariat is in
danger! The Faith is fallen!” They were not lack-
ing in pretexts for this party-cry. It was not difficult

to find cause against the Young Turks. Mahmud
Mukhtar Pasha had issued an order that military drill
and discipline should not be interrupted by prayer
times. Some of the officers had refused to join in
the prayers and had mocked the soldiers for beliefs
which they said were exploded. They had shown
contempt for the ceremonial rites. The sentiment of
one was quoted as: “Now, glory to God, every one is
free to believe as he likes.” When the League was
discovered to be working among the soldiers the lat-
ter were forbidden to associate with the Hodjas and
the Hodjas from entering the barracks. Officers even
directed the soldiers to be ready to bayonet the Hod-
jas. They retorted by calling the Young Turks in-
fidels, Freemasons, Jews, wine-bibbers, seducers of
Moslem wives and destroyers of harams, who de-
lighted to decorate their lodgings with pictures of
naked infidel women. By such influences, aided by
powerful bribes, the soldiers were weaned from their
allegiance, even the Salonica regiment, which, as sup-
porters of the Constitution, had been placed as guards
of the Sultan’s palace. On April 14, 1909, the sol-
diers rose in mutiny; in the Palace, the barracks, in
the cavalry, the marines and the regulars, all officers
who did not manage to escape were slain. The offi-
cers of the Committee and their journal, the Tanin,
were wrecked. The night following Constantinople
was terrorized and shuddered in wakeful, fearful an-
ticipation, while the soldiers shot off more than a mil-
lion cartridges. The next day in front of St. Sophia,
the mutineers and the Ulema celebrated the restora-
tion of the Shariat. Cries rent the air,—“Yashasun

Shariat-i-Paghambar!” (“Long live the Law of the
Prophet!”). With sounding of trumpets and chant-
ing of hymns, they rejoiced. On all sides and from
every lip went up the shout, “Shariat!” “Shariat!”
In the name of religion they had dared and won. The
next Friday the Sultan held his salaamlukh, with a
strange sight of soldiers on guard and officers con-
spicuous by their absence. The Sultan seemed again
triumphant and absolute.

DEPOSITION OF ABDUL HAMID

But that was the Red Sultan’s last salaamlukh.
Like an avenging fury, the Constitutional army swept
down from Macedonia upon the Capital, General
Husain Husni Pasha sending a proclamation that
“There exists not and cannot exist any law or power
above our Constitution.” Swift and sure was their
victory. Parliament reassembled. It put to the
Sheikh-ul-Islam this momentous question (April 22,
1909):

“What becomes of an Imam who has destroyed
certain holy writings; who has seized property in con-
travention of the Shariat; who has committed cruel-
ties in ordering the assassination and imprisonment of
exiles without any justification under the Shariat;
who has squandered the public money; who having
sworn to govern according to the Shariat has violated
his oath; who by gifts of money has provoked blood-
shed and civil war and who is no longer recognized in
the provinces?” The judgment of the Sheikh-ul-Is-
lam, the highest tribunal in Turkey, was in few
words: “He must abdicate or be deposed.”

A Committee of Parliament—chosen by lot—
waited on the Sultan, and by the mouth of a Salonica
Jew this mighty despot, this Caliph-Sultan, heard the
decree of deposition. His haram of several hundred
concubines were scattered to the homes of their child-
hood, in the mountains of Albania, the huts of the Cir-
cassians, or the palaces of favourites. The Sultan,
still well supplied with a retinue of three Sultanas,
four inferior concubines, five female slaves, four
eunuchs, and nine domestics, was exiled and confined
in a Salonica palace. The last picture we have of
the great assassin is, gathering his womenfolks about
him and casting the lot, which proves unfortunate,
for he exclaims “Bosh sheh!” (“Vanity, Vanity!”)
and breaks out into an oath—“Laanat Olsun!”
(“Cursed be it!”) (Francis McCallagh: “Fall of
Abdul Hamid”).

CONSTITUTIONAL RÉGIME; SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

Mahmud V Rashad was chosen Sultan and Caliph
and bound on the sword of Othman as a Constitu-
tional monarch. The Young Turks took up the task
of government with considerable hopefulness. The
press was active, newspapers multiplied; new books
were issued; modern text-books were adopted; schools
were established; a reformed writing and spelling was
introduced to facilitate the study of Turkish; recruits
were ordered to be taught to read, as well as to use
knives and forks; men of age began attending night
school, and could be seen reading on the street cor-
ners. Several hundred youths were sent to Europe
to study law, finance, politics, and industry; a ma-

ternity hospital was opened; lectures were delivered
on religious liberty; much freedom of speech and
travel was allowed. The white-slave traffic with
Egypt was abolished, encouragement was given to the
liberation of slaves, ladies-in-waiting were substituted
as far as possible for eunuchs in the palace. Tram-
ways were increased; telephones came into use; elec-
tric lights were no longer prohibited, but appeared
in the mosques and on their domes. The dogs were
cleaned out of the streets of Constantinople in spite
of the prophecy that their leaving would be a sign
that the city would be no longer Mohammedan.

In carrying out the provisions of the Constitution,
the Young Turks found circumstances too much
for them. Neither equality of the religions nor Otto-
manization of the races was possible practically.
Equality was violated in the arrangements for the new
parliament, for the representation was so manipulated
that out of 240 deputies, the Christians had only 37.
The enlistment of Christian soldiers met with diffi-
culties. The Turks were utterly unwilling to treat
them as themselves. They limited the number in each
regiment to twenty per cent. They did not ac-
cept them as officers; they did not desire that they
should receive military training, but rather that they
should be hewers of wood and drawers of water and
makers of roads. The Christians began to flee the
country to avoid the conscription. The Christian
soldiers were in danger of demoralization and of los-
ing their faith. The Patriarch of the Greeks and the
Exarch of the Bulgarians tried to arrange that Chris-
tian soldiers should have their own worship and chap-

lains, should keep Sunday, and should not be per-
mitted to become Moslems during their term of serv-
ice. They insisted that they should be received into
the military schools to be trained as officers. Civil
offices, too, were not given to the Christians in pro-
portion to their numbers, though they are very capa-
ble. In some places fifteen per cent of the police were
allowed to be Christians.

Unwillingness of the Moslems to allow Christians
to assume equality was one cause of the Adana mas-
sacres, though these were no doubt instigated by Ab-
dul Hamid and the reactionaries. The peasantry were
wrought upon by tales of how the Armenians were go-
ing to rise and rule over them. This massacre, 1909,
in which twenty-five thousand Christians lost their
lives, was more dastardly, cruel, and lustful than those
that preceded it. However inadequate the punishment
meted out may be considered, it was at least a sign
of progress and a new thing in history that a Moslem
government hanged for the murder of Christians
more than a score of Moslems, some of whom were
wealthy and some religious leaders. The Young
Turks in their sane moments have tried to teach Mos-
lems that they cannot kill Christians with impunity in
times of peace. A Moslem was executed at Jerusa-
lem for murdering an Armenian abbot. An Arab,
looking on, said: “It is a black day for us, for a Mos-
lem has been killed for killing a Christian.” But
these punishments were exceptional. The truth is that
neither in the army, in the courts, in the government,
nor in ordinary life, did the Christians receive lib-
erty, equality, fraternity, or justice. Islam and the

Constitution did not work together. It is doubtful
whether even a long period of peaceful progress would
have accomplished it. Rather it was demonstrated
that only power exerted from without can make the
life and property of Christians safe under Moslem
rule.

ATTEMPTS AT OTTOMANIZATION

Attempts were made in Arabia and Syria to bring
the Arabs nearer to Turkish methods. These were
met by hostility. The project was initiated of impos-
ing on the Albanians the language, alphabet, customs,
and military discipline of the Turks. A census was
ordered and new taxes imposed. The Albanians re-
sisted and rose in insurrection. Harassed by inter-
nal troubles and before it had time to put its house in
order, Turkey became a prey to its neighbours. Aus-
tria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bulgaria de-
clared her independence. Italy proclaimed war and
annexed Tripoli and some islands. The Balkan States,
Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece, formed an
alliance, conquered their ancient foe and rent from her
Macedonia, much of Thrace, Albania, Crete, and
other islands. The seizure of Morocco by France
added to the feeling of dismay and hatred. With
thousands of Macedonian refugees to provide for,
tension with Greece through boycotts and oppressions
of her Greek subjects, with danger of Kurdish raids
and Arab plots, with factional fights within and its
revenues diminished and its expenditures for war
preparations enormous, Turkey’s plight was sorry in-
deed. Its one consolation was the deep sympathy

which the Moslem world showed it in its misfortunes,
sympathy shown in lamentations and tears, in curses
on the Christians and in generous contributions.
These attacks of the Christian governments had by
this time driven from the minds of the Young Turks
all thought of treating the Christians of the empire
as equals; indeed, little remained that they should
treat them all as enemies. They found it necessary
to show a loyalty to Islam which they did not possess,
and to foster and strengthen the fanaticism of the
Moslems in order to utilize it.

