Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, bahai-library.com.
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IRAN
The Illusion of Povver
ROBERT GRAHAM

Revised Edition

CROOM HELM LONDON
CONTENTS

© 1978 Robert Graham
Croom Helm Ltd, 2-10 St John's Road, London SWll Acknowledgements
Revised edition 1979

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Introduction to Revised Edition 11

Graham, Robert
Iran, the illusion of power.
Part I: The Creation of Modern Iran
1. Iran - Economic conditions - 1945 - 1. The Coming of the Boom 15
I. Title
330.9'55'05 HC475 2. The Growth of Urban Iran 22
ISBN 0-7099-0201-8 3. Oil and the Iranian Economy 32
ISBN 0-7099-0187-9 Pbk
4. Monarchy and the Pahlavi Dynasty 53

Part II: Cycle of the Boom
5. The Big Opportunity 77
6. Limits to Oil Wealth 93
7. Successes an~ Failures 105

Part III: The System of Power
8. Use and Abuse of Power 131
9. Control Through Money 154
10. Influence of the Military 170
11. Problems of Culture 192
12. Opposition and Revolution 208

13. Conclusion 245

Appendices 255

Index 268

Printed in Great Britain by
Lowe & Brydone Printers Limited, Thetford, Norfolk
<1< 1 Umits to Oil Wealth Limits to Oil Wealth 97

,á11lprit of higher prices. Among those arrested were two of Iran's more accept the fixed price, many importers preferred to just leave their
Slh\'cssful businessmen, Habib Elghanian and Mohammed Wahabzadeh. goods unclaimed. As much as 40 per cent of all goods lying on the
1-'l~~ll:lllian had built up a large plastics business with extensive retail quays at Khorramshahr was unclaimed in 1975. By the time the customs
i)11tkts; while Wahabzadeh was mainly concerned with cars, being came to auction them the goods were frequently too badly damaged to
s 11 lt• agent for BMW. A summons was also served in absentia on Habib be worth buying, so continuing to clutter the port. 13
S:iht•t. More importantly, an important opportunity to overhaul the coun-
I ligh profits were being made and some unscrupulous merchants try's distribution network was wasted. Reducing the middle man's
\\t'rt' taking advantage. Yet profiteering was a symptom, not a cause. profits did not solve the key question of getting goods quickly and
l'l1t• ~ause lay in the inability of production, or imports, to meet efficiently into the market. The technocrats in the Ministry of Co~­
dt•111and. The campaign was also highly selective, and it was significant merce would have liked to have seen this happen but the political will
that the most vigorous action was taken in those areas where the was lacking.
;\sl'iring middle class had been most affected - for instance the rising The obstructive tactics of the merchants, mainly the traditional
1..' 1'sls of buying and maintaining a car. Vahabzadeh was accused of merchants of the Bazaar, proved too strong; and the Shah was neither
sdli11g BMW cars for Rsl .08 million instead of Rs800,000. 12 ready nor willing to risk a confrontation. Indeed to mollify the merch-
I 11\posing draconian price controls in a severely overheated economy ants, Commerce Minister Fereidoun Mahdavi was removed on 7 February
W;\s inevitably disruptive and ultimately counter-productive. Matters 1976. He had been the main champion of reorganising distribution -
\Wrc not helped by the bands of ill-informed inspectors, frequently including the creation of a model market like London's Covent Garden
St\hlt'nts, sent out to check prices and decide sometimes with complete (a scheme which was shelved with his demise). 14 Some considered it
;\rhit rariness the correct price for a product. The price war was the first significant that the bigger names prosecuted in the anti-profiteering or
i' 1 'litkal test of the newly formed single party, Rastakhiz; and on at prices campaigns were often outsiders - members of the Bahai sect, like
l1.';\st 1Hle occasion youths in the name of the party and the municipality Sabet, or Jews, like Elghanian - who were resented by the Bazaaris.
