# Muhammad Musaddiq and the Baha'is

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> Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Bahram Choubine, Muhammad Musaddiq and the Baha'is, bahai-library.com.
> ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
> 
> Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq
> and the Baha’is
> 
> By
> Bahram Choubine
> Table of Contents
> 
> Foreword
> 
> Preface
> 
> Acknowledgments
> 
> Part 1: Dr. Musaddiq and the Baha’is
> 
> Introduction: Iran and the Cold War
> 
> Chapters
> 1. The Crime
> 2. Government Reaction
> 3. The American Baha’is
> 4. The Military Tribunal
> 5. The Trial and the Verdict
> 
> Appendices
> 1. Sources for Studying Dr. Musaddiq
> 2. Primary Sources on the Abarqu Incident
> 3. British Support for Shi‘i Clerics
> 4. The Killing of Dr. Berjis
> 5. Defense of Dr. Musaddiq at the Tribunal
> 6. The Role of Ayatu’llah Burujirdi
> 7. Fada’iyan Islam
> 8. Appeals to the Shah and Clerics
> 9. Five Historical Documents
> 10. Eyewitness Accounts
> 
> Part 2: Suppression of the Baha’is of Iran in 1955
> 
> About the Author
> 
> Select Bibliography
> 
> Foreword
> This monograph consists of English translations of two research essays by Bahram
> Choubine.1 The first is Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq and the Baha’is, originally published in Persian
> by Sherkat Ketab in 2009. This learned article has been translated at the request of the
> author and the publisher and is presented below in an expanded form with additional
> annotations. The second translated essay by Bahram Choubine is entitled, “Suppression of
> the Baha’is of Iran in 1955.” Both articles have been translated and annotated by Ahang
> Rabbani and are briefly introduced below before their full translation is provided.2
> 
> A Few Words about Dr. Musaddiq and the Baha’is
> The Baha’i community has had a presence in Yazd and its surrounding towns from the time
> of Baha’u’llah. By 1903, the Baha’i community of Iran had experienced nearly a half-century
> of relative peace. During this period the community had changed its character from a
> militant messianic Babi community, to a peace-loving, ethically bound, progressive-minded
> Baha’i community that had grown considerably in numerical strength and geographic spread.
> Throughout this interval, however, Baha’is continued to be periodically harassed and
> occasionally a few were killed by their opponents, often as an excuse for political ambitions,
> but no large-scale persecution took place. This pattern changed drastically in the summer of
> 1903, when a pogrom was unleashed against the community in Yazd and its surrounding
> regions, resulting in the murder of several hundreds of defenseless Baha’is.3 Even though
> this incident was not spread across the nation, it may well be regarded as the first notable
> collusion of the local and state authorities with the ecclesiastical establishment in an attempt
> to bring about total eradication of the Baha’i community.
> After that incident, most of the Baha’is of this region moved to other regions—notably
> to the newly founded town of Ishqabad in Turkmenistan—while a few returned home to
> rebuild their lives and businesses. Gradually, the community gained strength and
> reestablished its activities, though always under the watchful eye of the fanatical Shi‘i clergy.
> In the nearby small town of Abarqu, however, there were no Baha’is until the summer of
> 1949, when a retired Baha’i by the name of ‘Abbas-‘Ali Purmihdi settled there. He had been
> an employee of the postal service and delivered mail and packages from Yazd to Abarqu; as
> such, he knew many of the inhabitants of this town.
> A few months later, on January 3, 1950, a 50-year-old Muslim woman by the name of
> Sughra and her five children were brutally murdered one night. What followed had profound
> implications for the Baha’is of that region, and indeed the entire country, and involved the
> 
> 1 It should be noted that Bahram Choubine has never been a member of or affiliated with the Baha’i
> 
> community. He has, however, on numerous occasions spoken strongly in support of the human rights of
> Baha’is in Iran and written extensively about the beleaguered religious minorities of that country. His
> collaborator, Ahang Rabbani, is a member of the Baha’i community and has authored numerous books and
> research articles on the history and teachings of the Baha’i faith. Some of his publications can be accessed at
> http://ahang.rabbani.googlepages.com/.
> 2 Choubine, Dr Mohammad Mossadegh & Bahaian.
> 3 In 1903, in an effort to engage Western countries in defense of the Baha’is of Iran, ‘Abdu’l-Baha wrote a
> 
> treatise about the tragic events of that summer, a translation of which is available at Rabbani, “‘Abdu’l-Baha’s
> Proclamation on the Persecution of Baha’is in 1903.”
> 
> administration of Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq (May 19, 1882–March 5, 1967), the nationalistic
> prime minister from April 28, 1951 to August 19, 1953 (except for a brief period July 17–20,
> 1952).
> Discussion of the history of this event and an analysis of documents pertaining to it are
> the subject of Dr. Choubine’s first essay appearing in this monograph. This essay was
> completed in March 2009 and published in Persian the summer of the same year. However,
> to aid the reader, it may be beneficial to outline the indisputable facts of this incident:
> 
> •   During the night of January 3, 1950, a Muslim woman named Sughra and her five
> children were brutally killed in Abarqu in their own home;
> •   All evidence suggested that the murderers were three men who perpetrated this
> crime at the instigation of Isfandiyar Salari, an influential landlord of this town.
> Media outlets, including the nationwide Dad newspaper, stated the same;
> •   Arrival of an inspector from Yazd by the name of Sadiqi changed the course of the
> investigation. He selected Sergeant Khakpur—a close friend and an associate of
> Salari—to investigate and prepare the police file;
> •   Khakpur initially arrested several innocent men and tried to place the blame on them;
> •   He then went to Yazd and upon returning claimed that Baha’is had had a hand in
> this murder;
> •   Several Baha’is found in nearby villages were arrested;
> •   The entire nine-member Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Yazd was arrested as
> well;
> •   Widespread anti-Baha’ism engulfed the region, resulting in the pillage of many Baha’i
> homes and causing dozens of Baha’is to become homeless;
> •   The involvement of influential ‘ulama in directing the events was evident;
> •   Recognizing that the events were orchestrated by the Shi‘i clerical establishment to
> undermine his authority, Prime Minister Razmara ordered that the Baha’i complaints
> be disregarded, so that he would not be charged as a Baha’i sympathizer by the
> clerics;
> •   At every stage of the investigation, the initial inspectors who had reported the
> charges against the Baha’is as baseless were dismissed and replaced with fanatical
> judgments;
> •   The government changed, and Dr. Musaddiq assumed premiership;
> •   When Dr. Musaddiq was in the United States, the American Baha’is appealed to him
> for the administration of justice and protection of religious minorities; despite his
> promise to do so, Dr. Musaddiq was unable to deliver;
> •   The highest criminal court in Iran tried the case in 1952 and again in 1954, and
> twelve Baha’i and three Muslim defendants were sentenced to various terms of
> incarceration. An innocent Muslim, on the false charge of being involved with the
> murders and of being a Baha’i, was executed.
> 
> This incident thus aptly demonstrates the nature of anti-Baha’ism in Iran when the state and
> the clerical establishment colluded against the Baha’i community and serves as a microcosm
> for understanding the dynamics of social relations concerning the Baha’is in that land.
> Throughout the entire twentieth-century, every opportunity has been seized upon by the
> fanatical clergy, at times with the alliance of the authorities, to falsely blame misfortunes and
> 
> crimes upon beleaguered Baha’is, who have remained completely defenseless in protecting
> themselves by any appeal to the law. In a number of instances, most notably in 1950s, and
> more recently during the Islamic Republic, the authorities have used this religious minority
> group as a means of distracting public opinion away from real problems confronting the
> nation.
> 
> Suppression of the Baha’is of Iran in 1955
> In introducing ‘Ali Dashti’s seminal work, 23 Sal [23 years], Bahram Choubine has penned
> an enlightening essay that places the events of twentieth-century Iran in their fuller
> perspective. This essay has been made available on the Internet.4
> More recently, the erudite author has considerably expanded this essay and included
> more analysis and documentation, offering it as a preface to Dashti’s 23 Sal, distributed by
> Alburz Publishing, in Frankfurt, Germany. A section of this expanded essay (pages 34–42),
> appearing under the heading, “Sarkub Baha’iyan” [The suppression of the Baha’is], is
> provided below in translation.
> 
> Technical Details
> Footnotes by the author are marked (BC). Remaining footnotes are by the translator.
> Clarifying remarks in square brackets […] are by the translator. Subheadings have been
> added in the translation to provide clarity and assist the reader’s understanding. Most names
> and Persian terms have been transliterated in accordance with academic standards, except
> some commonly recognized names, such as Khomeini, which have been written in their
> popular rendering.
> 
> 4 See for example:
> 
> http://www.jamali.info/minorities/index.php?page=111206_A1;
> http://www.negah.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=382&Itemid=15;
> http://www.cyrusnews.com/news/fa/?mi=2&ni=17649.
> 
> Preface
> Aequum et bonum est lex legum.
> [What is good and equal, is the law of laws.]
> 
> Events during the past three decades have drawn attention to the continued existence of an
> important Baha’i community in Iran—perhaps the largest minority group of that country
> and most likely the largest non-Muslim body of people in the Middle East—the plight of
> which under the Islamic Republic has provoked widespread comment in the world’s press,
> merited attention and action in the United Nations and its various international agencies, and
> drawn condemnation in a number of national parliaments.
> Since the Islamic Revolution, the activities of the Baha’i community of Iran have been
> severely curtailed. Physical, psychological, legal, social, and economic persecution of the
> community has been relentless, nationwide, malicious, and closely coordinated by the state
> and clerical establishment. Several hundreds of its membership, including much of its
> leadership, have been put to death, some by formal execution, others as a result of mob
> violence; hundreds, perhaps thousands, of others have been imprisoned—many of these
> have been tortured, often with the aim of extracting a denial of faith, and the vast majority
> have been deprived of access to legal representation; properties owned by Baha’is, both
> communal and personal, have been seized, looted, and destroyed; holy places and cemeteries
> of the community have been desecrated and demolished; assets of Baha’i companies have
> been confiscated and their operations halted; a large percentage of adherents have been
> dismissed from private and public employment, and none have been permitted to work in
> governmental agencies or educational sectors; Baha’i pensioners have been barred from
> collecting retirement funds; members of the faith-community have been disallowed access to
> public health facilities; Baha’i children have been subjected to abuse at schools and Baha’i
> youth denied access to institutions of higher education; the Baha’is in particular, and
> minority groups in general, have been made the target of a systematic campaign of lies and
> slander and libel by the national media, such as the infamous Kayhan newspaper, and the
> subject of countless polemics and anti-Baha’i seminars; Baha’i administrative bodies have
> been dismantled and much of their membership incarcerated; Baha’i publications of all
> forms have been seized and the Baha’i residents targeted for regular raids by the agents of
> the Ministry of Intelligence. Perhaps most grievously, tens of thousands of Baha’is—maybe
> more—have been forced to leave their native land, mostly without any of their possessions,
> and to seek a new life in diaspora.
> The intense persecution of the last thirty years did not occur in a vacuum. Behind it lies a
> history of decades of continual harassment and discrimination against the beleaguered
> Baha’is of Iran. Perhaps to better understand the matrix within which these events—and also
> the events of 1950–54, which are the subject of this monograph—occurred, it would help to
> briefly survey the history of this community.
> 
> Historical Background
> The Babi movement, a precursor to the Baha’i faith, began in 1844 when a young merchant
> in Shiraz by the name of Siyyid ‘Ali-Muhammad proclaimed that he was “the Bab” [the
> Gate], the personification of the much-anticipated hidden Twelfth Imam, a Messiah-like
> 
> figure whose appearance had been expected by Shi‘i Muslims for exactly one thousand years.
> The Bab further claimed that his appearance was to prepare the way for the advent of
> another prophet, whom he styled “Him Whom God shall make manifest,” whose teachings
> would establish unity, peace, and order on earth.5
> In short time, the Bab’s proposed reforms attracted many followers, but the embryonic
> community soon met with intense hostility from the social élites of the nation—in particular
> the Shi‘i clerical establishment.6 The Bab’s followers were organized and actively pressed
> their program forward, and in several instances they engaged in armed clashes with
> government forces.7 Over the next several years, thousands of Babis were imprisoned,
> tortured in public, and eventually murdered on the order of religious and political
> authorities.8
> The Bab was imprisoned and eventually executed on July 9, 1850. Suppression of the
> Babi movement often precipitated as a result of collusion between the clergy and the
> political authorities. The former opposed the new faith on religious grounds, while the latter
> believed that the Babi reforms were a threat to the security of the state. This latter belief was
> considered further confirmed by an assassination attempt on Nasiri’d-Din Shah following
> the Bab’s execution. The failed attempt on the Shah’s life provoked a renewed assault on the
> Babi community. Abrahamian notes that the Babi prisoners were “paraded in chains through
> Tehran, given a final opportunity to recant, and then portioned out for execution to various
> groups—to the royal family, the Qajar tribe, the clergy, the ministries, the military, the
> merchants, and the bazaar guilds.…Some were blinded before being shot; others were
> stabbed repeatedly, then decapitated; yet others were beaten mercilessly before being
> strangled.”9 In an article dated November 16, 1852, the New York Times reports that
> “upwards of 400 Babis were put to death in Tehran, as accomplices in the recent attempt
> against the life of the Shah….The unhappy sufferers were all tortured in the most cruel
> manner.”10
> In the midst of this fiery ordeal, and deep in the Siyah-Chal dungeon of Tehran, a young
> nobleman by the name of Mirza Husayn-‘Ali, and known to history as Baha’u’llah [the Glory
> of God], who had been wrongly accused of being party to the assassination attempt,
> discovered that he was the fulfillment of the promised “Him Whom God shall make
> manifest.” After release from prison in 1852, Baha’u’llah spent much of his subsequent life
> 
> 5 For an academic discussion of the Babi religion, see Amanat, Resurrection and Renewal; pp. 375–77 contain
> 
> discussions of the Bab’s prophecies about the next prophetic figure.
> 6 For instances of hostilities towards the Bab during the early years of his ministry, see Afnan, The Genesis of the
> 
> Babi–Baha’i Faiths in Shiraz and Fars.
> 7 See Zarandi, The Dawn-Breakers: Nabil’s Narrative of the Early Days of the Baha’i Revelation, pp. 324–414, 465–95,
> 
> and 527–80. For a detailed discussion of one such incident, see Rabbani, The Babis of Nayriz: History and
> Documents.
> 8 See Amanat, Resurrection and Renewal, pp. 401 and 405. Cole, Modernity and the Millennium, p. 26, describes “a
> 
> vicious pogrom against real and suspected Babis inside Iran, with much public torture of those accused,
> resulting in several thousand deaths,” and asserts that “the truly gruesome aspect of church-state entanglement
> was demonstrated in the joint efforts of officials and clergy to invent ever more ingenious ways of inflicting
> pain on those branded heretics.”
> 9 Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran, pp. 20–21. As a child, ‘Abdu’l-
> 
> Baha was an eyewitness to these Babi killings and has recorded some of his observations; see Mu’ayyad, Eight
> Years near ‘Abdu’l-Baha.
> 10 Wagner, “Babi Attempt on the Life of the Shah, 1852: Coverage in the New York Times.”
> 
> in exile and captivity until his death in 1892, however, the religion he founded and headed
> until his death continued to spread and grow into a worldwide community.
> The claim advanced by the Bab and Baha’u’llah to be messengers of God is the principal
> reason why the Baha’i faith is considered to be heretical by Muslims, who believe the
> Prophet Muhammad to be the final prophet that will ever be sent by God. This has
> crystallized into a widely held belief that Baha’is are “public enemies who must be controlled,
> punished or…forcibly reconverted.”11 Moreover, the interpretation of Shi‘i law practiced in
> Iran (based on the Qur’anic teachings) asserts that conversion from Islam into another
> faith—that is, apostasy—is an offense punishable by death. This prohibition is also used to
> justify punishment of individuals who, under duress, agree to convert to Islam, but
> subsequently resume the practice of their own faith. Influenced by the Shi‘i clergy and fueled
> by nationalism, Iranians generally view the global message of the Baha’i faith as an alien,
> even pro-Western, interference in Iran.12
> During its entire history, the Baha’i community of Iran has faced repeated cycles of
> persecution, varying in intensity. Since its inception, the Baha’is of Iran have not enjoyed any
> measure of liberty to practice their religion and have suffered concentrated, widespread
> economic and social exclusion. Great numbers of its members have been subjected to
> execution, thousands have suffered arbitrary imprisonment, and many smaller Baha’i
> communities of that country have experienced periodic pogroms. Another recurring aspect
> of anti-Baha’i campaigns has been the confiscation and destruction of Baha’i property,
> including holy sites, cemeteries, personal property, and community institutions. In Shiraz, the
> house occupied by the Bab, one of the Baha’i community’s most sacred religious icons and a
> site of obligatory pilgrimage for future Baha’is, was attacked on several occasions and was
> finally totally demolished in 1979 by the country’s Islamic Republic. All these waves of
> persecution have been carried out with the support of national judicial, administrative, and
> law-enforcement systems.
> The Baha’i community has suffered most severely when the clerical influence in national
> affairs has been strongest. The 1950s witnessed organized anti-Baha’i campaigns resulting in
> mob violence, destruction of religious sites, and the formation of private anti-Baha’i
> organizations, approved and assisted by senior civil, military, and religious leadership figures.
> The propaganda used to cultivate and justify social persecution created negative stereotypes
> that continue to have repercussions to the present day. Clerics who gained an influential
> public voice during these campaigns later attained powerful positions in the post-1979
> Islamic Republic.
> 
> 11 MacEoin, “The Baha’is of Iran: The Roots of Controversy,” p. 77.
> 12 See MacEoin, A People Apart, for a detailed discussion of perceived objections to the Baha’i movement.
> 
> Acknowledgements
> 
> The present author wishes to acknowledge the friendship and careful research and
> translation work of Dr. Ahang Rabbani, who has collaborated with me on producing this
> monograph, as well as other projects. Dr. Rabbani not only prepared the present English
> rendering of this study at my request but also contributed to the considerable expansion of
> this study since its original Persian printing.
> Gilbert Hakim and Liliane Saberin are thanked for graciously providing an opportunity
> for this translation to be prepared. The National Baha’i Archives staff at the United States
> Baha’i National Center kindly provided a number of important documents cited in this
> research. Phillip Tussing, Sen McGlinn and Christine Zerbinis are thanked most sincerely for
> reading the English monograph and kindly suggesting a number of important improvements.
> 
> Bahram Choubine, PhD
> April 2010
> 
> Part 1
> Dr. Musaddiq and the Baha’is
> 
> Introduction:
> Iran and the Cold War
> 
> Preamble
> The lives of Baha’is in Iran are constantly under threat and filled with interminable dangers.
> Theirs is an unceasing struggle to achieve human rights and legitimate recognition. Let us lift
> our vision to a new perspective of liberty and justice based on the code of law.
> The period spanning from 1941 to August 19, 1953 was filled with days of mystery and
> secrets in modern Iranian history. By the late 1930s, Reza Shah had become increasingly
> despotic and disliked. Parliament assented to his decrees, the free press was suppressed, and
> the swift incarceration of political leaders like Dr. Musaddiq and the murder of others like
> Taymurtash and Davar halted the formation of any democratic process. The situation
> continued to worsen, and in August 1941, Britain and the Soviet Union occupied Iran by a
> massive assault, subsequently forcing Reza Shah to abdicate in favor of his son, Muhammad-
> Reza Shah. In 1951, under the leadership of the nationalist movement of Dr. Muhammad
> Musaddiq, the Iranian parliament unanimously voted to nationalize the oil industry. This
> shut out the immensely profitable Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), which was a pillar of
> Britain’s economy and political influence in the region. A month after that vote, Musaddiq
> came to power as the prime minister, committed to reestablishing democracy and
> constitutional monarchy, and to nationalizing the entire Iranian petroleum industry. From
> the start he erroneously believed that the Americans, who had no apparent stake in AIOC,
> would support his nationalization plan. He was buoyed in this hope by Henry Grady, the
> American ambassador to Iran. However, during these events, the Americans supported the
> British, and, fearing that the Communists with the help of the Soviets were poised to
> overthrow the government, they decided to remove Musaddiq. In late 1952, the British
> government invited Kermit Roosevelt of the United States Central Intelligence Agency
> (CIA) to London and proposed that they cooperate under the code name “Operation Ajax”
> to bring down Musaddiq. Under the direction of the CIA and the British Secret Intelligence
> Service, a covert operation took place to depose Musaddiq with the help of military forces
> loyal to the Shah. Despite high-level coordination and planning, the coup initially failed,
> causing the Shah to flee first to Baghdad, then to Rome. After a brief exile in Italy, the Shah
> returned to Iran, this time through a successful second attempt at a coup on August 19,
> 1953. The deposed Musaddiq was arrested, given a show trial, and sentenced to solitary
> confinement for three years in a military prison, followed by house arrest for life in his estate
> at Ahmadabad, where he is now buried. General Fadlu’llah Zahidi was installed to succeed
> Prime Minister Musaddiq, and he quickly reversed most of reforms brought about during the
> Musaddiq era.
> The purpose of this essay, however, is not to investigate all aspects of this period; it only
> aims to offer short glimpses and brief insights into the political thoughts of Dr. Muhammad
> 
> Musaddiq, Iran’s champion of the nationalist movement. This monograph is not written for
> impatient individuals. In this brief essay, I am a fellow-traveler of Confucius, who said, “I
> can never teach the person who tries with all his might not to understand anything” and
> when he admonished us not to “judge historical events by our present standards.”
> Therefore, I invite the reader to patience and forbearance, so in this way we can find our way
> to knowledge and a station worthy of our humanity.13
> 
> Systematic Anti-Baha’ism in Contemporary Iran
> In September 1941, Iran fell under the military occupation of the Allied forces of the Soviet
> Union, Britain, and the United States. From the time Hitler came to power in Germany and
> World War II commenced, tendencies favoring Hitler’s ideas and extreme nationalism could
> be seen in Iran. Although Iran clearly and unambiguously declared her neutrality on two
> separate occasions, this declaration did not save Iran, nor did it prevent her from being
> occupied by Allied forces. After Hitler’s war machine attacked the Soviet Union in June
> 1941, Stalin’s Red Army, along with the British and American forces, invaded Iran in
> accordance with Article 6 of the 1921 treaty between Iran and the Soviet Union, which gave
> the latter the right to enter Iran in the event of threats from Iran.
> In September 1941, Reza Shah was forced to abdicate his throne in favor of his son
> Muhammad-Reza Pahlavi and was exiled to Mauritius, an island nation off East Africa that
> was one of the British colonies.14 In truth, Muhammad-Reza Shah came to power through
> the consent of the British and the farsightedness of Muhammad-‘Ali Furughi.15
> Iran’s invasion and occupation by foreign governments, along with the collapse of her
> military, police, and security apparatus, coupled with extremely poor economic conditions
> brought about to a large measure by the occupying forces, in addition to constant hate
> incitement and profit-mongering interference by the Allied regimes, created favorable
> conditions for the orthodox elements and those aligned with foreigners to come to power.
> Moreover, powerful entities, in particular the British and Americans, began to compete
> with one another over the region’s natural resources, especially the oil reserves in Iran and
> the Middle East. Therefore, they endeavored to extend their political, military, and economic
> spheres of influence in Iran.
> Naturally, the activities of the British and American governments in Iran and the Middle
> East did not escape the notice of Stalin, the autocrat of the Union of Soviet Socialist
> Republics (USSR). Therefore, he began to pursue the Soviet Union’s strategic objectives
> through Iran’s Tudeh [Communist] Party—a Party he had a significant role in creating—in
> the hope that Iran would not turn into a base against the interests of the Soviet Union.
> In this confused but relatively free atmosphere, many parties, organizations, and groups
> were formed in Iran with the support of the Soviet Union and England, and a little later with
> backing from the United States, and people gained certain individual and societal liberties.
> Political prisoners were freed. Once again, newspapers, political parties, and religious
> 
> 13 See appendix 1. (BC)
> 14 See Mahdavi, Tarikh Ravabit Khariji Iran: Az Ibtida-yi Duran Safaviyih ta Payan Jang Duvvum Jahani, chapter 9, pp.
> 
> 375–453. (BC)
> 15 Better known by the title Zika’u’l-Mulk, he was a learned prime minister during the reign of Reza Shah, who
> 
> wrote several important publications in the field of philosophy. It is said that he was a leading Babi during his
> generation.
> 
> organizations, which during the reign of Reza Shah had gone underground into a dark social
> substratum, reemerged and gained much strength.
> The mullas themselves confess that the departure of Reza Shah and the beginning of the
> Cold War presented them with their most favorable historical juncture: “With Reza Khan
> gone, the religious orthodoxy was more pleased than others and beat the drum of joy.
> During this entire period of the suppression of intellectual proclivities, the clerics had kept
> silent too. But now with the departure of Reza Khan, they were like doves freed from their
> cage and were winging their flight.”16
> However, Ahmad Kasravi (1890–1946), the noted linguist, historian, and brave critic of
> the Shi‘i sect and of the corrupt clerical apparatus, had a different view: “Those [i.e., the
> mullas] who had changed their clothing, came back to the ‘aba and turban. And those who
> had gone into hiding in corners, came out into the open, and once again started to battle
> with secular law, knowledge and all things good. Once again, young seminarians, bred on
> begging and indolence, appeared on the field.”17
> With the conclusion of World War II, Stalin used the same Article 6 of the 1921
> agreement as a pretext not to remove his Red Army from Iran. With the deceitful support of
> the Democratic Party in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, he further fueled insecurities and created
> disturbances in northern Iran. However, England and the United States well remembered
> what they had witnessed in the Balkans and commenced to openly and strongly oppose the
> designs of the Soviet Union; they even had to threaten atomic attack upon that country. This
> was reckoned as the first encounter and reaction by the West against the Soviet Union
> during the Cold War.
> Eventually, with the departure of the Red Army from Iran and the disgraceful defeat of
> the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in 1946, relative peace and tranquility was
> established in Iran. However, the Cold War had commenced; Iran, with its 2,700-kilometer
> border with the Soviet Union, became one of the unexpected opponents of that country and
> a major pillar of the Cold War in the Middle East, and indeed in the entire world.
> The Soviet Union had emerged from World War II weak, but victorious thanks to the
> help of the United States and England. Nevertheless, from the perspective of revolutionaries
> in those days, that country was considered to be the center of global socialism and was seen
> as if it had a magical luster.
> The aim of the Cold War in the West, and also in the Middle East, particularly in Iran,
> was to oppose the spread of Communist-Marxist revolutionary ideas. Strengthening Islam by
> promoting religious proclivities and superstitions was one of the most fundamental
> instruments in waging the Cold War. This was a precious gift for the Shi‘i clerical
> establishment, which in the past had had an intimate and cozy relationship with the British
> imperialist regime. The only difference was that now, with the arrival of the United States on
> Iran’s political scene, Shi‘i clerics had gained even more power and influence. From this
> time, the clerical hierarchy became the closest ally and the most unified and cohesive support
> for the Cold War and the powers of global imperialism. Through collaboration with foreign
> governments, the entire structure of [Shi‘i] religiosity and the clerical establishment was
> placed at the service of anti-nationalistic policies and opposition to the principles of
> constitutional rule in the country. Once again, the clerics regained their traditional position,
> which they had lost with the victory of Iran’s Constitutional Revolt [1905–11] and the
> 
> 16 Ja‘farian, Jaryanha va Sazmanhayi Mazhabi-Siyasi Iran (1941–1979), p. 23. (BC)
> 17 Kasravi, Dadgah, p. 55. (BC)
> 
> subsequent wise and sensible policies of Reza Shah that had prevented mullas from
> interfering in affairs of state.
> The Allied forces’ blueprint and design for winning the Cold War in Iran, which
> stemmed from consultation and discussion with leading clerics and governmental figures,
> was based on three principal pillars:
> 
> 1. Opposition and conflict with Iran’s Tudeh Party and, in general, combating any
> revolutionary thought, change, or innovation that had socialist or communist underpinning;
> 2. Opposition and a campaign against the Baha’is because through their belief in the
> appearance of the Lord of the Age and the manifestation of Siyyid-i Bab in 1844, and his
> claim to Mahdaviyyat [the station of being the Mahdi, the “Rightly Guided One” of Islam],
> they have proclaimed that the appearance and resurrection of the Mahdi [in the future] is
> null and void; moreover, they do not believe at all in the role of clerics in politics and their
> influence on people’s lives. The spiritual teachings and the administration of this newly
> founded religion were completely at odds with traditional Islam and naturally opposed to the
> clerical hierarchy, the involvement of the ‘ulama in politics, and their participation in the
> propagation of the Cold War. This point was well known and understood by the Shi‘i
> ecclesiastics and clearly stated in their writings after the Islamic Revolution.
> 3. Opposition and protestation against Kasravi and his anti-Shi‘i ideas, and against the
> somewhat anti-Islamic tendencies of Kasravi and his followers. Kasravi’s ideas had directly
> targeted the intellectual foundation of the supporters of the Cold War—that is, the clerics
> and Islamist members of government—and there was no other remedy but to destroy
> Kasravi himself and his notions. For this reason, his assassination by Fada’iyan Islam was
> greatly welcomed and cheered by both the government and the clerics. The message of
> Kasravi and the influence of his following were limited to Iran. However, the Baha’i faith
> had members throughout the entire world, having long since transcended Iran’s geographical
> boundaries, and therefore not all of its members were within the reach of the mullas.
> Furthermore, people other than Iranians had also discovered this religion and had converted
> to it.
> 
> After the passing of Ayatu’llah Aqa Siyyid Abu’l-Hasan Isfahani and the sudden death of his
> successor, Ayatu’llah Haji Aqa Husayn Qumi in Najaf [in Iraq], the marja‘iyat [leadership] of
> Shi‘i Islam once again returned to Iran. Ayatu’llah Haji Aqa Husayn Burujirdi became the
> marja‘ [source of emulation] and assumed the administration of the newly established
> seminary in Qum. For nine years, he studied and was a student of Akhund Mulla Kazim
> Khurasani, and he had become thoroughly familiar with all the details of political Islamism.
> Akhund Mulla Kazim Khurasani had intimate and profitable ties with Britain’s imperialistic
> regime.18 Memoirs and documents published after the Revolution clearly demonstrate that
> Ayatu’llah Burujirdi and the clerical establishment were shrewdly pursuing the recovery and
> strengthening of their reactionary powers. They illegally interfered in all aspects of the
> country’s administration and showed their enmity towards Iran’s constitution and laws.
> Beneath the same cloak of religious leadership and clericalism, the terrorist organization
> Jam‘iyat Fada’iyan Islam [the Society of the Devotees of Islam] commenced operation under
> the guidance of a young seminarian who had not benefited from Islamic knowledge, but who
> was a religious fanatic beyond all sanity.19 The founding of the terrorist organization Jam‘iyat
> Fada’iyan Islam under the leadership of Siyyid Mujtaba Mirlawhi, known as Navvab Safavi,
> 
> 18 See appendix 3. (BC)
> 19 See appendix 7.
> 
> and a number of other large or small religious organizations, precipitated a decade of
> bloodshed and persistent insecurity. Ultimately, it resulted in an open and purposeful
> disregard for the constitutional law of the country, and various administrations—all based on
> worn-out ideas and connected to imperialism—came and went one after another, without
> any regard for the calamity that they were causing for the people of Iran.
> In Tehran and other towns, widespread attacks began on the offices and centers of the
> Tudeh Party, of the Baha’is, and of Ahmad Kasravi. In full daylight and in front of police
> officers and security agents, Ahmad Kasravi, that fearless and headstrong critic of the Shi‘i
> sect, and his secretary Haddadpur were assassinated March 11, 1946 in the national Palace of
> Justice by terrorist members of Fada’iyan Islam in the most brutal manner. This first murder
> over religious differences during the Cold War and inside Iran’s principal judicial building
> was a clear warning to the Shah and to the government of [the Prime Minister] Qavamu’s-
> Saltanih, who considered themselves the defenders of Iran’s constitutional law. However,
> this momentous warning went unheeded by all those serving in the government. Siyyid
> Husayn Imami, the murderer of Kasravi and his secretary, was freed from prison
> accompanied by the cries of Allah’u’Akbar [“God is Great”]—a liberty which emboldened
> and encouraged the instigators and masterminds of this bloody terror.
> From this point onward, the Shi‘i leadership and the clerical establishment, along with
> the political leaders of Iran, became partners in all the bloodshed and ensuing political,
> social, and economic instability and chaos. Because of the deep-rooted religious and
> superstitious attitude of Iranian society, the financial and moral support of the clerical
> establishment, and the shortsighted and reckless policies of various governments after World
> War II, the Jam‘iyat Fada’iyan Islam gained unprecedented influence.
> There was no limit or bounds on the creation of religious-political groups and societies in
> the capital [Tehran] or other towns. For instance, Anjuman Tablighat Islami [the Society for
> Islamic Propagation] was formed in 1942 by ‘Atau’llah Shahabpur and through the assistance
> of the Ministry of Education gained widespread support. The formation of the Ittihadih
> Muslimin [the Union of Muslims] by Haji Mihdi Saraj-Ansari and of the Jam‘ih Ta‘limat
> Islami [the Society for Islamic Teachings] by ‘Abbas-‘Ali Islami, both of which had formed
> branches throughout Iran, were other notable examples of the all-encompassing efforts of
> the mullas to participate in the Cold War and involve themselves in the government’s affairs
> and leadership. Ayatu’llah Siyyid Hasan Chahrsuqi revived the Hay’at ‘Illmiyih Isfahan [the
> Scientific League of Isfahan], which had been forgotten and disbanded for many years.
> In Shiraz, where the Babi movement began, Hizb Bardaran [the Brothers Party],
> otherwise known as Hizb Nur [the Light Party], was formed by a resolute enemy of the
> Baha’is, of Kasravi’s ideas, and of the Tudeh Party, namely, Ayatu’llah Siyyid Nuri’d-Din
> Shirazi, who collaborated with Ayatu’llah Baha’u’d-Din Mahallati in this work. Ayatu’llah
> Siyyid Nuri’d-Din Shirazi became so aggressive in pursuit of his objectives that when the
> Shah was visiting Shiraz and making a pilgrimage to Shah-Chiraq, he issued a fatwa [religious
> ruling] for the destruction of the home of Siyyid-i Bab, which for the Babis, and particularly
> for the Baha’is, was a sacred and historic site. He himself placed a chair in front of this
> spectacle and observed the attack on the house of the Bab. This incident caused a great
> uproar in Shiraz and brought about unrest in the city. Since it was feared that it would result
> in a massacre of the Baha’is, martial law was imposed over the city to ensure calm and
> order.20 Initiating a new tactic, the mullas eventually formed Nihzat Khuda-Parastan Sucialist
> 
> 20 Ja‘farian, Jaryanha va Sazmanhayi Mazhabi-Siyasi Iran (1941–1979), p. 23. (BC)
> 
> [the Movement of God-Worshipping Socialists], which was a mixture of Islamic and socialist
> ideas and concepts.
> These are but a few minor examples of a long list of extremist Islamic groups formed to
> agitate against the Tudeh Party, the Baha’i community, and every form of progressive and
> modern thought in Iran. A large number of daily newspapers, monthlies, or quarterlies, with
> either a prefix or suffix of “Islam,” were established in these same years and were published
> with the financial and moral support of the government and the clerical apparatus.
> It is noteworthy that the foundation of all these moneymaking enterprises with the cover
> of religion was to combat the Tudeh Party and “in particular to prevent the spread of the
> activities of the Baha’is and other corrupt social groups.” Openly and overtly, they spoke of
> the suppression of the Baha’is, and even of their planned massacre in Iran. In their
> publications, they repeatedly called people to support these objectives, and the unlettered
> people were provoked and instigated by them. Moreover, government officials who
> outwardly appeared constitutionalist, directly or indirectly, openly or covertly, backed their
> extremist deeds and words.
> It is astonishing that whenever the clerics were not able to achieve their immediate goals
> or wishes cloaked in Islamic piety—though in truth they were thoroughly misanthropic—
> they would criticize Muhammad-Reza Shah or political figures by accusing them of not
> following the constitutional law of the land. Whereas, based on documents published by the
> Islamic Republic itself, it is clear that it was the clerics themselves who exerted constant
> pressure to that effect on the Shah or government apparatus, even urging and encouraging
> them to disregard the constitution or overlook it altogether.
> The politics of the Cold War, which led to Europe’s and America’s supporting clerics
> against every form of ideas that were not reactionary, made religious and tribal minorities, as
> well as leftist and nationalist parties, persistent targets of abuse, harassment, and persecution
> in all Muslim countries, particularly in Iran. The instigators of these constant mistreatments
> were those who made their living from religion or who were politicians set on deceiving the
> public. This dark period was a propitious time for Shi‘i clerics to redefine the theory
> underlying their medieval ideas and to strengthen their own position with an eye to
> profiteering.
> The notion of the vilayat faqih [the guardianship of jurists] is an ill-conceived effort by
> some mullas to present the teachings of an Arab religion as logical and modern. Moreover,
> Islamic government is a dream leftover from the age of ignorance, by men whose thoughts
> are rooted in a medieval era. It is a reflection of Cold War policies, fostering unwise and
> injudicious conspiracies that were far from any farsighted policies envisioned by the
> government, political leaders, and intellectuals of Iran.
> One of the imprudent decisions of that time can be mentioned as an example. Due to
> enormous pressure from the clerical establishment, Siyyid Husayn Imami, the murderer of
> [Ahmad] Kasravi, was released without suffering any consequences for his act and in fact
> was loudly greeted by a large welcoming party. Soon after that, on November 4, 1949, he
> assassinated the Court Minister [‘Abdu’l-Husayn] Hazhir.21 Grand Ayatu’llahs Kashani,
> 
> 21 Hazhir (1899–1949) served as minister on ten occasions and eventually served as the prime minister from
> 
> June 13, 1948 to November 9, 1949. He was then appointed as the court minister, when he was assassinated as
> the consequence of a false accusation that he was a Baha’i.
> 
> Bihbahani, and others spread a report among the ignorant masses that “Hazhir was a
> Baha’i!”22
> A month after the assassination of Hazhir, during the administration of Prime Minister
> Muhammad Sa‘id Maraghih’i, the murders in Abarqu and the brutal killing of Dr. Sulayman
> Berjis, a well-regarded and deeply caring physician, took place February 3, 1950.23
> Muhammad Sa‘id Maraghih’i was the son of Mulla Shaykh Ahmad Qazizadih. He was
> appointed the prime minister twice, was the foreign minister eight times, the interior minister
> once, and for many years was a member of the parliament, an ambassador, or a minister-at-
> large. When Hazhir had been prime minister for only a few months, Muhammad Sa‘id was
> appointed in his place. During his ill-fated administration, which also lasted only a few
> months, Sa‘id resigned three times; eventually ‘Ali Mansur, who was a weak old man without
> the strength to walk and who was renowned for corruption, was appointed prime minister.
> He started office March 23, 1950, and on June 26th, that is, after three months—he resigned.
> Lieutenant-General Haji ‘Ali Razmara was then appointed as prime minister of Iran.
> Regarding the latter’s personality and manners, Dr. Baqir ‘Aqili has offered the most concise
> and complete opinion:
> 
> Razmara was a clever, hard working, serious and ambitious man.… To achieve his
> objectives, he would demonstrate great bravery and constancy. He had no regard for
> his agreements or treaties, and would sacrifice everything in order to achieve his
> end. He was able to use every incident to his own benefit.24
> 
> Razmara’s progress and advancement, whether in the military or political arena, was always
> based on secret agreements and conniving. When he was 44-years-old, during the
> premiership of Sadru’l-Ashraf and the military command of Major-General Arfa‘, Razmara
> was forced into [early retirement and] staying at home. After Sadru’l-Ashraf, the Qavamu’s-
> Saltanih became prime minister in January 1946. Immediately, Razmara was returned to
> military service by the leaders of the Tudeh Party and by Muzfar Firuz, who was accounted
> an enemy of the Shah. His return was based on a widespread rumor that he had close
> connections with the Soviet Union. Eventually, after a series of connivances, tricks, and
> schemes, and through betrayal by the Qavam and others, he became prime minister.
> 
> 22 See Mohajir, “Kard-Ajin Kardan Doctor Berjis.”
> 23 See appendix 4. (BC)
> 24 ‘Aqili, Sharh Hal Rijal Siyasi va Nizami Mu‘asir Iran, vol. 2, pp. 714–20.
> Haji ‘Ali-Razmara should not be
> confused with Brigadier-General Husayn-‘Ali Razmara, who was a learned man and who created devices such
> as a Qiblih-locator and compass for the blind, which often are erroneously attributed to Lieutenant-General
> Razmara. (BC)
> 
> Lieutenant-General Haji ‘Ali Razmara
> 
> Two significant incidents marked Razmara’s premiership. First, through trustworthy
> officers, he arranged for ten leaders of the Tudeh Party who had been incarcerated in Qasr
> Prison to escape. Through this deed, he endeared himself to the leadership of the Soviet
> Union. Second, through his opposition to the nationalization of the petroleum industry, he
> won the deep gratitude of English imperialism. It should be noted that the Tudeh Party was
> among the staunchest supporters of Razmara during his tenure as prime minister.
> We should ask, Was the news of the coup d’état against the Shah and Iran’s
> constitutional regime of that time the only rumor spread by enemies of the state? With plans
> for a coup d’état, Razmara was planning a bloody calamity. It should be a cause of much joy
> that he did not succeed. In fact, I am convinced that he was planning a military coup and the
> establishment of a military dictatorship in Iran.
> 
> Chapter 1
> The Crime
> 
> Historical Background
> On Tuesday, January 3, 1950, a heinous crime took place in the village of Robat, two
> kilometers from Abarqu. What happened in that village was that during the night, in the
> most brutal manner, Sughra, an ill-fated mother [age 50], and her three daughters, ages 15,
> 11, and 8, and her two sons, ages 14 and 6, were murdered.25
> To this day, sixty years later, the perpetrators of this murderous tragedy have not been
> brought to justice. The inheritors of such crimes and inhuman activities, after having
> established the “Government of God” in Iran, are seated upon the throne of authority, and
> in their revolutionary accounts recall these crimes in different ways and shamelessly confess
> their pride and satisfaction in having committed these deeds.26
> 
> Motive for the Murders
> Muhammad-Hasan Khan Salari, a well-known landlord in Abarqu, suddenly died while still
> relatively young. After his death, his widow, Maryam Salari, a beautiful and charming
> woman, was left with a vast estate and great wealth. With the death of her father, she
> inherited more land and affluence, but she was alone. To earn a living for her family, who
> were without a provider, Sughra became Maryam Salari’s maid.27
> Even though he was already married and had children, Isfandiyar Khan Salari, a brother
> of Muhammad-Hasan Khan, yearned after his brother’s beautiful and rich widow, who also
> happened to be his paternal cousin. He decided to marry Maryam. But she refused the
> greedy and insistent suitor, and did not heed the repeated marriage proposals and many
> efforts of her cousin, Isfandiyar Khan.
> The reason that Maryam Salari was disinclined toward her cousin was due to Hujjatu’l-
> Islam Siyyid Muhammad Qayyumi. Sughra—Maryam’s maid—was the neighbor of the
> Siyyid, who was a rawdih-khan [a teller of the story of the martyrdom of the Imam Husayn] in
> Abarqu, and Sughra was the intermediary between him and Maryam. It was rumored in
> Abarqu that at times Maryam and the preacher Siyyid, who was a tall, well-proportioned, and
> handsome young man, would secretly meet in Sughra’s modest home to engage in merry-
> making and smoking opium in the courtyard by the pool. In such a romantic atmosphere,
> the Siyyid would discard all self-restraint, and with his warm, charming, and pleasant voice,
> which until then had not found an opportunity to express its full range except in rawdih-
> khanis, he would whisper tender melodies and would sing passionately in his intoxicated
> state.
> The curiosity of the Robat villagers was so aroused that quietly and secretly they would
> go over the connected roofs. From the rooftops of Sughra’s neighbors, they witnessed the
> courtship of the widow of the Khan and Hujjatu’l-Islam Siyyid Muhammad Qayyumi, who
> 
> 25 See appendix 2. (BC)
> 26 One instance is Kayhan newspaper, January 25, 2006. In this issue, Kayhan published an article on the Abarqu
> 
> incident filled with libelous lies and slanders.
> 27 Sughra’s husband and family provider, Rida, had died some time earlier.
> 
> was a resident of Abarqu. This love story and the tale of their exploits were on all tongues in
> the town of Abarqu. Those who have lived in small towns understand well that deeds,
> sayings, and even the thoughts of every resident are well known to neighbors and are the
> currency of the town—this is a characteristic of all small communities in Iran and other
> places.
> There is no doubt that the report of these nightly merry-making and romantic activities
> by Sughra’s pool had reached the ears of the disappointed and thwarted Isfandiyar Khan
> Salari, and had caused him further anxiety and agitation. On several occasions, he had
> threatened to kill Hujjatu’l-Islam Siyyid Muhammad Qayyumi and Sughra. From what can be
> learned from the pages of the investigation and judicial files related to the murders in
> Abarqu, Qayyumi had several times taken his complaint to the police in Abarqu and Yazd,
> stating that if one day he or Sughra came to harm, then the instigator and responsible person
> was none other than Isfandiyar Khan Salari.
> Eventually, Maryam Salari consented to marriage with Hujjatu’l-Islam Siyyid Muhammad
> Qayyumi, who also already had a wife and children. Because Maryam’s family opposed this
> marriage, and the couple feared Isfandiyar Khan Salari, a large landowner and influential
> citizen of Abarqu, the couple secretly drove in Maryam’s automobile to Eqlid, which is
> located twenty-four kilometers from Abadeh.28 It was in Eqlid where they recorded their
> marriage at the town registry.
> 
> Abarqu in relation to Abadeh, Yazd, and Eqlid
> 
> 28 Abarqu is 218 kilometers from Yazd and 120 kilometers from Dehbid. It is also 72 kilometers from Abadeh.
> 
> Abarqu has approximately 20,000 inhabitants. Eqlid is on the way to Abadeh from Abarqu and is 24 kilometers
> from Abadeh. (BC)
> 
> The news of the marriage of Maryam Salari and the Hujjatu’l-Islam Siyyid Muhammad
> Qayyumi went through Abarqu like a whirlwind and reached the ears of Isfandiyar Khan
> Salari. From this moment, plans were hatched to avenge this union by taking the life of the
> ill-fated Sughra and her children, and to conspire to ascribe these murders to the Baha’is of
> Shiraz, Abadeh, Yazd, and regions around Abarqu, which naturally would lead to the
> persecution of Baha’is all across Iran. The demonic impulse of religious prejudice and anti-
> Baha’ism that resides at the core of Iranian society became a vital and powerful
> underpinning and foundation for implementation of this evil and bloody scheme—a pattern
> and mindset that lives to this very day in a most reprehensible form in Iran.
> 
> Initial Investigation
> On the same day, January 3, 1950, the report of the murder of Sughra and her children
> reached the police chief in Abarqu, Sergeant-Major Husayn Sadripur. While examining the
> crime scene and the remains of the slain, Sergeant-Major Sadripur observed that the
> murderer or murderers had not brought a weapon of any kind, but instead had used a shovel
> and hammer on the victims’ faces, particularly on the mouth, to kill Sughra and her children.
> In pursuing his investigation and the preliminary questioning, Sadripur learned that
> instruments used in the killings actually belonged to Sughra and still remained in the corner
> of the house, covered with bloodstains.
> Sergeant-Major Sadripur concluded with near certainty the reason that the entire
> household had been slain was that during their struggles the victims had probably cried and
> called out for help, and knew the identity of the killer(s). In order not to be identified and
> arrested, the murderer or murderers resorted to killing the entire household, then with
> blood-soaked hands had searched through Sughra’s meager furnishings and wrapped
> clothing, and had escaped during the dark of the night.
> It can be learned through the pages of the crime file that after the initial investigation,
> Sergeant-Major Sadripur immediately arrested three individuals: ‘Ali, who was Sughra’s son-
> in-law and the husband of Ruqiyih, Sughra’s sole surviving daughter; Ja‘far [‘Ali’s father]; and
> his brother, Ramadan. They had been at Sughra’s home well into the night of the incident,
> but, when questioned by Sadripur, had offered contradictory accounts. Also, since the crime
> had taken place at night and the instruments of the killings were found inside the house, it
> stood to reason that the three of them had committed these murders.
