# Baha'u'llah and the God of Avicenna

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> Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Joshua D. T. Hall, Baha'u'llah and the God of Avicenna, bahai-library.com.
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> 
> Bahá’u’lláh                                      l’exposition faite par Avicenne au sujet de
> l’existence de Dieu en tant que vájib al-vu-
> and the God                                      júd ou “le Nécessairement Existant”; que
> ses déclarations confirment le récit déductif
> of Avicenna                                      d’Avicenne sur les attributs divins; et qu’Il
> confirme le propos central des arguments
> d’Avicenne concernant la nature de l’acte
> JOSHUA D. T. HALL                                créateur de Dieu, sa relation au monde, et
> la durée infinie de sa création, tant dans le
> Abstract                                         passé que dans l’avenir. L’auteur soutient
> This article analyzes and compares the           en outre que la philosophie d’Avicenne ap-
> teachings of Bahá’u’lláh on the nature and       porte un éclairage unique sur la métaphy-
> existence of God with the core metaphys-         sique et la théologie de Bahá’u’lláh, dans
> ical positions of Avicenna, the preeminent       la mesure où son analyse théologique aide
> philosopher of Islam. In three parts, it ar-     à comprendre la teneur et la signification
> gues that Bahá’u’lláh validates the meta-        philosophiques, ainsi que la logique rigou-
> physical principles underlying Avicenna’s        reuse des déclarations de Bahá’u’lláh sur
> argument for the existence of God as the         l’existence, la nature et l’acte créateur de
> vájib al-vujúd or “the Necessarily Exis-         Dieu.
> tent”; that His statements affirm Avicenna’s
> deductive account of the divine attributes;      Resumen
> and that He confirms the central content of      Este artículo analiza y compara las en-
> Avicenna’s arguments regarding the na-           señanzas de Baha’u’lláh sobre la naturale-
> ture of God’s creative act, His relation to      za y la existencia de Dios con las princi-
> the world, and the limitless duration, into      pales posiciones metafísicas de Avicena,
> the past and future, of His creation. It fur-    el preeminente filósofo del Islam. En tres
> thermore submits that Avicenna’s philoso-        partes, argumenta que Baha’u’lláh valida
> phy sheds a uniquely informative light on        los principios metafísicos subyacentes en
> Bahá’u’lláh’s metaphysics and theology,          el argumento de Avicena por la existencia
> insofar as his theological analysis helps        de Dios como el vájib al vujúd o “Existente
> one understand the philosophical content         Necesario”; que Sus aseveraciones afirman
> and significance, and rational rigor, of         los razonamientos deductivos de Avicena
> Bahá’u’lláh’s own statements on God’s ex-        sobre los atributos divinos; y que El confir-
> istence, nature, and creative act.               ma el contenido central de los argumentos
> de Avicena relacionados a la naturaleza del
> Résumé                                           actuar creativo de Dios, Su relación con
> L’auteur analyse les enseignements de            el mundo, y la duración sin limites en el
> Bahá’u’lláh sur la nature et l’existence         pasado y el futuro de Su creación. Además,
> de Dieu et les compare avec les positions        sostiene que la filosofía de Avicena de
> métaphysiques fondamentales d’Avicenne,          manera única echa luz informativa sobre la
> philosophe prééminent de l’Islam. Dans           metafísica y la teología de Baha’u’lláh, en
> cette analyse qui se décline en trois parties,   la medida en que su analisis teológico le
> l’auteur soutient que Bahá’u’lláh valide         ayuda a uno entender el contenido y sig-
> les principes métaphysiques sous-tendant         nificado filosófico y el rigor racional, de
> 8                     The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> las aseveraciones propias de Baha’u’lláh         philosophers in Christian Europe, such
> sobre la existencia, la naturaleza, y el actu-   as Thomas Aquinas (McGinnis 244).
> ar creativo de Dios.                                Given the importance of Avicenna’s
> thought in the history of Islam, with-
> Acknowledgements                                 in the cultural and religious context
> of which the Bahá’í Faith emerged,
> I would like first to thank Naeem Nabiliak-
> this article explores the currents of
> bar for his continuing and ceaseless love,
> support, counsel, and encouragement, his
> Avicenna’s theology that are repre-
> unique insight into the Bahá’í Writings,         sented and affirmed in Bahá’u’lláh’s
> and his invaluable assistance with and           writings, and, secondarily, in the ex-
> instruction in Persian and Arabic; Adib          planations of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. Though
> Masumian for his unflagging interest, gen-       Bahá’u’lláh Himself never composed
> erous help, enthusiasm, and patient proof-       a work of systematized theology
> reading; Professor Rhett Diessner for his        (Schaefer xiii), His many writings in
> sound, illuminating scholarly perspective        Arabic and Persian are nonetheless
> and constructive comments; and Professor         rich in metaphysical content. As a
> Ardi Kia, for his professional engagement,       whole, they present a consistent phil-
> review, and kindness.                            osophical worldview expressed in the
> substantial nomenclature of the Islamic
> I                                   intellectual tradition. Accordingly, one
> may approach an understanding of
> As suggested by the title, it is the             Bahá’u’lláh’s theology by considering
> aim of this article to analyze and               how it treats the central questions on
> compare the core theological posi-               the nature of God dealt with by Islamic
> tions of Bahá’u’lláh and the Islam-              philosophers, among whom Avicenna
> ic philosopher Avicenna. Avicenna,               stands out as especially prominent.
> perhaps most famous in the West as               Throughout the course of this article, I
> the celebrated author of the Qánún fí            will thus present two broad arguments.
> aṭ-Ṭibb or Canon of Medicine, was a              First, I propose that Bahá’u’lláh’s
> Persian Muslim born near the city of             theological teachings are substan-
> Bukhárá in 980 A.D. Propounding a                tively affirmative of the metaphysical
> rationalistic worldview and synthesis            principles underlying Avicenna’s ar-
> of Neoplatonism, Aristotelianism, and            gument for God’s existence and his
> Islamic monotheism, Avicenna indeli-             philosophical positions on God’s na-
> bly shaped the contents and character            ture, attributes, and creative act, with
> of Islamic philosophy from medieval              no implication that His teachings are
> into modern times and became, by                 derivative from those of Avicenna or
> far, the most influential philosopher of         in any way reducible to them. Second,
> Islam; going well beyond the borders             I suggest that Avicenna’s metaphys-
> of the Islamic world, his ideas even             ics, given Bahá’u’lláh’s affirmation
> informed the thought of the scholastic           of his core philosophical arguments,
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                          9
> 
> provides a framework that clarifies        insights, though he does not explicate
> and rationally elucidates the essential    in detail Avicenna’s original argument.
> content, logical coherence, and phil-      Juan Cole, in his monograph “The
> osophical integrity of Bahá’u’lláh’s       Concept of Manifestation in the Bahá’í
> teachings on the existence and nature      Writings,” significantly states that
> of God. Thus, examining the aspects of     Bahá’u’lláh “affirmed Avicenna’s solu-
> Avicenna’s theology that Bahá’u’lláh       tion to the problem of the co-eternity of
> affirms, far from being a merely aca-        the universe with God,” though it was
> demic exercise, will all the more reveal   beyond the aims of that work to treat
> the implications, conceptual depth, and    Avicenna primarily. Ian Kluge likewise
> rational nature of Bahá’u’lláh’s meta-     has warmly referenced Avicenna in a
> physical and theological statements.       number of his outstanding essays on
> Because Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá       Bahá’í philosophy, stressing the com-
> so consistently affirm, as will be seen,     monality of Avicenna’s rationalist and
> both Avicenna’s terminology and the        broadly Aristotelian worldview with
> philosophical substance underlying         the Bahá’í Faith’s own philosophical
> that terminology, and reject opposing      presuppositions.
> views in the history of Islamic thought       Keven Brown, similarly, has dis-
> in favor of Avicenna’s, the deep study     cussed some of Avicenna’s views,
> of Avicennian thought is relevant to       along with those of other Islamic
> discerning and articulating the princi-    philosophers, in his papers “Abdu’l-
> ples of Bahá’í theology—a scholarly        Bahá’s Response to Darwinism: Its
> endeavor requiring that we examine the     Historical and Philosophical Context”
> historical frameworks that Bahá’u’lláh     and “‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s Response to the
> and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá employ or forego in       Doctrine of the Unity of Existence,”
> describing Their distinctive theology.     even if Avicenna was not the primary
> This article thus aims to contrib-      philosopher under discussion. Vahid
> ute to a discourse in scholarship on       Rafati in “Lawḥ-i-Ḥikmat: The Two
> the Bahá’í Faith that deals with the       Agents and the Two Patients” makes
> relationship between Bahá’u’lláh’s         a useful reference to how Avicenna’s
> teachings and Avicenna’s theological       account of the four elements relate to
> philosophy. Scholars have gestured         Bahá’u’lláh’s Lawḥ-i-Ḥikmat. Nader
> before at the philosophical common-        Saiedi likewise references the cosmol-
> alities between Bahá’u’lláh’s teach-       ogy of Avicenna in his book Gate of the
> ings and Avicenna’s thought, even if       Heart, as does Moojan Momen in his
> Avicennian metaphysics has not been        paper “Relativism: A Basis for Bahá’í
> their primary subject of concern. Wil-     Metaphysics.” Interestingly, however,
> liam Hatcher, in his admirable book        Momen does not mention Avicenna in
> Minimalism, put forth an argument in       his article “The God of Bahá’u’lláh,”
> formal logic for God’s existence that      favoring instead the Sufi Andalusian
> consciously draws from Avicenna’s          thinker Ibn ‘Arabí.
> 10                   The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> This article therefore aims to contrib-   features of Islamic thought—and that
> ute to this body of Bahá’í scholarship        Avicenna, while certainly not being
> by investigating the elements of Avi-         the only philosopher relevant to un-
> cenna’s thought affirmed in the Bahá’í          derstanding the metaphysics treated
> Faith, specifically engaging Avicenna’s       in the Bahá’í Writings, is particularly
> and Bahá’u’lláh’s theological positions       important to Bahá’í studies because of
> and analyzing their respective thought        his significant place in this history of
> in three discrete parts. Part One, accord-    philosophy and of Islamic thought, as
> ingly, treats Avicenna’s argument for         well as the extensive degree to which
> the existence of God as the vájib al-vu-      his principles and arguments are repre-
> júd or “the Necessarily Existent,” and        sented in the Bahá’í Writings and help
> seeks to demonstrate that Bahá’u’lláh         elucidate their metaphysical content.
> affirms the basic metaphysical princi-             These subjects will be addressed
> ples underlying Avicenna’s argument           through analysis of the primary
> for God’s existence, validates his log-       sources. These include a selection of
> ical procedure, and corroborates his          Bahá’u’lláh’s discrete epistolary works
> concept of God as an existentially or         in Arabic and Persian, called alváḥ
> ontologically independent and tran-           (tablets), such as his Lawḥ-i-Basíṭ al-
> scendent first cause. Part Two then           Ḥaqíqat and Lawḥ-i-Ḥikmat, as well
> discusses Avicenna’s deductive argu-          as the metaphysics (iláhíyyát) sections
> ments for why such a first cause must         within two of Avicenna’s philosophical
> be divine, successively treats each           compendia, the Arabic ash-Shifá and
> important attribute Avicenna ascribes         the Persian Dánishnámiy-i-‘Alá’í, with
> to God, and argues that Bahá’u’lláh           occasional reference to Avicenna’s Ar-
> confirms Avicenna’s account of re-            abic an-Naját. Passages from the writ-
> spective divine attributes. Lastly, Part      ings of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, meanwhile, will
> Three establishes that Bahá’u’lláh and        be analyzed in conjunction with those
> Avicenna, being in harmony with re-           of Bahá’u’lláh as indispensable inter-
> spect to their views on God’s creative        pretative aids.1 Though official trans-
> act and the eternal nature of the world,
> have central cosmological positions in           1     ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s     interpretations
> common, and that Bahá’u’lláh conse-           of Bahá’u’lláh’s theology are vital when
> quently affirms characteristically Avi-         analyzing Bahá’u’lláh’s own views, in-
> cennian positions on God’s relation           sofar as ‘Abdu’l-Bahá was specifically
> to the world. The conclusion will sum         appointed by Bahá’u’lláh to explicate His
> up our findings, treat several possible       teachings and preserve Bahá’ís from dis-
> objections, and likewise explain how          agreement, as seen in the Kitáb-i-Aqdas,
> the Avicennian ideas demonstrated to          Kitáb-i-‘Ahd, Súriy-i-Ghuṣn, and Lawḥ-
> have been affirmed by Bahá’u’lláh are           i-‘Arḍ-i-Bá. Even from a secular point of
> indeed meaningfully characteristic of         view, therefore, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s interpre-
> Avicenna, and are not purely general          tations represent authoritative explana-
> tions of Bahá’u’lláh’s theology, and must
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                           11
> 
> lations of the Bahá’í Writings will be      it. The atheist, conversely, believes that
> used when available, extensive atten-       there is no supernatural reality, and as-
> tion will be given, either in footnotes     serts that nature is simply the whole
> or the body of the text, to the precise     of existence, and that any legitimate
> wording of the Arabic or Persian origi-     explanation of a thing must necessarily
> nal and the exact philosophical signifi-    be a natural and not supernatural one.
> cance of particular words. All passages     It follows on atheism, then, that the
> from Avicenna, however, are my own          existence of nature itself can have no
> renderings, though they have bene-          cause, grounds, or explanation. This is
> fited from reference to the pioneering      because one cannot explain the whole
> translations published by Parviz More-      of nature and its existence through
> wedge and Michael Marmura of the            something that is itself part of nature
> Dánishnámih and ash-Shifá, respec-          and a natural phenomenon, bounded
> tively. Marmura’s bilingual publication     by space, time, and the limitations of
> of ash-Shifá’s “Metaphysics” has been       matter. One can only explain, via an-
> especially useful as an edited source of    tecedent physical causes, subsequent
> Avicenna’s original Arabic.                 physical conditions, but not why the
> In what follows, we shall begin by      whole of nature should exist at all or,
> considering how Bahá’u’lláh and Avi-        ultimately, anything whatsoever for
> cenna each argue for God’s existence,       which nonexistence is logically and
> a necessary point of departure before       metaphysically possible. Therefore, if
> establishing the other areas of concep-     nature is all there is, nature itself must
> tual convergence.                           be inexplicable, even if individual phe-
> nomena within it allow for proximate,
> G            N              E              but of course never ultimate, causes
> and explanations.
> A         ’ A                                   Bahá’u’lláh and Avicenna both ex-
> N            E                              plicitly reject such naturalism, and
> insist that there is a transcendent and
> The primary difference between theism        supernatural       reality—God—which
> and atheism lies perhaps in differing        grounds the existence of the world.
> views of nature. According to the the-      Bahá’u’lláh, in the Lawḥ-i Ḥikmat,
> ist, there is a reality beyond and tran-    writes on this theme:
> scendent above the material universe
> and its phenomena—a supernatural              Those who have rejected God and
> and absolute reality that ultimately          firmly cling to Nature as it is in
> grounds the existence of the world,           itself are, verily, bereft of knowl-
> while remaining utterly sanctified from       edge and wisdom. They are truly
> of them that are far astray. They
> have failed to attain the lofty sum-
> be considered in any thorough analysis of     mit and have fallen short of the
> Bahá’u’lláh’s writings.
> 12                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> ultimate purpose; therefore their        his part, proposes an argument for
> eyes were shut and their thoughts        the existence of God as just this sort
> differed, while the leaders among         of transcendental reality in the meta-
> them have believed in God and in         physics section of his comprehensive
> His invincible sovereignty . . . When    philosophical compendium, ash-Shifá,
> the eyes of the people of the East       specifically in the first chapter of Book
> were captivated by the arts and          Eight of the “Metaphysics.” Some of
> wonders of the West, they roved          the premises of the argument, howev-
> distraught in the wilderness of ma-      er, find their grounding in other parts of
> terial causes, oblivious of the One      the “Metaphysics,” which will thus be
> Who is the Causer of Causes, and         referenced in giving a whole account
> the Sustainer thereof . . . . (Tablets   of his argument.
> 143–44; Maj’mú’iy-i-Alváḥ ba’d               Avicenna begins his reasoning by
> az Kitáb-i-Aqdas 85)                     noting that there are some concepts
> which are “impressed in the soul in a
> And Avicenna, for his part in ash-         primary way” (ash-Shifá 22). That is
> Shifá, distinguishes between the natu-     to say, there are certain ideas which are
> ral and supernatural or divine orders of   themselves so basic and self-evident that
> causality:                                 they cannot be proven or demonstrat-
> ed, insofar as they are the fundamen-
> The theistic philosophers do not         tal ideas by which all other concepts
> mean by the term “efficient cause”         might be demonstrated or defined. An
> what is merely the source and            example is the idea of existence. Avi-
> principle of a physical change, as       cenna points out that everyone, no mat-
> the naturalists assert. Rather, they     ter the language spoken, understands
> regard the efficient cause as that         in a basic way the meaning of the term
> which is the source of a thing’s         existence. But any attempt to define
> existence and what imparts exis-         existence itself or to demonstrate that
> tence to it, even as God imparts         there is such a thing as existence would
> existence absolutely to the world        fail, because one would have to assume
> (and does not merely fashion it          the existence of something beforehand
> from pre-existing matter). (195)         in order to use it subsequently to define
> or demonstrate the idea of existence.
> Both Bahá’u’lláh and Avicenna assert,      Any definition or demonstration would
> therefore, the existence of some real-     accordingly be circular and therefore
> ity that is not contained in the natural   invalid. We thus understand existence
> order, and they will thus argue that       in itself as a primary idea, and not as
> nature itself is not a metaphysical ul-    something apprehended secondarily
> timate. But why do they suppose that       from other things.
> there is anything beyond the phenom-           Avicenna then states that the terms
> enal world of nature? Avicenna, for        necessary, possible, and impossible
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                              13
> 
> are likewise understood by the mind           proceed to analyze the different modes
> in a primary way—as basic concepts            in which things exist, as he does in
> known intuitively and comprehended            chapter six of Book One in ash-Shifá.
> immediately. This is because any at-          Conceptually, existence can be divid-
> tempt to define the necessary, possible,      ed into what is possible or contingent
> and impossible falls prey to circularity      (mumkin) and what is necessary (vá-
> just like trying to define existence does,    jib). What is inherently impossible2
> for the definition of any one of these        clearly does not and never shall exist,
> terms is inescapably made in reference        and thus existence can only be said of
> to one or both of the other two. In de-       what is either necessary or possible.
> fining what is possible, for instance,        If the existence of a thing is possible,
> one might say that it is something that       it may just as well exist as not exist,
> is neither necessary, such that it must       when considered in itself.3 If it does
> be and cannot not be, while at the same       exist, however, then its existence is, in
> time it is not something that is impossi-     some way, made actual or necessary by
> ble in itself, such that it could never be,   virtue of something else, that is through
> just as a four-sided triangle could never     a cause. To use a favored example of
> be. To define what is necessary, how-         Avicenna, a house, considered in itself,
> ever, one must either say that “it is not     might just as well exist as not exist, and
> possible to suppose its nonexistence, or      its existence is thus only possible in it-
> that it is impossible to suppose it being     self. But if a carpenter should assemble
> any other way than it already is” (ash-       the proper materials and construct it,
> Shifá 28).                                    the house that was merely possibly or
> In this way, Avicenna shows that           potentially existent would become nec-
> the concepts of existence, necessity,         essarily existent and actual.
> possibility, and impossibility have               Avicenna makes an important point
> self-evident and fundamental mean-            here. The house, once it exists in
> ings that must be apprehended directly
> by the mind, for the only definitions
> 2      As, for example, something that
> they can accommodate are mutually
> involves an essential contradiction or mis-
> referential. It is important for Avicen-      use of terms, such as an unmarried bache-
> na to give an account of these terms at       lor or a round square.
> this juncture, since they will be central        3      That is, considering something
> to his argument for God’s existence,          merely in terms of what it is. For exam-
> and also since his very subject here is       ple, the existence of a bachelor is not im-
> metaphysics, which he defines as that         possible, nor is it strictly necessary; there
> branch of philosophy which studies be-        could be no bachelors. Simply given what
> ing insofar as it is being. Accordingly,      a bachelor is, considered in itself, it is
> he must give an account of the basic          equally possible for there to be one or not
> terms he uses to describe existence.          to be one. For either of these two states of
> Having done so, Avicenna can then          affairs to obtain, therefore, external causes
> are necessary.
> 14                   The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> actuality, is still only possibly or con-         At this point in the trajectory of his
> tingently existent in itself, insofar as it   thought, Avicenna is confident that
> requires a cause for its existence. Thus,     there are things that exist, and that
> according to Avicenna, it is necessarily      there are things whose existence is pos-
> existent through another (vájib al-vu-        sible or contingent in itself and which
> júd bi-ghayrihi) but only possibly or         may be made necessary and actual
> contingently existent in itself (mumkin       through a cause. Another theoretical
> al-vujúd). This is because the house,         division of being remains, however. If
> as a particular arrangement of matter,        there are things that are contingently
> does not merely depend on its materi-         existent in themselves, could there be
> als having been assembled by an agent         something that is necessarily existent
> at some point of time in the past; it also    not through another but in itself? Avi-
> depends on the cohesion of its respec-        cenna does not attempt to prove that
> tive elements in the here and now—for         there is something necessarily existent
> without the cohesion of these parts, it       in itself (vájib al-vujúd bi nafsihi) until
> could not exist. A water molecule may         Book Eight of the “Metaphysics” in
> be presented as a contemporary exam-          ash-Shifá. However, because the idea
> ple. Before any two hydrogen atoms            of the Necessarily Existent in Itself is
> and single oxygen atom cohere in a co-        central to Avicenna’s theological vi-
> valent bond, the existence of a certain       sion, he thoroughly teases out the basic
> water molecule is merely possible, its        implications of such a reality early in
> existence being contingent on the junc-       ash-Shifá and also in the Dánishnámih,
> tion and cohesion of those atoms. But         even before he formally attempts to
> once the bond is established, the exis-       demonstrate that the Necessarily Exis-
> tence of that water molecule becomes          tent does in fact exist.
> actual and necessary—though its exis-             First, Avicenna makes it clear that
> tence remains only possible or contin-        the existence of what is contingently
> gent in itself—insofar as the molecule        existent in itself, (mumkin al-vujúd), is
> was originated by a cause, depends in         not in itself necessary or impossible—
> the present on the covalent bond, and         it is thus possible. But it is clear that for
> may well cease to exist as a water mol-       the contingently existent actually to ex-
> ecule should the bond be broken. Con-         ist, and for its existence to be rendered
> sequently, the inevitable and intrinsic       necessary, it requires a cause. Avicenna
> features of a contingently existent being     justifies this claim in the Dánishnámih,
> are, first, its being originated, and sec-    chapter nineteen of the “Metaphysics,”
> ond, its continuing dependence in the         when he writes:
> present on composition of some kind.
> Thus the water molecule does not, in             As to whatever is contingent and
> itself, exist necessarily, but only contin-     only possible, its existence, con-
> gently, though its existence is rendered        sidered in itself, has no prepon-
> necessary once its causes are present.          derance over its non-existence.
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                            15
> 
> Its existence is therefore due to              actuality, it is clear that what is nec-
> the existence of its cause, and its            essarily existent in itself would not
> non-existence would be due to the              require a cause to exist. This is because
> non-existence of the cause. If it              its existence would not be logically
> existed of itself without a cause,             equivalent to its non-existence, insofar
> its existence would be necessary—              as the necessarily existent in itself is
> not possible—in itself. Therefore,             not merely possible. If there is some-
> whatever is contingent and possi-              thing that is truly necessary in itself,
> ble in itself requires a cause for its         its actual existence would be necessary
> existence, and that cause is prior to          and essential to it and its non-existence
> it essentially (that is, not necessar-         impossible, in contrast to the contin-
> ily prior in time). (369)                      gently existent being whose existence
> and non-existence are both similarly
> Avicenna’s point here is that the ex-         possible. This, of course, does not yet
> istence of something possible is logi-           show that there is such a thing as exists
> cally equivalent to its non-existence: in        necessarily in itself; it merely shows
> itself, it could just as well exist as not       that what is necessarily existent in it-
> exist. If it exists in actuality, therefore,     self would require no cause.
> its existence logically must have pro-               Yet the relevance of the concept
> ceeded to it from another, something             of the Necessarily Existent, the vá-
> that acts as the determinative of its ex-        jib al-vujúd, might now be becoming
> istence: a cause.4                               clear in regard to its theological im-
> If, then, what is possibly existent           plications: if God exists, and if He is
> in itself requires a cause to exist in           the creator of all things—a reality on
> which all other beings depend—it is
> clear that He Himself could not require
> 4      Avicenna’s premise here should         a cause for His existence. If He did, He
> not be misconstrued as being an example          would not be God, but simply anoth-
> of inductive reasoning, and criticized on
> er creature, or created thing, among
> that ground. He is not drawing a general
> many. What Avicenna must now do
> rule by observing that contingent things
> in his experience do in fact have causes,
> is show that there is a first cause that
> and then concluding that this stands for all     does not itself have a cause, for such
> contingent beings. He is rather concluding       a thing would be identical to the Nec-
> deductively that if the innate possibility       essarily Existent. His formal argument
> of a thing’s existence is equal to the pos-      for the existence of a first cause can be
> sibility of its non-existence, there must be     found in several places throughout his
> something external to that thing to account      works, but significantly in Book Eight,
> for its existence, should it actually exist: a   chapters one to three of ash-Shifá, even
> cause or sequence of causes. For Avicenna,       as Daniel De Haan has noted, with a
> the presence of the cause is a matter of log-    variation in an-Naját. The sketch of
> ical necessity and is not, by any means, a       the argument below thus draws from
> generalized observation.
> 16                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> ash-Shifá as well as the Dánishnámih.          the first thing has its existence ei-
> One important point before ex-              ther in itself or from a third thing,
> plaining Avicenna’s argument for               whereas the existence of the sec-
> the Necessarily Existent as the first          ond derives from the first. More-
> cause, however, is to clarify the ways         over, the existence of the second
> in which, according to him, a cause            thing, in this scenario, is necessi-
> may be said to be prior to an effect.           tated by the first, the second not
> A cause, of course, can be prior to an         being necessary in its essence, in-
> effect in time, even as the father must         sofar as in itself it is only possible.
> exist prior to his son in time. But in         Furthermore, this is allowing that
> Avicenna’s terminology, the father is          the first thing, so long as it exists,
> not prior to his son as a cause essen-         necessitates the existence of the
> tially, (muqaddam bi dhátihi) but only         second thing. (ash-Shifá 126)
> temporally (bi zamán). This is because
> the son, whether as a child or a man,        Avicenna then clarifies this rather tech-
> does not depend on the father for his        nical explanation through an illustra-
> continued existence, or his subsistence.     tion. If Zayd is holding a key and his
> The son, therefore, does not depend          hand moves, the motion of the hand
> essentially on his father, for causal de-    is clearly the cause of the motion of
> pendence on his father is not an essen-      the key, while the motion of the key
> tial or necessary property of the son. If    is clearly not the cause of the hand’s
> the father dies, the son will continue       motion. The motion of the hand is thus
> to exist. This is because, according to      prior to that of the key essentially,
> Avicenna, the father is not actually the     even though the motion of each one is
> cause of the son’s subsistence, but rath-    simultaneous with the other. The mo-
> er only of a certain aspect of the son’s     tion of the key is necessitated by, and
> temporal origination, “the motion of         essentially dependent on, the motion
> the seed” (ash-Shifá 201). Thus, for         of the hand, while the hand’s motion is
> Avicenna, the activity of a true cause is    neither necessitated by nor dependent
> always concurrent with its effect (201).      on the key’s motion. What is more, so
> A cause is essentially prior to its ef-   long as the motion of the hand exists,
> fect when they are concurrent, and the       so will that of the key.