"-h'kl'd a Tehran supermarket, said to be overcharging, in a manner
Oil as a Variable
~-...'miniscent of the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution in China.
l'ht' party subsequently admitted that its involvement in the prices The dampener on the boom came not from inside Iran but outside. Oil
,';\mpaign was a mistake - or rather that it would not be repeated. sales failed to meet expectation and revenues fell. By December 1975
,-\s a whole the price campaign was a failure. Official indices went oil production was running 20 per cent below the same period the
'"'" n for six months but black-market prices for essential commodities previous year. For the year as a whole the average daily production was
~\\.~' sharply. The shortages were not relieved, and if anything became almost 12 per cent down. 15
:~h,r1.' pronounced. Importers decided in many instances that if controls Throughout the summer sales had been slack. A surge of buying just
''•'n.' to be placed on profit margins of products it was more economic prior to the biannual OPEC meeting in Vienna in September 1975
:~,,t t1) import at all: the same applied to local manufacture. Elghanian's proved a temporary phenomenon. Continued world recession and a
:'~•\St ks operation, arguably the most efficient in Iran and marketing the mild European winter kept international demand sluggish. Iran was
:~~'"-"t sophisticated range of products, closed down, never to reopen. especially affected because of the nature of its crude oil: a 'light' crude
~~~1.'t. aged 72, stayed in Paris, refusing to return to run his empire and of high quality with a low sulphur content; and a 'heavy' crude with a
s,,u~ht to put his capital elsewhere. higher sulphur content suitable for fuel oil. 16 The heavy crude was most
l'hc anti-profiteering campaign and price controls also had a damaging similar to that of Kuwait, while the light competed with the high-volume
-.'t~~t on the ports. Because goods had been 'under-invoiced' the govern- crude of Saudi Arabia. Normally Iran exported a ratio of 52/48 light/
n~-t\t tlxed the price and profit margin on the price declared. This heavy. However, the mild winter severely affected demand for fuel
l'\~\t that importers were being made to sell at below cost price. oil, and through the complex OPEC pricing system that differentiated
Although a clever ruse by the government to encourage the importers various types of crude, Iranian heavy oil became uncompetitive, especi-
t\. h~ more honest, it backfired. Rather than declare the real price or ally when both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia reduced the price of their
220 Opposition and Revolution Opposition and Revolution 221
had been prominent religious figures, while his elder brother became Grievances of the Clergy
an ayatollah (see Appendix C). He first studied under the latter, then
Inside Iran the basic bone of contention with the regime of the moderate
moved to Isfahan, then to Arak before settling in the holy city of Qom.
clergy led by Ayatollah Shariat-Maderi was the increasingly ambivalent
Here he quickly earned a reputation so that even before he was 30 his
role of religion. The Shah exploited religion when it suited him and
philosophical teachings attracted a keen following among seminary
ignored it when it contradicted development needs. To this were added
students. He refused to see Islam in a narrow religious context but re-
a host of major and minor irritants. The loss of land owned by the
garded it as an all-em bracing moral force. In 1941 he wrote a book
mosques as a result of Land Reform remained a nagging sore - though
strongly attacking Reza Shah - the beginning of a sustained attack on
not as great as some would contend since compensation had been paid
the monarchy and Pahlavis. His writings appeared to be strongly influ-
and important religious endowments at Meshed and Qom had been
enced by nationalistic and moral considerations. Seeing Iran increasingly
retained. A greater complaint was the Shah's scheme to redevelop
dominated by Britain and Russia and witnessing the changes wrought
the Holy Shrine at Meshed which involved the destruction of large
on society during the Second World War, he determined to free Iran
segments of the old city. It was a classic instance of something being
from all foreign influence. His views have been remarkably consistent,
imposed from on high, wholly unaware of local opinion. The scheme,
his sole solution for Iran being an Islamic republic. 37
and the Shah's close identification with it, was so unpopular that bull-
Like several other of the clergy, suspicious of Mossadegh's ties with
dozers and construction equipment was frequently bombed or sabo-
the Tudeh Party, Khomeini took his distance from the National Front
taged .38 A more significant, and gratuitous, affront to the religious
during the 1953 oil nationalisation. The overthrow of Mossadegh left
community was the imposition of the monarchy calendar in 1976. This
Khomeini as one of the leading opposition figures and by 1962 he had
helped convince some of the moderate clergy that the Shah was bent on
established himself as a formidable presence, as well as one of Iran's destroying the Islamic roots of Iran.