> It is noteworthy that after the news of the killings was disseminated and ‘Ali, Ja‘far, and
> Ramadan were arrested in Abarqu, Isfandiyar Khan Salari had fallen under greater suspicion
> for having instigated Sughra’s murder. Generally, the inhabitants of Abarqu considered him
> to be the true perpetrator of this incident.
> Dad newspaper in Tehran published by Abu’l-Hasan ‘Amidi-Nuri, who later was one of
> the ten tort lawyers representing Ruqiyih, the sole survivor of Sughra, reported the following
> under the heading, “Heinous Crime in Abarqu”:
> 
> In Abarqu, a woman and her four [sic] children were murdered in a heart-wrenching
> and brutal manner. The perpetrators of this crime were arrested through the efforts
> of Baniadam, the Governor of Yazd.
> It became known during the course of the investigation that the murderers were
> her son-in-law and his father, who committed this crime through the incitement and
> instigation of several brothers who are residents of Abarqu [i.e., the Salari brothers],
> who bore enmity towards the aforesaid woman.
> 
> From what has been learned, the brother of one of the instigators had passed
> away. He had an attractive wife and was very wealthy. One of his brothers
> [Isfandiyar Khan Salari] had wanted to wed the widow. The murdered woman
> [Sughra] had been instrumental in the marriage of this beautiful woman with a
> resident of Abarqu [namely, Hujjatu’l-Islam Siyyid Muhammad Qayyumi].
> 
> At this time, that is, on January 3, immediately after the remains were discovered,
> interrogations were conducted by Abarqu’s chief of police, Sergeant-Major Husayn Sadripur,
> his official file was prepared, and details were reported in Yazd and Tehran newspapers,
> where no allegation of the involvement of Baha’is in the murder of Sughra and her
> unfortunate five children was made. However, the scheme to involve and ascribe this bloody
> tragedy to Baha’is was already in motion.
> Following his customary practice, and uninformed of the events during the preceding
> night, a Siyyid, shortly after the murder of Sughra and her children, went by the brook near
> his house to perform his ablutions at dawn on January 3, 1950. According to the remaining
> pages of the police file from that time, that Siyyid, known as Siyyid Sabbagh, reported the
> following to Sergeant-Major Sadripur:
> 
> Very early at dawn, when the light had begun to break, I went by the brook near my
> house to perform my ablutions. Suddenly, I saw Isfandiyar Khan [Salari] coming out
> of his house, looking worried and in a hurry, and appearing to be leaving on a
> journey [out of town]. I stood up and greeted him. Isfandiyar Khan said, “Last
> night, Muhammad Shirvani, who is Sughra’s neighbor, along with his son and
> brother, Muhammad [-Hasan] Niku’i, has slain Sughra and her hapless children, and
> has escaped.”
> 
> According to this testimony, Siyyid Sabbagh—a devoted Muslim resident of Abarqu—
> shortly after the murders in their town, had seen Isfandiyar Khan Salari “looking worried
> and in a hurry,” who had then spoken the names of the supposed perpetrators. Since the
> murders had taken place during the night, and according to various testimonies, Ruqiyih’s
> husband ‘Ali; his father, Ja‘far; and his brother, Ramadan, had been in the home of Sughra
> into the night, and at a time when no one knew of this heinous incident (even the prayer-
> offering, early-rising Siyyid Sabbagh was unaware of the occurrence) we note that Isfandiyar
> Khan Salari, “looking worried and in a hurry,” appeared to be on his way on a journey and
> that he knew the names of the supposed offenders.
> 
> • Siyyid Sabbagh was the first person who heard Isfandiyar Khan Salari state, “Muhammad
> Shirvani, who is Sughra’s neighbor, along with his son and brother, Muhammad Niku’i”
> had “committed this crime” and had taken their flight. Therefore, a conspiracy to
> commit the murders and ascribe them to guiltless men, instead of to the actual
> perpetrator[s], was laid in advance.
> 
> • Most likely, Isfandiyar Khan Salari was not only the instigator of this incident but also the
> main character involved in the murders, and his partners in crime were ‘Ali, Ja‘far, and
> Ramadan. During the night, after killing Sughra and her children, Isfandiyar Khan had
> returned home to destroy his bloodstained clothing. He had quickly left his residence,
> when “looking worried and in a hurry,” he had unfortunately run across Siyyid Sabbagh
> and thereafter had commenced a journey to Yazd.
> 
> • Perhaps the reason that the murderer or murderers searched through Sughra’s meager
> furnishings was in the hope of finding documents or other items entrusted to Sughra
> and belonging to Maryam or Hujjatu’l-Islam Siyyid Muhammad Qayyumi. It appears that
> Maryam thought that her paternal cousins, that is, the Salaris, planned to rob her.
> 
> • Also, it can be supposed that searching through Sughra’s furnishings with bloody hands
> was a ruse by the perpetrators to pretend that the real motive for the murders was
> robbery. Since Sughra was employed as a maid by Maryam Salari, clearly she did not own
> valuable things, so this deception likely was authored by Isfandiyar Khan Salari.
> 
> Role of Yazd’s Judiciary Surrounding the Murders in Abarqu
> Reports of these murders were conveyed to Yazd’s judiciary. Siyyid Muhammad Jalali-Na’ini,
> the town’s prosecutor, instructed Javad Sadiqi, the town’s investigator, to gather all the
> information pertaining to this case. That very day, Sadiqi left Yazd for Abarqu in the
> company of Yazd’s police chief.
> However, en route, he changed direction, and instead of proceeding to Abarqu he went
> to Mehriz, where he stayed two nights and a day. The purpose of this detour was for him to
> consult and confer with Sergeant-Major Khakpur Faraghih’i, the police chief in Mehriz, and
> a devotee and confidant of Isfandiyar Khan Salari. They wanted to make plans for Isfandiyar
> Khan and others who had committed this crime to escape punishment and legal pursuit, and
> instead for the blame to be placed on the shoulders of innocent others. This group arrived in
> Abarqu on January 5th; it soon became clear during this interval in Mehriz what an evil
> scenario was being conceived.
> The two men, namely, Javad Sadiqi, who was Yazd’s investigator, and Yazd’s chief of
> police, who was also Sergeant-Major Khakpur’s chief, arrived in Abarqu. The police chief
> immediately dismissed Sergeant-Major Sadripur from any further investigation—Sadripur
> being the person who had conducted the initial investigation, who had issued the arrest
> notices for the primary suspects ‘Ali, Ja‘far, and Ramadan, and who had caused “worry” and
> “hurriedness” in Isfandiyar Khan Salari.
> In place of Sadripur, Sergeant-Major Khakpur (the police chief of Mehriz and an intimate
> of Isfandiyar Khan) was appointed. At once, he released the three imprisoned men without
> any investigation or even securing sureties. In their place, he immediately arrested and
> imprisoned Muhammad Shirvani, a Muslim neighbor of Sughra, and his 17-year-old son
> named ‘Ali-Muhammad, and Muhammad-Husayn Niku’i. Moreover, he destroyed all
> evidence and police files associated with the previous suspects and left no trace of their
> involvement in official records.
> Unlike the initial investigation by Abarqu’s police chief, Sergeant-Major Sadripur (who
> considered the motive for this crime to be revenge and enmity by Isfandiyar Khan Salari
> towards Hujjatu’l-Islam Siyyid Muhammad Qayyumi), the direction of the inquiry completely
> changed at the behest of Javad Sadiqi and his accomplice, Sergeant-Major Khakpur, who
> now maintained that the motive was religious differences between the Baha’is and Muslims.
> At this point it is critical to note that on the strength of Sergeant Sadripur’s report and
> that of Abarqu’s mayor, Baniadam, the governor of Yazd, informed Tehran of the motives
> for these murders and had given this information to such local and national newspapers as
> Bakhtar Imruz, and Dad—the latter was cited earlier in this monograph. In addition, the
> inhabitants of Abarqu knew that the entire population of Abarqu, without exception, was
> Muslim, and that not even one single Baha’i lived among them. This was because several
> 
> years earlier they had killed three Baha’is in extremely brutal ways, and ever since no Baha’i
> dared live in Abarqu. How could they then ascribe this crime to the Baha’is?
> After dismissing Sergeant Sadripur and installing in his place an officer who was in the
> pocket of the conspirators, Javad Sadiqi and Yazd’s chief of police then returned to Yazd.
> They had connived with Isfandiyar Khan Salari and designed a plan to entrap Baha’is in this
> incident and attribute the murders to them. They entrusted Sergeant-Major Khakpur with
> implementing the steps that remained to complete the police crime file.
> From their initial inquiries, Officer Khakpur knew that Muhammad [-Hasan] Niku’i had
> a brother named Ahmad who was Baha’i. It was common in Iran that many families could
> be found in which some members were Baha’i and the rest Muslim. The Niku’i family was
> one such family.
> Even though Ahmad Niku’i lived long ways from Abarqu, this was not important to the
> conspirators. Officer Khakpur announced that on the night of the incident, Muhammad-
> Husayn Niku’i had taken the stolen property from the home of the deceased to the home of
> his Baha’i brother, Ahmad Niku’i, in Dehbid, and had returned that very night to Abarqu.
> The fact that he did not own an automobile, nor did he possess any other means of making a
> journey of 300 kilometers that night in one direction, then turn around and be in Abarqu
> again by early morning, never mattered. What was important was that the name of a Baha’i
> had at last entered the arena.
> However, Isfandiyar Khan, who continued in all minds as the suspected perpetrator of
> this crime, but who had no legal responsibility or standing in this investigation, left behind
> his home and work, and went to Dehbid, where he searched the meager residence of Ahmad
> Niku’i. From there, he traced the footsteps of Ahmad Niku’i and went to Qeshlaq. But
> learning that Ahmad Niku’i was in Shiraz, and not having found anything in his house,
> Isfandiyar Khan proceeded forthwith to Shiraz to arrest Niku’i.
> However, Ahmad Niku’i was in Shiraz on the night of the murders; moreover, for a week
> preceding the murders he had been engaged in selling goods in the streets there. The
> doorkeeper of the caravansary where he lived and other travelers testified to his
> uninterrupted stay in Shiraz.
> When Isfandiyar Khan was unable to secure a warrant for the arrest of Ahmad Niku’i
> from Captain Thurayya, the chief at police station no. 3 in Shiraz, he hastened to Yazd,
> where he was able to secure a warrant from his comrade Javad Sadiqi. He returned to Shiraz,
> arrested Ahmad Niku’i, took him to Abarqu, and placed him under the charge of Khakpur.
> The latter sent Niku’i to Yazd to be incarcerated.
> 
> Motives for Murders from the Schemers’ Perspective
> Two major obstacles remained in the path of the schemers. First, no Baha’i resided in
> Abarqu; second, they did not know what to present as a motive for the murders—though by
> itself this was not a difficult task in the past or the present for those who were scheming
> against the Baha’is.
> To solve the first problem, Sergeant-Major Khakpur initially attempted to subject
> Muhammad Shirvani—a Muslim and one of the prisoners—to the most brutal torture in
> hope that he would “confess” to being a Baha’i and to having committed the murders.
> However, Shirvani, a Muslim, was determined and steadfast in his convictions.
> Failing this, Khakpur attempted a different approach. He placed ‘Ali-Muhammad, the 17-
> year-old son of Shirvani, under severe torture. At first, they hung the young and innocent
> 
> youth from the ceiling of the prison, but that proved fruitless. Then they flogged him; that
> too proved unproductive. They branded him with a hot iron, but the young Muslim endured
> that as well. At last, they stripped him of all his clothing and in the depth of winter put him
> outside on ice. The 17-year-old youth was unable to endure such intense, sustained torture
> and confessed to whatever Sergeant Khakpur wanted him to say, namely, that the three
> Baha’is of Isfandabad had come to Abarqu during the night and, together with his father
> [Muhammad Shirvani], had slain Sughra and her children.
> The motive for the murder that they concocted was: Whenever Hujjatu’l-Islam Siyyid
> Muhammad Qayyumi recited rawdih in Abarqu and insulted Baha’is, Sughra, who was among
> the attendees, would also curse and slur Baha’is. It is interesting to note that after consulting
> and reconciling with Isfandiyar Khan, Siyyid Muhammad Qayyumi’s fanatical Muslim
> proclivities were provoked, so that he enrolled among the companions of Isfandiyar Khan
> and testified to the truth of what was claimed about Sughra.
> Sergeant-Major Khakpur quickly went to Isfandabad, arrested the three Baha’is of that
> village on the charge of murder, and sent them to Yazd prison. However, as bad coincidence
> would have it, Muslim witnesses came forward and testified that on the night of the murders
> these three individuals were in Bavanat, located many kilometers from Abarqu. When the
> case investigator discovered that ascribing these murders to these three men was impossible,
> he had no choice but to free them.
> Meanwhile, Baniadam, the governor of Yazd, who initially had taken the path of fairness
> and equity, and who had been the first to truthfully write about the incident, was dismissed
> from office through the influence of Isfandiyar Khan and his accomplices in Yazd and
> Tehran. Ahmad Mu‘avinzadih, the chief of judiciary in Yazd, who was completely trusted by
> the conspirators, then assumed the governorship.29 In this way, all major posts came under
> the control of the connivers.
> Since the idea of painting the Baha’is of Isfandabad as murderers was unsuccessful, the
> conspirators found a weak excuse to accuse and imprison Haji Mirza Hasan Shams, the
> chairman of Isfandabad’s Baha’i Spiritual Assembly, [who had refused paying a bribe to
> Khakpur]. He was sent to Yazd prison.
> Gradually, the thought of implicating the Baha’is of Yazd in this crime gained currency.
> Through the excuse that there had been a connection between [Haji Mirza Hasan] Shams
> and the Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Yazd, all nine members of Spiritual Assembly of
> Yazd were summoned to the judiciary [for interrogation].30
> At the end, Javad Sadiqi, Yazd’s inspector, named four individuals as having committed
> the murders: Muhammad Shirvani, a Muslim; Muhammad-Husayn Niku’i; Ahmad Niku’i;
> and ‘Ali-Muhammad Shirvani. He also named the following eleven as instigators and
> planners of these murders: Haji Mirza Hasan Shams; ‘Abbas-‘Ali Purmihdi; and the nine
> members of Spiritual Assembly of Yazd.
> It is incredible that the indictment issued by Yazd’s prosecutor states that the three
> Baha’is of Isfandabad had remained unidentified until that time but participated in the
> murders. One has to ask: How is it possible that even though Isfandabad had so few Baha’is,
> it was clear and unequivocal to the prosecutor that three of these Baha’is had participated in
> 
> 29 Nikravan, “Barrasi,” states that Mu‘avinzadih and his accomplice, Lutfi, were entrenched enemies of the
> 
> Baha’is and launched a determined attack against them in the media.
> 30 The nine members of the Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Yazd were: Badi‘u’llah Afnan, Dr. Rasti, Dr.
> 
> Malakutian, Salikian, Mishki, Muhammad-‘Ali Afnan, Ra’fati, Majzub, and Dr. Manshadi.
> 
> this crime, even though he had been unable to identify them? This question remains
> unanswered to this day.
> About this time, the orders for the arrest of another Baha’i by the name of Jalal Binish,
> who was an ailing merchant, was issued. The charge against him was that he had written a
> letter to Haji Mirza Hasan Shams in which he had advised regarding the receipt of a load of
> tobacco from Abarqu. The judiciary in Yazd concluded that this was a secret message about
> the occurrence of these murders; therefore, he was arrested as having been involved in the
> killings. After eleven months of incarceration, having withstood enormous difficulties, Jalal
> Binish passed away in prison prior to the trial [on January 2, 1952].
> 
> Kerman Prison
> On the night of January 7, 1951, the arrested men were conducted to the prison in Kerman.
> At this time, ‘Abdu’llah Razi, the ranking member of the Bar Association, was appointed to
> defend them. From the beginning, Razi realized that the case against his clients was
> fabricated and twisted so as to be consistent with the conspiracy plotted subsequent to the
> incident. He also noted that many pages of the file from the early stages of the investigations
> were missing.
> Razi presented this information to Husayn Furughi, the head of the judiciary in Kerman,
> who was also the presiding judge in [Kerman’s] High Criminal Court. The latter agreed and
> added, “I too have noticed the same; for this reason, and other considerations, I have
> requested that the case be transferred to Tehran’s High Criminal Court.” At any rate, it was
> determined to transfer the accused to Tehran [and this took place on February 26, 1951].31
> 
> Salari Family
> Undoubtedly, the curious reader would raise this question: How is it possible that an
> Abarqui feudalist, through the collaboration of various authorities and high-ranking officials
> in the magistrate of constitutional Iran, could create such an evil and bloody plot and never
> face punishment, nor suffer consequences for his malicious doings? To gain insight into this
> issue, one needs to know something about the Salari family.
> The Umid-Salari family was among the most powerful and affluent landlords in Abadeh
> and Abarqu. In particular, Muhammad-Rida Khan Umid-Salar, the only son of Salar-Nizam
> and the son-in-law of Haji Shaykh Ahmad, who was Abadeh’s Imam-Jum‘ih, enjoyed a
> special trust and following. He had been elected to the national parliament on several
> occasions. He always boasted that Ahmad Shah Qajar and his entourage, which included
> Sardar Sipah [the highest ranking military officer in Iran’s army], had paused in Abadeh and
> had lunch at the home of his father, Salar-Nizam, and that in 1938, Reza Shah and the heir
> to throne had visited his father’s home, and that in the spring of 1941, Reza Shah and his
> wife, Fuziyih, and their entourage had stayed in Abadeh and had been their guests.
> Eventually, this opportunist managed to secure a Taj Medal from Muhammad-Reza Shah.
> Knowing this background gives us insights to the sixty-year-old question and shines a
> small light on the darkness of religious and political despotism in Iran. It makes it clear why
> 
> 31 The number of defendants at the trial in Tehran was eighteen, of whom fourteen were Baha’is.
> 
> such a powerful person could command the power to dismiss or install ministerial officials
> and authorities in Abarqu, Shiraz, and Yazd, and to interfere in governmental affairs.
> His sister, Maryam Salari, was the wife of his paternal cousin, Muhammad-Hasan Khan
> Salari, who became a widow at a young age. The criminal and love-struck Isfandiyar Khan
> Salari was yet another paternal cousin of this woman who had been raised in the lap of
> luxury.
> We do not know why the judiciary chief in Kerman, namely, Husayn Furughi had
> “reasons and other concerns,” nor why he sent the case of the innocents accused of murders
> in Abarqu to the magistrate in Tehran. However, with some historical awareness, we can
> perhaps ascertain what “reasons and other concerns” he may have had. Let us proceed to
> study the internal and external factors that influenced everything related to this crime.32
> 
> 32 The present author has a nearly completed monograph in which he discusses roots of this unfortunate and
> 
> ill-fated episode. It is hoped that this book will soon be published. (BC)
> 
> Chapter 2
> The Government’s Reaction
> 
> Taking the Accused to Tehran
> Muhammad-‘Ali Buzari, the minister of justice in Razmara’s administration, was from
> Taleqan. In his youth he had been an akhund [a junior cleric], and he had very close ties with
> the clerical establishment and its leadership. More important, he had an excellent relationship
> with the Fada’iyan Islam. After Hazhir’s assassination, based on recommendations from
> Taleqan, Navvab Safavi, the leader of the terrorist organization Fada’iyan Islam, went into
> hiding in villages around Qazvin and Taleqan. While there, he would deliver secret speeches
> against the Baha’is in which he would inveigle and urge the villagers to massacre and
> persecute the Baha’is of that region.
> 
> Navvab Safavi
> 
> It is astonishing that during the reign of Lieutenant-General Razmara, Baha’is were
> subject to harassment throughout the entire country—many of them lost their jobs,
> particularly in the Education Ministry at the instructions of Shamsu’d-Din Jazayiri, the
> minister of education. The latter was a descendent of Siyyid Ni‘matu’llah Jazayiri, a
> renowned akhund in the royal court of Shah Sultan-Husayn Safavi, and generation after
> generation, family members ranked among the clerics. For many years, Shamsu’d-Din
> Jazayiri, Iran’s education minister, was also a cleric: for this reason, he was for many years
> the leader of the pilgrims going to Mecca.
> At this point, it should be noted that from the time of Reza Shah until the concluding
> years of the reign of Muhammad-Reza Shah, almost without exception, all ministers, and
> political and cultural figures of Iran, particularly high-ranking officials of the country’s
> judiciary, came from the ranks of clerics, or were sons of clerics, or were from the feudalistic
> class, or numbered among the thousand families of the Qajar tribe. Anti-Baha’ism and
> opposition to progressive and modern ideas among these court loyalists had a long and
> deep-rooted history.
> During the premiership of Razmara, an unprecedented attack on the Baha’i community
> of Iran commenced, and anti-Baha’ism was evident throughout the country in a pronounced
> way, which completely destroyed any serenity among this minority community. There was
> nothing that could be done, although the Baha’is, as was their habit, appealed to the
> authorities about this discrimination and persecution in hope of gaining a measure of human
> and civil rights.
> 
> Accordingly, the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Iran wrote several times
> to Lieutenant-General Haji ‘Ali Razmara, the prime minister, and requested that he
> investigate and stay the waves of persecution against Baha’is that were sweeping the country.
> However, Haji ‘Ali Razmara was busy preparing for his planned coup d’état and paid no
> attention to these letters by the Baha’is. It is deeply surprising that some of his ministers
> considered him a fanatic and a believer in the Baha’i religion. In their proclamations against
> Razmara, Fada’iyan Islam always used the slur “Baha’i Dog” after mentioning ‘Ali-Akbar
> Muhtadi, the deputy prime-minister and the translator of Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws.
> 
> The Prisoners Sent to Tehran
> Earlier, we saw that the chief of the judiciary in Kerman decided to send the file of the
> Baha’i prisoners to Tehran. Now we will examine his evidence and documents.
> As noted by Baqir ‘Aqili, Lieutenant-General Razmara had a tendency to “use every
> incident to his own benefit.” He now decided to use the accused Baha’is who were
> imprisoned in Yazd to his own benefit. For this, Razmara telephoned his minister of justice,
> Muhammad-‘Ali Buzari, and urged him, “Try to make sure that the accused are killed on the
> way from Yazd to Tehran: this way, we will all be freed from all the tumult, difficulties, and
> the ensuing trial.”
> The Baha’is became aware that Razmara entertained ill-thoughts towards the Baha’i
> prisoners in Yazd. Therefore, in their third long letter to Lieutenant-General Haji ‘Ali
> Razmara, after enumerating many horrific acts that had been perpetrated against the Baha’is
> throughout the nation, the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Iran wrote about
> the transfer of the Baha’i prisoners in Yazd to Tehran and their deep worry over this:
> 
> The other matter that is extremely important and should be brought to Your
> Excellency’s attention is that in accordance with legal provisions, the trial of these
> innocent men [accused of murders in Abarqu] should take place in Kerman. For this
> reason, the prisoners have been transferred to that town, and their lawyer has also
> proceeded to that region. Therefore, it is not clear for what reason the judicial
> authorities have suddenly changed their minds and referred the case to Tehran. It is
> clearly evident to the officials in charge that in Tehran there are antagonistic and
> fanatical individuals, who through the provocation and influence of certain elements
> [i.e., the Fada’iyan Islam] who caused clamor and tumult in the trial of the murderers
> of Dr. Berjis, would once again array themselves and cause mischief.
> All the evidence and indications—dispensing with efforts to find the true killers
> of the woman in Abarqu, the arrest of a number of innocent men who had no
> involvement in this incident whatsoever, the initial transfer of the accused to
> Kerman and then the transfer of their case to Tehran, the publication in a number
> of newspapers in Tehran and other locations of a number of inflammatory articles
> and essays all contrary to the truth and all against the Baha’i community, the
> incendiary talks by a number of preachers and priests in religious settings, the silence
> of the police authorities, and the consent of the high officials of the judiciary to the
> legal proceedings in Yazd and Kerman—all of these events have firmly convinced
> this Assembly that a well-planned and carefully orchestrated scheme, based on
> conscientiously calculated steps against the innocent Baha’is of Iran, is
> unquestionably being carried out, and self-interested individuals wish to implement
> their evil plots through these tactics….
> 
> Since this Assembly has always wished and will continue to hope that during the
> administration of that distinguished person [i.e., Haji ‘Ali Razmara], such ill-
> conceived incidents would not take place, we have submitted the above evident facts
> with utmost sincerity and cherish the expectation that your office will issue clear and
> effective instructions for the proper remedy of this discrimination and these
> difficulties.
> 
> Once again, Lieutenant-General Haji ‘Ali Ramzara paid no attention to the petition of the
> Baha’i community and busily continued to implement his plan [for a coup d’état]. At any
> rate, in accordance with the instructions of Razmara and his minister of justice, the accused
> were put on a bus and sent to Tehran with considerable fear and trepidation. There were
> persistent rumors on people’s tongues that the bus was to be attacked on the way and the
> accused Baha’is harmed. Sometimes it was also said that Razmara wished to use this
> assassination attempt [of the Baha’is] as a pretext to proclaim military rule and then stage a
> coup d’état, all as an excuse that he was preventing an attack on the Baha’is and suppressing
> tumult in various cities.
> 
> Intercession of Habib Mu’ayyad
> The Baha’is attempted a different approach. Dr. Habib Mu’ayyad, who was one of the
> closest friends of Razmara, was sent to see the prime minister. While Razmara was serving in
> the military in Kermanshah, he had been severely ill. The only competent and skilled
> physician there was a Baha’i by the name of Dr. Habib Mu’ayyad, who had been trained
> overseas; he had been brought in to attend to Razmara.33 With great effort, Dr. Mu’ayyad
> was able to remedy his condition; this precipitated a close friendship between the two, to the
> point that Razmara would call Dr. Mu’ayyad “father,” and Dr. Mu’ayyad would call him
> “son.”
> In August 1941, Dr. Habib Mu’ayyad moved from Kermanshah to Tehran, where he
> reestablished his residence and medical practice. One of his patients was Razmara. Dr.
> Mu’ayyad was a member of the National Spiritual Assembly, and that body asked him to
> meet with Razmara.
> For this reason, Habib Mu’ayyad went to see his “son,” Haji ‘Ali Razmara, who was a
> lieutenant-general and the prime minister of Iran, and recounted for him the story of the
> wretched Baha’is of Yazd from the beginning. The prime minister not only disregarded the
> supplication and justice-seeking of the “father,” he was further provoked and refused to
> issue instructions for a fair investigation of the situation of the accused. With a face betraying
> his deep ambitions, at once he asked Dr. Habib Mu’ayyad, “Father, do you foresee that I
> would attain my objectives?” Dr. Mu’ayyad responded, “Son, I am not aware of your inner
> thoughts and aspirations. But, I will fatherly counsel you to see that Almighty God beholds
> all your deeds under all conditions, and to act with equity. Do not build the foundation of
> your government on the blood of innocents.”
> With a heart full of sadness and hopelessness, Dr. Mu’ayyad left the office of the premier
> and reported the details of the meeting to the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of
> Iran. At this time, on the instructions of their institutions, the Baha’is of Iran commenced
> prayer vigils, as they had no other recourse but patience and perseverance. The mullas’
> 
> 33 For a fascinating memoir of Dr. Mu’ayyad, see Eight Years near ‘Abdu’l-Baha: Diary of Dr. Habib Mu’ayyad.
> 
> unceasing propaganda that suggests the Baha’is enjoyed the support of Muhammad-Reza
> Shah and his government was so frivolous and comical that it cannot be accepted by rational
> thinkers.
> 
> Change of Government
> Irony and the mystery of history intersected at this moment. Razmara was assassinated by
> Khalil Tahmassbi, a member of the terrorist organization Fada’iyan Islam, which harbored
> great enmity and hatred towards the Baha’is.34 In contrast, the bus bringing the innocents
> accused of the murders in Abarqu arrived in Tehran with no notable incident as had been
> feared. But this was not the end of the events.
> In recent times, much has been written and published about Razmara’s assassination by
> Fada’iyan Islam. At any rate, we know that this assassination took place with the knowledge,
> and likely the previous consent of some of the leadership of the Jibhe Milli [the National
> Front].35 The Kremlin was saddened by General Razmara’s murder and issued a strongly
> worded and harsh statement against the United States and England.
> In 1952, when the National Front had reached the apex of its power in parliament, a
> number of parliamentarians who were members of that party drafted a resolution, which was
> passed by the national parliament and according to which Khalil Tahmassbi was freed from
> prison. This resolution had only one article:
> 
> Since the treason of Haji ‘Ali Razmara and his support by the foreign powers is
> evident to the people of Iran, even if his murderer is Ustad Khalil Tahmassbi, he is
> recognized as innocent by the people, and is hereby acquitted.
> 
> “With the passing of this parliamentary motion and its approval by [Muhammad-Reza] Shah,
> Razmara’s family registered its protest by writing a letter to the Shah, stating, ‘How is he
> considered mahduru’d-dam36 when his family was granted posthumously the Javidan Medal
> [eternal medal], and he was accounted as one of the martyrs of the military?’”37
> Since there are individuals who, with good reason, wish to know the identity of those
> who participated in passing a parliamentary resolution to free Khalil Tahmassbi, the names
> of these twenty-seven members of parliament are recorded here: Shams Qannatabadi, who
> was an akhund, disciple of Ayatu’llah Kashani and a member of the Fada’iyan Islam; Nad-‘Ali
> Karimi; Haji Siyyid Javadi; Engineer Hasibi; Dr. Shaygan; Siyyid Baqir Jalali; Angaji, Dr.
> Baqa’i; ‘Ali Zahri; Husayn Makki; Engineer Zirakzadih; Dr. Malaki; Parsa; Muddaris; Dr.
> Falsafi; Nazirzadih; Ha’irizadih; Iqbal; [Siyyid Hashim] Vakil; Purakhgar; Milani; Shapuri;
> Farzanih Mu‘tammid; Damavandi; Nasir Dhulfaqari; Dr. Sanjabi; and Nariman.38
> The drafting and passing of the resolution to free Khalil Tahmassbi, Razmara’s murderer,
> which fundamentally was against all principles of the constitutional law and the criminal and
> penal code of the country, took place during the premiership of Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq.
> 
> 34 This assassination took place March 7, 1951.
> 35 For more details on the National Front, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Front_(Iran).
> 36 Someone whose blood can be spilled on religious grounds with no sanction or consequence.
> 37 Amini, Jam‘iyat Fada’iyan Islam va Naqsh an dar Tahavulat Siyasi, pp. 219–20.
> 38 Qannatabadi, Khatirat Shams Qannatabadi: Siyri dar Nihzat Millishudan Naft, p. 219; and Amini, Jam‘iyat Fada’iyan
> 
> Islam va Naqsh an dar Tahavulat Siyasi, pp. 219–20. (BC)
> 
> Dr. Musaddiq was a politician, not a holy man. What impelled parliament to take up this
> resolution is an important discussion that must be explored dispassionately but which must
> be relegated to another occasion, as it is unrelated to the current study. That research is
> being written in detail by the present author in another monograph.
> 
> The Murder of Nuri’d-Din Fatha‘zam by Fada’iyan Islam
> I am compelled at this juncture to discuss a crime that took place during the premiership of
> Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq—Iran’s national hero and the unconditional defender of
> constitutional law. This incident took place after the August 7, 1952 passage of the law
> freeing Khalil Tahmassbi, the renowned terrorist of the Fada’iyan Islam, but before he was
> freed from incarceration on November 15, 1952. I am of the belief that Dr. Musaddiq and
> his interior minister, Dr. Ghulam-Husayn Sadiqi, did not have a hand in this horrific crime.
> However, individuals, such as Ayatu’llah Kashani, Jamal Imami, and Dr. Baqa’i, who were
> from a faction of the National Front, had close relations with the organization of the
> Fada’iyan Islam.
> We know that after the assassination of Court Minister Hizhar on November 4, 1949,
> and the immediate execution of his assassin, Siyyid Husayn Imami, on November 8, 1949,
> Siyyid Mujtaba Navvab Safavi, the leader of the Fada’iyan Islam, at once escaped to the
> villages around Qazvin and Taleqan with the help of Ayatu’llah Taleqani and other citizens
> of Taleqan, and hid in that region. During this time, he delivered speeches against the
> government of Prime Minister Sa‘id; he was also provoking a few Muslim families against the
> Baha’is. These activities continued; eventually during Dr. Musaddiq’s government, Nuri’d-
> Din Fatha‘zam, a Baha’i landlord in the village of Ramjin, near Qazvin, was brutally killed at
> night by the Fada’iyan Islam using shovels, pickaxes, and knives. It is astonishing to note that
> the police officer who witnessed the villagers’ attack on Fatha‘zam ran away and left the
> victim alone with his assailants.
> Nuri’d-Din Fatha‘zam was a humanitarian; at his own expense, he had built a bathhouse
> for the villagers. More importantly, he had also built a mosque at his own expense so that his
> Muslim farmers would have no difficulty in offering their obligatory prayers or attending
> religious ceremonies. All of these good deeds did not prevent the occurrence of this crime;
> the ignorant population gave in to the prejudice and deception of the Fada’iyan Islam.
> On May 16th, a few months before the coup d’état of August 19, 1953, the trial of those
> accused of the murder of Nuri’d-Din Fatha‘zam took place in Tehran. The agent of the
> Intelligence Office shared with the country’s police headquarters a confidential report of the
> court proceedings, which is instructive:
> 
> With respect, this is submitted. Supplement to reports of special agents Qasim and
> Taqi Samavarsaz, the activities of the Fada’iyan Islam on Saturday, May 16, 1953,
> and Sunday, May 17, were as follows:
> At 9 A.M. on May 16, about 20 members of the Fada’iyan Islam under the
> leadership of Aqa Siyyid Hashim Husayni arrived at the Court for Misdemeanors
> and the trial of 17 farmers in the village of Ramjin accused of participating in the
> murder of the late Fatha‘zam commenced. Dr. Pad was appointed by the members
> of Fada’iyan Islam to defend the accused, and commenced his arguments. As a
> result, the 17 defendants were completely acquitted of all charges and immediately
> freed.
> 
> Members of Fada’iyan Islam sacrificed six sheep in front of the prison of the
> judiciary building when the former defendants were leaving. Special agents explained
> that Siyyid ‘Abdu’l-Husayn Vahidi [the number two man in the Fada’iyan Islam
> organization] had raised a sum of 400,000 rials in the bazaar in the name of the 17
> freed farmers, stating that they had killed a Baha’i. Of this sum, 60,000 rials were
> given to Dr. Pad as his remuneration. Fada’iyan Islam even threatened the family of
> the late Fatha‘zam who had gathered outside [the courthouse].39
> 
> This report is long; I have only cited its opening paragraphs and not included the remaining
> portion, which states that during the following night, 500 members of Fada’iyan Islam
> gathered at Gumruk Square, with Navvab Safavi presiding. That evening until midnight,
> food and drinks were served at the home of Haji Yusufian-Muqaddam to celebrate this
> mighty victory.
> Husayn ‘Ala was appointed to the office of prime minister after Razmara’s assassination.
> On March 15, 1951, representatives of the National Front submitted to the full parliament
> the draft law for the nationalization of the petroleum industry, and the law was passed
> unanimously. To celebrate this, great festivities were held in Tehran and other cities, and
> everyone was most joyful.
> Protests fomented by Ayatu’llah Siyyid Abu’l-Qasim Kashani, the leader of the terrorist
> organization Fada’iyan Islam, increased, and resulted two months later in Prime Minister
> ‘Ala’s resignation from office and his assumption of the post of court minister.
> It was during these days that the book, Rahnama-yi Haqayiq [Guide to the Truth], which is
> the manifesto of Fada’iyan Islam, was published in large numbers. How this book was
> published and who paid for its expenses will be told at another time, as it is one of the
> untold aspects of the history of modern Iran.
> 
> 39 Gul-Muhammadi, Jam‘iyat Fada’iyan Islam bi Ravayat Asnad, vol. 2, p. 467, no. 253. It should be noted that the
> 
> police headquarter reported through the Interior Ministry. (BC)
> 
> Chapter 3
> The American Baha’is
> 
> Premiership of Dr. Musaddiq
> In an emergency meeting of parliament on April 28, 1951, Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq, the
> leader of Iran’s National Front, came to the premiership. He was nominated by Jamal Imami
> and had the support of the majority of representatives. Immediately, the two chambers of
> parliament adopted a resolution that was the basis for the nationalization of the petroleum
> industry throughout the country and sent the resolution to the administration for
> implementation.
> On another occasion, we must pursue the story of various schemes and conspiracies of
> those days, since we know that Dr. Musaddiq, the champion of the National Front, did not
> have a restful moment. Every single day was busy dealing with various tricks and
> connivances by internal and external enemies.
> Eventually, on October 7, 1951, he led a delegation of government officials on a mission
> to defend the rights of the people of Iran before the Security Council of the United Nations.
> The delegation that accompanied Dr. Musaddiq consisted of: Senator Matindaftar; Senator
> Bayat; Allahyar Salih; Dr. Shaygan; Dr. Karim Sanjabi; Dr. Muzaffar Baqa’i; Dr. Husayn
> Fatimi; Dr. ‘Isa Sipahbudi (interpreter); Javad Bushihri; Husayn Navvab; Muhsin Asadi
> (interpreter); ‘Abbas Mus‘udi, the chief-editor of Ittila‘at newspaper; Senator Dr.
> Misbahzadih, the editor of Kayhan newspaper and a member of parliament; Shujau’d-Din
> Shafa, the chief spokesperson; and Dr. Ghulam-Husayn Musaddiq and Zia-Ashraf
> Musaddiq, who were Dr. Musaddiq’s two sons.
> On October 11, 1951, Dr. Musaddiq delivered an enthusiastic speech to the Security
> Council of the United Nations and defended the decision to nationalize Iran’s oil industry;
> he also spoke of many cruelties of the imperialist British government. That historic day will
> never be dimmed in the memory of the people of Iran.
> The next day, after having sought the permission of Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq,
> representatives of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the United States (an
> elected governing council of the Baha’is of America) came to meet the prime minister where
> he was staying, so they could discuss the deplorable condition of the Baha'is accused in the
> Abarqu murders as well as the violation of the rights and denial of justice for the Baha’is of
> Iran. With a pleasant demeanor, Dr. Musaddiq received and listened to them, and it is
> noteworthy that he offered sincere and prudent counsel to the Baha’i representatives.
> The following is a report to the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the United
> States of this friendly meeting between representatives of the American Baha’i community
> and the leader of the National Front and the prime minister of Iran—a close and
> unprejudiced study of which in these days can clarify some of the efforts of Iranians both
> inside and outside of the country, particularly Iran’s National Front, against the Islamic
> Republic’s anti-Baha’ism.
> 
> Report of Audience with Dr. Muhammed Mossadegh, Prime Minister
> of Iran40
> 
> Time: 11 o’clock a.m., Friday, October 19, 1951 (Birthday of the Bab)
> Place: Suite of the Prime Minister at Ritz Tower Hotel, Park Avenue & 57th Street,
> New York.
> 
> Report: Great care was exercised to secure an audience under circumstances that
> would permit as much freedom of expression as possible, so that the timing was an
> important factor in our considerations.
> Through the excellent offices of Dr. Fazly A. Melaney [Milani], we were granted
> an audience at the time mentioned. Representing the National Spiritual Assembly
> were H. Borrah Kavelin and Dr. Melaney. We were ushered in by Dr. [Husayn]
> Navab, Iranian Minister to Holland and presented to His Excellency, the Prime
> Minister.
> Also present were Dr. [Siyyid ‘Ali] Shayegan, member of Parliament in Iran and
> Assistant to the Petroleum Commission, and the daughter of the Prime Minister.
> Dr. Navab and the Prime Minister’s daughter were occupied with a group of
> photographers who were preparing their equipment, so that our audience with Dr.
> Mossadegh was held under ideal conditions.
> Dr. Mossadegh does not speak English, and he asked Dr. Melaney to serve as his
> interpreter, which was extremely fortunate in my being able to convey accurately to
> the Prime Minister not only the substance but also the spirit of my presentation. Dr.
> Shayegan who speaks English very well was an interested listener, but entered very
> little into the discussion.
> I informed His Excellency that I had the honor to represent the National
> Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the United States, as well as thousands of
> American Baha’is in welcoming him warmly to our country and expressing our best
> wishes for his good health.
> He expressed his cordial appreciation of these sentiments and said he was very
> pleased to receive us.
> I then told him that the American Baha’is have a special interest and faith in the
> welfare of his country not only because it is the birthplace of the Baha’i World Faith
> but also because it is the home of so large a number of our brother Baha’is; that
> Baha’is in every country, when given the opportunity, endeavor to serve the best
> interests of their country; that a just government is a true servant of God; that
> Baha’is never enter into the politics of their country but are concerned chiefly with
> insuring justice for all peoples; that if given the opportunity, Baha’is are ardent
> supporters of just government.
> He showed deep interest in my remarks, and replied that in Iran, there is a better
> and more cordial balance with the Baha’is than with other minorities.
> I then stated that the American Baha’is are deeply concerned over the incident of
> persecution of the Iranian Baha’is, and he asked if we knew of any such incidents. I
> informed him that we have documented evidence of these incidents, and he replied
> that he was extremely sorry to hear of this. He stated that he places the blame for
> 
> 40 The present translator is grateful to the Archives Office of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of
> 
> the United States for a copy of this report, which is recorded in this monograph exactly as it appears in the
> original English, with the exception that “Persia” has been replaced with “Iran” (private communications,
> December 2009).
> 
> these incidents on some of the religious leaders who are under the influence of
> some of the political movements, particularly the Communists.
> He stated that his Government has nothing against the Baha’is, and he hopes
> that just as throughout the world, religion is free, the same condition will take place
> in Iran; that he will personally do all he can to assist the Baha’is in his country and
> will never resist an opportunity to see that justice is done. He said he hopes that
> these incidents of the past will not be repeated.
> I expressed deep appreciation for his cordial sentiments and told him the Baha’is
> would pray for his good health. He replied that he too would pray for the success of
> those who have good thoughts for the progress of Iran.
> I expressed regret at not having received the souvenir from the National
> Spiritual Assembly which had not yet arrived, but that I would have it delivered
> upon its arrival. Meanwhile, I showed him the article that appeared in Life Magazine,
> and gave him copies of the Baha’i Peace Program and Appreciations of the Baha’i
> Faith. Dr. Shayegan was very much interested in the Life article, and I presented it to
> him.
> The spirit of the audience was one of extreme friendliness; it was entirely
> unhurried, and I had full opportunity to say all that I considered necessary and
> important. Dr. Melaney and I both felt that the Prime Minister was fully sincere in
> his expressions. He personally accompanied us to the door upon leaving and shook
> my hand very warmly on two occasions.
> ——————————
> Early Friday evening, Dr. Melaney received a telephone call summoning him to
> Dr. Mossadegh’s apartment. In the meantime, the souvenir package from the
> National Assembly had arrived and I had given it to Dr. Melaney to deliver. Upon
> arriving, he presented it to the Prime Minister who seemed very pleased to receive
> the beautiful leather folder with the photographs of the exterior and interior of the
> Temple [in Wilmette, Illinois]. Dr. Melaney also read to him the letter of the
> National Assembly and the enclosed statement documenting numerous incidents of
> persecutions of Baha’is of Iran.
> Dr. Mossadegh informed Dr. Melaney that he knew of the imprisonment of
> Baha’is of Yazd and other incidents; that General Alahi [‘Ala’i] has approached him
> and reported to him that the Baha’is have not been treated justly. The Prime
> Minister then said that he wants to help the Baha’is in Iran; that it would not help
> him to have a letter from the National Spiritual Assembly of the United States in
> which the spread and influence of the Faith are recorded, because that would be
> disliked. What he needs is a formal representation in which the incidents of
> persecution are documented, and a request and appeal made for help for our fellow
> Baha’is in Iran who have been persecuted.
> He then actually dictated the following statement which he suggested should be
> inserted at the close of our formal representation: “We wonder that in a country
> which has an ancient civilization and possesses constitutional laws, a group of
> people is treated in a manner which conflicts with these fundamental laws. The latter
> proclaim that the people are equal before law.”
> He stated that this representation should be written on the letterhead of the
> National Assembly, signed and sealed, so that he can use it in his efforts to help the
> Iranian Baha’is.
> He emphasized the extreme importance of keeping this matter a secret, as
> otherwise, his hands will be bound. He asked Dr. Melaney various questions, among
> them the number of Baha’i students in this country from Iran. He was told that
> there are very few—perhaps ten to fifteen in all.
> 
> Dr. Melaney and I both feel extremely grateful for this providential opportunity,
> which coincided with the Birthday of the Blessed Bab, and that it may inaugurate a
> period of greater freedom and justice for our brother Baha’is in Iran.41
> 
> An Analysis of the Above Report
> According to the above report of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the
> United States, an official meeting with Iran’s Prime Minister Dr. Musaddiq took place in an
> “extremely friendly” atmosphere. The Minister knew well that the wrongs inflicted on the
> Baha’is predated his assumption of the office and cherished the hope that these tyrannies
> and injuries “of the past will not be repeated.” He gave his assurance that he would help the
> Baha’is and said that “he will personally do all he can to assist the Baha’is in his country and
> will never resist an opportunity to see that justice is done.” According to the testimony of
> the representative of the American Baha’is, Dr. Musaddiq was “fully sincere in his
> expressions” and speech, for he was the prime minister of a Muslim nation, but more
> importantly, the prime minister of a country under constitutional law.
> The Baha’is of America who were “deeply concerned over the incident of persecution of
> the Iranian Baha’is” were happy to have had an opportunity to discuss their anxiety and to
> appeal for justice with the prime minister of Iran, who enjoyed a considerable international
> appeal and popularity at that time. It appears that they alluded to the Baha’i prisoners of
> Yazd and expressed concern over the incident of murders in Abarqu. In response, Dr.
> Musaddiq stated that he “knew of the imprisonment of Baha’is of Yazd and other incidents”
> since one of the Baha’is of Iran, Major-General ‘Ala’i,42 had met with him, and had reported
> that Baha’is were not treated with equity.
> It is noteworthy that the representative of the American Baha’is confirmed and
> emphasized in his report that Dr. Musaddiq sincerely recommended to them that he write
> him an official letter and then immediately, unmistakably, and clearly reminded them not to
> write him a letter promoting the Baha’i Faith or “in which the spread and influence of the
> Faith are recorded,” since, as emphasized by the representative of the American Baha’is,
> “that would be disliked.” “What he needs is a formal representation in which the incidents of
> persecution are documented, and a request and appeal made for help for our fellow Baha’is
> in Iran who have been persecuted.”
> 
> 41 A handwritten note appears at the bottom of the report, which states:
> 
> I transmitted this information to [the secretary of the National Spiritual Assembly of the
> Baha’is of the United States] Horace Holley, and explained the type of letter requested by the
> Prime Minister. Horace sent me the letter, enclosing a copy of a printed letter written in
> Persian, being a translation of a letter written to the chiefs of Islam by the NSA some years
> ago.
> The letter from Horace had to be re-written, and in the meantime, the Prime Minister
> had left for Washington. I therefore asked Horace to send the final draft to Mr. [Paul]
> Haney, who was requested to deliver the documents to Dr. Mossadegh in care of the Iranian
> Embassy.
> Mr. Haney reported that he delivered them to the secretary at the Embassy with the
> statement that the Prime Minister was awaiting these documents, and he was assured that
> they would be placed in the hands of Dr. Mossadegh.
> 42 Major-General Shu‘a‘u’llah ‘Ala’i (1889–1984) was a member of the National Spiritual Assembly of the
> 
> Baha’is of Iran; on February 29, 1952, he was appointed to the rank of the Hand of the Cause of God, a high
> administrative office in the Baha’i community.
> 
> Dr. Musaddiq, the leader of the Nationalist Movement of Iran, was so sincere and
> truthful that he clearly explained the reasons for his recommendation and told the
> representative of the Baha’is what to write “on the letterhead of the National Assembly,
> signed and sealed” so that it was “a formal representation” and could be used “for help.” He
> even went so far to dictate the actual wording to be used at the conclusion of the letter, “We
> wonder that in a country which has an ancient civilization and possesses constitutional laws,
> a group of people is treated in a manner which conflicts with these fundamental laws. The
> latter proclaim that the people are equal before law.”
