# Prolegomena to a Baha'i Theology

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> Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Jack McLean, Prolegomena to a Baha'i Theology, bahai-library.com.
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> 
> Published in the Journal of Bahá’í Studies Vol. 5, number 1 (1992)
> © Association for Bahá’í Studies 1992
> 
> Prolegomena to a Bahá’í Theology
> J. A. McLean
> 
> Abstract
> Theology is intrinsic to the Bahá’í revelation. While community attitudes have tended to view the discipline of theology
> somewhat suspiciously, the term and field of “Bahá’í theology” remain valid and are indispensable. One can distinguish
> source theology or revelation theology, contained in holy writ, from derivative theology (commentary), which is more
> relative and subjective. The relativity of religious truth, while it plays a useful role in deabsolutizing dogmatism and in
> promoting interreligious dialogue, is itself relative and currently runs the risk of becoming another absolute. Bahá’í
> theology is both apophatic (negative) and cataphatic (affirmative). An abstruse, apophatic negative theology of a hidden
> God is explicit as background to Bahá’í theology. Apophasis rejects defining God and honors God by remaining silent
> about the divine essence. If apophasis does speak of God, it does so by via negativa, by describing God through a process
> of elimination of what God is not, rather than making affirmations about what God is. The main substance of Bahá’í
> theology, however, is manifestation theology or theophanology, that is, a theology calculated upon an understanding of the
> metaphysical reality and teachings of the divine Manifestation. This manifestation theology is cataphatic. Cataphasis dares
> to speak about God but recognizes that God transcends the human analogies used to describe divinity. Bahá’í theology is,
> moreover, based in faith rooted in the person of Bahá’u’lláh and his divine revelation, has a strong metaphysical bias,
> eschews dogmatism, and welcomes diversity.
> 
> Résumé
> La théologie fait partie intégrante de la révélation bahá’íe. Si, dans la communauté bahá’íe, on a tendance à envisager la
> théologie avec méfiance, l’expression «théologie bahá’íe» et le domaine meme sont poutant bien valables et
> indispensables. On peut établir une distinction entre la théologie de la révélation qui porte sure les Écritures (source
> theology/revelation theology) et la théologie sous forme de commentaries, la théologie derive (derivative
> theology/commentary), qui est plus relative et subjective. Si la relativité de la verité religieuse est utile parce qu’elle
> permet de se distancier du dogmatisme et de favoriser le dialogue entre les religions, cette relativité est elle-même relative
> et elle court le risqué, à l’heure actuelle, de devenir un autre absolu. La théologie bahá’íe est à la fois apophatique et
> cataphatique. La théologie abstruse, apophatique et negative d’un Dieu cache existe en toile de fond à la théologie bahá’íe.
> La théologie apophatique rejette toute definition de Dieu et, par respect envers Lui, n’aborde pas la question de l’essence
> divine; si elle le fait, elle procède via negativa, en disant ce qu’ll n’est pas et non en affirmant ce qu’ll est. Par contre, la
> théologie bahá’íe est essentiellement une théologie de la manifestation ou théophanologie, c’est à dire une théologie qui
> repose sur la compréhension de la réalité métaphysique de la Manifestation divine et de Ses enseignements. Une telle
> théologie est cataphatique en ce sens qu’elle ose parler de Dieu Tout en reconnaisant qu’il transcende les analogies que
> l’homme utilise pour Le decrier. De plus, la théologie bahá’íe repose sur la foi en la personne de Bahá’u’lláh et en Sa
> révélation divine, elle possède une forte orientation métaphysique, rejette le dogmatisme et accueille la diversité.
> 
> Resumen
> La teología es intrinseca a la revelación bahá’í. A la vez que el modo de pensar del público demuestra tendencia de mirar
> con cierta sospecha la disciplina de la teología, la expresión y el campo de “La teología bahá’í” mantien su validez y son
> indispensables. Se puede distinguir la teología originaria, es decir teología reveladora contenida en la Sagrada Escritura, a
> la teología derivativa (comentario), que resulta más relative y subjeyiva. La relatividad de la verdad religiosa, no obstante
> de dempeñar un papel importante en apartar lo categórico en lo digmático y en la promoción de diálogos interreligiosos, es
> por sí misma relative, corriendo por lo tanto el riesgo de tornarse en un nuevo absolute. La teología bahá’í es tanto
> apofática (negativa) como catafática (afirmativa). Explícito como fondo a la teología bahá’í está la teología apofática,
> negativa y abstruse de un Dios oculto antes de su manifestacíon. La apofática rechaza definir a Dios y rinde homenaje a
> Dios, lo guardando silencio respecto a la esencia divina. Si la apofática se atreve a hablar de Dios, lo hace por la via
> negativa, calificando a Dios mediante proceso de eliminación de lo que no es, en vez de afirmaciones referentes a lo que
> es. La esencia principal de la teología bahá’í es la teología de manifestacíon o la teofanología, es decir, una teología
> calculada con base en la comprensión de la realidad metafísica y de las enseñanza de la Manifestación divina. Esta teología
> de manifestación es catafática. La catafática se atreve a hablar de Dios pero reconoce que Dios astá mas allá de las
> analogías humanas utilizadas para calificar la divinidad. Es más, la teología bahá’í está basada en una fe arraigada en la
> persona de Bahá’u’lláh y Su revelación divina, tiene fuerte orientación metafísica, se abstiene de dogmatismo, y abraza la
> diversidad.
> O thou who assumest the voice of knowledge! This Cause is too evident to be obscured, and too
> conspicuous to be concealed. It shineth as the sun in its meridian glory.
> —Bahá’u’lláh
> 
> N    inety years ago, Cambridge Orientalist E.G. Browne wrote that during his stay in Persia in 1887–88 among the
> “Behá’í Bábís,” their religion consisted mainly of listening to tablets (alwáh) (Browne, Introduction to Phelps,
> Abbas Effendi xxv). Bábí-Bahá’í teachings were “varying and unfixed,” he noted, and contained little doctrine
> “touching on questions of Metaphysics, Ontology, or Eschatology” (Browne, Introduction to Phelps, Abbas Effendi
> xxv-xxvi).1 While the subsequent decades witnessed a proliferation in the translation of Bahá’í sacred scripture
> which have dealt precisely with many of Browne’s concerns, only recently have we begun to witness the emergence
> of Bahá’í theology per se. The last two decades of the twentieth century particularly have witnessed a gradual but
> significant increase in scholarly writings treating diverse themes in Bahá’í theology and metaphysics. Bahá’í
> theologian Udo Schaefer finds, nonetheless, that compared with Islam, which by its mid-second century had already
> founded its four schools of law,2 Bahá’í research has thus far focused mainly on history and has produced, with
> some notable exceptions, little “on the metaphysical and theological aspects of Bahá’u’lláh’s Revelation,” which
> Schaefer maintains are “at the core of a religion” (“Challenges” 26).3 Whatever speculation may exist about the
> causes for the lag in the development of Bahá’í theology, a consciousness seems to have finally crystalized around
> the vital necessity to foster the growth of the scholarly exploration of the specifically religious teachings of the
> Bahá’í Faith.
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá exhorted the Bahá’ís to “the advancement of all branches of knowledge” which he said was
> “a fixed and vital principle . . .” (Bahá’í Education: A Compilation 39).4 This exhortation would naturally include
> sacred study. We still find, however, that basic Bahá’í teachings such as the nature of Bahá’í ethics, progressive
> revelation, the fundamental unity of the world religions, and the implications of the old and difficult question of “the
> one and the many,”5 which still persists in the Bahá’í Faith as “unity in diversity,” are just some of the teachings that
> have received little in-depth treatment in Bahá’í scholarship, a situation that promises to be temporary.6 One also
> looks forward to the development of a systematic theology (since Bahá’í theology consists thus far mainly of
> piecemeal themes) and to a “world theology,”7 as well as to more existential and holistic approaches to the field.
> This article takes a broad overview of the question of “Bahá’í theology,” and has two basic objectives: (1)
> to address the more preliminary question of the concept and validity of Bahá’í theology8 per se; and (2) to help clear
> the ground—a process already under way—for the more in-depth examination of a few selected themes.
> These two basic objectives will be met more specifically by defining Bahá’í theology through a discussion
> of terminology, the relativity of religious truth, manifestation and negative theology, and elements of Bahá’í
> cosmology. These questions lie at diverse points on the theological spectrum and, other than Bahá’í theology itself,
> are not tied together by any one extended theme. It should be understood that any ideas about Bahá’í theology are
> put forward here as tentative theories only and are obviously not meant to be binding on anyone, including the
> author.
> 
> Defining Bahá’í Theology
> There are possibly two great dangers of any theology. Bahá’í derivative theology (commentary) would be no
> exception. One is the risk of idolatry, meant here in the Judaic sense of absolutizing or worshipping anything but
> God. The intellectual pursuit of theology, whose object is the understanding of the divine milieu,9 always runs the
> risk of becoming a substitute for the truth, revelation, and the spiritual life, which are all its prime purpose.