leading ayatollahs. He opposed the Shah's proposals for land reform
There was also a groundswell of discontent over the Shah's efforts to
and the emancipation of women - the two pillars of the White Revolu- cow the clergy. Dissident voices inside Iran like Ayatollah Taleghani and
tion - at two levels (see Chapter 4). At one level he contested the Ayatollah Rouhani were jailed for alleged subversive activities which
legality of the Pahlavi dynasty and its prerogative to introduce such far amounted to no more than challenging the Shah's use of torture and
reaching reforms. At another he was challenging the regime which he political repression (see Chapter 8). The imprisonment of well-known
felt was using populist reform to weaken the traditional power and figures like Ayatollah Taleghani alienated ordinary people far more
authority of the clergy. The other clergy did not really share his per- than tough police handling of the former politicians or the guerillas.
sonalised crusade against the Pahlavis and the monarchy, but they Attempts to brand religious persons as political subversives rarely suc-
supported his concern that traditional areas of authority were being
ceeded, even if official propaganda tried to insinuate that these persons
eroded as the modem state assumed responsibility for education, birth were being manipulated by Marxists. 39
control, marriage and family laws.
At least three other factors were a source of friction with the clergy.
This was why the Ayatollah's arrest in June 1963 provoked such
(I) Corrnption. This has already been mentioned but it should be
riots. The clergy were fully behind him. Yet once Khomeini had taken
stressed that corruption even extended to the management of religious
up his forced residence in Najaf, Iraq in late 1964, the more moderate
affairs. For instance the chief officials concerned with organising the
clergy were relieved that such an uncompromising figure should be out
pilgrimage to Mecca were found guilty in 1976 of taking bribes from
of the way. Khomeini retained, however, a following in Iran, especially 40
pilgrims. (2) The uncertain nature of state financial support. The
at Qom where seminary students continued to commemorate the riots.
clergy were constantly concerned that the authorities would use state
From his Iraqi exile he refused to drop his crusade, denouncing the
support for endowments and religious institutions as a means of con-
lavish Persepolis celebrations organised by the Shah in 1971 and calling
trol. Increased financial costs as a result of the inflation since 1973 had
for a boycott of the Rastakhiz Party when it was established in 197 5.
weakened their financial independence.41 (3) The rise of Bahaiism.
But it was not until 1977 that the same forces that helped form a
Bahaiism is not officially recognised in Iran as it is considered an here-
broadly united front of religious protest in 1963 began to coalesce again.
tical Moslem sect whose founder was executed in Tabriz in 1851. This
222 Opposition and Revolution Opposition and Revolution 223

doctrine was based on the idea that certain holy men could be used as a disturbances at least 70 persons were killed - the bloodiest incident
means of communication between the people and the awaited, but since 1963.
hidden, Twelfth Imam. 42 Despite tremendous persecution Bahaiism The spontaneous response to this anti-Khomeini smear campaign,
prospered, earning itself the reputation of a freemasonry that in turn and the government's heavy-handed reaction, transformed the situation.
produced much slanderous gossip about Bahai ritual. The traditional The secular constitutional protest movement lost the initiative to the
clergy feared the growing presence of such 'heretics' in positions of religious inspired opposition, and the moderate clergy, still in the
power - whether close to the Shah (like his personal physician) or in majority, found themselves being outmanouevred by the more radical
business, like the banking magnate, Hozbar Yazdani. It was also held pro-Khomeini supporters. It is also probably correct to trace the begin-
against Hoveida that his father was a Bahai. (One explanation for nings of the clergy's awareness of their power to this incident at Qom.
Khomeini's strong anti-Israeli feeling has been the presence of the M~over that it should come from Qom itself was no accident. This
Bahai international headquarters in Haifa.) city had refused to allow the attributes of modern Iran to permeate:
there are no bars, cinemas, alcohol stores or luxury shops. It is a city
The Power of the Mosque
whose life revolves round the mosques and the seminaries so that it
All these elements combined to make the religious community inside could claim to have been 'unpolluted' by the Iran of the Pahlavis.