> The meeting ended with great cordiality, and the Baha’i representatives assured him that
> “the Baha’is would pray for his good health.” It is also noted, “The spirit of the audience was
> one of extreme friendliness; it was entirely unhurried.” And when the representatives left the
> prime minister, “he personally accompanied” them “to the door upon leaving and shook”
> their “hand very warmly on two occasions.”
> 
> Letter of the American National Spiritual Assembly
> Three days later, the letter that was sent on the recommendation of Dr. Musaddiq on the
> letterhead of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the United States arrived at
> the Iranian Embassy in Washington. In this letter, the Baha’is provided a detailed account of
> anti-Baha’ism and widespread massacres of Baha’is throughout Iran during the 1940s, and
> urged the prime minister to administer justice.
> This letter is not merely a request for justice or an account of the cruelties of the mullas.
> Rather, it is a report filled with sorrow, condemning the government [of Iran] and its society,
> which disregarded the rights of individuals and the civil rights of religious and tribal
> minorities.43
> 
> The National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the United States
> The Office of the Secretariat
> 538 Sheridan Rd
> Wilmette, IL 60091
> 
> October 23, 1951
> 
> Care of the Embassy of Iran in Washington, D.C.
> 
> [Your Excellency Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq, the Prime Minister of Iran:]
> 
> On behalf of the American Baha’i community, the National Spiritual Assembly
> welcomes Your Excellency to this country and considers it timely to respectfully
> submit before you, as the head of the government of Iran, a brief account of the
> wrongs inflicted upon the Baha’is of Iran in recent times.
> Regarding the issue of tribulations perpetrated against the Baha’is of Iran, a 24-
> page report is available in the archives of this Assembly, in which many incidents of
> torture, tyranny, persecution, and harm against members of that community is
> 
> 43 In a communication dated December 3, 2009, the Archives Office of the National Spiritual Assembly of the
> 
> Baha’is of the United States informed the present translator that the original of this letter in English was not
> available in their files. Therefore, the following rendering from the Persian should be considered as
> approximating the original communication.
> 
> recorded. In accordance with this report, this Assembly can justly state that
> followers of the Baha’i Faith in Iran have been deprived of their civil rights in
> governmental agencies, that their possessions and property have been plundered by
> unregulated elements, and that their lives are the targets of attacks, even death, while
> police officers and security agents have offered no assistance.
> The National Spiritual Assembly [of the Baha’is of the United States] has copies
> of various letters and documents prepared by administrative agencies of the Baha’is
> of Iran, which have been submitted with great urgency to the government of that
> country, but which have remained unanswered and have resulted in no remedy. This
> Assembly is confident that Your Excellency, aware of the impoverishment of public
> opinion [in Iran] and the ill-behavior of officials, will take effective steps towards
> ensuring the safety and security of Baha’is under the protection of the law.
> What will be briefly outlined in this presentation relates to current events that
> commenced in 1944; reference to other events or enumerating the most critical
> details in these historical documents has been avoided.
> The instigators of persecution against Baha’is are in reality members of an active
> group known as Anjuman Tablighat Islami [The Society for Islamic Propaganda],
> whose activities have greatly increased since 1941. Members of the aforesaid group
> are active in various parts of the country and provoke the public against Baha’is;
> moreover, they urge the police to neglect the protection of these wronged citizens in
> the face of public abuse. Moreover, this Society has been engaged in publishing lies
> against the Baha’is and in fueling the fire of public enmity and prejudice, to the
> point that the populace now considers Baha’is to be enemies of religion and the
> nation, destroyers of Islam, and opposers of civil law. Wherever the Baha’is are
> under attack, the Muslim ‘ulama—in other words, mullas—have an active hand in
> events. They assure people in the mosques that if they were to massacre and
> completely annihilate the Baha’is, they would receive a worthy prize in paradise.
> They instruct people to kill Baha’is and plunder their possessions.
> These records indicate that in many instances, local authorities have considered
> any attempt to suppress this prejudicial incitement to be most dangerous. For this
> reason, despite the fact that Baha’is are most brutally subjected to attack and their
> possessions are pillaged, the nation’s administrative apparatus is also rendered
> impotent.
> In 1944, mosques and other Islamic institutions in Shahrud provoked the
> population to persecute the Baha’is. The people set the entrance to the Hadiratu’l-
> Quds [Baha’i Center] on fire, and plundered all the furnishings and provisions
> inside. A few days later, a tumultuous mob, five-thousand strong, armed with rocks,
> clubs, knives and meat-cleavers, attacked Baha’is. Several of them [Baha’is] took
> refuge in the police station, but were confronted by an officer’s cry, “Kill these
> infidels!” With that, the police officers assaulted the Baha’is with their rifle-butts.
> Simultaneously, the crazed mob attacked the homes and shops of the Baha’is, forced
> their way inside, and plundered all that there was, leaving these Baha’is naked and
> dispossessed—and not one soul came to their aid.
> A Baha’i by the name of Muhammad Jazbani was severely beaten and left injured
> and unmoving. His unconscious body was taken to a physician’s office in that
> vicinity, but the mob forced their way inside, seized the Baha’i, and threw him down
> from the second floor window. His dying body was so brutally assaulted in the
> streets that he soon expired.
> Among the Baha’is whose homes and shops were pillaged and then set on fire
> were the following families: Khuda’i, Aqazadih, Muhajirzadih, Tabataba’i, and
> ‘Attari. After destroying their shops, the mob attacked the homes of these Baha’is
> and killed several of them.
> 
> The Baha’is appealed to the governmental authorities; however, the investigators
> who were sent to Shahrud reported to the Justice Ministry that the real offenders
> were the Baha’is themselves! Another examiner submitted a prejudicial report filled
> with lies against the Baha’is. None of these non-Baha’i witnesses had the courage to
> testify about what they he had observed.
> Eventually, 34 individuals were arrested on charges of murder and pillage, and
> their case was sent to the High Criminal Court of Tehran. Of these, 31 were
> sentenced to misdemeanors and other minor offenses. The manner of this trial and
> the way it was conducted greatly offended public sentiment.
> Despite all existing evidence and witnesses, the murderers were freed, and the
> looters were sentenced to just one month of imprisonment.44 This resulted in the
> encouragement of lawlessness and the erosion of people’s confidence in the
> judiciary. This in turn resulted in a new wave of persecution against Baha’is. “Go,
> kill Baha’is and confiscate their possessions! Did the government punish the people
> of Shahrud? You too can act like them!” Such was the call to arms of the mischief-
> makers and rabble-rousers!
> The following is the text of a Ministerial Decree, no. 744, dated July 4, 1944:
> 
> Among the Baha’i teachers and leaders are commonly found those
> who work in governmental offices. The activities of these
> individuals and their involvement in the affairs of the nation are
> destructive and a cause of harm and loss. With the utmost care and
> seriousness they must be kept under surveillance; should they fail
> to follow instructions, they must be dealt with in accordance with
> the law.
> 
> This document provided the mischief-makers with the necessary pretext to further
> harass, persecute, and attack Baha’is, and to expel them from various government
> offices.45
> Other incidents that have been briefly reported are as follows:
> 
> • A home in Abadeh, which served as the Hadiratu’l-Quds [Baha’i Center], was set
> on fire, and a number of the Baha’i residents were beaten. Their books and
> papers were burned and their homes plundered. Two local clerics incited people
> to slay the Baha’is and confiscate their possessions. Police did not make any
> effort to prevent these actions.
> • In Aran, in the vicinity of Kashan, a mob burned the entrance of a Baha’i shop
> and then marched in the streets while shouting insults and abuse against Baha’is.
> 
> 44 After the Baha’i killings in Shahrud, a cleric by the name of Shaykh ‘Abdu’llah Shahrudi published a book
> 
> under the title, Dasa’is va Fitnih-Angizihayi Baha’iha, printed by Daftar Nashriyat Dini Nur. The appearance of
> this book came to the attention of one of the witnesses of these brutal killings and awakened his conscience.
> He decided to write a rebuttal and disclose the lies, untruths, and deceits in Shahrudi’s book. It so happened
> that this person was a supporter of Ahmad Kasravi, the famous author of the [polemical] monograph, Baha’igari
> [Baha’ism], and who by his own account, was a Pak-Dinan [lit. pure-religions, a reference to the followers of
> Ahmad Kasravi], and stated that “I have no connection to the Baha’is,” and who was even critical of the
> Baha’is. Under the title of Haqayiq Guftani, this book was first published by Daftar Parcham, in Tehran, on Azar
> 1324 [December 1945]. This monograph is an undeniable document of the crimes of mullas against Baha’is and
> clearly documents anti-Baha’ism in the Iranian culture. Haqayiq Guftani was published a second time by Payam
> Publishing and distributed by Alburz Press in Frankfurt, Germany. I recommend this book to all Iranians. (BC)
> [A rendering of this book in English is underway by the present translator.]
> 45 In the original text, it appears that this sentence is erroneously included with the ministerial proclamation.
> 
> • In Bandar-Gaz, people brought down the wall of the Hadiratu’l-Quds.
> • In Bushru’i, in Khurasan province, a number of Baha’is were injured, and two
> shops and seven homes were destroyed. The entrance to the Gulistan Javid
> [Baha’i cemetery] was burned, and the cemetery was completely ruined. Baha’i
> women and children were treated with great brutality; not only did
> governmental officials not take any action, they even forced the Baha’is to pay
> money to the attackers. Thirty individuals raided a home and severely beat the
> owner and his wife. The furnishings of that home—estimated to be worth
> 20,000 tumans—were looted. Among the attackers, the chief of police,
> Ghulam-Rida Jamshidi, employed violence against the wife of the Baha’i
> resident.
> • In Bandar-Shah, the shops of Baha’is were looted, and the Baha’is were
> subjected to harm and injuries, and attacked with knives. Police did not pursue
> the matter at all.
> • Similar incidents were reported in Bujard, Bam (Kerman), Rafsenjan, Zabul, and
> Sirjan.
> • In Tehran, people were ceaselessly urged to persecute Baha’is.
> • Azadegan newspaper published the following statement:
> Our laws regarding denying employment in governmental offices
> for [members of] this apostate sect [Baha’is] is completely clear.
> Therefore, by our official tradition, that is, by Islamic
> jurisprudence, the killing of Baha’is is permitted—nay, is
> considered a religious obligation.
> 
> Likewise, incidents of persecution, harassment, and discrimination against Baha’is,
> including bodily harm and injuries, as well as the pillaging of property and
> possessions, have been reported in: Tabas and Ferdaws (in the province of
> Khurasan), Qasr-Shirin, Qum, Kulaveh-Dareh (near Qazvin), Mahmud-Abad,
> Gulpaygan, Mahmudabad of Yazd, and Nahavand. All of these occurred in 1944.
> The following year, 1945, witnessed the wider spread of persecution and
> harassment in places such as Ardestan, Imamzadeh Hashem, Zabul, Isfand-Abad,
> Kengavar, Nayriz, Sirjan, Rubat-Turk, Asiaban, Fasa and Sarvestan. In Jahrum,
> Colonel Shirvani provided protection and security to those who had instigated these
> cruel and oppressive deeds. Other cities where Baha’is were subjected to various
> forms of harassment and maltreatment include Zavareh, Yazd, Eqlid, Isfahan,
> Geshin-Jan, and Fasa.
> For marrying in accordance with Baha’i rites, Baha’is were imprisoned
> throughout the province of Khurasan, and some were fined for this reason as well.
> In Isfahan, Baha’i sacred places and burial sites considered sacred and blessed by the
> Baha’i community were desecrated. In the same city, a Baha’i student was expelled
> because of his religion. In other towns, Baha’is were barred from attending public
> bathhouses.
> Documents and files of events related to 1946 are particularly disturbing. For
> instance, in Birjand, a section of the city that was a neighborhood of Baha’is was
> attacked and raided by a mob. The possessions of the Baha’is were plundered, their
> papers and documents destroyed, and several residents assaulted. It is estimated that
> this incident caused a loss in excess of 1,500,000 rials. The police and security forces
> were unable to withstand the onslaught of the attackers. Women and children were
> overcome with deep fright, while the men took refuge in the mountains and fields.
> In the same year, in cities such as Yazd, Sari, Pul-Sefid, Shahsavar, Beh-Shahr,
> Shahi, Nasrabad, Sarvestan, Mianduaba, Ardestan, Rafsenjan, Chenar, and Daryun,
> 
> Baha’is were violated and made targets of violence. It is noteworthy that in Brujen,
> near Isfahan, the chief of the Education Department, along with officials of the
> telegraph office and municipality, provoked Muslims against Baha’is. In Zahedan, a
> Baha’i youth aged 20 was so brutally beaten and his head smashed in with a
> hammer, that he lost the sight in one eye. In Khash (Zahedan), two Baha’is were
> assaulted with rocks and clubs, and their merchandise was pillaged. At Sar-Chah, a
> 60-year-old Baha’i woman was so mercilessly attacked that she was at death’s door
> because of the loss of blood. Thereafter, all Baha’i residents of that region were
> expelled.
> Moreover, records indicate that in that same year, 1946, in Kashan, Aran, Nayriz,
> Khuramabad, Bandar-Gaz, Jahrum, Dughabad, Dahaj, Riz, Zavarih, Chal-Khames,
> and Natanz, Baha’is sustained great losses to their persons and prosperity. In
> Zavarih, a cleric compelled people not to enter into business transactions with
> Baha’is and not to repay debts to them. In Natanz, near Isfahan, a Baha’i child died
> when her home was set on fire.
> In 1947, the unceasing efforts to exterminate the Baha’is failed in their objective.
> For this year, we refer to two horrific incidents, in which Baha’is in an area were
> violently attacked and compelled to leave their homes and the Spiritual Assembly
> was dissolved. In Bandar-Shah, the chief clerics barred any commercial interaction
> with Baha’is. In Gulpaygan, after Baha’is were beaten and injured, the local
> authorities incarcerated both groups, that is, both the assailants and the Baha’is.
> However, the public uproar reached such heights that they were forced to free the
> offenders and banish the Baha’is who had suffered through this ordeal.
> In Nameq, one of the towns in the province of Khurasan, police officers
> confiscated the Haziratu’l-Quds of the Baha’is and made it their own headquarters.
> As far as we are aware, the case involving the murder of a woman and her five
> children in Abarqu in 1950 has not yet been concluded. Although the local villagers
> knew who the real wrongdoer was and identified him to the authorities, and even
> though newspapers in Yazd published the real motive for this crime, nevertheless,
> through pressure exerted by influential citizens, the path of the investigation
> changed until eventually two Baha’is were accused and arrested. The Baha’is of Yazd
> informed the government that fanatical elements in Yazd were readying themselves
> to attack and assault Baha’is, and that if the authorities did not intercede, there
> would be grim consequences. At last, the case was sent to Tehran for adjudication.
> Based on what has been heard, uproar and noisy propaganda could greatly sway
> [official] decisions and hide the truth, and turn this case into a broad condemnation
> of the Baha’is and their religion.
> We are confident that this brief outline will suffice to establish our assertion,
> since in various parts of Iran, Baha’is have been ruthlessly made the target of assault
> and injury, some have been mercilessly killed, the possessions of many have been
> plundered and pillaged, and they have been deprived of their civil rights.
> Baha’is are not allowed to print books or journals. When the enemies publish
> lies, it brings disrepute upon the Baha’is.
> In the official government census, even though the Baha’is forthrightly declared
> their religion, nonetheless the census-takers registered them as Muslim.
> Fifty-eight Baha’is were discharged or suspended from work in the Education
> Ministry or other governmental offices by October 1950, and we have their names
> on file.
> At a time when the fanatical Muslims accused the Baha’is of atheism, Satan-
> worshiping and apostasy, and proclaimed them as the true enemies of Islam, our
> 
> Spiritual Assembly wrote to the leaders of Islam throughout Iran on March 21,
> 1928.46 That letter included the truth about the Baha’i teachings and the close
> connection between the Baha’i Faith and Islam, and the high regard by Baha’is for
> the Prophet Muhammad, which may aid Your Excellency in becoming more aware
> of the reality of the Baha’i Cause. For your information, we attach a copy of that
> communication, which has been translated into Persian, and submit it to your
> presence.
> The National Spiritual Assembly has copies of twelve publications appearing in
> Iranian media regarding violent attacks on the Baha’is of that country:
> 1. Dad newspaper, no. 1737, February 6, 1950.
> 2. Naysan newspaper, no. 8.
> 3. Mahan newspaper, no. 20, 1949.
> 4. Iran-Tehran newspaper, no. 9004, February 6, 1950.
> 5. Ittila‘at newspaper, no. 7147, February 6, 1950.
> 6. Ittila‘at newspaper, no. 7151, February 11, 1950.
> 7. Ittila‘at newspaper, no. 7146, February 5, 1950. [Ittila‘at newspaper, no.
> 7151, February 11, 1950, has been listed a second time.]
> 8. Bakhtar-Imruz newspaper, no. 156, February 5, 1950.
> 9. Kayhan newspaper, no. 2046, February 5, 1950.
> 10. Haraz newspaper, no. 24, February 11, 1950.
> 11. Millat-Iran newspaper, no. 90, February 9, 1950.
> 12. Khandaniha Journal, no. 44, February 14, 1950.
> 
> What has been described will of necessity reach the public outside Iran’s borders.
> Dissemination of these news items has not come about because Baha’is have spoken
> about them, but is due to travelers and visitors to Iran who have learned of these
> incidents, have written about them, and have shared those with the media. For
> instance, on October 4, 1950, the Cleveland Plain Dealer newspaper, a reliable and
> influential American media outlet, published a detailed account under the title, “An
> Iranian Religion is under Threat and Danger of Religious Fanatics.” That article
> discussed the verdict of acquittal rendered in the trial of the eight murderers who
> had confessed to killing Dr. Berjis, a Baha’i in Kashan.
> Dr. Musaddiq, we consider it essential to submit to your presence the truth of
> the Baha’i teaching, which emphatically enjoins upon Baha’is to be faithful to their
> government, obedient to the laws and not to participate in any antagonistic political
> parties. With utmost effectiveness, these teachings compel Baha’i citizens to
> praiseworthy conduct.
> We are deeply astonished and puzzled as to why a country like Iran, with its
> brilliant ancient civilization, which enjoys the benefits of constitutional law, can
> nevertheless deal with a minority group like the Baha’is in ways that are against
> decency and opposed to the provisions of the law, when its Constitution has clearly
> and with foresight provided for the equality of all people before the law.
> We submit this petition to your honor not only for the sake of religious
> fraternity and unity with, and affection for, the Baha’is of Iran, but also because of
> our Faith’s teachings, which enjoin upon us to have a special regard for Iran.
> We ask that with confidence you accept our well-wishing prayers.
> 
> With loving regards,
> Horace Holley, Secretary of the National Spiritual Assembly
> 
> 46 See appendix 8.
> 
> We do not know the exact effect that the reading of this complaint and its demand for
> justice had on Dr. Musaddiq. However, we are confident that he was completely against any
> extra-legal treatment of Baha’is, which was against the principles of the country’s
> constitutional code—and his enemies, particularly the mullas, have stated as much in their
> memoirs.
> 
> Chapter 4
> The Military Tribunal
> 
> Falsafi and Musaddiq
> The famed preacher Muhammad-Taqi Falsafi writes in his memoirs about his first visit along
> with a contingent of other clerics to the home of Dr. Musaddiq:
> 
> We went to the home of Dr. Musaddiq on Kakh Avenue, which is the present
> Palestine Avenue. He was lying in bed under the covers. We sat on chairs near him.
> Musaddiq asked with perplexity, “Do you go each day to mosque to perform your
> obligatory prayers?” It appeared that he was not aware to the necessary extent of the
> details of congregational prayers in the country’s mosques.…
> Even more bewildering was the incident that took place during the second
> meeting between Dr. Musaddiq and me. The background was that Baha’is in various
> towns had voiced complaints and were showing strength. At the instruction of the
> Grand Ayatu’llah Aqa Burujirdi, I went to see him. As he had been the last time, he
> was in his bed under the cover. I conveyed the message of Aqa Burujirdi and added,
> “You are the head of the Islamic government of Iran; presently the Baha’is are
> active in various towns and have caused complications for the Muslims. Therefore,
> constantly complaint letters are received about them by Aqa Burujirdi, and he
> considered it imperative that you take steps in this regard.”
> After I had concluded my remarks, Dr. Musaddiq gave me a mocking look and
> with a resonant voice started laughing, saying, “Aqa Falsafi, in my view, there is no
> difference between Muslims and Baha’is. They are all one nation and Iranian.”
> This reply was most astonishing for me since if he had asked, “What is the
> difference between Baha’is and Muslims?” I would have explained. But with that
> mocking laughter and comment, there was no room for further discussion or
> explanation. Therefore, I became silent, and the next time I met Ayatu’llah Burujirdi,
> told him of what had transpired. He listened with great wonder and astonishment.47
> 
> Opposition to Musaddiq
> It is important to repeat a point that fairness and conscience demands of us, and perhaps by
> mentioning it we will become better acquainted with an aspect of Iran’s contemporary
> history. We know—and there is no need to deny it since the youth of yesteryear, the present
> author included, were themselves close witnesses to it—that a few months before the coup
> d’état of August 19, 1953, at the instigation of the British and the United States, who were
> the leaders of the Cold War in Iran, the entire clerical and political establishment
> commenced opposition to the government of Dr. Musaddiq. Each day, through extensive
> and vociferous marches in the streets and bazaars, they expressed this opposition. Their
> newspapers and proclamations were widely published and disseminated. These opponents
> were declaring everywhere that the country was on the verge of falling into the Soviet camp
> and that soon the reins of power would be in the hands of the Communists and the Baha’is.
> 
> 47 Davani, Khatirat va Mubarizat Hujjatu’l-Islam Falsafi, pp. 138–39.
> 
> It suffices to cite one among the countless articles that were published against the
> Nationalist Movement and in favor of the suppression of Baha’is in the effort to implement
> the policies of the Cold War, so that we may become more thoroughly familiar with the
> clergy’s involvement in sedition and conspiracies.
> Hujjatu’l-Islam Siyyid Shamsu’d-Din Qannatabadi has written in an article:
> 
> Musaddiq’s anti-religious activities and his conspiracies against the Constitution, his
> changes [in the Constitution], his plans to alter the regime, his support of the Baha’is
> and the Tudeh Party, and his implementation of a plan to divide Iran and establish a
> dictatorship,…all caused the highly distinguished community of the clerics, from
> Ayatu’llahs Burujirdi, Kashani and Bihbahani, to the plain seminarians, to array
> themselves in a single row in accordance with their religious and national duties, and
> in conformity with their consciences, against the mischievous, untruthful, anti-
> religious, anti-clerical, and cursed government of Musaddiq.48
> 
> The opponents of the Nationalist Movement were hoping to provoke the sentiments of
> Ayatu’llah Burujirdi, who harbored profound enmity towards the Baha’is, by saying that Dr.
> Musaddiq supported and protected not only the members of the Tudeh Party but also the
> Baha’is.
> Ayatu’llahs Burujirdi and Kashani, as well as the preacher Muhammad-‘Ali Falsafi, and
> indeed the entire ecclesiastical establishment, never understood the meaning of “the people
> and the government,” and never accepted the premise of constitutional law in a
> constitutional monarchy; for this reason, they threw in their lot with those planning the coup
> d’etat, and the calamity of August 19th took place.49
> 
> The anti-imperialist uprising of the people of Iran was not an unplanned event, nor
> was it without a prelude. Similar to all other movements and revolutions, it came
> about as a historical necessity after a series of occurrences resulting from social and
> global developments after World War II, and led to great victories. The failure of
> this uprising was not unplanned nor without a precedent either, and many events
> and causes precipitated this fall.50
> 
> Dr. Musaddiq’s response to the query of his defense counsel, Colonel Jalil Buzurgmihr,
> stating that certain elements considered the growing power of the Tudeh Party to be
> dangerous and therefore brought about the August 19 bloody revolt, can be expanded, and
> we can also refute the slanderous and false charges against Dr. Musaddiq that he supported
> and promoted the Baha’is and the Tudeh Party. It is through this review of the facts that we
> learn about Dr. Musaddiq’s view of “nation,” “constitutional government,” and “liberty and
> democracy.” And it is because of his broadmindedness that we discover why the preacher
> Falsafi thought it was most astonishing when Musaddiq remarked, “Aqa Falsafi, in my view,
> there is no difference between Muslims and Baha’is. They are all one nation and Iranian.” In
> truth, Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq believed in parliamentary democracy and supported the
> Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
> 
> 48 Rahnama, Niruhayi Mazhabi bar Bistar Harikat Nihzati Milli, p. 996. (BC)
> 49 For details, see “Suppression of the Baha’is of Iran in 1955” included in this monograph. (BC)
> 50 Nijati, Tarikh Siyasi Bist-u-Panj Salih Iran, p. 17. (BC)
> 
> Hujjatu’l-Islam Muhammad-Taqi Falsafi
> 
> Let us consider Dr. Musaddiq’s response to Colonel Buzurgmihr:
> 
> Those who think this way do not possess political sense and acumen. What have
> these Tudeh members done? As that man said,51 they yelled slogans or printed
> newspapers. We did not give them permission to do anything else, and I always
> instructed the security forces to prevent them [i.e., the communists] from doing any
> harm…. Essentially, one should ask: What was the cause of coming into being, of
> the formation, and continued existence of my government? Was it something other
> than the fact that people supported me? Do governments have any other support
> other than the people? No, not at all.
> The foreigners were not happy [with my premiership]. Some others, who were
> servants of the foreigners and whose hands were completely cut off from affairs,
> were not happy with me either.
> Did the Senate willingly vote for this government? Was it out of fear of the
> people that I received a vote of confidence whenever I went to the National
> Parliament or the Senate?
> Therefore, when the people bring a government to power, that government is
> appointed by the people and cannot silence the voice of the people or prevent the
> people from speaking out. To suffocate the voice of the people is the work of
> imperialism. It is their way to ensure that no one can breathe a word so they can do
> whatever they wish, such as arranging for oil exports, or creating consortia and such
> things.52
> 
> With all its internal conflicts, the Nationalist Movement was not a harmonized political and
> historical phenomenon, but the premiership of Dr. Musaddiq was a harmonizing historical
> and political necessity. It was because of this reality that the people before the August 19th
> coup would shout in the streets, “Death or liberty,” followed by shouts of “Death or
> Musaddiq.”
> After the August 19th coup d’état, a description of which is beyond the scope of this
> monograph, a military tribunal was convened, at which Dr. Musaddiq gave a historic self-
> defense. This tribunal resulted in the disgrace of the government of Major-General Zahidi
> and eventually of Muhammad-Reza Shah, and to this date is considered one of the most
> important political trials in the contemporary history of Iran. Dr. Musaddiq’s testimony and
> 
> 51 A reference to Brigadier-General Husayn Azmudih, the prosecutor at Dr. Musaddiq’s military tribunal. Later,
> 
> he became a dervish, and his critics, such as Almuti, referred to him as “Eichmann ‘Ali Shah.” (BC)
> 52 Nijati, Tarikh Siyasi Bist-u-Panj Salih Iran, p. 20. (BC)
> 
> the defense of his lawyers in this tribunal caused a deep divide among the political elites of
> Iran, which neither the supporters nor the opponents of the Shah have been able to bridge.
> Colonel Jalil Buzurgmihr was Dr. Musaddiq’s defense attorney—a trustworthy and
> faithful man—who until his last breath kept the memory of Dr. Musaddiq true and
> exhilarating by publishing his valuable memoirs and documents. For reasons that are not
> clear to us, Dr. Musaddiq, however, did not fully trust him, and this fact is clearly revealed by
> Colonel Buzurgmihr in his own words in his Musaddiq dar Mahkamih Nizami [Musaddiq in
> the Military Tribunal].53 It appears that gradually, with great calmness, effort, and openness,
> he was able to win the trust of Dr. Musaddiq. At any rate, based on the court proceedings
> that Colonel Buzurgmihr has published himself and which are available to all, it appears that
> he had a minor role in the military tribunal. Nonetheless, we should remember him with
> much respect and praise him for being true and open during those perilous days.
> 
> Colonel Shahquli in the Military Tribunal
> Astonishingly, Brigadier-General Riahi, the head of the military’s Joint Chiefs prior to the
> August 19th coup, selected for his own defense counsel one of the most renowned Baha’is,
> who was highly regarded in all military courts. The skilled and learned defense of Dr.
> Musaddiq offered by Colonel Shahquli, the attorney of Brigadier-General Riahi, remains one
> the most brilliant, and without any exaggeration, the most significant and precise defense
> ever offered in Iran’s military courts. Regarding Shahquli, the following is noted by Colonel
> Jalil Buzurgmihr:
> 
> In the fifth session, Lieutenant-Colonel Shahquli, the attorney of Brigadier-General
> Riahi, began the defense of his client. Given his thorough knowledge of the criminal
> code, particularly the military justice code, as well as his extensive experience and
> expertise in military legal defense, Colonel Shahquli commenced by questioning the
> [court’s] jurisdiction over this trial. With a face beaming with smiles and self-
> confidence, with wise and learned expressions spiced with humor, with occasional
> charming smiles and great calmness and total control over his emotions, he
> conducted his deliberations with the utmost skill. The main line of his argument was
> a fundamental justification of Dr. Musaddiq’s views. In fact, he delivered this so well
> that Brigadier-General Azmudih [the prosecutor] in response to Lieutenant-Colonel
> Shahquli accused him of defending Dr. Musaddiq54—and this was true.55
> 
> Dr. Musaddiq knew Colonel Shahquli from earlier associations and had complete confidence
> in him. With some melancholy and perhaps with a touch of disappointment, Colonel Jalil
> Buzurgmihr writes:
> 
> At times during court recesses, he [Dr. Musaddiq] would put his head on the
> shoulder of Lieutenant-Colonel Azmin, who was one of the defense counsels of
> Brigadier-General Riahi. He would close his eyes and pretend to be sleep. At other
> times, he would put his head on the shoulder of Colonel Shahquli, the other defense
> attorney of General Riahi. Through their joint work and involvement on the
> 
> 53 See appendix 5. (BC)
> 54 This was not the trial of Dr. Musaddiq, but Shahquli was laying the groundwork for the later trial of the
> 
> prime minister.
> 55 See appendix 5. (BC)
> 
> commissions appointed to reform the criminal code within the military, Dr.
> Musaddiq and Colonel Shahquli had established deep bonds of friendship and
> fraternity.
> They would peacefully and with smiles whisper certain words between
> themselves, though they did not exchange any comments with me. The court
> recognized me as the Prime Minister’s tort attorney, but he bore no expressions of
> gratitude or of being happy with this fact, and did not even bother to pretend.56
> When his case was appealed, I was appointed by him to be his lawyer, and for
> outward appearances he would uphold the lawyer-client relationship.57
> 
> Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq and Colonel Shahquli in the military tribunal
> 
> Regarding Colonel Shahquli, Muhammad-‘Ali Muvahhid, the author of the well-documented
> and enjoyable monograph, Khab Ashufteh Naft [The nightmare of oil], writes the following:
> “Among the attorneys defending Brigadier-General Riahi, Colonel Shahquli was the most
> eloquent, with the best command of arguments, and he was remarkably distinguished.”
> Elsewhere, he restates the same view, “With an irrefutable and solid logic, and vast
> knowledge of the law, Colonel Shahquli was the most eminent among the legal counselors in
> the military tribunal of Dr. Musaddiq.”58
> With legal deductions and sufficient evidence, Colonel Shahquli established that the
> military tribunal against Dr. Musaddiq, the [former] prime minister, was unlawful and against
> the provisions of Iran’s Constitution and its criminal and penal code. From the perspective
> of law, he did not consider the presiding judge to have jurisdiction over the trial, and his
> deduction was correct. That is because during the premiership of Dr. Musaddiq and after the
> passage of the Military Court Reform laws, the man serving as the judge had been forced
> into early retirement. [Shahquli argued that] such a person could not serve as the presiding
> judge in a tribunal.
> After the August 19th coup, almost all officers who had been forced to retire on the
> instructions of Dr. Musaddiq and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Riahi, were
> 
> 56 Colonel Buzurgmihr had been appointed by the court to be Dr. Musaddiq’s legal representative. (BC)
> 57 Nijati, Tarikh Siyasi Bist-u-Panj Salih Iran, p. 22. (BC)
> 58 Muvahhid, Khab Ashuftih Naft: Az Kuditay 28 Murdad ta Suqut Zahidi, ch. 6, “The Most Significant Trial in
> 
> Iran, the Defense Proceedings of Colonel Shahquli,” pp. 173–82, and p. 475. The present author highly
> recommends this book to all, since it is well documented and learned, and, unlike other political writings in
> Persian, it is unbiased. It should be noted that Colonel ‘Abbas-Quli Shahquli later became a member of the
> National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Iran. (BC)
> 
> returned to active duty on the recommendation of General Zahidi. Colonel Nasiri and other
> officers forced into early retirement were even promoted to a higher rank by General Zahidi
> prior to the August 19th coup and before the Shah’s return to the country. Thus, they
> received their reward for their collaboration with the organizers of the coup.
> Colonel Buzurgmihr writes, “Shahquli’s defense in the military tribunal certainly attracted
> considerable attention. He had participated in the Commissions for drafting Dr. Musaddiq’s
> reform legislation concerning the military courts and the military in general, and had exerted
> influence on these issues in which he deeply believed.”
> After the trial of Dr. Musaddiq was referred to the Military Court of Appeal, Colonel
> Shahquli prepared a forty-page statement in which he raised numerous objections to the
> ruling of the preliminary tribunal. Buzurgmihr writes, “It appears that the government of the
> day considered the forthrightness and intelligence of Shahquli to be inappropriate; he was
> instructed to feign illness [and to withdraw from the case], and he did as bidden.”
> After the initial session of the court, Colonel Shahquli did not participate in its later
> sessions. Buzurgmihr adds that pretending to be ill and the subsequent withdrawal of
> Shahquli was ordered [by the government] and politically motivated, but he also notes that
> he went to see him and saw “evidence of actual illness in him.”59
> At the conclusion of the military tribunal, as a means of payback for defending Dr.
> Musaddiq and raising logical objections to the jurisdiction of the military court [in trying the
> former prime minister], Colonel Shahquli was immediately retired from active duty on the
> instructions of Muhammad-Reza Shah, and Iran’s military lost one of its ablest and most
> devoted officers, loyal to the army and to the nation.
> 
> 59 Muvahhid, Khab Ashuftih Naft: Az Kuditay 28 Murdad ta Suqut Zahidi, pp. 174–75. (BC)
> 
> Chapter 5
> The Trial and the Verdict
> 
> Everything we know about Dr. Musaddiq has firmly established that he was against any form
> of suppression of ideas, anti-Baha’ism, or aggression towards unorthodox thinkers.
> Nonetheless, despite the promise that he had given to the representatives of the American
> Baha’is, Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq was unable to bring about a fair trial, nor was he able to
> effect the liberty of a number of innocent Muslims and Baha’is who had fallen victim to the
> connivance of religious clerics and Fada’iyan Islam. He himself was thoroughly consumed
> with political upheavals as well as internally and externally conceived conspiracies and plots.
> It was most unfortunate that those accused of the murders in Abarqu were entrapped in this
> sad spectacle during one of the most chaotic moments in the history of Iran.
> 
> Collection of More Evidence
> The trial of those accused of murder in Abarqu was convened on May 7, 1952, about two
> months before the resignation of Dr. Musaddiq from the premiership on July 16, 1952.60
> Before the court was convened and the trial took place, No. 1 Division of the Central
> Criminal Court studied the case dossier and, recognizing the inadequacy of the evidence,
> decided to take steps to complete the file. It wrote:
> 
> •   Where are the three unidentified Baha’is of Isfandabad who have been accused of being the
> real murderers? Bring them so we can sentence them to execution and also convict others of
> being accomplices.
> •   There is not a shred of evidence in the file about the activities of ‘Abbas-‘Ali Purmihdi. You
> must investigate further and state what his role has been in this murder.
> •   What is the source for Sergeant-Major Khakpur’s assertion that the furnishings of the slain
> were taken to the village of Dehbid to Ahmad Niku’i by Muhammad-Husayn, the brother of
> Muhammad Shirvani? How could Muhammad-Husayn have killed Sughra at night, then
> traveled to Dehbid, and returned to Abarqu by the morning?
> 
> Nevertheless, many essential elements of this case were disregarded. For instance, the
> [supposed] religious motivations for these murders; the inspector’s decision to set the
> 
> 60 An incident took place in Yazd that caused considerable problems for the Baha’is of that region. The
> following is recorded in The Baha’i World, vol. 12, p. 705:
> In March 1951, in Yazd, a young man was discovered dead in a desolate part of the town. A
> few enemies of the Baha’i Faith spread false rumors about, to the effect that the boy had
> been murdered by Baha’is. They placed his body in a coffin and carried it around the town
> lamenting the death of the youth and speaking vehemently of the cruel deed of the Baha’is.
> While this incident was taking place, two men who were members of the Faith, were severely
> beaten in a neighborhood shop because of their religious affiliation with the Baha’i group.
> At the same time another group of enemies of the Faith went about the town of Taft
> destroying the gardens and damaging the homes of Baha’is. One Baha’i with a Parsi
> background, named Barham Seroosh Rawhani, complained to the police about these
> persecutions. On the way back to his home that night he was attacked with knives and
> martyred by enemies of the Faith.
> 
> primary suspects, who were Sughra’s guests that night, free without any bond; the role of
> Isfandiyar Khan Salari; the sudden dismissal of Commander Haqqgu from his post in Yazd;
> the dismissal without cause of the chief of police in Abarqu, Sergeant-Major Husayn
> Sadripur, etc.
> At any rate, [inspector] Asadu’llah Zamanian was appointed to complete the legal file.
> He went to Yazd, raided the home of the Baha’is and their Hadiratu’l-Quds [Baha’i Center]
> in the same city, and confiscated a large quantity of notebooks, papers, Baha’i writings,
> books, some commercial documents of Jalal Binish, and even personal records and family
> pictures, as well as treasured manuscripts—in short, many documents that had nothing to do
> with the Abarqu case. He sent these to Tehran as irrefutable evidence of the case. He then
> traveled to Isfandabad and briefly questioned Sergeant-Major Khakpur.
> However, what he presented as his final report in response to the questions raised by the
> court as a means of completing the file is very interesting:
> 
> •    Regarding the three Baha’i farmers in Isfandabad, they had been freed, since even the
> inspector in Yazd, Sadiqi, had no choice but to let them go. However, Zamanian summoned
> them again, confounded them with kindness and trickery, and placed a paper before them, in
> order that those illiterate individuals should place their mark on it.61 Immediately afterwards,
> though, he arrested these three individuals—Muhammad Rafahi, Hasan Himmati, and
> Husayn Karambakhsh—and sent them forthwith to Tehran. In this way, he taught a new
> lesson in treachery and deceit to Khakpur and his master, Sadiqi.
> •    Regarding ‘Abbas-‘Ali Purmihdi and his connection with Muhammad Shirvani, no matter
> how they tried, they could not find the smallest evidence to establish their connection.
> However, eventually they located two individuals in Abarqu who testified, “Three days after
> Sughra’s murder, we saw ‘Abbas-‘Ali, who seemed agitated, in Abarqu, saying that he wanted
> to go to Yazd.” This became their “strong” evidence for his involvement in the murder.
> •    Regarding the impossibility of Muhammad-Husayn traveling all that distance that night, this
> too is very interesting. Khakpur had responded to Zamanian, “I do not remember who told
> me about this. But, Mr. Inspector, praise be unto God, you are very smart, so how do you
> not disbelieve that Muhammad-Husayn had killed Sughra, and that night traveled 150
> kilometers to Dehbid, returning by daylight?”
> 
> In such frivolous ways, responses to the court’s preliminary queries were arrayed and
> sufficient evidence for commencing the trial were assembled.
> 
> The Principles62
> As noted earlier, the court convened on May 7, 1952, at No. 1 Division of the Tehran
> Criminal Court.
> 
> The accused were as follows:
> 
> 61 According to Nikravan, “Barrasi,” in this document, the three Baha’is had confessed that the night before the
> 
> murder they had met with Shirvani and conceived the plans for Sughra’s murder.
> 62 This section has been added by the translator based on the report of the National Spiritual Assembly of the
> 
> Baha’is of Iran, July 16, 1952, reproduced in appendix 9, document 2.
> 
> •   The nine members of the Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Yazd: Badi‘u’llah
> Afnan, Muhammad-‘Ali Afnan, Majdhub, Dr. Malakutian, Dr. Manshadi, Mishki,
> Rafati, Salekian, Dr. Rasti;
> •   Hasan Shams, a member of the Spiritual Assembly of Isfandabad;
> •   ‘Abbas-‘Ali Purmihdi, a Baha’i pioneer in Abarqu;
> •   Husayn Karambakhsh, a Baha’i from Isfandabad;
> •   Hasan Himmati, a Baha’i from Isfandabad;
> •   Muhammad Rafahi, a Baha’i from Isfandabad;
> •   Muhammad Shirvani, a Muslim;
> •   Ahmad Niku’i, a former Baha’i;
> •   Muhammad-Husayn Niku’i, a Muslim (the last three were brothers);
> •   ‘Ali-Muhammad Shirvani, 20-year-old son of Muhammad Shirvani.
> 
> The panel of judges consisted of:
> • Justice Ashraf Ahmadi, president (a Shaykhi)
> • Justice Amir Ibrahimi, member (a Shaykhi)
> • Justice Vakili, member
> • Justice Fakhr Tabatabai, member
> • Justice Arshad Amiri, member
> 
> Prosecutor:
> • Khili Sabri, a Sunni
> 
> Tort Counsel pleading on behalf of the relatives of the deceased:
> • Shaykh Rida Malik
> • Adib Razavi-Yazdi
> • Mihdi Razavi
> • Khudadad Sabir Astarani
> • Abu’l-Hasan ‘Amidi-Nuri
> 
> Defense Counsel was composed of the following lawyers:
> • Naraqi, a Muslim
> • Mahmud Safavi, a Muslim
> • Abdullah Razi, a Muslim
> • Aziz Navidi, a Baha’i
> • Ahmad Nasiri, a Baha’i
> • Kazem Kazemzadeh, a Baha’i
> 
> After the procedure for the identification of the defendants was completed, the prosecutor’s
> indictment outlining the charges against the accused was read in full at the court. A summary
> of this indictment is provided in appendix 9, document 2.
> 
> The Role of Clerics in the Trial
> 
> The most essential point in the course of this incident is that the provocation of people and
> incitement of public uproar by the clerical establishment and its leadership was due to the
> clerics’ enmity and hatred for the Baha’is, and their actions were done for the purpose of
> instilling fear in the judicial officials and covering up the glaring holes in the legal file.
> The previous pages presented a brief account of political and religious developments in
> Iran after the conclusion of World War II and the impact of the Cold War on these
> developments. There is no doubt that Isfandiyar Khan Salari, in order to exonerate himself
> of the crime he had committed, placed blame on the Baha’is. However, this scheme could
> not have been implemented without the collaboration and alliance of the mullas. It appears
> conclusively that since he was a maternal grandson of Akhund Haji Shaykh Ahmad, the
> Imam-Jum‘ih of Abadeh, he had without doubt learned such conspiracies in the seminary
> classes of the Haji. For a wealthy and affluent man like him, who enjoyed close ties to the
> mullas, it is likely that through Ayatu’llah Siyyid Nuri’d-Din Shirazi, who was a sworn enemy
> of the Baha’is and who had established a considerable organization in the province of Fars
> against Baha’is, that he had made contacts with the office of Ayatu’llah Burujirdi, since it was
> enough only for the latter to hear the phrase “Baha’i” for him to lose all his composure. This
> is not merely a hypothesis or a conjecture; it is something that all the mullas who are
> presently at the top of the Islamic government confirm and affirm.
> In fact, there is no need to cite the memoir of Ayatu’llah Husayn-‘Ali Muntazari,
> inasmuch as earlier we cited a portion of the recollections of Muhammad-Taqi Falsafi, and
> that should suffice. However, the enmity of this Source of Emulation [Ayatu’llah Burujirdi]
> was expressed particularly strongly in the case of the murders of Abarqu, as evidenced by the
> facts that his student, companion, and biographer, Hujjatu’l-Islam ‘Ali Davani, has narrated.
> The latter, who on “numerous occasions” benefited from the highly adorned seminary [in
> Qum] and who was trusted with the most secret thoughts and doings of the Source of
> Emulation of the Twelver Shi’is, Grand Ayatu’llah Haji Aqa Husayn Burujirdi, stated that in
> a similar instance, the Ayatu’llah
> 
> would immediately write letters to the Shah, the prime minister and Ayatu’llah
> Bihbahani and send them to Tehran.
> Several years ago when the wayward sect of the Baha’is had sent several of their
> mischief-makers to one of the villages of Yazd where with a shovel they tore into
> pieces a hapless woman named Sughra and her young children, and they connived
> to escape justice, the late Ayatu’llah did not have a moment of rest by night or day.
> Constantly, he communicated with Tehran, with the great scholars in the capital,
> and with governmental authorities, which eventually led to the criminals [i.e.,
> Baha’is] suffering the consequences of their deed. Some were hung and others still
> remain in prison.
> 
> Elsewhere, this confidant and companion of the chief of the Shi’is of the world writes
> regarding another incident in which several innocent Baha’is were arrested on a charge of
> murder:
> 
> Several Baha’is had killed one of their coreligionists, and through trickery had
> presented some devoted [i.e., Muslim] youth to the law. One of these youth was
> sentenced to execution, and the verdict was to be carried out in mid-Sha‘ban. This
> news deeply worried the Source of Emulation in Qum. Without any hesitation, he
> wrote letters to the Shah, to the prime minister and Ayatu’llah Bihbahani and sent
> them to Tehran. He then telephoned whomever he thought useful and pursued the
> 
> matter, until eventually in the middle of night the news of the verdict’s commutation
> was communicated to him. When he heard this news, tears poured from his eyes,
> and he profusely praised the Lord. At this time, one of his companions came into
> his room and asked, “Are you still awake?” The great Source of Emulation of the
> Shi‘is responded, “It was a very important matter, but came to pass well. Every time
> I think that the blood of an innocent Muslim might be spilled, my entire being
> trembles and I am overcome with the worry: How would I answer God on the Day
> of Resurrection?”63
> 
> There is no need to wait until the Day of Resurrection, since we will see in the conclusion of
> this book that Ayatu’llah Burujirdi’s hands were covered with the blood of innocents—and
> astonishingly, not just the blood of Baha’is, but also the blood of Muslims who considered
> him their Source of Emulation. Religious prejudice causes calamity.64
> Ahmad Nasiri, the attorney representing the three accused from Isfandabad, has
> mentioned several recollections in his account of the frenzied trial, of which we will cite only
> one instance.65 This particular recollection is about the involvement of Ayatu’llah Bihbahani,
> the fully empowered representative of Ayatu’llah Burujirdi, with respect to the murders at
> Abarqu. Because of the clarity of this recollection and its simplicity, there is no need to
> provide any commentary or analysis. Nasiri writes:
> 
> Before the trial of the accused in the murders of Abarqu, I came across Haji ‘Ali-
> Akbar Khan Tih in the courthouse. He was a litigator at the time and later became
> the prosecutor for the Bar Association.66 In the course of our conversation, he
> asked, “Are you involved with the Abarqu case?” I replied affirmatively. Haji ‘Ali-
> Akbar Khan Tih said, “I have an experience in this regard, which I should recount
> for you.”
> He then related, “Some time ago, one of the exalted ‘ulama, that is, Bihbahani,
> sent me a message to meet with him. I went to visit him. He raised the issue of the
> Abarqu murders and the trial, and instructed me to accept the role of the tort
> defense counsel,67 saying, ‘It brings a reward in the next world and also your fee will
> be paid.’ I replied to him, ‘So far about ten tort lawyers have been hired for the
> defense team. Is this not sufficient, that I should participate as well?’