> Following the idolatry leitmotif, Paula A. Drewek cautions against the danger of idolatry when discussing theology:
> 
> Any “God-talk” is prone to idolatry. In discussing forms of God, we had better be cognizant of potential
> dangers.... The images or forms of God cannot be confused with the truth they are intended to convey; the
> vehicle is not the essence. (“Divine Spirit and Form” 2)10
> 
> In other words, theology is not an end in itself. It should always focus on a clearer understanding of the
> teachings of the revelation, its concepts, and the existential human condition. The epitome of the absolutization of
> theology is historically exemplified by the rejection of the Manifestations of God by theologians. Here we have the
> supreme tragic irony and paradox of history. The divine Teacher who is the origin of all theology is rejected by the
> wayward pupils. The second danger is that theology become a tool of contention. Theology in Bahá’í perspective is
> open to accepting a congenial diversity of views on the divine milieu, of “letting a thousand flowers bloom.”11
> Theology in the past has been not only an instrument of sectarianism but also a powerful tool of repression and
> warfare. Christ’s condemnation of the Jewish parties of his time, “Ye blind guides which strain at a gnat, and
> swallow a camel” (Matt. 23:24) indicates how theologians can lose perspective and trivialize the pursuit of the truth,
> or tempt us to encompass and define doctrines that are beyond our intellectual capacity to define. The Universal
> House of Justice has alluded to the same difficulty:
> 
> In past dispensations many errors arose because the believers in God’s Revelation were overanxious to
> encompass the Divine Message within the framework of their limited understanding, to define doctrines
> where definition was beyond their power, to explain mysteries which only the wisdom and experience of a
> later age would make comprehensible, to argue that something was true because it appeared desirable and
> necessary. Such compromises with essential truth, such intellectual pride, we must scrupulously avoid.
> (Wellspring of Guidance 87–88)
> 
> Like an open window, theology must let in not only statements of truth but also the spirit of life. It must
> liberate and somehow contribute to the wholeness of human life. Further, theology must always be subordinate to
> revelation, whose purpose it is to elucidate. The great medievalist Etienne Gilson (1884–1978) was conscious of
> this danger of allowing theology to become a substitute for revelation. Referring to Karl Barth, the systematic
> theologian of church dogmatics whose purpose it was to purify liberal Protestant theology from all natural
> theology,12 Gilson wrote about the all-too-human tendency to ignore the divine Word and to idolize its interpreter:
> 
> We all know how energetically he [Barth] pursues this aim. God speaks, says K. Barth: man listens and
> repeats what God has said. Unfortunately, as is inevitable from the moment that a man sets himself up as
> His interpreter: God speaks, the Barthian listens and repeats what Barth has said. (“Intelligence in the
> Service” 223)
> 
> An understanding of Bahá’í theology depends, as in all philosophical questions, on working definitions.
> The word theology is used basically in two ways: narrow and broad. With some limited restrictions, these usages are
> quite compatible with the Bahá’í Faith. On the one hand, the narrow use of the term denotes Christianity and applies
> to dogmatic theology, a corpus of theological writings that have been worked out historically in church council,
> often through acrimonious theological disputes. Proponent of “world theology” Wilfred Cantwell Smith rejects,
> however, the notion that theology is a specifically Christian term and ascribes a much larger meaning to the word.13
> It is, however, incorrect to characterize all Christian theology as “dogmatic,” since that designation applies to only
> one branch of Christian theology, especially in the Church of Rome, a branch that concerns itself with orthodox
> pronouncements of doctrine.14 With the exception of fundamentalism, most modern and postmodern15 theologians
> write from nondogmatic perspectives. We are not currently living in the age of the great dogma, but rather, in a
> post-dogmatic age. Theology in the narrower sense is also written from a faith perspective, which accepts the
> authority of divine revelation—usually, but not necessarily, from a single source—that ordinarily views its own
> teachings as “normative,” that is, determinative of the truths of other faiths. Here Bahá’í source theology stands as a
> close parallel with its traditional biblical or quranic counterparts: the norm by which other truths are distinguished.
> The broad use of the word theology, on the other hand, refers to any religious consideration of God or the
> gods, humanity, the world, cosmology, salvation, eschatology, etc. Although one can even propose broader
> definitions of theology that exclude God or religion, such as nontheistic or so-called atheistic Buddhism16 or
> Marxism,l7 for pragmatic purposes, theological questions usually deal with the dimension of transcendence. There is
> some scholarly support, however, for the position that the interpretation of atheism and nihilism in Buddhism was a
> “later aberration” of the philosophers and was not part of authentic and original Buddhism (Panikkar, Silence 9), a
> position that would be congenial to the Bahá’í interpretation of Buddhism.18 Buddhists today would prefer
> “doctrine” to theology since they shy away from theos. Even doctrine would be too much for some in the face of the
> Buddha’s silence. The broad use of theology, moreover, also extends the meaning of the word to religious
> experience generally, as perceived in the psychology of religion or mysticism, and includes the comparative study
> of religions.19 It also places a premium on the perspective of religious pluralism and the historical study of religion.
> It is worth noting in passing that while in North America (1912), ‘Abdu’l-Bahá specifically endorsed the
> study of comparative religion as a means for combating prejudice and superstition and for fostering “fellowship”
> and “brotherhood,” and recommended the investigation of an underlying religious unity as a means of abolishing
> prejudice.20 The broad use of the word theology does not, however, recognize as normative any one religious
> tradition. Even though, from the time of F. Max Müller (1823–1900), one of “the founding fathers of comparative
> religion” (Sharpe, Comparative 252), historians of religion or comparative religionists were careful at first to
> distinguish their work from theology, which was looked upon as being dogmatic, apologetic, and orthodox-
> exclusive, more recently they have reverted to using the word theology, albeit in a broader sense of simply speaking
> the truth about God. This newer understanding of theology has given rise to such phrases and new enterprises as
> comparative theology,21 world theology,22 and interreligious dialogue.
> All theology, however, begins in some sense as a quest to understand God, or the gods, through a spiritual
> and rational interpretation of humanity and the universe. As such, theology is meant to assist in the discovery of the
> divine truths that have been deposited first in God’s written revelation and then in all of creation, the “two books” of
> which ‘Abdu’l-Bahá speaks.23 At the simplest and most nonthreatening level, theology can be looked upon simply
> as “God-talk,” an expression that is sometimes used instead of “theology.”24
> Theology, either narrow or broad, requires conscious reflection or critical analysis of questions about God
> and religion. If theology were not critical reflection on the faith experience, it would remain undifferentiated from
> “blind faith” or religious practice, that is, an accepted and unquestioned belief system. As “the science that treats of
> the divine” (The Penguin Dictionary of Religions 328), theology is a systematic reflection upon certain key
> questions of the faith-state or the given belief system. G. F. van Ackeren’s cogent definition states that theology is:
> “The methodological elaboration of the truths of divine revelation by reason enlightened by faith” (“Theology”), a
> definition that follows St. Anselm of Canterbury’s (1033–1109) teaching of “faith seeking understanding—I
> believe, so that I may understand” (fides quaerens intellectum—credo, ut intelligam), a statement that is congenial to
> Bahá’í theology.
> From both the broad and narrow uses of the word, we can conclude that the definition of theology would
> be compatible with the Bahá’í Faith, with two restrictions: First, the Bahá’í Faith eschews dogma. Second, while the
> Bahá’í Faith regards its teachings as normative, it does not view them as orthodox-exclusive.
> Bahá’í theology cannot be dogmatic in the normal sense of the word, that is, a final and duly perceived
> infallible doctrine imposed upon the believers by the institutions of religion. However, the function of dogma, in
> contradistinction to dogma itself, is preserved in the Bahá’í notion of “authority,” that is, the ipse dixit teachings of
> the Báb, Bahá’u’lláh, and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. These ipse dixit teachings are perceived objectively by the community of
> believers as being statements of truth, and as such carry binding authority, harking back to one of the original
> meanings of dogma, that is, a revealed doctrine.25 Likewise the inspired interpretations of Shoghi Effendi or the
> enactments or pronouncements of the Universal House of Justice, while they do not have the status of prophetic
> divine revelation, carry divine authority that is binding upon believers. The church, however, claimed for its dogmas
> not only divine authority but the status of divine revelation itself, as Harnack’s statement (see n. 25) indicates.