Though bent on carrying out the policy of Otto-
manization of everything, yet necessity made the
Young Turks dependent on the brain and experience
of Christians. So after the Balkan War foreign ad-
visers were called in. German officers took charge of
the army and Gen. Liman von Sanders became com-
mander of the corps at Constantinople. To the Brit-
ish was signed the navy; to the French, finance and the
gendarmerie. Others were to assist in reforms in
Armenia and Kurdistan. With all this it appears that
Pan-Islamic agitation was taken up from Constan-
tinople. Agents and tracts were sent out. The Near
East says (April, 1914): “The publication of Pan-
Islamic, anti-Christian, anti-European literature has
increased markedly of late.” The European name for
the capital, Constantinia, was erased from the coinage
and Dar-ul-Khalifate ul Aliyah (the abode of the High
Caliph) substituted, corresponding to the official title
of the city, Dar-i-Saadat, the Seat of Prosperity. The
change has one advantage, in that the coins can be
used in the new capital without recoining. Stamps

were ordered to be printed in Turkish alone, the French
being deleted. Signboards, which were often in three
languages, must be only in Turkish. Turkish names
must be given to the schools and other institutions of
the non-Moslems. The street-sweepers of Pera had
badges with number and title in both French and
Turkish. They went on strike, complaining that the
Frangi letters on their necks interfered with their
prayers. Their petition was granted. Efforts were
begun to curtail and even abolish the privileges of the
Christian races and to annul the status granted to them
by Mohammed the Conqueror, and even to change the
privileges conferred by the Caliph Omar. These privi-
leges were granted to regulate the condition of those
subjects who were denied the rights of full citizenship
enjoyed only by Moslems under their law. Each race
or religion has had an organization (millat) with a
large measure of self-government. The Patriarch was
considered the head of the race as well as of the re-
ligion and administered many matters ordinarily in
charge of the civil magistrate. The abrogation of these
privileges must depend upon the establishment of real
equality in law and practice which has not yet been
attained.

ABOLITION OF THE CAPITULATIONS

Another step towards Ottomanization was the aboli-
tion of the Capitulations, which was put into effect
September 9, 1914. These capitulations are treaties
which the Sublime Porte has made with reference to
foreign subjects living within its borders. They are
named from the capitula or sections into which the

treaties are divided. In Byzantine times the emperors
had made such arrangements with regard to resident
Europeans. These regulations were confirmed by Mo-
hammed II. They were founded on an ancient prin-
ciple of law that the State would not extend rights
and privileges under its laws to foreigners and that
their own State must take the trouble of governing
them. Moslem rule made special regulations more
necessary, for it would not grant the privileges under
the Sacred Law to any except Moslems and could not
expect subjects of independent Christian States to take
the inferior position of the rayats or subjugated Chris-
tians. Hence a special arrangement, mutually agree-
able, was entered into which allowed each nationality
to be judged by its own consul and laws. Each group
formed a separate colony, enjoying what have been
called extra-territorial rights. These were extended
under the favourite nation clause to all who made
treaties. At first the powerful Sultans entered into
this arrangement somewhat as a matter of grace and
accommodation. They were relieved of the trouble of
governing the Genoese, Venetians, and other colonies,
and the power of the Sultans was not limited by this
in any way in which they cared to exercise it. But
when Turkish power declined, these privileges became
extended and acted as a restraint on Turkish authority.
These capitulations granted freedom of religious wor-
ship, freedom from the jurisdiction of the Turkish
courts, with right of trial by one’s own consul, pro-
tection from molestation from natives or from the
police, exemption from taxes or arrest, inviolability of
domicile. They arranged the rate of custom-duties,

which could not be changed without the consent of the
foreign governments. They permitted foreign post-
offices in connection with the consulates.

These privileges were at times greatly abused. By
selling or granting the right of citizenship or by re-
ceiving many into nominal service at the embassies,
the number enjoying these privileges was wrongfully
increased. One French ambassador received $80,000
for passport privileges. The Austrians and Russians
enrolled several hundred thousand subjects in Wal-
lachia and Moldavia. Governments which charged
enormous duties at their own ports, limited Turkey
to an eight- or eleven-per cent duty. There was no
doubt of the gross injustice of the conditions. Besides
it was galling to the pride and self-respect of the Turks
and a sign of their inferiority. Efforts were made to
annul them in 1856 and 1862, after the adoption of
the Code Napoléon. Especially since the adoption of
a Constitution declaring equal rights to all races and
religions, the Turks felt that the time had come to
abolish such restrictions. On the face of it their con-
tention is right. But some considerations make it evi-
dent that the fulness of time had not come for their
abolition. For the equality of Christians with Mos-
lems before the courts is not yet put into practice; the
judges are all Moslems, and the testimony of a Chris-
tian does not yet count for much as against that of a
Moslem; the courts are notoriously corrupt, and have
not yet been reformed. The Tanin declares that the
judges continue to oppose the reform of the judiciary
and that when a European adviser was employed to
purge and regulate the courts he was stoutly resisted.

Reform, it says, “is a fight against the whole force of
the magistrates, their methods, their ignorance, their
inability, their mental state.” This difficulty is not in-
superable, for if Greece and Japan can judge all for-
eigners, and if Great Britain can have Moslem jus-
tices in India who are worthy of confidence, such may
be at length developed among the Turks. Indeed,
there is testimony to assure us that in the Shari courts
upright judges are not wanting.

The abolition of the Capitulations was celebrated
in Turkey as an Independence Day,—as “the dawn
of a new era.” Flags were flying for three days, amid
great rejoicings and congratulations. It was regarded
as a great and glorious event—as a fact accomplished
—in spite of the unanimous protest of the Legations.

Following this, new laws have been issued. Duties
have been raised from fifteen to one hundred per
cent; an income tax (Temettu) has been fixed on
foreigners and their occupations, exception being
made for certain classes as teachers and clergy. Most
disquieting is the new law regarding schools, which
directly affects those of the missions. All schools
must be formally authorized, must state the name of
their responsible director, of the text-books and cur-
riculum, must teach Turkish equally with the chief
language of the school, and the history and geography
of Turkey in the Turkish language. Think of it!
The history of Turkey must be taught, and according
to the Turkish representation of the facts. But fur-
ther the law declares “that religious knowledge and
history and the teaching of the creed of the denomina-
tion to which the school belongs shall not be given to

pupils who do not profess that religion.” Nor must
such pupils be made to attend prayers. This strikes
at the foundation of educational mission work, the
largest branch of the American work in Turkey.
This has already been specifically applied, as at
Beirut College.

At another point the Ottomanization programme
shows itself. After the massacre of the Christians
by the Druses in 1860, the Lebanon district was placed
under a special administration. Its privileges have
been declared null. An army of seventeen thousand
was sent in and all administration was taken over by
the Turks. The Christian governor’s authority was
reduced to a shadow. The patriarch of the Maron-
ites was stripped of his privileges.

The aim of this movement and of these new laws
is to reduce the whole empire to a uniform basis
under Ottoman law, to abolish all special laws and
privileges. The non-success of the attempt in Al-
bania does not argue well for its wisdom.

TURKEY AND THE PRESENT WAR

On the opening of the present European war Tur-
key began general mobilization, calling to arms
Christians and Jews as well as Moslems. Many non-
Moslems were excused on the payment of fifty pounds.
After three months, on November 7, 1914, Turkey
entered the conflict on the side of Germany, and pro-
claimed the jihad.

Why did the Turks enter the war? According to
their own word, they believed that the day of deliv-

erance for Islam had come, “the day of vengeance
against the oppressors,” the day of triumph over those
who had despoiled their heritage. “We are fighting,”
says the editor of the Turkish Yourdou, “for the
freedom of the Turkish race and of Islam.” The
Tarjuman says: “The Turkish expeditionary army
on the West and on the East carries the message of
salvation and life to the Moslems living there.” Hali-
dah Khanum, the famous writer, graduate of the
American College, says: “This war is an absolute
necessity; how eagerly our brethren in Russia await
the army of the caliphate!” (Orient, January 25,
1915). Sir Edwin Pears, a high authority, confirms
this opinion, saying that popular sentiment was with
the war party because they hoped to get back some
of the territory they had lost.

ENGLAND OR GERMANY! WHICH?