> “Bihbahani replied, ‘No, your involvement is necessary as well. For the sake of
> protecting the rights of the victims’ descendants, you should agree to legally
> represent them. Your presence will be effective.’ I said, ‘If it is so, then kindly issue
> instructions to pay my fee so I can begin.’ [Ayatu’llah] Behbahani replied, ‘I will
> advise them to pay you 2,000 tumans and also there is an eternal reward.’ I said, ‘If I
> 
> 63 Davani, Zindigani Za‘im Buzurg ‘Alim Tashay‘, ‘Allamih ‘Aliqadr Hadrat Ayatu’llah Burujirdi Quds Sarih. (BC)
> 64 According to Nikravan, “Barrasi,” considerable pressure was also brought upon the Shah and the court by
> 
> Ayatu’llah Shari‘atmadari in Qum and other high-ranking clerics in Mashhad.
> 65 The Baha’i defendants were represented by three Baha’i lawyers and several Muslim lawyers. The Baha’i
> 
> lawyers were Azizu’llah Navidi (1913–1987), Kazem Kazemzadeh (1898–1989), and Ahmad Nasiri.
> 66 One of Dr. Musaddiq’s reforms was to make Iran’s Bar Association independent of the Justice Department.
> 
> Although most of the legislation passed during the Musaddiq era was later abrogated, the independence of the
> Bar Association was maintained.
> 67 Tort law is a body of law that addresses and provides remedies for civil wrongs stemming from intentional
> 
> and negligent acts. A person who suffers legal damages may be able to use tort law to receive compensation
> from someone who is legally responsible, or liable, for those injuries. In the Abarqu case, not only were the
> defendants prosecuted by the Justice Ministry, they were also sued by ten lawyers provided by the clerical
> establishment.
> 
> am asked to take on this case, then kindly instruct them that 20,000 tumans be paid
> as my fee. I will then accept this case.’ Surprised, he stated, ‘The descendants of the
> victims have nothing, and this 2,000 tuman was raised by the believers. You should
> accept this amount.’
> “I replied, ‘As far as I have heard, so far 700,000 tumans has been collected for
> this trial, and I will not accept anything less than 20,000 to serve as the tort counsel.’
> When I said that, Aqa Bihbahani became agitated and with much anger said, ‘Such
> talk is not true. If you do not want to accept the case, you are free to decline.’”
> Haji ‘Ali-Akbar Khan Tih added, “I did not accept the case, but as long as such
> sums of money can be raised, each year they will accuse a Baha’i for having
> murdered someone and on the pretext of hiring tort attorneys, collect and pocket
> large sums.”68
> 
> In accordance with Ayatu’llah Bihbahani’s instruction, every night the mullas at mosques and
> worship centers cursed, blighted, attacked, and slandered the Baha’is and convinced people
> who did not suspect their deception and conspiracies.
> For the sake of history, we should record the names of the ten69 tort attorneys who were
> on the payroll of Ayatu’llah Bihbahani, since some of these names are still current on
> people’s tongues: Kishavarz Sadr, Shaykh Reza Maliki, Ahmad Dhu’l-Majd Tabataba’i,
> Hashim Tabataba’i, Pur-Reza, Adib Razavi Yazdi, Siyyid Mihdi Razavi, Khudadad Sabir
> Astara’i, and most unfortunate of all, Abu’l-Hasan ‘Amidi-Nuri, the editor of Dad
> newspaper, who at first published the news and the names of the real perpetrators of the
> Abarqu murders, but who later after receiving fees for legal services from Ayatu’llah
> Bihbahani spoke extensively in the trial against the innocent defendants.
> From this time onward, Iran’s judiciary was under the control of the collaborators of
> Ayatu’llah Burujirdi and his Tehran chieftain, Ayatu’llah Bihbahani, and the thugs and
> ruffians of the terrorist organization Fada’iyan Islam ruled over the Justice Ministry’s
> headquarters in Iran.
> 
> Anti-Baha’i Propaganda
> During the Abarqu trial, a large number of mullas and preachers, as well as fanatical and
> angry shopkeepers from the bazaar, sat in the courtroom, not to observe the proceedings,
> but only to disrupt the order in the court and to instill fear in the defendants’ attorneys. With
> a loud and vociferous uproar, they would demand that the court issue a verdict against the
> [Baha’i] accused and condemn them to execution.
> In order to deflect anti-religious sentiments from himself, Khalil Sabri, the prosecutor in
> the case who was a Sunni, was extreme in his fervor, and delivered a seditious and regrettable
> indictment in front of the Shi‘i congregation attending the trial. He claimed, “For fifty years,
> Baha’is have been killing people,” and concluded his remarks by stating, “The court must
> punish the accused to the fullest extent of the law, as otherwise the people themselves will
> take revenge.” In this manner, he incited religious prejudices and brought about a fearful
> atmosphere in the court, even though the task of the prosecutor was to present factual
> evidence against the accused.
> 
> 68 Afnan, Bigunahan, pp. 155–56.
> 69 Only nine names are given in the text.
> 
> Each day outside the courthouse, pamphlets filled with lies, calumnies, reprehensible
> slanders, and shameful insults were distributed by the terrorist society of Fada’iyan Islam. As
> an example, in a decorated 32 x 52 cm. flyer, the following was printed:
> 
> How were the lady Sughra and her innocent five children killed? Why were they
> killed? Who are their murderers and instigators?
> Each day, from 9 in the morning come to the Criminal Court and observe the trial.
> How will the nation’s authorities, the judiciary, and the honored judges
> adjudicate and administer justice regarding this great tragedy? Will they hang the
> murderers and instigators on the gallows, or will they leave the judgment and
> punishment to the people to administer? With heavy hearts we will observe the
> trial until its last day and await its verdict.
> 
> In another proclamation by the same Fada’iyan Islam, the following was said:
> 
> This is an Islamic nation. The brave people of Iran will drag the evil remains of
> unpatriotic elements in the dust of abasement.
> O nationless Baha’is! O sullied hands! O high authorities in the judiciary! O
> judges! The eyes of millions Muslims are open to your deeds; from under a
> mountain of dirt, the blood-soaked bodies of the martyrs of Abarqu, who have been
> torn and broken with shovels and pickaxes, are now fixed on your judgment!
> We demand:
> 
> 1. Execution of those involved in the murder of a woman and her five
> children;
> 2. Execution of the evil elements who in the courtroom of this Shi‘i nation
> have openly confessed to their apostasy [i.e., to being Baha’is].
> 
> In another proclamation that Fada’iyan Islam disseminated in the same building of Iran’s
> high court, the following was reflected:
> 
> Should the court and its judges fail to punish the shameless murderers of a meek
> Muslim lady and her dear five children, or hesitate or delay in issuing the verdict of
> execution regarding them, then by the order of the Lord of creation, the brave
> children of Islam will send, wherever they may be, the criminal Baha’is to hell.
> We swear by the Almighty God that should those who have torn asunder our
> Muslim sister and her beloved children not be hanged from the gallows, not only we
> will tear each and every one of them into pieces, we will also gravely punish the
> responsible and conservative authorities.
> 
> Dozens of similar proclamations and pamphlets were distributed, all intended to provoke the
> religious sentiments of ill-informed people and to influence the decision of the court.
> 
> Presentation of Tort Attorneys
> With the exception of two or three of the tort attorneys who confined themselves to
> discussion of the law, legal matters, details of the incident and, in fairness, observed decorum
> and etiquette, the other tort attorneys over several days of the trial consistently caused a huge
> uproar, and in place of logic and deduction in proving the charges against the [Baha’i]
> 
> defendants, they launched severe attacks, accompanied by false accusations and the most
> abusive language, against the personal beliefs and characters of the accused.
> Khudadad Sabir Astarani, who bore great enmity towards Baha’is, would bring such
> books to the court as the Bayan by the Siyyid-i Bab, the Aqdas by Baha’u’llah, and Mufawadat
> [Some Answered Questions] by ‘Abdu’l-Baha. Misleadingly, he would proclaim that Baha’is
> considered every impure object as clean, or if a Baha’i did not change the furnishing of his
> house every 19 years, then he would be expelled from the community, or that Baha’is must
> place their dead in marble coffins for interment, and was it not clear that “if everyone
> became Baha’i, where would so much marble come from?”
> In order to deflect charges of being a Baha’i-sympathizer, Abu’l-Hasan ‘Amidi-Nuri, the
> editor of Dad newspaper, who at the beginning of the events had published a true account of
> the incident and had indentified the actual instigators on the strength of a report by
> Baniadam, the truthful Governor of Yazd, brought with him the thoroughly fictitious and
> fabricated Memoirs of Kinyaz Dolgorukii, the former Russian Ambassador to Iran,70 and read
> the entire text in the court and without any evidence or support called the accused,
> “nationless, spies and murderers.”71
> Siyyid Mihdi Razavi, another tort lawyer of Ruqiyih, the sole surviving daughter of
> Sughra, stated, “By causing uproar and pandemonium in the trials of those who had killed
> the mahduru’d-Dam72 Baha’is in Shahrud or Dr. Berjis in Kashan, we threatened and
> frightened the judges, and succeeded in gaining acquittals through the court.” With such
> words, he deliberately told the judges and observers what they were expected to do.
> Adib Razavi-Yazdi said, “Before the Constitutional Revolt, anyone who openly admitted
> to being a Baha’i in Yazd was a must-be-killed, and by now, hundreds of Baha’is have been
> killed in Yazd on the basis of fatwas issued by the ‘ulama.73 However, after the ratification of
> the Constitution, ‘ulama were not permitted to issue a fatwa sanctioning anyone’s death, and
> as such, the court must find Baha’is guilty and through this means eradicate these people.”
> Another tort attorney spoke at length about the necessity of giving the Baha’is to
> different occupational groups for killing—the same thing that Nasiri’d-Din Shah Qajar had
> done with the Babis of Tehran.74Yet another attorney hired by Ayatu’llah Bihbahani claimed
> that Mirza Taqi-Khan Amir-Kabir was killed by Baha’is, while another attorney said that the
> 
> 70 The book, Memoirs of Kinyaz Dolgorukii, was a creation of the fiction-writing pen of ‘Ali Javaher-Kalam and
> 
> was published with the financial aid of Astan Quds Razavi and the encouragement of the Shi‘i clerical
> establishment. (BC)
> 71 His misfortune was in the fact that after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, all his services were ignored by
> 
> the mullas, and he came to an ill end. On Thursday, October 9, 1997, Kayhan newspaper printed in London, no.
> 677, page 11, the following account in Persian:
> Abu’l-Hasan ‘Amidi-Nuri, the publisher of Dad newspaper, who was a flamboyant attorney
> and a Member of Parliament, was executed by the Islamic Republic. It was then reported to
> his family that his execution was in error, and as such, the instruction to confiscate his estate
> was withdrawn. (BC)
> 72 Literally, free blood, refers to such groups as Baha’is, the spilling of whose blood is not subject to religious
> 
> sanction or payment of blood-money to the surviving family under Shi‘i jurisprudence.
> 73 On the brutal pogrom against the Baha’is of Yazd and its environs, see Rabbani, Baha’i Martyrdoms in Manshad
> 
> in 1903: Three Historical Accounts; and also, Rabbani, “‘Abdu’l-Baha’s Proclamation on the Persecution of Baha’is
> in 1903.”
> 74 A detailed discussion of this incident is given by ‘Abdu’l-Baha, presumably based on his firsthand knowledge.
> 
> See, Mu’ayyad, Eight Years Near ‘Abdu’l-Baha: Diary of Dr. Habib Mu’ayyad.
> 
> reason that the Baha’is had slain Sughra was because fifty years earlier the Muslims of
> Abarqu had killed two Baha’is.75
> They manufactured the most bewildering statements in the name of the Comte de
> Gobineau, Edward Granville Browne, and George Bernard Shaw, and openly insulted,
> belittled and abused the sacred beliefs of the accused, accompanied by the most offensive
> language. Along with these, members of the Fada’iyan Islam, who had filled all the chairs in
> the courtroom, would raise the cry of Allah’u’Akbar, or occasionally proclaim salutations to
> the Prophet, as a means of supporting and confirming the outlandish remarks of the tort
> attorneys. The air was so filled with attacks and threats that the defense attorneys, and of
> course the accused themselves, were deeply frightened, and had lost all hope of surviving
> this ordeal; with great trepidation and worry, they awaited the conclusion of this spectacle.
> The insults and accusations against the defendants voiced by the attorneys bought by
> Ayatu’llah Bihbahani, even though they were all completely unrelated to the Abarqu
> murders, and even though not all of the defendants were Baha’i and some were Muslim,
> nonetheless were not met with any objections on the part of the presiding judges. On the
> contrary, time and again, the defendants’ attorneys were interrupted by judges who warned
> them about and objected to their statements. There is much to be said on this.
> Ahmad Nasiri, one of the defense counsels, stated:
> 
> At the end of the third day of trial, Siyyid Mahmud Safavi, who was another attorney
> representing the defendants, and I were leaving the courtroom. Suddenly we were
> confronted in the corridors of the courthouse by one of the fanatical elements
> whose job was to provoke the spectators into disruption, who was wearing an ‘aba
> and kippah, and displaying a long beard. He began to chase and threaten us in the
> most abusive and filthy language. Siyyid Mahmud Safavi held my hand and said,
> “Do not respond.” With great haste we left the courthouse.
> Next day, Siyyid Mahmud Safavi sent a note by his physician stating that he was
> ill, and he never attended the trial after that.
> For a long time after that, whenever he saw me in the court building, he would
> avoid me and pretend that he did not know me.
> 
> It is likely that Ahmad Nasiri did not know that Siyyid Mahmud Safavi was the maternal
> uncle of Siyyid Mujtaba Navvab Safavi, the founder of the terrorist society Fada’iyan Islam.
> Undoubtedly, Siyyid Mahmud Safavi’s life had been threatened by the head of the Fada’iyan
> Islam, and on the pretext of being ill, he had withdrawn from the case. The Fada’iyan Islam
> always sought to conceal the fact that the mother and the maternal uncle of Navvab Safavi
> were deeply appalled by his crimes and always turned their backs on his evil ways.
> 
> Lawyers Representing Baha’i Defendants
> It is propitious to name those who in the midst of such turbulent times and worrisome
> conditions nevertheless accepted to represent the Baha’is; perchance, their example of
> 
> 75 Presumably, this is a reference to the fact that two Baha’is, Aqa Siyyid Ja‘far and Ustad Muhammad Zaman
> 
> Sabbagh, were arrested in Isfandabad, taken to Abarqu, and publicly tortured and killed on April 2, 1901. Later
> in the same year, another Baha’i, Aqa Rida, was killed in his own home in Isfandabad. In 1903, Aqa ‘Ali
> Muhammad, the brother of Aqa Rida, was shot and killed in Isfandabad. Source: Rasti, Eyewitness Account of
> 1950 Persecutions in Abarqu, p. 1.
> 
> bravery and humanity would serve as a brilliant lamp for our countrymen in these difficult
> times.
> The bravest and most experienced of the attorneys who represented the Baha’is of Yazd
> was ‘Abdu’llah Razi. He was a devoted Muslim who believed that Baha’is did not disrupt the
> general order of Iranian society, paid their taxes, and for this reason Baha’is must be
> provided with civil rights, which must be protected, and that their dignity and beliefs must
> be safeguarded from the darts of the ill-wishing. On many occasions, he agreed to provide
> legal counsel to Baha’is, and with utmost sincerity and interest he would carry out his law
> practice. In the Abarqu trial, he agreed to represent the defendants, since he believed in their
> innocence. He was an experienced and skilled lawyer.
> In addition to his oral arguments, Razi submitted his remarks to the court in writing, so
> that they could not advance a false claim against him or accuse of him of any shortcoming.
> ‘Abdu’llah Razi, who had fully comprehended the ill-intention of the court and knew about
> the aggressive actions of the Fada’iyan Islam, placed a copy of the Qur’an over his head and
> with that commenced his defense. With a resonant voice he swore, “I am a Muslim, and am
> duty-bound to defend the innocent.” He sprinkled his conclusive and well-supported
> defense with verses from the Qur’an and examples from the history of Islam, as he knew
> these would be pleasing to the presiding judge and to the Fada’iyan Islam. Fearlessly, he
> referred to the entire case as a show-trial against some innocent men. Many times, the judge
> interrupted his energetic and reasoned statements, but ‘Abdu’llah Razi never hesitated in his
> able defense of the guiltless defendants. The unceasing cries and threats of the Fada’iyan
> Islam never overwhelmed or vanquished him, and in utmost bravery and courage he
> continued to stand by his innocent clients. May his memory be honored.
> 
> The Verdict
> The trial of those accused in the murders of Abarqu concluded in twenty-one days, on May
> 12, 1952.76 Ashraf Ahmadi, the malevolent and suborned presiding judge in this trial, issued
> an inhumane verdict intended to please those in authority and power. Soon, he climbed the
> ladder of success: Husayn ‘Ala, the Court Minister of the Shah, took him into his ministry
> and installed him as his own deputy. [Document 2 in appendix 9 gives considerable details
> about the court proceedings.]
> The verdict of such a court in such an atmosphere was a foregone conclusion. All the
> defendants were found guilty:
> • Four of them were condemned to death: Muhammad Shirvani (a Muslim), Hasan
> Himmati, Husayn Karambakhsh, and Muhammad Rafahi—the last three being
> Baha’is from Isfandabad.
> • Three of them were sentenced to ten years’ incarceration with hard labor: Hasan
> Shams (a Baha’i and member of the Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of
> Isfandabad), ‘Abbas-‘Ali Purmihdi (a Baha’i) and ‘Ali-Muhammad Shirvani (20-
> year-old Muslim son of Muhammad Shirvani).
> 
> 76 Iran’s National Spiritual Assembly suggests in its report of July 16, 1952, that the trial ended on May 12 (see
> 
> appendix 9, document 2). This appears to be in conflict with June 1952 report by Kazemzadeh (see appendix
> 10, account 1). For this study, this variance was settled in favor of Kazemzadeh whose report was earlier and
> who was the leading defense attorney in this trial.
> 
> •   All nine members of the Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Yazd were
> sentences to three years’ hard labor.77
> 
> Apprising the Authorities
> The Baha’i administration in Iran quickly contacted the head of the Baha’i community,
> Shoghi Effendi Rabbani, who issued instructions on June 26, 1952, for the Iranian Assembly
> to apprise the National Spiritual Assembly of the United States and Canada of the situation.
> On July 28, the American Assembly telegraphed Dr. Musaddiq, informing him that the case
> of the Baha’is falsely accused in this case was before No. 2 Division of the High Court and
> requested that an audience be given to the representative of the Iranian Assembly to brief
> him on the facts of the case. No evidence is known that such an opportunity was ever given
> by the prime minister to the Baha’is of Iran. On September 4th of the same year, the
> American Assembly contacted Dr. Pernahad, Iran’s chargé d’affaires in its Washington
> embassy, and provided him with the details of the court proceedings and requested that his
> office inform the authorities in Iran. Again, no evidence is known that this communication
> was passed on to appropriate officials in Tehran. Yet once more, the American Assembly on
> September 5, 1952, wrote a detailed letter to Dr. Musaddiq, providing him with the details of
> the case, the court’s verdict, and an update on the appeal process. Once again, it appears that
> this communication fell on deaf ears in Tehran.78
> 
> The Appeal79
> In accordance with Iran’s criminal code, an appeal was automatic in such cases, and within a
> few weeks the case dossier was sent to the High Court of Appeal. The case went before
> Judge Ha’iri-Shahbaghi for review. He privately advised the defense counsels that the court
> verdict in the earlier trial was wrong and had to be set aside. However, he was then pressured
> by the Justice Ministry, and all he could do was to commute the death sentence of the three
> Baha’is of Isfandabad to fifteen years’ imprisonment.
> The Supreme Court of Iran then instructed another High Court to review the case, but
> this Court procrastinated and did not convene for two years. At last, the political climate
> allowed the Court to review the ruling of the lower court and to rescind some of the earlier
> sentences. It ordered a new trial for five of the condemned.
> The new trial by No. 2 Division of the Criminal Court started on June 13, 1954, and
> lasted fourteen days. The defense team consisted of some of the lawyers who had
> participated in 1952 trial: Kazem Kazemzadeh, Aziz Navidi, and ‘Abdu’llah Razi. The
> prosecuting team had five lawyers on its staff. Once again, the atmosphere was charged with
> 
> 77 Nikravan, “Barrasi,” states that all those incarcerated with also fined. The two brothers of Muhammad
> Shirvani, namely, Ahmad Niku’i and Muhammad-Husayn Niku’i, were pardoned since they repented and
> returned to Islam. This by itself demonstrates that the motive all along was religious bigotry towards Baha’is.
> 78 These documents were kindly furnished for this study through the kindness of the National Archives of the
> 
> National Baha’i Center and appear in appendix 9. The Persian version of these documents is published in
> Afnan, Bigunahan.
> 79 This section and the next have been added by the translator based on documents in appendix 10 and
> 
> incorporating some of the author’s original materials.
> 
> anti-Baha’i sentiments and slogans, but the panel of judges seemed less susceptible to
> fanatical influences.
> The court ruled that the Baha’is who had been condemned to death at the 1952 trial be
> given ten years’ imprisonment; one of the members of the Yazd Assembly be released since
> his participation in and presence at the meetings of the Assembly had not been proven; and
> the sentence of one of the accused be reduced from ten years to five years’ incarceration.
> 
> Conclusion
> Muhammad Shirvani was condemned to execution, and this decree was carried out in a
> public square in Yazd known as Amir-Chakhmaq. He wrote a letter to Ayatu’llah Burujirdi,
> the Source of the Emulation for the Shi‘is of the world, and stated his innocence and belief
> in Islam.80 However, the Ayatu’llah was consumed with the thought of destroying the
> Baha’is, and it did not matter to him that Shirvani was a Muslim. What was important was
> that he was to be executed in the name of Baha’is, and that this was a victory for the
> protection of the Muslim congregation. For this reason, he gave no reply to the letter of this
> hapless and innocent farmer.
> At the time of his execution, Muhammad Shirvani faced the throng of onlookers, and
> tearfully and remorsefully said with a resonant voice, “People know that I am innocent and a
> Muslim.” But the conspiracy and collusion of Isfandiyar Khan and the mullas had done its
> work and had robbed him of life.
> Other defendants were sentenced to imprisonment with hard labor. The elderly Haji
> Mirza Hasan-Shams, who was condemned to remain in prison for ten years, lasted only a
> few years and died on April 5, 1955,81 after having endured immense difficulties and
> tribulations in the course of his incarceration. It is said that the cause of his death was an
> unsanitary surgery in prison after he had developed appendicitis.
> The three innocent Baha’is of Isfandabad were imprisoned for ten years and eventually
> freed in 1960. Eight members of the Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Yazd were
> imprisoned for three years and then were released in September 1953.
> 
> Now that we have reached the end of this brief analysis, there remains no other recourse for
> any of us but to honor the memory of Sughra and her innocent and ill-fated children, as well
> as the guiltless Muslims and Baha’is who suffered in this evil incident because of fanaticism
> towards religious minorities.
> 
> 80 See appendix 6. (BC)
> 81 Nikravan, “Barrasi,” records the date of his death as April 1, 1955.
> 
> Appendix 1
> Sources for Studying Dr. Musaddiq
> 
> We have gathered much soon to be published information regarding the relationship of Dr.
> Muhammad Musaddiq with the Baha’is in particular and with Iranian political parties and
> religious and tribal minorities in general. Meanwhile, the following learned and noteworthy
> sources among the wide range of materials and research that has been produced about Dr.
> Musaddiq are recommended:
> 
> •   Fu’ad Ruhani, Zindigi Siyasi Musaddiq dar Matn Nihzat Milli [The political life of
> Musaddiq in the context of the nationalist movement];
> •   Homa [Homayoun] Katouzian, Iqtisad Siyasi dar Iran Jadid [Political economy in
> modern Iran];
> •   Fakhri’d-Din ‘Azimi, Buhran Dimucracy dar Iran [Democratic upheavals in Iran];
> •   Colonel Ghulam-Rida Nijati, Junbish Millishudan San‘at Naft Iran [Movement to
> nationalize the petroleum industry in Iran];
> •   Colonel Ghulam-Rida Nijati, Kuditayi 28 Murdad 1332 [The coup d’état of 28 Murdad
> 1332 (August 19, 1953)];
> •   Colonel Ghulam-Rida Nijati, Musaddiq: Salhayi Mubarizih va Muqavimat [Musaddiq:
> The years of opposition and resistance];
> •   Muhammad-‘Ali Muvahhid, Khab Ashuftih Naft: Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq va Nihzat
> Milli Iran az Kuditayi 28 Murdad ta Suqut Zahidi [The nightmare of oil: Dr. Muhammad
> Musaddiq and nationalist movement from the 28 Murdad coup d’état until the fall of
> Zahidi], in 3 volumes.
> 
> In addition, those interested in this aspect of Iranian history may wish to peruse the
> scholarly, controversial monograph by Dr. Jalal Matini, Nigahi bi Karnamih Siyasi Dr.
> Muhammad Musaddiq [A glance at the political career of Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq], Los
> Angeles (California): Sherkat Ketab.
> The plot and elements of the coup d’état against Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq had been
> hatched several months before the events of August 16th and 19th. Exactly at the same time
> that the royal decree dismissing Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq was signed by Muhammad-Reza
> Shah on August 13, the military plot against Dr. Musaddiq had reached its concluding
> planning stages. Because of indecision and communication problems among the plotters,
> when the coup was launched at midnight on August 16th, they were countered by Dr.
> Musaddiq. However, the coup continued and eventually succeeded on August 19, 1953.
> For the information of those who write and lament over the lack of reliable documents
> regarding the 28 Murdad coup d’état or who refer to that event as an “anti-coup” incident or
> as a “national uprising,” the following source can provide many documents that would cause
> them to pause and contemplate the broader implications of this moment in history. This
> extremely valuable collection contains the most important documents surrounding the 28
> Murdad 1332 [1953] coup d’état that have been published to date by those who had a
> principal role in designing and implementing the event. Based on this evidence, there is
> absolutely no doubt about the interference and the key role of the United States and
> 
> England in this incident’s design and implementation of the coup up to its final success. By
> reading this book, the truth surrounding the 28 Murdad coup becomes completely clear, and
> one notes that without the least hesitation and with complete clarity, the principal actors in
> this event have described their role and activities. This very interesting and instructive book
> is Homa Katouzian, “The CIA Documents and the 1953 Coup in Iran,” in The CIA
> Documents on the 1953 Coup, ed. Gholamreza Vatandoust, (Tehran: Rasa Publications, 2000),
> published in English and Persian. See also, The CIA Documents & the Overthrow of Dr. Musaddiq
> of Iran, ed. Gholamreza Vatandoust, (Tehran: Rasa Publications, 2000).
> 
> Appendix 2
> Primary Sources on the Abarqu Incident
> 
> There is a limited-edition, 270-page book entitled, Bigunahan [The guiltless], prepared by
> Muhammad-Taqi Afnan regarding the murders in Abarqu.82 We received from a
> distinguished person a copy of this book, which has served as the primary source and the
> foundational document for the present research monograph,
> On the online site [The Democratic Voice of Iran] Khandaniha, on Sunday, February 22,
> 2009, “Shintou” has summarized the aforementioned book, which I have considered and
> used as well. “Shintou” describes the motive for his essay as follows:
> 
> [Several] Baha’is were accused of killing a Muslim family in Abarqu, and the judicial
> apparatus during the reign of the Shah is alleged to have supported the Baha’is.
> This accusation was repeated on February 11, 2009, when the Sih-Sima channel
> broadcast a program under the title “Nufuz Namar’i” [Invisible influence], which is
> part of their mini-series, “Asrar Tariki” [Dark secrets]—with an emphasis on
> “darkness.” By showing a photograph of the victims in this horrific incident, the
> program sought to incite the sentiments of Iranian viewers against the Baha’is.
> For this reason, the following essay will seek to clarify through exposition and
> analysis of this incident that, first, the Baha’is had no role in this murder, and,
> second, almost all of those involved from the judiciary, whether at a local or national
> level, through deception, falsification of documents, lies and misrepresentation of
> evident and undeniable facts, ruled against the Baha’is.
> 
> Based on Bigunahan, Behyar Nikravan wrote an article under the title “Barrasi Majira-yi
> Azar Baha’ian Bigunah Payru Yik Qatl Khunin dar Abarqu” [Analysis of the persecution of
> innocent Baha’is subsequent to a violent murder in Abarqu], which likewise explains the
> reason and occasion for writing this article in such words:
> 
> Following its widespread activities against the Baha’is during the past two years, in
> February 2006, Kayhan, Tehran’s morning newspaper, reopened the discussion of
> murders that took place 55 years ago in Iran, and ascribed them, by blatant lies, to
> Baha’is. In several issues, it has cited a manufactured case, which had the sole
> purpose of concealing the identity of the true instigators of this crime, and
> persecuting and banishing the Baha’is.
> At the time of this incident, they did not give any opportunity or permission to
> the Baha’is to explain to the people and in newspapers the true nature of events,
> since for some time it had been planned for the identity of the killers to remain
> secret, and for the group of wronged Baha’is, once again, be subjected to harm.
> Therefore, a thoroughly untrue and slanderous story was told to the people.
> Now that Kayhan has renewed the same old tired lies from a half-century ago,
> we take advantage of this opportunity to explain the true nature of the events to
> fair-minded readers.
> 
> 82 This book has not been published and is only available as a typed manuscript through private hands.
> 
> Since Kayhan, and indeed all the media organs associated with the Islamic Republic, have
> repeatedly published blatant lies and continue to do so, then we are forced to rely even more
> on the accuracy and originality of Bigunahan by Muhammad-Taqi Afnan. The above-cited
> articles are readily available to everyone outside of Iran.
> [The following additional articles should also be noted:
> 
> •   Tooraj Amini, Baha’iyan, Rawznamih Kayhan va Majira-yi Qatl dar Abarqu [The Baha’is,
> Kayhan newspaper and the case of murder in Abarqu], 8/11/1384 [January 28, 2006],
> http://www.rooznamehiran.blogfa.com/post-14.aspx
> •   Dr. Rustam Nikandish, Mas’ulin Kayhan dar Fikr Faji‘ihafarini Hastand [Kayhan
> publishers are in the mentality of creating a calamity], 18/1/1385 [April 7, 2006],
> http://negah1.info/articles/332      and      http://www.ohamzodai.com/170606-
> Korrektur/13-%20Fajeeafarini%20Keyhan%20-Abarghu-
> %20Rostam%20NikuAndish%200306.pdf]
> 
> Appendix 3
> British Support for Shi‘i Clerics
> 
> The reader is invited to refer to the 1,362-page book Siyahat Sharq [Exploration of the East],
> which is the memoir of Ayatu’llah Aqa Najafi Quchani, published in Tehran by Amir-Kabir
> Press, particularly pages 575 to 608; as well as the book Iran dar Jang Buzurg [Iran in the
> World War] by Ahmad-‘Ali Sipihr.
> Ayatu’llah Aqa Najafi Quchani devoted many pages of his long memoir to the close
> connection between Akhund Mulla Kazim Khurasani and the British. He witnessed many
> long meetings between the British political envoys or high-ranking officers and Ayatu’llah
> Akhund Mulla Kazim Khurasani, and provided evidence of an exchange of information and
> consultation among them. Ayatu’llah Aqa Najafi Quchani also named other first-ranking
> clerics who had close ties with the Russians.
> It appears that Ayatu’llah Burujirdi came to the marj‘iyat [leadership] of the Shi‘i through
> the direct help of the British chargé d’affaires, and the person who paved the way was
> Muhammad-Reza Shah, who frequently met with him in Firuzabad Hospital. Many
> photographs of these show-meetings were published in newspapers throughout the nation,
> and are still available to all. At the time of these meetings, Ayatu’llah Burujirdi had not yet
> attained to the leadership of the Shi‘is, and many clerics living in Iraq and Iran were qualified
> from every perspective to assume the office of marja‘iyat. However, the British had full
> confidence only in Burujirdi.
> It is astonishing that each year the British and the Americans publish a number of
> documents related to the political history of Iran. However, they have never published even
> a single document about the relationship of the clerics in Iran to their intelligence services.
> As an example, it might be beneficial to recall the Oudh Bequest.83 There is no doubt
> that documents pertaining to this endowment, the list of names, and the amount paid to
> each cleric since 1850, when it was first established, is now available in the Archives of the
> British government. Although it was well known that this endowment belonged to a
> governor in India, in truth it was funded by the British government to reassure the clerics
> and created as a front for this purpose. In the name of this endowment, a sum was deposited
> in the Bank of England in London, and from the interest earned, each year a large portion
> was paid to various clerics and seminarians in the ‘Atabat and to other protégés.
> To understand the crux of the matter, it is sufficient to cite the confession of a high-
> ranking officer of the British Foreign Ministry: Sir Arthur H. Harding, the British
> Ambassador in Iran from 1901 to 1906. In his well-known [1928] book, A Diplomat in the
> East, he writes on page 324, “The right to dispense India’s Oudh Endowment in my hand
> was like a lever with which I could lift any problem in Iraq and Iran, and solve those
> problems.”84
> 
> 83 See Litvak, “Money, Religion and Politics: The Oudh Bequest in Najaf and Karbala, 1850–1903.” Between
> 
> 1850 and 1903, the Oudh Bequest channeled over six million rupees from India, through British mediation, to
> the Shi‘i ‘ulama in the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala in Iraq. The British became directly involved in the
> distribution of the bequest in 1903, on the eve of the Constitutional Revolution. In view of the ‘ulama’s
> growing involvement in Iranian politics and gross corruption among the distributors, the British saw the
> bequest as a means to enhance their influence over the ‘ulama in Iran.
> 84 Translated from Persian.
> 
> In his book Dast Pinhan Siyasat Engilis dar Iran [The hidden hand of British politics in
> Iran], Khan Malik Sasani has recorded his observations of long lines of mullas behind the
> doors of British consulate in Iraq and other places, describing how they would wait to be
> paid in cash. This book is recommended to the reader.
> For more details on this theme, one should refer to the following sources:
> 
> •   Mahmud Mahmud, Tarikh Ravabit Iran va Engilis [History of the relationship
> between Iran and England], 8 volumes;
> •   Khan Malik Sasani, Dast Pinhan Siyasat Engilis dar Iran [The hidden hand of British
> politics in Iran];
> •   Isma‘il Ra’in, Huquq-Bigiran Engilis dar Iran [Salaried British in Iran];
> •   Bahram Choubine, Tut’igaran [Conspirators];
> •   Robert Dreyfuss, Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist
> Islam, Metropolitan Books, 2005. This book has been translated into Persian by
> Firiydun Gilani and discloses many interesting facets of the affiliation of the
> Americans and the British with the mullas and Islamic organizations in the
> Middle East. A close study of this controversial book can even more clearly
> explain how the Islamic Republic came to power.
> 
> The reason that the mullas accuse the Baha’is of being agents of Russia and Britain in the
> past, and more recently of America and Israel, is that they wish to deflect scrutiny from
> themselves because for many years they have been, and continue to be, in the pockets of
> foreigners themselves. There is no need to mention the relationship of Ayatu’llah Khomeini
> with foreigners while he was in exile at Neauphle-le-Château, France, since videos, pictures,
> documents, and details of these connections have already been published. In accusing others
> of espionage and being agents of foreigners, mullas reflect their own example of duplicity.
> 
> Appendix 4
> The Killing of Dr. Berjis
> 
> On the edge of the Kavir Desert lies Kashan, an ancient city and one of the earliest sites of
> human civilization. Evidence has been discovered that people were living in hills around
> Kashan some 7,500 years ago. In antiquity, Iranian Jews lived in Kashan, Isfahan, and
> Hamadan, and in some regions they constituted the majority of the inhabitants. With the
> assault of the Arabs, newly converted to Islam, Kashan, like the rest of Iran, went to wrack
> and ruin.
> Kashan never was a suitable place for the Iranians because of its desolation, repeated
> earthquakes, and proximity to the Kavir [great desert]. However, as a refuge from the wrath
> of fanatical religious jurists, it was conducive to the spread of diverse tribes and coexistence
> of followers of different religions. Until the end of the sixteenth century, Zoroastrians, Jews,
> and Sunnis lived together in this city. According to the unknown author of the Hududu’l-
> ‘Alam [The limits of the world], “there are more scorpions” in Kashan than “literati and men
> of letters.”85 Soon, many religious fanatics, who had been driven out of other Islamic
> regions, came to this far-away desolate town and added to the native scorpions. Yaqut
> Hamvi writes in Ma‘jamu’l-Baldan, “A number of fanatics in Kashan were waiting for their
> Qa’im to appear the next morning. Each dawn, they armed themselves and rode their horses
> outside of town; disappointed [over the nonappearance of the Qa’im], they returned home.”
> According to the sayings and beliefs of the Babis and Baha’is, the Qa’im appeared in
> 1844 and was executed in Tabriz, in accordance with the fatwa of the mullas who had
> seemingly been expecting him. A number of important and well-respected clerics of Kashan,
> Qamsar, Maymeh, Natanz, and Naraq joined the ranks of believers in the Bab and Baha [i.e.,
> Baha’u’llah]. From that time until the present, the central government has consistently
> consented, through hints and allusions, to the suppression and brutal killing of the Babis and
> in the last century, the Baha’is of Kashan, without any prosecution by the government or its
> judicial agencies.
> When Iran fell to the Allied Forces in 1941, Reza Shah was exiled and the reign of
> Muhammad-Reza Shah began, and in the political and social chaos ensuing from the Cold
> War in Iran, Kashan once again became the theater of operations for adventurists and
> internal and external “scorpions.” I have written earlier that after the forced exit of Reza
> Shah, the critique of his policies became a cornerstone of the Cold War in Iran. We should
> be mindful that during the time of Reza Shah—without losing sight of his dictatorial ways—
> a new middle class was created that had very different tendencies, and many widespread
> reforms took place. Despite all the debates about the manner in which these reforms were
> instituted—debates that are necessary, critical, and unavoidable—fundamental changes were
> implemented in Iran that remain firmly in place. Even after a reactionary and brutal
> revolution, thirty years of continuous bloodshed, and the feared apparatus of the vilayat faqih
> [guardianship of jurists], these changes gain strength in Iranian thought. With these reforms
> brought about by Reza Shah, Iran said farewell to the medieval era, and stepped into the
> modern world and the new age.
> 
> 85 For more details on this book, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hudud_ul-'alam.
> 
> The following are just a few of Reza Shah’s many modernization initiatives:
> consolidation of government’s power; peace with rebellious and defiant tribes; limiting the
> influence of the clergy; removal of women’s veils; modernization of men’s clothing;
> elimination of royal titles; mandatory military service; reduction of the feudalists’ power; the
> establishment of public schools and compulsory education; founding of universities;
> formation of a judiciary with modern laws; creation of the Ministry of Education, Treasury,
> the Foreign Service and several other ministries; construction of a railroad across Iran
> funded by taxes collected on sugar, tea, and opium; development of small businesses and
> industries in Tehran and other cities. All of these will be indispensible supports for a future
> parliamentary democracy to be established in Iran.
> Although Reza Shah can be blamed for disregarding the Constitution, banning the
> activities of political parties, carrying out certain actions that had grievous consequences in
> misguided attempts to bring about social and economic reform, the murders of several
> critics, and amassing vast personal wealth, one must nevertheless also confess that the
> present generation cannot easily understand the reign of Reza Shah and therefore cannot
> judge that era without bias. The chaotic and turbulent conditions that permitted Reza Shah
> to accede to power and which led to his dictatorship were the result of centuries of despotic
> rule by the monarchs and mullas in Iran. The Constitutional Period had just commenced,
> and hardly anyone knew its principles or thought about following its provisions. If someone
> else had come to the throne instead of Reza Shah, no doubt he too would have traversed the
> same path and would have had no other remedy than to use the power of his office.
> At any rate, after Reza Shah’s departure from Iran, the servants and hired hands of
> imperialism, who for many years had enjoyed close relationships with the colonial powers,
> came to Iran on the instruction of their masters clothed in the garments of clergymen. The
> army of ignorance that had previously been arrayed in the cities of Najaf, Karbala,
> Kazimayn, and Baghdad, and had been tested, was once again given a new mission.
> Ayatu’llah Husayn Burujirdi took up residence in Qum and became the marja‘ of the Shi‘is.
> Concurrent with his arrival in Qum, various organizations and societies with “Islamic” in
> their name grew like mushrooms, first in Tehran and subsequently in other cities of Iran, and
> commenced operation. Using religious funds available to him in addition to the financial and
> moral aid of the government, Ayatu’llah Burujirdi provided support to all these Islamic
> entities, even though he cleverly presented himself to the public as being unhappy with some
> of them.
> It is necessary to remember that combating and eliminating the Baha’i community was
> one of the goals of these organizations and societies. Therefore, it is not surprising that in
> Kashan, a town which from the early days of the Babi and Baha’i faiths has had followers of
> those religions, organizations such as the Anjuman Tablighat Islami and the terrorist,
> frightful Fada’iyan Islam and Hay’at Du‘at Islami were established with the support of
> Ayatu’llah Husayn Burujirdi and governmental agencies. Through the financial backing of
> Qum’s seminary, Ayatu’llah Burujirdi would dispatch his seminarians throughout Iran in
> order to combat Baha’is, and he would ask them to preach from pulpits against the Baha’is
> and to provoke and incite the people in this regard.
> Burujirdi sent an akhund to Kashan by the name of Turabi, who was probably born in
> Kashan. According to the testimony of residents of Kashan, he was “seditious and foul
> mouthed,” and skilled in “causing the fire of agitation and rabble-rousing.” In Kashan and
> its surrounding villages, many times he mounted pulpits and “fueled religious prejudice and
> provoked enmity” before fleeing the scene. Using powerful loudspeakers which covered
> most of the city, he would openly and directly speak slanderously and maliciously of the
> 
> Baha’is. He would defame their character, declare their blood free to spill, and use all his
> power and might to deceive ignorant and superstitious people.
> Simultaneous with the activities of Akhund Turabi, Shaykh Muhammad Khalisizadih, a
> son of Ayatu’llah Muhammad-Mihdi Khalisi, came from Kazimayn and settled in Kashan.
> From his youth, in addition to seeking religious education, he had also entertained political
> ambitions. He came to Iran after Reza Shah’s departure. To mislead the gullible populace,
> the British pretended that they had banished him from Tusirkan and had sent him to
> Kashan. While in the latter location, he undertook many religious activities and renewed the
> seminary. He gathered a large number of youth who were enamored with religious studies
> and enabled them to enter into religious-political activities. Some of them were young
> seminarians who were already active in the Fada’iyan Islam organization and its opposition
> to the Baha’is.
> Khalisizadih was an itinerant traveler and journeyed throughout Iran. He had homes in
> different towns and would stay in each for a while. It is likely that his real job was to gather
> news and information for the British. Otherwise, he did not have a specific occupation, and
> it is not clear how one could afford such extensive travel and maintenance of several homes
> without a steady income. For this reason, other mullas who could not spend as freely as he,
> labeled him “Makhlutizadih” [mix-birthed, a pun on his name]. In particular, he traveled to
> towns where Baha’is had congregated and would provoke ignorant and superstitious people
> against the Baha’is, and incite and encourage them to persecute and kill Baha’is. He traveled
> extensively to Yazd. “Basically, Khalisizadih was most determined to provoke young
> seminarians and make them active. He was very charismatic. According to some accounts, in
> this city [Yazd], he exerted efforts to reactivate seminaries, expanded religious endowments
> and fought against the Baha’is and the Shaykhis.”
> According to eyewitness accounts, “Khalisizadih routinely traveled to Kashan, and from
> the pulpits would explicitly urge the fanatical and gullible people to raid the homes and
> shops of Baha’is, plunder and murder them and burn their residences. He claimed that these
> acts by Muslims would reap a great spiritual reward.”
> Once at the pulpit he stated, “Bring out Dr. Berjis, who is the leader of the Babis, from
> his office and kill him. He is an infidel and atheist. He is an impure Babi.” In this manner the
> seeds of the brutal murder of Dr. Sulayman Berjis were sown.
> Persecution of the Baha’is began in the villages and regions surrounding Kashan. At
> night, they would cut the trees in orchards owned by Baha’is. They would steal their sheep,
> burn their crops, confiscate their farms and homes, and force them to depart, dispossessed.
> Every few days, people who had lost all their possessions would come to Kashan
> seeking recourse and refuge. The Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Kashan, which was
> chaired by Dr. Berjis, wrote a letter to the chief of police, Major Fatimi, in which an account
> of the wrongs perpetrated against Baha’is were recounted, warning of the dreadful
> consequences for the Baha’i community that could stem from these activities and sermons.
> In response to the letter, Major Fatimi said to the person bringing the letter, “Be assured that
> nothing will happen.”
> It is bewildering that hours after this meeting, ‘Ali Naraqi, the chief intelligence officer
> of the police department, dispatched his colleague to the Baha’is with the message, “Do not
> come unwarranted to the police, since we cannot prevent people from giving vent to their
> religious sentiments.” The exact same behavior is now taking place across all of Iran by
> those enslaved to the Islamic Republic.
> The Baha’is conveyed the collaboration of the chief of police and the chief of
> intelligence in Kashan with Akhund Turabi and Khalisizadih in a letter to Major-General
> 
> Zahidi, the nation’s chief of police. In this letter, they enumerated a number of instances in
> which Major Fatimi and ‘Ali Naraqi collaborated with the mullas, and stated that they had
> evidence suggesting the chiefs of police and intelligence of Kashan were promoting and
> inciting the mullas to anti-Baha’ism, and assuring them of their protection and alliance.
> Major-General Fadlu’llah Zahidi not only disregarded these reports but also in effect left the
> police officers throughout the nation free to allow the mullas do as they wished. After the
> August 19th coup, General Zahidi sent Mujtab Navvab Safavi, the leader of the terrorist
> organization Fada’iyan Islam, to an Islamic conference with a diplomatic passport and at the
> government’s expense. This was a partial payment from those behind the coup d’état to the
> Fada’iyan Islam for their support of the coup.
> Day by day the activities of the mullas in Kashan expanded, and the air was filled with
> fear and fright. It was rumored in the city that the life of “Dr. Berjis, the leader of the
> Babis,” was in danger. However, the hand of destiny wished to create a hero of this well-
> regarded and reputable physician. Patiently, he awaited the divine decree. His friends warned
> him that it might be best to quit the city, which, as Muhammad-Taqi Damghani has
> described, had become “a nest of ruffians and thugs.” Dr. Berjis was happy and satisfied that
> fate did not intend the crown of “martyrdom” to adorn his head.
> Whenever he went to visit his patients, he was seen in the streets riding his horse, and
> the enemies would throw rocks at him and curse and threaten him. He was severely
> castigated and scolded: “Why is a Babi riding a horse?” However, he did not allow himself to
> become the prisoner of the ignorant, and with patience and compassion born out of his
> untroubled conscience, would continue on his way. Eventually one night, like the boorish
> Mafia in The Godfather, they cut off the head of his horse in his stable. Nonetheless, he did
> not allow fear to enter his being; indifferent to the evil ways of his enemies, he would walk to
> visit his patients or see to the needs of the sick at his office.
> Let us come to the end of the story. The fatwa for his assassination was issued. Those
> selected to carry out this murder were notified and trained in what to say and what to do
> after the killing. One Thursday evening, they gathered in the home of Rasulzadih, and in
> accordance with the practice of the Fada’iyan Islam, engaged in reciting the Qur’an. At the
> end, they consulted the Holy Book [for omens] about carrying out the murder the next day.
> It appears that the decision to spill the blood of a virtuous and humanitarian physician was
> reached.
> Next day, Friday, February 3, 1950, two of the would-be assassins went to the office of
> Dr. Berjis and pleaded with him to accompany them on a visit to an elderly woman in grave
> condition. On the way, most likely, Dr. Sulayman Berjis’ chief concern was to reach the
> woman in time to attend to her ills. The murderers conducted him to a home where a
> customary rawdih [mourning] for Imam Husayn was under way. The news of their arrival
> reached the ringleader, who came out from the rawdih session with several other offenders.
> They all surrounded the town’s sole physician and told him to go inside the rawdih gathering.
> The intent was to force this lover of humanity to recant his belief in the Baha’i faith. Dr.
> Berjis became aware of their deceit and plans. He turned to leave. We can just imagine the
> visage of this benevolent man, who was the physician of the downtrodden and the poor at
> that time.
> It was too late; no other recourse remained but to welcome death as decreed by fate.