> Commentary by scholars, moreover, regardless of their status in the Bahá’í Faith, remains nonauthoritative and
> nonbinding. Commentary has strictly a pedagogical function in the Bahá’í Faith. Dogma is, moreover, arbitrary by
> nature and eschews any connection with or appeal to philosophy, while Bahá’í theology is in large part
> philosophical theology, or “divine philosophy” in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s phrase, and in many cases is philosophy as
> revelation, since specific philosophical concepts and constructs are taught in Bahá’í sacred scripture. For example, a
> fundamental philosophic concept that has been incorporated into Bahá’í theology is the Platonic idea of the
> impossibility of knowing the essence of any thing in itself, Kant’s Ding an sich. The possibility of knowing its
> attributes, however, is affirmed (Some Answered Questions 220). ‘Abdu’l-Bahá asserts, however, that the
> knowledge of God’s “true attributes” remains unknown. What we may suppose are God’s attributes are merely
> human projections that in no way resemble them. In his letter to Dr. Auguste Forel (God and the Universe) ‘Abdu’l-
> Bahá says, “It is not meant, however, that that Universal Reality or the attributes thereof have been comprehended.
> Neither its Essence nor its true attributes hath any one comprehended” (Bahá’í World Faith 346).
> Dogma, moreover, usually intends only one possible meaning to the teaching under discussion, whereas in
> Bahá’u’lláh’s hermeneutic, the divine word has multiple and hidden meanings.26 Further, Bahá’í theology is not
> viewed by its proponents to be the exclusive truth. The truths of other divine revelations are specifically affirmed,27
> while the many doctrinal accretions in the world faiths have to be evaluated individually in the light of
> Bahá’u’lláh’s divinely revealed teachings.
> Based on these considerations, one can offer two heuristic definitions of Bahá’í theology. The first points
> to revelation as the source of theology; the second points to theology as commentary on revelation. The narrow
> definition refers to the Bahá’í revelation itself, what I call here source theology or revelation theology, which is the
> substance of Bahá’í sacred scripture.28 Bahá’í source theology refers to the authoritative, objective, and normative
> truths of the Bahá’í sacred writings or those elucidated by its duly appointed interpreters. Authoritative means that
> the teaching is binding on believers; objective means that the truths of source theology are commonly perceived and
> recognized as true by the community of believers; normative means that the teaching is recognized by believers as
> the standard of truth. The broader definition refers to the commentary of scholars, called here derivative theology:
> Bahá’í derivative theology (commentary) is the subjective, relative, and nonbinding elucidation of Bahá’í teachings
> by competent scholars. Subjective here means that the commentary is particular to the viewpoint of the writer and
> becomes objective only where a common consensus exists as to its validity.
> Further, to observe the distinctions in Bahá’u’lláh’s writings made by Shoghi Effendi, we can say that all
> Bahá’í theology, whether source or derivative can be subdivided into three categories: the doctrinal, ethical, and
> mystical (God Passes By 140). The bulk of theological writing to date, however, falls almost entirely into the
> doctrinal category. Very little commentary exists on the ethical dimension (moral theology), which predominates,
> for example, in the religions of China and Japan, and particularly in Confucianism. Moreover, little has been written
> by Bahá’í scholars on mysticism.29 Theology is also concerned with the processes of history and with God’s
> revelation and final purpose (eschatology) within history.
> 
> The Relativity of Religious Truth: Relating to the Absolute30
> The notion of the relativity of religious truth is one of the fundamental questions in Bahá’í philosophical theology.31
> Shoghi Effendi names the teaching in conjunction with progressive revelation and describes it as “the fundamental
> principle which constitutes the bedrock of Bahá’í belief . . .” (The World Order 115). The Bahá’í teaching on
> relativity dates back to the prophetic insights in the nineteenth century of the founders of the Bahá’í Faith. The
> teaching is thus grounded in revelation rather than speculation, giving it the authority of scripture and ensuring it a
> lasting place in Bahá’í theology.
> Like any concept, relativity has its own history. In Western philosophy, relativity is usually traced to the
> first and most renowned humanistic Sophist, Protagoras (481–411 B.C.) with his well-known proposition, “Man is
> the measure of all things.”32 Protagoras’s view of relativity was based on his understanding of perception, which
> seemed to include both sense perception and opinion. In response to a critique by Plato, Protagoras cites the
> example of food that tastes bitter to the sick man but wholesome to the man who is well.33 Protagoras extended this
> subjective perception to his theory of truth. All opinions are true, he argued, because they are true for the one
> perceiving them. They have no universal validity. This concept led to both a radical subjectivism in epistemology
> and an ethical relativism that was criticized by Plato in the Theaetetus.34
> Although relativity is currently used as a tool to promote interfaith understanding by deabsolutizing the
> perception of one’s own truth, it was first perceived as a threat to official doctrine by the Roman Catholic Church
> because it ascribed temporal conditions and subjective limitations to Catholic dogma, which was held to be
> immutable. Relativity was condemned by Pope Pius X in his encyclical Lamentabili Sane or Lamentabili Sane Exitu
> (Syllabus Condemning the Errors of the Modernists) (1907) with its list of sixty-five modern errors, a syllabus that
> was modelled upon Pope Pius IX’s Syllabus Errorum (Syllabus of Errors) (1864).35 The leader of Catholic
> modernism, Alfred Loisy (1857–1949), priest, noted bible scholar, and lecturer at the Institut Catholique in Paris,
> was excommunicated in 1908 in part for relativizing dogmatic theology. Loisy had declared in L’Evangile et
> l’Église that dogmatic definitions are always relative, variable, and conditioned by historical circumstances. Loisy,
> however, had also extended his concept of relativity to Jesus and declared Jesus to be limited and fallible in his
> judgments. Loisy also opposed traditional teaching on the inspiration of scripture (Livingston, Modern Christian
> Thought 280–83, 291, 452). The American theologian H. Richard Niebuhr (1894–1962) also treated relativity in
> The Meaning of Revelation (7–38), although he distinguished it from a radical subjectivism and skepticism.36
> Although the concept of the relativity of religious truth is not new to the Bahá’í Faith, its use is somewhat
> novel. The context of Shoghi Effendi’s statement correlates relativity with progressive revelation. Niebuhr and
> Nathan Söderblom (1866–1931), Nobel laureate for peace (1930), comparative religionist and primate of the
> Church of Sweden, also had their own concepts of “progressive revelation” and “continued revelation”
> respectively.37
> Shoghi Effendi’s joining of the relativity of religious truth with progressive revelation yields, however, a
> first-level meaning of relativity. The Bahá’í view of dispensational progressive revelation is that religious truth is
> relative both to our point in historical evolution and to the state of our current understanding. According to this
> view, the Bahá’í Faith is not the final prophetic revelation. Revelation is unending, Bahá’í scripture affirms. There
> will, therefore, be other revelations. In that sense, the Bahá’í view of religious truth is not absolute, for truth unfolds
> progressively and will continue to do so “to the end that hath no end…” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 68).38 This view
> can be contrasted with the more absolute and fundamentalist views of the finality of revelation in Christocentric
> Christianity, Judaism, or Islam.
> There are, however, other implications for religious relativity. The current discussion among practitioners
> of interreligious dialogue and “world theology” favors a bias toward the relativity pole of the discussion, what
> Langdon Gilkey has called “the flood of relativity” (“Plurality” 50). The polar opposite of relativity, the absolute,
> has largely been avoided because of its negative associations with dogmatism and orthodox exclusivism. One of the
> benefits of the relativity of religious truth is that it has allowed us to recognize revelation, truth, salvation, and grace
> in traditions other than our own. This has been just one inheritance from liberal Protestant theology, an inheritance
> that has emancipated Christian theology from doctrinal exclusivism and has driven Christian theologians and
> comparative religionists to lead the way in fostering interreligious dialogue and in making the first tentative theories
> in “world theology.”
> However, certain cautions need to be cited in connection with relativity. David J. Krieger and Raimundo
> Panikkar, for example, warn against letting relativity slip into a radical relativism that rejects any criteria of truth as
> being universally valid to adjudicate among the various theological conceptual systems.39 The teaching has therefore
> been rightly scrutinized lest it abolish the domain of the absolute, which has not only a long philosophical history
> but also definite implications for grounding one’s personal religious convictions and for the impact of such
> convictions on the dynamics of interreligious dialogue. Relativity has also led to an impasse surrounding the
> resolution of apparent doctrinal differences and contradictions. The theories of some perennial philosophy such as
> Huston Smith’s “primordial tradition,” or Frithjof Schuon’s “esoteric” mystical heart of all religions as
> distinguished from the “exoteric” accidentals seem to be the more promising proposals as a way out the dilemma.40
> Relativity, moreover, should not fall into the trap of absolutizing relativity, which would be tantamount to
> an ironic defeat of its own purpose. Relativity itself is also relative and invites the imposition of some limits on the
> concept. To use a literally “down-to-earth” biological analogy, relativity and the absolute have to live in symbiosis,
> much like the algae and fungi in the lichen. As Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) pointed out in First Principles, one
> pole of the relativity-absolutism discussion can only be meaningful in the light of the other. If relativity is pursued
> exclusively, without defining its relation to the absolute, it takes on the function of an absolute itself and results in
> contradiction:
> 
> From the necessity of thinking in relation, it follows that the Relative is itself inconceivable, except as
> related to a real non-relative. Unless a real Non-relative or Absolute be postulated, the Relative itself
> becomes absolute, and so brings the argument to a contradiction. (Spencer, quoted in Reck, Speculative
> Philosophy 195)
> 
> Leonard Swidler, a Catholic ecumenical theologian, summarizes four cogent arguments for the relativity of
> religious truth, an approach he labels as “deabsolutizing truth.” Swidler discusses in turn: (1) The historicization of
> truth. Statements are products of their historical Sitz im Leben and can only be understood by examining the Sitz.