Why did the Turks enter the war on the German
side? From a conviction of self-interest. It appears
to them that Russia, Great Britain, and France are
the countries that are holding Moslems in subjection,
while Germany has been content with financial ad-
vantages. It need not be counted strange that they
believed Germany to be their friend. The German
emperor had assumed that position, had supported the
Red Sultan at the time of the Armenian massacres,
had twice visited him in 1889 and 1898, had stood
by the grave of Saladin at Damascus and announced
that, “The three hundred millions of Mohammedans
that are scattered through the world may rest assured

that the German emperor will eternally be their
friend.”1

When the star of Abdul Hamid was setting, the
Germans won the friendship of the Young Turks,
which the British lost by inexplicable diplomacy.
After the Balkan War, the German ambassador pub-
licly declared: “The time has come when the Father-
land may attach to the Asiatic provinces the warning,
‘Touch me not!’” So when the present war was
declared, it is no wonder that the crowds made a
great demonstration in front of the German embassy.
The Ambassador spoke to them of the struggle as one
for the real welfare of Islam before which there was
victory and a glorious future. In this connection we
may recall the telegram which a great mass-meeting
of Persians and their sympathizers sent from Stam-
boul to the Kaiser, beseeching his help against Eng-
land and Russia on behalf of Persia. Germany had
played its game of diplomacy so as to impress the
Moslems, of Turkey and Persia at least, with her
friendship. Of small importance, and intended only
to inspire the populace, were the reports that the
Kaiser had become a Mohammedan and had adopted
the name Haji Mohammed Wilhelm, and was wearing
a fez, as the photograph showed, and that his haram
was coming to visit the Sultan in the captured dread-
naughts of the British; that the Germans had become
true believers and in proof of their anti-Christian
feelings had sent views of the ruined churches of

1 When I saw the glaring metal tablet at Baalbek, placed to
commemorate the Kaiser’s visit, I thought it exceedingly incon-
gruous in those sublime ruins.

Belgium; that they had appointed a Mohammedan
governor of Belgium, and the Belgians themselves
were desirous of becoming Moslems. Even a con-
sular agent of Germany in Persia is said to have pro-
fessed to be a Mohammedan in order to win the Per-
sians to the jihad.

Lest you be too much astonished at these things,
behold the other great Protestant Power of Europe
vying with Germany in being the friend and assister
of Islam. Sardar Wingate of the Sudan said in his
proclamation on behalf of the British Government
(Near East, January 1, 1915): “From the religious
aspect also we [Great Britain] have brought the holy
places within a few days’ journey of Khartum. We
have subsidized and assisted the men of religion. We
have built and given assistance to the building of new
mosques all over the country. The Kadis and others
have received free and thorough education in the
Koran and in the tenets of the Mohammedan religion.
… Great Britain will continue to improve in every
possible manner the facilities for the practice of the
Mohammedan religion.” The High Commissioner in
Egypt, representing King George, in the formal ad-
dress to the new Sultan Husain Kamal, declares that
“The strengthening and progress of Mohammedan
institutions in Egypt is naturally a matter in which
his Majesty’s government takes the deepest interest.”
Lieut.-Col. A. C. Yate, member of Parliament, at a
session of the Central Asian Society, presided over
by Sir Mortimer Durand, said: “If ever a great
Mussulman confederacy was to be formed, it must
be done with the fullest sympathy and support of the

British Empire. The day might come when Great
Britain might stand forth as the champion of Islam,
of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan in alliance with
the Mussulmans of India.”

THE PROCLAMATION OF THE HOLY WAR

The Jihad, or Holy War, was proclaimed with due
ceremony, before an immense crowd at the Mosque
of Mohammed the Conqueror at Constantinople. By
legal custom, questions were asked and formally an-
swered by the Fatva-amini, this constituting a lawful
declaration. In this the call is made to all Moslems,
“old and young, living in all parts of the world,” in-
cluding those living under the governments of Russia,
England, and France, to join battle against the enemy,
with their persons and their property; otherwise their
conduct is “a great revolt against the Omnipotent
and liable to celestial punishment, and if they fight
against the Sultan they are to be punished with hell-
fire.” The proclamation was repeated all over the
country and with special ceremony at Jerusalem.
The concourse gathered at the Dome of the Rock, the
rock-top of Mt. Moriah, the altar of Abraham. The
Kazi of Medina was brought to add impressiveness to
the occasion. Just as he rose to read, a thunder-
storm interrupted him. In a lull he began again,
when a fierce wind tossed the flag from its staff at
his feet. The Kazi was alarmed at these evil omens
and tremblingly read the proclamation, after which
he fell into a fit, and died within three days (Near
East, 1914, p. 384). Far and wide throughout all

Islam the proclamation of the Jihad was sent.
Through the press, through tracts, and travelling
agents the Holy War was urged upon the faithful.
Bulletins were scattered by aeroplanes over the armies
of the Allies in Belgium and France to call the Mos-
lem soldiers of Algeria, Senegal, and India to al-
legiance to Islam. Let me give some extracts from
a proclamation of the Jihad: “To the millions of
Islam! ‘God will punish them in your hand; ye
will overcome them!’ (Koran). Oh, ye faithful, what
do ye wait for? How often have the savage Rus-
sians, the traitorous English, the Frenchmen born of
impure parentage, planted their unclean flags upon
your holy mountains. Oh, ye helpless people of India,
of the Oxus, of Tunis and of the orphan isles, and
you wretched tribes of Turkey. Ye have become
slaves of the people of the Cross. If you desire
honour and glory, houris and damsels, behold all are
in the grasp of your sword. Attack your enemies
from every side. Whenever you meet them, kill them.
Quicken the failing proclamation of the Unity. Listen
to the will of God, the desire of your prophet, the
command of the Caliph that you give no rest to the
enemy. If you have no arms, tear his throat with your
teeth. Jihad! Jihad! Oh, Moslems! The Great
God is ordering you to fight everywhere. God will
give you the victory. He gives you the houris and
the damsels of heaven.”

Turks and Germans expected great things from the
Jihad. Ali Fahmi Mohammed (in The Near East)
declared: “Egypt would revolt against England in
a world-wide conflict or any serious rising in India.”

Hafiz Bey Ramazan, an Egyptian Nationalist, had
been assured that the Kaiser expected to plan his at-
tack in connection with an uprising in India and
Egypt. Grothe (quoted by Hurgronge: “The Holy
War,” p. 36) anticipated that on Turkey’s proclaim-
ing the Holy War, the Moslems would attack their
masters “here with secrecy and ruse, there with
fanatical courage,” and especially to the undoing of
England. Mr. Carl Peters, the African traveller,
voiced this expectation (quoted from Professor Vam-
bery in “Islam: A Challenge,” p. 239): “There is
one factor which might fall on our side of the balance
and in case of a world-war might be made useful to
us: That factor is Islam. As Pan-Islamism it could
be played against Great Britain as well as against the
French Republic; and if German policy is bold enough,
it can fashion the dynamite to blow into the air the
rule of the Western Powers from Cape Nun, Mo-
rocco, to Calcutta.”

The ambitious scheme had in some minds this con-
summation, that there should be in the world two
great empires; the Caliph should be ruler of all Islam
and the Kaiser of all Christendom.

It is not strange that many persons with a knowl-
edge of the intense disloyalty and hatred that prevails
among Moslem subjects of Christian Powers and of
the propaganda that had been carried on through so
many years, should have anticipated great results from
the call to the Jihad. They miscalculated indeed, but
did not misjudge Moslem feelings. The Moslem peo-
ple did not make a general uprising. We need not,
however, give too much value to the proclamations

of loyalty issued in Egypt, India, Zanzibar, Algeria,
and Central Asia. These might be diplomatic utter-
ances accompanied even by secret disloyal plottings.
But two reasons account for the failure of the call
to the Jihad. The first and greatest was the convic-
tion that the Jihad did not promise success. The
Moslem leaders of Asia and Africa could not believe
that the united force of Great Britain, France, and
Russia could go down in defeat. These are the great
and conquering empires whose power they have felt.
They looked upon Turkey as broken, overcome by
Italy and by her own late subjects, the Balkan States.
Besides if the Germanic Alliance should be victorious,
they felt that they would only be changing one Chris-
tian master for another, and as one Moslem expressed
it, quoting Shakespeare:

“Thus must we from the smoke into the smother.”

In addition to this the wily head of Pan-Islamism
was gone and the Islamic world has a suspicion of, if
not a detestation for, the Young Turks as a set of
worldly, Europeanized men with little care for the
faith as such, and of the Committee of Union and
Progress as a sceptical group of Crypto-Jewish
Dunmas and wine-bibbing modernists, who are playing
with the jihad as a political instrument. Besides they
felt the incongruity of fighting for the faith of Islam
in union with an army partly composed of and com-
manded by Christians.

However, had the Austro-Germans conquered the
Allies and the campaigns of Turkey in Egypt, the
Caucasus, and Persia been successful, the Moslem

world would have been agitated to its depths and its
widest extent. There is no doubt that Egypt, Tripoli,
Algeria, Morocco, the Sudan from east to west, in-
cluding the powerful Sanusiyahs, would welcome an
opportunity to cast off the hated infidel yoke. Persia
would rejoice to attack the Russian bear, could it feel
assured that its teeth were extracted and its paws
disabled. As to India we hear well-worded expres-
sions of loyalty from the official class, but we do not
hear from the great sixty millions of steadfast
Sunnis who, no doubt, would join the Hindus to throw
the British into the Indian Ocean, if confident of ulti-
mate victory. The twenty million Moslems of Russia
are of the same mind. In all these lands there are
few Moslems loyal to their Christian rulers. To be
so is contrary to the law, instinct, and spirit of Islam.
They would prefer to be as Afghanistan, with a civil-
ization of the Middle Ages and under the old-time
absolutism of a Mohammedan ruler, than to have the
culture and education of Aligarh College, under the
British Raj. Albeit their progressive men hope for
twentieth-century civilization with the Mohammedan
faith and political independence. To obtain the latter
they would welcome the first favourable opportunity,
not because the Turks proclaim a jihad, but because
it is the deep and fervent desire of their hearts. Con-
vince them of a successful issue, and rebellion will
follow. In this lies the danger in a repulse of the
Allies at the Dardanelles. For their retreat might be
the signal for a tremendous upheaval in other Mos-
lem lands. It will create a serious problem for the
Christian colonies and camps in Africa and Asia if

the Jihad becomes universal, while the forces of
Christian nations are engaged in Europe.