> effect could not possibly exist without          In the Dánishnámih, Avicenna ex-
> the sustaining activity of the cause.        plains this idea of essential causal pri-
> Avicenna states:                             ority through the example of a house,
> which I used as an illustration earlier:
> When there are two things and the
> existence of the first does not de-          The generality of people suppose
> rive from the second, then the first         that the cause of a thing is that
> thing is prior in existence to the           which brings about its existence
> second thing. This holds true when           and once it has done so, the thing
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                          17
> 
> has no need of a cause. But they         and the emission of light, fire and the
> have put forth an empty proof and        emanation of heat, a sequence of mov-
> have been pleased with a mis-            ers and things moved (such as a series
> leading analogy. They argue that         of gears), and the force that coheres
> “whatever had begun to exist sub-        the parts of a thing and the thing com-
> sequently does not depend upon           posed. Now, in these cases, the cause
> its cause, insofar as one does not       or source of the effect is in its essence
> make again what is already made.”        independent of the effect, while the ef-
> Their analogy is this: should some-      fect is essentially dependent on such a
> one make a house, it is not in need      cause.
> of another maker once it has been           This is not merely a technical point
> constructed. But this is their mis-      that lacks wider relevance. This un-
> take: no one suggested that what         derstanding of what the efficient cause
> is made needs to be made again.          consists in is vital to Avicenna’s argu-
> Rather, we say that what is made         ment for a first cause that is necessar-
> requires something to support and        ily existent, an argument in which the
> sustain it. But their analogy of the     question of time is completely irrele-
> house betrays an evident error,          vant. For when Avicenna then argues
> for the carpenter is not the cause       that there is indeed a first cause, he will
> of the existence of the house, but       be speaking solely in terms of efficient
> is rather the cause of the motion        causes that are concurrent with their
> of the wood and clay to a certain        effects, and are ordered (murattab) in
> location, and that is precisely the      a sequence such that the causes are
> meaning of carpenter and con-            essentially—not temporally—prior to
> structor. But the cause of the form      their effects, and the effects are essen-
> of the house is the cohesion of its      tially—not temporally—posterior to
> elements, and the nature of those        their causes. It is thus that he stresses,
> elements that necessitates the per-      as Book Eight of the “Metaphysics” of
> sistence of the house in the form it     ash-Shifá opens, that “the cause of a
> has. (370)                               thing’s existence is concurrent with it.”
> What, then, is Avicenna’s argument
> If the true cause is always concurrent     for a first cause, itself independent of
> with its actual effect, then, any contin-   any cause and necessarily existent in
> gent being—anything that is only pos-      itself? As we have seen, Avicenna first
> sibly existent in itself—depends upon      establishes that everything is either
> a cause or causes in the here and now,     necessary or contingent in itself, and
> and not merely upon a certain cause in     shows that all contingent beings—
> the past that was part of its temporal     since they are merely possibly existent
> origination. Thus, examples of causes      in themselves—require concurrent
> that are essentially prior and effects      causes to exist in actuality. Avicenna
> essentially posterior include the Sun      then concludes that there must be a
> 18                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> necessarily existent being, since there      how many more intermediate causes
> cannot be an infinite series of con-         are added to the sequence. If there were
> current contingent causes; any causal        no absolute cause, the sum of interme-
> chain must therefore terminate in a          diate causes would lack the concurrent
> necessarily existent being, on which         cause that it, due its contingency, re-
> the entire causal sequence depends,          quires. This absolute cause, however,
> and which itself depends on no cause.        cannot itself be contingent; if it were,
> He thus writes that if one “supposes an      it would itself have a cause, and would
> effect and its cause, and for that cause      therefore be yet another intermediate
> a cause, there cannot be for every cause     cause added to the sum, and not the
> yet another cause ad infinitum” (ash-        absolute cause that the sum requires.
> Shifá 258).                                  One consequently must conclude, as
> Avicenna justifies this claim, in ash-    Avicenna writes, that “[t]here cannot
> Shifá, by having the reader meditate on      be a sum of causes without there being
> a theoretical sequence of essentially        a causeless cause, a first cause” (ash-
> ordered causes simultaneous in time          Shifá 258). This first cause is therefore
> (258). If, for example, a is the cause of    not contingent, but necessarily existent
> b, and b is the cause of c, then a is the    of itself, and there thus exists a neces-
> absolute cause of the effects b and c,        sarily existent being.
> while b acts as an intermediate cause            In an-Naját, meanwhile, Avicenna
> between the extreme cause a and the          defends the need for a necessarily ex-
> extreme effect c. Each member in this         istent cause in slightly simpler terms
> sequence would have a special charac-        (300). There, Avicenna points out that
> teristic, a as absolute cause of the suc-    the causal sequence of concurrent
> ceeding members of the sequence, b as        contingent causes is a composite, and
> intermediate cause, and c as ultimate        since composites are contingent, any
> effect. Now, no matter how many more          sum of concurrent contingent caus-
> members are added between the abso-          es itself requires a cause in order to
> lute cause and the ultimate effect, the       exist. It depends on its parts to exist,
> characteristic of intermediacy is still a    and those parts are themselves contin-
> feature of the causes succeeding a and       gently existent; the sum is therefore
> preceding c. Thus, if the ultimate effect     contingent—an argument mirrored in
> is not c but z, such that the sequence is    ash-Shifá when he writes, “whatever
> now a, b, c, d, . . . z, the mere addition   is dependent on what is caused is also
> of more causes does not exempt them,         caused” (ash-Shifá 258). The cause of
> as a sum, from the characteristic of in-     the sum of concurrent contingent caus-
> termediacy. The important point here is      es cannot itself be contingent, howev-
> that all intermediate contingent causes,     er. If it were, it would just be part of the
> precisely because they are intermedi-        sum itself and the cause of its own ex-
> ate, will essentially depend and be con-     istence—an impossibility. There must
> tingent on an absolute cause, no matter      be a cause, therefore, that is external
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                           19
> 
> to the sum of contingent causes, and            1. Whatever exists is either nec-
> which is therefore not contingent at all,           essary or contingent.
> but necessarily existent in itself. “Con-       2. Whatever is contingent has a
> tingent beings thus terminate,” so Avi-             concurrent cause of its exis-
> cenna writes, “in a cause that is neces-            tence.
> sarily existent. There is not, therefore,       3. Whatever is necessary exists
> for every contingent being a contingent             independent of any cause.
> cause ad infinitum” (an-Naját 301). It          4. A causal sum of concurrent
> is this reality, then—the Necessarily               contingent causes is itself con-
> Existent—that causes, and bestows                   tingent.
> existence on, the whole of contingent           5. Therefore, such a causal sum
> being at every moment. Importantly, if              has a concurrent cause of its
> one were to counter that, given infinite            existence (from 2, 4).
> time, an infinite sequence of contin-           6. The concurrent cause of such
> gent causes is possible, the objection              a causal sum is either neces-
> would have no bearing on Avicenna’s                 sary or contingent (from 1).
> argument. This is because Avicenna is           7. If a causal sum has no nec-
> discussing concurrent causes, as we                 essary cause, it will have
> have seen, and is thus answering the                contingent concurrent causes
> question of how any contingent being                ad infinitum.
> or the whole of contingent being can            8. A causal sum cannot have
> exist in the here and now, given its                contingent concurrent causes
> intrinsically dependent and non-neces-              ad infinitum.
> sary reality. To this question, Avicenna        9. Consequently, the causal sum
> answers that such contingent being ex-              does have a necessary cause
> ists because it is ceaselessly caused and           (from 7, 8).
> sustained by a necessarily existent and         10. Therefore, there is something
> independent reality.                                necessary and independent of
> Though this argument, in either                  any cause (from 3, 9).
> of the two forms, may seem complex
> from the foregoing pages, this is mere-     T       N           E
> ly because Avicenna’s basic premises            B       ’ ’   ’ W
> required a thorough explanation. In
> summary, the argument may be pre-           Avicenna thus demonstrates the exis-
> sented as follows with nine premises,       tence of something necessarily existent
> themselves supported by the arguments       in itself. His proposition that a sum of
> above, leading to a final conclusion.       concurrent members subsists by virtue
> (For brevity, “necessary” and “contin-      of those members and thus only contin-
> gent” will be used in place of the more     gently is almost self-evident. It appears,
> technical “necessary” or “contingent in     therefore, that his strongest claim is
> itself”).                                   found in premise two: “whatever is
> 20                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> contingent requires a concurrent cause       to creation as consisting of mumkinát,
> for its existence.” We have previously       contingent beings, only possibly ex-
> seen the logical problems in suppos-         istent in themselves. This tablet is
> ing otherwise, and as such Avicenna’s        partially translated in Gleanings by
> argument represents a remarkably ele-        Shoghi Effendi, and since he various-
> gant and powerful logical argument—          ly translated the term mumkinát, I will
> proceeding from an analysis of exis-         indicate it below with parentheses.
> tence itself into model categories—for       Bahá’u’lláh states in the beginning of
> something necessarily existent. I will       the tablet:
> not address here, however, all possible
> objections to Avicenna’s argument, in-         All praise to the unity of God,
> sofar as my larger purpose is to show          and all honor to Him, the sover-
> that Bahá’u’lláh affirms his concept of          eign Lord, the incomparable and
> the divine.5                                   all-glorious Ruler of the universe,
> The question before us now con-             Who, out of utter nothingness,
> cerns the theological implications of          hath created the reality of all
> Avicenna’s proof and how it relates            things (mumkinát) . . . and Who,
> to Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings about God.          rescuing His creatures from the
> First of all, essential to the idea of God     abasement of remoteness and the
> is that He is the creator of all things,       perils of ultimate extinction, hath
> something metaphysically ultimate on           received them into His kingdom of
> which the existence of all other things        incorruptible glory. Nothing short
> depends, and who Himself depends               of His all-encompassing grace,
> on nothing for His existence—God is            His all-pervading mercy, could
> something beyond and independent of            have possibly achieved it. How
> the phenomenal and contingent order            could it, otherwise, have been
> of nature. The central idea of God, as         possible for sheer nothingness to
> Avicenna’s analysis shows, is that He is       have acquired by itself the worthi-
> something necessarily existent in Him-         ness and capacity to emerge from
> self. This—as will be demonstrated             its state of non-existence into the
> through quoted passages—is precisely           realm of being?
> what Bahá’u’lláh says regarding God.              Having created the world and
> In this vein, Bahá’u’lláh explicitly           all that liveth and moveth therein
> terms God vájib, necessarily existent,         (kull-i-mumkinát) . . . . (64–65)
> in a short but comprehensive Persian
> tablet (Majmúʻiy-i-Alváḥ-i-Mubárakih         Here Bahá’u’lláh identifies creation
> 338–42), in which He likewise refers         with what is contingently existent,
> using precisely the same Arabic-Per-
> 5     For a similar, though distinct,     sian term—mumkinát or contingent
> appraisal of which of Avicenna’s premises    beings—as Avicenna. Bahá’u’lláh lit-
> are the most ontologically robust, see Mc-   erally states that it is by God that all
> Ginnis, 166.
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                           21
> 
> contingent beings (kull-i-mumkinát)           the transient (ḥádith) and the Eternal
> have their existence, even as it is the       (qadím), the contingent (mumkin) and
> Necessarily Existent, for Avicenna,           the Absolute (vájib)” (Gleanings 66;
> that sustains the existence of any con-       Majmúʻiy-i-Alváḥ-i-Mubárakih 28).
> tingent being in the here and now.            Bahá’u’lláh thus confirms the same
> Bahá’u’lláh implies here that God             metaphysical principles, the distinc-
> must exist, insofar as contingent real-       tion between contingent and necessary
> ity could only derive from something          existence, and the need to appeal to the
> that is ontologically superior to it; there   latter to explain the former, that Avi-
> must be something existentially superi-       cenna employed to demonstrate God’s
> or to the world of contingent beings to       reality as the Necessarily Existent.
> ground it and to cause its existence—            This language distinguishing be-
> something that is, by implication, nec-       tween the necessary and the contin-
> essarily existent.                            gent in reference respectively to God
> For Bahá’u’lláh, it is evident that       and His creation is central to this work
> contingent beings could not precede           of Bahá’u’lláh, and its centrality to
> from “sheer nothingness,” and in              Bahá’u’lláh’s theological vision in
> themselves do not even have “the ca-          general is clearly realized as soon as
> pacity to exist.” They must depend,           one notes that the term imkán, literally
> therefore, on what is not contingent but      signifying the realm of contingent ex-
> necessary. In itself, contingent being is     istence, is used in reference to creation
> characterized only by “the abasement          ubiquitously in Bahá’u’lláh’s writ-
> of remoteness and the perils of ultimate      ings, even as mention of mumkinát—
> extinction,” and accordingly must be          contingent beings—is unavoidable
> “rescued” by a transcendent reality in        in most any prayer, tablet, or epistle
> order to subsist at all. Here we see, im-     from Him. As such, the Lawḥ-i Ḥik-
> plicit in Bahá’u’lláh’s account, the vital    mat opens with: “This is an Epistle
> distinction between what is necessarily       which the All-Merciful hath sent down
> and what is only contingently existent,       from the Kingdom of Utterance. It is
> for it is by the former that the latter has   truly a breath of life unto those who
> its being, while the former in itself is      dwell in the realm of creation (imkán).
> independent of all else. Accordingly          Glorified be the Lord of all worlds!”
> and significantly, in this same Tablet        (Tablets 137; Majmúʻiy-i-Alváḥ ba’d
> Bahá’u’lláh soon identifies God explic-       az Kitáb-i-Aqdas 80). Likewise, the
> itly with what is necessarily existent,       Long Obligatory Prayer enjoined by
> using the term vájib, technically mean-       Bahá’u’lláh states: “Thou seest me
> ing “necessary,” just as Avicenna did.        turning toward Thee, and rid of all
> Bahá’u’lláh states that “there can be no      attachment to anyone save Thee, and
> tie of direct intercourse to bind the one     clinging to Thy cord, through whose
> true God with His creation, and no re-        movement the whole creation (mum-
> semblance whatever can exist between          kinát) hath been stirred up” (Prayers
> 22                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> and Meditations 317; Ad‘íyyiy-i-             such limitations” (Gleanings 150–51;
> Ḥaḍrat-i-Maḥbúb 65).                         Iqtidárát 72–73). Here, “whatsoever in
> These are but two examples among          the contingent world can either be ex-
> myriad of Bahá’u’lláh’s identification       pressed or apprehended” translates the
> of creation with contingent being, with      Persian ánchih dar maqám-i-mumkin,
> its implied attribution of necessity         literally “whatsoever is in the station
> to God. We may further consider, for         of the contingent (mumkin)”; such a
> instance, Bahá’u’lláh’s statement in         thing, Bahá’u’lláh says, is maḥdúd, or
> the Kitáb-i-Íqán in which He stresses        limited, by ḥudúdát-i-imkáníyyih, the
> God’s ontological distinction from           limitations pertaining to the contingent
> mumkinát or contingent beings, insofar       realm, or the constraints of contin-
> as they have an intrinsic dependence         gency. According to Bahá’u’lláh, God
> upon Him: “No tie of direct intercourse      alone transcends such limitations. As
> can possibly bind Him to His creatures       such, Bahá’u’lláh here explicates the
> (mumkinát) . . . inasmuch as by a word       ontological gulf between God and His
> of His command all that are in heav-         creation in the Persian text by explicit-
> en and on earth have come to exist,          ly characterizing creation as being “in
> and by His wish, which is the Primal         the station of the contingent,” while
> Will itself, all have stepped out of utter   He implicitly affirms the necessary
> nothingness into the realm of being,         existence of God by saying that He
> the world of the visible” (63).              alone transcends such constraints of
> In yet another work, Bahá’u’lláh          contingency.
> again stresses, using precise meta-              This language of necessity and
> physical language, that God utterly          contingency with its accompanying
> transcends contingent existence. He          logic continues through the writings
> thus explicitly validates, beyond any        of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Who even repeats a
> mere coincidence of terminology, the         kind of argument from contingency in
> content of Avicenna’s central distinc-       which reasoning similar to Avicenna’s
> tion between that which is necessar-         appears in the eloquent brevity of a sin-
> ily existent in itself, being God, and       gle sentence: “So long as the contingent
> what exists within the constraint of         world is characterized by dependency,
> contingent being, namely, the cre-           and so long as this dependency is one
> ation. Bahá’u’lláh thus asserts: “the        of its essential requirements, there
> habitation wherein the Divine Being          must be One Who in His own Essence
> dwelleth is far above the reach and ken      is independent of all things” (Some
> of anyone besides Him. Whatsoever            Answered Questions 6; Mufávaḍát 4).
> in the contingent world can either be        That ‘Abdu’l-Bahá appeals to the con-
> expressed or apprehended, can nev-           tingent nature of the world to argue for
> er transgress the limits which, by its       God’s existence, as an ontologically in-
> inherent nature, have been imposed           dependent reality, shows that He vali-
> upon it. God, alone, transcendeth            dates the basic metaphysical principles
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                             23
> 
> underlying Avicenna’s argument for               beings,” of referring to God as “neces-
> God, and that His use of a term like             sary” and “One Who in His own Es-
> “contingent” is likewise no mere co-             sence is independent of all things”—
> incidence of terminology, but rather a           the significance of such expressions is
> substantive affirmation of the concept             utterly lost without an understanding
> of creation’s inherent contingency and           of that metaphysical world-picture
> God’s ontological necessity.                     rationally argued for by Avicenna and
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá furthermore uses the             an appreciation of its attendant terms
> very term necessarily existent (vujúb)           of contingency and necessity. This fact
> in explicit reference to God, such as            illustrates the relevance of analyzing
> when He says that God is absolutely              the Avicennian positions affirmed in
> one and indivisible insofar as the di-           the Bahá’í Writings to understand the
> vine reality “admits of no division, for         theological teachings contained in
> division and multiplicity are among the          them.
> characteristics of created and hence                 Another example of this point can
> contingent things, and not accidents             be seen when, right next to the terms
> impinging upon the Necessary Being               necessary and contingent, Bahá’u’lláh
> (vujúb)” (Some Answered Questions                calls God qadím and creation ḥádith:
> 127; Mufávaḍát 27). Similarly,                   “there can be no tie of direct inter-
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá states that such things as          course to bind the one true God with
> “we affirm for creation to be among the            His creation, and no resemblance what-
> requirements of origination we deny in           ever can exist between the transient
> God; for to be sanctified and exalted            (ḥádith) and the Eternal (qadím), the
> above all imperfections is one of the            contingent (mumkin) and the Absolute
> characteristics of the Necessary Being           (vájib)” (Gleanings 66; Majmúʻiy-i-Al-
> (vujúb)” (Some Answered Questions                váḥ-i-Mubárakih 340).Though qadím
> 339; Mufávaḍát 204). He asserts, more-           is generally and rightly translated as
> over, that “whatever is originated, in           eternal, it alludes to those philosophi-
> respect to its existence and conditions,         cal points about causation that we con-
> requires the effluence of being that em-           sidered in the first section of this paper.
> anates from the Necessarily Existent”            In this connection, qadím comes from
> (Khitábát 2:6, provisional translation).6        the same root as muqaddam, which
> Clearly, Avicenna’s modal meta-               signifies “being prior,” whether in time
> physics is not merely incidental to              or in essential independence, from the
> these passages from Bahá’u’lláh and              ḥádith, an effect or phenomenon (trans-
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. The significance of call-          lated as “transient” above). It is ac-
> ing creation “the contingent world,”             cordingly in the full sense of a cause’s
> of calling created things “contingent            essential priority to its effect, as Avi-
> cenna explains, that Bahá’u’lláh here
> employs the term qadím in reference to
> 6      All provisional translations in this   God and ḥádith with respect to created
> article are by the author.
> 24                 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> things, insofar as according to both       Avicenna, but also affirms the meaning
> Avicenna and Bahá’u’lláh creation is       underlying it. “That primal Essence,”
> co-eternal with God but essentially and    Bahá’u’lláh assures us in the Lawḥ-
> ceaselessly dependent on Him—as will       i-Tawḥíd, “subsists (qá’im) by virtue
> be explored in Part Three of this arti-    of its own self” (Majmúʻiy-i-Alváḥ-i-
> cle. Thus, Bahá’u’lláh not only stresses   Mubárakih 313, provisional transla-
> the necessary existence of God and the     tion). Similarly, in the Short Obligato-
> contingency of His creatures, but also     ry prayer enjoined by Bahá’u’lláh, one
> alludes to His being essentially prior     reads: “I testify, at this moment, to my
> to them, as the ultimate and uncondi-      powerlessness and to Thy might, to my
> tioned cause of all other things at all    poverty and to Thy wealth. There is
> times, as Avicenna argued.                 none other God but Thee, the Help in
> Moreover, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, in chapter      Peril, the Self-Subsisting (al-qayyúm)”
> eighty of Mufávaḍát or Some Answered       (Prayers and Meditations 314; Ad’íyy-
> Questions, Himself provides a detailed     iy-i-Ḥaḍrat-i-Maḥbúb 74). In addition,
> presentation of essential and temporal     when explaining the immortality of the
> priority, as well as the dependent and     human soul, Bahá’u’lláh distinguishes
> originated nature of an effect (ḥudúth),    between the everlasting existence of
> that precisely mirrors Avicenna’s own      the soul, which is nonetheless contin-
> explanations; this again indicates His     gent, temporal and thus dependent on
> support for the metaphysical account of    a cause, and the eternal existence of
> causation underlying Avicenna’s argu-      God, which is necessary, absolute, un-
> ment for God. In this light, Bahá’u’lláh   conditioned and essential to Him, and
> likewise uses the term ḥudúth to refer     thus in need of no cause. He states:
> to created things’ essential contingency
> and their fundamental insignificance         When the soul attaineth the Pres-
> when compared with God’s necessary           ence of God, it will assume the
> and unconditioned existence: “how            form that best befitteth its immor-
> utterly contemptible must every con-         tality and is worthy of its celestial
> tingent (ḥudúth) and perishable thing        habitation. Such an existence is
> appear when brought face to face with        a contingent and not an absolute
> the uncreated, the unspeakable glory of      existence, inasmuch as the for-
> the Eternal” (Gleanings 187–88; qtd.         mer is preceded by a cause, whilst
> in Dávúdí 131).                              the latter is independent there-
> Even when Bahá’u’lláh uses terms          of. Absolute existence is strictly
> other than vájib in reference to the         confined to God, exalted be His
> nature of God’s existence, the evident       glory. (Gleanings 157; Majmúʻiy-
> meaning remains that God is neces-           i-Alváḥ-i-Mubárakih 164–65)
> sarily existent in Himself and essen-
> tially independent—an indication that         The term translated as “absolute
> He not only uses the terminology of        existence” is baqáy-i-dhátí, which
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                          25
> 
> literally signifies essential existence.     in being causally dependent and con-
> Because God exists necessarily of Him-       ditioned (Muntakhabátí 1:58–59).
> self without need of anything external       From the above points, therefore, we
> to Him, His existence is essential to His    may safely conclude that Bahá’u’lláh,
> nature, and is accordingly absolute, as      along with ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, recognizes
> Shoghi Effendi perceptively translated,       and affirms the Avicennian distinction
> insofar as it is not contingent on, or       between contingent and necessary ex-
> conditioned by, anything whatsoever.         istence, and identifies God with the
> Since this “essential existence” is not      Necessarily Existent. The above points
> preceded by or dependent on a cause—         also showcase how an understanding
> whereas non-essential existence is—          of the metaphysical principles Avi-
> Bahá’u’lláh is clearly distinguishing        cenna uses in his argument for God’s
> between existence which is essential         existence illuminate the meaning of
> to something and thus necessary, and         Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s state-
> existence which is incidental, derived       ments—Their own arguments in favor
> from a cause, and thus contingent to a       of God’s existence and clarifications of
> thing. As such, it is this necessary exis-   His nature.
> tence, not dependent on a cause, which          Nevertheless, the concept of the Nec-
> He says is “strictly confined to God.”       essarily Existent that Avicenna propos-
> In    this    passage,      therefore,   es may initially seem too conceptually
> Bahá’u’lláh carefully explicates the         bare to be easily identified with God,
> metaphysical notions of contingent and       particularly the full and lively God of
> necessary being, and what they entail        Bahá’u’lláh. Though the concept of
> for the nature of God and His creatures,     God presented by Bahá’u’lláh clearly
> and consequently affirms the concep-           entails that He exists necessarily and
> tual core of Avicenna’s argument for         not merely contingently, we have yet
> God and subsequent conception of the         to see the full rational justification
> Divine in its essential form. Similarly,     for why, in Avicenna’s metaphysics,
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá makes a precise distinc-        something necessarily existent in itself
> tion, like Avicenna, between the condi-      should be recognized as divine and as
> tional and hence contingent existence        the single reality worthy of the term di-
> of creatures and the necessary exis-         vinity. The object of the following part
> tence of God, when He explicitly states      of this paper, therefore, is to explore
> in one place that existence is “of two       how a rich theological picture emerg-
> kinds,” that of God and that of khalq or     es from the idea of absolute necessi-
> creation. While the existence of God,        ty, and how the attributes of divinity
> He explains, is preceded by and depen-       can be logically deduced therefrom in
> dent on no cause whatsoever, being ab-       Avicenna’s system. We will see, mean-
> solute and eternally and independent-        while, an even greater convergence
> ly subsistent, the kind of existence         between Avicenna’s arguments and
> creatures possess is radically different      Bahá’u’lláh’s statements, as well as
> 26                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> the explanations of the latter’s son and    contingent beings. The prime method
> successor, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá.                    of establishing God’s attributes, there-
> fore, in both the Bahá’í Writings and
> T    D       A                       Avicenna’s work, is the apophatic ap-
> proach of negative theology, by which
> In the foregoing pages, we reviewed         properties that are characteristic of cre-
> Avicenna’s argument for God as the          ated and contingent beings as such are
> Necessarily Existent, and demonstrat-       negated from God. In this light, God
> ed that in Bahá’u’lláh’s view God, as       is the one reality that transcends the
> Avicenna stresses, is indeed charac-        conditioned, contingent, caused, and
> terized by necessary existence. What        mutable order of nature, and is thus
> remains to be shown, therefore, is          absolute and sanctified from the multi-
> twofold. First, we must elucidate the       plicity of attributes that are distinctive
> rationale behind Avicenna’s assertion       of contingent beings. By this method
> that the Necessarily Existent is indeed     of negation, a fuller understanding
> God by explaining how he deduces            emerges of what necessary existence
> further divine attributes from the idea     logically entails, and what it must pre-
> of necessary existence. We will do this     clude, with the result that one comes
> by considering the divine attributes        to know God by virtue of what He is
> of simplicity, singleness, immutabil-       not, such as when one asserts that He
> ity, eternality, perfection, goodness,      is eternal (not in time), necessary (not
> intellect, will, and infinitude, each of    contingent), one (not multiple), and so
> which is significant in Bahá’u’lláh’s       on.
> revelation and Avicenna’s thought.             A related principle to bear in
> Second, we must ascertain whether           mind—one whose justification will
> Bahá’u’lláh accepts Avicenna’s ac-          become evident once the concept of
> count of the divine attributes, in order    simplicity has been discussed—is
> to determine further how Bahá’u’lláh        that for Bahá’u’lláh and Avicenna the
> affirms Avicennian principles and how         divine attributes treated in this part
> understanding those Avicennian princi-      are not discrete and separate proper-
> ples illuminates the nature, and rational   ties that characterize God. Each one,
> character, of Bahá’u’lláh’s own teach-      rather, is a different construal of His
> ings on the nature of God. Such, then,      necessary existence. We saw, for in-
> is the object of the second part of this    stance, in this article’s first part that
> paper.                                      the Necessarily Existent has no cause.
> In order to contextualize the dis-       If it needed a cause to exist, it would
> cussion of divine attributes that fol-      not be necessarily existent in itself.