> Statement A will not have the same meaning in one historical context (Sitz 1) as it will in a later one (Sitz 2). It will
> require at least a qualifying or different statement (Statement B). (2) The sociology of knowledge. This refers to a
> sociological theory of knowledge. All statements are relative not only to a point in time but also to the standpoint of
> the speaker and are determined by that perspective whether cultural, social, religious, etc. The speaker’s worldview
> determines the truth of the statement. In Karl Mannheim’s phrase, it is standortgebunden (standpoint bound). (3)
> The limits of language. Following Wittgenstein, any statement is per force cast in the limited perspective of the
> speaker, whether categories, style, method, etc. (4) Subjective hermeneutics. Following Hans Georg Gadamer and
> Paul Ricoeur, one cannot make claim to the “true” interpretation of a text since the subject is part of the object, the
> observer forms part of the observed. All views of truth deabsolutize truth for they are interpretive and relational
> (Swidler, “Interreligious and Interideological Dialogue,” esp. 7–13). We could reduce these statements to a simpler
> one: Statements of truth are relative to our ability to understand and express them, relative to the age in which they
> appear, and relative to the speaker’s viewpoint.
> Religious relativity acts then as a bulwark against the one-way interpretation of dogmatism; implies that
> religious truth although fundamentally one, is progressive, dynamic, infinite, and ever-changing; and allows us to
> accept various interpretations of metaphysical and theological questions, which would on the surface appear to be
> incompatible. It is thus an ally of a more inclusive view of reality, one that allows for a diversity of approaches. The
> relativity of religious truth also has strong implications for reestablishing some measure of unity between science
> and religion or philosophy—one of the most meaningful and potentially fruitful questions in our time.
> 
> The Function of the Absolute
> The domain of the relative invokes that of the absolute. Like so many other bipolar issues, such as the universal and
> the particular, fact and value, spirit and matter, logic and intuition, revelation and reason, the domains of the relative
> and the absolute engage us in a dialectic that invites consideration of both poles of the discussion.
> At the outset, there is something chilling in the notion of the Absolute. As a philosophical concept of God,
> it would appear not to coexist well with the view of God as a Being who enters into a personal spiritual relationship
> with the believer, although serious attempts have been made to combine belief in a personal God with the
> Absolute.41 The Absolute also has connotations of an arbitrariness of will, of unlimited self-determination and
> power. According to Karl Popper, the Absolute was applied in Hegel’s political theory to justify absolute power in
> the rising German nation through a philosophy of State that led to the devastating effects of nationalism and
> totalitarianism.42 In religious praxis, absolutism has led to narrow dogmatism and orthodox exclusivism, which, in
> the sacred academy at least, have gradually given way in the post-World War II years to a growing relativism that
> recognizes the validity of the convictions of the faith of others.
> There are, however, aspects to the notion of the absolute that make it essential to the functioning of our
> religious beliefs and, when balanced with an appreciation of the deabsolutizing and limiting aspects of relativity,
> make it a congenial ally for both the praxis of interreligious dialogue and the self-recognition of the limited but
> ever-expanding nature of our cognitive beliefs.
> The absolute functions as an existential center for our religious convictions. It is in this center or on this
> ground that we stand when we interpret the world in spiritual terms. If we did not stand on the hard ground of some
> central beliefs, we should be subject to the drifts of shifting sands created by the passing of every wind. Gilkey
> makes the point that our worldview and religious convictions function as absolutes, as “some fixed or absolute
> center” in our interpretation of reality:
> 
> We need a ground for the apprehension and understanding of reality—a ground that undergirds our
> choices, our critiques of the status quo, our policies. We need a ground for the values and eros that fuel and
> drive toward justice, and for the confidence and hope necessary for consistent action. We need criteria for
> the judgments essential both for reflective construction and for liberative doing; and we need priorities in
> value if we would creatively and actively move into the future. (“Plurality” 46)
> 
> While Gilkey’s statement does not constitute an attempt at a philosophical reconciliation of the absolute
> and the relative, it nonetheless provides a strong dose of realism as to the actual functioning of the absolute nature
> of our spiritual values in the perspective of faith in action or praxis.
> Speaking as a Christian engaged in interreligious dialogue, Gilkey states that he has chosen to remain
> within the Christian tradition, since one “cannot escape all particularity” (“Plurality” 49). For the Bahá’í, and indeed
> for the member of any faith, Gilkey’s words ring true, for they alert us to the existential center, to the point of
> departure. By opting for a spiritual center, we avoid the “slippery slope” of so-called value neutrality, of being
> nowhere by standing everywhere. Interreligious dialogue begins, then, from the center of our particular faith and
> sets out in an adventure to discover new and creative understandings of our own and the other’s particular spiritual
> truth, in the hope of creating new universals, in Plato’s sense of discovering some fundamental essence to all of the
> particulars. Our religious convictions are, then, functional absolutes. They orient us in life, without imposing a
> claim to immutability or finality in terms of our understanding of them. Without these functional absolutes,
> moreover, we would lack a sense of commitment so necessary for moving the study of religion out of the purely
> speculative, academic, and theoretical realms and putting it more firmly into the camp of praxis, dialogue, and social
> action.
> It would be too hasty to conclude, therefore, that religious relativity has done away with the Absolute
> (absolute), either in its concept of God, or in the perception of “normative” or irreducible truths in Bahá’í scripture,
> or in the absolute nature of the claim to observe ethical conduct. Bahá’u’lláh’s claim to be the prophetic figure for
> the present age carries with it an extraordinary apocalyptic certitude, and while affirming a fundamental oneness in
> the revealed religions and recognizing the colossal achievements of these religious systems, Bahá’u’lláh also
> maintains that the Bahá’í Revelation is in our age the standard for determining other truths.43 In this sense, Bahá’ís
> view Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings as the ultimate standard for truth in our dispensation, the metaphysical point beyond
> which we cannot currently advance, a kind of speed of light or point of “absolute zero” of spiritual truth. The Bahá’í
> belief in Bahá’u’lláh as the ultimate standard of truth does not betray, however, any narrow dogmatism or
> fundamentalism. Arnold Toynbee, just one of several to make a similar observation, perceived an exemplary spirit
> of tolerance in the Bahá’í Faith: “Of all the Judaic religions, Bahaism is the most tolerant. In its catholicity, it comes
> near to Mahayanian Buddhism or to Hinduism” (Christianity among the Religions 104).
> Interreligious Dialogue: A Means of Resolving the Tension between the Relative and the Absolute
> If practitioners of world theology and interreligious dialogue have concentrated on the relativity side of the
> relativity–absolutism equation, it is not merely for reasons of deabsolutizing dogma. Andrew J. Reck asserts that
> “few categories in the history of philosophy have been intractable to conceptual specification as the category of the
> Absolute” (Speculative 167). Reconciling relativity to the absolute remains a challenging problématique, or so it
> would seem. Ernst Grunwald rejected Karl Mannheim’s notion of “relationism” in the sociology of knowledge
> (Wissenssoziologie) as a proposed middle ground between relativism and the absolute, by stating flatly: “Relativism
> and absolutism are contradictory opposites with no more ‘middle ground’ between them than exists between true
> and false, yes and no” (“Sociology of Knowledge” 240). Further, if God, as in Hegelian philosophy, is merely the
> Absolute or the Absolute Idea, the perfect resolution of all the contradictions of dialectic in some higher Metaidea,
> what remains of the personal God? If God is merely an Idea, albeit the perfect idea, God remains primarily an object
> of pure thought alone and is reduced to philosophical abstraction.44 How can this Absolute Idea be reconciled to the
> concept of God as a Self, who is perceived as a Person and who relates to other persons or selves in an intimate
> spiritual relationship of love? An attempt to reconcile these concepts has been made by the American idealist
> philosopher Josiah Royce (1855–1916) who maintained a belief in a personal God while postulating God as the
> Absolute, the Universal of universals, an attempt that historian of philosophy Frederick Copleston regards as only
> partially successful.45
> Langdon Gilkey sees in the relative-absolute equation a frustrating paradox that is difficult to resolve, at
> least theoretically: “The interplay of absolute and relative of being a Christian, Jew, or Buddhist, and affirming that
> stance, and yet at the same time relativizing this mode of existence—both stuns and silences the mind, at least mine”
> (“Plurality” 47). Although the relativity–absolute paradox appears to be obdurate, Gilkey goes on to propose a
> resolution of it, but not one that lies in the realm of speculation. Rather, this resolution lies in the realm of religious
> experience and action, that of religious dialogue.