The Turk, wherever his hand reaches, is waging his
Holy War with terrible reality. See it in action with
all its old-time fanaticism. Tens of thousands of
Christians in Urumia and Salmas, Persia, have fled
for their lives, abandoning all. Their villages, homes,
and churches have been destroyed, and their women
ravished. The tribal Nestorians of the Kurdish
mountains have been driven into the Alpine fast-
nesses to perish of hunger, or to surrender to death
or Islam. Their patriarch, Mar Shimoon, is a fugi-
tive in a foreign land. Look over the mountains and
plains of Asiatic Turkey and see the ruthless Holy
War waged against the defenceless Armenians.
Their strong men butchered in cold blood or drafted
into the army to be slaughtered in the van. The old
men and children set adrift in the wildernesses to per-
ish. All the goodly women subjected to unspeakable
dishonour or carried off to the harams of the Turks
and Kurds and forced to Islamize. Thousands of
villages and towns and districts depopulated. Hun-
dreds of thousands of Christians, Armenians, Nes-
torians, Jacobites, Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholics,
and Protestants mercilessly destroyed, with the dia-
bolical purpose to wipe out Christianity from Turkey.
This is the ripened fruit of the reform movement of
the Young Turks.

We write over that movement and the attempt to
establish Constitutional government, as over that of
Persia: “Failure! Mene, mene, tekel! Weighed in
the balance! Found wanting! To be divided!” A

righteous issue of the war will be the dismember-
ment of Turkey, with the remnant deprived of the
power ever to proclaim a jihad or to persecute its
non-Moslem peoples.

A review of present-day movements among Mos-
lems shows that Islam is neither dead nor moribund.
It is full of life, action, agitation, of cross-purposes,
the resultant of contrary religious and intellectual
forces. Some are striving for the reform of the social,
intellectual, political, and religious life of Islam; some
are mighty to conserve and spread the old Faith; not
a few would strengthen the old fanatical zeal and
hatred of its people and call into exercise its perse-
cuting spirit. All these movements in Islam are
energetic, aggressive, determined, and anti-Christian.

Upon the Church of Christ, Islam is an urgent call
to duty, to faith and obedience. Facts and conditions
voice anew the command of Jesus Christ: “Go, preach
the Gospel to the Moslems.” The call is for a con-
trite heart, recognizing the long neglect of the Church;
for a sincere love which will overcome our crusader
spirit and quench thought of vengeance in prayer for
their repentance and forgiveness; for heroic faith
because of the supreme difficulties of the task; for
unfailing courage, knowing that the conversion of Is-
lam is the most arduous work that the Church has
undertaken. The need of and hope for Moslems is
a movement Christ-ward.

INDEX

A 136; propaganda, 137; num-
Abbasides, 24, 63, 67, 113, 170. bers, 137; compared to Ba-
Abdul Aziz, Sultan, 58, 59, haism, 138; Moslems on, 135;
103, 255, 256, 258, 261. inclusive, 135; use of press,
Abdul Baha, 129-131. 139
Abdul Hamid, 21, 41, 59, 63, Ahmad Sultan Shah, 247.
64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 72, 74, Al-Akbar Ibn Arabi, 24.
85, 88, 104, 151, 181, 207, 208, Al Askari, 170.
233, 258-265, 272-273, 284. Al Azhar, 31, 98, 106, 175-176,
Abdul Kadir (Algeria), 87, 183, 236.
219. Al Bakri, Sheikh, 158, 160.
Abdul Kadir Jilani, 24. Al Sarraj, 17.
Abdul Mejid, 40, 255, 256. Albanians, 62, 182, 239, 270,
Abdullah II, 56. 273, 276.
Abdullah, Mulvi, 168. Alcohol (see Wine).
Abubekr, 20. Algeria, 25, 26, 45, 77, 87, 95,
Abu Hanifa, 13, 21. 104, 219, 290.
Abul Huda, 63, 64, 264. Ali Allahis, 61, 125, 126.
Abyssinia, 109. Aligarh, 163, 223, 290 (see
Acca, 115, 124, 128, 130. Schools; India).
Achmad Abdullah, cited, 99, Ali, Imam, 20, 72, 73, 112, 117,
103, 105. 267; exalted to divinity, 27,
Adrianople, 31, 124, 128. 29, 44, 126.
Afghans, Afghanistan, 25, 26, Ali Mohammed (see Bab).
42, 69, 70, 93, 134, 189, 222, Ali Nur-i-Din, Sheikh, 115.
240, 286, 290. Alivis, 98 (see Ali Allahi).
Africa, 21, 22, 26, 33, 42, 62, 77, Allegorical interpretations, 16,
87, 0, 99, 145, 173, 196, 212, 21, 127.
217, 219, 222, 223, 226, 227, America, 71, 109, 150; Baha-
236, 290; penetration by Is- ism in, 130, 131.
lam, 94-105 (see Sudan). Amir Ali, Justice, 32, 64, 66,
Africa, South, 96, 102, 109. 111, 121, 164-167, 169, 170,
Aga Khan, 229; cited, 89, 92, 201, 212, 229.
188. Animism, 45, 46.
Ahli Koran, 168. Annam, 46.
Ahmad Ahsai, Sheikh, 116, 155. Anti-Christ, 114.
Ahmad Khan, Sayid, 163, 187, Arabi Pasha, 63, 71, 232.
229. Arabia, 25, 36, 54, 55, 57, 69,
Ahmad, Sayid of Oudh, 56. 85, 101, 164, 221, 262.
Ahmadiyas, founder, 132; Arabic, 97, 106, 173, 175, 186,
claims, 133: teachings, 134; 192, 199.
hostile to Christianity, 134; Arabs, 62, 67, 74, 90, 103, 169,
proofs, 135; imprecations, 182, 195, 200, 238, 270, 275,
276.

Armenians, 81, 83, 84, 89, 93, compared to Ahmadiyas, 138-
98, 121, 199, 251, 256, 261, 139; 146, 155, 169.
263, 265, 270, 275, 277, 283, Baku, 162.
291 (see Christians, massa- Balkans, 88, 90, 209, 220, 227,
cres of). 276, 277, 289.
Arnold, T. W. (cited, 45, 47, Batinis, 121, 127.
57, 86, 94, 95- Battaks, 57, 85, 93, 228.
Aryans, 22. Bayan, 119, 121.
Asceticism, 19, 20. Bayazid, Sultan, 21.
Asia, Central, 162, 163, 174, Becker, Prof., cited, 33, 38.
175, 218; 289, 290. Beduins, 28, 74, 75, 200, 237.
Assassins, 114, 125. Beirut, 152, 192, 207, 212, 282.
Assassinations by Sultans, 66; Beluchistan, 25, 26.
by Bahais, 124; as a prac- Berbers, 25, 62.
tice, 169 note. Bliss, E. M., cited, 65, 78, 84.
Astrology, 33, 45, 63. Books, censored, 78.
Atchin, 65, 87, 93- Boudros Pasha, 235, 236.
Azal (see Subh-i-Azal). Brahmanism (see Hindus).
Azalis, 124, 169, 243. Britain, Great, British, 56, 66,
67, 69, 71, 84, 90, 135, 137,
B 177, 180, 217, 242, 253, 260,
Bab, title, 117; history, 116- 277, 283, 286, 289; partiality
120; books, 116, 119 (see to Islam, 222-225; cultivating
Bayan); claims, 118, 121; at- favour, 285-286; in Sudan,
titude of government, 119; 141, 145, 146, 285, 286; in
imprisonment, 119; execu- Egypt, 184, 233-238; in In-
tion, 120; reforms, 121, 122; dia, 187, 188, 222, 281, 287.
successor, 123; 146, 153, Brown, J. P., cited, 16, 24, 258.
155. Browne, E. G., cited, 15, 71, 72,
Babis, 62, 74, 169, 243, 250; 73, 89, 116, 123, 154, 158, 242,
wars of, 119; brutalities, 119; 243.
attempt on Shah, 120; in- Bukhara, 65, 76, 175, 211.
carnations among, 123. Bulgaria, 220, 222, 263, 265,
Babism, 116-122; doctrines, 275, 276.
121, 123; rites, 122; results,
122, 123. C
Bagdad, 24, 52, 63, 67, 112, 123, Cairo, 31, 52, 67, 99, 110, 174,
124, 170, 183, 215, 268. 175, 185, 212, 233, 236.
Baha Ullah, history, 123, 124, Cairo Conference, 174, 176.
129; polygamist, 128; claims, Caliphate, 69, 151; Osmanli,
124, 125; as fulfilment, 126; 63-67; by whom acknowl-
worshipped, 128; doctrines, edged, 64-65, 103, 104; em-
127; writings, 127-128, 133. phasized, 69; ordered massa-
Bahaism, its system, 124; rela- cres, 83.
tion to Babism, 123, 124; Caliphs, 13, 43, 52, 56; titles,
laws, 128; rites, 128; peace- 64; insignia, 64; qualifica-
advocate, 129; pilgrimage, tions, 64, 66; may be de-
130; its quarrels, 129; propa- posed, 67; supreme, 76; 105,
ganda in West, 130-131; con- 113, 117, 200, 266, 277,
verts in America, 130-131;