> lows, we can note at the outset that a      Insofar as we conclude that there is
> conceptual analysis of the Necessarily      a first causeless cause, we can deter-
> Existent shows the stark disparity and      mine that it is identical to the Neces-
> categorical distinction between it and      sarily Existent, for it would require
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                          27
> 
> a cause if it were merely possible in        S
> itself. And yet, although being neces-
> sarily existent and being independent        The above point—that in God there
> of any cause are distinct propositions,      is no multiplicity—is especially ap-
> the reality they point to is the same, as    parent from an understanding of the
> each predication is fully identical to,      attribute of simplicity. It is discussed
> or convertible into, the other. Similar-     first because it is arguably the most vi-
> ly, each of the attributes spoken of will    tal to comprehend in order for one to
> not constitute a discrete entity in God,     understand the God of Avicenna and,
> but will serve as a way of deducing          likewise, the God of Bahá’u’lláh. In
> the logical consequences of necessary        sum, simplicity means that the Nec-
> existence. This is by way of negating        essarily Existent is incomposite and
> from the Necessarily Existent the at-        absolutely one in its essence—it has
> tributes peculiar to contingent beings,      no component parts. Simplicity stands
> as described above, rather than affirm-        in contrast to complexity, which en-
> ing of it a plurality of discrete proper-    tails the composition of multiple parts
> ties, as Avicenna stresses:                  as well as a variety of real ontological
> disjunctions and various internal as-
> God has attributes whose meaning           pects cohering within an entity. But,
> is negative, such that when we             as Avicenna explains (Dánishnámih
> say that God is “one,” for exam-           368–69 and 374–75), the Necessarily
> ple, we mean that His reality is           Existent must be simple because it has
> such that He has no peer, or that          no cause for its existence, nor for its
> He is not composed of parts. Sim-          being the way that it is. For if the Nec-
> ilarly, when we say He is eternal,         essarily Existent were composed of
> we mean that His existence has             different parts, then it would depend
> no beginning, but these two attri-         on those parts, and on some principle
> butes—oneness and eternity—do              by which they would cohere, in order
> not bring about any multiplicity in        to exist. In such a case, its existence
> His essence. (Dánishnámih 381)             would be contingent and not neces-
> sary—contingent, that is, on a range
> It is in this light that ‘Abdu’l-Bahá        of parts and on something to cause
> says, as seen earlier, that such things as   them to come together so as to sustain
> “we affirm for creation to be among the        the subsistence of the complex enti-
> requirements of origination we deny in       ty. If this were so, then it would only
> God; for to be sanctified and exalted        be possibly existent in itself and not
> above all imperfections is one of the        necessary. It would not be something
> characteristics of the Necessary Being       metaphysically ultimate, for anything
> (vujúb)” (Some Answered Questions            that depends on composition is defi-
> 339; Mufávaḍát 204).                         nitionally not the absolute terminus
> of causal explanation, insofar as it
> 28                    The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> depends on ontologically more funda-               Thus, the Necessarily Existent can-
> mental elements.                                not have any parts, nor can it entail
> Another way to reason out the sim-          any composition. Consequently, there
> plicity of the Necessarily Existent is          could be no discrete physical parts in
> this: if the Necessarily Existent did           the Necessarily Existent, and it could
> have parts, would those parts be nec-           not be something extended in three
> essarily existent in themselves? If they        dimensions. For Avicenna, however,
> were not necessarily existent in them-          there are deeper, metaphysical ways in
> selves, then what they would compose            which something could be a compos-
> clearly could not be necessarily exis-          ite in contrast to being a simple entity.
> tent, for “what is dependent on what is         Namely, something could be a compos-
> caused is also caused” (ash-Shifá 258).         ite of actuality and potentiality, matter
> But if we did conceive these parts each         and form, essence and existence. We
> as necessarily existent, there would            will thus successively explore the sig-
> still have to be a cause or principle by        nificance of each of these pairs in Avi-
> means of which they would join to-              cenna’s thought.
> gether and form the Necessarily Exis-              First, with regard to actuality and
> tent being whose existence we initially         potentiality, Avicenna accepts Aristot-
> deduced. But such a complex being               le’s fundamental postulate, articulated
> would not be necessarily existent, for          in Book Nine of his Metaphysics, that
> it would still be dependent for its ex-         something is either actual or potential,
> istence on the composition of separate          and that causation, change or origi-
> elements as well as some external prin-         nation involves the actualization of a
> ciple to unite those elements; it thus          potential. In fact, Avicenna assimilates
> would not be fundamental and neces-             this Aristotelian insight into his divi-
> sary in itself. Consequently, something         sion of existence into the modalities of
> cannot be composed of necessary enti-           necessity and possibility. For Avicen-
> ties and remain necessarily existent in         na, whatever can possibly exist must
> itself.8                                        be said to exist in some way or other,
> whether in actuality or in potentiality,
> 7      This same logic, as we discussed
> even as he expresses in the Dánish-
> earlier, showed us that composition is a        námih: “When it is possible for some-
> feature strictly confined to contingent be-     thing to exist but it still does not exist,
> ings. Composition entails the existence of      the possibility of its existence while it
> something prior to the composed thing,          is nonexistent is called potentiality”
> something more basic which supports,            (363). When a possibly existent thing
> causes, and sustains its existence. The         comes into existence, it passes from
> Necessarily Existent, then, must be entire-     potentiality into actuality. However,
> ly void of such composition.                    such a thing does not have actuality in
> 8      Avicenna’s demonstration that
> in principle there could only be one nec-
> essarily existent reality is discussed in the   section “Singleness.”
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                            29
> 
> itself but must be actualized by a cause;    a cause to become actually existent.
> insofar, then, as a contingent being can     If that potential in it were actualized
> change or revert to nonexistence, it is      by a cause, then the being of the Nec-
> not pure, self-subsistent actuality, but     essarily Existent would not be fully
> rather is partly actual (as actualized by    necessary in itself but necessitated by
> its cause or causes) and partly potential    a cause. This, of course, is a contra-
> due to its inherent contingency.             diction. Alternatively, if one part of its
> Consequently, things that are caused     existence were actual in itself, and an-
> or mutable are composites of actuality       other part potential, the former would
> and potentiality, actual and potential       have no need of the latter to exist. That
> existence. That is, a contingent being,      former would then be the true Neces-
> say a tree, is actually one way and          sarily Existent, in which case it could
> potentially another. Part of a tree’s        not be subject to an external cause to
> contingency entails that it has poten-       join it to something only potentially
> tiality—it can potentially exist or not      existent, nor would it make sense to
> exist; it can potentially be fertile green   say that what is necessary in itself de-
> or withered brown; it can potentially        pends on a part that is only possibly
> grow or diminish. Conversely, it actu-       existent in itself.9
> ally is one way or another at any par-           Hence, the Necessarily Existent is
> ticular time, and that current actuality     no composite of actuality and poten-
> is made actual, or necessary, by some        tiality, but fully actual and necessarily
> cause or other. The tree, accordingly, is    so—not upon the condition of anything
> not purely actual or necessary in itself,    else; it is thus wholly unconditioned,
> but is subject to causes and has poten-      absolute, and free of any metaphysical
> tials that may or may not become ac-         composition. The simplicity of its ex-
> tualized. Metaphysically, therefore, the     istence inevitably entails that it is one
> tree is a composite of actual and poten-     thing and one thing only, in complete
> tial existence: existence as necessitated    actuality and necessity—pure actuality
> by its causes and existence as merely        with no potentiality. In classical terms,
> possible in itself.                          it is pure act with no potency.
> But Avicenna writes in ash-Shifá,            Similarly, Avicenna explains that
> “Whatever is necessarily existent by         the Necessarily Existent could not be a
> its own essence is necessarily existent      composite of matter and form:
> in every aspect” (30). This is because
> if the Necessarily Existent had any po-
> tentiality, if any part of its existence        9      Likewise, and stated more simply,
> were not already fully actual and nec-       the Necessarily Existent can have no po-
> essary but potential and contingent, it      tentiality, for then it would have an actual
> would not be necessarily existent in         part and a potential part, and then it would
> itself. In itself, that part would only      not be fundamentally irreducible and inde-
> be possibly existent and would require       pendent of the composition of more basic
> elements.
> 30                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> There cannot be any multiplicity           that receives the form and is actualized
> in the Necessarily Existent, such          by it, as wax receives the impression
> that its existence becomes actual-         of the seal. Lastly, the final cause is the
> ized due to a multiplicity of things,      purpose of a thing, or its end, the state
> even as the body of man is. Nor            that it is directed towards by virtue of
> can things be divisions within it,         its particular nature, the realization of
> each part subsisting in its own            which constitutes its good.10
> right, like the wood and clay of a             The Necessarily Existent, in not
> house. Nor can there be divisions          depending upon causes, clearly does
> within it that are conceptually sep-       not have an existence that is realized
> arate though not in essence, even          by virtue of any one of these four caus-
> as matter and form are conceptu-           es. As such, the Necessarily Existent
> ally separate in natural bodies, for       could have neither a material nor for-
> in that case the essence of the Nec-       mal cause: it could not be comprised of
> essarily Existent would be a com-          matter, some basic stuff with the poten-
> posite and admit of association            tiality of being actualized in a particu-
> with causes, as has been shown.            lar form. If this were the case, it would
> (Dánishnámih 374)                          not be necessarily, but only possibly,
> existent. Accordingly, even as it is not a
> The full significance of the Necessar-       composite of discernible discrete parts,
> ily Existent’s not being a composite         or of actuality and potentiality, the Nec-
> of matter and form similarly depends         essarily Existent cannot be a composite
> on some understanding of Aristotelian        of matter and form. It follows logical-
> metaphysics and its view of causation,       ly, then, that it must be immaterial, for,
> the basic structure of which Avicenna        otherwise, it would be a contingent
> adopts and defends. In brief, the Ar-        entity composed of two metaphysical
> istotelian account presents four kinds       parts: matter and form. Matter would
> of cause: the efficient, the formal, the       represent its potentiality, form its actu-
> material, and the final. The efficient         ality, and it, as a being whose existence
> cause is already familiar from the dis-      has been realized, would be dependent
> cussions in Part One; it is the agent, the   on those causes, the material cause
> source of a change in a thing (such as       and the formal cause, as well as some
> when a stove imparts heat to water) or       agent, the efficient cause, to actualize
> the existence of a thing (as when the        the substrate of matter into some con-
> motion of the hand creates the motion        crete form. This, of course, is impossi-
> of the key being held). The formal           ble for the Necessarily Existent, for it
> cause, however, is the essential form        is dependent on no cause whatsoever.
> and nature or functional organization
> of a thing, which makes it actually the         10    Significantly, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
> thing that it is. Conversely, the material   likewise validates the Aristotelian theo-
> cause is the matter, the raw potentiality,   ry of the four causes; see chapter eighty
> of Mufávaḍát.
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                            31
> 
> Given, therefore, that the Neces-        attributes peculiar to water: its inherent
> sarily Existent is immaterial, it cannot    nature. Water, as H2O, has properties
> even be conceived as a uniform and          that neither of its elements, hydrogen
> homogeneous substance existing in           and oxygen, has alone, and its attri-
> three-dimensional space; rather, it is      butes are not a mere sum of hydrogen’s
> something that altogether transcends        and oxygen’s discrete properties. Water
> space and the material world. Conse-        has a unique set of properties, such as
> quently, it is void of all the incidental   being capable of existing in gas, liquid,
> attributes particular to material enti-     and solid states in a narrow range of
> ties, which include subsisting in space;    temperatures. Water is thus essential-
> being situated in three dimensions;         ly or intrinsically different from other
> exhibiting weight, mass, position, and      elements.
> locomotion; and so forth. Immaterial-           The important point is that Avicen-
> ity is thus a logical consequence both      na recognizes that, for any contingent
> of necessary existence and simplicity.      being, whether it exists must be a dis-
> There remains, however, yet anoth-       tinct consideration from what defini-
> er and even more fundamental level          tionally constitutes what it is. This is
> at which the Necessarily Existent is        because there is nothing entailed by
> properly understood as absolutely sim-      the essence of any contingent being
> ple. This involves Avicenna’s famous        that will demonstrate to someone that
> distinction between essence and exis-       it exists in actuality. The essence of
> tence. For Avicenna, contingent beings      a human being, for example, may be
> are composed of essence and existence,      defined, as it was classically at least
> and their essence is conceptually and       since Aristotle, as a rational animal. If
> metaphysically distinct from their ex-      the essence of the human being, then,
> istence. In other words, for Avicenna,      is to be a rational animal, it is clear that
> the fact that something is distinct from    this remains a fact even if all human
> what something is. The essence of a         beings become extinct. Likewise, even
> thing is its quiddity, its máhíyyat, the    if humans had never emerged, that
> whatness that defines it. An essence is     would not have changed the fact that
> what makes an entity the thing it is and    the human essence is to be a rational
> not some other thing. For example, the      animal. One cannot know whether any
> essence of a triangle—triangularity—        human exists simply by investigating
> determines that any triangle has three      what constitutes the human essence;
> sides and three sides only, internal        instead, one must empirically deter-
> angles whose sum is 180 degrees, and        mine whether humans exist in the
> so forth. A triangle is not a square; the   present, or deduce their existence in-
> two shapes are essentially different. To     directly from their effects, insofar as
> use a more concrete example, the es-        their existence is not logically neces-
> sence of water could be construed as        sary but contingent and incidental to
> that reality by which it manifests the      their essence.
> 32                 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> Avicenna, in addition, has a briefer    essence. It is thus that saying “the es-
> proof of the distinction between es-       sence is an existent” differs from say-
> sence and existence in ash-Shifá. His      ing “the essence is an essence.”
> proof rests on the idea that, if essence      This distinction between essence
> and existence were not distinct, then      and existence moreover clarifies why
> even some of the simplest propositions     a contingent being is only possibly ex-
> would revert to bare tautologies. He       istent in itself. Because of the distinc-
> explains:                                  tion between essence and existence, a
> contingent being cannot derive exis-
> It is evident that for everything        tence from its own essence; it there-
> there is a reality particular to it,     fore does not have existence in and of
> and this is what constitutes its         itself, that is, from its own nature and
> essence. Likewise, it is clear that      essence. It must therefore receive ex-
> the reality particular to each thing     istence from something other than its
> is distinct from its existence. This     essence, from something beyond itself:
> is because it is intelligible to say     an external cause. As a case in point,
> that the reality of something does       although triangularity is the essence
> exist in a concrete way, or as ap-       of a triangle, and although no triangle
> prehended in the mind, or abso-          can exist without that essence, what
> lutely as common to both. But it         Avicenna would call the formal cause,
> is vain and useless to say that the      no concrete triangle can exist without
> reality of something is the reality      an efficient cause, some external factor
> of something, or that the reality of     imparting existence to it, say, the geo-
> something is a reality. (24)             metrician who draws it and creates it as
> a particular triangle. Because contin-
> Though Avicenna continues with his         gent beings evince, in this way, a real
> explanation, his main point is that,       distinction between essence and exis-
> while a statement such as “the essence     tence, they are only possibly and not
> of man exists (either concretely or as     necessarily existent, insofar as they do
> conceived by a mind)” is meaningful        not exist simply given what they are.
> in that the predicate reveals something    Accordingly, every existent contingent
> more about the subject, to say “the es-    being evinces a fundamental composi-
> sence of man is the essence of man” or     tion, a composition that immediately
> “the essence of man is an essence” is      points to the conditional, dependent,
> a mere restatement. The predicate, in      and derivative nature of its being: the
> that case, reveals nothing more about      composition of essence and existence.
> the subject. This shows, for Avicenna,     A composite of essence and existence
> that there is a distinction between es-    is not metaphysically fundamental
> sence and existence. Otherwise, to say     and self-sufficient, but rather relies
> that a particular essence exists would     on something else for its being and
> not convey anything more about that        origination.
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                             33
> 
> It then follows that, unlike each            here is simply identical to the predicate
> member of the totality of contingently          in a way that would not hold for any
> existent beings, the Necessarily Exis-          contingent being.
> tent could not be such a composite of               In this connection, one may recall,
> essence and existence. As Avicenna              as discussed earlier, how Bahá’u’lláh
> deftly argues in the Dánishnámih:               implicitly confirms this Avicennian
> “Whatever has an essence other than its         proposition by restricting “essential
> own existence is not necessarily exis-          existence” to God; because God’s es-
> tent. For if the essence of a thing is not      sence is His existence, His existence
> its own existence, its existence would          is essential to Him. Contingent beings,
> have the characteristic of being an in-         in contrast, have a merely accidental
> cidental, and not essential, feature to it.     or incidental existence, as Avicenna
> Any incidental feature, moreover, has a         explains: “Whatever is necessarily ex-
> cause” (377). The Necessarily Existent          istent of itself has no essence except
> is thus nothing other than necessary            existence, and . . . whatever is not nec-
> existence, nothing other than absolute          essarily existent of itself has existence,
> being. Therefore, it has no essence             therefore, only incidentally” (Dánish-
> distinct from its existence, and in this        námih 409). ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, in valida-
> sense one may say that the Necessarily          tion of this point, thus states that “[t]
> Existent has no essence, insofar as it          his common existence (of contingent
> does not have an essence distinct from          beings) . . . is only one accident among
> its act of existence. In this connection        others that enter upon the realities of
> Avicenna writes: “The Necessarily               created things” (Some Answered Ques-
> Existent has no essence; it is rather           tions 337–38; Mufávaḍát 203). In this
> from Him that existence emanates onto           sense, the essential is associated with
> those things that have essences. It is          the necessary, and the contingent with
> pure being from which all privation             the accidental, which here refers to that
> and description is negated” (ash-Shifá          which is incidental, and not essential
> 276). Yet Avicenna also writes that,            or inherent, to a thing. Such contingent
> in another sense, the Necessarily Ex-           beings do not have existence of them-
> istent’s essence is its existence: “The         selves or essentially, their existence
> Necessarily Existent has no essence             is “accidental” or incidental to them,
> apart from its existence” (ash-Shifá            as ‘Abdu’l-Bahá and Avicenna both
> 274). In the Necessarily Existent, then,        explain.
> there is no distinction between what it            Since the essence of the Necessar-
> is and the fact that it is; what it is is its   ily Existent is its very incomposite
> existence. It is therefore absolute and         existence, it follows that it could not
> unconditioned Being. Thus, to say “the          have a plurality of essential attributes.
> Necessarily Existent exists” is equiv-          Contrary to contingent things such as
> alent to saying “the Necessarily Exis-          a human being—which is a composite
> tent is necessarily existent”; the subject      of the essential attributes of rationality
> 34                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> and animality by virtue of the intellect     can be nothing in it that is actualized by
> and the body, respectively—the es-           any external cause.
> sence of the Necessarily Existent could          The essential simplicity of the Nec-
> not be a composite of different meta-         essarily Existent thus entails that it
> physical parts or attributes, for then       is nothing else than the absolute act
> that essence would be something other        of being. In it there is no junction of
> than the single and incomposite reality      physical parts, no admixture of actu-
> of necessary existence. As Avicenna          ality and potentiality, no combination
> explains (Dánishnámih 374), if the           of discrete attributes, no cohesion of
> Necessarily Existent did have multiple       form and matter, no union of essence
> discrete attributes, its essence would be    and existence. It is instead something
> actualized by virtue of those attributes,    absolutely one and indivisible, simple
> and that essence would thus be depen-        and uncomposed. Accordingly, there is
> dent on those parts, and a cause to unite    nothing more fundamental, more basic,
> those parts. And this, as we have seen,      more ultimate to reality than the simple
> is impossible for the Necessarily Exis-      reality that the Necessarily Existent is.
> tent. Its essence, therefore, is simply or   It is categorically and essentially un-
> non-compositely necessary existence,         like any contingent being by virtue of
> and whatever attribute is properly as-       its inherent necessity, simplicity, and
> cribed to it is in fact identical to that    absolute oneness, and it is due to its
> necessary existence and does not indi-       utterly simple essence that it is some-
> cate an actual multiplicity within it.       thing truly ultimate. Consequently, the
> It follows, then, that in the Neces-     Necessarily Existent is not just one
> sarily Existent there is no distinction or   being among beings, for in that case it
> composition of essence and attributes.       would merely be a limited and contin-
> Its attributes are either identical to       gent instantiation of existence, superior
> its essence, or it transcends attributes     only in relative degree to other beings.
> altogether, at least in the sense that       Rather, its simplicity entails that the
> contingent beings have attributes. Con-      Necessarily Existent is not something
> sequently, given that the Necessarily        that has or instantiates existence as be-
> Existent is “necessary in all aspects,” it   ings do, but instead is Being itself, sub-
> likewise cannot admit of any incidental      sisting of itself, dependent on no other.
> or non-essential attributes or features.     It is thus wholly unlike all other things
> As Avicenna asserts, any incidental          and unique—an attribute that will have
> feature would require that an external       its full discussion under the coming
> cause had actualized something contin-       subsection, “Singleness.”
> gent in the Necessarily Existent, since          This, then, is how Avicenna deduces
> no incidental feature is essential to the    the simplicity of the Necessarily Exis-
> being of its possessor. But we have          tent, and hence of God. But how does
> seen that it is “necessary in every as-      Bahá’u’lláh affirm God’s simplicity in
> pect” and fully actual, and thus there       addition to His necessity? There are,
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                           35
> 
> indeed, many instances in His writings      insofar as His existence, as seen above,
> and those of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá in which di-      is essential to Him. Bahá’u’lláh fur-
> vine simplicity is either implicitly—as     thermore suggests, in affirming that
> mentioned above—or explicitly con-          God is “one in his works” (váḥidan fí
> firmed. In one of His tablets, for exam-    af‘álihi) that God does not engage in
> ple, Bahá’u’lláh firmly asserts that God    a multiplicity of actions or works, as
> “in truth, hath, throughout eternity,       contingent beings do, and thus does not
> been one in His Essence, one in His at-     admit of the multiplicity of potentially
> tributes, one in His works” (Gleanings      enacting one thing and then actually
> 193; Muntakhbátí 77). More tellingly,       enacting it, of potentially being one
> Bahá’u’lláh writes the following in the     way and actually another. This in ac-
> Lawḥ-i-Madíniy-i-Tawḥíd or the Tablet       cord with Avicenna’s position that God
> of the City of Divine Unity: “Thou art      enacts, and is identical to, His single
> then witness that God is one in His at-     and absolute act of existence, and that
> tributes, and that [multiple] attributes    He is thus exempt from a multiplicity
> are debarred from entry into the court      of contingent actions, which would in-
> of His sanctity . . . Recognize, more-      volve the actualization of potentiality
> over, that the multiplicity of various      in Him.11 Bahá’u’lláh therefore clearly
> designations and attributes shall never     affirms that God does not have various
> be joined unto His essence, for His at-     parts or composition, discrete proper-
> tributes are verily His essence itself”     ties or separate qualities, and confirms
> (Má’idiy-i-Ásmání 4: 329–13, provi-         that He is one absolutely and categor-
> sional translation).                        ically. In this way, Bahá’u’lláh affirms
> In these passages, Bahá’u’lláh as-       the notion of God’s simplicity in addi-
> serts that God is one and does not have     tion to His necessity.
> plurality of attributes, for whatever          Furthermore, if each of God’s attri-
> attribute may be properly ascribed to       butes is identical with His essence, as
> Him is identical to His single essence.     Bahá’u’lláh states, then logically each
> Consequently, it seems His intent in        one of them is identical with, or con-
> these passages is not merely to stress      vertible to, any of the others. It follows,
> that there is only one God. As we saw       then, that for Bahá’u’lláh God has no
> with Avicenna, the intent behind em-        attributes distinct from His essential
> phatically stating that God is one in es-   and utterly indivisible being, just as
> sence, attributes, and acts seems rather    for Avicenna. Moreover, Bahá’u’lláh’s
> to disallow any notion that there is any    statement that God is “one in His acts”
> multiplicity in God at all. His essence     is fully intelligible from the notion of
> is one; His attributes are one; His acts
> are one. Therefore, in God there are not       11    The section “Creation and Cos-
> multiple attributes and discrete proper-    mology” will explore the question of how
> ties; there is only His essential being,    the Necessarily Existent performs the
> which for Bahá’u’lláh is His existence,     creative act according to Bahá’u’lláh and
> Avicenna.
> 36                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> God’s being complete actuality, sheer       both He and Avicenna are in perfect
> necessary being without any addition        concord, as shall be shown.
> of potentiality or contingency or any          The context of this Tablet indicates
> composition therewith. God is, in other     that Bahá’u’lláh was asked about
> words, pure act insofar as He is neces-     the meaning of the following saying,
> sary existence, the very act of absolute    originating with Plotinus in the En-
> being. If God is truly one, His essence     neads (5.2.1): “The Simple Reality is
> could be no more distinct from His ex-      all things,” which was affirmed by the
> istence than His action could be distinct   prominent early modern Persian phi-
> from either His essence or existence.       losopher Mullá Ṣadrá. That the Simple
> He is at once necessary existence and       Reality (Basíṭ al-Ḥaqíqat) is clearly
> the act of being, insofar as His reali-     understood to refer to God is assumed
> ty as the Necessarily Existent means        throughout the Tablet, and Bahá’u’lláh,
> that His essence is to be. Bahá’u’lláh’s    incidentally, even refers to God quite
> statements are therefore manifest ex-       explicitly as the Necessarily Existent in
> pressions of the idea of divine sim-        this work. Bahá’u’lláh’s aim, however,
> plicity, as is clear after considering an   is to explicate Plotinus’ original state-
> account of Avicenna’s explanations          ment and Mullá Ṣadrá’s views in a way
> for why the Necessarily Existent must       that precludes any pantheistic reading.
> be simple. Understanding Avicenna’s         In His interpretation, Bahá’u’lláh ex-
> logical analysis of necessary existence     plicitly affirms God’s simplicity and
> and simplicity thus illuminates the         denies that He has any parts or partic-
> philosophical context and content of        ipates in the multiplicity of contingent
> Bahá’u’lláh’s own statements.               things. Rather, God is the fullness of
> Even if the logical consequenc-          existence itself with all its perfection,
> es of these passages failed to prove        from Whom the existence of His crea-
> definitively that Bahá’u’lláh affirms         tures proceeds, while He Himself re-
> God’s simplicity, His remarks on this       mains one and undivided among other
> theme in His Lawḥ-i-Basíṭ al-Ḥaqíqat        things or in Himself. Bahá’u’lláh thus
> or Tablet on the Simple Reality would       states:
> be sufficient to show that He in fact so
> strongly supports the doctrine of di-         Thou hast written that an inquirer
> vine simplicity as to take it as a given.     hath asked for an explanation of
> Moreover, Bahá’u’lláh stresses in that        the statement of the philosophers,
> Tablet that divine simplicity should not      “the Simple Reality is all things.”
> be construed as entailing any kind of         Say: Know that the meaning of
> pantheism or monism, a view in which          “things” in this connection is
> the distinction between the necessary         nothing else but existence and
> and the contingent collapses, and God         the perfections of existence qua
> becomes identical with the creation           existence, while the meaning of
> that proceeds from Him. In this too,          “all” is the possessor thereof. This
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                             37
> 
> “all” admits of no division and of              vision of the seer. Insightful eyes
> no parts. Thus, the Simple Reality,             behold, in all things, the signs of
> because it is simple in all aspects,            the One, for in all things are the
> is the possessor and totality of all            divine names manifest, while
> limitless perfections, as it hath               God Himself hath ever been, and
> been said, “there is no limit to His            shall forever be, sanctified from
> handiwork.”                                     ascent, descent, and limitation, as
> In the Persian tongue,12 it may              well as connection and association
> be said that the intent of the phi-             [with any other thing]. All other
> losopher in the above passage in                things, in contrast, abide in the
> regard to “things” is the perfec-               sphere of their specific limitations.