> Following the pragmatics of John Dewey that what may seem to ratiocination [the process of reason] a
> “hopeless contradiction” may become “successfully resolved” through “intelligent practice” (“Plurality” 46), Gilkey
> views dialogue as the framework for relativity as a de facto imperative, while the participants remain nonetheless in
> the domain of the absolute. On the psychological level, our religious convictions function as absolutes; otherwise
> we would not be Christian, Bahá’í, Buddhist, or some other. We would be that other. Once we enter into dialogue,
> however, we must abandon our absolutes; otherwise, there would be no dialogue, only a monologue whose covert
> agenda would be conversion. Praxis requires, therefore, that we relativize our absolute convictions. In interreligious
> dialogue, we become only one faith among others, as we stand face to face with the other(s). As we interact in
> dialogue, we feel limited. Our absolute convictions (e.g., Bahá’u’lláh is the promised Manifestation of God) become
> relativized by the presence of the other(s), with their equally weighty claims on truth. In dialogue, Gilkey sees an
> on-going dynamic tension between the relative and the absolute, “a dialectic or paradox combining and
> interweaving …a relative absoluteness” (“Plurality” 47):
> 
> What to reflection is a contradiction, to praxis is a workable dialectic, a momentary but creative paradox.
> Absolute and relative, unified vision and plurality, a centered principle of interpretation and mere
> difference, represent polarities apparently embodiable in crucial practice despite the fact that they seem
> numbing in reflective theory. (“Plurality” 47)
> 
> Gilkey is calling for a new type of experimental scholarship, one that would take the scholar out of the
> refuge of his study into a praxis of colloquia with other scholars. Following this approach, the solitary individual
> must engage in a kind of cooperative learning, a creative participatory approach that bases its method in dialogue:
> “Thus reflection must not, because it cannot, precede praxis; on the contrary, it must be begun on the basis of
> praxis” (“Plurality” 47). By pursuing such a method, we discover that the One is revealed in the many, the Absolute
> appears within the relative, new and creative understandings of the oneness of spiritual truth are discovered.
> Gilkey’s pragmatic approach does not preclude, however, a successful theoretical resolution of the relative and the
> absolute.
> 
> In Search of a Common Terminology: Science of Divinity, Divine Philosophy, and Bahá’í Theology
> While Bahá’ís refer to their sacred scriptures as the Bahá’í Revelation or the Bahá’í Writings, there is no common
> terminology to describe derivative theology. It would seem appropriate for Bahá’í scholars to share a common
> terminology when referring to commentary. The search for correct terminology in the Bahá’í Faith is analogous to
> the search by scholars in the history of religions to find the correct terminology to describe their discipline:
> Religionswissenschaft [science of religion], history of religions, comparative religion, religiology, and the science of
> religion have all been proposed, with “history of religions” and “Religionswissenschaft” dominating the field.46
> Comparative religion is, strictly speaking, one of the subdisciplines of the history of religions on which it is based,
> although comparative religion is commonly used in Anglo-Saxon countries to refer to the study of the world’s
> religions.
> It is worth having a clearer understanding of the usage of the following terms, not only for examining their
> usage in the Bahá’í Faith but more especially to anticipate how these terms would be understood in interfaith
> dialogue in which Bahá’í scholars would, one hopes, participate. A summary treatment is given below.
> 
> The Science of Divinity (Divinity)
> Both “the science of divinity” and “divine philosophy” have close associations with revelation. “Science of
> divinity” is a term taken directly from ‘Abdu’l-Bahá (Promulgation 326). Although the phrase is associated with
> both Shiite gnosis and Christian theology, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá associates divinity with divine philosophy: “… it [divinity]
> essentially means the wisdom and knowledge of God, the effulgence of the Sun of Truth, the revelation of reality
> and divine philosophy” (Promulgation 326). Defining it in the negative, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá dissociates divinity from its
> meaning in Christian dogmatic theology, thus giving the old word a new meaning:
> 
> Divinity is not what is set forth in dogmas and sermons of the church. Ordinarily when the word Divinity is
> mentioned, it is associated in the minds of the hearers with certain formulas and doctrines.... (Promulgation
> 326)
> 
> He explains that
> 
> Divinity is the effulgence of the Sun of Reality, the manifestation of spiritual virtues and ideal powers. The
> intellectual proofs of Divinity are based upon observation and evidence which constitute decisive
> argument, logically proving the reality of Divinity, the effulgence of mercy, the certainty of inspiration and
> immortality of the spirit. This is, in reality, the science of Divinity. (Promulgation 326)
> 
> This passage establishes a rationalist basis for the science of divinity. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá speaks of “intellectual proofs,”
> “observation and evidence,” and “decisive argument.” These are all phrases that derive from dialectics. The passage
> mentions proofs for the existence of God, as well as the immortality of the soul and divine inspiration, subjects
> treated in medieval scholastic theology, which was also essentialist and rationalist in orientation.
> 
> Divine Philosophy
> Another of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s expressions is “divine philosophy,” which might be taken to mean divinely revealed
> philosophy or revelation. He states, for example, “According to divine philosophy, there are two important and
> universal conditions in the world of material phenomena; one which concerns life, the other concerning death…”
> (Reality of Man 28).
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s divine philosophy is used in contradistinction to natural philosophy and is reminiscent of
> the ancient Aristotelian distinction between “physics” (natural philosophy/science) and “metaphysics,” or the
> seventeenth- and eighteenth-century distinction between “natural philosophy” (today biology and physics) and
> “moral philosophy,” a distinction that arose because of the growing prestige of the conclusions of Galileo and the
> emergence of Newtonian physics:
> 
> Philosophy is of two kinds: natural and divine. Natural philosophy seeks knowledge of physical
> verities and explains material phenomena, whereas divine philosophy deals with ideal verities and
> phenomena of the spirit. (Promulgation 326)
> 
> Although ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s philosophy takes Muslim Neoplatonism as its starting point, his mention of “ideal
> verities” and “phenomena of spirit” is strongly suggestive of the Western philosophy of idealist metaphysics, a
> philosophy that also traces its origins to Plato and which endured in various forms until the first quarter of the
> twentieth century.47 Idealism may have some relevance in the establishment of some philosophical unity between
> religion and science.48
> Bahá’í Theology
> Although the phrase ‘‘Bahá’í theology” is not used in Bahá’í sacred scripture, the term remains nonetheless valid. In
> a communication to the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of Germany, the Universal House of Justice
> endorsed a qualified use of the term “Bahá’í theology” when they state:
> 
> If one understands “theology” to mean “the study of religion” or “the study of the nature of God,” one can
> certainly use the term “Bahá’í theology.” In the context in which…uses it in the passage you quote, the
> House of Justice presumes that he means that the Bahá’í teachings about the nature of God and His
> relationship to His creation are related to those of Islam, which is correct. (February 8, 1981)49
> 
> The House of Justice, however, in another communication has left the term’s usage a matter for Bahá’í scholars:
> 
> The House of Justice feels that the question of whether or not to use the term “Bahá’í Theology” is best left
> to the discretion of yourself and other Bahá’í scholars, who would make such a decision in the light of their
> understanding of the meaning of this term and the connotations of such usage. (Letter to an individual, 28
> May 1991)
> 
> The House of Justice also adds the proviso that no controversy should arise about the matter and foresees the
> possibility of a variety of views on the subject:
> 
> It trusts that this matter will not become a source of contention between Bahá’í scholars and within the
> Bahá’í community, and sees no difficulties with Bahá’í scholars coming to different conclusions about the
> appropriateness of this usage provided they do not attempt to compel others to accept their views. (Letter to
> an individual, 28 May 1991)
> 
> The guidelines on the usage of the term “Bahá’í theology” by the Universal House of Justice could well serve as a
> keynote of Bahá’í scholarship, theological or otherwise: Scholarship should be noncontentious and diverse.
> The adjectival form of the word, theological, occurs in various English-language renderings of Bahá’í
> scripture or its authoritative interpretation. Shoghi Effendi, for example, uses the term in his interpretive English
> translation of Bahá’u’lláh’s Kitáb-i-Íqán. Reference is made to Muslim divines who “are still doubtful of, and
> dispute about, the theological obscurities of their faith, yet claim to be the exponents of the subtleties of the law of
> God…” (83, emphasis added).50 In a talk on reincarnation, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá speaks of the station of humanity as being
> at the end of the “arc of descent” (materiality) and at the beginning of the “arc of ascent” (spirituality) as “an
> established and deep theological proposition” (musallam-i-mudaqqiqín-i-masá’il-i-iláhí) (Questions 285–86).