> The attackers descended on him and assaulted him with fists, kicks, rocks, and knives. Their
> struggle continued, and they reached a house with an open door. They shoved the bloodied
> and injured Dr. Berjis inside the house. After tearing him to pieces with their knives, they
> threw his lifeless remains into the courtyard. The murderers were not finished, but like
> 
> vicious and hungry wolves they continued their brutality. At last, Muhammad Rasulzadih, the
> chief of villains, sat on the body of Dr. Berjis, and with his knife cut his neck’s artery. Then
> he cut the veins in his arm.
> They left the torn and blood-soaked body of Dr. Berjis in the courtyard and came
> outside, raising the cry of “There is no god but God.” They washed their evil and wicked
> hands with the snow on the street.
> For many years, Rasulzadih was proud that he had torn asunder the sole physician in
> their town. It was time for the hyenas to boast. Years later, Ahmad Imami was jealous of
> Rasulzadih’s fame and claimed, “There is no reason to credit the murder of Dr. Berjis to
> Rasulzadih, since he had only brought a small knife, which after a few stabs became bent and
> ineffective. I was carrying a large dagger, and it was I who cut the main artery in Dr. Berjis’
> neck.” It is a bewildering time in which devoted Muslims pride themselves on holding
> cleavers!
> Like a flock, the people followed the murderers to Kashan’s police station. There, drunk
> with their crime, they cried out, “We have killed a Baha’i!” They entered the building and
> went directly to their accomplice, the chief of police, and confessed, “We have carried out
> our religious duty and have sent the chief of the wayward sect of the Baha’is of Kashan to
> the nether world. We are of Fada’iyan Islam.” Several months later, on September 17, 1950,
> during the premiership of Razmara, the judiciary acquitted and freed the murderers who had
> freely confessed to their crime.
> I have always esteemed those who do not leave the evil site of battle. I have praised
> them—those who outwardly appear very fragile, but when confronted with the challenges of
> time, stand like brave heroes. I do not rejoice in the falling of a hero. Dr. Sulayman Berjis did
> not become just a hero for the Baha’is; indeed, he became a hero for all non-Baha’i Iranians
> and heterodox thinkers who cherish the wish to see a modern nation one day.
> Sulayman Berjis was born into a Baha’i family. His father stepped from one minority
> group, namely, the Jewish community, into another minority group, which in the eye of the
> public was more dangerous than the Jews. It appears that the phrases “minority” or
> “majority” did not carry any substantive meaning for him. He was happy that he had not
> sacrificed his curiosity and enthusiasm for discovering the truth to the mundane matters of
> daily life. One must be enthralled to become a Baha’i and not give in to the fear of being in a
> minority, especially in a country that has never shown any mercy to its minorities.
> In those days, after the conclusion of the trial and the release of the criminals, at a time
> when moral courage and ethics in politics were forgotten and few had the audacity to speak
> the truth, the freedom-loving Muslim editor of the newspaper Jahan-Ma wrote the following
> in relation to the murder of Dr. Sulayman Berjis:
> 
> [We are] committed to the principles of equity and justice, equality and oneness of
> all people before the law, and to the existence of an unprejudiced and consistent
> judiciary, which is able to win people’s confidence and esteem for its judgments
> while preserving its own independence in the face of inappropriate pressure, by
> rendering unbiased verdicts. These are attributes of a progressive and free society,
> which regrettably are utterly missing in our nation.…
> A judiciary that convicts the innocent, finds the guilty guiltless…[and] fails to carry
> out its duties…a judiciary that allows in its courtyard, and in bright daylight, one of
> the most distinguished of its judges and attorneys to be slashed to pieces, and in
> response frees the villains who committed this crime…no wonder that every day a
> new scandal takes place under such a corrupt and unjust system, and a new tale of
> shame is added to its previous chapters.
> 
> The tale of the trial of the killers of Dr. Berjis is the latest page written in this
> book of disgrace. Everyone remembers the tragic story of the slashing to death of
> one of the citizens of this country—someone who had every right to live in this
> nation—a story that has been covered in great detail in the newspapers of the
> governing body. Everyone also has seen or heard about the verdict and
> demonstrations over the past few days.
> Undoubtedly, on hearing what has transpired, every observer in possession of a
> conscience can have no other feeling but disgust for this system of justice. Every
> man of conscience will discern that only two possibilities could have governed these
> events:
> 
> 1. One possibility is that we assume the present accused men were innocent, and
> that therefore the court’s verdict was just, in which case the question would be
> raised: What sort of justice system is this that without cause throws innocent
> people into prison and subjects them to trial, causing them financial loss and
> destitution? Even more importantly, the question would be raised: Where are
> the true perpetrators of this crime?—because no one can deny that a physician
> was murdered by being slashed to death. Is it sufficient to just dismiss the
> accused, or is the justice system established so that it would bring to justice the
> real offenders?
> 
> 2. The second possibility is that the justice system has once again, as in so many
> previous instances, fallen prey to influence, and issued a verdict accordingly,
> finding innocent those who perpetrated this crime. Particularly when a person
> takes into account the demonstrations and animal sacrifices86 of the first days,
> and continual cow-sacrifices, parades and festivities after the verdict, this
> possibility gains further strength. This is because one cannot imagine that all
> these animal sacrifices and demonstrations were merely to celebrate the
> discovery that the accused were innocent. This is because this justice system has
> witnessed many innocent defendants who have gone to the gallows; yet in no
> instance except the present trial and that of the killers of the late [Ahmad]
> Kasravi have we observed such demonstrations and festivities.
> 
> In addition to the criminal aspect of Dr. Berjis’ murder, there are two important
> social issues to be considered. First, this incident is related to the rights of minorities
> in our nation.…At a time when foremost in the charter of the United Nations is
> ethnic and religious liberty, and equality and protection of the rights of minorities, it
> is a source of much regret for every honorable Iranian who wishes to see his
> country exalted among the nations of the world, to instead witness that the lives and
> rights of minorities are violated in our country in such ways.
> When every humanitarian Iranian sees that the Culture Ministry has issued
> instructions for a list of minority employees to be prepared in order to impose more
> limitations on them, when he sees that some newspapers have reported that schools
> have received instructions to shun the acceptance of minority students, when he
> sees encouragement and provocation for racial animosity among certain political
> factions, then he has every right to dread and feel his heart filled with revulsion over
> the recent reprehensible verdict of this court.
> The other issue is related to the spread of superstitious practices. We are under
> the impression that no honorable Iranian would consent to the spilling and
> 
> 86 As a form of exhibiting jubilation, Iranians sacrifice a lamb or other animals in honor of the victor.
> 
> spoliation of the blood of a citizen of this country—whoever he may be or whatever
> he may believe—and barter this blood for the demonstrations of vulgar mobs,
> animal sacrifices and self-stabbings.87
> If it were the norm that a bunch of hoodlums, under some name or pretext, was
> allowed to attack and slash to death others, and judicial institutions, either out of
> fear or because of threats, intervention or playing politics, accepted that that blood
> had been lawfully spilled, then no one in this country would have any safety or
> protection! Of what possible use then would be this enormous and expensive police
> and judiciary?
> At any rate, this incident is most alarming for all progressive-minded
> countrymen, and no honorable Iranian should remain silent in the face of such
> injustice. In particular, the forward-looking publications of this nation should never
> consent to silence over this fundamental issue.88
> 
> The main problem confronting the mullas and fanatical Muslims is how to reconcile the
> animalistic tendencies of the age of barbarism with the social morality of modern times.
> For more details about the calamity of the murder of Dr. Sulayman Berjis and many
> other murders during the 160 years of the Babi–Baha’i faiths, one should refer to the
> enjoyable and well-documented: Fereydun Vahman, 160 Sal Mubarizih ba Diyanat Baha’i [160
> Years of combat against the Baha’i faith]; and Muhammad-Taqi Damghani in his memoir,
> Jamih-yi Aludih dar Aftab [Soiled garment under the sun], in addition to a description of the
> brutal killing of Dr. Berjis, has left a moving account of his own life.89
> Regarding the life and activities of Shaykh Muhammad Khalisizadih, one should refer to
> Khatirat Ayatu’llah Khatam Yazdi [Memoirs of Ayatu’llah Khatam Yazdi], pp. 51–52; and
> Hujjatu’l-Islam Rasul Ja‘farian, Jaryanha va Sazmanhayi Mazhabi-Siyasi Iran (1941–1979)
> [Religious-political currents and organizations in Iran during 1941–1979], 6th ed., Tehran:
> private printing, Spring 1385 [2006], pp. 116–18.
> 
> 87  During certain anniversaries, such as the observance of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn (‘Ashura),
> uneducated Shi’ites resort to cutting themselves with daggers or beating themselves senseless. It creates a most
> disturbing and unpleasant scene.
> 88 Jahan-e Ma Journal, 26 Shahrivar 1329 [September 17, 1950].
> 89 For a detailed discussion of this incident, see Mohajer, “Kard-Ajin Kardan Doctor Berjis.” A translation of this
> 
> important research article has been completed by the present translator and will be published soon.
> 
> Appendix 5
> Defense of Dr. Musaddiq at the Tribunal
> 
> One of the best sources on the trial of Dr. Musaddiq is Jalil Buzurgmihr, Musaddiq dar
> Mahkamih Nizami [Musaddiq in the military tribunal], vol. 2, London: Nashr Tarikh Iran
> Press, 1363 [1984]. In this source, it is noted that the defense presented by Colonel ‘Abbas-
> Quli Shahquli began in the fifth session and concluded on the eighth session of the trial
> when further discussions, questions, and answers about the same arguments took place.
> According to the above-cited book by Jalil Buzurgmihr, we note that General Muqbili, the
> presiding judge, and Azmudih, the prosecutor, greatly respected Colonel Shahquli and his
> deep knowledge of the law.
> Muhammad-‘Ali Muvahhid, the author of Khab Ashufteh Naft [The nightmare of oil],
> published in Tehran, 1384 [2005], pp. 173–74, testifies to the skilled and the learned defense
> made by Colonel Shahquli. A few aspects of the arguments presented by Colonel Shahquli in
> the military tribunal are taken from Musaddiq dar Mahkamih Nizami and cited below:
> 
> 1. The [military] court does not have jurisdiction over the stated charges:
> During the past several days, sufficient discussion has taken place, and the text
> of the indictment is also available. The charges are all political in nature and
> have been addressed by the Constitution and its supplementary provisions,
> particularly Articles 72, 74, and 79. The exact text of the Constitution is as
> follows:
> 
> • Article 72: Disputes about political rights are resolved by judicial courts,
> unless stipulated differently by the law.
> • Article 74: No court may be convened, unless directed to do so by the law.
> • Article 79: A jury must be present in cases involving allegations of illegal
> activities of a political or journalistic nature.
> 
> …The charge against defendant number 1, Dr. Musaddiq, is that, being the
> Minister of Defense and the Prime Minister, he refused to follow the
> instructions given to him. That is, according to the esteemed prosecutor’s
> indictment, the illegal actions commenced at a time when the accused was
> discharging the office of the premiership. Therefore, the supposition of this
> charge is that the royal decree was not adhered to by the person of the Prime
> Minister—and not some ordinary person. As such, this charge is against the
> Prime Minister; the competent body to investigate such charges is elsewhere and
> is limited to bodies able to determine such accusations against Ministers.…
> Now, based on what evidence is he accused of not having obeyed
> instructions from the Shah conveyed to him, as the Prime Minister? That is, it is
> supposed that disobedience of the Prime Minister is an offense, and such
> charges must be adjudicated by bodies competent to charge Prime Ministers.
> Consequently, the charge against the defendant, who was the Prime Minister, is
> outside the jurisdiction of this military tribunal.
> 
> At that point, Colonel Shahquli alluded to the sphere and limits of the Shah’s purview, and
> stated, “Basically, the point that His Majesty the Shah is authorized to pronounce such a
> decree is not within the scope of this court, since none of the eminent prosecutors have the
> jurisdiction to explore the limit and the rights of His Royal Majesty. This is not our job. This
> is not our mission. This is a matter left for the Constitution and its supplementary laws.”
> Colonel Shahquli also pointed out, “The royal decree dismissing [Dr. Musaddiq from the
> premiership] is dated August 13. However, on that date the Prime Minister had not seen the
> decree.”
> As mentioned earlier in this monograph, the order for dismissal was issued on August
> 13th, but it reached Dr. Musaddiq at midnight of August 16th. Just a few hours later, the
> Shah, without the knowledge of the Prime Minister Dr. Musaddiq, flew from Ramsar to
> Baghdad and then to Rome. In the morning, the people were informed that the Shah,
> without the government’s knowledge, had left the country, and all the newspapers printed
> the news of the Shah’s escape. For details, refer to Muhammad-‘Ali Muvahhid’s Khab
> Ashuftih Naft: Az Kuditay 28 Murdad ta Suqut Zahidi [The nightmare of oil: From the coup
> d’état of 28 Murdad [August 19] to the fall of Zahidi], chapter 6, “The Most Significant Trial
> in Iran, the Defense Proceedings of Colonel Shahquli,” pp. 173–82; or refer to Colonel Jalil
> Buzurgmihr’s Musaddiq dar Mahkamih Nizami, vol. 1, pp. 204–5.
> Inasmuch as we are discussing Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq, it might be of interest some to
> mention his interview with a foreign reporter as evidence of his awareness and foresight. The
> following was recorded on July 15, 1951, by Andre Brissaud, a French reporter:90
> 
> Musaddiq said to me that he had been confronted by the British regarding the
> nationalization of oil, and mentioned his discussion with Harry Truman, the
> President of the United States, and the espionage efforts of various organizations
> against Iran.
> After a moment, he added, “I have grown old and do not think I will reach the
> age 80. (He was 71 at the time, and died at age 87.) Perhaps I can never carry out
> what I wish for my country, but I am confident that others will come after me who
> will do these things. They will eliminate imperialism and the Russians. They will
> destroy the Shah or expel him. Even though he has a soft nature, his great desire is
> to take the place of Cyrus the Great and be the absolute autocrat of the country. I
> do not think that the Tudeh Party is capable of seizing power and maintaining it.
> Likewise, I do not think the military is capable of mounting and establishing a
> [military] dictatorship.
> “I hope that the Shi‘i leadership is not harboring a serious desire to enter into the
> political arena. If this happens, Iran will be at the door of a calamity which will lead
> Iran’s neighbors (Iraq, Syria, and Jordan) to declare war on us. I truly fear this
> religious organization [i.e., the Shi‘i ecclesiastical order]. It is true that we are
> Muslims, but in truth we are not Arab, and we stand opposite to the Sunnis. As
> such, if the Shi‘i clerical establishment, with all their ranks and resources, came to
> power, we would be confronted within the country with a bloody revolution and on
> the outside would be forced to endure the effects of a jihad against Iraq, Jordan, and
> Syria. I do not think that Egypt, or even Israel, would interfere. At any rate, if this
> last prediction came to pass, an Ayatu’llah would enter the arena and would bring
> about a revolution filled with hatred towards the West, even anti-Semitic, and with
> 
> 90 In fairness, it should be noted that the veracity of this report has been brought into question by at least one
> 
> scholar: http://www.jebhemelli.net/htdocs/Views/2008/November/Bayatzadeh_Brissaud.htm.
> 
> enmity towards the Sunni Arabs. And very likely, our streets would be filled with the
> dead and with blood.”91
> 
> 91 Sahand Journal (26, March 2008): 85–87. (BC)
> 
> Appendix 6
> The Role of Ayatu’llah Burujirdi
> 
> Muhammad-Taqi Falsafi writes:
> 
> In one of the villages of Yazd, Baha’is had massacred several Muslims. Ayatu’llah
> Burujirdi took action in this regard also to ensure that the murderers would be
> prosecuted and punished. This incident caused the people to decide to slay the
> leaders of the Baha’is, which they carried out through the killing of Dr. Berjis, a Jew
> converted to Baha’i, in Kashan.
> At any rate, the widespread activities of Baha’is throughout the nation and the
> inattentiveness of the government and the Shah to the problem of the Baha’is had
> caused Ayatu’llah Burujirdi to become sad and despondent. Some time after May
> 1954, he wrote me a letter [in which he stated], “Meet the Shah and convey my
> complaint and protest over the situation [i.e., the supposed freedom of the Baha’is].”
> 
> The actual text of this letter from Ayatu’llah Burujirdi to the preacher Falsafi is as follows:
> 
> In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful!
> It is submitted to that honored person that some time ago, a letter was received
> from some of the congregation of this lowly one in Abadan, in which it was stated
> that almost the entire oil industry in Abadan was taken over by the Baha’i sect.
> Because of the occurrence of other events, which all were important and required
> attention, this lowly one forgot to mention this matter to your presence. However,
> yesterday, another letter was received from some of the congregation that confirmed
> the first letter.
> I do not know where the future of Iran will lead! It seems that the authorities of
> the nation are in such deep slumber that no alarm—no matter how loud—will
> awaken them. Nevertheless, it is necessary to inform that honored person so that
> perchance you will find an opportunity to awaken and admonish some of the
> authorities to the fact that issues related to this sect [i.e., Baha’is] are not
> insignificant. This lowly one sees a very dark future for Iran because of this sect.
> They have such influence in governmental agencies and have assumed such
> command of the affairs that the Justice Department does not dare to punish one of
> them who has been established as the murderer of five innocent Muslims in Abarqu.
> It is astonishing that Muhammad Shirvani wrote me a letter, and I enclose that and
> kindly consider that as well. Behold for yourself the situation in Iran and with what
> hands the Judiciary is administered in this country! I do not know with whom we
> must speak or with what bell92 we may awaken the slumbering.
> At any rate, if you consider it prudent, ask for an appointment in the royal court
> and inform His Majesty of these matters, although I do not imagine that it will have
> the least benefit. This lowly one is completely discouraged about reforming this
> nation.
> Peace, mercy, and the blessings of God be upon you.
> June 10, 1954
> Husayn Burujirdi
> 
> 92 Ayatu’llah Burujirdi misspelled naqus [bell] in the original document. (BC)
> 
> One wonders how an ecclesiastic who is the highest-ranking marja‘ of the Shi‘is could be so
> hardhearted and disregard the plea of an imprisoned farmer [Shirvani], and instead send this
> letter to a court preacher. Ayatu’llah Burujirdi could instead have sent a fair-minded Muslim
> lawyer to Yazd to closely hear the complaints of this hapless old man, so that the death and
> hanging of a wretched Muslim could have been prevented. However, he did not do so and
> was content with telling lies and weaving schemes against a small religious minority group.93
> Muhammad-Taqi Falsafi in chapter 5 of his memoir, and also other high-ranking clerics
> who were contemporaries of Ayatu’llah Burujirdi, have recorded the activities and the
> hostility they exhibited at the encouragement and urging of Ayatu’llah Burujirdi against the
> Baha’is, which I will enumerate on another occasion. In short, Ayatu’llah Burujirdi and his
> marja‘iyat establishment were the center of conspiracies, enmity, and difficulties for the
> Baha’is and all other non-orthodox thinkers in Iran.
> 
> 93 For further details, see Davani, Khatirat va Mubarizat Hujjatu’l-Islam Falsafi, p. 199. (BC)
> 
> Appendix 7
> Fada’iyan Islam
> 
> The Fada’iyan Islam (lit. Devotees of Islam) is an extremist group and perhaps the oldest
> active pressure faction in Iran. The group was formed in 1945 by Siyyid Mujtaba Mirlawhi, a
> young Shi‘i seminarian, after he became deeply concerned with secularization programs
> undertaken by Reza Shah.
> 
> Mirlawhi (1924–1955, Tehran) was born into a fanatical Shi‘i family. Like many others
> among the orthodox, he was distressed by the influence of Ahmad Kasravi, a renowned
> historian and linguist who was writing books and articles that criticized the role of Shi‘ism in
> Iranian history. These concerns grew into a fatwa by senior Shi‘i clerics, who condemned
> Kasravi to death—it is said that Ruhu’llah Khomeini approved this fatwa. In May 1945,
> Mirlawhi attempted to assassinate Kasravi, but only wounded him. Mirlawhi was imprisoned
> for a short time, and from prison he organized the Fada’iyan Islam to fight Shi‘i causes. A
> year later, in May 1946, the Fada’iyan Islam succeeded in assassinating Kasravi. Its agents
> were acquitted shortly after their capture.
> Over the next several years, Mirlawhi developed a close relationship with Ayatu’llah
> Abdu’l-Qasim Kashani. He also started the newspaper Parcham Islam [Flag of Iran] and
> adopted the nom de guerre of Navvab Safavi.
> In early 1949, the Fada’iyan Islam commenced a large-scale assassination campaign. The
> first target was the young Shah of Iran, but an attempt on his life at the University of Tehran
> in February 1949 was unsuccessful. Shortly thereafter, Husayn Imani, a member of the
> Fada’iyan, was able to assassinate Abdu’l-Husayn Hazhir, a former prime minister, in central
> Tehran. On March 7, 1951, Prime Minister ‘Ali Razmara was assassinated in Tehran’s Shah
> Mosque by the same extremist group. The assassin, Khalil Tahmassbi, however, won an
> acquittal. After Musaddiq’s regime, in 1952–53 the Fada’iyan renewed their terrorist
> activities. An unsuccessful attempt on the life of Prime Minister Husayn ‘Ala in November
> 1955, however, ended this phase. In retaliation, the government executed Mirlawhi and four
> of the Fada’iyan’s leaders on January 18, 1956.
> The loss of Mirlawhi was a serious blow to the organization, but the Fada’iyan
> continued to function underground. They reappeared in the early 1960s when Khomeini
> 
> began his public opposition to the Shah. Operating under the name of Jami‘ih Motalifih
> Islami [the Islamic Coalition Association], operatives assassinated Prime Minister Hasan-‘Ali
> Mansur in January 1965. Even after Khomeini’s exile, the Fada’iyan continued close contact
> with him. They distributed tape cassettes of Khomeini’s sermons and writings, and thus
> endeared themselves to future revolutionary figures.
> In 1978, the Fada’iyan came out in the open as supporters of Khomeini. Ayatu’llah
> Sadiq Khalkhali, a close associate of Khomeini and a member of the group since his
> seminary days, became head of the Fada’iyan in May 1979. Under his leadership, the
> Fada’iyan launched a terrorist campaign against Khomeini’s enemies. As soon as Khomeini
> consolidated power in Iran, Khalkhali became chairman of the Revolutionary Courts.
> However, his brutality earned him such a reputation that he alienated even his supporters,
> and he was deposed in December 1980. By then, Khomeini had gained complete ascendancy
> in Iran, and in 1981 the Fada’iyan formally disbanded.
> The group reappeared during the Khatami regime in the late 1990s. President
> Muhammad Khatami came to power as a moderate with the idea of reform. His initiative to
> open dialogue with the West in 1998 caused the defunct Fada’iyan to revitalize. This time the
> driving force was anti-Americanism. Besides threatening and carrying out attacks on
> Americans, the leaders of the Fada’iyan turned their attention to moderates. Two victims,
> husband and wife Darius Furuhar and Parvanih Iskandari, were murdered in Tehran in
> November 1998. Other murders followed that had the Fada’iyan trademark. Evidence exists
> that Iranian intelligence services had a hand in the resurrection of the Fada’iyan, but the
> suspected leader of the group, Sa’id Imami, allegedly committed suicide in prison on June 19,
> 1999. A subsequent investigation uncovered little information, but enough found its way to
> the media to discredit several of the top intelligence leaders, which led to several key
> resignations.
> 
> Sources: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navvab_Safavi; Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and
> Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period, Albany, NY: State
> University of New York Press, 1980; Fereydoun Hoveyda, The Broken Crescent: The “Threat” of
> Militant Islamic Fundamentalism, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998; Michael Rubin, Into the Shadows:
> Radical Vigilantes in Khatami’s Iran, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East
> Policy, 2001.
> 
> Appendix 8
> Appeals to the Shah and Clerics
> 
> The following are texts of two important documents by the National Spiritual Assembly of
> the Baha’is of the United States and Canada to the government and the clerical establishment
> in Iran, which documents are of significant importance in understanding the genesis of anti-
> Baha’ism in that country.
> Deeply worried about the condition of the Baha’is in Iran, the American Assembly on
> July 16, 1926, addressed a detailed letter to Reza Shah Pahlavi appealing for government
> protection for this religious group. Though this text is available elsewhere,94 it is reproduced
> here as Document 1 for ease of reference and for a fuller appreciation of the historical
> background of events described in this monograph.
> After this letter was sent, the situation of the Baha’is of Iran, however, continued to
> worsen; and when a prominent Baha’i was killed in Ardabil, another appeal was sent, this
> time to the Muslim ecclesiastics in Iran. The Persian text of this letter has kindly been
> provided by the National Archives of the United States Baha’i National Center and appears
> below in translation as document 2.
> 
> Document 1: An Appeal Addressed to Reza Shah Pahlavi
> Reza Shah Pahlavi, His Imperial Majesty,
> Imperial Palace, Tihran, Persia.
> 
> Your Majesty:
> Moved by the cruel persecutions being inflicted upon the Baha’is of Persia, we address this
> petition to the supreme authority of that land, confident that when all the facts are
> assembled, the conditions realized and the consequences understood, your Majesty will
> straightaway initiate whatever measures are necessary to terminate this long and frightful
> chapter of unmerited woe.
> 
> Recent Cases of Murder and Pillage
> The latest example of the extreme suffering endured by Persian Baha’is, brought to our
> attention through sources of unquestionable accuracy, was in the outbreak of public violence
> which took place in the town of Jahrum on April 7th last. On that day eight Baha’is were
> tortured and slain under circumstances of unbelievable brutality. The names of these
> innocent victims are: Siyyid Husayn Ruhani, Ostad ‘Abbas, Muhammad Kazim, Muhammad
> Hassan, Muhammad Shafi, Mashhadi ‘Abbas, Ostad Muhammad Hassan, and Muhammad
> Riza. In addition to those murdered outright, many others were severely wounded, and some
> twenty homes overrun and looted or burned to ground. Among the atrocious acts
> committed in the same town we must record also the slaughter of Baha’i women in the most
> shameful manner and the cutting into pieces of the body of a Baha’i child by the pitiless
> criminal’s knife.
> 
> 94 The Baha’i World, vol. 2, pp. 287–94. The text reproduced here has been slightly edited.
> 
> The survivors of such fanatical outbreaks are perhaps more deeply to be pitied even than
> those who suffered martyrdom by fire and sword. Against them are closed all doors of
> mercy, of justice, even of the most elemental human association in any form. The civil
> authorities deny them the rights and privileges of the law of the land and all protection of
> local and provincial courts; the chiefs of Islam pronounce association with them a violation
> of the principles of the religion of Muhammad; they are prevented from having access to
> shops which supply the daily necessities of existence; their homes, their property, and their
> persons are abandoned to the will of the insane mob or of the worst criminal element in the
> community. Such are the conditions existing today in the town of Maraghih, in the province
> of Adhirbayjan, of your realm.
> To recount the sufferings of the Persian Baha’is in detail, hundreds of pages would be
> required. Sufficient for the moment, to state that twenty of these unfortunate people have
> been slain within the past few weeks, while three were murdered during the previous year,
> with fanatical outbreaks more particularly in the towns of Qamsar and Faran and the
> provinces of Fars, Yazd, and Khurasan. The anti-Baha’i incidents preceding the assassination
> of Vice-Consul Major Robert W. Imbrie in the streets of Tihran are becoming well known to
> the American people, through the extensive newspaper publicity following that unhappy but
> significant case.
> If the slightest doubt should arise as to the number or grave character of these anti-
> Baha’i outrages in Persia, we are prepared to file the complete record with any suitable
> authority your Majesty may care to name. The essence of the matter is this: at this very hour,
> under your Majesty’s rule, just as has been the case for more than eighty years under
> preceding sovereigns, the life of a Baha’i in Persia is bereft of all those sanctions and
> guarantees which are written into the law of every civilized nation, and adhered to as a moral
> code even by peoples who have not developed to the state of formal law. The Persian
> Baha’is at any moment are subject to such shameful violence as hunters would not inflict
> upon beasts of prey.
> The astonishing record of the martyrdoms undergone by the Bab and His followers, and
> by those who later acknowledged the spiritual leadership of Baha’u’llah, is extant in the
> libraries of America and Europe in the works of well-known scholars such as the late
> Professor Browne of Cambridge University, the late Baron Rosen of Petrograd, and Comte
> de Gobineau of France. The leading humanitarians and independent thinkers of the West are
> cognizant of the fact that in Persia during the past eighty years there has occurred the most
> heroic expression of the religious spirit which has glorified humanity for hundreds, perhaps
> for thousands of years. Animated by invincible faith, more than twenty thousand men,
> women and children have during that period of time voluntarily yielded up their lives to
> promote the Cause of Baha’u’llah.
> 
> Religious Freedom Guaranteed
> If from local and provincial authorities, and from the religious leaders as well, the general
> justification has been attempted that the Baha’is individually and collective are dangerous to
> the public welfare and their extermination a service to the people and state, we must be
> permitted to ask by what authority has their case been tried? Under what condition has it
> been established beyond the right of appeal, that a Baha’i as such is synonymous with a vital
> menace to Persia—nay, apparently, a menace to mankind? For every species of criminal, no
> matter how vile, the law assigns methods of trial and degrees of punishment. When did the
> supreme court of Persia, despite the fact that religious freedom is guaranteed by the Persian
> Constitution, make an exception in the case of the Baha’is?
> 
> We know full well that according to the universal standards of morality, the Persian
> Baha’is are not merely the peers, they are indisputably the superiors, of their fellow
> countrymen. The Persian Baha’is are truthful and industrious. They are progressive and
> public spirited. They value highly the benefits of scientific and industrial as well as cultural
> and religious education. They recognize the equality of men and women. They are bound by
> the explicit text of their religion to be loyal to the head of their national government and to
> take part in no movements of sedition. Since the individual Baha’i cannot be condemned
> according to the prevailing moral or civil standard, and the Baha’is collectively cannot be
> proven ever to have arisen against the government, it must be that those responsible for
> their persecution assert that the Baha’i Faith itself, independent of the lives and actions of its
> adherents, contains some dreadful taint, some mysterious evil, the stamping out of which is
> required by Divine law!
> Should this specious vindication be put forward—this condoning of theft, arson, pillage,
> torture and murder on the part of the officials and clergy as though sanctioned by the Will of
> God—then we assert that either no effort has been made by its enemies to understand the
> principles of the Faith, or those who occupy the seats of religious authority in Persia can no
> longer discriminate between right and wrong, good and evil, truth and falsehood.
> 
> Baha’i Principles and Doctrines
> The principles and doctrines of the Baha’i Cause are not subject to changing interpretation
> according to individual caprice or the self-interest of any special group. These teachings are
> to be found in the writings of Baha’u’llah, together with the interpretations of ‘Abdu’l-
> Baha—and exist in no other source. For the sake of brevity, ‘Abdu’l-Baha summarized the
> essential objects and teachings of the Faith as follows:
> [See appendix A at the conclusion of this letter.]
> Brief though it be, the foregoing statement of the principles and doctrines of the Baha’i
> Faith is quite sufficient to reveal its comprehensive character, its noble purpose, and its pure
> spirit. What conscientious minister or priest of any religion; what statesman of any country;
> what responsible man of affairs; what scientist or thinker, could assert that loyalty to such
> teachings threatens the true welfare of any person or group? By what logic can these
> principles be claimed a form of heresy to any Divine law or treason to any just government?
> Nevertheless, the Persians themselves, save only the Persian Baha’is, still ignore the
> greatness that came into their midst, repudiate the principles of true progress and civilization
> so lovingly offered them, and even decide that the followers of this Faith, irrespective of
> their personal morality and civic virtue, are deserving of the most implacable hate, the most
> relentless hostility, the most inhuman death!
> 
> Outline of Baha’i History
> To consider now the circumstances under which Persia gave birth to a Cause destined to
> influence the entire world: On May 23, 1844, a youth of the pure lineage of Muhammad
> arose in Shiraz and proclaimed a new spiritual mission. This personage, known as the Bab,
> based His mission upon truth and fact in exact conformity with the Qur’an of the Prophet
> Muhammad. The essence of the Bab’s teaching was that He proclaimed the coming of One
> who would be the World Educator foretold in all the Holy Books. He asserted that true
> loyalty to the Prophet must now consist in awaiting the coming of that One and in
> preparations for loyalty and obedience to Him. This proclamation produced an immediate
> far-reaching effect in Persia, attracting many thousands of faithful souls but also creating
> frantic opposition among the leaders of Islam. Their hatred, in alliance with the power of the
> 
> government in Tihran, brought about the martyrdom of this radiant Spirit at Tabriz, July 9,
> 1850.
> Far from extinguishing the light of this new Faith, the cruel execution of the Bab resulted
> in a great increase in the number and loyalty of His adherents. As the ecclesiastics continued
> to inflame the civil authorities and the ignorant populace, scenes of indescribable barbarism
> took place in the public streets and squares of cities and towns throughout the land.
> Thousands of helpless, inoffensive men, women, and children perished under the sword of
> the executioner, or the knives, stones, and clubs of the maddened mob. Some of these
> Baha’is were blown from the mouth of cannon; others were scourged through crowded
> streets and, as in the case of the glorious martyr Sulayman Khan, lit candles placed in their
> bleeding wounds. Thus was paid the price of a new spirit of hope and love brought to earth
> in this age!
> No attention need any longer be paid to that apparent confusion in the internal affairs of
> the Cause of God following the Bab’s martyrdom. His followers needed and sought a leader
> able to unite their moral forces, instruct their minds, and point out their spiritual duties
> under the difficult conditions obtaining throughout the country. Several claimants arose, but
> He who alone fulfilled the conditions and met the opportunities was Mirza Husayn ‘Ali,
> eldest son of a family of exalted rank in the realm, known to history as Baha’u’llah.
> Baha’u’llah offered Himself as the target for all the blows aimed at the helpless Babis;
> assumed all responsibility as their leader in the eyes of the government; was imprisoned
> under heavy chains for their sake in Tihran; bastinadoed, stripped of property and rights,
> banished to Baghdad with His family; then successively exiled to Constantinople, to
> Adrianople, and finally condemned to life imprisonment in the barracks of pestilential ‘Akka,
> the Turkish penal colony, situated at the foot of Mount Carmel in Palestine [now Israel].
> The rulers of Persia and of Turkey were associated together in this sentence of exile and
> imprisonment, acting to put down a movement whose inner power they recognized but
> whose meaning they could not understand. But the spiritual mission of Baha’u’llah could not
> be eclipsed by any material opposition. Serenely, under the shadow of death, He completed
> the Book of His religion, and while suffering the treatment of slaves and criminals, predicted
> the overthrow of both those dynasties conspiring against His Cause. And, as your Majesty so
> well knows, that which He foretold has come to pass. Students of the Christian and Jewish
> Scriptures who have become cognizant of the facts concerning the exile and imprisonment
> of Baha’u’llah recognize that these events fulfill their most glorious prophecy, even as the
> martyrdom of the Bab fulfilled the prophecy of the Qur’an.
> Who, even now, can read unmoved the noble words uttered by Baha’u’llah in the famous
> letters sent forth from His prison to Sultan and the Shah?
> [See appendix B at the conclusion of this letter.]
> As history has recorded, these letters were written more than fifty years ago.
> Today, the Epistles and Books of Baha’u’llah are held in grateful reverence by uncounted
> thousands of devoted followers throughout the world. In them they have found a source of
> unity and fellowship overcoming every difference of creed, language, custom, and tradition.
> The Books of Baha’u’llah create in hearts the reality of human oneness and the spirit of
> peace, burning away the veils of indifference, misunderstanding, antagonism. and fear. They
> uphold the doctrine of the oneness of God in its universality by revealing the identical
> mission and power in the origin of all the religions. They bring new assurance as to the
> mercy and love of God for man, and new confirmation of man’s spiritual destiny. The
> essence of all the Holy Books of the past returns in this Word, stripped of those particular
> allusions and expressions inevitable under the restrictions of former times. Whoever truly
> 
> loves any Manifestation of God, whether Muhammad, Moses, Zoroaster or Christ, will
> surely turn to Baha’u’llah in joyous devotion, as to the only One capable of bringing his most
> cherished ideals to fruition in this unsettled, dangerous yet glorious age.
> Foremost among those who have served the Cause of Baha’u’llah and increased the
> proofs of its spiritual truth, is His eldest son, ‘Abdu’l-Baha.
> It was as a child of eight years that ‘Abdu’l-Baha began to walk in the path of that Light.
> From city to city and from prison to prison He accompanied Baha’u’llah, taught only by
> Him, inspired by Him to continue the mission when the physical body of Baha’u’llah must at
> length be no more. Yet, though confinement and oppressive hardship had been His lot for
> more than fifty years, when ‘Abdu’l-Baha journeyed through Europe and America there was
> not one to match the ardor of his humanitarian service, nor the penetration of His mind into
> the essential problems of human life. His voice most clearly sounded the call of religious
> unity and brotherhood—His warning most courageously foretold the coming World War
> and pointed out what steps must be taken to avert a complete overthrow of civilization, East
> and West.
> He came not as the representative of any institution, the exponent of any creed, the
> ambassador of any nation, the defender of any race. Rather did this Personage come as one
> sent from the very Kingdom of God, and His thoughts, manners, purpose and methods—
> above all, His intense love for every fellow-man—reflected to humanity the conditions of a
> higher realm. Though limited human beings cannot honor One from the world of Spirit,
> nevertheless even according to ordinary standards, such honor was bestowed upon ‘Abdu’l-
> Baha as no Persian ever received in the Occident during the memory of man.
> By reason of the predominance of Greek thought upon modern education in the West,
> Persia for hundreds of years has been viewed through the eyes of Greek historians and
> writers, with the result that your Majesty’s nation and people have been victims of instinctive
> prejudice. By many, Persia would be associated with the idea of complete decadence and
> corruption, while others would recall the menace of military invasion prevented by the
> famous victories of Salamis and Marathon. In addition to this burden of prejudice, Persia has
> also suffered grievously from the antagonism felt by many Christian leaders for every
> Muslim country. Before ‘Abdu’l-Baha journeyed to the West, it would have been difficult
> even to imagine any influence powerful enough to lift this burden from Persia and replace
> long-established contempt with sympathy and respect.
> 
> Persia Honored in the West
> But in ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Europe and America learned to honor Persia as the source of true
> wisdom and love. Were the Persian people aware of what He accomplished on their behalf,
> they would hasten to raise monuments in His name and seek to acquaint themselves with
> His truth. Instead of that, the Persians, like wolves, are actually tearing to pieces those
> among them who testify that Baha’u’llah and ‘Abdu’l-Baha lived only to serve mankind. One
> of the teachings of Baha’u’llah definitely attributes special glory to Persia as the center of
> devotion for Baha’is of all lands. Should not all patriotic Persians appreciate this as the
> greatest tribute ever paid to their land?
> The journey undertaken by ‘Abdu’l-Baha throughout the United States in 1912 assumes
> year by year a larger meaning and a profounder importance. During this journey the great
> Exemplar of the Baha’i Faith turned the clear, radiant light of His spiritual wisdom upon the
> complexity of Western civilization. He made contact with all our problems, conditions, and
> opportunities. Appreciating those memorable days, His American followers took steps to
> record permanently the addresses delivered by ‘Abdu’l-Baha in churches, synagogues,
> 
> universities, and other important institutions. The record of His journey survived in two
> volumes, published under the title suggested by Him: The Promulgation of Universal Peace. To
> read these words is to find is to find the very essence of the solution of the sinister problems
> of war and peace, capital and labor, church and state, science and religion, so gravely
> menacing the world at this time.
> Since ‘Abdu’l-Baha is the only Persian whose addresses to the West have gained wide
> influence and fame; and since it would be impossible to appreciate the full influence and
> meaning of the Baha’i Faith apart from these two volumes, we take the liberty, your Majesty,
> of presenting copies of them to you in connection with this petition. Lack of space prevents
> us from informing you of another work of ‘Abdu’l-Baha wherein He deals specifically with
> the condition of Persia and suggests suitable methods and measures by which the Persian
> people can regain their ancient, their rightful position of eminence among the peoples of the
> world. A translation of this work has been published both in England and America;
> doubtless we can furnish a copy in the original Persian tongue, should we receive a request
> for the same.
> ‘Abdu’l-Baha passed from this world in 1921, a Light of international friendship and
> understanding that shall never die. Perhaps another decade must elapse before His wisdom
> becomes the source of inspiration of the majority of responsible statesmen and thinkers, but
> the outcome does not stand in doubt. Already a host of grateful people in the all countries
> acknowledge His spiritual guidance, unified in the one world-movement raised above the
> reach of economic, political, or religious factions. In Persia alone, the ranks of the Baha’is
> today include a considerable section of the population—especially among the most
> progressive minds—therefore one can appreciate the spiritual power able to make these
> people prefer death to violent resistance and human revenge. Let none believe that it has
> been through fear or weakness that the Baha’is of your realm have submitted to the injustice
> we have mentioned. They have entrusted their lives to God, and who dare assert that they
> have trusted in vain?
> The following words written by ‘Abdu’l-Baha in a letter to American Baha’is nearly
> twenty years ago refer most significantly to Persia and its conditions:
> [See appendix C at the conclusion of this letter.]
> 
> Conditions Indicate Anarchy
> We have referred to the long period of time over which these dire persecutions have been
> spread. We have indicated also that the original antagonism for the Babis and their
> successor, the Baha’is, emanated not from the mass of the people but from the chiefs of
> religion and state. Without their deliberate provocation and example, the people would never
> have become inflamed with the insane spirit of fanaticism and bloodshed. But once this
> dreadful example was set, the people throughout the land were quick to learn that one could
> rob, insult, strike, torture, and slay a Baha’i with impunity—nay, even with the approval of
> those in local positions of power. Therefore, by all too logical steps, conditions in Persia
> have come to the point where, if public agitation is wanted for purpose, or ambitious leaders
> desire to divert attention from an issue, all that is necessary is for them to raise a hue and cry
> against the Baha’is, and behind the smoke of violence the agitators can work unseen. The
> condition is one of moral and civic anarchy, and if prolonged must seep higher and higher
> into the structure of the central government until at last the supreme executive, to maintain
> himself, must become little better than a bandit chief. A patriot like your Majesty, who
> understands the basis of national order and stability, has surely viewed this problem of local
> 
> government as one of supreme concern for the progress, for the very existence of the
> Persian state.
> Very humbly, and as true friends of Persia, we suggest that the question of the Baha’is of
> your realm has become a vital issue no longer to be postponed or entrusted to prejudiced or
> incompetent hands. For the cruel treatment being inflicted upon this innocent people is
> becoming the cause of absolute anarchy and disregard of law. Not until your loyal Baha’i
> subjects receive full justice and protection will these negative forces be successfully resisted,
> which will otherwise lead to the total disintegration of civilized customs, manners, and
> forms. When the supreme authority of Persia today reverses the example its predecessors set
> over seventy years ago, and protects the Baha’is resolutely instead of condoning their
> persecution, then at last can the process of anarchy and disintegration be checked, and the
> national government, the sole hope of any people, be placed on foundations able to endure.
> It may well be that the case of the Persian Baha’is has become a vital issue in another
> direction as well.
> 
> Menace to Persia’s Economic Development
> Aware of the explicit statements made by ‘Abdu’l-Baha concerning the future of the
> relations between East and West, the Baha’is of the United States and Canada have long
> watched with the greatest interest the signs of an increasing intimacy between North
> America and Persia. We have felt keenly the need for cordial association and mutual spirit of
> cooperation between these two lands and peoples, in order to offset by an example of
> international justice and true morality the grievous effects of that previous contact of East
> and West so frequently founded on national or sectional greed. Is it not evident that Persia
> would benefit by direct financial cooperation from this country—enterprises of a non-
> political character intended to develop the natural resources of that economically
> undeveloped land? But the consummation of any plan of financial cooperation between our
> people and Persians is impossible until real stability has been effected in Persia itself, and
> those processes of justice and security have been realized which are absolutely necessary as
> guarantees that large economic developments can succeed. We have direct knowledge of one
> important enterprise recently abandoned by American interests for lack of these guarantees.
> But such considerations are entirely secondary to our essential purpose, of requesting
> protection and justice for the Persian Baha’is on purely spiritual grounds. No other purpose
> could have induced us to take this unusual step of addressing a petition directly to a head of
> state. It is because all the circumstances are extraordinary, and the issues supremely
> important, that we felt compelled to disregard ordinary custom and place this petition
> directly in your Majesty’s hands. The news of your accession to the throne gave us great
> hope that Persia had now been blessed with a ruler not only firm but imbued with modern
> standards and ideals. We feel certain that your Majesty will appreciate the gravity of the case
> and determine to uphold the full responsibility of your exalted position as the founder of a
> new dynasty by hastening to suppress conditions of terror long crying to Divine Justice for
> amends.
> 
> Baha’i Literature Confiscated
> We express the hope that your Majesty will also decide that no useful end can any longer be
> served by the confiscation of Baha’i magazines, literature, and correspondence sent to Persia
> from this country, or by the banning of photographs of ‘Abdu’l-Baha. It is such imperial
> regulations which serve indirectly to justify the atrocities committed by your subjects upon
> the Baha’is.
> 
> We await your Majesty’s assurance that our respectful appeal has achieved its aim. Our
> love for these oppressed Baha’i brothers and sisters makes it imperative that we continue our
> efforts to rescue them from their sea of calamity, until assured that henceforth they shall be
> protected by the full power of the Imperial Government, and just restitution made them for
> losses already sustained.
> We transmit this petition in behalf of the Baha’i Spiritual Assemblies of the United States
> and Canada as follows: Berkeley, Geyserville, Glendale, Los Angeles, Oakland, Pasadena,
> San Francisco, and Visalia, California; Montreal, Quebec, Canada; Denver, Colorado; New
> Haven, Connecticut; Washington, D.C.; Miami, Florida; Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands; Chicago
> and Urbana, Illinois; Eliot, Maine; Baltimore, Maryland; Boston, Springfield, and Worcester,
> Massachusetts; Detroit, Fruitport, Lansing, and Muskegon, Michigan; Minneapolis, Minnesota;
> Montclair, Newark, and West Englewood, New Jersey; Buffalo, Geneva, New York City, and
> Yonkers, New York; Akron, Cincinnati, and Cleveland, Ohio; Portland, Oregon; Philadelphia
> and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Seattle, Washington; Kenosha, Milwaukee, and Racine,
> Wisconsin;—and on behalf of the Baha’i groups and meetings as follows: Clear Lake
> Highlands, Santa Barbara, and San Diego, California; Toronto, Ontario and Vancouver,
> British Columbia, Canada; St. Augustine, Florida; Atlanta and Augusta, Georgia; Spracklesville,
> Maui, Hawaiian Islands; Keokuk, Iowa; Peoria and Springfield, Illinois; Haverhill and
> Somerville, Massachusetts; Duluth and St. Paul, Minnesota; Omaha, Nebraska; Asbury Park and
> Jersey City, New Jersey; Johnstown, Ithaca, and Rochester, New York; Dayton and Sandusky,
> Ohio; and Spokane, Washington.
> 
> National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the United States and Canada
> By Horace Holley, Secretary
> Green Acre, Eliot, Maine
> July 16, 1926
> 



> Appendix A
> Summary of Baha’i Teachings
> 
> The Oneness of the World of Humanity
> “Baha’u’llah addresses Himself to the world of man saying: ‘Ye are all the leaves of one tree
> and the fruits of one orchard.’ That is, the world of existence is no other than one tree, and
> the nations or peoples are like unto the different branches or limbs thereof, and human
> individuals are similar to the fruits and blossoms thereof…while in all past religious books
> and epistles, the world of humanity has been divided into two parts: one called the ‘people of
> the Book’ or the ‘pure tree’, and the other the ‘evil tree.’ One-half of the people of the world
> were looked upon as belonging to the irreligious and the infidel; one-half of the people were
> consigned to the mercy of the Creator, and the other half were considered as objects of the
> wrath of their Maker. But Baha’u’llah proclaimed the oneness of the world of humanity—
> He submerged all mankind in the sea of divine generosity.
> Independent Investigation of Truth
> “No man should follow blindly his ancestors and forefathers. Nay, each must see with his
> own eyes, hear with his own ears, and investigate truth in order that he may find the truth;
> 
> whereas the religion of forefathers and ancestors is based upon blind imitation—man should
> investigate the truth.