Capitulations, 279-282. Clergy, Mohammedan (see
Caste in Islam, 44. Mullahs), development of,
Caucasus, 76, 87, 205, 221, 246. 29, 30; classes, 31.
Celibacy, 20. Committee of Union and
Charms, 24, 33. Progress (see Young Turks).
China, 44, 65, 77, 87, 106, 192, Constantinople, 21, 22, 31, 34,
204, 228. 41, 52, 56, 64, 69, 71, 81, 82,
Chiragh Ali, Maulvie, 167. 84, 98, 104, 105, 152, 169, 190,
Christ, Lord Jesus, 23 (see 207, 212, 217, 224, 229,
Jesus). 233, 237, 270, 271, 274, 277,
Christian converts, 28, 51, 109, 286.
136, 239, 256-257. Constitution (see Persia, and
Christians, Christianity (see Turkey).
Missions), 23, 30, 43, 44, 50, Copts, 185, 236, 237.
51, 54, 61, 96, 98, 103, 107, 109, Crawford, S., 29.
147, 166, 169, 174, 187, 191, Creed (Moslem), 18, 46, 60,
192, 201, 210; hatred for, 74, 250.
75, 76, 77, 80, 81, 103, 220, Cromer, Lord, 12, 77, 158,
221, 259, 277; of the devil, 169, 192, 194, 204, 214, 224,
76; must be subject, 85, 86; 233.
in Babism, 121; in Bahaism, Crusades, 43, 60, 91, 220.
129, 131; Mirza Ahmed on,
133-135; in Turkey, 59, 63, D
69, 181, 224, 279; efforts to Damascus, 31, 283.
cripple, 78; books censored, Danfodio, Osman, 57, 93.
78-79; work repressed, 79; Dar-ul-Harb, 43, 56, 86, 221.
enslaved, 211; efforts to Is- Dar-ul-Islam, 43, 86.
lamize, 79, 93; contempt for, Darvishes, 19, 21, 230, 270;
81; persecutions of, 81, 82, their feats, 19; lodges, 20,
213; churches taken, 82, 83; 22, 24, 101; for Pan-Islam-
massacres of, 66, 261, 275, ism, 68, 77; reforms in, 160,
282, 283, 291; cause of, 83; 257; orders of, 19, 21; wide-
had religious motive, 79; list spread, 22; influential, 26,
of, 83, 84; ordered by Sultan, 258; propagandists, 95, 98-
83; accepting Islam, 84, 184; 105, 108; Maulavis, 18, 22;
women outraged, 199, 291; Baktashi, 19, 21, 98; Kadiri-
reforms for, 217, 220, 256- yah, 20, 98, 99, 102; Ma-
260; united with young daniyah, 77; Nakshbandi, 20;
Turks, 263; rejoiced with, Mahdiist, 139-145; Rufai,
265; under Constitution, 268- 21, 63; Sadiyah, 160; Sa-
270, 274-276; military ser- nusiyah, 22, 77, 99-105 (see
vice, 274, 282; discriminated Sanusi, Sufiism).
against, 223, 224, 225, 274, Dissimulation, 120, 129.
275, 277; national aspirations, Divination, 33.
227; rights abrogated, 278 Divorce, 40, 122, 128, 135, 196-
(see Armenians; Greeks; 198.
Copts; Nestorians); in Per- Dowie, J., 136.
sia, 155, 156, 179, 251, 291; in Dreams, 24.
Albania, 239, 276; Christian Druses, 82, 114, 125, 282.
civilization, 239-240, 262. Dutch East Indies, Islam in,
Circassians, 45, 273.

22, 26, 33, 34, 35, 45, 46, 81 F
note, 87, 88 note, 108, 115, Fanaticism, 55, 56, 59, 69, 74,
196, 204, 225 (see Java, Su- 81, 84, 114, 174, 225, 235, 258.
matra). Farquhar, J. N., cited, 108,
Dwight, H., cited, 31, 32. 132, 189.
Fast, 54, 58 (see Ramazan).
E Fatimides, 61, 67, 112, 114,
Edinburgh Conference, 222, 125.
224. France, 95, 149, 177, 211, 218,
Education, old style, 172-176; 224, 276, 277, 283, 286, 287,
in mosques, 172; curriculum, 288, 289.
173, 174; illiteracy, 176, 187; French language, 149, 180, 186,
traditional, 174 (see Theo- 278, 280.
logical Schools); modern, Fulahs, 57, 62.
152, 158, 162, 177, 187; non-
clerical, 191-192; effects, 192- G
193 (see Schools); of girls, Gairdner, W. H. T., cited, 42,
182, 183; in Egypt, 185-186; 159, 169, 185.
India, 187, 205; Russia, 205; Gasparinski, Count, 110, 162.
Persia, 206; Turkey, 206- Gazzali, Al, 20, 21.
208, 266; of Moslems in Eu- Germany, 130, 277, 283, 284.
rope, 104, 178, 180, 181, 182, Germany, Emperor of, 65, 226,
184, 185. 274, 284, 285, 288.
Egypt, Egyptians, 22, 41, 42, God, Sufi doctrine of, 15; as
45, 62, 63, 70, 71, 101, 104, incarnated, 121, 125, 126, 133;
112, 131, 150, 177, 198, 200, hulul, 126; repetition of
204, 205, 211, 231, 274, 285, name, 18, 100 (see Zikr).
287; Sultan of, 160, 138, 285; Goldziher, I., 36, 39, 47, 100,
modernism in, 158-160; press, 167.
190; in Sudan, 140, 141, 144; Gordon College, 98, 146.
Nationalists, 70, 90, 231-238, Gordon, Gen., 98, 140, 141, 142,
262, 287; history of, 233- 146.
238; causes, 234; legislature, Great Britain (see Britain).
237 (see Schools; Educa- Greeks, Greece, 22, 39, 49, 81,
tion). 88, 94, 132, 169, 170, 222, 227,
Enver Pasha, 184, 237, 264. 255, 263, 265, 270, 274, 276,
European influence, 149, 177. 281; massacred, 82-84.
European governments (of Griswold, H. D., 133, 137.
Moslems), 65, 71, 80, 90, Gulam Ahmad, Mirza (see Ah-
186; hold in subjection, 217- madiyas).
220; aggressions of, 90, 219,
220; attitude, 97, 109; par- H
tiality to Islam, 222-225, Habib Ullah, Amir, 42, 240.
226; assist it, 222, 223, 224; Hadi, Haji Sheikh, 157, 242.
discriminate against Chris- Hafiz, 16, 174, 191.
tians, 223-225; in India, 229- Hajis, 74, 75, 76; guides of, 34
231; Egypt, 232-238; num- (see Pilgrims).
bers, 218.
Europeans in Turkey, 59, 69,
255-256, 277, 279-280.