> Shoghi Effendi uses the word theological in connection with the importance of the study of the Kitáb-i-Íqán: “The
> Íqán deepens the knowledge of the reader by acquainting him with some of the theological problems of the Faith”
> (letter to an individual, 10/1/33, Bahá’í International Archives).51
> The term “Bahá’í theology,” once viewed with great hesitation, has become increasingly common with
> Bahá’í scholars, particularly with those writing on specifically religious questions. Udo Schaefer referred to
> Theologie in the Bahá’í Faith in his 1957 doctoral dissertation (Heidelberg) Die Grundlagen der
> Verwaltungsordnung der Bahá’í (The Legal Basis of the Bahá’í Administrative Order).52 Schaefer’s recent book
> Heilsgeschichte und Paradigmenwechsel: Zwei Beiträge zur Bahá’í Theologie (Salvation History and Paradigm
> Shift: Two Contributions to Bahá’í Theology, not yet published in English), deals specifically with Bahá’í theology,
> as the title suggests.53 Claudia Gollmer’s master’s thesis is entitled Die metaphysischen und theologischen
> Grundlagen der Erziehungslehre der Bahá’í–Religion (The Metaphysical and Theological Foundations of
> Education in the Bahá’í Religion). Juan R. I. Cole, likewise, made use of the term “Bahá’u’lláh’s theology” in “The
> Christian–Muslim Encounter and the Bahá’í Faith.” His later “The Concept of Manifestation in the Bahá’í
> Writings” uses “Bahá’í theology” and “Bahá’u’lláh’s theology” (3, 23). Cole’s use of the term “Bahá’í theology”
> points to the narrow use of the word, that is, to source theology (revelation). Cole uses the phrase in his discussion
> of the relationship between the divine essence and its attributes, citing Bahá’u’lláh’s “Tablet of the City of Divine
> Unity” (Lawh-i-Madínati’t-Tawhíd) in which, Cole states: “One must understand the nature of these attributes in
> Bahá’í theology in order to grasp the concept of the manifestation of God. Bahá’u’lláh affirms that God’s essential
> attributes are simply different names for his essence” (“The concept of Manifestation” 3). In other words, God is
> one in essence and attributes. Cole also speaks of the cosmological infusion of spiritual energies released with the
> martyrdom of a prophet as one aspect of “Bahá’u’lláh’s theology” (“The Christian–Muslim Encounter” 22). Cole’s
> usage of the term, at least on the basis of these few examples, applies to the writings of Bahá’u’lláh rather than
> commentary. Moojan Momen also recognizes that “there are ample passages in the Bahá’í scriptures that could
> serve as the basis of theology and metaphysics” (“Relativism” 185). Michael Sours deals directly with a theological
> issue in “Seeing with the Eye of God.” Likewise, social scientist Will. C. van den Hoonaard speaks of “Bahá’í
> theologians and historians” (“Dilemmas and Prospects” 24). Nader Saiedi also speaks of “Bahá’í theology” in “A
> Dialogue with Marxism.” These examples are not exhaustive.
> A reluctance to use the word theology is not new to the Bahá’í Faith. Surprisingly, the word was at first
> avoided in Christianity, the faith that is most closely associated with it. Within Christianity, the term theology was
> used very infrequently in the beginning and even avoided for several centuries because of the connotations of the
> word in Greek philosophy. Theologia for Plato and Aristotle was used polemically against the poets and their
> mythologies and theogonies. Plato and Aristotle contrasted these with philosophy, which sought explanations of
> things in themselves (Congar, “Christian Theology” 455). Plato was, moreover, a monotheist, and the poets were
> polytheists. The poets were seen as rivals to the philosophers, since it was widely held that Homer and the
> tragedians were the masters of technical knowledge as well as being sound guides of the moral and religious life
> (Republic 322, editor’s note). Plato, however, denied the poet’s ability to lead to the knowledge of the essence of
> things and viewed dramatic art as a bane to human psychology, and poetry far removed from true knowledge
> (Republic 328–40). He, therefore, excluded the poets from The Republic.
> The great Origen (d. 254) was the first to use “theologia” to apply to the knowledge of the God in whom
> Christians believed, since the word gnosis (Gk. knowledge) had acquired heretical connotations (s.v., “theology,”
> Encyclopedia of Religion). Peter Abelard (d. 1142) used the word theologia as the title of one of his works, and by
> the time of St. Thomas Aquinas, the angelic doctor (A.D. 1225–1274) the word began to gain acceptance, although
> Aquinas himself preferred the term sacra doctrina (Congar, “Christian Theology” 456). Likewise, the phrase
> “Bahá’í theology” has been avoided within the Bahá’í community because of its negative associations of intellectual
> elitism, religious warfare, and odium theologicum, the antipathy caused by theological quarrelling.
> There are at least three reasons, however, for looking at the phrase “Bahá’í theology” favorably: (1) It is
> the correct term to describe the nature of the thing itself, since Bahá’í teaching begins from a faith perspective and
> has a strong rational, metaphysical, and theological bias. (2) It is the correct term to use when the Bahá’í teachings
> are being cited as normative and authoritative, or not; that is, it may be used by either Bahá’ís or non-Bahá’ís for
> questions relating to the doctrines of the Bahá’í Faith. Catholic scholar Christian Cannuyer, for exampIe, refers to
> the “Bahá’í theology” (théologie bahá’íe) of Shoghi Effendi in his favorable review of Peter Smith’s
> groundbreaking historical-sociological study The Bábí and Bahá’í Religions: From Messianic Shi’ism to a World
> Religion. (3) It is the term that would be most easily understood by non-Bahá’í scholars either in a discussion of
> Bahá’í teachings or in interfaith dialogue, where such terms as “world theology” and “pluralistic theology” have
> become part of the current language.
> As systematic theologies of the Bahá’í Faith begin to be written or as Bahá’í theologies of the world
> religions are developed, phrases like “divine philosophy” or “science of divinity,” while perfectly congenial and
> appropriate for intracommunity dialogue and usage, might seem odd to scholars in religious studies in other
> traditions, since “science of divinity” might suggest an exclusively Christian focus and “divine philosophy”—a very
> lofty term—might also be taken to mean a philosophy of God exclusively. Whereas, Bahá’í theology is a more
> inclusive term, one that includes concepts that have an impact not just on sacred concerns but on secular ones as
> well, in such areas as education and moral development, ecological concerns, economics, women’s issues, the
> treatment of minorities, Third World development, and international law. Philosophy is also usually understood to
> be a secular term and to take reason as its ground rather than God and revelation. It would seem better, therefore, in
> the interests of both logic and accepted usage, to use the phrase “Bahá’í theology,” since it is closer to current
> terminology, rather than to have to use a new terminology that is out of synchronization with the current one. This
> has become all the more true now that comparative religionists are returning to the word theology to describe their
> own discipline.
> 
> The Hidden and Revealed God: Negative54 and Manifestation Theology
> In making affirmations about God, Bahá’í theology employs a manifestation theology, that is, a theology of the
> metaphysical reality of the prophet or divine manifestation and his teachings rather than a theology of God.
> Bahá’u’lláh, however, makes some abstruse but explicit references to God in the occult or unmanifest state; to that
> silence which precedes God’s Word, to that divine darkness from which the holy light radiates forth. In the
> mystical, partially cosmological tablet, Lawh-i-kullu’t-ta’ám (The Tablet of All Food),55 which delineates the
> metaphysical realms of paradise, Bahá’u’lláh points to the unmanifest God as God-Háhút, the One who dwells
> alone in the realm of “HE.” Of this realm of the paradise of the divine oneness, Bahá’u’lláh says: “None is capable
> of expounding even a letter of that verse in that Paradise” (Lambden, “A Tablet” 31). We do not, and are asked not
> to, speculate on the nature of this God, for all efforts must end in futility. “The way is barred and to seek it is
> impiety…” (Bahá’u’lláh, Seven Valleys 23).
> Bahá’u’lláh’s negative theology of Háhút is very much in the apophatic tradition. Apophasis (var.
> apophaticism) maintains the strictest silence about making any statements concerning the essence of divinity, which
> it views as being completely unknowable, and confines itself to defining God in the negative: whatever is affirmed
> of God, whether goodness, love, mercy, justice, perfection, etc., in no way describes God. By using such
> designations, it is simply affirmed that God is not lacking these qualities (negative theology/via negativa): “We
> affirm these names and attributes, not to prove the perfections of God, but to deny that He is capable of
> imperfections” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions 148). In affirming this negative theology, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
> is following a long well-established theological tradition.56 In Buddhism, we find the extreme limit of apophasis
> would be the Buddha’s silence about God, which several scholars have interpreted as agnosticism or atheism but
> which comparative religionist Raimundo Panikkar takes as a sublime sign of the Buddha’s reverence for the
> mysterious and the ineffable.57 Apophasis rejoins the Mahayana philosophic epithet Neti, Neti (Sk.=not this, not
> this) that indicates both a failure to conceptualize and a profound reverence for the Absolute. Apophasis can
> therefore take the belief in the divine unity to limits that would appear to approach agnosticism since apophasis does
> not affirm anything about God. About this hidden God, we can say ultimately nothing at all, the Bahá’í writings
> affirm.