> tions of existence insofar as it is             (Má’idiy-i-Ásmání 7:140–41, pro-
> existence, and his intent as to “all”           visional translation)
> is a possessor, that is, the One who
> is the possessor and totality of              In Bahá’u’lláh’s interpretation, “the
> all limitless perfections in a sim-           Simple Reality is all things” means that
> ple manner. They have put forth               God, the Simple Reality, is the posses-
> similar statements on the themes              sor of existence and its perfections in-
> of divine simplicity and on the               sofar as it is absolute existence indepen-
> “potency” and “intensity” of ex-              dent of any of the incidental attributes
> istence.13 Here, the philosopher’s            of being found diversely in contingent
> intent was not that the Necessarily           entities (such as place, position, quan-
> Existent hath permeated or is di-             tity, temperature, texture, etc.). For
> vided among limitless entities. Ex-           Bahá’u’lláh, the simple and non-com-
> alted is He above that! Rather, it            posite nature of God is absolute; God
> is as the philosophers have stated:           is not the basic stuff out of which other
> “The Simple Reality is all things,            things are literally made, and His reali-
> and not any single one of them,”              ty is never a part of, or a substratum to,
> and in another place, “The splen-             the contingent order. This would require
> dors of the Simple Reality can                that God’s simplicity become inter-
> be perceived in all things.” This             mixed with limitless complexity, and
> perception is conditioned by the              that He be something basically material
> and composite which could take part in
> 12     Here, Bahá’u’lláh switches from       the material and composite world. This
> Arabic to Persian, and largely reiterates the   would certainly contradict the absolute
> same point.                                     reality of God’s necessary existence and
> 13     This is a reference to Mullá Ṣadrá,   thus His simplicity, for we have seen
> for his philosophy made use of the ideas of     how the Necessarily Existent must be
> the relative intensity (tashdíd), as well as    wholly actual being with no potentials
> the differentiation (tashkík), of existence as   and no aspects receptive to being or be-
> beings proceed from the absolute existence      coming contingent on external causes.
> of God.
> 38                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> Indeed, for Bahá’u’lláh and Avi-         to God as the Necessarily Existent.
> cenna, God is something fully one and          However much simplicity may
> complete in His necessary being, abso-      seem to be a rather abstract attribute
> lutely simple and non-composite, from       of God, it is the most fundamental of
> Whom the existence of other things          the attributes that we shall discuss, for
> proceeds, while He Himself remains          two reasons. The first is that it enables
> absolute, simple, and indivisible. And      one to understand precisely why God
> so Avicenna writes in this connection:      as the Necessarily Existent is the ab-
> “Everything is from Him, and He is          solute terminus of explanation: there is
> not like anything which proceeds from       simply nothing more basic and funda-
> Him. He is the source of everything,        mental than He is Himself, and there
> and is not any one of the things that are   is thus nothing—even theoretically—
> posterior to Him” (ash-Shifá 283).          upon which He could depend. Because
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá,       too,    elucidates   there is no distinction whatsoever be-
> Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings on the simplic-     tween His essence and His attributes,
> ity of God. Reiterating Bahá’u’lláh’s       or His essence and His existence, we
> assertion that in God there is no plu-      have no need to ask why He is one
> rality of attributes, and that each of      way and not another, or whether He
> His attributes is consequently identical    could exist or not exist, insofar as He
> with His essence, He writes that “the       is necessarily existent in Himself. The
> essential names and attributes of God       second reason to devote so much atten-
> are identical with His Essence, and His     tion to simplicity is that it enables one
> Essence is sanctified above all under-      to deduce additional attributes of God,
> standing” (Some Answered Questions          and also to understand that these seem-
> 168; Mufávaḍát 105). Elsewhere,             ingly additional attributes are not sep-
> as we saw earlier, He asserts that the      arate properties but merely represent
> Godhead “admits of no division, for         different ways of considering what the
> division and multiplicity are among         same reality, termed the Necessarily
> the characteristics of created and hence    Existent, logically entails. Simplicity,
> contingent things, and not accidents        then, enables one to understand how
> impinging upon the Necessary Be-            God’s attributes could be identical
> ing” (Some Answered Questions 127;          to His essence and to one another, as
> Mufávaḍát 27). The Bahá’í Writings,         Bahá’u’lláh and Avicenna state, and
> therefore, confirm Avicenna’s notion        are not a collection of distinct proper-
> of the simplicity of God. Logically,        ties in actuality.
> what is necessarily existent of itself         But before we proceed to what
> cannot have parts of any kind, physi-       Bahá’u’lláh and Avicenna have to say
> cal or metaphysical, and Bahá’u’lláh        about God’s attribute of singleness, it
> and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá accordingly affirm           should be noted that there are some
> God’s essential and absolute oneness,       statements from Avicenna on God’s
> in addition to Their explicit references    simplicity that may not be explicitly
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                           39
> 
> mentioned by Bahá’u’lláh or ‘Abdu’l-         throughout the Bahá’í Writings.
> Bahá. These include Avicenna’s deduc-           But a question remains. Clearly,
> tion that in God there can be no dis-        there can be no multiplicity within the
> tinction between His essence and His         Necessarily Existent, but has it been
> existence—that He just is His being.         shown there is one thing, and one thing
> What Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá            only, that is necessarily existent of it-
> do state unequivocally is that God is        self? This, of course, is a vital question
> the Necessarily Existent and absolutely      for the monotheism of Avicenna and
> one and simple, there being in Him no        Bahá’u’lláh, and it is hence to the at-
> multiplicity and division, and that His      tribute of singleness that we must now
> attributes are one with His essence. The     turn.
> potential absence of an explicit state-
> ment on such matters as the identity of      S
> God’s essence with His existence does
> not imply, however, that They do not         The singleness of the Necessarily Exis-
> uphold its truth, for it follows logically   tent means that there is not, and cannot
> from what Bahá’u’lláh says of God’s          be, more than one necessarily existent
> necessity, essential existence, and sim-     being, and that it is unique and com-
> plicity, His oneness in essence and at-      pletely without like or peer. Avicenna’s
> tributes. As discussed above, to be nec-     demonstration that the Necessarily
> essarily existent logically implies being    Existent is single in this sense follows
> incomposite and simple at the deepest        from its necessity and simplicity. We
> level, that of having a complete unity       have seen that the Necessarily Existent
> of essence and existence. It is thus that    is nothing other than its own neces-
> Bahá’u’lláh uses the term “essential         sary existence, without parts, various
> permanence or existence” (baqáy-i-           discrete attributes, incidental features,
> dhátí) with reference to God. In sum,        or potentiality of any kind. How then
> if this existence is essential to God and    could there be more than one? For Avi-
> thus an essential attribute, and if God’s    cenna reasons in chapter twenty-two of
> attributes are identical to His simple       the Dánishnámih’s “Metaphysics” that
> essence, it follows that Bahá’u’lláh         if there were more than one being with
> upholds Avicenna’s position that God         the attribute of necessary existence—
> is the Necessarily Existent whose            say two—then each one would have
> essence is His existence. If God’s es-       to have some additional characteris-
> sence were not His existence, His ex-        tic that the other did not have. There
> istence would not be essential to Him        would have to be something that dis-
> and would therefore proceed from an          tinguished one from the other, so they
> external cause—making Him a con-             could be considered multiple instanti-
> tingent being. Avicenna’s argument,          ations of the same nature; otherwise,
> therefore, illuminates the importance        they would be identical. For example,
> of the statements on divine simplicity       two human beings are distinguished
> 40                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> from each other by virtue of the fact        the Necessarily Existent, and the Nec-
> that each one is capable of evincing         essarily Existent would thus have to be
> a plurality of attributes, qualities, and    a composite of actual and potential ex-
> incidental features. One is standing in      istence—existence as it is in itself and
> position a, the other in position b; one     existence as caused by another. In this
> is six feet tall, the other is five feet;    case, it would be a composite being,
> and so on. Although each person has          and any composite being is only con-
> the same human nature, each one rep-         tingently existent, in being dependent
> resents a separate and distinct instanti-    on parts, as has been shown. Thus, as
> ation of that nature. Existence, in other    Avicenna points out in chapter sev-
> words, is imparted to the same human         en of Book One in ash-Shifá, there is
> essence in two discrete instances.           simply nothing by virtue of which one
> But because the Necessarily Exis-         necessarily existent being could be dif-
> tent is absolutely simple and necessary      ferent from another—each, being only
> in all aspects, one necessarily existent     simple existence, would be perfectly
> being would be identical to another in       indistinguishable and thus identical.
> every respect; one would have no es-         Therefore, it is simply incoherent to
> sential attribute the other did not itself   say there could be more than one nec-
> possess. Each would be immaterial, as        essarily existent entity.
> was shown in the previous section, so            Moreover, since the essence of the
> neither could occupy a different posi-        Necessarily Existent just is its exis-
> tion in space. Both would be wholly          tence, it follows that same essence
> actual, so one could not have a poten-       could not have more than one instantia-
> tial feature the other did not have. And     tion of existence. Since the essence of a
> since no necessarily existent being can      contingent being is not its existence, it
> be a composite of multiple attributes,       can be made existent in more than one
> neither could possess an attribute be-       instance, just as there are many human
> sides necessary existence the other did      beings, water molecules, trees, and
> not possess. As a result, there can be       so forth. But the Necessarily Existent
> only one necessarily existent being.         does not have an essence distinct from
> And since, as shown in the previous       its own existence, and so the single es-
> section, the Necessarily Existent is         sence could only have one existence,
> necessary in every aspect and is sheer       for it is identical to that existence. On
> actuality with no potentials, it is im-      account of these and other reasons,
> possible for it to have any incidental       there can only be one necessarily ex-
> or contingent attribute (such as place,      istent being.
> position, quantity, quality, or time) by         Therefore, when Avicenna speaks of
> which it could be distinguished from         the sum of contingent causes needing
> another necessarily existent being. For      an external, necessarily existent cause,
> such an incidental attribute, in order to    it could not be objected that there
> arise, would require a cause external to     could, even in principle, be a number
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                         41
> 
> of necessarily existent beings sustain-        He is, and hath from everlasting
> ing the contingent world. There is but         been, one and alone, without peer
> one absolute reality, then, which con-         or equal, eternal in the past, eter-
> currently sustains the entire contingent       nal in the future, detached from all
> structure of being, and which imparts          things, ever-abiding, unchange-
> existence to it absolutely and inex-           able, and self-subsisting. He hath
> haustibly. It is as though there is but        assigned no associate unto Him-
> one spring from which all the waters           self in His Kingdom, no counselor
> of being flow, or but one root by which        to counsel Him, none to compare
> all the branches of existence are sus-         unto Him, none to rival His glory.
> tained. The oneness and singleness of          To this every atom of the universe
> the Necessarily Existent is accordingly        beareth witness, and beyond it the
> a logical consequence of its necessity,        inmates of the realms on high, they
> its simplicity and the identity of its es-     that occupy the most exalted seats,
> sence and its existence. There is noth-        and whose names are remembered
> ing like it, for all other things are con-     before the Throne of Glory.
> tingently existent and have being only            Bear thou witness in thine in-
> derivatively, and thus are much more           most heart unto this testimony
> like one another than they could ever          which God hath Himself and for
> resemble that absolute source of all           Himself pronounced, that there
> being. Avicenna, through this means, is        is none other God but Him, that
> able not only to infer the existence of        all else besides Him have been
> that divine reality transcendent above         created by His behest, have been
> nature, but also to affirm that such an          fashioned by His leave, are subject
> ultimate reality must be absolutely one        to His law, are as a thing forgotten
> and single, unique and matchless. The          when compared to the glorious
> central claim of all monotheistic faiths       evidences of His oneness, and are
> is thus rigorously upheld by the ratio-        as nothing when brought face to
> nal philosophy of Avicenna—that there          face with the mighty revelations
> is only one God, incomparable, single,         of His unity. (Gleanings 192–93;
> and peerless.                                  Muntakhabátí 75–76)
> This claim, too, is central to the
> Faith of Bahá’u’lláh. There is hardly        And what Bahá’u’lláh declares in the
> any work by Him that does not stress,        poetic strains of the prophet, Avicen-
> with the unshakable conviction of            na reiterates in the sober tones of the
> certitude, the oneness of God and the        philosopher:
> incomparable, the transcendent nature
> of His being. Bahá’u’lláh thus affirms,          It has thus been established for
> in a representative instance, the single-      you that there is something nec-
> ness of God as a natural concomitant of        essarily existent. Likewise, it has
> His divine nature:                             been shown that the Necessarily
> 42                   The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> Existent is one. He is thus sin-       the Necessarily Existent is simply nec-
> gle; nothing shares with Him His       essary existence and actual being, with
> station, and nothing else is nec-      no other part existing contingently or
> essarily existent. He alone, there-    potentially, or in any way involving
> fore, is the principle by which        contingency or potentiality, and since
> the existence of all other things      any change involves the actualization
> is necessitated, whether directly      of a potential or the realization of a
> or through an intermediary cause.      contingency through some agent, it
> And since the existence of all oth-    follows that there could be no change
> er things proceeds from Him, He        in the Necessarily Existent. Any such
> is the First. By “first” we do not     change would require an external
> mean an attribute additional to His    cause conditioning some potential as-
> necessity, such that the necessity     pect or part of the Necessarily Existent.
> of His existence becomes multi-        Its complete necessity and simplicity,
> ple. Rather, we mean that He is the    however, make this strictly impossible.
> First in the sense of how all other    Avicenna writes:
> things stand in relation to Him.
> (ash-Shifá 274)                          Whatever admits of change must
> also admit of having a cause, of
> I                                            being in one condition by virtue
> of a certain cause, or lacking that
> The simplicity and singleness of the         condition by virtue of another
> Necessarily Existent distinguishes it as     cause. The being of such a thing
> utterly unlike any contingent being and      is not clear of association with
> transcendent above the entire order of       those two causes, and its being
> the contingent realm. And among the          would therefore make up a com-
> attributes and inherent conditions of        posite conditioned by causes. But
> contingent beings is change and al-          we have previously shown that
> teration, becoming and perishing. But        the Necessarily Existent is not a
> since the Necessarily Existent has no        composite being of any kind in as-
> likeness to contingent beings and con-       sociation with causes. Therefore,
> tingent attributes, it cannot admit of       it is not capable of any change.
> any alteration, or be receptive to any       (Dánishnámih 376)
> change.
> Avicenna’s proof for the immutabil-     That is, in order for the Necessarily Ex-
> ity of the Necessarily Existent in the     istent to change, there would have to
> Dánishnámih is remarkably brief, but       be some aspect or part of its reality that
> since he has previously established its    was not necessary in itself but rather
> necessity and simplicity, its immutabil-   contingent upon being actualized by
> ity need only be shown to be logically     some external cause. Such a being,
> entailed by those two notions. Since       however, would not be the Necessarily
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                           43
> 
> Existent, which is absolutely simple and   that God whom He has affirmed to
> not a composite of actual and potential    be necessarily existent. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
> existence. The Necessarily Existent is     thus validates the logical method un-
> therefore immutable and unchanging.        derlying Avicenna’s own conclusion.
> The immutability of the Neces-          Avicenna’s method, in turn, elucidates
> sarily Existent, and hence of God, is      the rational structure of the Bahá’í
> likewise affirmed by Bahá’u’lláh and         theological claim—a trend observed
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá states ex-      throughout this paper.
> plicitly and decisively:                       Of course, to say that the Neces-
> sarily Existent is unchanging is not to
> For the essence of the Godhead           imply that it is stagnant, lacking need-
> there is no ascent or descent, no        ed activity or dynamism. Rather, it is
> entrance or egress. It is sanctified     itself the sheer act of being, and thus of
> from time and place. It is ever in       unbounded vitality and life. For there
> the apex of sanctity, for change         to be any alteration in the Necessarily
> and alteration are impossible            Existent, therefore, would mean for it
> for the reality of the Godhead.          to quit its station as the ultimate reality,
> Change and alteration and motion         the ground for all dynamism in the con-
> from one condition to another are        tingent realm. And it is only because it
> incidents particular to contingent       is the unchanging and absolute ground
> and originated phenomena. (Kh-           of being that it can sustain the chang-
> iṭábát-i-ʻAbdu’l-Bahá 2:131–32,          ing realm of contingent becoming. The
> provisional translation)                 Necessarily Existent is not stagnant,
> then, but rather constant, and in that
> Indeed, change is a fundamental fea-       constancy any change would constitute
> ture of the contingent world, the realm    no added virtue, but would rather sig-
> of becoming, and thus is far removed       nify a deficiency commensurate with
> from the Necessarily Existent, which       that of the realm which it sustains and
> is absolute being without any aspect       supports.
> of becoming. Any change, moreover,             Bahá’u’lláh accordingly proclaims:
> is dependent on what already is, and       “Praise be to God, the Eternal that
> therefore only absolute, immutable be-     perisheth not, the Everlasting that de-
> ing could be the ultimate ground and       clineth not, the Self-Subsisting that
> support of the changing realm of con-      altereth not (Al-Báqí bi lá faná’, ad-
> tingent beings. The vital point here is    Dá’im bi lá zavál, al-Qá’im bi lá in-
> that ‘Abdu’l-Bahá not only asserts the     tiqál)” (Epistle 1; Lawḥ-i-ibn-i-Dhi’b
> immutable nature of God; He argues         1). He is báqí and thus abides forever,
> for God’s immutability by noting that      bi lá faná’, without death. He is dá’im
> mutability is foreign to God precisely     and thus perpetual and constant, bi
> because it is characteristic of contin-    lá zavál, without decline, corruption,
> gent beings and thus impossible for        or extinction. He is qá’im and thus
> 44                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> subsists dependent on no other, bi lá       being, the immutability, the constancy
> intiqál, without change or alteration.      of what is truly God. As such, eternal is
> one of the various senses of the word
> E                                           qadím that Avicenna applies to the
> Necessarily Existent. In the Dánish-
> The Necessarily Existent is thus im-        námih he explains that the Necessarily
> mutable. However, it is also common-        Existent alone has the full possession
> ly understood that God is eternal, and      of qidam, eternality; for anything that
> this is asserted by Bahá’u’lláh without     exists through the sustaining power
> reservation. Indeed, when we consider       of something beyond itself, even if it
> the Necessarily Existent, we see that       had always contingently existed in this
> eternality is entailed in the very con-     manner, is in the realm of origination,
> cept of necessary existence. For what-      of ḥudúth (382–83). Accordingly, the
> ever exists necessarily of itself, and      Necessarily Existent, dependent on no
> is immutable, must also exist without       other, alone has what the sixth-centu-
> beginning or end, and is not subject        ry philosopher Boethius eloquently
> to the passage of time, being beyond        defined eternality as: “the possession
> any measure of motion and change.           of endless life whole and perfect at a
> The Necessarily Existent never began        single moment” (Book 5, ch. 6).
> to exist, and it can never fail to exist.      As to Bahá’u’lláh, He repeatedly
> Moreover, there can be no change in         affirms the eternality of God, in one
> the condition of its existence, and time    place writing: “One and indivisible,
> thus has no hold or power over its          He hath ever subsisted within His sta-
> unchangeable reality. There is no mo-       tion sanctified from all time and place”
> tion for the Necessarily Existent, and      (Má’idiy-i-Ásmání 7:8, provisional
> so within it there can be no difference      translation). To say that the Necessar-
> between the past, the present, and the      ily Existent is sanctified from place, it
> future. No alteration or finality awaits    being immaterial and thus not extended
> it, just as no origination or beginning     in three dimensions (since that would
> precedes it.                                require it to be composite), likewise
> In it there is rather an everlasting    affirms one of Avicenna’s theological
> present of the fullness of its existence.   arguments, but what is important here
> The present that belongs to it is one       is Bahá’u’lláh’s affirmation that God is
> of constancy, permanence, unceasing         sanctified from zamán, or time. He is
> actuality, and absolute being; it is a      thus eternal, entirely unbound by the
> present that consists in a timeless and     temporal-spatial conditions of con-
> immutable act of existence, a present       tingent beings. Though Bahá’u’lláh’s
> that has no likeness to the temporal        references to God’s eternality are too
> order of the contingent realm. Eter-        numerous to quote adequately here, we
> nality, then, in a word sums up the         may again consider His statement that
> necessary existence, the transcendent       “there can be no tie of direct intercourse
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                           45
> 
> to bind the one true God with His cre-           A human being, to use Avicenna’s
> ation, and no resemblance whatever            example, admits of imperfection, “for
> can exist between the transient (ḥádith)      many things,” he writes, “among the
> and the Eternal (qadím), the contingent       perfections of his existence are defi-
> (mumkin) and the Absolute (vájib)”            cient in him” (ash-Shifá 283). That
> (Gleanings 66; Majmúʻiy-i-Alváḥ-i-            is, there are many things requisite for
> Mubárakih 340).                               the complete flourishing of a human
> being that exist only potentially and
> P                                             not actually or necessarily, and their
> actualization not only requires some-
> In the foregoing pages, we have seen          thing outside that person but also may
> that the Necessarily Existent must be         simply fail to occur, in which case he
> simple, single, immutable, and eter-          or she would suffer sheer imperfection
> nal. By logical extension, then, it is        and deficiency. Such things as sound-
> ultimate, incomparable, absolute, un-         ness of health, prosperity, education,
> changeable, everlasting, and the source       virtue, and love are needed for human
> of all other reality. Such attributes alone   life and existence to be complete, or
> and in themselves distinguish it above        perfect in the relevant sense. But a hu-
> all other things. Through an under-           man being depends on external causes
> standing of what necessary existence          for these things or may altogether fail
> logically entails, therefore, we see that     to achieve them, and furthermore may
> divinity may well be rightly ascribed to      lose them in time. No human being,
> the Necessarily Existent. But its divine      nor any other contingent being, can be
> character will be much more evident           perfect in any essential sense, for in
> once its subsequent attributes, starting      and of themselves human beings do not
> with perfection, are established.             even have existence, this having been
> Avicenna states, in chapter six of         acquired through external causes, and
> Book Eight of ash-Shifá’s “Metaphys-          thus they are deficient and imperfect in
> ics,” that the Necessarily Existent is        themselves.
> perfect, and that perfection follows             But the Necessarily Existent, being
> from its necessary being. Not only is         in itself pure existence and fully actual
> it perfect; its perfection transcends the     without any potential remaining to be
> kind achievable by any contingent be-         actualized, is támm al-vujúd, “com-
> ing. For Avicenna, perfection (kamál          plete and perfect in its existence.” It
> or tamám) refers to completeness and          needs nothing and depends on nothing
> actuality, as opposed to deficiency and       in order to enjoy that fullness of being,
> unrealized potentiality. For something        and there is no higher state of actuali-
> to be perfect, then, means that it is         ty which it might attain. Therefore, in
> complete and free from deficiency in          it there can be no lack or deficiency,
> respect to what it is and what is proper      no unrealized potential or possibility,
> to its existence.                             for that would assume that there is
> 46                    The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> something proper to it and needed by            and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. We may recall, in
> it that it does not already have by itself      this connection, Bahá’u’lláh’s state-
> and necessarily of itself. Such cannot          ments in the Lawḥ-i-Basíṭ al-Ḥaqíqat,
> be said of the Necessarily Existent,            which was discussed in the section on
> which is itself independent, subsistent         “Simplicity.” In that work, Bahá’u’lláh
> being, single and without parts. But            mirrors Avicenna’s own phrases, such
> not only is it perfect in itself; it is, in a   as “the perfections of being,” when the
> certain sense, fawq at-tamám, “above            latter writes that the Necessarily Ex-
> perfection.” “For not only does He pos-         istent is “complete and perfect in His
> sess His own being,” writes Avicenna,           existence, for there is nothing deficient
> “but the existence of every being itself        in Him in respect to His being and the
> flows from the abundance of His being,          perfections of His being.” Bahá’u’lláh
> belongs to Him, and emanates from               states:
> Him” (ash-Shifá 283).
> The Necessarily Existent, therefore,          Thou hast written that an inquir-
> has a transcendental perfection, for by           er hath asked for an explanation
> it is the being of all other things created       of the statement of the philoso-
> and sustained, and their own contingent           phers, “the Simple Reality is all
> perfection realized and made manifest.            things.” Say: Know that the mean-
> There can be no limit or deficiency to            ing of ‘things’ in this connection
> its being, and thus it is perfect and the         is nothing else but existence and
> source of all perfections in the realm of         the perfections of existence qua
> contingent existence. In addition, inso-          existence, while the meaning of
> far as it is immutable, the Necessarily           ‘all’ is the possessor thereof. This
> Existent could never become some-                 ‘all’ admits of no division and of
> thing less than it is, and could thus             no parts. Thus, the Simple Reality,
> never suffer, even theoretically, any              because it is simple in all aspects,
> deficiency or lack. Its perfection, there-        is the possessor and totality of all
> fore, is inviolable, supreme, and truly           limitless perfections, as it hath
> necessary, while that of a contingent             been said, “there is no limit to His
> being is quite naturally only possibly            handiwork.” (Má’idiy-i-Ásmání
> existent, corruptible, and conditioned.           7:140)
> Perfection in the full sense of the word,
> then, not only applies to the Necessar-         Here we see how Bahá’u’lláh uses the
> ily Existent but is also more truly said        phrase “perfections of being,” as Avi-
> of it than anything else, for it is, in a       cenna himself does. This shared usage
> meaningful sense, perfection itself.            points to the fact that both Bahá’u’lláh
> Such, at least, is the basic sense in       and Avicenna are explaining a congru-
> which Avicenna regards the Necessari-           ent concept of God, a God of absolute
> ly Existent as perfect, and this concept        and necessary being, who is transcen-
> is explicitly affirmed by Bahá’u’lláh             dental perfection, and the indivisible
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                           47
> 
> source of all perfections in His cre-         with the theology of Bahá’u’lláh, is
> ation. His perfection is His being, and       not possible here. Nonetheless, we can
> His being His perfection.                     analyze the basic reasoning behind
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, too, affirms the per-          Avicenna’s ascription of goodness to
> fection of God and even God’s identity        the Necessarily Existent, and consider
> with his perfection. In chapter twen-         how this further aligns his theological
> ty-seven of Mufávaḍát or Some An-             vision with that of the Bahá’í Writings.
> swered Questions, He states definitive-           Since Avicenna works within the
> ly that “God is pure perfection and the       Aristotelian philosophical tradition
> creation is absolute imperfection,” God       and accepts its basic postulates (such
> being, in other words, kamál-i-maḥḍ or        as the role of actuality and potential-
> absolute perfection, and the contingent       ity, form and matter, the four causes,
> world nuqṣán-i-ṣirf or sheer deficien-        etc.), Aristotle’s account of the good is
> cy. Moreover, He remarks there that           indispensable in illuminating Avicen-
> “the contingent world is the source of        na’s own position. In the Nicomachean
> deficiencies and God is the source of         Ethics, Aristotle, after having rejected
> perfection. The very deficiencies of          the Platonic account, considers how
> the contingent world testify to God’s         the good is said of many things, and
> perfections.”                                 that it thus does not have a single, or
> From these passages, it is evident         univocal, meaning. A man is good, a
> that the Bahá’í Writings affirm the             horse is good, a meal is good, and so
> rational basis of Avicenna’s insistence       on, but the respective goodness of each
> that God, since He is unconditioned           is not identical in meaning, but of a
> being, must also be absolute perfection.      different character. Nonetheless, there
> The Necessarily Existent is perfect,          is an analogous relationship among
> and it is, in a sense, perfection itself by   these respective goods. The good, in
> virtue of its absolute and incorruptible      every case, is what is sought. How-
> being.                                        ever, among goods there are those
> that are desirable in themselves, and
> G                                             those sought rather as a means to oth-
> er things. So the goodness of a meal
> Goodness is no less a divine attribute        is as a means to nourishment and also
> than perfection, however, and so we           by virtue of the pleasure it affords. But
> must consider whether the Necessarily         Aristotle singles out eudaimonia—
> Existent is good, insofar as the good is      happiness, flourishing, or living well—
> linked with the monotheistic concep-          as that which is desirable in itself for
> tion of God. Yet since the good is such       human beings; it is sought as an end
> an equivocal term, applied in different        and not as a means to other goods, and
> ways to different things, an exhaustive        is thus the highest good of human life.