Hallaj Al, 20. Incarnations, 121, 125.
Haram, 195 (see Woman). Innovations (see Islam, modi-
Hasan Khan, Mukhbir-ul- fications of).
Mulk, 73, 244. International Review of Mis-
Hasheesh, Bhang, 16. sions, 29, 80, 95, 161, 193,
Hatti Humayun, 40, 256. 205, 212, 215, 224, 230.
Hatti Sherif, 40, 256, 268. Irak, 73, 152, 257.
Hausa, 62, 93. Islam (see Neo-Islam; Mod-
Hejaz, 52; railway, 74. ernism; Moslems), 149, 152;
Herrick, G., 86, 89. is it changeable?, 11, 13, 44,
Hindus, Hinduism, 22, 32, 44, 46-48, 49; reformable, 214-
45, 56, 107, 135, 136, 205, 229, 216; signs of decay, 52;
230, 231, 290. weak, 218; expecting tri-
Hiyat-ul-Qulub, 27. umphs, 89, 91, 221, 283, 292;
Holy War (see Jihad). divisions of, 61-62; parties
Houris, 88, 89. in, 49-51; unifying forces,
Hughes, T., 22, 112, 114. 60, 70, 74 (see Sects; Creed;
Hurgronje, cited, 68, 69, 76, Superstitions); periodicals
288. for, 6 (see Press); priest-
Husain Ali (see Baha Ullah). craft in, 32-34; scholasti-
Husain, Imam, 25, 56, 113, 139. cism, 21; lowers woman, 195-
197 (see Woman); propaga-
I tion by force, 55, 56, 57, 79,
Ibn Chaldoun, 15. 85-86, 94, 95; by missions
Ibn Hanbal, 13. (see Islamic missions, mod-
Ibn Malik, 13. ifications of, 14, 21, 35, 46-
Ibn Saud, 55. 48, 215; by Sufiism, 14, 20,
Ibrahim Pasha, 56. 22-23; by saint-worship, 23-
Idolatry, 44. 26; apotheosis of Moham-
Ijma (consensus), 35, 38, 48. med, 26-29; uncreated Ko-
Imams, 12, 23, 35, 50, 51, 54, ran, 29; development of
87, 112, 113, 116, 121, 146, clergy, 29-35; sheikh medi-
166, 249, 272 (see Ali; Hu- ators, 34; the Canon Law,
sain; Mahdi). 35-40; modern codes, 40-43;
Imperial Gazetteer of India, 45, accommodation to conditions,
137. 43; local superstitions and
India, 28, 43, 45, 49. 56, 69, 70, customs, 44-46; process of,
71, 74, 77, 87, 89, 90, 131, 48-49; shows its insufficiency,
132-137, 139, 150, 186, 200, 23; revival in Islam (see
204, 205, 211, 214, 218, 228, Wahabism; Pan-Islamism),
286, 290; Moslem awakening 52, 53; reasons for, 53, 57;
in, 107-108, 110, 171; lead- influence, 57-58; reactionary,
ers of, 229; press, 190; na- 58, 59; propagates the faith,
tionalism in, 229-231; pro- 94, .103, 105, 107.
gram of, 230 (see Moslem Islamic missions (see Islam),
Leagues). 94; new spirit of, 96; posi-
Indonesia (see Dutch East In- tion favourable, 96; means,
dies). 96-97; by darvishes, 98-105;
Indulgences, sale of, 33, by mullahs, 105; societies,
35. 107, 110; congresses, 110;
press, 108, 109; aided by

Christian governments, 97, K
98; success, 5, 102-103; in Kaaba, 13, 17, 34, 68.
Africa, 96-105; in Asia, 105- Kaffirs, 93, 222.
110, 222, 223, 224; Christians Kamal-ud-Din, 137.
Islamized, 105, 109, 137, 138; Kazi (Kadi), 30, 31, 32, 41,
in Japan, 110 175. 285, 286.
Islamic Review, 17, 137. Kazim Haji Sayid, 116.
Ismieliyah, 61, 112, 114, Keane, cited, 75, 147.
125. Kerbela, 25, 30, 56, 73, 75, 175,
Italy, 88, 90, 102, 175, 220, 227, 243-
276. Khairalla, I. G., 130.
Khalifa (see Caliphs), 72, 240.
J Khalifa of Mahdi, 113, 141,
Jabulsa, Jabulka, 113. 144.
Jalal-ud-Din, 15, 17. Khartum, 139-144.
Jamal-ud-Din, 70-72, 74, 151, Khavarij, 64.
158, 169, 242, 243, 246. Khedive, 56, 71, 74, 140, 169,
Jami, 15. 175, 176, 184, 204, 231, 232,
Janissaries, 21, 255. 234.
Japan, 89, 106, 228, 229, 246, Khojas, 68, 271.
281. Khuda Bakhsh, S., cited, 32,
Java, 26, 69, 74, 76, 161, 175, 37, 167-168.
225. Kibla, 14.
Javanism, 46. Kirghiz, 76, 205, 222.
Jerusalem, 13, 183, 275, 286. Kitchener, Lord, 144, 185, 236,
Jessup, H. H., cited, 67, 218, 237.
260. Kiyas, deduction, 36, 37, 38.
Jesus Christ, Lord, 114, 132, Koran, 15, 18, 20, 25, 27, 35,
133, 134, 138, 141, 164. 52, 98, 117, 121, 138, 139,
Jews, 31, 44, 61, 85, 121, 134, 153, 155, 160, 164, 173, 174,
237, 251, 263, 264, 268, 269, 195, 201, 240; uncreated, 29;
270, 271, 273, 282. has little legislation, 36, 40;
Jihad, Holy War, 5, 43, 49, 61, modernism on, 164, 166-168;
104, 167, 222, 288, 290; used 169; “Back to the Koran,”
to propagate faith, 55, 56, 50, 54, 159, 160, 168; trans-
57, 93; also by Wahabis, 54- lations, 138, 167, 190-191;
56; obligatory, 55, 56; en- Ahli Koran, 168; cited, 30
joined by Mohammed, 85; note, 85-86, 87, 88, 135, 200,
by Mahdi, 143; till resurrec- 203, 210, 287.
tion, 86; restrained by fear, Koreish, 43, 64, 67.
87; by expediency, 87; in- Kuenen, cited, 35.
voked against sects, 87, 88; Kufa, 72, 113.
proclamations of, 88, 106; in Kurds, 61, 62, 152, 200, 239,
present war, 286-289; effec- 253, 270, 276, 277, 296.
tive, 88; condemned by Kuzil Beshi (see Ali Allahi).
Baha, 129; by Ahmadi-
yas, 134; by Neo-Moslems, L
168. Lahore, 25, 107, 108, 187.
Judgment Day, 33. Lane-Poole, Stanley, 12, 36, 47,
Junaid, Al, 20. 170, 194, 195, 197, 199.

Law, Sacred (Shariat), 17, 25, Malays, 22, 76, 109, 173, 223,
30, 53, 54, 66, 73, 153, 224, 225, 227 (see Dutch East
235-236, 240, 258, 279; inter- Indies).
preter of, 31; origin of, 35, Malcom Khan, 242, 243.
167; small part from Ko- Mann, Oscar, 47, 53, 89.
ran, 36, 167; borrowed, 37- Marabout, 10, 25, 26.
39, 47; Goldziher on, 36, 39, Margoliouth, Prof., 18, 46, 48,
47; complex, 38; indebted 202, 215.
to Christianity, 39; supple- Marriage, 20, 40, 44, 45, 122,
mented by urfi in Persia, 168 (see Polygamy).
40; by code in Turkey, 40- Marseya Khan, 25, 34.
42, 58, 257; conflict, 41-42; Masonic order, 98, 263, 271.
regarding interest, 41-42; ac- Massacres (see Christians).
commodated, 43; mixed with McCallagh, F., cited, 67, 260,
Hinduism, 44-45; animism, 273.
46; process of change, 48- Mecca, 13, 25, 33, 34, 43, 51,
49; on jihad, 85-88; Neo- 52, 55, 56, 57, 60, 64, 67, 68,
Islam on, 165, 168, 203; re- 70, 72, 74, 75, 99, 106, 110,
lation to Constitutions, 250, 117, 147, 164, 174, 211, 240
266-271. (see Sherif).
Law, Roman, source of Mos- Mediators, 18, 34 (see Saint-
lem Law, 37-39, 49, J 67- worship; Mohammed Ali).
Lebanon, 82, 282. Medina, 52, 54, 55, 64, 74, 113,
Leeder, S. H., 159, 185. 183, 286.
Lucknow, 108, 187. Mehemet Ali, Khedive, 56.
Merrick, J. L., 27.
M Miracles, 23, 155, 165, 167.
Macdonald, D. B., 19, 22, 26, Miraj, 155. 165, 167.
37, 48, 161, 215. Missionary Review of the
Mahdi, Mahdiism, 51, 62; ex- World, 32, 35, 57, 77, 87, 88,
pectation of, 50, 113, 114; 91, 107, 115, 133, 147, 161,
doctrine of, 112; history, 162, 225, 239.
112-116; the hidden Imam, Missions, Moslem, 51 (see Is-
113, 117; Mahdis many, 56, lamic missions).
101, 113, 114, 115, 132, 134, Missions to Moslems, 5, 14,
147, 218 (see Bab; Baha Ul- 97; hindered, 98, 132, 281-
lah; Ahmadiyas); causes of, 282; imperative, 103; need
146-147; significance, 148. of, 111, 148, 149, 193; oppor-
Mahdi of Sudan (Mohammed tunities, 179, 184, 226; en-
Ahmad), 62, 63, 87, 98, 233; couragement, 213; critical
history of, 139-145; propa- time, 216, 292; Dutch Gov-
ganda, 139-140; occasion, 140; ernment favours, 225; schools
victories, 141-143; marks of, of, 156, 183, 184, 187, 206,
142; laws, 142-143; degen- 208, 281 (see Christian Con
eracy, 143; polygamy, 144; verts).
tomb destroyed, 145, 220; Modernism in Islam, 149, 150,
dire results, 145-146. 160, 228 (see Neo-Islam).
Mahkama, 40, 59. Modifications in Islam (see Is-
Mahmud II, Sultan, 40, 58, 66, lam, modifications of).
255. Mohammed, 18, 20, 24, 33, 61,
62, 64, 78, 100, 110, 117, 133,