Iran deeply concerned when they too detected that the Shah's Great The clergy had a genuine constituency - the conservative mass of
Civilisation was fading into the distance and being replaced by popular the population who were puzzled, confused and bitter about the
discontent with no apparent change in the system of government. How- contradictory policies and broken promises of the Shah. These were
ever, first they were neither militant nor organised, and indeed seemed people who did not read newspapes and inherently mistrusted govern-
to have little sense of their own potential power. ment and who saw the mullah and the mosque as the repository of
Since 1976 when the first group of Iranian pilgrims was allowed to traditional values. At first the clergy's power was used to organise
visit Shiia shrines in Iraq, Ayatollah Khomeini had been able to keep in protest funeral processions for those killed in clashes with the security
closer touch with his supporters inside Iran.43 Tapes of his sermons forces. These drew on the Iranian tradition of large, highly emotional
attacking the regime were smuggled in with increasing frequency and mourning processions. At 40-day intervals these continued from Janu-
he was well able to exploit the regime's more tolerant attitude towards ary until August 1978. In the meantime, Khomeini, still in Iraq, was
mosque pronouncements in mid-1977. His tough rhetoric from outside transformed into a mythical symbol of the hidden Imam, who one day
raised the pitch of religious protest. By the autumn of 1977 the tenor would return to the Shila faithful. 47 But if the growing surge of protest
of sermons had changed and in many instances was becoming openly to the Shah's regime took an increasingly religious aspect, it was not
hostile to the Shah, while others called for observance of the Constitu- entirely attributable to the power of the clergy. The Bazaar and the
tion .44 With Khomeini once again in the public eye, the tempo of rootless urban proletariat played an important role.
protest quickened. The Ayatollah's own determination was hardened
The Bazaar
by the mysterious death of his son, Mostafa, in Iraq on 23 October,
apparently the work of SAVAK.45 Whether or not this belief was true The Bazaar is the hub of urban life in Iran. It serves not merely as a
the authorities certainly began to blame Khomeini for the emerging ' commercial centre but also as a unique type of community centre. It
religious unrest. On 7 January 1978 the leading Persian language daily, includes one, or several, mosques, public baths, the old religious schools
Etelaat, published an article attacking and slandering Khomeini. 46 It a?d nymerous tea houses. With so much activity condensed in a rela-
quickly filtered through that the article had been ordered by the t1vel)f small area, communication within the Bazaar is quick and easy,
Information Minister, Darioush Homayoun, an ambitious apparatchik and as a result the Bazaar has traditionally been the main source of
who had gained the post for his zealous activities in Rastakhiz. The P<;>litical mobilisation. This was true of the constitutional movement at
next day in Qom theological students staged a sit-in. This was broken J the turn of the century and it was true of the pro-Shah counter demon-
up by security forces, an action which quickly provoked violence strations that ensured his return in 19 53.
with the security forces shooting at the demonstrators. In two days of 1jhe independent financial strength of the Bazaar has been a vital
224 Opposition and Revolution Opposition and Revolution 225

element in its power. Despite the modernisation of the economy, the tion whose new wealth permitted them to buy property outside the
Bazaar still controls over two-thirds of domestic wholesale trade and Bazaar a\ea yet whose tradition made them work in, and continue to
accounts for at least 30 per cent of all imports. 44 At the same time identify With, the Bazaar. The merchants themselves were resentful of
through its control of the carpet trade and other export items like nuts the government's challenge to their privileges. The more so when they
and dried fruits, the Bazaar has access to foreign exchange which has saw business taken from them in the name of the state now being con-
not been channelled through the official system. Likewise its traditional ducted for the benefit of friends and associates of the Royal Family. 5t
money lending and money changing have continued. One unofficial An indication of the residual Bazaari attitude towards the Royal
estimate put Bazaari lending in 1976 at 15 per cent of private sector Family was the virtual absence of royal portraits in the Bazaar area. 52
credit.49 Yet such resentment was insufficient to turn the Bazaar merhcants into
Precisely because the Bazaar possessed such political power, the the organisers and financiers of the nationwide anti-Shah protests that
Shah sought over the years to diminish it. This was done firstly by emerged in 1978.
building new state schools, new housing and new shopping centres out- Politically; the Bazaar has had to be opportunist to survive. However,
side the Bazaar, while within the Bazaar streets were 'widened' - a the bul-k, of kazaaris could be classified as conservative, devout Moslems
euphemism for imposing a modern grid-iron pattern of roads on the and providers of important funds to subsidise religious activity. When,
old narrow alleyways (which also made security easier to enforce). therefore, the mosque sermons became more anti-Shah and open criti-
Secondly it was done by the modernisation of the banking system and cism was voiced of the tremendous waste of national assets and the
the entry of the state into the distribution system. State corporations corruption of national character by foreigners, the Bazaar and its
were set up to import and distribute basic foodstuffs like wheat, sugar leaders were an audience that needed little conversion.