> treatment of the good in Avicenna’s           From this point, Aristotle proceeds to
> philosophy, and its correspondence            analyze what constitutes eudaimonia,
> 48                   The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> and settles on a life lived in accord           being. Thus, being, in fact, is what
> with reason that evinces fundamental            is sought. Being, therefore, is pure
> virtues. The human good, therefore, is          good and absolute perfection. To
> a manner of life that actualizes or per-        wit, the good, in general, is that
> fects the inherent potentials of human          which everything seeks within its
> existence.                                      own limit, and that by which its
> This is not the place to explicate Ar-       existence is made complete. Evil,
> istotle’s ethical theory. What is vital for     conversely, has no definite es-
> our purposes is his notion that some-           sence. It is rather the privation of
> thing that is sought may be termed              a substance, or the privation of a
> good, especially that which is sought           substance’s wholeness and integri-
> for its own sake, for every living thing        ty. Being, accordingly, is goodness,
> has its fundamental end in the flourish-        and the perfection of being is the
> ing condition of its own being. In addi-        goodness of being. And that Being
> tion to this notion, in Avicenna’s writ-        which is untouched by privation,
> ing we find affirmed the Neoplatonic              neither the privation of substance
> idea that evil does not in itself have any      nor that of something belonging to
> positive existence but, rather, it is lack      substance, but which is rather per-
> and deficiency—the privation of being           petually in actuality—that Being
> and of its perfections, even as blindness       is pure good. A contingent being
> is a privation in the eye, as Plotinus ex-      in its essence is not pure good, be-
> plains in the Enneads (1.8.9). The good         cause its essence, simply by virtue
> is thus the eminent presence of some-           of itself, does not have existence.
> thing, of being and perfection, insofar         Its essence, therefore, is subject to
> as the latter are desired for their own         privation, and that which is sub-
> sake. With these two notions in mind,           ject to privation in a certain sense
> we can consider what Avicenna writes            is not clear in every aspect from
> in ash-Shifá regarding the goodness of          evil and deficiency. Therefore, ab-
> the Necessarily Existent:                       solute good is nothing other than
> the Necessarily Existent in its es-
> The Necessarily Existent, in its es-          sence. (283–84)
> sence, is pure good. For the good,
> in general, is that which all things        Thus, for Avicenna, the Necessarily
> desire, and that which all things           Existent is pure good in itself, insofar
> desire is being, or that perfection         as it is pure being and absolute perfec-
> of being which accords with the             tion, which is precisely what is sought
> manner of a thing’s existence.              as the good by every being, insofar as
> Nothing desires privation as such,          every being seeks its own flourishing,
> but only insofar as the nonexis-            and for its potentials of life to be ac-
> tence of a certain thing is condu-          tualized in ever greater stages of per-
> cive to being and the perfection of         fection. Furthermore, the Necessarily
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                             49
> 
> Existent is pure good insofar as in it        an inevitable feature of anything that
> there is no privation or deficiency, and      exists contingently, for such a being
> thus in it there can be no evil, which is     does not, in itself, have existence, and
> the privation of the good.                    thus is necessarily subject to the priva-
> But the Necessarily Existent is also       tion of being and imperfection.14
> good in the sense that all other good            Regrettably, it is outside the scope
> proceeds from it. It is good, therefore,      of this essay to give the full Avicennian
> not only when considered in itself, but       answer to the so-called problem of
> also in its effects. Avicenna writes:          evil. It is sufficient to describe, in sum,
> how Avicenna affirms the goodness of
> Good is also said of that which             God: first, by identifying the good with
> bestows the perfections of things           being and perfection; second, by show-
> and their virtues. Now, it is evi-          ing that the Necessarily Existent is ab-
> dent that the Necessarily Existent          solute being and perfection, and hence
> must be, by its very essence, that          pure good; and third, by demonstrating
> which bestows existence onto all            that it is the cause and source of all oth-
> things, and that by which the per-          er being and perfection, and hence only
> fection of anything is realized. It         the cause of good, insofar as evil is not
> is good, therefore, in this aspect as       a created thing but merely the inevita-
> well, even as within it there is no         ble privation of existence inherent to
> deficiency or lack. (ash-Shifá 284)         any contingently existent being.
> Significantly, these notions of
> In Avicenna’s view, if good is properly       the good are readily affirmed by
> said of being and its perfection, then        Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. In
> the Necessarily Existent is supremely         Mufávaḍát (184) or Some Answered
> good insofar as it, in its essence, is pure   Questions (304), ‘Abdu’l-Bahá gives
> being and sheer perfection. Further-          His full support to the Neoplatonic
> more, it is by the Necessarily Existent       account of evil as privation and, after
> that any other thing has existence, and       giving a summation and defense of its
> it is by it that the existence of any thing   central premise, concludes:
> is made complete, such as when an
> acorn grows into an oak tree, or an in-         Whatsoever God has created, He
> fant into an adult. In it there is no evil,     has created good. Evil consists
> no deficiency, no lack, no imperfection.
> Evil, similarly, does not proceed from           14     In this connection, moral as op-
> it. Evil, instead, is something without       posed to natural evil may be analyzed as a
> any positive existence or essence. It         corruption or imperfection of the will con-
> operates as the privation of being and        trary to the objective good and flourishing
> imperfection in a thing, such as when         of human nature. Though there are evil
> decomposition results in the death of         actions, they spring from corruptions or im-
> an organic being. But this evil is merely     perfections of human nature and result from
> having a damaged or disordered character.
> 50                    The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> merely in non-existence. For ex-                 In any case, it is implicit in
> ample, death is the absence of life:          Bahá’u’lláh’s presentation of God that
> When man is no longer sustained               God is wholly good. The goodness
> by the power of life, he dies. Dark-          of God, consisting in His perfect and
> ness is the absence of light: When            inexhaustible being, is expressed in
> light is no more, darkness reigns.            personal terms, even as Bahá’u’lláh re-
> Light is a positively existing thing,         peatedly emphasizes the utter transcen-
> but darkness has no positive ex-              dence of God. On this latter theme, He
> istence; it is merely its absence.            writes:
> Likewise, wealth is a positively
> existing thing but poverty is mere-             In truth, no praise or mention of
> ly its absence.                                 God—how exalted is His majesty,
> It is thus evident that all evil is          how universal is His grace—can
> mere non-existence. Good has a                  ever befit Him. For the way is
> positive existence; evil is merely              barred that leadeth to His unap-
> its absence.                                    proachable sanctuary; the path is
> obstructed that endeth in that in-
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, here and in the sur-                accessible Secret, that Mystery of
> rounding context of the passage, affirms            mysteries. What is the concourse of
> the Avicennian account of goodness as             the visible set against the sanctum
> convertible with being and perfection,            of that invisible Essence? What
> and agrees that evil consists merely in           way can reach Him or road attain
> its privation. Since evil is an ‘adam, an         to Him? If ever the infinitesimal
> absence or privation of good, it has no           ant could make mention of Him
> positive ontological reality in itself; it        who is the Aim and Desire of all
> consequently is present in the world              things, perhaps then the pen could
> only as an instance of non-being, de-             mark down some word relating of
> ficiency, imperfection, corruption, or            the Eternal. And if ever the mote
> decline. It follows, then, that God as            of dust could impart any notion of
> the ultimate positive ontological reality         the blinding splendor of the Sun, if
> and as perfect being is pure good, from           ever the meanest drop could even
> Whom only good proceeds: “Whatso-                 suggest the full immensity of the
> ever God has created, He has created              ocean, perhaps then human tongue
> good.”15                                          could advance some praise of the
> Best Beloved of the worlds . . .
> 15     Incidentally, neither Avicenna’s        but thou knowest full well that the
> nor ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s statements on evil             invisible Essence is sanctified of,
> entail that there is “no such thing” as evil.     transcendent above, and removed
> Although metaphysically evil is non-be-
> ing and imperfection, it is a feature in the
> world in the same sense that there are such     on. Though these things are not substances,
> things as blindness, darkness, death, as so     they can be meaningfully referred to.
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                           51
> 
> from all in the realm of the visible.     mindless principle, devoid of con-
> (qtd. in Dávúdí 85, provisional           sciousness. Avicenna, like Bahá’u’lláh,
> translation)                              describes the Necessarily Existent
> as having munificence and supreme
> But even as God, according to               generosity; for Avicenna, He is indeed
> Bahá’u’lláh, ultimately transcends the      javvád, all-bountiful and munificent.
> knowledge and descriptions of His           This characterizes the goodness of the
> creation, He nonetheless is the “Aim        Necessarily Existent, which consists
> and Desire of all things” and the “Best     in how it bestows existence onto all
> Beloved of the worlds,” and thus the        things, as an intelligent and voluntary
> ultimate object of desire and love—         act, done not for the sake of itself but
> the highest good. For as pure being         for the good of created things. It is, fur-
> itself, He is Himself that paradigm of      thermore, difficult to conceive some-
> perfection for which all things long,       thing as God that itself is devoid of any
> and as the source of all existence, He      knowledge. Therefore, if the Necessar-
> is that inexhaustible wellspring from       ily Existent is to be regarded as divine,
> which all conceivable good proceeds.        it must have intellect and volition,
> Since God is the source of all being        and a goodness consonant therewith.
> and therefore of all good, Bahá’u’lláh      We will thus consider how Avicenna
> stresses His loving kindness, His mer-      deduces the intellectual nature of the
> cy, and His providence, and it is in        Necessarily Existent, and further cor-
> these personal terms that He expresses      relate his views with the teachings of
> the supreme goodness that is God. He        Bahá’u’lláh.
> writes, as quoted earlier, that God “res-
> cuing” all things “from the abasement       I
> of remoteness and the perils of ultimate
> extinction . . . hath received them into    Though the attribute of simplicity was
> His kingdom of incorruptible glory.         paramount in showing the ultimate
> Nothing short of His all-encompassing       and incomparable nature of the God of
> grace, His all-pervading mercy, could       Bahá’u’lláh and Avicenna, it is in the
> have possibly achieved it. How could        attribute of intellect and knowledge
> it, otherwise, have been possible for       that the fullness of His divine nature is
> sheer nothingness to have acquired by       revealed. For without such a thing as in-
> itself the worthiness and capacity to       tellect, the Necessarily Existent, how-
> emerge from its state of non-existence      ever supreme, would seem to amount
> into the realm of being?” (Gleanings        to some kind of force requisite for the
> 64;      Majmúʻiy-i-Alváḥ-i-Mubárakih       existence of all things, but which itself
> 338).                                       could not be meaningfully regarded as
> But if God’s goodness is spoken of      God. If Avicenna’s God were such as
> in terms of generosity, munificence,        this, however, it could not be identical
> mercy and love, then He cannot be a         to the omniscient God of Bahá’u’lláh.
> 52                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> To consider Avicenna’s Necessarily           Necessarily Existent, however, is rath-
> Existent as void of consciousness,           er the transcendent cause of all physi-
> however, would be a grave mistake.           cal systems and contingent entities and
> The attributes of necessity, simplicity,     thus cannot be construed as something
> singleness, immutability, eternality,        existent within such systems or as de-
> perfection, and goodness all together        scriptive of them.
> point to a reality that is not unknow-           The Necessarily Existent, therefore,
> ing and uncomprehending, but which           is not a body or any corporeal reality;
> in its very nature is all-knowing and        it has no mass or dimension, location
> all-encompassing in its comprehen-           or position, shape or delimitation, nor
> sion, which is itself pure consciousness     is it the activity and operation of things
> and intellect, and which consequently        exhibiting such attributes. Its being al-
> is eminently worthy of the term divine.      together transcends material realities,
> Avicenna’s demonstration of the           while being their ultimate cause. If,
> intellective nature of the Necessarily       then, the Necessarily Existent is not
> Existent is brief, but he bases his argu-    matter, could it be mind? According
> ment from prior principles in his theory     to Avicenna, simply by virtue of tran-
> of the faculties of the mind. In chapter     scending matter and all material attri-
> six of Book Eight of ash-Shifá’s “Meta-      butes, it could be nothing else except
> physics,” he points out that the Neces-      ‘aql-i-maḥḍ, pure intellect. Although
> sarily Existent is wholly immaterial,        this might not seem immediately intu-
> and that its existence is disassociated      itive, to recognize the Necessarily Ex-
> from matter in every respect. We saw         istent’s nature as intellect is inevitable
> the reasons for this in the discussion       once its radical immateriality is con-
> of the earlier attributes, especially sim-   sidered in juxtaposition with its other
> plicity, for if the Necessarily Existent     essential attributes. Incidentally, that
> were a corporeal entity, it would be a       the Necessarily Existent is immaterial
> substance extended in three dimen-           in itself has profound implications for
> sions. It consequently would be com-         one’s worldview, for if the Necessarily
> posed of matter and some form to actu-       Existent does exist, then materialism
> alize the potentiality of that matter into   is false; if materialism is false, then
> a realized kind and arrangement. This        explanations of reality, and especially
> would characterize it as a contingent        mind, need not, and should not, be con-
> entity, however, which is impossible         fined to what exists in matter.
> for the Necessarily Existent. A modern           If, then, the Necessarily Existent
> person, moreover, could not construe         is immaterial, how should it be de-
> the Necessarily Existent as energy of        scribed? Among immaterial things,
> some kind, for the concept of energy         there are indeed concepts and abstrac-
> simply refers to the work or activity        tions that the human mind conceives
> exhibited in and by physical systems,        after considering the universal essence
> which are contingent entities. The           of a thing, such as humanity, as distinct
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                           53
> 
> from its instantiation in particular        house; the intelligible form of a horse
> physical manifestations, such as indi-      cannot win a race. The Necessarily Ex-
> vidual human beings. Such concepts,         istent, however, is a cause in actuality
> for Avicenna, would constitute form         and supremely so. It, therefore, cannot
> that is not joined with matter, form        be some inert, immaterial idea. It must,
> which exists not concretely as a partic-    then, be pure intellect, unbounded
> ular but in an intellect as a universal.    by the realm of contingent, material
> But the Necessarily Existent cannot         existence.16
> be a mere intelligible form conceived           In addition, the reader may recall
> by a contingent mind, for then it could     from the section on “Simplicity” that
> not be the ultimate cause of all exis-      the Necessarily Existent is not distinct
> tence. What is more, Avicenna rejects       from its act of being; it is pure actuali-
> the Platonist notion that abstractions,     ty. Therefore, this act of the Necessari-
> such as “the Beautiful,” “the True,”        ly Existent is one of immaterial being.
> and “the Equal,” exist independently        What, then, is the actuality, the act and
> of concrete reality or any intellects to    action, the mode of existence proper to
> conceive of them, and any such thing,       a wholly immaterial reality? The only
> consequently, could not be the Neces-       immaterial action conceivable is intel-
> sarily Existent. It follows for Avicenna,   lection, knowing and understanding
> then, that the Necessarily Existent, in     as opposed to sensing and physically
> being wholly immaterial, must be pure       perceiving. If intellection is the only
> intellect. This follows because it could    act proper to something immaterial,
> not be a mere ma‘qúl, an intelligible       the Necessarily Existent must be pure
> reality, dependent on or subsisting         intellect, insofar as there is nothing
> within an intellect. The Necessarily        material in its being.
> Existent, therefore, must be a fully in-        Furthermore, the Necessarily Ex-
> dependent ‘áqil or agent of intellection    istent is the creator and source of all
> and knowledge. It is, in the perfection     things, which possesses all the “per-
> of its immaterial being, a comprehend-      fections of being” unitedly in a simple
> ing reality rather than a comprehended      way. The infinite creative power that
> object.                                     originates and sustains all contingent
> Avicenna’s conclusion may be           existence cannot be reduced to any one
> further defended by pointing out that       immaterial form that does not itself
> immaterial realities could conceivably      possess, in a higher way of pure unity,
> include either intelligible forms—uni-      all the perfections present in the exis-
> versals and abstract objects—or minds       tence of the fathomlessly vast cosmos.
> and intellects. But things within the       But Divine Intellect conceivably could
> former category of immaterial reality       comprehend all the perfections of being
> seem causally inert: the number 100
> does not put a hundred dollars in one’s
> pocket; the idea of blue cannot paint a       16     A point familiar to some contem-
> porary theistic philosophers; see Craig.
> 54                   The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> immaterially, through an act of perfect       God immediately knows Himself, and
> intellection, and thus be the source of       is thus conscious of Himself in the full-
> their realization in the contingent order     ness of His being. As Avicenna states
> of existence. The Necessarily Existent,       in chapter twenty-nine of the Dánish-
> therefore, could not be an immaterial         námih’s “Metaphysics,” what makes
> reality, like a mathematical abstraction,     something intelligible, as opposed to
> which in itself is bereft of knowledge        sensible, is that it be abstracted from
> and consciousness, but must be pure           matter and its concomitants. When
> intellect enacting perfect knowledge          form actualizes matter, the resulting be-
> and comprehension.                            ing exists materially and is perceivable
> Thus, by virtue of its absolute im-        by the senses; it is extended in three di-
> materiality, Avicenna regards the Nec-        mensions, and can be seen, felt, tasted,
> essarily Existent as ‘aql-i-maḥḍ, pure        smelled, and heard. But when some-
> intellect. At this stage, the justification   thing is apprehended by the intellect,
> for Avicenna’s characterizing the Nec-        the form is considered separate from a
> essarily Existent as divine, as truly         material instantiation, and thus is intel-
> God, stands ever more revealed. For           ligible, but not sensible. The concept,
> what, other than God, could the Neces-        say, of food is not sensible; it can be
> sarily Existent be—that supreme intel-        thought of as an abstract concept, but
> lect which is the self-subsistent cause       it cannot be smelled or tasted. In order,
> and creator of all things, that source        then, for something to be grasped by
> which is absolutely one, incomparable,        the intellect, it must be removed from
> unique, eternal, immutable, perfect,          matter and considered as an abstracted
> and wholly good? One may question             form. An intellect, therefore, in being
> the actual existence of this reality, but     immaterial and removed from matter is
> one cannot question that it deserves the      immediately known to itself, for there
> name God. For the Necessarily Exis-           is no impediment, no matter, that could
> tent, in being pure intellect, cannot be      obstruct direct self-apprehension.
> a mere what, but is properly a who in             Hence, God knows Himself. He
> the fullest significance of that word. As     is at once knower, ‘áqil, and the ob-
> such, for the sake of brevity, the Neces-     ject of His knowledge, ma‘qúl. Of
> sarily Existent will henceforth be called     course, God is absolutely simple, so
> God interchangeably and referred to as        God as the knower and as the known
> He. Being immaterial, God, of course,         is identical; there is not one aspect of
> is not a body and thus free of sex and        Him that knows and another that is
> gender; nonetheless, in being intellect,      known. In knowing Himself, the in-
> God cannot properly be referred to as         tellect that knows is identical to the
> an it, for that would imply He is void        intellect that is known. Furthermore,
> of mind.                                      since God has no parts, His essential
> But if God is pure intellect, what does    being cannot be distinct from His act
> He intellect? According to Avicenna,          of knowledge, so He is also the very
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                          55
> 
> act of self-apprehending intellection;       to attribute imperfection to Him, it
> He is knower, known, and knowing all         is likewise improper to ascribe to
> at once and in perfect unity—intellect,      Him multiple acts of intellection.
> intellection, and intelligible. So God,      Rather, the Necessarily Existent
> as pure and absolutely simple intellect,     intellects all things in a universal
> is His knowledge just as much as He is       fashion. And yet no particular es-
> His necessary existence, His simplic-        capes Him: “Not even the weight
> ity, His singleness, His immutability,       of an atom, in the heavens or on
> His perfection, and so forth.                earth, escapes him”17 . . . In regard
> The nature of God’s knowledge is          to how this can be, when He ap-
> explored to great depth in chapter six       prehends His essence and appre-
> of ash-Shifá’s “Metaphysics,” in which       hends Himself as the source of ev-
> Avicenna analyzes the implications of        ery existent thing, He apprehends
> God’s knowledge. Since in God there          the principles of all beings and
> is perfect unity, He must be identical       what proceeds from them; nothing
> to His act of intellection; He is His        whatsoever exists except insofar
> knowledge. His knowledge, therefore,         as its existence is necessitated by
> must be as absolute, as necessary, as        Him through a cause—as we have
> uncaused, and as immutable as He is          shown. The confluence of these
> in Himself. God, then, cannot come           causes results in the origination of
> to know something, for that would            particular things. The First knows
> necessitate a change in His essence,         these causes and their interrela-
> which is impossible. Nor could God           tions; He thus knows the necessi-
> contemplate a number of separate             ty of what results from them, the
> things in changing sequence, as human        intervals of time between events,
> beings do, for that would degrade His        and their recurrences. For it is im-
> simplicity. His knowledge, therefore,        possible that He should know the
> cannot be like human knowledge inso-         cause and not the necessary effect.
> far as it utterly transcends contingen-      He thus comprehends particular
> cy, mutability, and multiplicity. How,       things insofar as they are univer-
> then, could God know anything other          sal. (ash-Shifá 288)
> than Himself? In one sense, God only
> knows Himself, but in knowing Him-         Thus, God knows things not by sense
> self He knows Himself as the cause of      perception, but through His perfect in-
> all things, and He thus knows them in      tellectual knowledge of Himself as the
> an eternal, universal way. In describing   ultimate cause of all particular things
> God’s knowledge and omniscience,           and their necessary interactions, in be-
> Avicenna writes:                           ing the eternal source of their existence.
> His knowledge of all things, then, is
> Even as affirming a plurality of
> acts to the Necessarily Existent is
> 17    A reference to the Qur’án, 34:3.
> 56                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> universal and eternal, identical to His      God’s attributes are identical to one an-
> unchanging knowledge of Himself              other and to His essence—that He is ab-
> as the source of all things. He knows        solute unity. Among the attributes that
> things by virtue of being their creator,     Bahá’u’lláh repeatedly affirms of God,
> even if through secondary causes, in a       of course, is His unbounded and all-en-
> manner very roughly analogous to how         compassing knowledge, His complete
> a novelist knows, in a universal way,        and universal wisdom. He writes of
> all the particulars of her novel, the ac-    God in the Lawḥ-i-Madíniy-i-Tawḥíd,
> tions of the characters, and the neces-      saying: “He is the Ever-Abiding who
> sary effects of those actions in the plot,    perisheth not, from Whose knowledge
> by virtue of being the ultimate creator      nothing can escape, Whose grace en-
> of the novel. It is in this way that Avi-    compasseth all contingent being, Who
> cenna affirms the omniscience of God.          knoweth all the secrets of men’s hearts
> This is not the place, however, to        and everything that proceeds from
> explore the many implications of Avi-        them” (Má’idiy-i-Ásmání 4:314, provi-
> cenna’s account of divine knowledge          sional translation). If knowledge is an
> and omniscience, especially as God’s         attribute of God, and if God’s attributes
> knowledge relates to particular things.      are, as we have seen, identical to His
> My purpose is rather to show that Avi-       Essence, then His essence is not onto-
> cenna demonstrates that the Necessar-        logically distinct from His knowledge
> ily Existent is God in the full sense of     or intellection any more than it is dif-
> divinity, by establishing that the Nec-      ferent from His perfection, goodness,
> essarily Existent is pure intellect and      or immutability. Therefore, if God es-
> omniscient intelligence. Had Avicenna        sentially is His knowledge, it follows
> rejected God’s personal18 and omni-          under Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings that He
> scient nature, the Necessarily Existent      is immaterial intellect, who alone fully
> of his philosophy would not correlate        comprehends His own being.
> with the God of Bahá’u’lláh. That Avi-           On this theme Bahá’u’lláh states in
> cenna instead affirms this personal and        the same Tablet:
> omniscient nature of God yet again
> indicates the theological harmony that         He is the Eternal from Whom
> exists between Avicenna’s thought and          nothing can depart, unto Whom
> Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings.                       nothing can be joined, Who is, in
> We saw earlier that Bahá’u’lláh val-        truth, the Exalted, the Omnipotent,
> idates the Avicennian position that God        the Supreme. Nothing but His own
> is simple and non-composite. As such,          Essence can acknowledge His
> Bahá’u’lláh explicitly affirms that              oneness, and nothing but His own
> Being can in truth recognize Him.
> 18    In the sense of having conscious-      All that hath been originated and
> ness, knowledge, and intellect, not in the     called into existence in this world
> sense of being like a contingent human         hath been created only at the word
> person.
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                          57
> 
> of His behest. None other God is            within Him, His essential attribute of
> there but Him, the Almighty, the            knowledge, would be contingent on,
> Munificent.    (Má’idiy-i-Ásmání            and in need of, other things, which is
> 4:314, provisional translation)             impossible. But if God knows, as Avi-
> cenna argues, not through a contingent
> If, according to Bahá’u’lláh, God             perception of any particular thing, but
> knows, is known to Himself, and is            rather through a direct self-apprehen-
> identical to that attribute of knowl-         sion of Himself as absolute existence
> edge in perfect oneness and simplici-         and as the universal cause and source
> ty, it follows that Avicenna’s analysis       of any kind of contingent being what-
> of God is correct, namely, that God is        soever, who encompasses within Him-
> intellect, intelligible, and act of intel-    self and in utter unity all perfections,
> lection, in absolute unity. Here we see       then ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s statement is not
> that Bahá’u’lláh not only confirms the        only intelligible but theologically nec-
> accuracy of Avicenna’s view; Avicen-          essary, given Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings
> na’s analysis provides a framework by         on the independent and indivisible na-
> which one can understand the philo-           ture of God.
> sophical significance of Bahá’u’lláh’s           Reflecting back on the attribute of
> own statements, insofar as Bahá’u’lláh        goodness examined in the previous
> explicitly states that God’s attributes       section, we now see how one can in-
> are one and identical to His essence.         deed construe God’s goodness in per-
> This proposition from Bahá’u’lláh is          sonal terms, as Bahá’u’lláh and Avi-
> intelligible if one accepts Avicenna’s        cenna both do. This is because God’s
> argument that to be necessarily existent      unchanging and absolute creation of all
> is to be immaterial, that to be immate-       things, His bestowal of existence onto
> rial is to be intellect, and that to be in-   all things, is effected by Him insofar as
> tellect is to have knowledge. God thus        He is intellect and self-apprehending
> remains one, His attributes being iden-       consciousness—and thus in knowledge
> tical to His essence and to one another.      and not unwitting compulsion. Insofar,
> Furthermore, Avicenna’s account           then, as God is pure good and sheer
> of God’s knowledge is in accord with,         perfection, the source of all good and
> and even makes philosophical sense of,        all perfections—and insofar as He is
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s explanation in chapter         intellect—He may well be described
> eighty-two of Some Answered Ques-             as all-bountiful and munificent. These
> tions that God’s knowledge is not de-         terms, of course, can only be applied
> pendent on objects of knowledge. That         to Him by analogy, for His bounty in-
> is, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá insists that, although       finitely transcends the limitations of
> God has knowledge, He is not depen-           human generosity. A further discussion
> dent on anything external to Himself          of this point, however, leads us neces-
> in order to have that knowledge. If He        sarily to the attribute of will.
> were thus dependent, then something
> 58                 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> W                                          not to will; and yet it is not incidental,
> for it is necessitated by its essential na-
> Throughout Bahá’u’lláh’s writings,         ture. As to incidental acts, these occur
> and indeed in each of the Abrahamic        when there is neither intent, nor strict
> religions, there is much mention of        necessity, but some element of chance
> God’s will. It is indeed by virtue of      or an incidental confluence of causes
> God’s having will that His creative act    and potentialities, or when persons are
> can be construed as generous, and it is    compelled to act by an external pow-
> by virtue of will that personal terms      er or agent, and not according to their
> of devotion can be applied to Him.         own nature or will.
> How, then, does Avicenna deduce the           When one acts knowingly, how-
> attribute of will, of volition, from the   ever—when one acts with an under-
> nature of the Necessarily Existent? In     standing of the act and oneself as the
> this connection, it must first be noted    author of that act, non-accidentally and
> that for neither Bahá’u’lláh nor Avi-      without compulsion—then such an act,
> cenna can God’s will be an attribute       says Avicenna, “is not devoid of will.”
> actually distinct from the others, on      Avicenna subsequently divides willful
> account of His simplicity. Therefore,      or voluntary actions into those done
> even as God’s necessity is His simplic-    due to reason and knowledge, those
> ity, which is His immateriality, which     done due to supposition (gumán), and
> is His intellect and knowledge, so is      those due to imagination (takhayyul),
> God’s will, for Avicenna, identical to     and it is the first that he will ascribe to
> His knowledge.                             God. A voluntary act done in accord
> To understand this, one may con-       with knowledge, Avicenna states, is
> sider how Avicenna makes clear in          like that of the physician or geometri-
> the Dánishnámih, specifically chapter      cian, who applies a treatment or draws
> thirty-three of its “Metaphysics,” that    a figure according to what they know
> will concerns the manner by which          intellectively.