135, 138, 164, 165; “Life of pathy with Turkey, 90, 230,
Mohammed,” 27, 164, 165, 277; under Constitutions,
167, 168; made changes, 13; 248-253, 265-272.
glorification of, 26-29, 44, Moslem World, cited, 19, 38,
100, 169; pre-existence, 26- 107, in, 132, 133, 187, 192,
27; Nur-i-Mohammed, 27, 205, 210, 268.
167; sinlessness, 27, 28, 167; Mosques, 106, 146, 172, 186,
intercessor, 28, 168; birthday, 223, 225.
29, 54; made few laws, 36; Mufti, 31, 43, 99, 175.
traditions assigned to, 35, Mufti, Grand, 41, 158, 159, 175,
117, 146, 153, 154, 192; on 235.
sects, 61; enjoined jihad, 85; Muharram, 25, 34, 73, 156, 241.
on woman, 197-198, 200; as Mujtahids, 30, 36, 38, 48, 72,
example, 86, 167, 195, 199, 73, 87, 123, 156, 157, 241, 243,
200; “Back to Mohammed,” 245, 249, 250.
50, 159, 166. Mullahs, 42, 75, 146, 153, 157,
Mohammedanism (see Islam; 172, 223, 248, 265; classes of,
Moslems). in Persia, 30; in Turkey, 31;
Mohammed Abdu, Sheikh, 158, duties, 30, 32, 105, 106;
159, 169, 175- power, 32 (see Clergy;
Mohammed Ahmad (see Mahdi Ulema).
of Sudan). Muridism, 72.
Mohammed Ali, Shah, 156, Music in Islam, 18, 99.
179, 245, 252. Mustashar-ud-Doulah, 73, 243,
Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahab 244.
(see Wahabism). Mutasharis, 53, 155.
Mohammed V Rashad, 22, 273. Mutavalsul, 64, 67.
Morocco, 68, 74, 90, 99, 101, Mutazali, 160, 170.
175, 211, 276, 290. Muzaffar-ud-Din, Shah, 244,
Moslems, 121, 150; interest in, 247.
5, 6; movements, 6, 11, 13, Mystics, Mysticism, 14, 17, 21,
40, 49-51, 94, 114, 147, 148- 34, 99 (see Sufis).
151, 177, 191-193, 228, 292;
no longer unitarian, 28-29; N
new mode of initiating, 46; Najef, 30, 73, 174, 243.
numbers in races, 62, 283; Nasr-ud-Din Shah, 71, 157, 169,
intellectual life, 172 (see Ed- 179, 241, 242, 243.
ucation; Schools; Press); Nationalism, 5, 62, 220-221,
reaction, 231; borrowing civ- 227-239; developing, 227; pa-
ilization, 239-240; expecta- triotism, 228 (see India;
tions, 114, 148; adjustment Egypt; Albanians).
under Christian rule, 219- Negroes, 62, 226 (see Africa).
222; expatriation, 221; race Neo-Islam, 51, 149, 150; how
secondary, 222, 227; not loyal, brought about, 149-150, 152;
222, 226, 227, 228; allied with how evidenced, 150; repres-
Christians, 43, 289; hatred of sion of thought, 151-153; lib-
Christians (see Christians; eral thought, 152; among
Massacres; Nationalism; Eu- Ulema, 153; leaders in Per-
ropean Governments; Fanat- sia, 155-157; relation to
icism); Moslem Leagues, 90, Christians, 155-156; religious
107, 164, 203, 229, 271; sym-

dissatisfaction, 157; promot- ture, 60; object, 60, 61; or-
ers in Egypt, 158; their cry, ganized by Caliph, 63-67;
159; retain and modernize, Mecca as a centre, 67, 68;
160; reforms, 160; as to as- agents, 68; use of press, 69,
sassination, 169; rapid ad- 77; negotiations with Shiahs,
vance in Malaysia, 161; 70-74; expense of, 68; apos-
changes of habit in Russia, tle of, 71; Pan-Islamic So-
161; education, 162; progress ciety, 72; rejected by rulers,
among Tartars, 162, 163; 74; hajis as propagandists,
leaders in India, 163-168; ra- 74-75; congenial to Arabs,
tionalistic, 164, 166, 170; as 74; widespread, 76-77; anti-
to Mohammed, 165, 167; as Christian, 78-80; led to mas-
to law, 165, 166, 168; as to sacres, 85; relied on jihad,
Koran, 164, 166, 168; Mutaza- 84-89; estimates of, 89-93;
lite, 170; anti-Christian, 169; manifestations of, 91, 96.
favours religious liberty, 212, Pantheism, 14, 15, 44, 115.
213, 216; prospects of, 214- Paradise, 88, 135.
215; can Islam be reformed?, Passion-Play, 25, 73.
214-216; reaction from, 231; Pears, Sir Edwin, cited, 65, 66,
modernism in education, 177- 81, 98, 104, 153, 194, 204, 209,
189, 191-193; in society, 194- 213, 283.
211 (see Woman; Slavery). Persecutions, 13, 81-82, 212,
Nestorians, 82, 251, 291. 213 (see Christians).
New Testament, 30, 31. Persia, 5, 66, 72, 73, 74, 79, 112,
Notovich, N., 134. 117, 121, 131, 139, 198, 199,
Nusairiyahs, 114, 117, 125 (see 211, 221, 229, 259; home of
Ali Allahis). Sufiism, 14, 21; Shiahs in,
70-73 (see Shiahs, Babism,
O Bahaism); influence on Is-
Oman, 65. lam, 14, 22, 37, 39, 170, 171,
Omar, 13, 64, 73, 278. 215; common law, 40; saint-
Omar-i-Khayyam, 17. worship, 25, 29; mullahs, 30,
Opium, 52, 56, 122. 32, 248; modernism in, 153-
“Orient,” cited, 92, 182, 183, 157, 204; new education,
209, 283. 177-179; Shah’s College, 178;
Ottoman (see Turkey). press, 189; freedom of
Ottomanization, 182, 266, 268, speech, 233; borrowing civil-
276-282; of races, 276, 278, ization, 239-240; politically,
282; abolishing capitulations, 217, 231, 284, 286; reforms,
279-281. 241; leaders of, 241-242; agi-
tations, 242-244; cause of,
P 243, 245-246; tobacco monop-
Pachpiriyas, 45. oly, 273; agrarian conditions,
Padri sect, 56. 245; corruption, 246, 252;
Palestine, 43. Constitution in, 114, 131, 154,
Palgrave, 12, 21, 32, 34, 52, 53, 156, 178, 179, 213, 240, 242;
57, 92. origin of, 246; outline of,
Pan-Islamism, 51, 104, 151, 189, 247-248; relation to religion,
226, 230, 234, 263, 277, 288, 248-250; aided by mullahs,
289; development of, 60; na- 248; relation to liberty, 250-
251; to non-Moslems, 251;

difficulties, 251; Nationalists, S
213, 249, 250; causes of fail- Saadi, 16, 174, 191.
ure, 252-253, 291; character Sadra, Mullah, 155.
of reformers, 252-253; Rus- Saints, intercession of, 23, 26
sia and Great Britain, 253; (see Sheikhs; Imams; Pirs;
in the present war, 93, 284, Valis).
285, 290; Christians in, 291. Saint-worship, 23-26; preva-
Persian language, 19, 173, 176, lence of, 23, 25, 26, 35, 45,
180, 186, 191. 115; denounced, 54, 100.
Persians, 15, 20, 39, 75, 125, Salim I, 63, 64, 82.
133, 169, 173, 176, 199, 200, Salonika, 152, 263, 271, 273.
204, 226. Sanusi, Sheikh, 77, 88; history
Petrograd, 71, 76, 106, 163. of, 99-102; Order, 100-101;
Philippines, 65. Mahdi, 101, 105, 115.
Pilgrimage, 25, 58, 68, 70, 110, Sanusiyahs, 100 (see Dar-
116, 122, 145, 168. vishes); influence of, 102;
Pilgrims, 24, 31, 56, 75 (see held slaves, 100, 102; propa-
Hajis). ganda, 102-104; their army,
Pirs, 23, 24, 26, 35, 48. 104, 105; jihad, 104, 105, 290.
Polygamy, 20, 66, 122, 135, 138, Sayids (descendants of Mo-
144, 166, 168, 196, 197, 201- hammed), 35, 45, 70, 221, 248.
203, 273; decreasing, 204, Schamyl, Sheikh, 72, 87, 115,
222. 219.
Prayer-rite, 26, 54, 58, 122, 143, Schools (for Moslems) in
167, 168. Africa, 97, 102, 186, 224;
Priests, Christian, 30 note. China, 106; Egypt, 184-186,
Priests in Islam, 29, 32-34, 35. 224, 235, 237; India, 107, 162,
Primal Will, 15, 27, 121. 178; Aligarh College, 163,
Punishments, 42, 128, 142, 143. 167, 187-188; project for
University, 188-189; results,
Q 189; Persia, 154, 172, 173,
Qadian, 132, 137. 178, 179; Russia, 105, 161,
162, 204; Turkey, 59, 173,
R 176, 180, 181-184, 260,
Railways, 74-75. 262, 281 (see Theological
Rajputs, 44, 45. Schools; Education).
Ramazan, 34, 41. Sects, 35, 44, 45, 56, 106, 125,
Ramsay, Sir William, cited, 22, 126, 155; Mohammedan, 61;
69, 80, 81, 196. number, 61-62, 168.
Review of Religions, 135, Sell, Canon, 17, 57, 77, 99, 168,
137. 214.
Rice, W. A., cited, 146, 170. Senegambia, 93.
Russia, 65, 67, 90, 217, 228, 246, Severance, L. H., 6.
258, 280, 283, 286, 287, 289, Shafi, Imam, 13.
290; in Persia, 156, 177, 243, Shah Abdul Azim (asylum),
245, 247, 250, 253, 254. 71, 244.
Russia, Islam in, 32, 105, 153, Shahs of Persia, 62, 73, 74, 113,
161-163, 190, 205, 211, 222; 119, 121, 155, 177, 221, 249;
Pan-Islamism, 76, 77. no religious authority, 30;
conflict with Shariat, 40, 221.