and meat, or to import essential raw materials like cement or steel. The first concrete indication of a new militant link between the
These corporations appeared in the wake of the 1973 boom when the mosque and the merchants was a curious struggle to prevent the Bank
subsidies on foodstuffs were increased and the need to manage raw Saderat - known as the Bazaaris' friend - falling under the control of
material supplies was paramount. To cut out the Bazaari middlemen in a Bahai. At the end of 1977, Hozbar Yazdani, the Bahai and self-made
1976 the government sought to improve the nationwide distribution millionaire, had acquired a 51 per cent stake in the medium sized
of foodstuffs, and conceived of building a new market in Tehran, based Iranians Bank. He was manoeuvering to take over Shahriar Bank (in
on London's new Convent Garden. 50 A third move to break the Bazaaris' which several w~althy Iranian families were important shareholders)
hold was the price freeze and anti-profiteering campaign initiated in and had just raised his stake in Saderat, Iran's largest private com-
August 1976 (see Chapter 6). mercial bank, to 26 per cent. On the orders from the Shila clergy,
In one sense these moves were an essential part of modernising the the Bazaar merchants organised a campaign of sustained withdrawals.
economy. For instance the Bazaar merchants had a ruthless strangle- The campaign was so effective that the central bank, Bank Markazi, was
hold on the distribution of foodstuffs which was mercilessly exploited obliged to intervene and Yazdani - reportedly on the Shah's orders -
at the expense of the poor farmers. However, the Bazaaris interpreted sold out his interest in Saderat. 53
these actions as a calculated attack on the Bazaar as an institution; an Once demonstrators began getting killed by the armed forces, the
impression which the government did nothing to alter. At another level Bazaar offered financial support to the victims' families. More impor-
there was no urban renewal in the Bazaar area and no effort to preserve tant, the Bazaar was willing to finance strikes. At first in May 1978 it
what was valid in Bazaar life - or for that matter to provide an accept- was the university students and teachers. Then in the autumn, from
able substitute other than moving into the ranks of the middle class. In September onwards, they helped support large sections of the striking
many instances the cost of new housing for those anxious to move workforce, whether civil servants or oil-workers. There was no precise
outside the Bazaar became prohibitive in the wake of the 1973 boom. point when this support transformed from protest into backing for
The net effect was to establish a fairly clear-cut division between revolutionary change and the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty. The
those who could afford to leave and those who were obliged to stay in most important Bazaar, that of Tehran, was occupied for the first
the Bazaar area. A link, however, was maintained by the older genera- time by tanks on 11 May 1978, but as early as January there had been
226 Opposition and Revolution Opposition and Revolution 227

shutdown protests. Certainly this was the beginning of increasingly With passions running high this transformed the demonstration into a
frequent shutdown protest strikes. These protests were made in a riot, spearheaded by such youths, attacking the symbols of Iran's new
different frame of mind from the constitutionalists' and intellectuals'. wealth (the banks), its political bankruptcy (the headquarters of the
Theirs was more a gut greivance and openly Islamic, despite the fact Rastakhiz Party), its cultural corruption (the cinemas) and its moral
that the leading merchants had family with university education that decadence (liquor stores). Mixed in with this was some unashamed loot-
were also part of the constitutionalist movement. ing and a strong element of Azarbaijani resentment at being neglected
The Tehran Bazaar leadership was provided by a five man Bazaar by the central government. (Since 1946 the Shah had visited Tabriz
Merchants Association which existed in defiance of attempts to impose only once.) Radical students from Tabriz University had also played a
officially sponsored guilds controlled through the Rastakhiz Party. part in transforming this demonstration. The toll was some I 00 killed
These five men operated through a network of assistants who in turn and over 600 arrested. ss This pattern of protest turned riot was to
had their own subgroupings and lesser heads that permeated throughout repeat itself throughout Iran's major cities from now on.