> an agent acts. Avicenna immediate-            In regard to God, His act cannot be
> ly distinguishes between acts that are     incidental to Him, for He has no inci-
> due to nature, due to will, or due to      dental attributes, as we saw in the sec-
> “accident,” i.e. incidentally. Regarding   tions “Simplicity” and “Singleness.”
> acts due merely to nature, one could       He is purely His own essential being,
> present the example of the Sun, which      and cannot be affected by anything
> illumines the earth by the necessity of    whatsoever, for what He is is necessary
> its inherent nature; we may well pre-      and immutable. Therefore, His act can-
> sume that the Sun does not choose to       not be incidental to Him or compelled
> do so, nor does it understand what it      or conditioned by another. Similarly,
> is doing, nor does it understand itself    His act cannot mechanically be mere-
> as the agent of that effect. The Sun’s      ly due to His nature, for that would
> action is therefore due to nature, and     imply that His act could be separate
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                          59
> 
> or independent from His knowledge,           hand, has no needs or desires whatso-
> which is impossible because of His           ever. Avicenna writes:
> simplicity. The act of God as the Nec-
> essarily Existent, therefore, must be          We find that the Necessarily Ex-
> done in knowledge, for He is Himself           istent, Who is perfect being, or
> pure intellect and comprehends Him-            Who rather transcends perfection,
> self in the fullness of His being. He          has no goal in His action, and it is
> thus knows that He creates all other           likewise unbefitting of Him that
> realities, and that He ultimately causes       He should know something as
> and sustains their existence. Likewise,        being of utility to Him, such that
> He knows His creative act, and Himself         He should desire it. (Dánishnámih
> as the author of that act, and moreover        394)
> acts without external compulsion. He
> therefore acts willfully and voluntari-      In other words, God is complete and
> ly. Consequently, since God perfectly        perfect self-sufficient existence. He
> knows and fully wills what Avicenna          thus desires nothing, and has no goal or
> calls the “order of the good” (niẓám-        aim—in human terms—which He de-
> i-khayr) that proceeds from Him, the         sires to be realized through the creative
> profound and fundamentally unmerited         act. His will, therefore, is not equiva-
> share of existence that all things receive   lent to desire, for that would imply that
> of Him, He is the author of a voluntary      there is something in God that could
> action of boundless generosity and           be actuated by a final cause, a purpose
> bounty. Since He understands this, the       external to Him.
> bestowal of being from God is a mani-           Avicenna further writes in the
> festation of His goodness, His bounty,       Dánishnámih:
> and His providence. To state the matter
> again, God, in the supremacy of His            The Divine will is nothing oth-
> being, is not compelled by anything            er than God’s knowledge of how
> outside of Him. The creation of the            the order of the existence of all
> world, therefore, proceeds according to        things must be, and His knowl-
> His volition from the superabundance           edge that their existence is good,
> of His self-subsistent existence.              though not for His sake, but rather
> Nonetheless, Avicenna is explicit in        for themselves, for the meaning
> His affirmation that God’s will should           of “goodness” is the existence of
> not be likened to human volition. Hu-          everything as it must be, and the
> man beings have needs and entertain            providence of God consists in His
> ends because they are not complete             knowledge of how things must be,
> and perfect in their existence. They           such as the best ordering of the
> will something because they desire that        limbs of man and the motion of
> thing, and the realization of an end is        the heavens. (394–95)
> for their own sake. God, on the other
> 60                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> The purpose of this passage is to state      His works; that is, Avicenna’s account
> that, while in human beings intellect is     of God’s will is in accordance with
> something distinct from their will for       Bahá’u’lláh’s commitment to divine
> the things they desire, in God there is a    simplicity. Avicenna is able to show
> complete unity of attributes. Thus, His      how God’s attribute of will is really
> nature as pure intellect is identical with   identical to His knowledge, how God’s
> His being a voluntary agent of His ac-       knowledge consists in His intellectual
> tion, which is nothing else but the per-     being, which in turn is His very es-
> fect knowledge He has in His essence         sence as the Necessarily Existent. Con-
> of the eternal procession of existence       sequently, God is one in His attributes
> from Him according to the “order of          and essence. But if God must also be
> the good.” His will is His knowledge,        “one in His acts,” He cannot will a
> and His knowing act is necessarily vol-      number of particular things at particu-
> untary, even as there is nothing outside     lar times, as conditioned by changing
> of Him that could compel Him, just           circumstances. Therefore, as Avicenna
> as He has no desire or end He needs          says, He wills one primary act eter-
> to realize that could somehow influ-         nally—the very act of His self-sub-
> ence His action. His will, therefore, is     sistent and necessary existence—and
> as absolute and unconditioned as His         from this voluntary and intellective
> knowledge and essential being.               act there proceeds, in a universal way
> Avicenna’s account of Divine will—        as governed by His providence, a sin-
> while persuasive, coherent, and consis-      gle effect: the cascading sequence of
> tent with his account of God’s other         beings in the contingent world.19 This
> attributes, especially His simplicity—is     universal and eternal creative act is
> subtle, even abstruse, and no doubt de-      thus one, and is identical to God’s will
> serves a more comprehensive treatment        and His knowledge. We see once again,
> of its own. The brief discussion above,      therefore, how Avicenna’s analysis il-
> however, should suffice to ground an           luminates the rational basis and philo-
> exploration of the theological harmony       sophical content of Bahá’u’lláh’s own
> between Bahá’u’lláh’s and Avicenna’s         statements.
> accounts of divine will.                        Third, Bahá’u’lláh moreover affirms
> First, both Avicenna and Bahá’u’lláh      Avicenna’s notion that God has no need
> posit that it is proper to speak of God      or desire for things outside Himself,
> as having will, as demonstrated by           and thus He does not create the world
> Bahá’u’lláh’s oft-repeated statement         for His own sake, out of desire. He cre-
> regarding God, “yaf‘alu má yashá’”           ates for the good of the creature, and
> (He doeth whatsoever He willeth). Sec-
> ond, Avicenna’s account conforms to             19    How the multiple entities of the
> Bahá’u’lláh’s statement, discussed in        world proceed from the simple being and
> the section on “Simplicity,” that God is     unitary act of God shall be examined in the
> one in His essence, His attributes, and      third and last part of this paper, “Creation
> and Cosmology.”
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                               61
> 
> out of His knowledge of the order of the     ment, however, of Bahá’u’lláh’s and
> good in the contingent realm. For God,       Avicenna’s account of creation is to
> as we have seen, is in Himself perfect       be found in the final part of this paper.
> being, and thus stands in need of noth-      Until then, we must consider the divine
> ing whatsoever. In the Kitáb-i-Aqdas,        attribute that will close and complete
> Bahá’u’lláh appeals to this fact when        our discussion of God’s attributes.
> He says that people ought to accept the
> religion of God for their own benefit,       I
> and not because He has any need of
> worship. “This is the changeless Faith       That which is infinite must be, by defi-
> of God,” Bahá’u’lláh says in reference       nition, not finite; it has no limitations.
> to His own revelation, “eternal in the       The classical monotheistic conception
> past, eternal in the future. Let him that    of God often stresses His infinity, His
> seeketh, attain it; and as to him that       lack of any limit, whether imposed on
> hath refused to seek it—verily, God is       His being, His knowledge, His power,
> Self-Sufficient, above any need of His         or His goodness. The idea of each of
> creatures” (85–86, 173). Similarly, in       the omni- attributes, whether omni-
> the Kitáb-i-Íqán Bahá’u’lláh states:         science, omnipotence, omnipresence,
> “that ideal King hath, throughout eter-      or omnibenevolence, thus follows
> nity, been in His Essence independent        from divine infinity. It is thus proper
> of the comprehension of all beings, and      to speak of how the Necessarily Exis-
> will continue, forever, in His own Be-       tent, according to Avicenna’s positions,
> ing to be exalted above the adoration of     must be infinite, and how Bahá’u’lláh
> every soul” (52–53, 34).                     likewise supports God’s infinitude.
> Thus for Bahá’u’lláh, as for Avicen-     But here we should also consider how
> na, God could not have willed the exis-      the infinite is, by extension, identical
> tence of the world through any need on
> His part, or any desire for something
> to know and love God. Does this contradict
> that would have made His existence
> Bahá’u’lláh’s other statements and imply
> more sound or complete. God already
> that God wanted or needed recognition
> is perfection, or even above perfection,     or worship? That the human purpose lies
> fawq at-tamám. God’s creating is thus        in the knowledge and recognition of God
> done not for Himself but for the sake        does not entail, in fact, that this recognition
> of His creation and His knowledge of         benefits Him in any way whatsoever. Rath-
> the order of the good that creation con-     er, the duty of recognizing God is solely
> stitutes; hence, He is all-bountiful and     for the good of the human being. Since a
> supremely generous.20 A fuller treat-        human being is a rational animal, the high-
> est good of the intellect is to recognize God
> 20     A reader may here wonder about      as the source of all being and as goodness
> those instances in Bahá’u’lláh’s writings,   itself. Though God is above worship, the
> such as the Short Obligatory Prayer, in      knowledge of Him is the highest good of
> which He says that humanity was created      the beings that He created to be rational.
> 62                 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> with the supremely transcendent, for       and dimension.21
> Bahá’u’lláh routinely emphasizes               By the same argument, we realize
> the incomprehensible transcendence         there is no limit to God’s power, for all
> of God, how He surpasses every cat-        power proceeds from Him, and He de-
> egory of contingent existence, and         rives His power from no other. Indeed,
> eludes any direct apprehension of His      a thing has power, or the ability to act
> essence.                                   in a certain way, by virtue first of ex-
> First, we should reflect on the in-     isting and then of existing as the kind
> evitable conclusion that God, as the       of thing it is. Both these facts, how-
> Necessarily Existent, submits to no        ever, are contingent upon the creative
> physical limit. This is because He is      act of God, His ceaseless bestowal of
> not material and has no extension in       existence. God therefore has a power
> three dimensions. As such, God can-        in Himself that knows no limitation,
> not have any spatial delimitation. He      whereas the power of contingent be-
> cannot have a certain form, shape, or      ings is limited by their essential con-
> figure, imposing on Him the limitation     tingency and ontological poverty. We
> of being materially present in a partic-   should not understand omnipotence,
> ular location in space. Nor could God,     however, as meaning “the ability to do
> as discussed earlier, be physically ex-    anything whatsoever,” for that, taken
> tended throughout all material reality,    literally, is not an attribute that could
> enveloping and penetrating discrete        be ascribed to the Necessarily Existent.
> objects. This would imply taking on        He cannot, for instance, cease to exist
> the accidental qualities and limita-       or choose to do so, since He just is
> tions of mutable, contingent realities,    necessary being, nor could He in any
> changing with them and taking on           way descend into the conditions of
> their multiplicity. As the immaterial,     the created order; as Bahá’u’lláh says,
> simple, single, and necessarily exis-      “the Unseen can in no wise incarnate
> tent cause of all contingent realities,    His Essence and reveal it unto men”
> God cannot be conceived of in this         (Gleanings 49; Muntakhabátí 19). Nor
> way. God accordingly is omnipresent
> only if “presence” does not signify           21    I must here admit that Avicenna,
> occupying or filling a point in space      as far as I can tell, does not specifically
> as a body does. Rather, since what-        treat the idea of God’s omnipresence in
> ever exists has its being from God,        ash-Shifá or the Dánishnámih. But as it
> there is no place where the supremely      was illustrative of the idea of infinitude
> creative, ceaselessly sustaining, and      and immateriality, I here adapted one of
> boundless ontological power of God         Thomas Aquinas’ arguments for God’s
> is not evident and intimately oper-        omnipresence found in the Summa Theo-
> ative. He thus is everywhere in this       logica (1:8:1–2), an argument that is fully
> sense, but not in the manner of occu-      compatible with (perhaps even influenced
> pying material space and having mass       by) Avicenna’s account of the Necessarily
> Existent’s attributes.
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                           63
> 
> should we expect that God can bring         omnipotent, omniscient, and so forth.
> logical impossibilities into being, for     The Necessarily Existent has, or rather
> an impossibility, in its proper sense, is   is, the superabundance of perfect be-
> merely semantic incoherence. As such,       ing. This is because, unlike contingent
> God cannot create four-sided trian-         beings, He has no essence distinct from
> gles or married bachelors. Impossible       His existence. A contingent being, in
> things simply cannot exist; power is        contrast, has a particular essence, that
> set over the possible, not the impos-       which makes it what it is—that which
> sible, as Avicenna himself notes (Mc-       necessarily defines, distinguishes, and
> Ginnis 187). God, therefore, is infinite    limits it.
> in power, when power is understood              For example, the powers and func-
> coherently. He is thus omnipotent, as       tions of a rose bush, stemming from
> Bahá’u’lláh repeatedly proclaims.           the irreducible fact of its essence, are
> God likewise is infinite in His         necessarily limited—they are not those
> knowledge. He knows all things by           of a dog, a dolphin, or a human being.
> virtue of being their eternal and univer-   The rose bush’s existence is limited
> sal cause as pure intellect; His knowl-     due to the kind of thing it is; it can only
> edge is therefore perfect and complete.     exist according to the limitations, and
> There consequently is no limit to His       inherent potentials, of what it is. It can
> knowledge, and He may well be called        only act in conformity with the limita-
> omniscient. Nor is there any limit to       tions of what it is. Consequently, its ex-
> His goodness. For if evil is privation      istence as a rose bush cannot transcend
> of being, He is absolute good in that       the limitation of its “rose” essence. And
> He is absolute being. And insofar as        since a rose’s essence is distinct from
> all possible good proceeds from Him,        its existence, it is astoundingly limited
> and insofar as creation is a supremely      in its being, for it has no existence of
> bountiful act on His part, there is no      itself; its essence requires an external
> limit to His goodness, and He is thus       bestowal of existence, and even when
> omnibenevolent.                             that essence is made existent, it is in-
> But God’s infinity can be expressed     herently limited in the operations it can
> on an even deeper level, beyond omni-       perform.
> presence, omnipotence, omniscience,             But God has no essence distinct
> and omnibenevolence; it can be ex-          from His necessary existence. Hence,
> pressed at the level of being itself. A     there is in Him no essence that only
> little reflection will show that there      contingently exists; He therefore, as
> can be no limitation to the being of        we have seen, exists of Himself. But
> the Necessarily Existent. Perhaps we        more profoundly, His being is not lim-
> then should resurrect an admittedly ob-     ited, is not circumscribed or delimited,
> scure word, and term Him omniëssent,        by any essence distinct from His exis-
> “all-being” or “all-existing,” under the    tence. His being then has no limit, no
> same paradigm by which one calls Him        limitation, no condition, no restriction.
> 64                   The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> Whereas every contingent being is a            transcends kind and type entirely. Avi-
> finite being, the Necessarily Existent         cenna accordingly writes: “It has thus
> is Himself infinite being. As infinite         been made clear that the First has no
> being, He naturally can act as the in-         genus, no quiddity, no quality, no quan-
> exhaustible, the all-bountiful source of       tity, no spatial or temporal location, no
> the existence of all that is brought forth     equal, no partner, and no contrary—ex-
> into being, and all that is sustained in       alted and glorified is He—nor does He
> being.                                         have any definition” (ash-Shifá 282).
> By virtue of the identity of God’s          That is, the Necessarily Existent has
> essence with His existence, He tran-           no essence distinct from His existence
> scends all categories to which con-            that could be subject to a definition.
> tingent beings belong. This follows            This is yet another indication of God’s
> because a contingent being, in having          infinitude—His being cannot be con-
> an essence that can be considered in           tained by kind and species, genus and
> isolation from its existence, has an es-       differentia, nor can it be subject to any
> sence that can be defined by the logical       reductive analysis.
> terms of genus and differentia—that                 But insofar as the intellect com-
> is, what general category something            prehends a thing by considering its
> belongs to and what distinguishes it           essence abstracted from a particular
> within that category. For instance, a          instance—the concept, say, of animal
> triangle belongs to the genus of “plane        in contrast to any seen or imagined par-
> figure,” and has the differentia of hav-        ticular animal—the intellect compre-
> ing three closed sides; a triangle is          hends a thing by separating that thing
> thus defined as a closed plane figure          conceptually from its own particular
> having three sides. The existence of           existence. Likewise, the intellect com-
> any particular triangle is limited to and      prehends an essence by defining it; by
> circumscribed by that definition. Being        regarding it as belonging to a general
> itself, however, does not have a logi-         type, a genus; and by recognizing it
> cal genus-differentia definition.22 Now,        as distinguished within that genus by
> even if only one triangle existed in all       a differentia. But since God has no es-
> concrete reality, it could still be defined    sence distinct from His particular exis-
> as belonging to a general kind, and as         tence, and accordingly does not belong
> distinguished by a specific differentia.        to any genus or have any differentia,
> But since God has no essence distinct          it follows from Avicenna’s reasoning
> from His existence, He has no limit in         that He must uniquely transcend the
> the sense of a standard definition. He         power of the human intellect to com-
> is not even “one of a kind,” but rather        prehend His reality. Significantly, this
> is a central aspect of Bahá’u’lláh’s the-
> ology—that God transcends all other
> 22      Avicenna’s idea that existence is   things not only in the order of being,
> an irreducible or basic concept is discussed   but also in the order of thought and
> in the first section of this article.
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                              65
> 
> intellective apprehension. One can           God defies comprehension because
> come to the recognition of God’s exis-       He transcends the limitations of finite
> tence only indirectly, and not through       reality. In this spirit, Avicenna writes
> actual perception or comprehension of        that “when you recognize Him, He is
> His essence. This is well expressed by       described, after His individual exis-
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá when He writes in His           tence, by the negation of similarities to
> address to Auguste Forel:                    Him” (ash-Shifá 283). That is to say,
> one can form a conception of God, not
> Now concerning the Essence of              by direct comprehension of His tran-
> Divinity: in truth it is on no ac-         scendent essence, but by affirming that
> count determined by anything               essence in its transcendent nature, by
> apart from its own nature, and             negating from it all the attributes of
> can in no wise be comprehended.            contingent things, and by recognizing
> For whatsoever can be conceived            that positive assertions about God are
> by man is a reality that hath lim-         on the order of analogy. On this theme,
> itations and is not unlimited; it is       ‘Abdu’l-Bahá writes that
> circumscribed, not all-embracing.
> It can be comprehended by man,               no soul has ever fathomed the
> and is controlled by him . . . How           reality of the Essence of the Di-
> then can the contingent conceive             vinity so as to be able to intimate,
> the Reality of the absolute?                 describe, praise, or glorify it .
> . . . Thus man cannot grasp the           . . Yet we ascribe certain names
> Essence of Divinity, but can, by             and attributes to the reality of the
> his reasoning power, by observa-             Divinity and praise Him for His
> tion, by his intuitive faculties and         sight, His hearing, His power,
> the revealing power of his faith,            His life and knowledge. We af-
> believe in God, discover the boun-           firm these names and attributes
> ties of His Grace. He becometh               not to affirm the perfections of
> certain that though the Divine Es-
> sence is unseen of the eye, and the
> logical (manṭiqíyyih) principles.” This
> existence of the Deity is intangi-         statement indicates ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s sup-
> ble, yet conclusive spiritual proofs       port, as likewise evidenced by chapter two
> assert the existence of that un-           of Mufávaḍát or Some Answered Questions,
> seen Reality. (Tablet 15–16; Min           for philosophical arguments for the exis-
> Makátíb Ḥaḍrat ‘Abdu’l-Bahá                tence of God, such as Avicenna’s. Rational
> 259)23                                     recognition of God is, however, fully com-
> plimentary with an experiential and inward
> 23    Here, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá states in Per-   apprehension of the presence of the Di-
> sian that one can believe in God through     vine, as indicated by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s men-
> qavá‘id-i-‘aqlíyyih va naẓaríyyih va         tion here of “intuitive faculties” (ṭulú‘át-i-
> manṭiqíyyih, literally through “rational     fikríyyih) and the “revealing power of his
> (‘aqlíyyih), theoretical (naẓaríyyih), and   faith” (inkisháfát-i-vijdáníyyih).
> 66                 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> God, but to deny that He has any         single is to deny Him multiplicity; to
> imperfections.                           say He is immutable is to negate from
> When we observe the contin-           Him any change or motion; to say He
> gent world, we see that ignorance        is eternal is to assert that He does not
> is imperfection and knowledge is         exist in time and is not subject to alter-
> perfection, and thus we say that         ation or decay; to say He is good is to
> the sanctified Essence of the Di-        understand that in Him there can be no
> vinity is all-knowing. Weakness          privation of being such as contingent
> is imperfection and power is per-        entities undergo; to say He is pure in-
> fection, and thus we say that that       tellect is to clarify the implications of
> sanctified and divine Essence is         His immaterial being; lastly, to say He
> all-powerful. It is not that we can      is infinite is the logical conclusion of
> understand His knowledge, His            negating from Him the deficiencies of
> sight, His hearing, His power, or        contingent being, for whatever exists
> His life as they are in themselves:      contingently is limited and finite—God
> This is assuredly beyond our             must therefore be infinite. Even when
> comprehension, for the essential         one ascribes necessity to Him, one
> names and attributes of God are          comes to this through the recognition
> identical with His Essence, and          that there must be a reality that is not
> His Essence is sanctified above all      contingent.
> understanding. (Some Answered               Expressing this theme, Bahá’u’lláh
> Questions 168; Mufávaḍát 105)            Himself writes in the Lawḥ-i-Basíṭ al-
> Ḥaqíqat, with respect to God: “Exalted
> We see here that ‘Abdu’l-Bahá is do-       is He, and again exalted is He, above
> ing precisely what Avicenna has de-        being incarnate in anything whatso-
> scribed: employing the via negativa        ever, or bound by any limitation, or
> of apophatic theology—recognizing          joined to anything in creation! He
> God through negating of Him what He        hath ever been sanctified from, and
> is not, denying that He is at all simi-    transcendent above, all else besides
> lar to contingent reality. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá    Himself” (Iqtidárát 108, provisional
> first recognizes implicitly that God, as   translation). No human conception,
> absolute being, is necessarily existent    therefore, could be identical to God’s
> and not contingent and dependent.          infinite being, however much all
> From that premise, He deduces divine       things, in having received existence
> attributes through a two-fold process      from Him, are signs of that transcen-
> of negation and analogy. He specifical-    dent reality, as Bahá’u’lláh explains in
> ly negates from Him those deficiencies     the Kalimát-i-Firdawsíyyih: “God is
> of contingent reality, and thus asserts    immeasurably exalted above all things.
> God’s perfection. Accordingly, to say      Every created being however revealeth
> God is simple is to assert that He is      His signs which are but emanations
> non-composite; to say He is one and        from Him and not His Own Self. All
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                          67
> 
> these signs are reflected and can be        All-Glorious. Thus, for Bahá’u’lláh,
> seen in the book of existence, and the      God’s majesty, His jalál, and His beau-
> scrolls that depict the shape and pattern   ty, His jamál, are at once contained and
> of the universe are indeed a most great     exemplified precisely in God’s glory—
> book” (Tablets 60; Ishráqát 116). And       His bahá—which Stephen Lambden
> in this connection Bahá’u’lláh fur-         has perceptively glossed as “radiant
> ther relates, again in the Lawḥ-i-Basíṭ     ‘glory’, ‘splendour’, ‘light’, ‘brillian-
> al-Ḥaqíqat: “God Himself hath ever          cy’, ‘beauty’, ‘excellence’, ‘goodli-
> been, and shall forever be, sanctified      ness’, ‘divine majesty’” (13).
> from ascent, descent, and limitation,           On God’s majesty, Bahá’u’lláh ex-
> as well as connection and association       claims in a supplication: “Thou art
> [with any other thing]. All other things,   He to Whose power and to Whose
> in contrast, abide in the sphere of their   dominion every tongue hath testified,
> specific limitations” (Iqtidárát 106,       and Whose majesty and Whose sov-
> provisional translation).                   ereignty every understanding heart
> In both Bahá’u’lláh and Avicenna,        hath acknowledged.” And as to God’s
> consequently, there is a wonder and an      beauty, He implores: “Let the object of
> awe expressed before the impenetrable       mine ardent quest be Thy most resplen-
> being of the Divine, the unfathom-          dent, Thine adorable, and ever-blessed
> able infinitude of God, who is at once      Beauty.” But it is alone God’s glory,
> recognized as the illimitable source        His bahá, from which the very title
> of all things, and as the ultimate, the     Bahá’u’lláh—the Glory of God—pro-
> unconditioned and transcendent reali-       ceeds, and the name of the Bahá’í Faith
> ty. This wonder and awe experienced         originates. “Lauded be Thy name” thus
> before the Infinite is further expressed    proclaims Bahá’u’lláh, “O my God and
> in what could be termed the epithets        the God of all things, my Glory and the
> of praise, those titles that particular-    Glory of all things” (Prayers and Med-
> ly extol God’s exaltation above all         itations 248; 178; 59; Munáját 166;
> praise, His sublimity, His majesty, and     121; 45).
> His glory, as well as His all-arresting         Even here, in the epithets of
> splendor and all-entrancing beauty.         praise, Avicenna is in harmony with
> And here too is light often the chosen      Bahá’u’lláh, as the clear-eyed philos-
> metaphor for expressing the fullness of     opher takes up the pen to compose an
> God’s perfect being, as set against the     almost hymn-like conclusion to his
> darkness of privation and deficiency.       analysis of the Divine. The heart is as
> For Bahá’u’lláh, God’s sublime maj-         moved, it seems, as the mind is awed,
> esty on the one hand—as the supreme         when it contemplates the Infinite.
> reality—and His splendorous beauty          “There can be,” he says, “no higher
> on the other—as the object of all de-       beauty or glory (bahá) than this, that
> sire and perfect goodness and boun-         the Divine Essence is sheer intellectual
> ty—combine in His name al-Abhá, the         being, absolute good, free from every
> 68                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> manner of deficiency, and one in every      T    A            A
> aspect. Beauty and absolute glory be-       C
> long to the Necessarily Existent, who
> is the source of the beauty of all things   To understand Avicenna’s view on
> and their glory. And His glory consists     God’s creative act we must first re-
> in this, that He is precisely as He ought   call the substance of his argument for
> to be” (ash-Shifá 297).                     God’s existence in Part One of this
> article. Nowhere in his reasoning did
> C                C                     Avicenna claim that there had to be a
> definite point in the past at which the
> In the preceding parts, we have seen the    universe came into being and that,
> significant extent to which Bahá’u’lláh     consequently, God’s existence must be
> affirms Avicenna’s theological posi-          invoked as a first cause in a temporal
> tions, and likewise how much Avi-           sense. Rather, in Avicenna’s view, for
> cenna’s account of divine attributes        anything whatsoever to exist, even in
> accords with the explicit and implicit      this moment, requires that existence
> content of Bahá’u’lláh’s statements.        emanate or proceed to it from the Nec-
> For Avicenna as well as Bahá’u’lláh,        essarily Existent. In other words, any
> God is the Necessarily Existent, ab-        contingent being, in the here and now,
> solutely one in His attributes and es-      is in need of an ultimate cause for its
> sence, transcendent and metaphysical-       existence, and thus in need of the Nec-
> ly ultimate. In this part, we will treat    essarily Existent, because the totality
> yet another aspect of Avicenna’s phil-      of any causal structure, visualized as
> osophical theology that Bahá’u’lláh         a chain, depends on a first cause, but
> affirms—namely, Avicenna’s account            in a purely atemporal sense. Even as
> of how God creates the universe, and        the first gear of a series of gears im-
> his assertion that God’s creation has       parts motion simultaneously with the
> no temporal beginning and is thus, in       movement of the subsequent gears, or
> a sense, co-eternal with Him. We will       even as light proceeds simultaneously
> therefore proceed by first considering      with the inherent incandescence of the
> Avicenna’s notion of a creation that        Sun, so does God impart being to the
> eternally emanates from God. Then, in       entire contingent order of reality. God
> the following section, we will explore      thus creates everything, that is, gives
> how the writings of both Bahá’u’lláh        existence to all things, as profoundly
> and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá affirm the core              now as He ever did in the past or will
> metaphysical elements of Avicenna’s         continue to do in the future.