> The Foundation of All Religions Is One
> “The foundation underlying all the divine precepts is one reality. It must needs be reality, and
> reality is one, not multiple. Therefore the foundation for the divine religions is one. But we
> can see that certain forms have come in, certain imitations of forms and ceremonials have
> crept in. They are heretical, they are accidental, because they differ; hence they cause
> differences amongst religions. But if we set aside these imitations and seek the reality of the
> foundation we shall all agree, because religion is one and not multiple.
> Religion Must Be the Cause of Unity Among Mankind
> “Every religion is the greatest divine effulgence, the cause of life amongst men, the cause of
> the honor of humanity, and is productive of life-everlasting amongst humankind. Religion is
> not for enmity or hatred. It is not for tyranny or injustice. If religion be the cause of enmity
> and rancor, if it should prove the cause of alienating men, assuredly non-religion would be
> better. For religion and the teachings which appertain to it are as a course of treatment. What
> is the object of any course of treatment? It is cure and healing. But if the outcome of a
> course of treatment should be productive of mere diagnosis and discussion of symptoms,
> the abolition of it is evidently preferable. In this sense, abandoning religions would be a step
> toward unity.
> Religion Must Be in Accord with Science and Reason
> “Religion must be reasonable; it must agree perfectly with science, so that science shall
> sanction religion and religion sanction science. The two must be brought together,
> indissolubly, in reality. Down to the present day it has been customary for man to accept a
> thing because it was called religion, even though it were not in accord with human reason.
> Equality Between Men and Women
> “This is peculiar to the teachings of Baha’u’llah, for all former religious systems placed men
> above women. Daughters and sons must follow the same form of study and the same
> education. Having one course of education promotes unity among mankind.
> Abandonment of All Prejudices
> “It is established that all the Prophets of God have come to unite the children of men and
> not to disperse them, and to put in action the law of love and not enmity. Consequently we
> must throw aside all these prejudices—the racial prejudice, the patriotic prejudice, the
> religious and political prejudices. We must become the cause of unity of the human race.
> Universal Peace
> “All men and nations shall make peace. There shall be universal peace amongst religions,
> universal peace amongst races, universal peace amongst the denizens of all regions. Today in
> the world of humanity the most important matter is the question of universal peace. The
> realization of this principle is the crying need of the time.
> Universal Education
> “All mankind should partake of both knowledge and education, and this partaking of
> knowledge and of education is one of the necessities of religion. The education of each child
> is obligatory. If there are no parents, the community must look after the child.
> 
> Solution of the Economic Problem
> “No religious books of the past Prophets speak of the economic question, while this
> problem has been thoroughly solved in the teachings of Baha’u’llah.…Certain regulations are
> revealed which insure the welfare and well-being of all humanity. Just as the rich man enjoys
> his rest and his pleasures surrounded by luxuries, the poor man must likewise have a home,
> be provided with sustenance, and not be in want.…Until this is effected, happiness is
> impossible. All are equal in the estimation of God; their rights are one and there is no
> distinction for any soul; all are protected beneath the justice of God.
> A Universal Language
> “An international auxiliary language shall be adopted which shall be taught by all the schools
> and academies of the world. A committee appointed by national bodies shall select a suitable
> language to be used as a means of international communication, and that language shall be
> taught in all the schools of the world in order that everyone shall need but two languages, his
> national tongue and the international auxiliary language. All will acquire the international
> auxiliary language.
> An International Tribunal
> “A universal tribunal under the power of God, under the protection of all men, shall be
> established. Each one must obey the decisions of this tribunal, in order to arrange the
> difficulties of every nation.
> “About sixty years ago Baha’u’llah commanded the people to establish universal peace
> and summoned all the nations to the ‘divine banquet of international arbitration’ so that the
> questions of boundaries, of national honor and property and of vital interests between
> nations might be decided by an arbitral court of justice.
> “Remember, these precepts were given more than half a century ago. At that moment no
> one spoke of universal peace, nor of any of the principles; but Baha’u’llah proclaimed them
> to all the sovereigns of the world.…They are the spirit of this age, the light of this age; they
> are the well-being of this age.”
> 



> Appendix B
> Excerpts from Letters of Baha’u’llah to the Sultan of Turkey and the Shah of Persia
> (Fifty Years Ago)
> 
> To the ruler of Persia, Baha’u’llah wrote, in part, as follows:95
> “O King! I adjure thee by thy Lord, the All-Merciful, to look upon thy servants with the
> glances of the eye of thy favour, and to treat them with justice, that God may treat thee with
> mercy. Potent is thy Lord to do as He pleaseth. The world, with all its abasement and glory,
> shall pass away, and the kingdom will remain unto God, the Most Exalted, the All-Knowing.
> “Say: He hath kindled the lamp of utterance, and feedeth it with the oil of wisdom and
> understanding. Too high is thy Lord, the All-Merciful, for aught in the universe to resist His
> Faith. He revealeth what He pleaseth through the power of His sovereign might, and
> 
> 95 This section quotes passages from the writings of Baha’u’llah that are now available in a better translations,
> 
> and these more accurate translations are instead cited in this segment.
> 
> protecteth it with a host of His well-favoured angels. He is supreme over His servants and
> exerciseth undisputed dominion over His creation. He, verily, is the All-Knowing, the All-
> Wise.
> “O King! I was but a man like others, asleep upon My couch, when lo, the breezes of
> the All-Glorious were wafted over Me, and taught Me the knowledge of all that hath been.
> This thing is not from Me, but from One Who is Almighty and All-Knowing. And He bade
> Me lift up My voice between earth and heaven, and for this there befell Me what hath caused
> the tears of every man of understanding to flow. The learning current amongst men I studied
> not; their schools I entered not. Ask of the city wherein I dwelt, that thou mayest be well
> assured that I am not of them who speak falsely.…
> “The Pen of the Most High addresseth Me, saying: Fear not. Relate unto His Majesty
> the Shah that which befell thee. His heart, verily, is between the fingers of thy Lord, the God
> of Mercy, that haply the sun of justice and bounty may shine forth above the horizon of his
> heart. Thus hath the decree been irrevocably fixed by Him Who is the All-Wise.
> “Look upon this Youth, O King, with the eyes of justice; judge thou, then, with truth
> concerning what hath befallen Him. Of a verity, God hath made thee His shadow amongst
> men, and the sign of His power unto all that dwell on earth. Judge thou between Us and
> them that have wronged Us without proof and without an enlightening Book. They that
> surround thee love thee for their own sakes, whereas this Youth loveth thee for thine own
> sake, and hath had no desire except to draw thee nigh unto the seat of grace, and to turn
> thee toward the right hand of justice. Thy Lord beareth witness unto that which I declare.…
> “Amongst the people are those who allege that this Youth hath had no purpose but to
> perpetuate His name, whilst others claim that He hath sought for Himself the vanities of the
> world—this, notwithstanding that never, throughout all My days, have I found a place of
> safety, be it to the extent of a single foothold. At all times have I been immersed in an ocean
> of tribulations, whose full measure none can fathom but God. He, truly, is aware of what I
> say. How many the days in which My loved ones have been sorely shaken by reason of My
> afflictions, and how many the nights during which My kindred, fearing for My life, have
> bitterly wept and lamented! And this none can deny save them that are bereft of truthfulness.
> Is it conceivable that He Who expecteth to lose His life at any moment should seek after
> worldly vanities? How very strange the imaginings of those who speak as prompted by their
> own caprices, and who wander distractedly in the wilderness of self and passion! Erelong
> shall they be called upon to account for their words, and on that day they shall find none to
> befriend or help them.
> “And amongst the people are those who claim that He hath disbelieved in God—yet
> every member of My body testifieth that there is none other God but Him; that those
> Whom He hath raised up in truth and sent forth with His guidance are the Manifestations of
> His most excellent names, the Revealers of His most exalted attributes, and the Repositories
> of His Revelation in the kingdom of creation; that through them the Proof of God hath
> been perfected unto all else but Him, the standard of Divine Unity hath been raised, and the
> sign of sanctity hath been made manifest; and that through them every soul hath found a
> path unto the Lord of the Throne on high. We testify that there is none other God but Him,
> that from everlasting He was alone with none else besides Him, and that He shall be unto
> everlasting what He hath ever been. Too high is the All-Merciful for the hearts of those who
> have recognized Him to apprehend His true nature, or for the minds of men to hope to
> fathom His essence. He verily is exalted above the understanding of anyone besides Himself,
> and sanctified beyond the comprehension of all else save Him. From all eternity He hath
> been independent of the entire creation.…
> 
> “I swear by God, O King! Wert thou to incline thine ear to the melodies of that
> Nightingale which warbleth in manifold accents upon the mystic bough as bidden by thy
> Lord, the All-Merciful, thou wouldst cast away thy sovereignty and set thy face towards this
> Scene of transcendent glory, above whose horizon shineth the Book of the Dawntide, and
> wouldst expend all that thou possessest in thine eagerness to obtain the things of God.…Of
> what avail are the things which are yours today and which tomorrow others shall possess?
> Choose for thyself that which God hath chosen for His elect, and God shall grant thee a
> mighty sovereignty in His Kingdom. We beseech God to aid thy Majesty to hearken unto
> that Word whose radiance hath enveloped the whole world, and to protect thee from such as
> have strayed far from the court of His presence….”96
> “We further beseech Him to make of this darksome tribulation a shield for the Temple
> of His Cause, and to protect it from the assault of sharpened swords and pointed daggers.
> Adversity hath ever given rise to the exaltation of His Cause and the glorification of His
> Name. Such hath been God’s method carried into effect in centuries and ages past.…Could
> the people but taste that choice Wine of the mercy of their Lord, the Almighty, the All-
> Knowing, which lieth in store for them in the world beyond, they would assuredly cease
> their censure, and seek only to win the good pleasure of this Youth. For now, however, they
> have hidden Me behind a veil of darkness, whose fabric they have woven with the hands of
> idle fancy and vain imagination. Erelong shall the snow-white hand of God rend an opening
> through the darkness of this night and unlock a mighty portal unto His City. On that Day
> shall the people enter therein by troops.…
> “We beseech God to purge the hearts of certain divines from rancour and enmity, that
> they may look upon matters with an eye unbeclouded by contempt. May He raise them up
> unto so lofty a station that neither the attractions of the world, nor the allurements of
> authority, may deflect them from gazing upon the Supreme Horizon, and that neither
> worldly benefits nor carnal desires shall prevent them from attaining that Day whereon the
> mountains shall be reduced to dust. Though they now rejoice in the adversity that hath
> befallen Us, soon shall come a day whereon they shall lament and weep. By My Lord! Were I
> given the choice between, on the one hand, the wealth and opulence, the ease and comfort,
> the honour and glory which they enjoy, and, on the other, the adversities and trials which are
> Mine, I would unhesitatingly choose My present condition and would refuse to barter a
> single atom of these hardships for all that hath been created in the world of being.
> “But for the tribulations that have touched Me in the path of God, life would have held
> no sweetness for Me, and Mine existence would have profited Me nothing. For them who
> are endued with discernment, and whose eyes are fixed upon the Sublime Vision, it is no
> secret that I have been, most of the days of My life, even as a slave, sitting under a sword
> hanging on a thread, knowing not whether it would fall soon or late upon him. And yet,
> notwithstanding all this We render thanks unto God, the Lord of the worlds, and yield Him
> praise at all times and under all conditions. He, verily, standeth witness over all things.”97
> 
> From the letter written by Baha’u’llah to the Sultan of Turkey we quote the following:
> “O thou who hast imagined thyself to be the most exalted of men and who hast
> regarded as the lowliest of all creatures this divine Youth, through Whom the eyes of the
> 
> 96 Baha’u’llah, The Summons of the Lord of Hosts, pp. 97–103.
> 97 Baha’u’llah, The Summons of the Lord of Hosts, pp. 133–36.
> 
> Concourse on high have been illumined and made radiant! This Youth hath sought nothing
> from thee or from such as are like unto thee.…
> “Even if this Lifegiver and World Reformer be in thine estimation guilty of sedition and
> strife, what crime could have been committed by a group of women, children, and suckling
> mothers that they should be thus afflicted with the scourge of thine anger and wrath? No
> faith or religion hath ever held children responsible. The Pen of divine Command hath
> exempted them, yet the fire of thy tyranny and oppression encompasseth all. If thou bearest
> allegiance to any faith or religion, then thou shouldst know that, according to all the heavenly
> Books and all the divinely inspired and weighty Scriptures, children are not to be held
> accountable. Aside from this, not even those who disbelieve in God have perpetrated such
> unseemly acts.…
> “Ye have plundered and unjustly despoiled a group of people who have never rebelled in
> your domains, nor disobeyed your government, but rather kept to themselves and engaged
> day and night in the remembrance of God. Later, when the order was issued to banish this
> Youth, all were filled with dismay.…
> “A handful of clay is greater in the sight of God than all your dominion and your
> sovereignty, and all your might and your fortune. Should it be His wish, He would scatter
> you in dust. Soon will He seize you in His wrathful anger, sedition will be stirred up in your
> midst, and your dominions will be disrupted.…
> “Neither will your glory last, nor will Mine abasement endure. Such abasement, in the
> estimation of a true man, is the pride of every glory.”98
> 
> 



> Appendix C
> Words of ‘Abdu’l-Baha Concerning Persia
> 
> “Regarding the subject of Persia. Praise be to God! She became the East of the Sun of Truth
> in this age. The Light of Eternity dawned, the everlasting Glory unveiled her countenance
> and the Realty of Mercifulness became manifest. This is the prosperity of Persia.
> Undoubtedly, she will progress day by day under the shade of the Blessed Tree until her
> illumination shall penetrate throughout the wide expanse of the earth.
> “Regarding the question of the establishment of then National Assembly ([i.e., the
> Parliament] of Persia, September 12, 1906). This National Assembly will not bring any rapid
> results. Now some of the agitators are harboring evil intentions and do not let agreement
> and union be realized between the government and (foreign) nations.…
> “However, we have nothing to do with these proceedings and counter-proceedings. We
> are commanded to quicken the souls, to train the characters, to illumine the realm of man, to
> guide all the inhabitants of the earth, to create concord and unity among all men and to lead
> the world of humanity to the Fountain of the everlasting Glory. The reformation of one
> empire is not our aim; nay, rather we invoke from God that all the regions of the world be
> reformed and cultivated; the republic of men become the manifestors of the bounty of the
> most glorious Lord; the East and the West be brought nearer together; and that Turk and
> Tajik, Iran and America, India and Arabia, Japan and Persia, China and Germany—in brief,
> 
> 98 Baha’u’llah, The Summons of the Lord of Hosts, pp. 161–65.
> 
> all the nations and peoples of the world—become as one soul and one spirit, in order that
> strife and warfare be entirely removed and the rancor and hostility disappear so that all
> become as the waves of one ocean, the drops of one sea, the flowers of one rose-garden, the
> trees of one orchard, the grains of one harvest and the plants of one meadow.
> “The Constitutional Government, according to the irrefutable text of the Religion of
> God, is the cause of the glory and prosperity of the nation and the civilization and freedom
> of the people. However, according to what is known, the hands of the selfish leaders from
> among the ‘ulama are in this affair. Outwardly they are desiring the establishment of the
> National Assembly and at every moment they are crying and clamoring (for its immediate
> realization), but inwardly they are sowing the seeds of corruption and agitation and try to put
> to naught the noble intention of the government. In the secret of their hearts and souls they
> do not favor the upbuilding of the National Assembly, the civilization of Persia, the
> awakening of the people, the advancement of the age, the spreading of knowledge and
> public instruction. Thieves like to lurk in darkness; fishers desire disturbed water; the bat
> shuns the rays of the sun; the black beetle dislikes the fragrance of the rose-garden; the
> ferocious wolf is in expectation of the sleet and snow; and the wine seller sees his advantage
> in the inebriate, irrational drinker. These leaders of religion also desire to behold the nation
> thrown into a weltering chaos of ignorance so that the reins of affairs remain in the hands of
> the arrogant ‘ulama. They know that if the nation began to adore wisdom, truthfulness,
> progress and fidelity, it would bring about their (the ‘ulama) degradation.…
> “Be ye engaged in prayer that with the utmost good pleasure the nation obey the
> government, comply with the wise counsels of the attendants of the central dominion, give
> no attention to the hearsay of the agitators and rise not to quarrel with and protest against
> the government like unto the Russian Duma, so as to throw the whole empire, the nation
> and the kingdom into a sea of anarchy and lawlessness. Much prayer is needed so that God
> may help and protect.”
> 
> And in another letter, also written at that same period, ‘Abdu’l-Baha declared:
> “Unquestionably, through the manifestation of the Infinite Power in this glorious age,
> wonderful signs will appear in the world and great changes are seen in the present and
> promised in the future, for the Word of God is like unto the Spirit, and the contingent world
> like unto the embryo in the womb of the mother. Through the power of the Spirit such
> various changes and metamorphoses become apparent, transforming them from one form to
> another. Especially in Persia, through the power of the Word of God, wonderful signs will
> appear.”
> 
> Document 2: An Appeal to Muslim Leaders in Iran
> New York,
> The United States
> March 1928
> 
> The Honored and Exalted Leaders of Islam in Tehran:
> 
> Esteemed Spiritual Brothers,
> 
> Even though human practice has not established goodly relations and mutual aid among
> different religious societies of the East and the West, nevertheless we address this
> communication to the honored leaders of Islam, confident that it will be received in the
> same spirit of respect and fraternity in which it has been written, and in the knowledge that
> the conditions and needs of the present age render religious disputes disagreeable, nay
> impossible.
> We adhere to this truth: that the greatest gift of God in this bright age is the recognition
> of the oneness of humanity, and that all the exalted religious leaders should consider the
> promotion of this fact as their greatest bounty. It is this truth, which, despite successive
> centuries of misunderstandings that have prevented spiritual relationships and mutual aid
> among the followers of diverse religions, has prompted us to compose this communication.
> No rational or fair-minded person can deny the reality that divine teachings are the source of
> all human aspirations and the foundation of all human undertakings. Therefore, as history
> has demonstrated, if at any time such teachings become the cause of division and difference,
> then without a doubt division and difference appear in deeds as well; conversely, whenever
> religion promotes unity and friendliness, then conflict and disputation subside.
> Understanding this universal divine reality in past ages—that is, at a time when the
> world of humanity was divided in every way due to differences in language, culture,
> traditions and geographical limits and boundaries—was not possible. However, today, when
> new means of travel, education and communication by telegraph and wireless are constantly
> bringing different nations closer, this truth shines brilliantly in the East and the West. Does
> this firm material connection not create new responsibility for religious leaders to emphasize
> such teachings as promote firm spiritual connections? Does the endless misery at the
> conclusion of the recent World War not compel those who wish to promote true religion to
> instead devote their efforts to the promotion of peace?
> Therefore, our principal purpose in writing this letter is an invitation to peace in the
> world of religion, so that serenity and tranquility can be established among the nations of the
> East and the West. This is because without the spirit of peace among religions, establishing
> peace among nations is impossible.
> We feel a discussion of this vital point with those wielding authority in Islam is
> appropriate for us, since of all the societies in the West, it is only the Baha’is who recognize
> the Prophet Muhammad as an appointed Messenger and a Manifestation of God. With
> utmost gratitude, we testify to His absolute sovereignty in promoting the spiritual goal of
> brotherhood among millions of people in the East, and also accept that even the West has
> benefited from the luminous civilization that appeared as a result of the penetrating
> influence of Muhammad and the power of His Words. There is no room for doubt that the
> progressive age which our historians have named the Renaissance came into being because
> of the brilliance of the Islamic world. Nonetheless, even though these realities are completely
> established to the Baha’is, the Christians in Europe and America are far from accepting
> them, and in many instances have insulted or even attacked the Baha’is of these regions for
> accepting the Messengerhood of Muhammad.
> However, such prejudiced attacks upon the Baha’is are a source of pride to us; we
> believe that as long as followers of every religion refuse to accept the principles of all
> religions, they cannot manifest their universal truth in eradicating the ills afflicting the body
> of humanity. One of our principal beliefs is that no Prophet is honored by the belittling or
> denying of another Prophet, and as such, we readily testify that the Prophet Muhammad has
> served in the Divine Vineyard; in this way we consider ourselves to be His humble followers.
> Our Faith’s teachings give us the assurance that true following in every Dispensation is only
> 
> possible through acceptance of the divine foundation of all Manifestations. The basis of our
> recognition of the grandeur and power of Prophet Muhammad is through the brilliant
> effulgence of Baha’u’llah’s teachings, Who with mighty courage arose to enunciate the
> principles of faith, and Who demonstrated to all well-wishers and men of insight that all
> Messengers have been appointed by the same single God. Baha’u’llah tore apart bonds of
> prejudice and rent asunder veils of ignorance. Because of His contributions in this arena,
> now His followers throughout the world, despite the fact that they have been raised in
> religious environments where bigotry and discord govern, have complete unity in the
> principles of religion.
> Islamic leaders no doubt owe a debt of gratitude to Baha’u’llah, Who eliminated enmity
> towards Muhammad in the heart of His Christian followers, and in its place instilled the
> merits of understanding and respect. We well recall the unforgettable memory of the time
> that ‘Abdu’l-Baha, the eldest son of Baha’u’llah, and His devoted and distinguished servant,
> proclaimed and established before large and eminent gatherings in this country the truth of
> the Prophethood of Muhammad. For instance, in a gathering at Temple Emmanuel,99 which
> is a Jewish synagogue in San Francisco, ‘Abdu’l-Baha spoke the following words on October
> 12, 1912:
> 
> You should consider that Muhammad was born among the barbarous tribes of Arabia, and
> He lived among them. Outwardly He was illiterate and uninformed of the holy books of
> God. The Arabian nations were in ignorance and barbarism, to the extent that they buried
> their daughters alive. This act was considered to be the expression of valor and of sublimity
> of nature. They lived under the yoke of the Persian and Roman governments, were scattered
> throughout the Arabian desert and were subjected to continuous internecine strife and
> bloodshed.
> When the light of Muhammad dawned, the darkness of ignorance was dispelled from the
> Arabian Desert. In a short space of time those barbarous tribes reached a degree of
> civilization which extended to Spain and was established in Baghdad and influenced the
> people of Europe. What proof is there concerning His Prophethood greater than this? The
> evidence is clear, unless one ignores impartiality and adheres to unwarranted discrimination.
> Christians believe in Moses as a Prophet of God. Muslims are believers in Moses, and
> praise Him highly. Has any harm come to Christians and Muslims because they have
> admitted the validity of Moses? No, on the contrary, their acceptance of Moses and
> confirmation of the Torah prove that they have been fair-minded.
> Why should not the children of Israel now praise Christ and Muhammad? This would
> forever do away with enmity and hatred which have lasted for two thousand years, so that
> differences and animosities may pass away forever.
> Muslims admit that Moses was the Interlocutor of God. What harm would there be if the
> Jews said that Christ was the Spirit of God and Muhammad was the Messenger of God?
> Thus there will be no hatred, no disputation, no warfare and no bloodshed.100
> 
> In the same address, ‘Abdu’l-Baha also spoke the following words:
> 
> …the foundation of the religions of God is one. Reality does not accept multiplicity. Every
> religion is divided into two parts. One part is concerned with the world of morality, the
> upliftment and advancement of the world of humanity, the knowledge of God and the
> discovery of the realities of things. This part of religion is spiritual, and is its essential and
> fundamental part. It is the foundation of all the religions of God. Therefore, all religions are
> one and the same.
> 
> 99 Located at 450 Sutter Street, San Francisco, California.
> 100 Translation from: Zarqani, Mahmud’s Diary, pp. 322–23.
> 
> The second part has to do with social relationships. This part is not essential; it is
> subject to change according to the requirements of the time….The essentials are spiritual in
> character and have to do with morality. They are the one foundation of religions, and are
> subject to neither change or multiplicity.
> The basis of the law was promulgated by Christ. That same foundation of religion was
> promulgated by Muhammad. Since all the Prophets called on the people to accept this
> reality, the purpose of all the Prophets has been the same. They upheld the honor and
> advancement of humanity, and instituted the divine civilization of man.101
> 
> Unfortunately, at the same time that ‘Abdu’l-Baha was teaching spiritual devotion and
> wisdom in the United States of America, the followers of Muhammad in Iran, who had
> misunderstood the purpose and teachings of Baha’u’llah, opposed the Baha’is by all possible
> means, and in the utmost severity subjected them to persecution, injury and death.
> Our intent is not to judge the perpetrators of these heinous deeds, since judgment
> remains with God. Our purpose in mentioning these difficulties is to express reasons that
> have compelled us to submit, on behalf of our coreligionist brothers and sisters in Iran, a
> request to the leaders of Islam, since, alas, the cup of sacrifice in the path of Baha’u’llah has
> not yet been filled to the brim. This very year, in the town of Ardabil, in the province of
> Azerbaijan, an innocent and blameless Baha’i was slain solely because he refused to recant
> his sincere belief in the teachings of Baha’u’llah.102 This incident took place at the instigation
> of the local ‘ulama, and consequently they had a direct hand in bringing about this great
> tragedy.
> When we learned of this appalling incident, it occurred to us to ask ourselves: Are the
> things that we are told about the teachings of the Qur’an true? Was Muhammad truly a
> regenerator of the message of divine love? Or was He, as most believe, a Prophet of the
> sword?
> Of course, either the above is true or His followers have diverted from the path of His
> true teachings, and even though they hold firmly to the influence of Muhammad, they have
> used that influence like a shroud to cover their human ignorance and enmity.
> Such thoughts are, of course, natural, particularly when we consider that the Baha’is of
> Iran for over eighty years have been the target of endless persecution by the followers of
> Islam, to the point that thousands of them have been killed by the bullets from guns and
> rifles.
> However, we set aside these thoughts and brought to mind this truth: that the followers
> of all Prophets, sooner or later, enter a phase of darkness, when the light of divine love is
> extinguished in their hearts and in the place of affection and self-restraint, which are
> attributes of that light, they cling to dark deeds. In truth, other than the power of God, what
> other power can raise the reality of man from its animal nature to the world of humanity?
> We embrace this power, and through this clinging we perceive our equality with the entire
> body of man.
> At this time we should inform you that last year we were so saddened and aggrieved over
> the news of the brutal killing of eight Baha’is in Jahrum103 that we submitted a confidential
> 
> 101 Translation from: Zarqani, Mahmud’s Diary, pp. 319–20.
> 102 A reference to the killing of the Aminu’l-‘Ulama; see Mazandarani, Tarikh Zuhuru’l-Haqq, vol. 9, pp. 79–81.
> 103 Shoghi Effendi records the following in Baha’i Administration, pp. 103–4, in a communication dated April 22,
> 
> 1926: “Once again the woeful tale of unabated persecution, involving this time the martyrdom of twelve of our
> long-suffering brethren in Jahrum, southern Persia, has reached our ears, and filled us with a gloom which all
> the joys and ennobling memories of Ridvan have failed to dispel.”
> 
> missive to the presence of His Majesty the Pahlavi King, and we requested that justice be
> carried out in regard to the wronged Baha’is of Iran, who have never contravened their
> government, and who in accordance with their religious teachings consider obedience to a
> just government to be obedience to God. However, our request remained unanswered, and
> tyranny and persecution continued.
> We now make the same request of the leaders of the Islamic religion—not as a criticism
> of the government, but as a means of drawing the attention of those spiritual guides whose
> influence and sway over people’s thoughts and actions are more than the influence of civil
> laws. Our appeal is that you consider the persecutions and wrongs perpetrated by the
> followers and promoters of Islam in the name of religion. Can anyone still imagine that
> religion can progress through the murder of innocent men and women? The wise of every
> nation understand that whenever human emotions are provoked against those with religious
> differences, eventually the divine decree directs that fire of enmity back onto its originator,
> and causes that religion to be wrecked. Therefore, it would be a true service to Islam and to
> humanity if Islamic leaders admonished the generality of people to compassion and
> kindness, and promoted peace and unity.
> Do not imagine that our intent is only to prevent and stay the slaying of some devoted
> and sincere followers of Baha’u’llah—even though every human life is precious before God.
> Our principal purpose is more fundamental, as we are trying to raise the call of affection,
> which gives the spirit of compassion and kindness to humankind without consideration of
> ethnicity, race and nationality. Our purpose is to establish fraternity among the nations of the
> world, and our wish is to help create the path of oneness among diverse religions, so that the
> spirit of faith would permeate us, and the contrary and destructive customs and thoughts of
> the past would be transmuted into unity and peace.
> The esteemed leaders of Islam have religious sway and authority over millions of souls in
> the East. Alas, if only this influence could be used for the promotion of religious liberty and
> the increase of spirituality. Otherwise, there is no hope that the seeds of conflict can be
> eradicated from the earth. The foundation of the progress of the nations of the East and the
> West is harmony among religions, and we exert every effort so that soon the day will come
> for the representatives of the different religions of Christianity, Judaism, Islam and others, to
> come together, so that we may develop complete unity of thought on the true principles of
> divine teachings. We are certain that you share the same wish and sentiment. However, until
> such a time as every religion prevents its followers from committing oppression and tyranny,
> this mighty purpose will remain unachievable.
> 
> On behalf of the Central Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the United States and Canada,
> Horace Holley,
> Secretary
> 
> Appendix 9
> Five Historical Documents
> 
> The following reports by Baha’i institutions in Iran and the United States shed considerable
> light on the trial and on efforts to liberate the innocent Baha’is entangled in the events
> associated with the murders in Abarqu. The National Archives staff of the National Baha’i
> Center of the United States is thanked for providing these documents, which have been
> reproduced below in slightly edited form (for grammar).104
> 
> Document 1
> Letter dated July 16, 1952, from the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Iran:105
> National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Iran (Persia)
> Tehran, Iran (Persian)
> July 16, 1952
> No. 2457
> 
> To the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the United States
> Mr. Horace Holley, Secretary
> 536 Sheridan Road, Wilmette, Illinois
> 
> Dear Baha’i Friends,
> A report of the imprisonment of the members of the Spiritual Assembly of Yazd and
> some other Baha’is, relating to the incident of Abarqu, namely, the murder of a woman and
> her children has been sent and received by your Assembly from time to time. Therefore, it is
> not necessary to repeat it here again.
> After the trial was held and sentence pronounced against those wronged ones, we sent a
> report to the Beloved Guardian, which we herewith enclose, and his telegraphed reply was as
> follows:
> 
> HAIFA, JUNE 26, 1952
> GRIEVE DEVELOPMENTS CASE YAZD PRISONERS ADVISE AFTER CAREFUL
> DELIBERATION    EXAMINATION    INTERNAL    SITUATION   CONSIDER
> ADVISABILITY YOUR ACQUAINTING AMERICAN ASSEMBLY DETAILS CASE
> EITHER ASK THEM APPEAL STATE DEPARTMENT OR AUTHORITIES PERSIA OR
> UNITED NATIONS. PRAYING ADDED FERVOUR DIVINE GUIDANCE.
> SHOGHI
> 
> After careful consultation by this Assembly, we have decided on these two proposals,
> namely, “ask them appeal State Department or Authorities Persia” and pass it on for the
> decision of your Assembly to decide which of the two in your opinion is more effective and
> 
> 104 Private communication, March 15, 2010.
> 105 A translation of this letter in Persian appears in Afnan, Bigunahan, pp. 228–30.
> 
> best or whether to try both proposals. Due to the fact that our Baha’i brothers in Persia are
> being severely persecuted by the fanatics, it is requested that their case be thoroughly
> investigated and their dossiers be referred to by unbiased parties. For the present, we
> consider referring to the UN be ignored.
> The main point to be considered carefully by your Assembly is that the judges of the
> Court of Yazd had fabricated false documents in advance against the Friends, as you have
> been previously informed, and subsequently with all their might misrepresented the whole
> case so that it would appear lawful in order that these wronged ones be sentenced.
> Although the Baha’is lawyers proved in detail that the Court’s accusations were weak and
> false and their documents were irrelevant to the case, yet unfortunately, their arguments were
> unheeded just as in the case of the martyrdom of Dr. Berjis; although the murderers
> confessed that they had murdered him, the Court set them free on the strength that there
> was not sufficient proof.
> This Assembly knows for certain and testifies that these Friends who have been
> persecuted and suffered all these trials are innocent and have been sacrificed for the
> fanaticism and animosity of these people. The Court and the judges of this country have
> always endeavored to oppress and encroach upon the rights of the Baha’is, and such matters
> have been brought many times previously to your Assembly’s notice.
> We kindly ask you to acknowledge receipt of this letter by telegraph.
> Sincerely yours in His Cause,
> [Signed by] A[li-Akbar] Furutan
> 
> P.S. We have just learned today, that the dossier has been sent to the No. 2 Division of the
> High Court. The President is Justice Lutfi, who is very fanatic and does not look favorably
> upon the Baha’is. If it is possible to do anything for us, we request you to do so as soon as
> possible.
> 
> Document 2
> The following report was attached to the above-cited letter of July 16, 1952, by the National
> Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Iran:
> The trial opened on 7th May, 1952 at No. 1 Division of the Tehran Criminal Court. The
> accused were as follows:
> 
> Nine members of the Spiritual Assembly of Yazd:
> Badiullah Afnan               Mr. Rafati
> Muhammad Ali Afnan            Mr. Salekian
> Dr. Rasti                     Mr. Majdhub
> Dr. Manshadi                  Mr. Mishki
> Dr. Malakutian
> Mr. Hasan Shams, member of the Spiritual Assembly of Isfandabad
> Mr. Abbas-Ali Pur-Mehdi, Baha’i Pioneer in Abarqu
> Mr. Husayn Karambakhsh, a believer from Isfandabad
> Mr. Muhammad Rafahi, a believer from Isfandabad
> Mr. Muhammad Shirvani, a Muslim
> Mr. Ahmad Niku’i, now a Muslim who was formerly a Baha’i
> 
> Mr. Muhammad Husayn Niku’i, a Muslim (the last three are brothers)
> Mr. Ali Muhammad Shirvani, 20-year-old son of Muhammad Shirvani
> 
> The tribunal was composed of:
> Justice Ashraf Ahmadi, president (belonging to the Shaykhi sect)
> Justice Amir Ibrahimi, member (of the Shaykhi sect)
> Justice Vakili, member
> Justice Fakhr Tabatabai, member
> Justice Arshad Amiri, member
> 
> Deputy Prosecutor—Khili Sabri (of the Sunni sect)
> 
> The Counsel pleading on behalf of the relatives of the deceased was composed of some of
> the bitterest enemies of the Cause who are well known for their religious fanaticism, such as:
> 
> Shaykh Riza Malik
> Adib Razavi
> Mehdi Razavi
> Khudadad Sabir
> Amidi Nuri—editor of the daily paper Dad who had lately shown marked opposition
> towards the Faith.
> 
> The Counsel for defense was composed of the following lawyers:
> 
> Mr. Navidi, a believer [Baha’i]
> Mr. Nasiri, a believer [Baha’i]
> Mr. Kazemzadeh, a believer [Baha’i]
> Mr. Naraqi, a Muslim
> Mr. Safavi, a Muslim
> Mr. Abdullah Razi, a Muslim
> 
> When the procedure for the identification of the defendants had ended, the prosecutor’s
> indictment setting out the charges against the accused was read in full at the Court. It ran
> briefly as follows:
> 
> In order to fulfill their pioneering plan for teaching work and [the] formation of [an]
> Assembly in Abarqu, the Spiritual Assembly of Yazd appointed Abbas-Ali Pur-Mehdi for
> this purpose, paid him some money and sent him to the above center. The inhabitants are
> highly fanatic in their religious beliefs and resent Baha’i propaganda. This is evidenced by
> the fact that prior to the arrival of the above-named, a certain Baha’i teacher by the name
> of “Sabit” was carrying out the same mission in Abarqu. However, having met strong
> opposition and being threatened with death, he was forced to escape from the area with his
> wife at midnight.
> One of the bitter enemies of the Baha’is in Abarqu, who often used to insult and
> denounce them in public, especially at Muslim lamentation gatherings was a woman by the
> name of Soghra. She lived in a caravanserai some two kilometers from Abarqu and earned
> her living by baking bread and doing laundry work. Her neighbor was a certain Muhammad
> Shirvani, a reserved Baha’i who was genuinely hurt by Soghra’s biting insults.
> 
> Abbas-Ali Pur-Mehdi got in touch with Shirvani by means of some business dealings in
> chickens for which the former maintained relations with Hasan Shams [sic], a member of
> the Spiritual Assembly of Isfandabad. Of course all these connections were highly secret.
> Finally, a plot was arranged to dispose of this poor woman so that the opposition towards
> the Baha’i Faith may be broken down through terror and the way be prepared for the
> formation of the Assembly in Abarqu. This plot was made with the full knowledge and
> approval of the Spiritual Assembly of Yazd and the active support of Abbas-Ali Pur-Mehdi
> and of Hasan Shams who instigated three native farmers from Isfandabad namely: Hasan
> Himmati, Husayn Karambakhsh, and Muhammad Rafahi, to join as accomplices in the
> plot. On the night of 13th Day [3rd January], the above accomplices called at the house of
> Muhammad Shirvani and accompanied by the latter’s 18-year-old son ([meaning,] at the
> time of the crime was 18 years old) and his two brothers Muhammad Husayn Niku’i and
> Ahmad Niku’i, they worked their way into the home of Soghra and murdered her and her
> three daughters and two sons with axes and spades, taking away some of her provisions
> and clothes as well.
> 
> The above was a summary of the indictment lodged against the defendants. It is indeed
> unique in irrelevancy and lack of sensible proofs. For instance, a reason given to prove that
> the murder was committed on religious grounds is that practically all the victims had
> sustained fatal blows in their face and jaws. And since the prosecutor could not find any
> tangible evidence to implicate the members of the Spiritual Assembly of Yazd and the other
> accused in this crime, he has satisfied himself by stating repeatedly that the whole affair was
> highly secret. For instance, it is stated that apart from the sum of 350 tumans paid to Abbas-
> Ali Pur-Mehdi according to the Assembly registers, further sums have been paid to him
> secretly. Another assertion is that those named above had established secret relations with
> Muhammad Shirvani or that Hasan Shams had given secret instructions to some natives of
> Isfandabad.
> When the reading of the indictment was over, the Deputy Prosecutor proceeded by
> saying that at a time when our neighbors in the adjoining lands are striving towards progress
> and self-advancement and our own country is in a dire need of economic and educational
> reforms, it is regrettable to see a number of people—whom I feel ashamed to call
> “Persians”—engaged in fratricidal strife in our homeland. They have secret organizations
> and seek to advance their doctrines by committing acts of crime. The case under review,
> involving the murder of a woman and her five innocent children, is one of their sinister acts.
> It must have been carefully plotted in advance and was committed by the accused quite
> cleverly and cautiously. If these people in the dock, said the Deputy Prosecutor, had killed
> their opponents openly in the daylight I would have regarded their crime as an ordinary one,
> however these cruel people attacked their victims in the dark of the night when they were
> fast asleep in their beds and murdered them in a very atrocious manner. After dwelling on
> such provocative and baseless allegations, the Deputy Prosecutor concluded by saying, “I
> demand from the Court that the severest sentences be passed on these criminals so that
> people will realize that in our country there is the rule of law, otherwise it would be likely
> that the public would intervene and take a harsh revenge.” This unusual and provocative
> statement by the Public Prosecutor led the counsel for defense, namely: Messrs. Navidi,
> Razi, Kazemzadeh, and Nasiri, to tender their resignations to the Tribunal on the grounds
> that these instigating remarks created such a strong excitement among the audience as to
> endanger the individual safety of the counsel, who still had to plead for the defense.
> Later the President of the Court gave an assurance that no demonstrations would be
> allowed and re-appointed Messrs. Navidi and Kazemzadeh to resume the defense of the
> 
> case. The other two members of the Counsel were also re-selected and introduced by the
> defendants.
> Now it was the turn of the lawyers who were to plead the case on behalf of the only
> [surviving] daughter of the murdered woman. From the outset it was evident that each of the
> ten advocates was told in advance what line he should adopt in making allegations when it
> was his turn to address the Court. So apart from the two or three who explained certain
> points about Law or spoke about the legal aspects of the case, the rest contented themselves
> with uttering words of denunciation, by making false and irrelevant statements and by
> directing bitter and derisive attacks towards the defendant—as well as the Cause to which
> they adhered.
> For instance, Mr. Khudada Sabir, one of the bitter enemies of the Faith, had brought
> with him copies of Bayan, Aqdas, and Some Answered Questions into the Court, and the gist of
> his talk was as follows:
> According to the text of the book Some Answered Questions, Baha’is reject evidence based on
> rational, tangible, or traditional proofs. Then how can one attain to the Truth? Baha’is regard
> everything unclean as clean. If a Baha’i fails to change his household effects once in 19 years, he
> will be dismissed from the community. Baha’is are ordered to place their dead in glass or marble
> caskets. When the Baha’i Faith becomes universal, one may wonder where one is going to get so
> much marble from for burial purposes. In the book of Aqdas there are laws for the punishment
> of men and women who commit sensual offences. Also there is a law as to how a robber is to
> be treated, but there is none relating to a woman robber. And so he went on for nearly an hour,
> dwelling on such absurd and inconsistent falsifications. However, the President did not stop
> him, not even a word of caution was said to indicate that his talk had no bearing upon the case,
> while on the other hand the spectators, numbering about 700–1,000, encouraged him with their
> tumultuous acclamations.
> Another speaker was Amidi Nuri, editor of the paper Dad, who seemed to be altogether
> ignorant about the case but had joined the prosecution team to gain personal prestige and
> reputation. For nearly forty minutes he read from the political writings of Dolgorukii, the ex-
> Russian minister who had made false allegations about the Faith, then making a bitter attack
> against the prisoners, referred to them as outcasts, spies, murderers, etc. He then went on to
> say that at the instigation of Baha’is, and contrary to the interest of our nation, has
> announced that a group of innocent Baha’is are being tried in Iran, reminiscent of the
> Medieval Ages when people were dragged to courts for Inquisition. In his vehement attacks
> against the Faith, Mr. Amidi Nuri outmatched ignorant fanatics and priests. Thus the ten
> lawyers who acted as Counsel on behalf of the victims’ relatives concluded their statements.
> Outwardly, they were supposed to support the prosecution in the case of the murder of a
> Muslim woman and her five children, but in fact they were appointed by a certain other
> source to defame the Cause.
> Now it was the turn of the Counsel for the defense to plead the case. They delivered
> lengthy, tactful speeches whereby they proved the innocence of the prisoners by legal,
> rational, and logical arguments. However, when any of the defending Counsel began to
> refute the false allegations and misrepresentations advanced by the prosecuting Counsel, he
> would invariably meet with the immediate intervention of the President stating that the
> argument was inconsistent with the case. When it was pointed out to him that the
> prosecution had distorted the truth or made false statements and that evidence is furnished
> to remove misunderstanding, the President would retort that there is no need for further
> explanation since the matter has no bearing upon the case.
> Of the defending Counsel, Messrs. Navidi, Nasiri, and Kazemzadeh manifested courage
> and tenacity in their work and conducted their defense in a masterly manner undeterred by
> 
> the threats and intimidations leveled against them. However, Mr. Safavi, the Muslim counsel,
> extremely alarmed at the sight of the be-turbaned mullas and the furious crowd of
> spectators, only took part in the first two sessions, and the other Muslim lawyer on the
> Counsel for defense, Mr. Naragi, was only present at the last session. He spoke very briefly
> about human rights and stated that the Court should approach inquiry only from the legal
> aspect and should not allow the proceedings to turn into a religious wrangle giving
> opportunity to people to appear before the Court and declare themselves as “Baha’is.”
> The number of the spectators in the Court was quite large and steadily increased each
> day. During the intervals in the hearing, anonymous printed notices were distributed in
> which Baha’is were vehemently attacked and the death sentence was demanded for all the
> accused. The defending advocates were also threatened with death unless they give up their
> appointment as counsel for the accused. However, order was maintained by an adequate
> number of policemen both inside and outside the Court.
> After the Counsel for defense had concluded their pleading, the Deputy Prosecutor once
> again addressed the Court. He repeated his former statement and brushed aside the
> arguments advanced by the defending advocates as baseless and vague. The other
> prosecuting attorney followed suit by reiterating the former false allegations, which were
> finally refuted by the defending Counsel. On the 11th and 12th May, the defendants made
> their last pleas before the Court in a brief statement. Thereupon the inquiry was declared to
> have been concluded, and the Tribunal adjourned to consider the verdict.
> As it was not known when the judges would return, the spectators, including some fifty
> turbaned mullas in a special gallery, gradually left the courtroom after waiting for a couple of
> hours. However, they returned between 3 p.m. until about 7 p.m. The crowd numbered
> some 600–700. Another report indicates that the top galleries were locked, in the afternoon,
> and the lower hall’s capacity does not exceed 400 seats. At this time security measures, which
> were not lacking throughout the trial, were redoubled, and a larger number of armed guards
> and policemen were posted around the courtroom and along the corridors in the building.
> Several police officers are reported to have said that the President of the Court looked rather
> terrified and was reluctant to enter the courtroom.
> The Tribunal passed verdict on the defendants between 7:30 and 8:00 p.m. in the
> presence of the five judges, the accused, and the spectators. The verdict was read by the
> Secretary of the Court as follows:
> 
> Muhammad Shirvani—Muslim
> Hasan Himmati—Baha’i
> Husayn Karambakhsh—Baha’i
> Muhammad Rafahi—Baha’i
> The above four were sentenced to death for committing the murder.
> 
> Abbas-Ali Pur-Mehdi—Baha’i Pioneer in Abarqu and
> Hasan Shamsi—member of the Spiritual Assembly of Isfandabad were sentenced to
> ten years of hard labor for acting as accomplices in the case.
> 
> Nine members of the Spiritual Assembly of Yazd were sentenced to three years’ hard
> labor each for having plotted the murder.
> 
> The two other accused, namely, Ahmad Niku’i (formerly a Baha’i) and Muhammad
> Husayn Niku’i were acquitted.
> 
> Usually when the verdict is passed at the Court, the convicted are required to sign the
> bill as evidence. Now, the sixteen accused prisoners who were convicted to execution or
> imprisonment had to affix a few words to the bill stating their intention to appeal to the
> High Court. This simple declaration will be legally binding and the dossiers will be submitted
> to the High Court of Appeal for their decision. There will be no need for a further petition
> to be filed with the Court seeking appeal in respect of its verdict.
> When an appeal is made in respect of a court verdict, the documents are forwarded to
> the High Court after one or two weeks, when the necessary office formalities are complied.
> However, when the verdict involves the death sentence, it is likely that the procedure will be
> expedited in all its stages.
> According to constitutional codes of law, when the Supreme Court of appeal renders
> judgment in a criminal case, the accused or the defending advocates are to be called in;
> however, if the parties concerned fail to attend with no good reason, judgment will be passed
> in their absence, and the case will not be postponed. Nevertheless, this principle is not
> recognized by the Persian High Court, and neither the party affected by the verdict nor its
> appointed Counsel is allowed to take part in the Court of Appeal proceedings.
> When the concerned dossier is forwarded by the Criminal Court to that for Appeal, it
> will be referred to one of the latter’s three divisions for consideration. The time taken by the
> High Court to pass judgment in a case ranges from about two to six months, depending on
> the importance of the case under consideration as well as on recommendations from people
> of high standing and on the extent to which the parties concerned could bring their efforts
> and influence to bear on the case. However, there have been cases in the past in which
> reconsideration by the High Court only took about one month.
> Three courses of action lie open to the High Court in passing judgment in a case of
> appeal:
> 
> 1. To issue a warrant upholding the verdict passed by the Criminal Court.
> 2. To quash the verdict already passed and to appoint another court of similar status to
> reopen inquiry into the Case. This would imply that the whole procedure should be
> repeated.
> 3. To repeal the verdict passed and to suspend further inquiry by another Court.
> 
> Should the High Court uphold the decision of the Criminal Court, one can request that
> the case be reopened for a second hearing. This has been allowed by law in such cases where
> the convicted person has been proved innocent, or when the sentence is found to be legally
> incompatible with the offense. If the petition for reopening of the case is approved, enquiry
> into the case will be committed to the charge of another court.
> The dossier belonging to the case under reference is at present held by the Registrar of
> the Criminal Court. Normally, it will be forwarded to the High Court within a week or two.
> However, if applications are submitted for copies of the verdicts or other documents on file,
> its dispatch may be postponed for a while. On its being received by the Court of Appeal it
> will be referred to one of the three Divisions for consideration and judgment. But since the
> defending lawyers will not be present on that occasion, it cannot be ascertained when the
> case will come before the High Court for their judgment.