the Bazaar in a pyramidical structure. This system enabled them to con-
The Role of Women
trol quickly large groups of persons through a mixture of personal
contact and money. It was not difficult to mount a demonstration with In the first major outburst of anti-Shah feeling, at Tabriz, women do
hired help .54 The regime itself had been doing this for years. not seem to have played a prominent role. However, one of the remark-
Part of the crowd in the early demonstrations was probably paid to able features of the ensuing demonstrations was the large scale partici-
participate by the Bazaaris. The boom had created a fertile source of pation of women. The chadoor, the traditional cloth with which
rabble. The thousands of persons who had flocked to the towns from women cover themselves, came to symbolise a form of protest: an
poor conservative backgrounds in the hope of jobs were that section of identity with Islamic values and a rejection of the modernising process
the urban proletariat that least benefitted from the boom. Often they instituted by the Pahlavis.
were single males whose families remained in country villages. They The chadoor was first used as a form of political protest inside the
were confronted with an alien culture, often forced to live on building universities in 1977. Students began to wear the chadoor on campus.
sites or at great expense in slum conditions. Their earnings, which at But the presence of women in the demonstrations probably owed little
first seemed high, were frequently illusory, eroded by inflation. From to the example in the universities. The bulk of the women taking part
mid-1977 the economic slowdown, combined with efforts to peg rents in the demonstrations were working class and this was an important
and house prices, provoked a sharp fall off in construction activity. This dynamic in the revolutionary process.s6 Women first appeared in large
meant that quite suddenly the main area of employment open to these numbers in the mourning processions for those killed. Because the
unskilled persons began to contract. Many became unemployed, and mourning processions were transformed into political protests, the
this unemployment further coincided with a bad year for the agri- women became part of this protest. Previously mourning processions
cultural sector. Production of staple products like wheat, barley and had been the sole occasion on which women from conservative back-
rice declined on average 13 per cent in 1977 /8 pushing more men to the grounds had been permitted to demonstrate their feelings in public.
towns in the hope of higher income. It was this confused, bitter new Therefore the political involvement of women was a natural evolution.
urban proletariat which imbibed quickest the protest messages coming Their presence was not discouraged. On the contrary, the demon-
from the mosques. They had nothing to lose and everything to gain. strators realised that this unexpected female presence tended to
The phenomenon of these 'rootless' males, mostly youths, was first unnerve riot police and the army, making demonstrations more difficult
evident in Tabriz in February 1978 - the first place where serious anti- to challenge. It is also possible that the presence of women gave the
Shah riots occurred. The Tabriz riot began as a demonstration of men greater courage to stand up to the police and army.
sympathy and solidarity to. com~emorate ti:ose killed in Qom the / This raises an important psychological question in the evolution of
previous month. However, it rapidly turned into a vehement protest the opposition movement. The Shah's system of government depended
against the Shah. The local Azarbaijani police refused to intervene and for its survival on two basic factors: a generalised acceptance of the
troops were called in who responded violently and with their weapons. status quo and a deeply inculcated fear of sanctions. The small incidence
242 Opposition and Revolution Opposition and Revolution 243

well as being beaten up. 39.Rastakhiz, 11June1975.
11. See Index Vol. 7 No. 1 'Iranian Protests' pp. 15-24. 40. Tehran Journal, 25 November 1976. The administration also made it
12. The Tudeh Party was formed in 1941 under the umbrella of the evolving deliberately expensive to visit Mecca. The officially sponsored month long trip
Russian presence in Iran as a result of the Anglo-Russian occupation during the cost'$ 2,000 per head. Some said this was also designed to prevent pilgrims
Second World War. journeying to Iraq.
13. Plan and Budget Organisation (PBO). Iran's Fifth Development Plan 41. International Herald Tribune, 15 January 1979.
1973-78, revised version, p. 401. 42. See Roger Stevens, Land of the Grand Sophy (London, Methuen, 1971),
14. Iran Almanac. Echo of Iran, Tehran, 1977, p. 411. pp. 46-8.
15. Ibid., p. 403. 43. The March 1975 Irano-lraq border treaty committed both sides to ease
16. There were no official figures for students studying abroad but the border crossing restrictions. The Iraqis eventually conceded an annual quota of
unofficial number was thought to be above 40,000. 130,000 pilgrims. Pressure by Shiia pilgrims to visit the Iraqi shrines was said to
17. The most radical institution in Iran was the Arayamehr Technical have been an element behind the Shah accepting to negotiate a border peace with
Institute, Tehran. Iraq.