> position, and how Avicennian thought,           Accordingly, for Avicenna, at any
> in turn, helps one understand the phil-     moment in the contingent world, God
> osophical content of Bahá’u’lláh and        is imparting existence to it. He Himself,
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s statements on God’s          in being pure existence, is alone pos-
> creative act.                               sessed of that infinite creative power
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                          69
> 
> to bestow existence. This universe, in      rays exist simultaneously with the Sun,
> contrast, is only contingently existent     though they are dependent on it.
> and depends on God to have any exis-           Simply stated, if God at one point
> tence whatsoever. In this sense, there-     were not creating, and then His cre-
> fore, God’s creative act does not refer     ative act had a beginning, He Him-
> exclusively, or even primarily, to any      self would have undergone a change,
> past state of the universe. He creates      which is impossible. It follows, then,
> all things and sustains their being, as     that He has always created and that
> an ultimate cause, even in the present.     the existence of things has always pro-
> The question that remains, therefore,       ceeded from Him. Avicenna thus states
> is whether the universe has a begin-        that, since God is immutable, if He at
> ning—whether, in other words, God’s         one point were not creating, even now
> creation had a beginning, or if it, like    there would be no creation. Avicenna
> Him, is everlasting into the past and fu-   concludes, therefore, that there could
> ture. Avicenna’s position, as mentioned     not have been any point during which
> several times before, is that there can     God was not creating, nor could there
> be no beginning to God’s creative act.      be a moment when He commenced
> The core to one of Avicenna’s sever-     creation. Accordingly, Avicenna writes
> al arguments on this theme, as found in     in ash-Shifá:
> Book Nine, chapter one of ash-Shifá’s
> “Metaphysics,” is that God himself            A sound intellect, which has not
> is unchanging and eternal. Since He           been prejudiced, will admit that
> Himself is immutable, and since His           if the Divine essence has never
> creative act cannot be conditioned by         changed in any respect, then even
> any external stimuli, it follows that         now nothing would proceed from
> God would neither change His will to          it, if formally nothing had done so.
> create nor could something affect His          If nothing was proceeding from it,
> will. Here we may recall that God’s           and subsequently something were
> will and creative act are no different         to do so, then there would have had
> from His knowledge or intellection;           to have been some new occurrence
> His intellection of things from eternity      in the Divine essence, whether an
> is the cause of their origination, even       intention, a volition, a disposition,
> as the knowledge and apprehension             an ability, a potency, or the like,
> of a book in the author’s mind is its         which had not existed before. (303)
> cause. But since God knows and wills
> immutably and eternally, it follows, for    Naturally, it is precisely Avicenna’s
> Avicenna, that God likewise creates         point that no new occurrence, of any
> the world immutably and eternally.          kind whatsoever, is possible within
> Consequently, His creative act has no       God. He thus has always created.
> beginning, and the world is accord-            Avicenna argues further that given
> ingly co-eternal with him, even as the      the presence of the cause, there must
> 70                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> issue forth a concurrent effect. If, then,   does abstruse discussions of time. Sim-
> the cause is present without that effect,    ilarly, it is beyond the aim of this pa-
> but then later does produce that effect,     per to defend Avicenna’s view against
> there would have to be some change          any possible objections. What is vital
> either in the cause itself or something     here is that Avicenna’s basic logic in
> external to it which affected its op-        the argument above, as we will see in
> eration. Since, regarding God, there        the next section, is routinely validated
> is nothing internal to Him that could       in Bahá’u’lláh’s and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s
> change, nor is there some external inci-    writings. In the meantime, then, we
> dent which could affect Him, Avicenna        will consider another important aspect
> concludes that God’s creation can have      of Avicenna’s views on creation in ad-
> no beginning—nor, we may add, can           dressing the question of just how the
> it have an end. In other words, given       world emanates from God.
> the fact of God’s eternal, unchanging          To frame this question, we may first
> will, such an eternally existent cause      consider something of a dilemma. It
> will necessarily result in an eternally     has been stressed throughout this paper
> present, concurrent effect that proceeds     that God, as understood by Avicen-
> from it. The term that Avicenna uses        na and Bahá’u’lláh, is fundamentally
> for this kind of creation, which entails    different from the contingent world
> the absolute imparting of existence, is     which depends on Him. Whereas He
> fayaḍán or emanation, insofar as he         is necessarily existent, immutable, im-
> conceives of contingent beings as eter-     material, single, and simple, the world
> nally emanating from their ultimate         is contingent, mutable, material, and
> source in God, which process might be       is, furthermore, subject both to multi-
> compared, analogously, to how certain       plicity and to composition. How, then,
> effects emanate from their concurrent        do the many created things proceed
> causes in the world, such as heat from      from the absolute oneness of God?
> fire or illumination from the Sun.          Avicenna’s answer to this question, as
> The above two arguments for an           a development of a core idea in Neo-
> eternal creation, though carefully put      platonic philosophy, is that “from the
> forth in ash-Shifá, do not at all exhaust   one, insofar as it is one, only one can
> Avicenna’s reasoning behind his belief      proceed” (ash-Shifá 330). That is to
> in the eternity of God’s creation and,      say, since God is one and simple, mul-
> hence, the world. Avicenna puts forth       tiple things cannot directly emanate
> several distinctly premised arguments       from Him. Avicenna argues that if dif-
> in defense of the eternity of the cosmos    ferent things, such as form and matter,
> and they are explained in detail by Mc-     were to proceed from God, insofar as
> Ginnis (182–202). It is not the object of   they differ in kind, they would have to
> this article, however, to provide a de-     proceed from different aspects in Him;
> tailed analysis of all of Avicenna’s ar-    there are, however, no different aspects
> guments on this theme, involving as it      existing in God, Who is absolute unity
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                               71
> 
> and simplicity. It thus follows that only         Whatever is necessarily existent
> one thing can directly proceed from               of itself has no essence except
> Him, a single effect of the absolute               existence, and . . . whatever is not
> act of His existence, something that is           necessarily existent of itself has
> not a physical composite of form and              existence, therefore, only inci-
> matter (ash-Shifá 328). For Avicenna,             dentally. But since this existence
> therefore, what immediately proceeds              is incidental to something, there
> from God is only one being, a fayḍ,               must be an essence to which this
> an effluence or emanation which is                  existence is incidental, such that
> immaterial like Him and accordingly               an entity is contingently existent
> an intellect, for the same reasons out-           in respect to its essence, necessar-
> lined in the earlier section on this very         ily existent in respect to its cause,
> subject. This intellect, then, is the first       and unable to exist without that
> being or created entity to emanate from           cause. Therefore, since the contin-
> God, first not in the sense of time but           gently existent receives existence
> of ontological rank. Given that it is an          from the Necessarily Existent, it
> intellect and the first created entity, it is     is one thing insofar as it has exis-
> naturally known as the First Intellect,           tence from its cause, another thing
> or ‘aql-i-avval in Persian.                       in respect to itself . . . if this thing
> Though the First Intellect is one              should be an intellect, it possesses
> and immaterial, it is nonetheless not             one aspect insofar as it knows God
> absolute unity, as God is Himself. As             as the First Cause, another aspect
> Avicenna explains in the thirty-eighth            insofar as it knows itself. (Dánish-
> chapter of the “Metaphysics” in the               námih 409–10)
> Dánishnámih, the First Intellect has
> two aspects. In one aspect, it under-           In other words, an intellect can com-
> stands itself as a contingent entity, in-       prehend its own essence and therefore
> sofar as, in itself, it need not exist and      its contingency, but it can also contem-
> is thus only contingently existent. In          plate its existence and thus its deriva-
> another aspect, however, it is neces-           tive or conferred necessity as caused
> sarily existent insofar as it is directly       by another. Such an intellect, therefore,
> caused by or emanated from God. As              has some multiplicity; even though it is
> a result, there is a kind of multiplicity       not a composite of matter and form, it is
> in the First Intellect, for it is admittedly    a composite of essence and existence.
> a composite of essence and existence,           As Avicenna explains in the rest of the
> which God, as the Necessarily Existent          chapter, it is true that only one thing
> in Himself, is not, as we saw in the            proceeds from God, who is absolute
> section on “Simplicity.” On this theme,         oneness: the First Intellect. It is subse-
> and of the concomitant distinction be-          quently from the First Intellect, howev-
> tween essence and existence, Avicenna           er, that the rest of creation proceeds, in
> writes:                                         increasing orders of contingency and
> 72                 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> multiplicity, insofar as the contingen-    eternal creation: God, Himself pure
> cy and multiplicity begins in the one      unity and absolute being, enjoys such
> entity of the First Intellect, and then    a superfluity of existence that it ema-
> compounds in the beings that emanate       nates or “overflows” from Him as an
> consecutively therefrom.                   eternal, constant act of creative grace
> The multiplicity of the contingent      and providence; this fayḍ or emana-
> world, in this case, does not emanate      tion then proceeds through the First
> directly from the unity and simplicity     Intellect ultimately to create the lower
> of God. Instead, Avicenna envisions a      realms in their multiplicity, diversity,
> hierarchy of being, in which different      and materiality.24
> levels of being are established as the        Before we consider the harmonies
> procession of existence descends from      between his cosmology and that of
> God. Consequently, material creation,      Bahá’u’lláh, however, I will note that
> which is subject to multiplicity, ema-     Avicenna’s view, in its metaphysical
> nates from God only through a series       aspects, should be of interest for any
> of intermediaries, of which the First      theist, insofar as he elegantly recon-
> Intellect is the prime member. God is      ciles the dilemma of how a realm of
> thus the ultimate ontological cause of     temporal existence and multiplicity
> the world but not its proximate, or im-    could ever be created by or proceed
> mediate, efficient cause. Finally termi-     from an ultimate reality that is eter-
> nating in the material world, the levels   nal and absolutely one: through an
> of existence that descend further from     intermediary principle that reflects
> the First Intellect become progres-        something of the nature of both real-
> sively more contingent, deficient, and     ties. Nevertheless, Avicenna did cor-
> imperfect, insofar as they have more       relate the considerations above with
> privation of existence and being, while    since-outdated theories on the scheme
> those closer in existential rank to the    of the physical universe. Namely, Avi-
> First Intellect and thus to God are more   cenna, not having the benefit of early
> perfect and enduring, even immaterial.     modern telescope technology, upheld
> In this connection, one could sug-      the geocentric theory of Aristotle, who
> gest an analogy in which God Himself       thought that the Sun, Moon, and plan-
> is thought of as a pure white, single,     ets revolved around the earth, each in
> immutable light source, while the
> First Intellect is the emanated light         24     Accordingly, the single act of
> that proceeds from Him; the lower          God, which is identical to Him, is His act
> levels of existence with all their mul-    of self-subsistent existence, as described in
> tiplicity, meanwhile, are the refracted,   the section “Simplicity.” However, through
> polychromatic rays produced by the         this same act of existence there eternally
> “prism” of increasing contingency and      emanates a voluntary effect: the procession
> privation. Such, then, is the essence      of the First Intellect and then, through it,
> of Avicenna’s emanative scheme of          the sequence of beings in the contingent
> realm.
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                           73
> 
> its own “sphere” (falak in Persian and     B        ’ ’    ’ A
> Arabic), while an outermost sphere              C
> compassed the cosmic frame. Ac-
> cordingly, Avicenna thought that nine      The two essential elements of Avicen-
> additional intellects proceeded after      na’s view on creation, as seen above,
> the First Intellect, each one producing    are first that God’s creative act is
> a particular sphere, until the emana-      eternal and that therefore the world is
> tion of the last, sublunar sphere. The     co-eternal with Him while being cease-
> intellect associated with this lowest      lessly dependent upon Him, and sec-
> sphere, the ‘Aql-i-Fá’il or Active         ond that God creates via an emanation
> Intellect, then would produce all the      of existence in a hierarchy of being
> multiplicity of the earthly realm and,     through some intermediary principle.
> most importantly, would actualize the      Both of these propositions find explic-
> many forms or essences of things in        it support not only in Bahá’u’lláh’s
> the potentiality of matter (McGinnis       writings but also repeatedly in those
> 205).                                      of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. First, with regard to
> Given the explicit rejection of         the eternity of the world, Bahá’u’lláh
> geocentrism in the Bahá’í Writings,        explains:
> (‘Abdu’l-Bahá,        Some Answered
> Questions, 28; Mufávaḍát 18–19) in             Know assuredly that God’s cre-
> agreement with modern astronomy, as            ation hath existed from eternity,
> well as Bahá’u’lláh’s affirmation that           and will continue to exist forever.
> “every fixed star hath its own planets”        Its beginning hath had no begin-
> (Gleanings 163; Muntakhabátí 65), it           ning, and its end knoweth no end.
> is of course apparent that the astro-          His name, the Creator, presup-
> nomical content of Avicenna’s posi-            poseth a creation, even as His title,
> tions is not confirmed by Bahá’u’lláh.         the Lord of Men, must involve the
> Nonetheless, the purely metaphysical           existence of a servant.
> content of Avicenna’s view remains                As to those sayings, attributed
> pertinent—namely, the core proposi-            to the Prophets of old, such as,
> tion that God creates the contingent           “In the beginning was God; there
> world through an eternal emanation             was no creature to know Him,”
> of existence from Himself through              and “The Lord was alone; with no
> the intermediary of the First Intellect.       one to adore Him,” the meaning of
> Accordingly, we will consider in the           these and similar sayings is clear
> last and final section of this paper the       and evident, and should at no time
> Avicennian principles confirmed in             be misapprehended. To this same
> Bahá’u’lláh’s own cosmology.                   truth bear witness these words
> which He hath revealed: “God was
> alone; there was none else besides
> Him. He will always remain what
> 74                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> He hath ever been.” Every discern-        of its ákhir, its end or extremity. Given
> ing eye will readily perceive that        that Bahá’u’lláh states this immediate-
> the Lord is now manifest, yet there       ly after confirming the limitless dura-
> is none to recognize His glory. By        tion of the world into the past and fu-
> this is meant that the habitation         ture, this sentence may be understood
> wherein the Divine Being dwelleth         as asserting that there is no temporal
> is far above the reach and ken of         beginning to the world’s generation,
> anyone besides Him. Whatsoever            just as there is no temporal end to its
> in the contingent world can either        progression or continuation. Hence, it
> be expressed or apprehended, can          is possible to render that sentence as
> never transgress the limits which,        follows: “There is neither a beginning
> by its inherent nature, have been         to the world’s generation nor any end
> imposed upon it (ḥudúdát-i-im-            to its progression.”
> káníyyih). God, alone, transcen-              The important point, however, is
> deth such limitations. (Gleanings         that creation does have a “start” or
> 150–51; Iqtidárát 72–73)                  avval in terms of its being absolutely
> dependent on God, who remains its
> In the first sentence of the above para-    concurrent cause; God is prior to the
> graph, Bahá’u’lláh unequivocally as-        totality of the world or His creation in
> serts the perpetual duration of God’s       terms of ontological rank, even if not
> creation, and subsequently connects         in time (recall the discussion in the
> God’s nature as Lord and Creator with       first two sections of how a cause can
> the notion that an everlasting and be-      be concurrent with its effect, and thus
> ginningless creation is a necessary ef-     “prior” to it in essence, though not in
> fect of His own unchanging will and         time). In this connection, Bahá’u’lláh
> causal status; this logic is unmistak-      affirms the essential dependence of the
> ably similar in character to Avicenna’s     world on God, and thus its atemporal
> arguments for the eternity of the world     posteriority to Him, when He states
> from the immutability of God.               in another place that “there can be no
> The second sentence, however, is        doubt whatever that if for one mo-
> paradoxical at first blush: how can the     ment the tide of His mercy and grace
> cosmos have a beginningless begin-          (fayḍ) were to be withheld from the
> ning or an endless end? The apparent        world, it would completely perish”
> ambiguity of Bahá’u’lláh’s statement        (Gleanings 68; Majmúʻiy-i-Alváḥ-i-
> may be resolved if we consider the pre-     Mubárakih 342). Here, it is significant
> cise wording of the original Persian, as    that Bahá’u’lláh uses the term fayḍ, or
> well as the implications of the preced-     literally emanation—as we saw with
> ing sentence. The Persian text literally    Avicenna—such that He states that
> states that there is no bidáyat or be-      without the emanation (of grace or ex-
> ginning to creation’s avval, its start or   istence) from God, the world would at
> firstness, and no niháyat or termination    once be rendered ma‘dúm, nonexistent.
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                          75
> 
> With an appreciation of this point—       creates the physical world. First, as to
> the unceasing dependence of the creat-       the world’s co-eternity, Bahá’u’lláh is
> ed world on God—we can understand            careful to note that, though the world
> Bahá’u’lláh’s statement in the large         may be without beginning or end in
> excerpt quoted above that while God          time, it nonetheless is “preceded” by
> is existent now, His creation is void        the causal power of God. He explains:
> of existence or mafqúd. Bahá’u’lláh
> immediately qualifies this statement           As regards thine assertions about
> by clarifying that God transcends all          the beginning of creation, this is a
> the ḥudúdát-i-imkáníyyih, literally all        matter on which conceptions vary
> the limitations of contingency. Since          by reason of the divergences in
> the world exists only contingently and         men’s thoughts and opinions. Wert
> dependently, in relation to God, who           thou to assert that it hath ever ex-
> exists necessarily and independently, it       isted and shall continue to exist,
> is as though it were nonexistent; God          it would be true; or wert thou to
> is alone, in the specific sense that He is     affirm the same concept as is men-
> without peer or match in the manner of         tioned in the sacred Scriptures, no
> His being and existence. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá          doubt would there be about it, for
> reiterates this position when He con-          it hath been revealed by God, the
> firms that “although the contingent            Lord of the worlds . . . God was,
> world exists, in relation to the existence     and His creation had ever existed
> of God it is non-existence and nothing-        beneath His shelter from the be-
> ness” (Some Answered Questions 324;            ginning that hath no beginning,
> Mufávaḍát 196).                                apart from its being preceded by a
> From the above points, we may               Firstness which cannot be regard-
> conclude that Bahá’u’lláh affirms                ed as firstness . . . (Tablets 140;
> Avicenna’s metaphysical position that          Majmú‘iy-i-Alváḥ ba’d az Kitáb-
> the created world is beginningless and         i-Aqdas 82)
> perpetual, but that it is always depen-
> dent, for its existence, on God, Who         Given the context of Bahá’u’lláh’s
> is its ultimate, unchanging and eternal      other statements, it is clear that in the
> cause. How, then, does Bahá’u’lláh           above passage He affirms that the world
> additionally confirm the idea of cre-        is eternal; He nonetheless endorses the
> ation as emanation? In this regard,          creation account in the scriptures be-
> the Lawḥ-i-Ḥikmat is relevant, for           cause He supports the underlying truth
> in that work Bahá’u’lláh not only af-        they uphold, namely, that the world is
> firms the co-eternity of the world with      created by God and is not eternal in
> God, Who ceaselessly sustains it, but        the sense of transcending the bounds
> He also establishes the Word of God          of mutability and being necessarily
> or Logos as an intermediary reality          existent in itself and immutable, for it
> that emanates from the Godhead and           is fundamentally contingent and could
> 76                 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> not exist, even for a moment, without      immediate audience, in this case the
> the sustaining providence of God, as       erudite Bahá’í philosopher Nabíl-i-Ak-
> Avicenna likewise states. Accordingly,     bar, who would have been well famil-
> for Bahá’u’lláh, one can support the       iar with Avicenna’s thought.
> eternity of creation while also affirm-          Shortly after this point in the Lawḥ-
> ing the central content of the Biblical    i-Ḥikmat, Bahá’u’lláh describes the
> and Qur’ánic accounts.                     Word of God as the instrumental cause
> With this understanding, the           of the cosmos. He states that this
> previously quoted statement from           all-compelling “Word of God” is “the
> Bahá’u’lláh is altogether intelligible:    cause of the entire creation,” while all
> “God was, and His creation had ever        else besides it is a created thing and
> existed beneath His shelter from the       an effect. The Word or “Command of
> beginning that hath no beginning, apart    God,” He states furthermore, has nev-
> from its being preceded by a Firstness     er been severed or munqaṭi’ from the
> which cannot be regarded as firstness .    world, which recalls His statement,
> . .”. Creation has ever resided “beneath   quoted above, that all created things
> His shelter”—that is, it is has always     would perish were the emanation of
> depended on God—“from the begin-           God’s grace to be withheld for even one
> ning that hath no beginning,” which is     moment. The Word of God may thus be
> to say forever into the past. The world,   identified as that emanation, or as the
> however, is preceded by the essential      chief medium of the gracious emana-
> priority or “firstness” of God as its      tion of being from God. Significantly,
> concurrent cause. This essential prior-    Bahá’u’lláh confirms this reading in
> ity or firstness thus is not recognized    the Lawḥ-i-Ḥikmat when He says this
> as a temporal priority or firstness. In    Word is al-fayḍ al-a‘ẓam, literally the
> other words, Bahá’u’lláh here affirms        supreme emanation, and the ‘illat al-
> Avicenna’s view that God precedes His      fuyúḍát, the cause of the [subsequent]
> creation as its cause but not in terms     emanations.
> of being prior in a sequence of time, as       Bahá’u’lláh then concludes this
> though there was some definite point in    section of the tablet by stating that this
> the past “before” which there was no       Word is “the Cause which hath pre-
> creation proceeding from God. Accord-      ceded the contingent world—a world
> ingly, Bahá’u’lláh may be understood       which is adorned with the splendors
> as saying that the world is “preceded      of the Ancient of Days, yet is being
> by [an essential] firstness which cannot   renewed and regenerated at all times”
> be regarded as [a temporal] firstness.”    (Tablets 141; Majmú‘iy-i-Alváḥ ba’d az
> Avicenna’s metaphysical analysis of        Kitáb-i-Aqdas 83). This last statement
> concurrent causation and essential         is particularly pertinent. The world is
> priority, as discussed in the first sec-   literally described as being adorned
> tion, thus helps make intelligible what    or muzayyan with aṭ-ṭiráz al-qadím,
> Bahá’u’lláh was here expressing to His     the vesture of eternity, and yet it is at
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                           77
> 
> all times regenerated (tajaddud) and            when Bahá’u’lláh describes the Primal
> originated or created (ḥudúth). This is         Will as the instrumental or mediating
> possible because the Word precedes              cause of the creation of the world in
> the world in being its concurrent cause,        the Lawḥ-i-Kullu’ṭ-Ṭa‘ám, a function
> and it is thus that which continuously          that belongs to the Word of God in the
> sustains and generates it, thus allowing        Lawḥ-i-Ḥikmat, for in the former He
> it to be beginningless and perpetual.           states that it is by means of the Primal
> In sum, Bahá’u’lláh represents this        Will that God created the heavens and
> Word as having emanated from God;               earth. Similarly, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá uses the
> it is “the supreme emanation,” and it           Word and the Holy Spirit as synonyms
> is moreover the cause of subsequent             in chapter thirty-eight of Mufávaḍát or
> “emanations,” which can be read as              Some Answered Questions.
> the levels of contingent reality that              In this connection, Bahá’u’lláh’s
> compose the rest of creation. It is thus        account of emanation, the intermedi-
> apparent that Bahá’u’lláh is describing         ary principle, and the co-eternity of
> a creation, even as Avicenna did, that          creation—affirming as it does the phil-
> eternally emanates from God through             osophical arguments of Avicenna—
> an intermediary principle, which He             is itself reaffirmed and clarified in
> calls the Word. The Word, then, is stun-        ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s writings and recorded
> ningly similar to the First Intellect de-       statements. In one instance, ‘Abdu’l-
> scribed by Avicenna and, in any case,           Bahá not only speaks of the ema-
> it is identical in function and operation       nation of the world from God, but
> as the first emanation from God which           also explicitly identifies the Word
> in turn emanates the subsequent levels          of God or Primal Will with the First
> of existence.                                   Intellect, while perhaps even alluding
> Let it be noted here that there is a gen-   to Avicenna himself. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
> eral consensus among Bahá’í scholars            thus asserts: “The procession (qíyám)
> that the intermediary principle which           of creation from God is a procession
> Bahá’u’lláh calls the Word of God in            through emanation. That is, creation
> the Lawḥ-i-Ḥikmat is the same reality           emanates from God” (Some Answered
> expressed by various terms through-             Questions 234; Mufávaḍát 144), where
> out the Bahá’í writings, including the          qíyám can signify dependence and sub-
> “Holy Spirit” (Rúḥu’l-Qudus) and                sistence, such that the creation depends
> the “Primal Will” (Mashíyyat-i-Av-              upon God by being subsistent through
> valíyyih), as well as the “Realm of             His emanation of existence. ‘Abdu’l-
> Revelation” or of “Divine Command”              Bahá continues by stating:
> (‘Álam-i-Amr).25 This is apparent
> It follows that all things have
> 25    Keven Brown, “Brief Discussion            emanated from God; that is, it is
> of the Primal Will in the Bahá’í Writ-
> ings”; Riaz Ghadimi, 662; and ‘Ali-Mu-
> rad Dávúdí, Ulúhíyyat va Maẓharíyyat,           “Station of Unity.”
> 78                   The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> through God that all things have            one defined in reference to time; there
> been realized, and through Him              has always been an originated creation
> that the contingent world has come          and contingent world. The world, then,
> to exist. The first thing to emanate        is contingent upon the ceaseless ema-
> from God is that universal reality          nation of existence from God through
> which the ancient philosophers              the First Intellect or Primal Will. Just
> termed the “First Intellect” and            as Avicenna recognizes that the First
> which the people of Bahá call the           Intellect is in itself a contingent being
> “Primal Will.” (Some Answered               and not equal to the Necessarily Exis-
> Questions 235; Mufávaḍát 144)               tent, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá likewise clarifies
> that, in itself, the First Intellect does
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá then stresses the eter-          not share the absolute ontological pri-
> nal nature of the First Intellect or Pri-     ority or precedence of the Godhead:
> mal Will, as well as the concomitant          “Though the First Intellect is without
> co-eternity, and ceaseless dependence,        beginning, this does not mean that
> of the creation upon that intermediary        it shares in the pre-existence of God
> principle, and ultimately God.                (qidam), for in relation to the exis-
> tence of God the existence of that uni-
> This emanation, with respect to             versal Reality is mere nothingness”
> its action in the world of God, is          (Some Answered Questions 235–36;
> not limited by either time or place         Mufávaḍát 145). Here, the word refer-
> and has neither beginning nor end,          ring to the “pre-existence” of God is
> for in relation to God the begin-           qidam, which, as explored in the two
> ning and the end are one and the            opening sections, refers to the ontolog-
> same. The pre-existence of God is           ical priority of a cause in relation to a
> both essential and temporal, while          concurrent effect to which it bestows
> the origination of the contingent           existence. Although the First Intellect
> world is essential but not tempo-           is eternal, it is eternally dependent on
> ral. (Some Answered Questions               the immediate effusion of being from
> 235; Mufávaḍát 145)                         the Godhead, and thus subordinate to
> it.