Shariat (see Law, Sacred). 14; pantheistic, 15; mystical,
Shawish, Sheikh, 183, 236, 237. 16; poets of, 16; antinomian,
Sheikhis, 61, 116, 121, 155, 156. 17; its paths, 17; zikr, 18;
Sheikhs, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 34, history, 20-22; prevalence,
48, 54, 65, 67, 95, 98, 99, 141, 21-22; origin, 22; an Indian,
157, 158, 160, 175. 44; rejected by Wahabis, 54
Sheikh-ul-Islam, 31, 71, 153, (see Darvishes).
206, 267, 269, 272. Sultan of Egypt, 169, 184.
Sherif of Mecca, 34, 64, 65, 67, Sultan, Osmanli, 31, 40, 56, 58,
74, 75. 62, 64, 65, 67, 73, 77, 89, 102,
Shiahs, 23, 25, 27, 30, 33, 34, 109, 140, 180, 183, 184, 211,
35, 44, 48, 55, 65, 73, 75. 87, 218, 226, 234, 237, 257.
112, 114, 117, 121, 139, 154, Sultans, 65, 279.
174, 198, 246, 249, 250: sects Sulus, 65.
of, 61, 112 (see Sheikhis); Sumatra, 56, 69, 76, 93, 225.
plan to join Sunnis, 69-73. Sunnis, 21, 23, 25, 27, 35, 44,
Shiraz, 116, 118. 48, 54, 56, 64, 67, 72, 87, 112,
Shrines, 16, 24, 25, 28, 71, 113, 139, 174, 290.
128, 130, 160, 199. Swan, G., 19.
Shuster, Morgan, 207, 247, 248, Sykes, Mrs., 198, 204.
252. Syria, 21, 29, 115, 125, 177, 210,
Siberia, 162. 221, 257, 265, 270, 276.
Sigat-ul-Islam, 156.
Sikhs, 56. T
Simon, G., cited, 22, 26, 29, 32, Tabriz, 25, 73, 117, 120, 154,
46, 65, 76, 88, 89, 91, 93, 226, 156, 179, 197, 206, 242, 243,
227. 244, 248, 250, 252.
Siraj-ud-Din, cited, 24, 28, 132. Tagiya (see Dissimulation).
Slatin Pasha, 142, 144. Takia (see Darvish lodges).
Slavery, 46, 56, 100, 102, 140, Tartars, 76, 162, 163.
166, 204, 256, 273, 274; slave Tears, in bottle, 34.
girls, 199, 212; Koran or- Teheran, 113, 120, 154, 156,
dains, 210; abolition, 211, 157, 179, 206, 212, 229, 243,
222; slave-trade being sup- 244.
pressed, 211. Theological schools, 30, 31, 52,
Smith, Bosworth, cited, 35, 47, 57, 106; in Mecca, 75; Shiah,
86, 166. 174; Sunni, 174, 176, 183,
Smyrna, 152, 224. 185, 186 (see Al Azhar);
Sohoto, 57, 93. condemned, 176.
Spain, 21, 215, 217. Tisdall, W. St. C, 165.
St. Sophia, 56, 65, 66, 270, 271. Tobacco, 54, 56, 99, 143,
Stamboul, 76, 77, 284 (see 273.
Constantinople). Traditions, 13, 18, 19, 20, 27,
Strafford de Redcliffe, 40, 255. 50, 88, 117, 132, 146, 154, 167,
Subh-i-Azal, 123, 124. 170, 174, 192; for Constitu-
Sudan, 22, 62, 87, 95, 98, 101, tion, 267; numerous, 35, 167;
104, 139-146, 196, 211, 212, not of Arabian origin, 36;
223, 290. invented, 39, 134; abrogated,
Sufis, Sufiism, 14-18, 20-22, 40, 43; on Caliphate, 64; re-
49, 61, 98, 99, 100, 105, 115, jected, 164-168.
128, 132, 155, 213; Persian,

Tripoli, 77, 88, 90, 104, 175, V
220, 237, 276. Valis, 23, 26, 48, 99.
Tufail, Ibn, 21. Vambery, A., 162, 288.
Turkey, 5, 21, 25, 30, 31, 32, Veil, 44, 122, 195, 200, 204, 205,
40, 44, 52, 58, 68, 69, 70, 71, 206, 207, 265.
88, 129, 131, 151-153, 226, Victoria, Queen, 65, 66.
229, 231, 286 (see Abdul
Hamid); reforms, 152, 180, W
204, 208-210, 239-240, 255- Wahabis, 26, 28, 35, 51, 62, 65,
257, 261; new codes, 40-42, 87, 96, 99, 100, 151, 160; his-
58, 257, 280; counsels, 68, tory of founder, 54; doc-
106; fear of revolution, 79; trines and reforms, 54; ji-
reactions, 58, 191; suppres- had used, 55; victories, 55;
sion of ideas, 78, 139, 151, its influence, 56-57; in In-
281; atrocities, 82-85, 86; dia, 56; in Africa, 57.
spy-system, 259-262; oppres- War, Holy (see Jihad).
sions, 260; Boy Scouts, 184; Washburn, Geo., 77.
Revolution, 236, 264-265 (see Watson, C. R., cited, 87, 145,
Turks, Young); Constitu- 161, 175, 196, 200, 224.
tion, 5, 41, 59, 152, 182, 211, Weitbrecht, Canon, 191.
240, 258, 261, 264, 272, 274; Westermann, Prof., 95, 98,
rejoicings, 264-265; provi- 196, 211.
sions of, 266; relation to Western Theological Semi-
Shariat, 266-272; Parlia- nary, 6.
ment, 270, 272; reaction, 270- Wherry, E. M., cited, 45, 132.
272; Sultan deposed, 272; Wingate, Col., cited, 140, 143.
reforms under, 273-274 (see Wine, wine-drinking, 16, 52,
Ottomanizing); capitulations 54, 58, 122, 143, 271.
abolished, 278-281; courts Woking, 109, 137.
corrupt, 281; failure, 291; Woman (see Education of
the present war, 5, 93, 169, Girls; Marriage; Polygamy;
226, 253, 282-291; jihad, 286- Veil; Divorce), 44, 45, 46,
287; atrocities against Chris- 122, 128, 135, 143, 154, 162,
tians, 291 (see Christians; 163, 176, 186, 187, 273; Is-
Education; Schools). lamic society a failure, 194;
Turkestan, 76, 162. woman’s degradation, 194;
Turks, 22, 43, 49, 62, 73, 84, 85, before Islam, 195-196; greater
86, 90, 103, 140, 185, 194, in Islam, 197-201; seclusion,
220, 222, 234, 237, 270, 275. 200-201; abductions, 199;
Turks, Young, 34, 152, 182, contract wives, 199; haram,
184, 204, 213, 236, 260-263, 200; scourging, 210; benefits
269, 270, 274, 275, 284, 289. claimed, 197; Neo-Islam: ad-
vocates freedom, 201; repu-
U diates polygamy, 201, 202; is
Ulema, 21, 30, 31, 32, 40, 42, decreasing, 204; and divorce,
43, 58, 64, 68, 74, 87, 99, 146, 202; seclusion, 202-203; les-
147, 150, 166, 174, 183, 213, sening, 204-206; improve-
230, 234, 246, 257, 258, 266, ment, 203-210; examples,
268, 270. 206, 207, 208; under Consti-
Usury, 42.

tutions, 207, 208, 265; wom- Yezidees, Islamized, 80.
an’s journals, 162, 208; new Young, Dr., 216.
liberty, 208-210; restrained,
209, 271. Z
Wurz, F., 159, 175. Zanzibar, 65, 74, 102.
Zikr, 18, 19, 100, 122, 160.
Y Zoroastrians, 44, 126, 205, 251.
Yahya, Mirza (see Subh-i- Zwemer, S. M., cited, 28, 87,
Azal). 91, 161, 190, 195.

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