> 
> Document 3
> 
> Letter dated July 30, 1952, from the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the
> United States:106
> Iran, Tehran, Shirkat Sahami Nawnahalan
> Mr. ‘Ali-Akbar Furutan,
> Secretary of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Iran
> 
> Dear Friends,
> The following actions were immediately taken regarding the matter that you reported to
> us in your July 16 communication:
> 
> 1. The following telegram was sent on July 28 to the Prime Minister of Iran:
> 
> WITH UTMOST RESPECT WE REQUEST YOUR EXCELLENCY TO INTERVENE IN THE
> CASE OF THE BAHA’IS OF YAZD WHO HAVE BEEN FALSELY ACCUSED OF MURDER,
> AND WHOSE CASE IS BEFORE NO. 2 DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT, SINCE IT
> APPEARS THAT THE APPEAL IS BEING GRAVELY INFLUENCED BY THE
> ENVIRONMENT AND RELIGIOUSLY-FANATICAL ELEMENTS, WHICH IS IN CONFLICT
> WITH THE PROGRESSIVE AIMS OF YOUR EXCELLENCY. THE AMERICAN BAHA’I
> COMMUNITY REQUESTS YOUR EXCELLENCY TO GRANT AN OPPORTUNITY TO
> REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BAHA’IS OF IRAN TO SUBMIT BEFORE YOU NECESSARY
> FACTS RELATED TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND SAVING THE LIVES OF
> INNOCENT AND LAW-ABIDING INDIVIDUALS.
> SIGNED, SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL SPIRITUAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BAHA’IS OF
> THE UNITED STATES
> 
> 2. A letter has been prepared reflecting what you have reported and representations you
> have made to the appropriate authorities: this letter will be sent to the Iranian
> ambassador in Washington.
> 3. A copy of these documents will be sent to the United States State Department.
> 4. We will inform the Guardian [Shoghi Effendi] of these undertakings.
> 
> We sincerely pray that these innocent persons will be completely exonerated and acquitted.
> 
> With loving greetings,
> Secretary of the National Spiritual Assembly,
> Horace Holley
> 
> Document 4
> Letter dated September 4, 1952, from the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the
> United States:107
> 
> 106 The National Archives staff at the National Baha’i Center of the United States informed the present
> translator (private communication, March 15, 2010) that the original of this letter in English was not available
> in their files. Therefore, a rendering from Persian is offered by the present translator based on the Persian text
> in Afnan, Bigunahan, pp. 230–31.
> 107 Persian translation appears in Afnan, Bigunahan, pp. 231–34.
> 
> Dr. Hassan Pernahad
> Chargé d’Affaires of Iran
> Iranian Embassy
> Washington, D.C.
> 
> My dear Mr. Chargé d’Affaires:
> The National Spiritual Assembly, as representative of the Baha’is of the United States,
> appeals to the Iranian Government through Your Excellency on behalf of members of the
> Baha’i Faith in Iran who have been unjustly arrested, brought to trial and condemned, for a
> crime they did not commit and for which there is evidence establishing the identity of the
> real criminal.
> The appeal made by the Baha’is of the United States, Your Excellency is assured, rests
> upon facts and documentary evidence.
> During the year 1950, a woman and five children living in Abarqu, near Yazd, were
> murdered. Residents of the village knew who the murderer was and pointed him out to the
> authorities. Affidavits and other evidence establishing this were and are available, but have
> been ignored by the authorities.
> Despite the actual facts, upon the basis of false documents the members of the Baha’i
> Assembly of Yazd, and other Baha’is, were imprisoned and charged with responsibility for
> the crime by the Judges of the Court of Yazd.
> The case was transferred to No. 1 Division of the Criminal Court in Tihran and the trial
> opened on May 7, 1952.
> The names of the accused are:
> Badiullah Afnan Muhammad Ali Afnan
> Dr. Rasti         Dr. Manshadi
> Dr. Malakutian Mr. Rafati
> Mr. Salekian      Mr. Majdhub
> Mr. Mishki
> being the nine members of the Baha’i Assembly of Yazd; [plus] the following Baha’is:
> Hasan Shams of Isfandabad
> Abbas-Ali Pur-Mehdi of Abarqu
> Hasan Himmati of Isfandabad
> Husayn Karambakhsh of Isfandabad
> Muhammad Rafahi of Isfandabad
> and the following Muslims:
> Muhammad Shirvani            Ahmad Niku’i
> Muhammad Husayn Niku’i Ali Muhammad Shirvani
> 
> The report of the trial clearly indicates that the facts pertaining to the crime were
> disregarded and the case made an occasion for publicly vilifying the Baha’i religion and
> persecuting innocent members of the Faith. The conduct of this trial proceeded in an
> atmosphere of religious prejudice and unrelenting hatred of the Baha’i religion and its
> adherents. Anti-Baha’i statements were printed and distributed. The prosecution dramatized
> the case as an indictment of the Baha’i religion and made no effort to submit proof and
> evidence carrying legal weight.
> On May 12, a verdict was passed by the Court, sentencing four defendants to death for
> committing the crime. Those sentenced were Muhammad Shirvani, Hasan Himmati, Husayn
> 
> Karambakhsh, Muhammad Rafahi. Of these, the first named is a Muslim, the other three are
> Baha’is.
> The verdict also passed sentence upon other defendants. Abbas-Ali Pur-Mehdi and
> Hasan Shamsi were sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment with hard labor for being
> accomplices to the crime. Nine of the defendants, members of the Baha’i Assembly of Yazd,
> were sentenced to three years at hard labor for plotting the murder. Two Muslim defendants,
> Ahmad Niku’i and Muhammad Husayn Niku’i, were acquitted.
> Appeal was made in due course to the High Court by the fifteen condemned prisoners
> for review of the verdict.
> The National Spiritual Assembly is informed that the High Court under its procedure has
> three courses of action in such appeals: to sustain the verdict pronounced by the Criminal
> Court; to quash the verdict and appoint another Court to conduct a new trial; to repeal the
> verdict and suspend further inquiry by another Court.
> On or shortly before July 16 the appeal was sent to No. 2 Division of the High Court,
> whose President is Justice Lutfi.
> Your Excellency, there is still an interval of time during which the condemned prisoners
> can be vindicated by examination of the true facts of the case as assembled and recorded by
> the members of the Iranian National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is.
> The appeal presented by the Baha’is of the United States is directed to this end: a new
> and impartial trial of the case by an unprejudiced tribunal competent to separate fact from
> mere denunciation, and logical evidence from false documentation. The American Baha’is
> feel it necessary in order to save these innocent, law-abiding Iranian Baha’is from pressure of
> prejudice and persecution, to appeal for the exercise of the high civil authority by
> appointment of an observer to attend the sessions of the Court.
> Our appeal, Your Excellency, is that this safeguard be granted the unjustly condemned.
> Not for one moment do the American Baha’is press for suppression of fact nor the exercise
> of mercy at the expense of justice. Our claim is that these unjustly condemned Baha’is are
> innocent, deserving a hearing before an impartial tribunal and responsible authority.
> May we request Your Excellency to transmit our appeal to the Iranian Government for
> consideration at the earliest possible moment. The Baha’is of the United States, and the
> Baha’is of all lands, honor the ancient land of Iran and desire to exalt its reputation for
> spiritual wisdom and justice throughout the world.
> We are,
> Sincerely yours,
> National Spiritual Assembly
> [Horace Holley] Secretary
> 
> Document 5
> Letter dated September 5, 1952, from the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the
> United States:108
> His Excellency Muhammad Mossadegh,
> Prime Minister of Iran
> 
> 108 Persian translation appears in Afnan, Bigunahan, pp. 234–36.
> 
> Tehran, Iran.
> 
> Your Excellency:
> The Baha’is of the United States are deeply concerned about the fate of a number of
> Iranian Baha’is recently arrested, tried and condemned by the Court for a crime they did not
> commit.
> This case, your Excellency, is an instance of religious persecution we consider to be of
> extreme importance in that the Baha’i victims have not suffered at the hands of lawless
> fanatics but have been unjustly condemned by a civil tribunal.
> The facts of the matter are summarized as follows:
> 
> During the year 1950, a woman and five children living in Abarqu, near Yazd, were
> murdered. Residents of the village knew who the murderer was and pointed him out to the
> authorities. Affidavits and other evidence establishing this were and are available, but have
> been ignored by the authorities.
> Despite the actual facts, upon the basis of false documents the members of the Baha’i
> Assembly of Yazd, and other Baha’is were imprisoned and charged with responsibility for
> the crime by the Judges of the Court of Yazd.
> The case was transferred to No. 1 Division of the Criminal Court in Tihran and the trial
> opened on May 7, 1952.
> The names of the accused are:
> Badiullah Afnan          Muhammad Ali Afnan
> Dr. Rasti                Dr. Manshadi
> Dr. Malakutian           Mr. Rafati
> Mr. Salekian             Mr. Majdhub
> Mr. Mishki
> being the nine members of the Baha’i Assembly of Yazd; the following Baha’is:
> Hasan Shams of Isfandabad
> Abbas-Ali Pur-Mehdi of Abarqu
> Hasan Himmati of Isfandabad
> Husayn Karambakhsh of Isfandabad
> Muhammad Rafahi of Isfandabad
> and the following Muslims:
> Muhammad Shirvani                Ahmad Niku’i
> Muhammad Husayn Niku’i           Ali Muhammad Shirvani
> 
> The report of the trial clearly indicates that the facts pertaining to the crime were
> disregarded and the case made an occasion for publicly vilifying the Baha’i religion and
> persecuting innocent members of the Faith.
> The conduct of this trial proceeded in an atmosphere of religious prejudice and
> unrelenting hatred of the Baha’i religion and its adherents. Anti-Baha’i statements were
> printed and distributed. The prosecution dramatized the case as an indictment of the Baha’i
> religion and made no effort to submit proof and evidence carrying legal weight.
> On May 12, a verdict was passed by the Court, sentencing four defendants to death for
> committing the crime. Those sentenced were Muhammad Shirvani, Hasan Himmati, Husayn
> Karambakhsh, and Muhammad Rafahi. Of these, the first named is a Muslim, the other
> three are Baha’is.
> The verdict also passed sentence upon other defendants. Abbas-Ali Pur-Mehdi and
> Hasan Shamsi were sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment with hard labor for being
> accomplices to the crime. Nine of the defendants, members of the Baha’i Assembly of Yazd,
> 
> were sentenced to three years at hard labor for plotting the murder. Two Muslim defendants,
> Ahmad Niku’i and Muhammad Husayn Niku’i, were acquitted.
> Appeal was made in due course to the High Court by the fifteen condemned prisoners
> for review of the verdict.
> The National Spiritual Assembly is informed that the High Court under its procedure has
> three courses of action in such appeals: to sustain the verdict pronounced by the Criminal
> Court; to quash the verdict and appoint another Court to conduct a new trial; or to repeal
> the verdict and suspend further inquiry by another Court.
> On or shortly before July 16 the appeal was sent to No. 2 Division of the High Court,
> whose President is Justice Lutfi.
> The American Baha’is, Your Excellency, appeal to the highest civil authority of Iran to
> assure a new and impartial trial of the case by an unprejudiced tribunal by appointment of a
> competent observer to attend the sessions of the Court.
> Your Excellency’s favorable consideration of this appeal will inspire gratitude in the
> hearts of Baha’is not only in America but throughout the world. The National Spiritual
> Assembly respectfully refers to the constitutional laws of Iran, which have been contravened
> by the treatment accorded to the unjustly condemned Baha’is.
> Respectfully,
> National Spiritual Assembly
> [Horace Holley] Secretary
> 
> Appendix 10
> Eyewitness Accounts
> 
> The following accounts printed in World Order109 journal provide important insights in the
> courtroom drama in 1952 and 1954, as the Baha’is were unjustly tried for the Abarqu
> murders. In introducing the first two accounts, Dr. Firuz Kazemzadeh states:
> Ever since its inception in nineteenth-century Iran, the Baha’i Faith has been subject
> to persecution by an unholy alliance of Shiite clergy and despotic state. Vilification,
> slander, economic pressure, withdrawal of fundamental human rights, denial of
> justice, and even massacre have been instruments used by the extremist elements
> among the mullahs, often supported by government authorities, in their attempts to
> exterminate the Baha’i community in the country of its birth. Even the partial
> modernization that followed the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 and the downfall
> of the Qajar dynasty that greatly decreased the power of the Shiite clergy failed to
> bring relief to Iran’s Baha’is. Through the entire Pahlavi (1925–79) period,
> discrimination and pressure, punctuated by outbreaks of physical violence,
> continued unabated.
> In the wake of World War II Iran underwent a period of confusion and turmoil.
> The reemergence of political parties and the resurgent power of the Shiite clergy
> produced instability that endangered the Baha’is, who could be attacked with
> impunity since the authorities were largely unwilling, and at times even unable, to
> protect them. The influence of the clergy further increased in 1953 when its leaders,
> the Ayatollahs Borujerdi and Kashani, sided with the Shah in his conflict with Prime
> Minister Mosaddegh. The Shah was now beholden to the mullahs who demanded,
> as payment for their services, freedom to suppress the Baha’is. The supposedly
> independent judiciary was tightly controlled by the government and decided cases at
> the direction of either the Cabinet or the Court. The majority of the legal profession
> were either intimidated or, with some outstanding exceptions, shared the prevailing
> prejudices of Iranian society. Persecution intensified with the establishment of the
> Islamic regime and continues to this day.
> The following two documents deal with two trials of Baha’is falsely accused of
> inciting and committing murder. I have translated them from the Russian and have
> added footnotes to clarify a number of points.
> The background to the trials involved a widow and her five young children all
> of whom were murdered in 1951 in Abarqu, a small town or village near Yazd in
> south-central Iran. Local police suspected a relative; but, since he was a person of
> standing in the community, they referred the case to Yazd, the provincial center.
> Suddenly original suspicions of the local police were discarded. Instead, the
> authorities arrested the entire membership of the Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is
> of Yazd and several other Baha’is, among them three simple farmers in Abarqu. The
> farmers were accused of the murders and the members of the Spiritual Assembly of
> incitement to murder. The case was widely advertised in the press. The trial was held
> in Tehran, giving it maximum publicity. The original verdict was appealed, and a
> 
> Firuz Kazemzadeh, “The 1952 and 1954 Trials of Baha’is from Yazd, Iran,” World Order 38 (2008) 3: 7–15.
> Steve Cooney is thanked for drawing materials cited in this appendix to the attention of the present translator.
> 
> second trial was held. At the conclusion of each trial, my father, the lead defense
> lawyer, wrote the following letters to me.110
> 
> Account 1: Kazem Kazemzadeh’s Firsthand Account of Defending Baha’is
> from Yazd in 1952
> June 1952
> My Dear Son:
> 
> The trial of the Yazd friends began on May 7 and ended on May 27. You cannot imagine
> what we endured in those twenty-one days. What agitation, what anxiety for the fate of those
> unfortunate men, what apprehension and fear for our own lives have we, defenders of a
> righteous cause, experienced. And the outcome of the trial? Four sentenced to death, three
> to ten years’ imprisonment, and nine [members of the Spiritual Assembly] to three years.
> This verdict dealt us a moral blow from which we have yet to recover.
> One could expect anything from such a court and such judges; but to condemn three
> innocent peasants who had done nothing, from whom the examining magistrate obtained a
> confession by trickery, charlatanry, and deception—that I did not expect. These
> unfortunates are illiterate. They affixed their fingerprints to the protocol of the investigation
> not knowing what was written there.
> More than a thousand persons were in the hall where the trial was held. In a box reserved
> for the press there sat forty to fifty head mullahs. The public was select in the full sense of
> the term—that is, they picked from the street anyone who suited their purpose and paid him
> three tumans. The guards numbered some 100 to 150 men. On the third or fourth day of the
> trial, all who wanted to enter the hall were searched. It was said that weapons were found on
> and confiscated from several people.
> In addition to the assistant prosecutor, ten lawyers participated as parties to the civil
> suit.111 There were only four of us defense attorneys of whom one, having assessed the
> situation, got sick (apparently of an upset stomach); another appeared on the final day of
> defense arguments and said a few words about the United Nations, human rights and so on,
> constantly emphasizing that he was hostile to the religious convictions of the defendants.
> After the speech of the assistant prosecutor, a Sunni, we, the defense, lodged a protest
> and resigned. This, if you will pardon the expression, assistant prosecutor read a speech
> prepared for him ahead of time pouring forth mud, insults, and slander on the accused and
> their beliefs. At the end of his spurious speech he demanded severe punishment of the
> defendants so as to avoid vengeance of the people. It was after this speech of the assistant
> prosecutor that we, the defense, resigned, declaring to the Court that we had been deprived
> of the necessary guaranty [of safety] and that, after the assistant prosecutor’s speech one
> heard in the hall shouts of “Execution, execution!”
> The Court found itself in a difficult situation, and we did not feel too well either.
> According to judicial procedure, after our resignation the Court should have appointed two
> 
> 110 Kazemzadeh, “The 1952 and 1954 Trials of Baha’is from Yazd, Iran,” which provides the text of Accounts
> 
> 1 and 2 quoted in this appendix. Steve Cooney is thanked for drawing the translator’s attention to this
> document and sharing a copy.
> 111 Under Iranian law, criminal and civil proceedings may be conducted simultaneously. (F. Kazemzadeh)
> 
> or three defense attorneys. The defendants could reject such defense attorneys in which case
> they must choose their own attorneys and recommend them to the Court. There was
> apprehension that, if the defendants chose us for the second time, the Court would refuse
> the request on the ground that we had been chosen before and had resigned. There was such
> a precedent. But if, as a form of protest, the defendants refused to choose their attorneys,
> the Court on its own could appoint attorneys, as was done for four other defendants; and
> such attorneys, not knowing the case and not caring for the accused, would have talked a lot
> of irrelevant nonsense and would have recounted in detail that they regretted being
> compelled, in accordance with the instructions of the Court, to defend individuals to whose
> convictions they were adverse, that in our country the official religion is Islam of Shiite
> denomination, and so on. One of the defense lawyers appointed by the court literally said
> such things.
> Considering all this, when the presiding judge told me and Navidi that we were wrong to
> resign and that we would be given full guaranty [of safety], we said that we would be ready to
> defend the accused as advocates appointed by the Court.112 He, the presiding judge, agreed
> and appointed us. The further peripeteia of our resignation and appointment are too
> detailed, and I shall not write about them.
> Private advocates began their speeches. They were a bunch selected from among three or
> four arrant fanatics, three or four lawyers in the worst sense of that term.…
> These gentlemen, having turned the rostrum of the court into a tribune of a political or
> religious meeting, said that Baha’is had no prohibition against marrying their sisters or
> daughters; that they considered everything, including dog excrement and human semen,
> ritually clean; that in Baha’u’llah’s laws nothing was said about how to treat a female thief,
> while there was a law about a male thief (Kitab-i-Aqdas speaks of the punishment of thieves
> in the masculine gender, and these gentlemen, alleged lawyers, concluded that female thieves
> were not to be punished); that Baha’is must change the furnishing of their homes every
> nineteen years or suffer excommunication.
> Another lawyer, editor of the newspaper Dad,113 who broke the record for maliciousness
> and hostility, devoted forty minutes of his speech to reading the so-called Memoirs of Prince
> Dolgorukii and came to the banal conclusion that this religion was created by a Russian
> diplomat.114 Words such as spies, murderers, men without fatherland, traitors, apostates,
> were repeated incessantly, but the presiding judge never stopped the overzealous advocates.
> When the lawyers, foaming at the mouth, described the method of the murder of the
> unfortunate woman and her five children, the public either expressed its indignation at the
> “cruelty” of the accused or applauded the orator who demanded the death penalty for all
> eighteen men. When applause was heard, the presiding judge would ring and direct the guard
> to remove the violators of order from the hall; but this was only a formality perfectly
> understood by both the public and the guards. Therefore, during the entire trial not one
> person was ejected.
> 
> 112 Aziz Navidi was Kazem Kazemzadeh’s colleague in the 1952 and 1952 trials. (F. Kazemzadeh)
> 113 Dad, Persian for justice. (F. Kazemzadeh)
> 114 The fictitious Memoirs of Prince Dolgorukii, a diplomat who had served as Russian minister plenipotentiary in
> 
> Iran were manufactured in clerical circles in the late 1930s in Mashhad. The alleged memoirs have been
> demonstrated by various scholars to be a poorly executed counterfeit, purporting to show that the Babi religion
> was invented by the Russians to weaken Islam and subjugate Iran. For more than half a century the Memoirs,
> an Iranian equivalent of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, have been used in attacking Baha’is as agents of foreign
> powers. (F. Kazemzadeh)
> 
> In the intermission suspicious persons distributed leaflets that demanded that the Court
> severely punish the accused. One leaflet bore a drawing: a woman is sitting on the rug by a
> samovar and around her, five children. These supposedly are Soqra [Sughra] and her five
> children resting at the family hearth after a day’s work; and below another picture—cadavers
> of the woman and five children covered with blood, the blood represented by red stains—
> shabby, grubby pictures in a cheap Persian manner. However, even these shabby leaflets
> made strong impression on Persian minds and feeling, if Persians have them. From every
> side one heard words of revilement cast at the defendants and even at their attorneys.
> Had I the time and the inclination I would have written a whole book about this trial,
> and the book would have turned out quite interesting and instructive. But, alas, there is a
> more urgent issue before me than writing a book, the issue of daily bread. For twenty-one
> days I was deprived of rest and sleep. I frequently sat up until four in the morning and got
> up at six. You can imagine your father limited to two hours of sleep. I have lost much weight
> and turned pale and weak. Yet at the trial I acted heroically. A smile never left my lips. I
> calmed the defendants, kept persuading them that the case could be won, frequently
> conversed with them. And an impression was created among all those present at the trial that
> I was the most reckless, the strongest, and the bravest of the defense lawyers. I will write you
> another time about my speech and the reactions of others.
> All of us defense lawyers spoke well and with dignity; but the Court frequently stopped
> us even in instances where we attempted to reply to certain insinuations or slanderous
> statements by the accusers. Thus, when at the start of my speech I said that the pamphlet
> entitled “Memoirs of Prince Dolgorukii” was read here and that to avoid possible
> misunderstanding I intended to prove that this documents was a forgery composed by a
> Persian and not by a Russian diplomat, the presiding judge said that the document had no
> particular significance for the trial. In order not to contradict the presiding judge on whose
> caprice and mood depended the fate of my clients, I replied that, following his instructions, I
> would not touch this issue and would confine myself to pointing out the fact that the
> content of this pamphlet kept changing all the time. Some “facts,” too obviously
> mendacious, have not appeared in new editions; chronological errors were corrected, and so
> on. For comparison of their texts I deposited with the Court two of the pamphlets printed at
> different times, from which it will be clear to the Court that the memories were counterfeit.
> With the pamphlets I gave the Court a note pointing out several examples of such
> divergences.
> My speech, given in two sessions, lasted some three or four hours. Having finished the
> speech that had been completely written and typed out. I submitted a copy to the Court.
> After the speeches of the defense, the assistant prosecutor spoke again so as to give an
> opportunity for private [civil] accusers to pour their bile and malice upon the unfortunates.
> After that came our turn, and we gave an appropriate answer to the slanderers. The Court
> declared a recess and left for deliberations. This was at ten o’clock in the morning. We
> defense attorneys left the court. The defendants were returned to prison since deliberations
> could last several hours.
> During the Court’s deliberations, all the dark forces were set in motion, and all buttons
> were pushed, and all means used. Today, when we visited the prison for consultations with
> the condemned, and an officer of the prison guard said that the presiding judge who brought
> out such a draconian verdict was afraid to leave the hall of the trial and kept asking the guard
> to make sure that there would be no one in his way. From 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. when the verdict
> was announced, the public did not leave the hall, expressed its impatience, and constantly
> made its presence known by uttering prayers like exclamations.
> 
> And thus under pressure of these elements and of the others hidden from the eyes of
> ordinary mortals, the Court rendered its shameful unprecedented decision. Of course, the
> verdict will be appealed, but the facts remain. The criminal court consisting of five judges,
> motivated by both religious fanaticism and other, more realistic, considerations, terrorized by
> a fanatical clergy and a group of adventurers, brought out a verdict that was received with an
> ovation by a handpicked and paid crowd, and the revulsion and indignation of all honest
> people.
> Dear son, I have filled ten pages but recounted only a hundredth of what I went through
> during this historic trial. I shall write more. I finish for now. I kiss you…and wish you
> happiness and achievements. Pray for us. Write more often. We are all in good health.
> Yours, Kazem
> 
> Account 2: Kazem Kazemzadeh’s Firsthand Account of Defending Baha’is
> from Yazd in 1954
> My Dear Firuz:
> … I could not answer your letter in a timely fashion because I was busy at the trial.
> As you know, two years ago a so-called criminal court in Tehran condemned nine
> members of the Spiritual Assembly of Yazd accused of subornation to the murder of an
> unfortunate woman, who lived in Abarqu, and of her five children to three years’
> imprisonment; and three Baha’i peasants indicted for the murder of the members of that
> family to execution; and two more Baha’is to ten years’ imprisonment each. The Supreme
> Court (again so-called), after two years of procrastination, at last got enough courage to
> rescind this, if you will pardon the expression, verdict as it related to the three who had been
> condemned to death, to one member of the Spiritual Assembly who had been sentenced to
> three years at hard labor, and to another Baha’i, condemned to ten years at hard labor. As far
> as the last two men were concerned, the verdict was voided for the simple reason that both
> convicted men were over sixty years old, and the law does not provide for hard labor for old
> people.
> The case of these five was remanded to the Second Section of the Criminal Court for a
> new trial. The members of this court, particularly its presiding judge, were relatively decent
> and honest men. The trial began on June 13 and lasted fourteen days. At first everything
> went well, and all of us got the impression that all the defendants would be exculpated. The
> defense team consisted of me, Navidi, and Razi.115 In addition to the assistant prosecutor…
> our adversaries were four other…lawyers.
> When our turn came, Mr. Razi in a very ardent speech refuted all the slanderous
> accusations. Then our opponents resorted to their old tired weapon—there materialized at
> the trial mullahs, bearded men with rosary beads, fanatics, followers of Navvab Safavi,
> founder of the Fadayan-e Eslam group; there appeared the murderers of the former minister
> Hazhir and of Kasravi.116 As I spoke, one heard shouts, curses and threats. Order was
> 
> 115 Aziz Navidi was also a lawyer in the 1952 trial. Razi was a highly respected Muslim lawyer and writer. (F.
> 
> Kazemzadeh)
> 116 Navvab Safavi, founder of Fadayan-e Eslam, a terrorist group that advocated the establishment of Islamic
> 
> state and carried out the assassination of several prominent statesmen, including Prime Minister Ali Razmara.
> Safavi was hanged in 1956. Abdol Hoseyn Hashir had served in several cabinets and as prime minister. Ahmad
> 
> maintained in the court by some thirty policemen and outside by a regiment of soldiers.
> Admission to the trial was only by tickets that were distributed by the prosecutor. Whenever
> an applicant was recognized as a Baha’i, he was refused a ticket.
> The closer we came to the end of the trial, the more furious became the attacks of the
> enemies. There appeared newspaper articles targeting the defendants. Three days before the
> end of the trial, leaflets were distributed in the hall calling for the death penalty for all the
> accused. After my first speech, when the judges had not yet left the hall, one character in
> clerical grab, a big fellow (later we heard that he was Kasravi’s murderer) shouted at full
> throat, “We demand the death penalty for all the defendants. Otherwise we will hang them
> ourselves and will cut to pieces their defense attorneys and the members of the Court.”
> The day before the end of the trial, taking advantage of mourning on the occasion of the
> Imam’s death, a crowd of shopkeepers, tramps, and adventurers gathered in a mosque.
> Speeches were made, calling to finish with Baha’i murderers, to march to the court, and to
> demand the harshest punishment of the accused. And, as is the custom, all sorts of idle
> stories and fairy tales circulated about the Baha’is who supposedly bribed everyone and
> everything. Fortunately, the authorities took appropriate measures and prohibited the
> crowd’s leaving the mosque.
> On the eve of the trial’s last day, a member of parliament, to intimidate the Court and the
> minister of justice of himself, asked the government a question, made up by our enemies,
> about the course of the trial. The last three days of the trial presented an interesting picture.
> Through the corridors of the court there marched arrogantly back and forth all sorts of
> terrorist fanatics. Behind them, like obedient slaves, crawled young men with black beards.
> Every moment one heard the thunder of “Salavat” [God’s blessing], as some mullah appealed
> to the faithful to defend the foundations of Islam form the infidels, and the crowd shouted
> “Sallallah Muhammad va al-e Muhammad” [God’s benedictions upon Muhammad and
> Muhammad’s family]. Others were recounting the tragic death of a Muslim woman and her
> five children at the hands of apostates. Sounds like wailing rose from the crowd. At the
> doors of the court there stood armed gendarmes. We were stared at as if we were monsters.
> At the end of each session we defense lawyers were surrounded by policemen who
> accompanied us to the cars because there was information about preparations of an attempt
> at our assassination. In addition to the police, we were guarded, secretly, by ten to fifteen
> [Baha’i] young men.
> Obviously, to render a just verdict in the case of innocent Baha’is in such an atmosphere
> heroes would have been needed; but since the judges were not heroes but just common
> contemporary Persians, all these demonstrations, threats, and pressures had their requisite
> effect, and they brought out the following verdict: the three men who had been condemned
> to death at the previous trial were given ten years in prison. The member of the Spiritual
> Assembly of Yazd was acquitted because the fact of his participation in and presence at the
> meetings of the Assembly had not been proved. The old man who had been sentenced to
> ten years was given five years.
> At first we were all stunned by this unjust verdict. But gradually, as passions subsided,
> and we coolly weighed all the circumstance, we came to the conclusion that even for that we
> should say, “Thank you.”
> 
> Kasravi, philologist, historian, and polemicist, was murdered in court at his trial in Tehran by a follower of
> Safavi. (F. Kazemzadeh)
> 
> Two weeks of the trial have completely frayed my nerves, and now, when by every article
> of every law I deserve a rest. I must again perform the heavy duties of the secretary of the
> National Spiritual Assembly because Mr. Furutan left for the provinces, and his trip will last
> about four or five months. I have filled six pages, and they are waiting for me at the
> Assembly’s office. Kiss my lovely and dear granddaughter….I kiss you.
> Yours, Kazem
> July 5, 1954
> 
> Account 3: Given the extremely volatile and intense anti-Baha’i atmosphere of
> the trial of the Baha’is defendants, a number of Baha’i young men, including
> the late father of the present translator, were asked to serve as bodyguards for
> the Baha’i lawyers during these trials. One of these bodyguards, Iraj Ayman, has
> recorded his recollections of the 1954 trial and notes, “I was an eyewitness to
> the horrifying scene of that maliciously staged trial of innocent Baha’is,
> including members of the Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Yazd.”117
> I accompanied a small group of young Baha’is who were asked to attend the
> court proceedings and serve as security guards for the Baha’i lawyers. Since
> we were not joining the crowd in what they were shouting all the time, it was
> obvious that we were Baha’is. The trial was conducted in the grand hall of
> the Supreme Criminal Court, which had a high ceiling. Behind the panel of
> judges there was a huge and imposing statue of Justice (a lady with covered
> eyes holding a balance in her hand). Several spectators were in the balcony
> facing the panel of the judges. There is no jury system in Iran. Instead, there
> were a presiding judge and two assistant judges (dadyars). Defense lawyers and
> the plaintiffs (private attorneys) were seated on the right side of the hall
> facing the Prosecutor General and his assistants. The defendants were seated
> in the middle of the hall facing the panel of judges. Baha’i lawyers were
> defending the Baha’is, including the members of the Spiritual Assembly of
> Yazd, trying to prove their innocence while plaintiffs were attempting to
> refute the arguments of the Baha’i lawyers. On the whole it was a very grand
> and impressive environment, if it had not been for the presence, interference,
> and agitations of the hired ruffians and a group of old and young mullahs.
> It was, indeed, a frightening experience. The Baha’i lawyers made their
> statements in a very brave, logical, well-documented, and polite manner. But
> each time they started to make their statement a crowd of several hundred
> rogues and ruffians began to shout “Khafeh Shu” (Shut up) and “Salavat”
> (God’s blessing, a tribute to Muhammad and His descendents); in this way
> they were constantly interrupting the statements of the Baha’i lawyers. We
> were afraid to enter or exit the courtroom and the building of the Ministry of
> Justice alone, and moved together as a group while the hired ruffians shouted
> abuse at us. All these things took place inside the building of the Ministry of
> Justice where policemen and other security officers were standing around but
> 
> 117 Ayman, “Recollections of a Baha’i Youth Attending the 1954 Trial,” composed on November 17, 2007.
> 
> would not dare to stop those who were shouting abuse and slander at us and
> were disgracing the Founders of the Baha’i Faith, Baha’u’llah, and the Bab.
> We could see how the Baha’i lawyers were courageously putting their own
> lives at great risk. All the time I was marveling at their courage, and I was
> extremely afraid for their safety. I testify that there is no exaggeration in what
> Kazem Kazemzadeh has written. As a matter of fact, he has written it in a
> very mild language that does not fully picture the great ordeal that he and
> others experienced. I vividly remember those situations.
> 
> Part 2
> Suppression of the Baha’is of Iran in 1955
> 
> Introduction118
> Persecution and slaying of the Babis and Baha’is were part of the daily activities of the clerics
> and monarchs of the Qajar dynasty. For religious and political reasons, this propensity to kill
> Babis and Baha’is continued up until the conclusion of the Qajar era.
> The [Azali] Babis had an important role in the Constitutional Movement of Iran, and
> indeed one could claim that their efforts to advance the Constitutional Revolution were
> critical and constructive. However, this fact does not imply that Baha’is were not supportive
> of constitutional rule, as it must be understood that their leaders insisted that Baha’is should
> not participate in partisan political activities, in order that the newly founded Baha’i
> community would remain immune from the attacks of those who sought to establish a
> Shari‘ah-based constitution, and who were among the leading clerics of the time.
> [The Iranian constitution of 1906, and 1907 supplementary legislation, created the
> foundation for institutionalized discrimination against the Baha’is.119 Although these
> documents were based on the model of Belgium’s 1831 constitution, its provisions
> guaranteeing freedom of worship were conspicuously omitted.120 While subsequent
> legislation gave some recognition to Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians as equal citizens
> before state law, it also “gave unprecedented institutional powers to the clerical
> establishment” and did not guarantee freedom of religion.121]
> 
> Reza Shah’s Reign
> [Whereas in the nineteenth century, suppression of the Baha’is had impact on individual
> adherents, towards the end of the Qajar era these attacks were accompanied by centrally
> directed campaigns that targeted the Baha’i community in general terms and its institutions
> in particular.]
> During the rule of Reza Shah, several towns witnessed Baha’i killings. However, as a
> whole, persecution of Baha’is was not one of the political objectives of Reza Shah’s era, as
> his main goal was to limit the influence of religious clerics. It was during his reign that the
> notion of millat [national identity] acquired its roots, and to some degree, the religious
> 
> 118 This translation was previously published in Baha’i Studies Review and appears in this monograph in an
> 
> expanded form with the kind permission of that journal’s editor.
> 119 The constitutional laws contained provisions that were later used to restrict the activities of the Baha’i
> 
> community. See, for example, a circular by the Minister of Interior dated 1957, Iqdam Kunid ta az Majami Baha’i
> Khuddari Shavad [Stop the Baha’is from congregating] asserting that Baha’is meetings had been taking place in
> violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, which prohibited gatherings of all organizations which generated
> threats to religion or state and disturbed order.
> 120 See Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909, p. 375, for the full text of the provisions.
> 121 One of the justifications given for closing the Baha’i Tarbiyat schools in Tehran was that “the Iranian
> 
> Government has not recognized the Baha’i religion as it has other minority religions.” See The Baha’i World, vol.
> 6, p. 26.
> 
> identity of ummat [body of the believers] was gradually replaced by millat. That is, the country
> was moving in a direction such that citizens would consider themselves Iranians without
> concern for religious belief, political orientation or tribal affiliation. However, in the years
> after Reza Shah’s demise, that policy was gradually abandoned and, once more, the idea of
> ummat Islami [the body of Muslims] entered political discourse. Moreover, the Cold War
> against the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc reinforced this idea among the political
> figures of Iran.
> The organization of Fada’iyan Islam [Devotees of Islam] was founded after Reza Shah
> had been deposed and was an effort to combat leftist tendencies in Iran.
> 
> Post-Reza Shah
> In the 1940s and 1950s, the persecution of religious minorities—particularly the Baha’is—on
> the pretext that they opposed the Shi‘i religion or had leftist tendencies, forced the
> government and the Shah, especially after the events of September 1941,122 to follow the
> blind alley of ummat Islami and obliged them to openly contravene the principles of the
> Constitutional Revolution and the country’s adopted constitution. Almost all political and
> prominent personalities of every faction significantly contributed to this wayward political
> path and forced Iranian society’s accelerated departure from the established norms of
> democratic principles enshrined in the goals of the Constitutional Revolution. A golden
> opportunity for strengthening democracy in Iran was lost, and the chance to gain popular
> support for the implementation of improvements and reforms, even within a controlled
> framework, was lost to the Shah and the government.
> With Reza Shah’s departure, intense criticism of his reign began. The clerical
> establishment, like termites, began gnawing at the foundations of the nation’s democratic
> system. As a result, every aspect of modern life, enlightened thought, social progress, and
> liberty became a toy in the hands of the reactionary forces in Iran. After 20 Shahrivar
> [September 11, 1941, the day of Reza Shah’s departure], the entire Shi‘i ecclesiastical order,
> joined by the ruling class, arose and once again forced women to wear chadors and veils, and
> strove to close all mixed-gender schools. Islamic propaganda groups and societies were
> organized throughout the country and began disseminating publications on “the truths and
> teachings of Islam,” as well as various religious pamphlets, daily newspapers, and weekly or
> monthly journals—all of which had the suffix of Islam or Islamic in their titles.
> In summary, the clerics’ long-held hatred of the Babis, and then of the Baha’i
> movement, surfaced once again, and the field for expressing animosity and abhorrence of
> religious minorities, particularly the Baha’is, as well as exponents of enlightened and
> progressive thought among Iranians, opened up. At the insistence of the religious leaders
> [maraji‘-yi taqlid, literally: “focuses of emulation”] Islamic training and religious propaganda
> were interjected in the curricula of all elementary and high schools throughout the nation.123
> 
> 122 The forced abdication of Reza Shah by the Allies during World War II and the installation of his son
> 
> Muhammad Reza Pahlavi as Shah.
> 123 Prohibitions against the Baha’is ranged from the censorship of Baha’i literature to the closure of Baha’i
> 
> schools in the 1930s and 1940s. Two of the largest schools closed were the Tarbiyat boys’ and girls’ schools in
> Tehran, with an estimated 1,500 pupils combined; see The Baha’i World, vol. 6, pp. 27 and 96, listing Baha’i
> schools closed throughout the country. While similar measures were directed against the Armenian, Jewish, and
> Zoroastrian minorities, the practice of non-recognition of Baha’i marriages was specifically targeted at that
> community.
> 
> All of these developments took place in Tehran and other cities during the 1940s and
> centered on opposition to Baha’is, to Ahmad Kasravi and his supporters, and to the Tudeh
> Party and its members, and occurred under the supervision of the government and in most
> instances with the financial and organizational support of the authorities. In truth, it was the
> clerical order that established the notion of Da’iy Jan Napoleon124 among Iranians who suspect
> that whatever occurs in Iran is the work of foreign agents. Fabricated documents, such as the
> Memoirs of Prince Dolgorukii,125 which was manufactured by the fiction-weaving pen of Ali
> Javahir-Kalam126 and published with the financial support of Astan Quds Radavi127 and the
> backing of the leading Shi‘i clerics [maraji‘], were disseminated. This was just one example of
> many such products that originated from the clerical establishment.128
> In reality, the widespread perfidious belief that “any non-Islamic idea is the creation of
> foreigners” stemmed from the fusty minds of the mullas. Through this devious approach,
> they attached such labels as “anti-Iranian” and “foreign” to everything that was not Islamic
> and which could threaten or undermine the power of these religion-mongers in Iran. This
> deceitful “Othering,” this spreading of the seeds of conflict and enmity, not only engulfed
> religious minorities, progressive nationalistic parties, and independent leftist groups but also,
> in the long run, even raised questions about the government itself and about constitutional
> rule. It became an excuse for the clerics to proclaim widely the claim that the people’s
> Constitutional Revolution, which in reality had taken place in protest against clerical
> influence and the absolutist rule of the Qajar, was an exploit of the Russian and British
> governments in order to serve their own interests. They occupied themselves with
> propagating this baseless idea, insisting that constitutional rule and secular law were
> fundamentally at variance with the true religion of Islam and with Iran’s historical tradition.
> [Politically weak, and faced with growing nationalism and acute economic difficulties,
> Muhammad-Reza Shah ceded control over certain religious affairs to the clergy. This power-
> sharing resulted, inter alia, in a campaign of persecution against the Baha’is which, some
> scholars believe, was most likely intended by the government to distract the citizenry from
> the country’s other problems.129]
> 
> 124 Da’i Jan Napoleon is a masterpiece of socio-political satire by the renowned satirist Iraj Pizishkzad. In the
> 
> course of this entertaining and fascinating novel, which was later made into a popular play, Pizishkzad discloses
> the Iranian tendency to think that behind every misfortune is the hand of foreigners, particularly the British.
> For a discussion of the Iranian preoccupation with conspiracy, see Momen, “Conspiracy Theories and
> Forgeries: The Baha’i Community of Iran and the Construction of an Internal Enemy.”
> 125 Prince Dimitri Dolgorukov [Dolgorukii] was the Russian Tsar’s ambassador to Iran, 1845–54. The book,
> 
> Memoirs of Kinyaz Dolgorukii, a creation of the troubled mind of ‘Ali Javahir-Kalam, endeavors to connect the
> Babi and Baha’i movements to Tsarist Russia. At first, this book attracted considerable attention in Iran, but
> soon the fact that it was a mere forgery was thoroughly established by historians and religious researchers. In a
> well-regarded article, Professor ‘Abbas Iqbal Ashtiyani proved these memoirs to be a forgery created by
> troublemakers (Yadigar, year 5, numbers 8 and 9). Professor Mujtaba Minuvi considers these memoirs to be a
> forgery and the forger to be an Iranian (Rahnamih-yi Kitab, year 6, numbers 1 and 2). Similarly, refer to
> Adamiyat, Amir Kabir va Iran, p. 456. (BC)
> 126 Adamiyat, Amir Kabir va Iran, p. 456n. (BC)
> 127 Astan Quds Razavi is responsible for maintenance and supervision of the Sacred Shrine of Imam Reza in
> 
> Mashhad. It has a strong publishing arm as well as administering many religious schools and endowments.
> 128 Adamiyat, Amir Kabir va Iran, p. 456n, was the first to attribute the authorship of the fictional Memoirs of
> 
> Kinyaz Dolgorukii to Ali Javahir-Kalam. However, subsequent research has proven this not to be the case. A
> detailed analysis will be the subject of a forthcoming study by Mina Yazdani.
> 129 Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in Pahlavi Period, p. 77.
> 
> Early 1955 Opposition to Baha’is
> It was stated earlier that after the coup d’état of 28 Murdad 1332 [August 19, 1953],130 the
> mullas insisted that their significant contribution to the coup d’état be recognized and that
> this was only possible by the suppression of the Tudeh Party and the Baha’is.
> [One of the well-known anti-Baha’i propagandists, whose commentaries were widely
> circulated by the Iranian media in the mid-1950s, was a populist preacher named Shaykh
> Muhammad-Taqi Falsafi, a collaborator of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.131 Falsafi enjoyed
> the support and encouragement of prominent religious figures.132 This is documented in a
> letter of encouragement from Ayatollah Siyyid Husayn Burujirdi, who in 1946 had become
> the Shi‘i’s “source of emulation,” the religion’s highest office.133 In 1951, Falsafi approached
> Prime Minister Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq on behalf of Ayatollah Burujirdi in order to
> discuss the Baha’is and their activities, but he was rebuffed by Musaddiq who rejected the
> idea that the Baha’is were any different than Muslim Iranians. However, after the 1953 coup,
> Falsafi approached the pro-monarchist government to once again press for action against the
> Baha’is.]
> The disreputable and notorious preacher Hujjatu’l-Islam Muhammad-Taqi Falsafi has
> stated in his memoirs that his sermons against the Baha’is took place with the prior consent
> of Ayatu’llah Burujirdi and Muhammad-Reza Shah. In an interview on May 10, 1955, with a
> reporter of Itihad-i Milli Journal, Falsafi described his meeting with Ayatu’llah Burujirdi in
> these words:
> 
> Before the blessed month of Ramadan, I went to Qum where I met Ayatu’llah
> Burujirdi and found him deeply distressed. He stated, “Now that the situation of the
> oil industry has been resolved and the matter of the Tudeh Party has been disposed
> of, we must make plans concerning the Baha’is and confront this challenge.”
> 
> In Khatirat va Mubarizat [Memories and struggles], Muhammad-Taqi Falsafi writes:
> 
> My religious duty compelled me not to be indifferent about this sect, and in spite of
> their connections to the government, to propagate against them in my sermons.…
> 
> 130 This is a reference to the coup of 28 Murdad 1332 against the government of Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq. It
> 
> is commonly called by Iranians the “28 Murdad coup” but will be referred to as the “1953 coup” in the rest of
> this translation. Musaddiq, who was the elected prime minister of Iran from 1951 to 1953, was a nationalist and
> passionately opposed foreign intervention in Iran. He was also the architect of the nationalization of the Iranian
> oil industry, which had been dominated and exploited by the British through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
> (today known as British Petroleum). Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi removed him from power in a CIA-
> orchestrated coup, supported and funded by the British and the US governments.
> 131 Falsafi’s published memoir acknowledges openly that Falsafi “played an important role in combat with
> 
> Baha’ism”; see Davani, Khatirat va Mubarizat Hujjatu’l Islam Muhammad-Taqi Falsafi.
> 132 See Didari Az Ayatollah Burujirdi az ‘Abbas Furutan [Report by ‘Abbas Furutan on his visit with authorities in
> 
> Qum], Ashuftih, no. 19, 7–10, 22/2/1334 (May 13, 1955), referring to Falsafi as a representative of Ayatollah
> Burujirdi in Tehran and in the Shah’s court, and stating that Shaykh Ahmad Khadimi, Siyyid Mustafa Khansari,
> and Taliqani met with Furutan and discussed their support for Falsafi and his actions.
> 133 See Namih Hadrat Ayatu’llah ul‘uzma Burujirdi [Letter from Grand Ayatollah Burujirdi]; the letter was recited
> 
> by Hujjatu’l-Islam Falsafi during sermon at Sultani Mosque; Pust Tehran, no. 581, 18/2/1334 (May 9, 1955).
> Falsafi’s memoir (p. 202, n. 1) states that his anti-Baha’i sermons in 1955 “were done with the previous
> agreement of Ayatollah Burujirdi and had his complete support.”
> 
> Ayatu’llah Burujirdi sent me a message to convey the issue [of the Baha’is] to the
> governmental authorities….Eventually, after May 1953 [Ramadan 1332], he sent me
> a letter instructing me to meet with the Shah and to express the Ayatu’llah’s
> disapproval and displeasure over the matter of [the relative freedom of] the
> Baha’is….Before May 1954 [Ramadan 1333], I asked Ayatu’llah Burujirdi, “Are you
> supportive of the idea that I discuss the situation of Baha’is during my radio
> sermons which are broadcast live from the Shah Mosque?” He thought for a
> moment and then responded, “If you did, it would be good. For now, the
> authorities are paying little attention [to the suppression and annihilation of Baha’is].
> At least that would put them [the Baha’is] in a bad light in the field of public
> opinion.”
> He added further, “It is necessary to mention this to the Shah beforehand so
> that he would not have an excuse later to intercede, ruin everything and terminate
> the radio broadcasts. Such a thing would be most unfortunate for the Muslims as it
> would embolden the Baha’is.”