> By contrast, Christian and Vaishnavite incarnation theology, although not alike in all respects, define
> God’s essence on the presumption that the divine essence incarnates itself within the limited human form in an
> absolute way. Bahá’í theology, however, eschews such attempts and views them as being mistaken. Negative
> theology really begins in Stage One (see Fig. 1),58 in the state of the God without attributes,59 the God who is
> indescribable, the God about whom even the divine Manifestations have no knowledge. We begin there, with the
> dark spot of the hidden God, with God-Háhút, the realm of “HE.” Although clearly teaching that God does have
> attributes, Bahá’u’lláh is also quite emphatic that God “hath through all eternity been free of the attributes of human
> creatures, and ever will remain so” (Seven Valleys 23).
> There is a certain parallel between the unmanifest God-Háhút and the teachings of Hinduism’s mystic
> philosopher Śankaracharya or Śankará (c. 788–820), the Advaita (monistic) vedantist.60 A well-known definition of
> Śankará points to Nirguna Brahman, God without attributes, which he views to be a higher order of being, in
> contrast to Saguna Brahman, God with attributes. Śankará teaches that for the Jivanmukta or liberated soul, the
> concept of a personal Lord (Ishavara) belongs to Saguna Brahman, the lower order of being, God with attributes.
> At a higher level, Saguna Brahman is absorbed by Nirguna Brahman.61 God without attributes is the object of
> knowledge; God with attributes the object of love and worship (Deussen, System of the Vedánta 102). God without
> attributes is explained analogically as the stillness of the ocean, while God with attributes is compared to the ocean
> stirred up with waves (Smith, Religions 73). The Upanishads also refer to Nirguna Brahman as the “Unmanifest”
> (Katha 6:7,8), which is precisely the state of God-Háhút. Śankará maintains that Nirguna Brahman is changeless
> and without form (Vedánta 207), and one can also postulate that such a description would apply to Bahá’u’lláh’s
> unmanifest God-Háhút.
> In an analogy based on the writer, his pen and ink, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá likens this unmanifest, unknown, and
> unknowable deus absconditus (hidden God) to a black spot of ink—the divine darkness—on a piece of paper that
> potentially contains all letters and words, in short, all possible meanings of the universe within it (Momen,
> “Relativism” 190). This “God above God,”62 in Tillich’s phrase, is the darkest and most impenetrable of mysteries,
> the Mystery of Mysteries. There are certain Judaic roots in the concept of the hidden God, for we read in Isaiah
> 45:15, “Verily thou art a God that hidest thyself, O God of Israel, the Saviour.”
> Bahá’í theology does not have, therefore, as its point of departure, a theology of God such as Kant’s Ding
> an sich, but a theology about God, a theology of the Word (logos theology), which, like the divine names, is a
> common element in the Jewish, Christian, Muslim, and Bábí–Bahá’í traditions.63 This manifestation theology,
> which has been dubbed theophanology by Cole (“Concept of Manifestation” 2), is a gloss64 on Shoghi Effendi’s
> description of the “rise” and “march” of the Faith of Bahá’u’lláh as a “supreme Theophany”65 (The World Order
> 97), a phrase that also has its roots in the Judeo–Christian tradition.66 One could also refer to manifestation theology
> as the less euphonic epiphanology. Manifestation theology, however, is cataphatic; that is, it does make use of
> human analogies to describe God. Cataphatic affirmations about God are calculated upon analogies of human
> experience, qualities that are, in a sense, projected onto God. Cataphasis is sensitive to the fact that God transcends
> any qualities that we apply to God.
> In Bahá’í theology, all statements about God apply to the Manifestation of God (Mazhar-i-Iláhí or prophet,
> (nabí, rasúl), both terms being used in the Bahá’í Faith;67
> 
> Consequently, with reference to this plane of existence [God], every statement and elucidation is
> defective, all praise and all description are unworthy, every conception is vain, and every meditation is
> futile. (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions 147)
> 
> Theological statements apply only to the person of the divine manifestation:
> 
> Therefore, all that the human reality knows, discovers and understands of the names, the
> attributes and the perfections of God refer to these Holy Manifestations. (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Questions 148)
> 
> Figure 1. The Realms of Being
> Note: Bahá’u’lláh’s use of the names of the realms of being is identical to the terminology of the Sufi Path. See J. Spencer
> Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam 160–61.
> Manifestation theology really begins in Stage Two, as God-Láhút, God Manifest, here called simply the
> first Manifestation of God. The divine Manifestation is called variously the Primal Will, Logos, the divine Word,
> the divine nous (mind), etc. God Manifest is also expressed more poetically as “the Tongue of Grandeur” and “the
> Most Exalted Pen.” Here the divine Word takes on the character of the paradox, for it stands revealed within the
> Godhead as the sum of all the divine names but is not yet revealed to humanity and thus remains occulted within the
> Godhead. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá also affirms that the “First Will” (Questions 203) or “Primal Will”68 is the agent of
> creation. The same is also affirmed of the Manifestation or Word of God (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 140). It would
> appear, therefore, that the Primal Will originates with or is present in the Manifestation of God, and in this sense
> they are identical. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá defines the stations of existence as three only: God, Kingdom
> (Manifestation/Word), Creation (Questions 295). This definition would appear to identify the Primal Will with the
> Kingdom, which is in turn synonymous with the divine Manifestations. The Primal Will, therefore, should not be
> seen above or existing independently of the Manifestation of God. The two appear to be synonymous.
> Further, manifestation theology is essentialist. Its starting point is the definition of God as an “unknowable
> essence” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 167). The philosophy of essence as the source of all contingent beings has a long
> history stretching back to the Presocratics,69 Plato, and Aristotle, through to Aquinas and the ‘Ilm-al-Kalám school
> of Islam. Essentialism is a realist philosophy and a unified system of theology and philosophy since it is at the same
> time a theology, a cosmology, an epistemology, and an ontology. It deals with the most basic of questions—the
> nature of God, the nature of Reality (Being), God’s revelation, the origin of both Spirit and matter,70 and what
> constitutes true knowledge. In Bahá’í perspective, the philosophy of essence includes the perception that the
> Manifestation of God and God’s divine names are at the origin of all other things in the universe, realities that are
> absolute and immutable, that is, persist unchanged through time. In this view, it is only these divine names and
> attributes that are worthy of our attention as objects of true knowledge.
> The doctrine of the divine names or attributes, however, is not only a major question in Islamic theology
> and in the Bahá’í Faith. It is also treated by Maimonides in his Guide for the Perplexed; by Dionysius, the Christian
> Neoplatonist, in his “Divine Names”; by Aquinas as the “divine names” or “transcendentals” (“Divinis Nominibus”
> [On the Divine Names], Question XIII, Summa Theologica); and by Spinoza in classical philosophy in the Ethics. It
> also has other implications for Western philosophy with strong resemblances to Plato’s doctrine of forms. To what
> extent Plato’s Form of the Good can be identified with the Manifestation remains as yet unexamined. Consequently,
> the divine names and attributes are one of those major questions that link at the same time the Semitic faiths and
> certain schools of Western philosophy.
> Stages Three and Four of manifestation theology are those of the realms of Jabarút and Malakút,
> respectively; that is, the angelic realms of the divine names and attributes, the realms of power (jabr), command
> (amr), and execution. Islamic and Bahá’í beliefs in angels are based on the preceding Jewish and Christian
> traditions. Even though the Archangel Gabriel is depicted as commanding Bahá’u’lláh to speak (Gleanings 103),
> archangels do not rank above the Manifestation of God, for Bahá’u’lláh states that the Seraph of the Day of
> Judgment has been ordained by the word of Muhammad (Kitáb-i-Íqán 116). In Old Testament theology there is a
> tradition that the prophet is an angel (Heb. Mal‘akh=messenger) since the high prophets never mention the angels
> and since the prophet Haggai (1:13) is called “the angel of the Lord” (Jacob, Theology of the Old Testament 77).
> The Báb’s forerunner Siyyid Kázim Rashtí (d. 1843) would appear to have adopted the more ancient Hebrew
> tradition of angelology, since in his Sermon of the Gulf he referred to Imam Ja‘far-i-Sádiq’s tradition of a proto-
> Shí‘ih Cherub as being identical to the “Self” (an-nafs) of the prophet (Lambden, “Sinaitic Mysteries” 91–92).