18.IranAlmanac, 1977,p.122. 44. This was especially noted in Tehran and Qom.
19. See Fred Halliday,!ran, Dictatorship and Development (London, 45. See Faroughy, L 1ran contre le Chah, p. 176.
Pelican Books, 1979), pp. 227-35. 46. The author has not seen the original and translations vary. According to
20. Tehran Journal, 22 January 1977. one version, the text insinuates Khomeini to have been a homosexual in the pay
21. Kayhan International, 21, 22, 23 January 1977. These were a series of of the British.
articles on the opposition with clear official inspiration and seeming to be based 4 7. See Stevens, Land of the Great Sophy, pp. 41-5 for a precise account of
on SAV AK interrogations of some important recently captured underground this aspect of Shiism.
figures. 48. Financial Times, 12 September 1978.
22. These shorthand terms have stuck and became current during their re- 49. Estimate given to the author by a Bank Markazi official in September
emergence in the 9-12 February 1979 convulsion. 1976.
23. Halliday, Iran, Dictatorship and Development, provides the most detailed 50. The scheme was drawn up with the aid of Britain's National Freight
analysis of their ideologies but is unable to pin down the philosophy of the Corporation.
Mojahidin (seep. 236). 51. The Bazaar campaign against Commerce Minister Mahdavi in 1975 was due
24. In 1975 a bomb was exploded in the Shah Abbas Hotel, Isfahan, the to this belief.
country's best known tourist hotel. In July 1975 bombs exploded at the British 52. The Bazaar area was the sole public place where the Royal Portrait was not
Council and American Information Centre in Meshed. visible.
25. See Halliday,Iran, Dictatorship and Development, p. 237. 53.Financial Times, 12 September 1978.
26. Kayhan International, 23 January 1977. 54.International Herald Tribune, 15 January 1979.
27. This was the view of Western embassies in Tehran. 55. Based on information supplied to the author by an expatriate Persian
28. For a digest of the incidents reported in the Iranian press in 1976 see/ran scholar who visited Tabriz as the riots ended.
Almanac, 1977, p. 122. 56. See Iran Almanac, 1977, pp. 422-3.
29. The number of incidents reported in 1977 dropped. This probably 57. Comment to the author by Dr Bakhtiar, 3 July 1977.
reflected a decline in guerilla activity. 58. See Stevens, Land of the Great Sophy, p. 42. Many Iranians emphasise,
30. Ahmad Faroughy, L 1ran contre le Chah (Paris, Editions Jean-Claude as a national trait, the tradition of martyrdom.
Simeon, 1979),p. 164. 59. Sunday Times, supplement 19 November 1978. Roger Cooper counted
31. From June 1975 to November 1976 the author recorded 158 such eight rows of full graves with 14 to 17 plots each and over 20 rows dug and
instances. waiting at the main Tehran cemetery.
32. While the author was in Iran from 1975-7 there was only one instance 60. Financial Times, 14 December 1978.
of a foreign news organisation being contacted by the underground opposition. 61. Financial Times, 19 December 1978.
This was Agence France Presse in July 1976. 62. International Herald Tribune, 17 January 1978.
33. The religious community also shunned the international press. The first 63. The Regency Council was approved under Article 42.
serious effort by the clergy to contact the foreign press was in January 1978. 64. The Shah maintained up until before the 31 March 1979 referendum that
34. Financial Times, 12 December 1978. he had not abdicated.
35. Denis Wright, The English among the Persians (London, Heineman, 1977), 65. Comment to the author by a prominent figure in frequent contact with
p. 107. the Shah during this period.
36. The 1907 supplement to the Constitution talks of a committee of at least 66. Financial Times, 12 September 1978.
five persons chosen from the 'ulemas'. 67. Financial Times, 8 November 1978.
37. This information is largely based on research carried out by Paul Balta of 68. International Herald Tribune, 25 November 1978. On this occasion 267
Le Monde. For Khomeini's birth date see Faroughy,L 1ran contre le Chah,p.160. political prisoners were released.
38. Information supplied to the author by an expatriate living in Meshed 69. International Herald Tribune, 28 August 1978.
in 1976. 70. International Herald Tribune, 10 January 1979.

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