> I called the Shah’s office and requested an appointment. When I met the Shah, I
> stated, “Ayatu’llah Burujirdi has consented that the issue of the Baha’is, which is a
> cause of concern for Muslims, be dealt with and discussed in my radio sermons
> during the month of Ramadan. Would your Majesty consent as well?”
> 
> Falsafi relates that the Shah remained silent for a moment and then said, “Go and preach
> accordingly.”134 [Falsafi also encouraged other preachers who were giving sermons during
> Ramadan to raise the Baha’i issue in their sermons, which they did.]
> From 1948 (1327), each Ramadan, Falsafi used to deliver sermons against the Tudeh
> Party. Elimination and annihilation of the Babis and Baha’is was the cherished desire of the
> mullas and their partners in the government. During those days, it was widely said that
> strikes against Baha’is and destruction of their administrative and religious centers were
> government objectives. However, this had to wait until May 1955 (Ramadan 1334).
> 
> 134 Davani, Khatirat va Mubarizat Hujjatu’l-Islam Falsafi, pp. 200ff. In the same book, various documents and
> 
> accounts are found that illustrate how the mullas and political figures worked hand-in-hand against the Baha’i
> community and strove to suppress and harm them. They even entertained the idea of adopting a parliamentary
> measure that would make it illegal to be a Baha’i. These documents clearly prove that the Shah and his
> appointed prime minister, Asadu’llah ‘Alam, were active partners in these undertakings. In Haqiqat-Pizhu, A’in-
> i Baha’i Yik Nihdat Siyasi Nist, after proving that the Baha’i faith has no political objective, the various
> objections raised by the leaders of the Islamic Republic are addressed and answered. For example, the author(s)
> have noted the manifold problems that the Baha’is had with the government during Reza Shah’s reign. In 1941,
> a number of Baha’is of Yazd were imprisoned on the charge of being Baha’is. In 1943, local Baha’i centers in
> various cities were confiscated, and some were destroyed. In 1946, a number of Baha’is were killed in Kashan
> and Shahrud, and the perpetrators were never arrested. In 1951, a jihad (religious war) against Baha’is was
> proclaimed, and they were accused of collaboration with the communists. After Shaykh Muhammad-Taqi
> Falsafi’s sermons in 1955, Baha’is were persecuted throughout Iran, and a number of them were killed. In 1956,
> the Baha’is complained to the United Nations about these persecutions and discriminations. From 1956 until
> 1963, Baha’i gatherings were proclaimed unlawful by the government. Finally, in September 1978, SAVAK
> organized anti-Baha’i riots in Shiraz aimed at diverting the Revolution and turning it into an uprising against the
> Baha’is. Over 300 Baha’i homes were plundered and then set on fire. In Paris, Ayatu’llah Khomeini spoke of
> this incident and pointed out its true character. (BC)
> 
> Baha’i Center in Tehran (prior to 1955)
> 
> 1955 Baha’i Persecution
> In accordance with Ayatu’llah Burujirdi’s wishes, soon after the 1953 coup, the attack against
> the Baha’is began to be included in the broadcasts of Falsafi’s sermons, delivered during
> Ramadan of 1334 [1955]. [Falsafi states, “Speeches against the Baha’is in the Shah Mosque
> and their broadcast from the radio caused a strange stir in the country, and people who had
> suffered at the hands of this wayward sect were excited. Everywhere one went, there was talk
> of the necessity of suppressing the Baha’is, who were connected to Zionism and America.”135
> In the third week of Ramadan, the Military Governor of Tehran, Taymur Bakhtiar, ordered
> his forces to occupy the National Baha’i Center in Tehran, an important religious site.136]
> The brutal attack led to the confiscation of Baha’i properties in every city by the
> government. In Tehran, on May 22, 1955, in front of the cameras of both foreign and
> domestic reporters, Lieutenant-General [Nader] Batmanqlich, the chief of staff of the
> Iranian army, along with [Brigadier-General] Taymur Bakhtiar, the military commander of
> Tehran, took pickaxes and demolished the dome of the Baha’i Center.137 [The Muslim
> Spiritual Community of Qum subsequently issued a statement applauding the destruction of
> this “house of corruption” and stated that this act had attracted “special attention from the
> Mahdi and had certainly met with the agreement of His Majesty the Shah.”138] For many
> years, that building was impounded by the military and used as its own command center.139
> 
> 135 Davani, Khatirat va Mubarizat Hujjatu’l-Islam Falsafi, p. 201.
> 136 See “Subh Imruz Quva Intizami Haziratu’l-Quds Markaz Tabliqat Baha’iyan Ra Ishghal Kard” [This morning the
> 
> armed forces occupied the Haziratu’l-Quds, the propaganda center of the Baha’is], Kayhan, no. 3571,
> 16/2/1334 (May 7, 1955); “Markaz Baha’iyan Chigunih Viran Shud” [How the Baha’i Center was destroyed],
> Tulu‘, 4/3/1334 (May 16, 1955).
> 137 See “Subh Imruz Kharab Kardan Haziratu’l-Quds Aqaz Shud: Timsar Sarlashkar Batmanqlich Avalin Kulang Ra Bih
> 
> Zamin Zad” [The demolition of Haziratu’l-Quds started this morning: General Batmanqlich was the first to
> strike with a pickaxe], Ittila‘at, 31/2/1334 (May 22, 1955), stating that Batmanqlich delivered the first blow to
> the building, Bakhtiar was present and assisted, and Falsafi was also present. Bakhtiar was supported by the
> Muslim clergy; see “Mulaqat Timsar Bakhtiar ba Ayatu’llah Burujirdi” [The meeting of General Bakhtiar with
> Ayatu’llah Burujirdi], Ittihad Millat, 29/5/1334, [August 21, 1955] reporting that Burujirdi thanked Bakhtiar for
> his work during the month of Ramadan.
> 138 Namih Jami‘iyih Rawhaniyun Qum [Statement from clerical community of Qum], Sitarih Islam, 27/3/1334 (June
> 
> 18, 1955). This proclamation was presumably intended to emphasize that the attack on the center was approved
> of by both religious and secular authorities.
> 139 In 1957, an order was issued for the return of the National Baha’i Center in Tehran to the Baha’i
> 
> community. See The Baha’i World, vol. 8, p. 295.
> 
> Generals Batmanqlich and Bakhtiar demolishing Tehran’s Baha’i Center
> 
> General Muhammad Ayarmalu, the deputy-chief of the most powerful branch of
> government, namely, the Department for Security and Information [SAVAK], writes the
> following in his memoirs:
> 
> One morning, Lieutenant-General Batmanqlich, the chief of staff of the army, along
> with Brigadier-General Taymur Bakhtiar, the military commander, climbed the
> dome of the Baha’i Center [in Tehran] and using pickaxes began to demolish it.
> The next morning, the military attaché of the United States came to my office
> and in a voice shaking with rage protested, “What was this act that the chief of staff
> committed? Why would the military chief take up an axe, and before the gaze of
> multitudes, demolish a building? Furthermore, he destroyed a building that is deeply
> respected and cherished by many of your citizens! My country is assisting Iran to
> repair the ruins, and now you turn a beautiful building into a ruin?”
> As I, too, could not find any logical reason for this destruction—particularly by
> the hands of such a high-ranking officer—I remained quiet and said nothing in the
> face of this rebuke from the American attaché.
> 
> A few hours later, the late Batmanqlich summoned me into his office and
> impatiently asked, “What are the military attachés saying about yesterday’s
> occurrences?”
> I openly shared the comments of the American military attaché and added,
> “Several more of the military attachés have expressed their perplexity and
> disappointment over this incident.” When I saw signs of distress in his face, I asked,
> “General, what truly motivated you to undertake this act?” He lifted his head and
> responded, “I had no motives. It was the chief’s order.” And by that he meant the
> late Muhammad-Reza Shah.
> As later I read in various publications, Muhammad-Reza Shah had given this
> order in order to appease several influential akhunds, particularly Siyyid Abu’l-
> Qasem Kashani….It is ironic to note that twenty-five years later [in the Islamic
> Revolution of 1979], the late Muhammad-Reza Shah witnessed the result of giving
> so much license to the akhunds. Also twenty-five years later, when General
> Batmanqlich was arrested and prosecuted at the height of the 1357 [1979]
> Revolution, he recounted this incident in his semi-successful defense.”140
> 
> 140 Ararmalu, Yadvarih Yik Bachih Qazaq, pp. 213–14. (BC)
> 
> [By Ramadan 10, Minister of Interior Amir Asadu’llah ‘Alam was sufficiently alarmed by the
> violence that he contacted Falsafi to voice his concerns that Falsafi’s sermons were
> disrupting the security of the nation. ‘Alam wrote in his memoir:
> 
> Falsafi managed to fool both the Shah and the military authorities and start a
> campaign against the Baha’is that dragged the country to the edge of disaster. It was
> Ramadan. [Falsafi’s] noon sermons were broadcast throughout the nation via radio
> and caused violence and terror in many locations. People killed a few Baha’is here
> and there. Falsafi justified these acts by saying that they increased the Shah’s
> prestige. I had no choice but to order him, in my own rash way, to refrain from
> giving further speeches until order was reestablished.141
> 
> Falsafi was not so easily deterred, and as a result, a week or so later, the Shah sent the head
> of the police force, General Alavi Muqaddam, and Brigadier-General Taymur Bakhtiar, to
> order Falsafi to stop referring to the Baha’is in his sermons, as it was creating a security
> concern. Falsafi bluntly refused to comply with the order:
> 
> It is not possible….If you want to discontinue the radio broadcasts, do it. Arrest me
> if you want to. Otherwise, I must continue my speeches until the end of
> Ramadan.…If I do not say anything…I will dishonor Islam and marja‘ [highest-
> ranking clergy], and I will never do that.142
> 
> Falsafi continued his sermons until the end of Ramadan and avoided arrest, but he was never
> again admitted into the Shah’s presence and was henceforth banned from preaching the
> Friday sermon at Shah Mosque, at the time one of the country’s most influential religious
> platforms.
> The general attack against the Baha’i community and its institutions, as well as the well-
> publicized seizure of the National Baha’i Center, provoked further anti-Baha’i attacks outside
> of Tehran. On July 28, 1955, in the village of Hurmuzdak in Yazd, seven Baha’is, ranging in
> age from nineteen to eighty years old, were killed by a large mob who hacked them to pieces
> with spades and axes. In Shiraz, parts of the house of the Bab, one of the Baha’i faith’s most
> sacred sites, were damaged. Raids and attacks on the Baha’is in nearby villages resulted in
> 800 apparently coerced recantations by members of the Baha’i faithful which were signed
> and submitted to the local Islamic authorities.143 In Rasht, Ahvaz, Shiraz, Isfahan, Karaj,
> Mahfuruzak, Abadeh, Reza’iyeh, Takur, and Hisar, public and private Baha’i properties were
> raided and destroyed, and homes, businesses, and Baha’i centers were looted and burnt. The
> Baha’i community responded to these events by appealing to various international bodies,
> including the newly formed United Nations.
> Even those merely sympathetic to the plight of the Baha’is might find themselves the
> target of religious extremists. When the governor of Fars Province, Brigadier-General
> Himmat, attempted to take action against the instigators of a local anti-Baha’i uprising, he
> was accused of being a Baha’i himself and was dismissed from his post.144]
> 
> 141 Mahdavi, Guftuguha-yi Man ba Shah, Khatirat Mahramaniyih Asadu’llah ‘Alam, pp. 66–67. (BC)
> 142 Davani, Khatirat va Mubarizat Hujjatu’l-Islam Falsafi, pp. 205–7.
> 143 “Jaryan Kamil Hadisiyih Shiraz va Abadeh va Ardestan” [Complete coverage of the incidents of Shiraz and
> 
> Abadeh and Ardestan], Sitarih Islam, no. 175, 10/4/1334 [July 2, 1955].
> 144 Afnan, The Genesis of the Babi-Baha’i Faiths in Shiraz and Fars, pp. 239–40.
> 
> Clerical Influence over the Government
> The activities of Ayatu’llah Burujirdi, and essentially the entire efforts of the Shi‘i clerical
> establishment against the Baha’is, were not just aimed at securing the “foundation of the true
> religion of Islam.” In fact, this undertaking was also an instrument for the clerics to portray
> themselves as actual participants in the 1953 coup d’état and restoration of the Shah to his
> throne.
> By yielding to the illegal wishes of the religious leaders [maraji‘-yi taqlid] and the clerical
> establishment after the 1953 coup d’état, the Shah and his government, in effect, placed a
> stamp of approval on the clerics’ participation in the government’s exercise of power.
> Through a study of documents, letters, and communications of the clerics after the 1953
> coup d’état until the 1979 Revolution, we can see how intertwined and aligned the
> relationship between the royal court and the government and clerics had become. This
> friendly association developed into such a close relationship that, hoping to realize his
> malevolent fancies, Ayatu’llah Burujirdi asked the Shah and Prime Minister Husayn ‘Ala’ to
> modify the contents of the nation’s Constitution through parliamentary action. This is the
> text of his letter:
> 
> In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.
> To his Excellency [Husayn ‘Ala’] the Prime Minister, may his glory endure!
> Your Excellency’s letter of 5 Tir 1334 [June 27, 1955], conveying the necessary
> instructions of His Majesty to the government regarding my suggestions as
> communicated in my letter of 27 Shavval 1373 [June 29, 1954], was received
> through Haji Qa’im-Maqam al-Mulk Rafi‘. The essence of my suggestions, as noted
> in your letter, are:
> 1. The Baha’i sect must be prevented from propagation [of its teachings],
> which is against the true religion of Islam.
> 2. Their assemblies and centers for propagation, wherever found across the
> country, must be closed.
> 3. Any employee who is not of one of the religions mentioned in the
> Constitution must be expelled after due investigation, in accordance with
> the law of the country. Consequently, the Baha’is would fall into this
> category [and be expelled].
> May God, exalted is He, protect the sacred Islamic religion and the independence of
> Iran from the harm of events that occur and the attack of the enemies. And may He
> confirm and succor His Majesty and the government authorities in their work of
> protecting the country and supporting the sacred religion [of Islam].
> Upon thee be the peace, mercy and bounty of God.
> 7 Dhi’l-Qa’dah 1374/7 Tir 1334 [June 28, 1955]
> Husayn at-Tabataba’i [Burujirdi]145
> 
> During that period and subsequently, Muhammad-Taqi Falsafi would cry out in warning in
> every mosque and place of worship in Tehran or other cities where he preached:
> 
> 145 Manzuru’l-Ajdad, ed., Marja‘iyat dar ‘Arsih Ijtima‘ va Siyasat, p. 498. (BC)
> 
> Brave merchants, employees, students, and workers of Iran! Arise and combat these
> irreligious people [i.e., the Baha’is] and Baha’i-sympathizers [by this he meant the
> Shah, the prime minister, and members of the national parliament] and completely
> exterminate them, so that it will be proven that [Imam] ‘Ali is alive, the Prophet [of
> Islam] is alive and the religion of Islam will not fade away. Do not permit this illegal
> government to belittle Islam any longer!
> 
> After its successful role in the 1953 coup d’état, the clerical establishment would attribute
> every political, societal, or economic reform to Baha’i designs, and through this stratagem
> would provoke religious sentiments, as well as inflame the latent anti-Baha’i attitude among
> the Iranian people. Whenever the Shah or the government retreated on these announced
> reforms, the clerics and Shi‘i religious leaders would refer to “an agreement having been
> reached between the government and the clerics,” or to “the defeat of the government,” or
> would say, “Through God’s will, the strivings of the courageous nation of Islam and the
> indefatigable clerics, we won a mighty victory!”146
> In a telegram to the Shah, Ayatu’llah Siyyid Muhammad [Musavi] Bihbahani stated, “I
> OFFER MY HEARTFELT GRATITUDE FOR CLOSING THIS CENTER OF RELIGIOUS AND
> NATIONAL SEDITION [i.e., the Haziratu’l-Quds, the Baha’i center in Tehran] THROUGH THE
> EFFORTS OF THE ISLAMIC ARMY, AND CONSIDER THIS AUSPICIOUS EVENT TO BE AMONG THE
> ANNUAL RELIGIOUS EVENTS WORTHY OF CELEBRATION.”                In response to Ayatu’llah
> Bihbahani, the Shah noted, “As you have repeatedly heard us state, we consider ourselves
> bound to carry out the requirements of Islam and beseech the Almighty to continue
> confirming us in this undertaking.”
> In a cable to the Shah, Ayatu’llah Burujirdi referred to the Baha’is as “enemies and
> trouble-makers” to the royal throne, and stated, “MAY GOD, EXALTED BE HIS STATION,
> PROTECT THE SACRED RELIGION OF ISLAM AND IRAN’S MONARCHY FROM THE HARM OF THE
> ENEMY AND MISCHIEF-MAKERS, AND MAY HE PRESERVE YOUR MAJESTY OVER ALL
> MUSLIMS.”
> In a letter to Muhammad-Taqi Falsafi, Ayatu’llah Burujirdi—the marja‘ at-taqlid [object
> of emulation] for all Shi‘ih—had expressed gratitude for his “precious services” to “the
> sacred religion of Islam, and indeed to all religions, and to the holy Qur’an.” He wrote that
> since Baha’is held many high positions in the government, the highest priority was therefore
> to remove them all from every agency, department, and bureau of the government, and from
> every other position of influence. In an interview with the newspaper Kayhan, he expressed
> his wish for the destruction of the Haziratu’l-Quds in Tehran, expulsion of Baha’is from all
> governmental and official positions, and the adoption of a parliamentary plan to forcibly
> expel all Baha’is from Iran.
> 
> 146 Zaban Guya-yi Islam: Hujjatu’l-Islam Muhammad-Taqi Falsafi [The eloquent tongue of Islam: Hujjatu’l-Islam
> 
> Muhammad-Taqi Falsafi], Tehran: Markaz Barrisi Asnad Tarikhi-yi Vizarat Ittila‘at, vol. 9. (BC)
> 147 See “Tiligiraf Ayatu’llah Bihbahani bih Pishgah Alahazrat Humayuni va Hazrat Ayatu’llah ul‘Uzma Burujirdi”
> 
> [Telegram from Ayatu’llah Bihbahani to Grand Ayatu’llah Burujirdi and his majesty the Shah], in Shura, no. 52,
> 19/2/1334 (May 10, 1955); “Payamha-yi Muhimmi Kih Bayn Ayatu’llah Burujirdi va Maghamat Mu’assir Rad va Badal
> Shudih Ast [Important messages exchanged between Ayatu’llah Burujirdi and important officials], Khandaniha,
> no. 690, 111–12.
> 
> Falsafi participating in the destruction of Tehran’s Baha’i Center
> 
> From the pulpit, Muhammad-Taqi Falsafi never hesitated to spread every manner of
> false and vicious rumor, intended to provoke the simple-minded, fanatical, and superstitious
> people against the Baha’is. He used the well-trained techniques of such preachers148 and
> made up false stories, saying:
> 
> One of the members of the Tudeh [Communist Party] disclosed to me, “As every
> arena of activity was closed to us and since we heard that the Baha’is intended to
> initiate a coup d’état the following year, we, therefore gravitated towards them so
> that we could make a big impact. In order to prove our interest in the Baha’i
> religion, we even married Baha’i women in accordance with their traditional
> ceremony.”
> 
> In response to objections from the international community and its agencies, and possibly
> also the protests from Western countries against the maltreatment of Baha’is in Iran, Falsafi
> devised a new trick. From the pulpit he would say, “We have not spoken of religion. Our
> only concern is the group who wears a religious mask, and it is against them that we speak.”
> 
> Falsafi’s Ties to America
> Falsafi himself declared from a pulpit that he had close affiliations with the agents of the
> American embassy—a place described by Ayatu’llah Ruhu’llah Khomeini as “the nest of
> spies.” In a resonant voice he would proclaim, “I told the Americans that Muslims were
> fighting the Tudeh Party and, if they were to support the Baha’is, it would be like supporting
> the Tudeh Party, which is an enemy of America.”
> In this way, Muhammad-Taqi Falsafi painted himself as America’s supporter in their
> fight against communism and socialism in Iran, and insinuated that the Cold War waged by
> the Americans and their European allies was in reality also aimed at combating the Baha’is,
> 
> 148 Rawdih-khan—these reciters of the story of the Imams would also preach as part of their performances.
> 
> and that their supporters were part of the same policy framework. His implication was that
> the suppression of Baha’is was not a religious issue but a struggle to guard Iran’s national
> unity as part of the overall plan to fight worldwide communism.149
> 
> Muntaziri’s Role in the Persecution of Baha’is
> The anti-Baha’i activities of Ayatu’llah Burujirdi were not limited to launching Falsafi, the
> preacher, on his theological outbursts against the Baha’is. He dispatched his seminary
> students and hired thugs to every corner of the country to provoke the already inflamed
> religious fanatics to murder Baha’is and plunder their properties. Based on information from
> hundreds of relevant documents, the present author can only briefly draw attention to the
> activities of Shaykh Husayn-‘Ali Muntaziri, who was one of the most mischievous clerics
> under the tutelage of Ayatu’llah Burujirdi.
> At that time, Shaykh Husayn-‘Ali Muntaziri was a young seminarian, but in the winter of
> his life he reached the rank of Grand Ayatu’llah and was a deputy to Ayatu’llah Ruhu’llah
> Khomeini, the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution. He has made public a lengthy
> account of his life and without any hesitation—indeed with great pride—has recounted
> many events. Here we note only a few passages:
> 
> The late Burujirdi was extremely anti-Baha’i. For instance, they had killed a Baha’i
> near Yazd and planned to execute his murderer.…Burujirdi had lost sleep over this
> and wanted to prevent this hanging by any possible means. [Through the illegal
> exertions of Ayatu’llah Burujirdi and the collusion of the government, the murderer
> was set free.]
> One year, Burujirdi instructed Falsafi to give sermons against the Baha’is on the
> radio during Ramadan. Ayatu’llah Kashani also concurred with this. At the
> beginning of Ramadan, Falsafi began his preaching against Baha’is. That year his
> sermons became very popular and people would gather around the radio to listen to
> him.…
> [It was about this time that Muntaziri was given a mission to go to Najafabad.] I
> asked Ayatu’llah Burujirdi about business dealings, trade, and commerce with
> Baha’is, and in response he issued a written fatwa [religious judgment] stating: “In
> His Name, the Exalted! It is incumbent upon all Muslims to leave off all association,
> relationship, and dealings with this sect [the Baha’is].…”
> News of the proclamation spread throughout the city and received a great deal
> of publicity in mosques and other public places….With the announcement of this
> religious ruling, an atmosphere of extreme tension was created against the Baha’is in
> Najafabad.
> At that time, I gathered representatives from every class and occupation of
> Najafabad, and each was asked to produce a proclamation against Baha’is. For
> instance, the bakers wrote, “We will not sell bread to Baha’is.” The taxi-drivers
> wrote, “We will not permit Baha’is in our cabs.”…In short, a taxi ride between
> Najafabad and Isfahan, which had previously cost one tuman, could not be had for
> fifty tumans by a Baha’i no matter how much he pleaded. Of course, these actions
> were not always based on religious faith. Many participated because they feared
> others or were forced to, due to the general social mood.…
> 
> 149For more details, see Iran-Namih, a journal of Iranian Studies, published in America, special issue, 19
> (Winter/Spring 2001): 1–2, devoted to the religious minorities of Iran. (BC)
> 
> Eventually, as a result of this campaign, they [the Baha’is] were all dislodged
> from Najafabad….After they were dispersed, they would hide themselves from
> public view….We extended this hostility to Isfahan as well, where a widespread
> uproar against Baha’is was initiated….After a while, it became known that I was the
> instigator and the author of these affairs.150
> 
> It was through the scheming of this “fair-minded” cleric—Ayatu’llah Muntaziri—that the
> homes of the Baha’is of Najafabad were plundered and looted, and they were made to
> wander homeless after being compelled to leave their native town, while the government
> took no action to protect them. Further, it was by the instructions of this “propagandist”
> and the “brilliant mind behind vilayat-i faqih [leadership of religious jurists]” that the Baha’i
> Center of Najafabad was set on fire and burned to the ground. Muntaziri admits that
> Ayatu’llah Burujirdi, “was completely aware of what was going on and was most pleased with
> my activities.”
> Owing to the machination of clerics more cunning than he, Muntaziri failed to become
> the deputy of the Imam and even received a letter from his supreme leader dated 6 Farvardin
> 1368 [March 26, 1989] that will live forever in the history of the “militant clerics.” In this
> letter, Khomeini addressed Muntaziri without the title of Ayatu’llah:
> 
> Your Excellency Mr. Muntaziri,
> 
> With a broken heart and great sadness, I write this short letter so that one day the
> people may become apprised of the situation….You have forfeited the necessary
> prerequisites and qualifications to become the next leader of the nation.…
> (From now on,) tell the seminarians who bring you money to take the funds to
> Qum, to the home of Mr. Pasandidih (my brother) or to bring them to Tehran to
> Jamaran (my residence). Praise unto God that you have no shortage of financial
> means (thanks to the Islamic Revolution and plundering the possessions of Muslims
> and non-Muslims).
> 
> At this point in the letter, the Imam refers to his deputy as dim-witted and with the
> customary language of an akhund addresses Muntaziri, “Since you are a simpleton,” you
> must remain under house arrest, “perchance God would pardon you your sins.” At the
> letter’s conclusion, Khomeini writes the reason for this communication:
> 
> You have committed a treasonous act against the nameless soldiers of the Hidden
> Imam151 and the sacred blood of the martyrs for Islam and the Revolution. So that
> you would not burn in the depths of hell, you should confess your mistakes and
> sins, perchance God would aid you.
> 
> In response to this insulting letter, the deputy of Imam Khomeini, the illustrious Grand
> Ayatu’llah Husayn-‘Ali Muntaziri, wrote most pathetically and meekly, “Please allow me to
> 
> 150 Khatirat Ayatu’llah Husayn-‘Ali Muntaziri [Memoirs of Ayatu’llah Husayn-‘Ali Muntaziri], Germany: Nima,
> 
> 2000, pp. 94–96. [This document can also be downloaded at http://www.amontazeri.com—in this edition this
> reference is at vol. 1, pp. 179–80, accessed 21 May 2008]. (BC)
> 151 The author is referring to treason against the agents of SAVAMA and VEVAK. SAVAMA stands for
> 
> Sazman Ittila‘at va Amniyat Milli Iran, which was the successor of the Shah’s secret police, SAVAK. Later,
> SAVAMA was transformed into Vizarat Ittila‘at va Amniyat Kishvar, or VEVAK for short.
> 
> continue my studies and teachings as before, like a small and insignificant seminarian, under
> the wise shadow of your exalted leadership.”152
> 
> The Collusion of the Clerics and the Government
> At the conclusion of Ramadan 1334 [May 1955], the most distinguished of the clerics, the
> religious leaders, the renowned preachers, and those who promoted Shi‘ism from the pulpits,
> along with a representative of Ayatu’llah Burujirdi gathered in the residence of Ayatu’llah
> Khunsari. After discussions and consultations, the participants composed a communication
> addressed to “the presence of His Majesty the King,” requesting urgent and ultimate disposal
> of the Baha’is of Iran. In this letter, the Muslim clerics stated at length their submission and
> fidelity to the Crown and pleaded with the Shah to conclude the situation of the Baha’is in
> much the same brutal and bloody way that he had eliminated the members of the Tudeh
> Party, insisting that delay would only prolong the inevitable.
> The struggle to cleanse Iran of the presence of “the wayward and misguided Baha’i sect”
> gradually turned into an anti-Western and anti-American struggle, and in the course of
> several decades ultimately evolved into a rebellion intent on toppling the Pahlavi dynasty in
> Iran.
> The presence of the two highest-ranking military chiefs at the destruction of the Baha’i
> Haziratu’l-Quds in Tehran was a clear sign of the Shah’s support and his government’s
> encouragement of persecution and the suppression of Baha’is—an act devoid of foresight
> and intended solely to appease the high-ranking clerics.…
> The mullas’ activities against Baha’is were not only to protect “the foundation of the
> true religion of Islam” but also an instrument by which the clerical establishment sought to
> demonstrate their power and influence to the government and people alike. It was the
> clerical establishment (and not, as was commonly believed among the people, due to the
> unwise assertions of the Tudeh Party, Sha‘ban Khan Ja‘fari), who were the “tajbakhsh” [king
> maker]. The truth was something other than what the ordinary people believed. Whenever
> social reforms appeared to conflict with the interest of the clerics, the clerical establishment
> would remind the Shah and his government that he wore the crown and sat on the throne
> solely due to its active role in the 1953 coup d’état.
> In the letters of Ayatu’llah Burujirdi, in the communications or speeches of Ayatu’llah
> Khomeini prior to 15 Khurdad [the Islamic Revolution], and in the memoirs of various
> clerics that are presently being published by the Islamic regime in Iran, we repeatedly see that
> the Shah was warned that he owed the return of his crown to the actions of “militant clerics”
> against Dr. Musaddiq’s government. In some letters, we note that they cautioned the Shah
> that if he were to undertake any act that would displease the clerics or jurists, they had the
> power and ability to remove him from the throne.153
> 
> 152 Khatirat Ayatu’llah Husayn-‘Ali Muntaziri, pp. 539–40 [in on-line version at vol. 1, pp. 673–76, pp. 681–82].
> 
> (BC)
> 153 Marja‘iyat dar ‘Arsih-yi Ijtima‘ va Siyasat. In this book, we encounter many documents discussing the
> 
> relationship between the Shah and his governments with various high-ranking clerics such as Ayatu’llahs Mirza
> Muhammad Husayn Na’ini, Haji Sayyid Abu’l-Hasan Isfahani, Haji Aqa Husayn Qumi, Haji Shaykh Abdu’l-
> Karim Ha’iri-Yazdi, and Haji Aqa Husayn Burujirdi. Indeed these documents would be most illuminating and
> surprising for any researcher. Citing all these documents would, however, unduly prolong this brief essay. (BC)
> 
> Recollections of Dr. Ha’iri-Yazdi
> Ayatu’llah ‘Abdu’l-Karim Ha’iri-Yazdi was an object of emulation (marja‘ at-taqlid) of the
> Shi‘ih and the founder of a religious school in Qum. His son Dr. Mahdi Ha’iri-Yazdi studied
> in Qum and later continued his advanced studies in Western philosophy in England, the
> United States, and Canada. He remained in the West continuing to teach and research in
> philosophy. Dr. Habib Ladjivardi has published, in the form of an interview, the memoirs of
> Dr. Mahdi Ha’iri-Yazdi as part of Harvard University’s Iranian Oral History Project. Some
> of these memoirs relate to events after the 1953 coup, the role of the clerics, the fall of Dr.
> Musaddiq, and the collusion of the Shah with the clerics in running the country. They are
> most illuminating in understanding the evolution of modern politics and religion in Iran.
> Regarding the issue of vilayat-i faqih [the rule of religious jurists], Dr. Mahdi Ha’iri-Yazdi
> states, “The way [the Islamic Republic] has defined this theory has no basis whatsoever. At
> least I have been unable to find any evidence in the book [Qu’ran], the traditions [sunnat] or
> in logic to support such a system.”
> Ha’iri-Yazdi had a close relationship with Ayatu’llah Burujirdi and relates:
> 
> On religious matters, Burujirdi would instruct the regime what to do, and the
> government would follow his wishes. For instance, he did not approve of Dr.
> Musaddiq. However, when the Shah returned from Italy [after the coup], Burujirdi
> approved of him.
> Dr. Musaddiq showed Burujirdi great respect, to the point that he used his
> position to pass a special legislation such that any publication which printed
> anything that offended the person of the marja‘ at-taqlid [object of emulation] would
> be banned immediately without even a trial. This law was passed solely for Burujirdi.
> It even caused annoyance to Ayatu’llah Kashani. In fact, one of the reasons that
> Kashani disassociated himself from Dr. Musaddiq was this very legislation and the
> feeling that Dr. Musaddiq had sided with Burujirdi.
> 
> Dr. Ha’iri-Yazdi recounts an incident involving Ayatu’llah Mir Siyyid Muhammad Bihbahani
> which is most interesting and instructive. According to this recollection, Ayatu’llah
> Bihbahani had knowledge of the 1953 coup d’état before it took place. Ha’iri-Yazdi states,
> “On the morning of 28 Murdad [August 19, 1953], the sun had not yet risen, when the
> phone rang.” The call was from the residence of Ayatu’llah Bihbahani with the instruction
> that he should immediately come before the Ayatu’llah for “an urgent matter.” Ha’iri-Yazdi
> quickly went to Bihbahani’s home and was told by the Ayatu’llah:
> 
> This morning you should leave for Qum. Go before Burujirdi and convey to him on
> my behalf, “Master, the country is on the verge of dismemberment. Soon it will be
> ruined because there is talk of forming a republic. The Shah has left, and any day
> now the country will be thrown into chaos and disorder. It is certain that the
> country will move to the other side of the Iron Curtain. No name will remain of
> religion; no name of him [Burujirdi]; no mention of religious guidance; no memory
> of the principles of the faith. The country will become communist. He should devise
> a plan—perhaps a communication, or a ruling—so that people would be made
> aware of the truth of the matter and would rise to oppose the Tudehis. In short, do
> not allow the country to become communist.”
> 
> Ha’iri-Yazdi continues, “I should mention that just as he considered Baha’is to be the
> disruptors of security and a threat to the country’s independence, Ayatu’llah Burujirdi also
> 
> viewed the Tudeh Party in the same light. And so, he combated the Tudeh Party the same
> way that he combated the Baha’is.
> A question was asked of Dr. Ha’iri-Yazdi regarding Ayatu’llah Burujirdi’s “intense and
> open battles against the Baha’is after 1953.” Dr. Ha’iri-Yazdi responded:
> 
> [Burujirdi] had a grand strategy.… At that time, Khomeini was one of the confidants
> of Burujirdi. In fact, it was widely acknowledged that he was Burujirdi’s foreign
> minister. This was at a time when he had not, as yet, come into conflict with
> Burujirdi. On at least one occasion during that episode, Khomeini went to the court
> and met with the Shah on Burujirdi’s behalf. After this meeting, I met with
> Khomeini. He himself explained, “Yes, I went as the emissary of Burujirdi and met
> with the Shah.” In telling this, Khomeini seemed very joyful and vigorous.
> Khomeini, continuing what he said to me, related, “I said to His Majesty, ‘The late
> Shah, your Majesty’s father, had this wayward group [the Baha’is] completely
> reduced and immobilized. And now the people of Iran expect the same from you.’”
> This is exactly what Khomeini related for me.…
> Burujirdi had conspired with the Shah to suppress and control these people [the
> Baha’is] as much as possible. For example, their Haziratu’l-Quds, which was their
> propaganda center located on Hafez Street, was closed. At that time, they had
> agreed on this plan—a plan in which the Shah himself was involved. They instructed
> Falsafi to commence his sermons from the pulpit in the Shah Mosque during the
> month of Ramadan and to prepare people for this. And they accomplished their
> plan.154
> 
> Dealing with “The Baha’i Problem”155
> As anti-Baha’i violence flared up in cities across the country, Iranian politicians conducted
> equally incendiary debates about “the Baha’i problem” in the Iranian Parliament or Majlis.
> On May 10, 1955, Siyyid Ahmad Safa’i, the Qazvin deputy, with the support of Burujirdi and
> Falsafi, introduced a bill in the Iranian Majlis that proposed a four-part solution to the
> problem:156
> 
> Article 1. The corrupt community of the Babis and their adherents, the Azalis and
> the Baha’is, are opposed to the security of the country and are declared illegal.
> 
> Article 2. Henceforth, membership in this community [i.e., Baha’i], and any
> pretense or adherence to it in any way, constitutes a misdemeanor, and the
> perpetrator will be sentenced to solitary confinement from 2 to 10 years and will be
> deprived of all civil rights.
> 
> Article 3. The properties [in the form of estate, land, or house] that are places of
> congregation and organizations related to this community, or revenue spent on
> issues related to this community, will be transferred to the Ministry of Culture to be
> used for the purpose of establishing educational organizations and spreading
> religious and godly principles.
> 
> 154 Ladjevardi, Khatirat Dr Mahdi Ha’iri-Yazdi, pp. 34–59. (BC)
> 155 This section, to “what really destroyed the Baha’i community was the Islamic Revolution,” is quoted, with
> 
> slight alterations, from A Faith Denied: The Persecution of the Baha’is of Iran.
> 156 Davani, Khatirat va Mubarizat Hujjatu’l-Islam Falsafi, p. 207.
> 
> Article 4. People adhering to this community, who are serving in government
> offices and related organizations, will from this day be fired from civil service and
> will in no way be subject to the employment law [i.e., cannot be hired].157
> 
> Safa’i’s bill failed to garner sufficient support to pass into law, due in part to the
> government’s anxieties over the potential international repercussions and concern about the
> legality of such measures.
> On May 17th, Minister of the Interior ‘Alam presented the Majlis with a draft decree the
> government proposed to circulate to provincial and city governors in accordance with the
> government’s decision to put down all anti-religious manifestations and demonstrations.
> Some deputies complained that the decree did not explicitly identify the Baha’is as agitators,
> making it difficult for the local authorities to know exactly where their duty lay, and they
> pressed ‘Alam to implement the policies suggested in Safa’i’s bill. ‘Alam responded that the
> government was prepared to act but only within the constraints of the law.
> The Parliament Deputy Dr. Shahkar proposed a compromise that he felt would obviate
> the government’s concern for legal proprieties. Dr. Shahkar suggested that ‘Alam’s decree be
> amended to include the following formulation:
> 
> The formation of sects which, under the guise of religion, spread disorder, and
> which have adopted the name of Baha’ism in order to implement political objectives
> is proscribed, inasmuch as their existence is illegal and the cause of the dissolution
> of order and security; and since they contradict the true religion of Islam.
> 
> Although this language was not retained in the final version of the decree, which simply
> restated the position of Twelver Shi’ism as the official state religion, this formula for
> dismissing the Baha’i community as a political movement rather than as a faith was one to
> which the Islamic Republic’s authorities would later return.
> The decree ultimately issued by Minister of the Interior ‘Alam empowered local
> authorities to “take measures to dissolve those social centers which are causing religious and
> secular sedition and are the source of attacks against security and order.” However, in a firm
> rebuff to the clergy and their supporters in the Parliament, ‘Alam’s decree also underlined
> that taking such measures was the sole responsibility of government officials and instructed
> 
> 157 For the text of the bill, see Davani, Khatirat va Mubarizat Hujjatu’l-Islam Falsafi, p. 207, citing Kayhan, no. 3575,
> 
> 20/2/1334 (May 11, 1955). Safa’i, who had introduced the bill at the request of Burujirdi, subsequently
> continued to urge the implementation of point no. 4, the purging of Baha’is from government positions. See
> also Bakhshnamiyih Vazir Kishvar Raji‘ Bih Firqiyyih Baha’i [Circular from the Minister of Interior about the Baha’i
> sect], published in Ittila‘at, no. 8677 on 26/2/1334 (May 17, 1955) warning that centers and societies that are
> anti-religion would be dissolved, but that attempts to disrupt order on the pretext of fighting the “straying
> sects” would not be tolerated either. Ayatu’llah Burujirdi was dismayed with the governmental authorities when
> this proposal met with opposition and delays. See Davani, Khatirat va Mubarizat Hujjatu’l-Islam Falsafi, p. 210,
> citing Davani, Zindiganiyih Za’im Buzurg ‘Alam Tasha’yu Ayatu’llah Burujirdi, p. 246: “After the fight against the
> Baha’is proved unsuccessful, Ayatu’llah Burujirdi’s relationship with the government, the Shah and his court
> became cold, and despair and distrust settled in [the Ayatu’llah’s] mind. The Shah and the government did not
> care for Ayatu’llah Burujirdi’s requests and with sarcastic and derogatory remarks, caused much worry and
> tribulation for him in the last years of his life.”
> 
> local governors “to take measures” against anyone provoking unrest “under the guise…of
> struggling against deceiving sects.”158
> Throughout the 1950s the clergy consistently spearheaded the repression of the Baha’i
> community. Their efforts, however, were ultimately checked by government ministers, who,
> although sympathetic to the popular anti-Baha’i sentiment, feared that anti-Baha’i violence
> would spin out of control and attract international criticism. Once clerical rule was
> established through the Islamic Revolution, the clergy was free to revisit without interference
> the objectives it had failed to attain in the 1950s. Most of Safa’i’s proposals were ultimately
> implemented by the new Islamic Republic, although they were now couched in the language
> suggested by Dr. Shahkar. As Falsafi observed in his memoirs:
> 
> Although the sermons of Ramadan 1334 [1955] dealt a blow against the Baha’is,
> what really destroyed the Baha’i community was the Islamic Revolution.159
> 
> The Hujjatiyyih
> To appease and placate the mullas, the Shah sacrificed an innocent religious minority, when
> in reality, every Iranian, young and old, knew that the Baha’is had no opposition to the
> parliamentary government and were not enemies of the state.
> After that, once more in order to indulge the mullas, SAVAK created the Hujjatiyyih
> Mahdaviyyah Charitable Society for combating Baha’is. [The Hujjatiyyih…was a
> fundamentalist Islamic organization.160 The organization’s name refers to Hujjat, a title of the
> Hidden Imam Mahdi, awaited by Shi‘i Muslims, as a sign of opposition to the Baha’is who
> believed the Bab was the Hidden Imam. Hujjatiyyih is said to be affiliated with and at times
> considered synonymous with the Anjuman Tablighat Islami [Islamic Propaganda Society].161
> The organization was founded by a clerical student named Shaykh Mahmud Zikrzadih
> Tavalla’i, also known as Halabi, who is reported to have been a close friend of Khomeini.162
> Sometimes termed the Anjuman Zidd Baha’iyat [anti-Baha’i society], the principal aim of the
> Hujjatiyyih was to combat the Baha’i faith, and it devoted much of its energies to training
> cadres in the “scientific defense” of Shi‘i Islam in the face of the Baha’i theological
> 
> 158 The final draft read: “In keeping with Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution, anti-religious publications and
> 
> the formation of societies and associations provoking religious and secular sedition and disorder are prohibited
> throughout the country. Therefore, in implementing the principles of the Constitution you shall take measures
> to dissolve those social centers which are causing religious and secular sedition and are the source of attack
> against security and order. Henceforth, you will take steps in all seriousness to implement this important duty
> with which you are entrusted in conformity with the Constitution and stop any kind of demonstrations or acts
> on the part of this type of groups, and which acts are prohibited by law. At the same time, since taking steps in
> these matters and implementing these laws is the task of government officials, and since the intervention of
> individuals or groups having no responsibility will cause disorder and insecurity, therefore, it is to be
> remembered that you are fully empowered to take measures against any person who provokes the people to act
> against the security of the country, under the guise and in the capacity of struggling against deceiving sects, or
> [any person] who himself commits acts which produce the smallest tremor against public order and security,
> according to those provisions of the criminal code which anticipate such crimes.”
> 159 Davani, Khatirat va Mubarizat Hujjatu’l-Islam Falsafi, pp. 209–10.
> 160 See Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran, p. 157; and Rubin, Into the Shadows:
> 
> Radical Vigilantes in Khatami’s Iran, p. 13.
> 161 Rubin, Into the Shadows: Radical Vigilantes in Khatami’s Iran, p. 14.
> 162 Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran, p. 157.
> 
> challenge.163 The organization attracted the support of such key religious leaders as
> Ayatu’llah Burujirdi, Hujjatu’l-Islam Falsafi, Ayatu’llah Mara’shi Najafi, Ayatu’llah Milani,
> Siyyid Abdu’llah Shirazi, and Ayatu’llah Baha’id-Din Mahallati.164 Other alleged members of
> the Hujjatiyyih who obtained powerful positions after the 1979 revolution were Supreme
> Leader Siyyid ‘Ali Khamenei, Foreign Minister ‘Ali-Akbar Vilayati, and the Minister of
> Education and President Mohammad-‘Ali Raja’i.]165
> This Society had many branches throughout Iran under SAVAK’s supervision,166 and
> was engaged in religious activities, in intelligence gathering and propaganda methods, thus
> causing uproar and unrest among religious minorities, particularly among the Baha’is.
> Although the Hujjatiyyih Society was undoubtedly founded with the Shah’s collaboration,
> gradually, and unanticipated by its founders, it became a recruiting ground for the “Islamic
> Coalition Societies” and the Mujahidin Khalq organization [an organization that came to
> oppose the Shah and led to his downfall].167
> 
> 163 Hojjatiyeh entry, Encyclopedia Iranica, p. 426, available at http://www.bahai.org/persecution/iran/iranica2.
> 164 See http://hojatieh.persianblog.com/1382_5_hojatieh_archive.html.
> 165 With slight alterations, this section is taken from A Faith Denied: The Persecution of the Baha’is of Iran.
> 166 After the Islamic Revolution, a number of SAVAK’s secret documents were discovered. Mujadih newspaper,
> 
> in its June 9, 1980 issue, printed a facsimile of a document related to the year 1350 [1971], which is illuminating:
> “Regarding Anjuman Tablighat Islami [Society for the Promotion of Islam]. The supervisor of Anjuman Islami
> in the central office [Tehran] has requested SAVAK to provide necessary aid in combating Baha’is scientifically
> and intellectually. In sharing this request of the Anjuman Islami with your contacts among known elements in
> the region, kindly emphasize that their activities should not cause provocation or interference. In simpler terms,
> while maintaining public order, Anjuman Tablighat Islami is permitted to use SAVAK’s assistance to combat
> the Baha’is.” The chief of SAVAK’s Third Department signed this document. Also, Subh Azadigan newspaper,
> in its Bahman 1360 [February 1982] issue, in an article under the title “A Glance at the Anjuman Hujjatiyyih,”
> described at length the deep relationship between SAVAK and Anjuman Hujjatiyyih. For a more detailed
> discussion of the relationship between SAVAK and Anjuman Hujjatiyyih, see Hizb Qa’idin Zaman [‘The Party of
> Founders of Time’] (a name for the Anjuman Hujjatiyyih)], by ‘Amadu’d-Din Baghi. (BC)
> 167 See Moin, Life of the Ayatollah; 1999, p. 66, asserting that the Shah “not only tolerated the activities of
> 
> [Hujjatiyyih founder] Sheikh Mahmud Halabi and his fellow anti-Baha’i clergymen, but allowed the clergy’s
> fight against the Baha’is to be aired from the government-controlled media. In an unprecedented move in 1955,
> Tehran Radio broadcast a series of anti-Baha’i sermons by Mohammad Taqi Falsafi, Iran’s leading preacher.”
> 
> About the Author
> 
> Dr. Bahram Choubine is a prominent Iranian sociologist and historian specializing in the
> social, political, and religious history of Iran and the Middle East in the 19th and 20th
> centuries. He has written numerous articles and books, and has also edited a number of
> books for publication in Persian and German, some of which have been translated into
> English and French.
> For several decades, Bahram Choubine has been actively promoting human rights and
> freedom of expression in Iran. He lives in Germany, where he is finalizing his much-
> anticipated study on the prophetic life of Muhammad. His published works in Persian
> include:
> 
> •   Tashai‘ va Siyasat dar Iran [Shi‘ism and politics in Iran], in 4 volumes;
> •   Andishih Istiqlal va Hakimiyat Milli dar Nihzat Mushrutiyat Iran [The concept of
> independence and nationalism in the constitutional revolution of Iran];
> •   23 Sal [23 years]; ‘Ali Dashti’s text in 700 annotated pages with a 200-page foreword
> by Bahram Choubine, discussing political and social developments in Iran in the 20th
> century; now in its 19th printing;
> •   Ru’ya-yi Sadiqih [True dream], by Siyyid Jamal Va‘iz Isfahani and others, introduced
> and annotated in Persian, German, and French; first-time publication of this work;
> •   Sih Maktub [Three epistles], by Mirza Aqa Khan Kirmani, introduced in 200 pages
> and set in its historical context; first-time publication of this work, presently in its 3rd
> printing;
> •   Maktubat [Correspondence] by Mirza Fath-‘Ali Akhundzadih, with a 300-page
> introduction about the life of the author and social and political movements of 19th-
> century Iran;
> •   Karivan Islam [The caravan of Islam] by Sadiq Hidayat, introduced and published for
> the first time;
> •   Kulthum Nanih, by Mulla Aqa Jamal Khansalari, introduced and annotated.
> 
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> — *Muhammad Musaddiq and the Baha'is (Used by permission of the curator)*