> When ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says that the orig-             ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s explicit identifica-
> ination of the world is not temporal          tion of the Primal Will, a core feature
> but essential, He evidently means to          of Bahá’í theology and cosmology,
> confirm that the world is created by          with the First Intellect mentioned and
> and dependent on God; its dependence          argued for by Avicenna, seems to me to
> and contingency are essential to its na-      demonstrate that the intermediary prin-
> ture. It is therefore, in its very essence,   ciple of creation, which Bahá’u’lláh
> originated and not self-subsistent; in        variously calls the Word of God, the
> other words, it is a contingent entity.       Most Exalted Word (Kalimiy-i-‘Ulyá),
> Nevertheless, this origination is not         and the Primal Will, is in essence
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                           79
> 
> identical to Avicenna’s First Intellect.     intellects emanate in succession, the
> Consequently, Bahá’u’lláh affirms the          last of which, the ‘Aql-i-Fá’il or Ac-
> core metaphysical content of Avicen-         tive Intellect, generates and sustains
> na’s cosmology, which we can break           the existence of the material realm. In
> down into the following seven proposi-       the Bahá’í system, there is no mention
> tions that they share: (1) God, in being     of such subsequent intellects. Instead,
> immutable, eternal, and absolute, eter-      Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá clearly
> nally creates the world; (2) the world,      state that the First Intellect or Primal
> accordingly, has no beginning or end         Will is in fact responsible for the cre-
> in time; (3) the world nonetheless is        ation of the physical world. It may fol-
> ceaselessly dependent on God for its         low, then, that for Bahá’u’lláh the First
> existence, insofar as it is a contingent     Intellect additionally assumes the op-
> entity; (4) God creates through the em-      erations performed by the Active Intel-
> anation of existence from Himself; (5)       lect under Avicenna’s view. In this con-
> the physical world is not an immediate       nection, Bahá’u’lláh and Abdu’l-Bahá
> emanation from God; (6) an interme-          have a cosmology that divides existence
> diary reality, whether called the Word,      into three realms. The first is the Realm
> the Primal Will, or the First Intellect,     of God or ‘Álam-i-Ḥaqq, which is the
> is the first entity to emanate from the      level of reality strictly confined to the
> godhead, first in the atemporal sense of     Necessarily Existent, who is perfect,
> ontological precedence (as the motion        immutable, and absolute. There is then
> of the hand precedes the motion of the       the Realm of Command or the Realm
> key it holds, not in time but in its caus-   of the Kingdom, ‘Álam-i-Amr and
> al operation); and (7) the First Intel-      ‘Álam-i-Malakút respectively, which is
> lect, which is the immediate emanation       the station of the First Intellect, Primal
> from the Godhead, in turn emanates           Will, or Holy Spirit. Lastly, there is the
> the existence of all other things. That      Realm of Creation or ‘Álam-i-Khalq,
> Bahá’u’lláh and Avicenna should share        which is the sum of contingent reality
> the seven propositions listed above is       created and sustained by God through
> no superficial testament to the fact that    the intermediary of the First Intellect.
> Bahá’u’lláh largely validates the cen-       ‘Abdu’l-Bahá describes this cosmolog-
> tral tenets of Avicennian metaphysical       ical picture thus:
> theology, and that Avicennian thought
> helps elucidate the philosophical con-         The Prophets . . . hold that there
> tent of the Bahá’í Writings. This being        are the world of God, the world
> established, there remains only one            of the Kingdom, and the world
> additional point to address before we          of creation: three things. The first
> conclude this section.                         emanation is the outpouring grace
> At the end of the preceding sec-            of the Kingdom, which has ema-
> tion, we saw that Avicenna holds that          nated from God and has appeared
> from the First Intellect nine other            in the realities of all things, even
> 80                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> as the rays emanating from the             article to explain the concomitant as-
> sun are reflected in all things.           pects of Avicenna’s theory of psychol-
> (Some Answered Questions 341;              ogy and abstraction, it is sufficient to
> Mufávaḍát 205–6)                           note that, for Avicenna, a prophet is
> one who is naturally disposed, by the
> For Avicenna, what the Bahá’í Writings       particular constitution and character of
> call the Realm of the Kingdom would          his soul, to receive more fully than oth-
> comprise at least ten intellects along       er people the intellectual illumination
> with the celestial spheres with which        of the Active Intellect, and who is thus
> they are associated, while the Earth,        able to understand the nature of things
> which is the realm beneath the last,         in a flash of inspired intuition, and not
> lunar sphere, is the physical world.         merely through unaided sense percep-
> Since Bahá’u’lláh rejects any geocen-        tion and induction (McGinnis 147–48).
> tric astronomy, He naturally does not           Similarly, in the Bahá’í system, a
> affirm the idea that there are multiple        prophet or Manifestation of God is one
> intellects emanating in succession as        whose human soul is uniquely asso-
> associated with the heavenly spheres.        ciated with the First Intellect, Primal
> I suggest, therefore, that the Realm         Will, or Holy Spirit so as to “manifest”
> of the Kingdom, ‘Álam-i-Malakút or           the attributes of Divinity, including
> ‘Álam-i-Amr, in the Bahá’í system,           inherent knowledge of the natures and
> may well be reduced to one univer-           realities of things, in the earthly realm.
> sal reality, as ‘Abdu’l-Bahá calls it,       Although Avicenna’s objective is to
> the First Intellect and Primal Will. In      provide a rational explanation of Is-
> sum, for Bahá’u’lláh the First Intellect     lamic prophethood consonant with his
> fulfills the direct creative activity that   metaphysics and theology, his approach
> the Active Intellect performs in Avi-        has resonances with the Bahá’í concept
> cenna’s cosmology. Aside from this           of the Manifestation of God, insofar
> minor point of difference, however, the       as he stresses the natural superiority
> metaphysical or theological content of       of the prophet to other human beings,
> Bahá’u’lláh’s and Avicenna’s cosmolo-        and his resulting special association
> gies are markedly similar, as is evident     with the Active Intellect; this replaces
> in the seven shared propositions listed      a more conventional idea of popular
> above.                                       faith, contrary to Bahá’í thought, that
> This commonality is even more ap-         the prophet is no different than other
> parent when we consider Avicenna’s           men, aside from a rather arbitrary im-
> account of prophethood. For Avicenna,        position of God’s directives into his
> the Active Intellect not only manifests      consciousness. This is yet another ev-
> the forms or essences of things in the       idence, therefore, that for Bahá’u’lláh
> material world, but it also actualizes       the First Intellect in fact encompasses
> universal concepts in human intellects.      the range of activity Avicenna divided
> Though it is beyond the scope of this        among the First Intellect or Emanation,
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                         81
> 
> subsequent intellects, and the Active       and wide-ranging, and indicates a
> Intellect. It remains for later scholar-    shared interpretation of reality as a
> ship to correlate as well as differentiate   whole in its basic features.
> further the more abstruse and minute           The sole purpose of this article has
> correlations of Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings     been to highlight this harmony, insofar
> and Avicenna’s philosophy.                  as it enriches the academic study of
> what Bahá’u’lláh means by God, but
> C                              also because an understanding of Avi-
> cenna’s work and intellectual contribu-
> In the foregoing sections, we have seen     tion provides a framework by which
> how the theology of Bahá’u’lláh val-        one might better comprehend the
> idates core features of the metaphysi-      metaphysical significance of many of
> cal philosophy of Avicenna—that God         Bahá’u’lláh’s theological statements,
> exists as the one ultimate and uncon-       such as His affirmation that God is nec-
> ditioned reality, necessarily existent,     essary or simple, that His creatures are
> simple, single, immutable, eternal,         contingent beings, or that His creation
> perfect, and wholly good; omniscient        has neither beginning nor end. Howev-
> in intellect and free in will; unlimited    er, as expressed in the introduction—
> in His being and thus truly infinite and    and I stress this unequivocally—the
> transcendent, as contrasted with the        objective has decidedly not been either
> constrained nature of contingently exis-    to state or to imply that Bahá’u’lláh’s
> tent beings. Bahá’u’lláh affirms, more-       positions are, in any way, merely de-
> over, as Avicenna argues, that these        rivative from Avicenna, or at all reduc-
> attributes are each indistinguishable       ible to his influence as the preeminent
> in reality from the indivisible essence     philosopher in the Islamic tradition.
> of God, which is necessary existence,       Likewise, I have not intended to imply
> insofar as to be necessarily existent       that Bahá’u’lláh’s theological teach-
> just is to be simple, indivisible, im-      ings are, by any means, restricted to
> mutable, perfect, wholly good, and in-      those themes in Avicenna’s philosophy
> finite. We have seen, furthermore, that     which He affirms and validates, how-
> Bahá’u’lláh confirms Avicenna’s view        ever much one may esteem the impor-
> that the world is eternal, though cease-    tance of such metaphysical principles
> lessly dependent on God, from whom          as necessary and contingent existence,
> the existence of all things emanates        concurrent causation, or emanation.
> through the intermediary of the First           Nonetheless, I have endeavored to
> Intellect or Primal Will. The metaphys-     show—through citation and analysis
> ical harmony between Bahá’u’lláh and        of a diverse selection of Bahá’u’lláh’s
> Avicenna is consequently not restricted     and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s works—that af-
> to certain superficial or incidental fea-   firmations of Avicenna’s theological
> tures of their thought. The agreement       ideas in the Bahá’í Writings are not due
> between them is in fact fundamental         merely to an incidental convergence
> 82                 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> of terminology, to the degree that         Consequently, why should the Bahá’í
> Bahá’u’lláh lived in the Islamic world     scholar study Avicenna himself, and
> and inherited a certain intellectual and   take Bahá’u’lláh’s theology as partic-
> literary culture, but to demonstrate       ularly vindicative of his theological
> that Bahá’u’lláh’s clearly stated views    philosophy? Even if this objection
> on God constitute a vindication of the     were largely correct—though I think
> metaphysical principles underlying         it slightly misses the mark—it would
> Avicenna’s argument for God’s exis-        still be fruitful to consider these theo-
> tence, and His nature, attributes, and     logical arguments and doctrines at the
> creative act, in actual content and con-   source, so to speak, and to consider
> cept. Indeed, the Bahá’í Writings’ af-     the rational basis, as explicated by
> firmation of the content of Avicennian     Avicenna, of those philosophical-theo-
> philosophical theology is incredibly       logical doctrines that Bahá’u’lláh and
> rich in implication; it indicates that     ‘Abdu’l-Bahá so consistently affirm,
> they validate the principles of ratio-     in order to demonstrate, and to have a
> nality that underlie Avicenna’s argu-      firmer understanding of, their coher-
> ments, and that the content of Bahá’í      ence, rigorous logic, and conceptual
> metaphysics can be further understood      depth. Indeed, if Avicenna’s ideas were
> through the study of the Islamic phil-     so powerful as to have become main-
> osophical tradition, to discern areas of   stream, the need to understand Avicen-
> affirmation, as in the case of Avicenna,     na himself would be commensurately
> or difference, in the case of other Is-     intensified.
> lamic thinkers.                                However, the real situation is much
> Since there are a number of possible   more complex. After Avicenna, phi-
> objections that could be brought to bear   losophy or falsafih did indeed become
> on the general argument of this article,   especially associated with his ideas in
> I will try succinctly to address them,     the Islamic world, and more generally
> with broad historical strokes, and also    with the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic
> to resolve possible misunderstandings      tradition Avicenna himself inherit-
> as to what the arguments of this article   ed, refined, and profoundly shaped.
> actually entail regarding Avicenna’s       Nonetheless, subsequent thinkers not
> relation to the Bahá’í Faith. One could    only adopted and developed his ideas,
> wonder, for example, if it is warranted    but also challenged and argued against
> to associate the relevant metaphysi-       them. In the succeeding generation, for
> cal principles that Bahá’u’lláh affirms      example, the widely influential Persian
> with Avicenna especially, instead of       thinker Ghazálí composed a famous
> seeing this affirmation as one per-          polemic against twenty propositions
> taining to ideas that, by Bahá’u’lláh’s    implied by or related to Avicenna’s
> time, had become mainstream in Islam       thought, The Incoherence of the
> itself due to the prevalence of Avi-       Philosophers (Taháfutu’l-Falásifih),
> cenna’s thought over a millennium.         and he especially took issue with
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                               83
> 
> Avicenna’s ostensibly heretical notions        theologians were generally opposed to
> such as the eternity of the world; his         some of those relevant metaphysical
> characterization of the nature of God’s        ideas Avicenna and the Bahá’í Writings
> knowledge; and his doubt, suggest-             affirm, such as the distinction between
> ed in several places, as to the bodily         essence and existence, the presence
> resurrection, insofar as he defends a          of necessary causal connections in
> purely spiritual view of the afterlife         the world, and a robust affirmation of
> in his metaphysical works—in agree-            divine simplicity.27 Moreover, philoso-
> ment with the Bahá’í perspective.26            phy itself, in succeeding centuries, was
> Ghazálí, in addition, argued for occa-         often looked at askance in the Islamic
> sionalism—which holds that there are           world, or even thought heretical, while
> no necessary causal relations in nature,       jurisprudence became the chief ex-
> but only direct actions of God’s arbi-         pression of religion among Islamic
> trary will—against the Avicennian no-          scholars. Indeed, although philoso-
> tion that natural entities have causative      phy—whether of Avicenna’s essen-
> powers and necessary relations in their        tially Aristotelian approach, broadly
> own right, even though they ceaseless-         Platonist “Illuminationist” thought
> ly depend on God for their existence.          (Ishráqí), or a synthesis of the two—
> It is the Avicennian notion, however,          was indeed practiced in the Shia milieu
> that the Bahá’í Writings affirm, as ev-          of Early Modern Iran by the School
> idenced by the passages on causation           of Isfahan, its practitioners were of-
> considered throughout this paper, and          ten persecuted or condemned by the
> the following statement from ‘Abdu’l-          ‘ulamá, even while the philosophical
> Bahá: “By nature is meant those inher-         tradition itself, so beautifully embod-
> ent properties and necessary relations         ied by Avicenna, was “by and large
> derived from the realities of things”          abandoned in the rest of the Islamic
> (Tablet 13).                                   world,” as expressed by the historian
> Furthermore, the generally fideis-          Abbas Amanat (114). Accordingly, it is
> tic school of Ash‘arite theology, from         not reasonable to diminish the degree
> which Ghazálí more or less operated,           to which Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-
> became far more mainstream in Sunni            Bahá actually vindicate and vali-
> Islam, the dominant branch of the faith,       date the arguments and conclusions,
> than Avicenna’s rationalist philoso-
> phy. And indeed, Ash‘arite-influenced             27     As Marmura notes: “For the
> Ash‘arites, the divine attributes . . . are
> 26     Fazlur Rahman expresses this         co-eternal with the divine essence . . . but
> more starkly, when he writes that “in gen-     are not identical with it. They are attributes
> eral” Avicenna “taught that the resurrection   ‘additional’ (zā’ida) to the divine essence.
> of the body was an imaginative myth with       This point is quite basic, particularly for
> which the minds of the Prophets were in-       understanding al-Ghazálí’s rejection and
> spired in order to influence the moral char-   condemnation of the philosophical doc-
> acter of the unthinking masses” (119).         trine of an eternal world” (141).
> 84                 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> characteristic of Avicenna himself and     forms by Avicenna, such as the dis-
> not Islamic theologians considered         tinction between essence and existence
> generally, regarding causation, con-       and contingent and necessary being,
> tingent and necessary existence, the       they are doing so as influenced directly
> distinction between essence and exis-      or indirectly by him, and arguably none
> tence, and God’s nature, attributes, and   of them enjoys the degree of eminence,
> creative act.                              influence, historical relevance, and
> Another objection, however, may         synthetic genius Avicenna is general-
> contend that this article has exagger-     ly recognized as possessing, with the
> ated the Avicennian character of the       possible exception, outside Islam, of
> principles discussed, insofar as certain   Thomas Aquinas among medieval phi-
> Islamic philosophers and thinkers after    losophers. Therefore, not to recognize
> Avicenna—such as Ibn ‘Arabí, Mullá         the Avicennian character of the princi-
> Ṣadrá, Mír Dámád, Sabzivárí, and           ples here discussed is no more reason-
> even Shaykh Aḥmad Aḥsá’í—have              able than to deny that the doctrine of
> variously and to differing degrees          the four causes,28 for example, is Aris-
> discussed some of the ideas treated in     totelian, despite the fact that countless
> this paper. It should be kept in mind,     subsequent philosophers, including
> however, that this article does not        Avicenna, have adopted, defended, and
> make any exclusive claim in demon-         clarified the concept.
> strating Bahá’u’lláh’s affirmation of           Moreover, certain other philoso-
> Avicenna’s ideas, as though Avicenna       phers in Islam, such as Suhravardí,
> is the only philosopher who has argu-      are notable for starkly rejecting the
> ments validated in the Bahá’í Faith,       Aristotelian heart of Avicenna’s
> nor does it suggest that the whole of      thought, even while the Bahá’í Faith,
> Avicenna’s philosophy, beyond the          as convincingly argued by Ian Kluge
> matters explicitly treated here, has the   in “The Aristotelian Substratum of the
> imprimatur of Bahá’u’lláh. Indeed,         Bahá’í Writings,” reaffirms the basic
> Ian Kluge has done impressive work         metaphysics of Aristotle’s thought,
> demonstrating the Aristotelian and         especially, I would add, as developed
> Neoplatonic principles affirmed by           by Avicenna. In addition, in certain
> Bahá’u’lláh, and this article is fully     respects it is the particularly Avicen-
> complementary to and supportive of         nian stance that the Bahá’í Writings
> such scholarship, insofar as Avicenna      affirm, in contrast to those of later
> himself inherited and further refined      thinkers: the Avicennian distinction
> those traditions, and works within clas-   between essence and existence, for
> sical theism more broadly, as shall be     example, came to be undermined either
> discussed below.                           by an emphasis solely on essence (as
> Nonetheless, when later philoso-
> phers in Islam argue for or develop
> ideas first articulated in their mature      28    Discussed     in   the    section
> “Simplicity.”
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                            85
> 
> in Suhravardí’s radical essentialism)         transcends all things in His essence
> or on existence (as in Mullá Ṣadrá’s          and yet imparts to them their very ex-
> Heraclitan existentialism).29 Likewise,       istence ceaselessly, and is thus “closer
> some subsequent thinkers, influenced          to a man than his life vein,” as it is said
> by Sufi mysticism, tended toward cer-         in the Qur’án (50:16). Since the Bahá’í
> tain monistic or pantheistic ideas, at        Faith evidently contributes to this tra-
> variance with Bahá’u’lláh’s teaching,         dition of classical theism, one could
> in contrast to Avicenna’s chaste insis-       find points of substantive commonal-
> tence on God’s transcendence. Conse-          ity between Bahá’u’lláh and philoso-
> quently, Avicenna is well-deserving of        phers such as Aristotle, Plotinus, and
> explicit attention in Bahá’í studies, and     Augustine—before Avicenna—and
> it is with this aim that this article has     Maimonides, Averroës, and Aquinas,
> focused exclusively on Avicenna, and          after him. Nonetheless, in the sheer
> only alluded to or briefly mentioned          abundance of Avicennian propositions
> other philosophers. Again, it should          that Bahá’u’lláh validates, the affinities
> be stated that the purport of this arti-      between Avicennian philosophy and
> cle is not that Bahá’u’lláh’s theology        the Bahá’í Faith should prove to be a
> is reducible to Avicenna’s thought as         rich field for future work and of spe-
> an historical antecedent. It has argued       cial interest to Bahá’í scholars. In this
> solely that Bahá’u’lláh’s theology is af-     connection, Avicenna may be taken
> firmative of, not derivative from, those      to be one remarkably impressive and
> Avicennian ideas we have discussed.           influential member of a broad, multi-
> I will note in closing, however, that     faith philosophical-theological tradi-
> the theological agreement between             tion whose relation to the Bahá’í Faith
> Bahá’u’lláh and Avicenna is no histor-        should be a matter of intensive study
> ical coincidence. Though Avicenna’s           and consideration.
> thought has a particular affinity with             Despite the above points, how-
> the Bahá’í Faith, he is admittedly one        ever, one may still wonder whether
> in a long line of thinkers who sup-           recognizing the Avicennian themes in
> port what is called classical theism,         Bahá’u’lláh’s metaphysics is anything
> a view of God which recognizes Him            more than a mere academic exercise.
> as the one metaphysically ultimate            On the contrary, Avicenna’s philosophy
> and absolute reality, who completely          invests one with a powerful tool in un-
> derstanding the conceptual, philosoph-
> 29    As discussed by Wisnovsky            ical, metaphysical, and logical content
> (111). ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s position is decided-    and implications of Bahá’u’lláh’s writ-
> ly Avicennian when He confirms that for       ings themselves. The Bahá’í Writings’
> contingent beings existence “is only one      affirmation of the distinction between
> accident (‘araḍ) among others that enter      essence and existence; of the two mo-
> upon the realities of created things” (Some   dalities of necessary and contingent
> Answered Questions 337–38; Mufávaḍát          being; of the necessary existence of
> 203).
> 86                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> God; of a robust account of divine sim-     revealed to be non-negotiable tenets of
> plicity holding that God’s attributes are   Bahá’u’lláh’s system, nowhere contra-
> identical to His essence; of the eternal-   dicted in His writings though expressed
> ity of God’s creation; and of the role of   in various ways depending on the char-
> the intermediary principle of the First     acter of His particular audience.
> Intellect or Primal Will—such central          In this connection, it should be ac-
> affirmations are rendered intelligible,       knowledged that there has been a con-
> and their rational basis elucidated,        trasting view, in the literature of Bahá’í
> through an appreciation of Avicennian       scholarship, that Bahá’u’lláh “does not
> metaphysics.                                assert the truth of any particular meta-
> Avicenna can serve a vital role in       physical position,” and even “denies
> Bahá’í studies for yet other reasons,       that metaphysics itself is the core of
> however. First, Avicennian philosophy,      religion” (Momen 38). It is naturally
> with its insistence on rational demon-      outside the scope of this article, in the
> stration in addition to its conformity      space of a conclusion, to address this
> to Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings, could well      perspective fully, as it is expressed in
> prove to be an invaluable resource          the essay “The God of Bahá’u’lláh,”
> for Bahá’í scholars as they undertake       which differs from this paper’s account
> the enterprise of articulating Bahá’í       of the existence, consistency, and ro-
> teachings, defending them, and clar-        bust nature of definite metaphysical
> ifying their rational structure, just as    principles in Bahá’u’lláh’s writings.
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá encouraged when He             It should first be noted that the thesis
> stated that in this day rational argu-      of “epistemological relativism,” which
> ments (dalá’il-i-‘aqlíyyih) are requisite   “The God of Bahá’u’lláh” argues is
> for the people of the world (Some An-       operative in Bahá’u’lláh’s writings,
> swered Questions 8; Mufávaḍát 5). Avi-      springs from a laudable goal of ex-
> cenna’s argument for God’s existence,       plaining how Bahá’u’lláh reconciles
> for example, is in full harmony with        different faith traditions with contrast-
> Bahá’í teaching, clarifies the content      ing metaphysical claims. Accordingly,
> of Bahá’u’lláh’s own theological state-     it is suggested there that Bahá’u’lláh
> ments, and illuminates the reasoning in     accomplishes this by generally teach-
> support of God’s existence found in the     ing that “religious metaphysical truth is
> Bahá’í Writings. Second, one who has        an individual truth which each person
> a foundation in classical, and indeed       sees from his or her own viewpoint”
> Avicennian, philosophy will more eas-       (38).
> ily realize that Bahá’u’lláh’s writings        Though there is indeed a kind of
> form a coherent and fully consistent        “perspectivism” implicit in the no-
> metaphysical system. Matters such as        tion of progressive revelation—and
> God’s existence, necessity, simplicity,     though Bahá’u’lláh clearly notes, in a
> and complete transcendence, as well as      number of places, that differing per-
> the contingent nature of the world, are     spectives qualify the truth values of
> Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna                        87
> 
> certain statements—it nonetheless          in the Bahá’í Writings,” does not en-
> seems to me that epistemological rel-      tail any monism or pantheism when
> ativism is not plausible, in any strong    read in context. Bahá’u’lláh simply
> formulation, vis-à-vis Bahá’u’lláh’s       affirms in that passage that God alone
> teachings. This is because definite and    exists necessarily, while other things
> intrinsically metaphysical and onto-       exist contingently and conditionally,
> logical claims, open to human knowl-       by asserting that essential or absolute
> edge—such as the existence of God,         existence is not preceded by a cause,
> His transcendent reality, the station      and that such existence is limited to
> of Bahá’u’lláh as the Manifestation        God (Majmúʻiy-i-Alváḥ-i-Mubárakih
> of God, the immortality of the human       165). This statement from Bahá’u’lláh,
> soul, the reality of objective moral ob-   therefore, actually confirms the tran-
> ligation, and many others—are essen-       scendence and ontological distinction
> tial, even foundational, to the Bahá’í     of God from a creation that exists con-
> Faith, and consistently stated as true     tingently, and it is not at all a monist
> without qualification. In addition, it     position differing from Bahá’u’lláh’s
> likewise seems to me that the thesis of    other statements.
> epistemological relativism is supported       Consequently, and more generally,
> by underemphasizing the remarkable         what is presented as two contrasting
> conceptual consistency, over a life-       positions in Bahá’u’lláh’s writings,
> long ministry, of Bahá’u’lláh’s writ-      “theism” and “monism,” are in fact one
> ings, and by overemphasizing apparent      consistent position, variously described
> disparities in them, which can be rather   and elaborated: God, even as Avicen-
> easily resolved, or even disappear, with   na logically deduced and Bahá’u’lláh
> reference to the evident metaphysical      repeatedly affirms, is the Necessar-
> content of His explicit statements on      ily Existent and thus exists without a
> the nature of God.                         cause or on any condition, whereas all
> As a case in point, we may con-         other things are contingently existent
> sider Momen’s suggestion that some         and thus depend on God ceaselessly
> of Bahá’u’lláh’s statements, such as       as their ultimate cause. Shoghi Effendi
> “absolute existence is strictly confined   expresses this metaphysical doctrine of
> to God” (Gleanings 157; Majmúʻiy-i-        Bahá’u’lláh—God’s absolute transcen-
> Alváḥ-i-Mubárakih 165) are monis-          dence and ontological distinction—
> tic or pantheistic, and substantively      succinctly when he writes:
> differ from other statements from
> Bahá’u’lláh that support what the ar-        So crude and fantastic a theory of
> ticle calls the “theistic view of God,”      Divine incarnation is as removed
> which holds that God completely tran-        from, and incompatible with, the
> scends the world. This statement from        essentials of Bahá’í belief as are
> Bahá’u’lláh, which we discussed in           the no less inadmissible pantheistic
> the section “The Necessarily Existent        and anthropomorphic conceptions
> 88                  The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
> 
> of God—both of which the utter-             Who is the Eternal Truth is the one
> ances of Bahá’u’lláh emphatically           Power Who exerciseth undisputed
> repudiate and the fallacy of which          sovereignty over the world of be-
> they expose. (112–13)                       ing, Whose image is reflected in
> the mirror of the entire creation.
> Much more, of course, might be said to        All existence is dependent upon
> do justice to the arguments in “The God       Him, and from Him is derived
> of Bahá’u’lláh.” In closing, however, it      the source of the sustenance of
> should only be noted that, to the de-         all things. This is what is meant
> gree that there are explicit and implicit     by Divine unity; this is its funda-
> metaphysical principles in the writings       mental principle. (Gleanings 166;
> of Bahá’u’lláh and of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá,           Iqtidárát 158)
> we may regard Avicenna as an import-
> ant ally in approaching the Baháʼí cor-                 W        C
> pus as scholars determined to discover
> and understand the precise nature of        ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. Khiṭábát. Bahá’í-Ver-
> Their teachings on the nature of reality.            lag, 1927. 2 vols.
> It remains for future studies to illu-   ———. Min Makátíb ʻAbd al-Baháʼ.
> mine further what positions of past phi-             Editora Baháʼí Brasil, 1982.
> losophers are affirmed by Bahá’u’lláh,        ———. Muntakhabátí az Makátíb-i-
> and how the philosophical tradition                  Ḥaḍrat-i-‘Abdu’l-Bahá, vol.
> of classical theism can be used to ex-               1. US Bahá’í Publishing Trust,
> plicate, articulate, defend, and clar-               1979.
> ify the metaphysics and theology of         ———. An-Núr al-Abhá fí Mufávaḍát
> Bahá’u’lláh. We may, nevertheless,                   ‘Abd al-Bahá. Mir’át Publica-
> remain confident in the explicit content             tions, 1998.
> of Bahá’u’lláh’s unequivocal testimo-       ———. Selections from the Writ-
> ny to the existence, transcendence, sin-             ings of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. Bahá’í
> gleness, and unity of the self-subsistent            World Centre, 1982.
> and infinite God, on Whom all things        ———. Some Answered Questions.
> ceaselessly depend, from Whom they                   Bahá’í World Centre, 2014.
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> George Ronald Publishers,
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> measurably exalted above, all cre-                 tory. Yale UP, 2017.
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> — *Baha'u'llah and the God of Avicenna (Used by permission of the curator)*