> Whether there is a rank ordering of the angelic beings of the realm of Malakút and the higher Jabarút is a
> matter of speculation. The realm of Malakút is referred to as the “Abhá kingdom” (heaven), while the realm of
> Jabarút suggests the higher state, “the all-highest paradise.” Further, in Jabarút, God’s decree or command (amr) is
> proclaimed. We might identify the realms of Jabarút and Malakút with the angelic realms of the seraphim and the
> cherubim respectively in the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions, for the seraphim and cherubim are
> “continually in the immediate presence of God, nearer than all others to Him, reflecting, without intervention of any
> other created being, the direct effulgence of his glory” (“Angels and Archangels” 86). In Dionysius’ “Celestial
> Hierarchy,” reputed to have been based on apostolic tradition, there are three orders of angels, each having a triple
> gradation making nine orders or choirs. Of the first order are the “thrones,” which are likewise identified with the
> seraphim and cherubim (“Angels and Archangels” 86). In Judaism, God directs Moses to place two gold cherubim
> facing one another on the “mercy seat,” also of pure gold, which covered the ark (Exod. 25:17–21). One of the
> seraphim commissions the Prophet Isaiah by touching his lips with a burning coal (Isa. 6:2). In Hebrew scripture,
> there would appear to be a ranking of the seraphim (angels of love) above the cherubim (angels of knowledge), if
> we are justified in inferring that the number of wings and the veiling of the face are symbols of power. The
> seraphim have six wings, and their faces are veiled by two of them, and attend the divine throne from above (Isa.
> 6:2); whereas, the cherubim have four wings and stand under the throne (Ezek. 10:1). It is not clear in Bahá’í
> theology whether or not there is a ranking of the seraphim and cherubim.
> The vision of Ezekiel’s wheel accompanied by the angels cherubim would appear to be a vision of the
> divine unity, which Bahá’ís would perceive esoterically as a prefigurement of Bahá’u’lláh’s revelation, since
> Ezekiel’s vision is attended by a manifestation of the glory of God (Ezek. 10:8), the name of Bahá’u’lláh.
> Bahá’u’lláh likewise speaks of the cherubim and the seraphim, and has the cherubim standing “behind the throne”
> (Kitáb-i-Íqán 79), while the seraph (Pers. Isráfíl) Bahá’u’lláh depicts as the angel of the Judgment Day: “Hath not
> the Seraph himself, the angel of the Judgment Day, and his like been ordained by Muhammad’s own utterance?”
> (Kitáb-i-Íqán 116). Muhammad adopted the Jewish and Christian traditions of angels in which Gabriel and Michael
> figured prominently as angels of revelation, protection, and mercy. According to the traditions, Isráfíl, the angel of
> the Judgment Day, whose name can probably be traced to the Hebrew seráfím (s.v. “Isráfíl,” Encyclopedia of Islam
> 4:211) also commissioned the first revelations at Mecca but disappears after the fitra, the three years of silence
> observed by Muhammad, after which Gabriel assumes the on-going and predominant role (Gaudefroy–
> Demombynes, Mahomet 75).
> Finally God’s names and attributes are manifest as Násút, his manifestation in the physical world. All
> kingdoms in the physical world are expressions of the Manifestation of God as the divine names. The believer
> whose life expresses fully the divine names lives in both the realms of Násút and Malakút, not only as a physical
> creature living in the elemental world of the senses but also as an angelic being.
> 
> Conclusion
> In its simplest terms, theology is the knowledge of God, or, following W. C. Smith, an attempt to be truthful when
> speaking about God. In the Bahá’í community, the discipline of theology as a form of scholarship would appear,
> ironically, to have been seriously underrated. There is currently a pressing and on-going need for theological works
> by scholars to make Bahá’í theology not only credible in the eyes of those academics engaged in religious studies
> but also an intellectual enrichment for those members of the community who would like to explore Bahá’í teachings
> in greater depth. The fundamental teaching of the oneness of religion, for example, which ‘Abdu’l-Bahá declared in
> 1911 in his first public talk in the West to be “the gift of God to this enlightened age” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá in London 19)
> and progressive revelation, which are both linked to the metaphysical paradigm of unity and the relativity of
> religious truth, have received almost no scholarly exploration after the passage of some eighty years.
> Bahá’í theology necessarily will evolve beyond its present piecemeal treatment of metaphysical themes
> until systematic theologies are developed. Beyond that point, however, it is likely that truly universal theologies will
> emerge and will synthesize the religions of East and West, theologies that will be viewed as the epitome of sacred
> study for the age. For if, as Shoghi Effendi has written, the Kitáb-i-Íqán “has laid down a broad and unassailable
> foundation for the complete and permanent reconciliation” of the followers of the world’s great religions (God
> Passes By 139), Bahá’í scholars will be required to bend their minds to the development of theologies that are able
> to reconcile the spiritual teachings of the Orient and the Occident.
> Finally, the following statement of Raimundo Panikkar, the noted comparative religionist, which could be
> read almost as a supplication for the intervention of a prophetic figure in our time as a way out of the tragic dilemma
> in which we find ourselves, will strike at the same time a responsive chord and a note of pathos for members of the
> Bahá’í Faith:
> 
> Great perceptive, prophetic figures and thinkers have appeared, yes, but scarcely any of the stature of a
> Śakyámuni, a Zarathustra, of a Confucius, any of the stature of a representative of the whole course of the
> age, any in a position to guide, “sublimate,” cause to “precipitate” (in the chemical sense of the word), or at
> least to assist at the birth of, the “new mankind” still in gestation.... What is needed today is a force that, in
> the old traditional schema, could be defined as prophetic”—in order to search out, with the authority of the
> fully lived personal experience, a path to the altogether human assimilation and vanquishing of the new,
> dehumanizing positions imposed by contemporary civilization.... (Silence 93)
> 
> A Persian nobleman proclaimed in the last century to be such a one. His person, life, teachings, and community
> provide us with more than adequate proof of his mission. We have only to wonder why Bahá’u’lláh’s voice has not
> yet been heard in the sacred academy of the proponents of world theology.
> Notes
> 1. It was an allusion by Moojan Momen to Browne that first drew my attention to this passage. Browne
> “commented on the fact that there is little in the corpus of works about that [Bahá’í] faith that can be described as
> systematic theological or metaphysical writing” (“Relativism” 185).
> 2. The four legal schools (madháhib; sing. madhhab) are: (1) the Hanafíte school, founded by Abú Hanífa (d.
> 767); (2) the Malakite school, founded by Málik ibn Anas (d. 795); (3) the Sháf‘íte, founded by Sháf’í (d. 820); and
> (4) the strictest and most conservative Hanbalite school, founded by Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855). Actions that might
> be considered lawful or unlawful are divided into five categories: (i) obligatory, (ii) prohibited, (iii) recommended
> but not obligatory, (iv) indifferent, and (v) disapproved but not forbidden.
> 3. To put a more optimistic light on Schaefer’s comparison, we have to bear in mind that demographically the
> Bahá’í Faith is working from a very broad base, the entire planet. It has taken longer, therefore, to lay down its root
> system of communities.
> 4. The complete quotation is: “In this new and wondrous Cause, the advancement of all branches of knowledge
> is a fixed and vital principle, and the friends, one and all, are obligated to make every effort toward this end....”
> 5. Aristotle refers to “the one and the many” in Metaphysics, Book Iota, in which he says: “The one and the
> many are opposed in several ways, one of which is the opposition between the one as the indivisible and the many
> as the divisible; anything that is divided or divisible is called a plurality, whereas the indivisible or undivided is
> called a unity” (205-6). The source of the problem of “the one and the many,” however, predates Aristotle. The
> early Greek philosopher Heraclitus first raised the question of the one and the many. Parmenides, Melissus, and
> Zeno also explored the problem.
> 6. The situation is already changing. Udo Schaefer has written an instructive article on Bahá’í ethics for the
> forthcoming Bahá’í encyclopedia. Dann J. May’s master’s thesis, entitled “The Bahá’í Principle of Transcendental
> Unity and the Challenge of Religious Pluralism” (1993), defines Bahá’í theology more closely through an
> examination of the concept of faith and the two-fold (spiritual/social) nature of religion. In the light of scholarship,
> he also critiques “radical pluralism” and examines the grounds for belief in a unity of religions.
> 7. See n. 22 below.
> 8. It is understood by the term “Bahá’í theology,” that a diversity of theologies are possible. I will, however, use
> the singular throughout this article.
> 9. The “divine milieu” is an expression I have borrowed from Le Milieu divin—the title is usually retained in
> translation—one of the seminal works of the French Jesuit and vital evolutionist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. By the
> “divine milieu,” I mean not only God or a doctrine of God but also all human perceptions of God and the various
> forms of spirituality.
> 10. Drewek is echoing in her remark a long-established view of idolatry dating back to ancient Judaism, Islam,
> St. Paul, and Luther, among others. In his article “Idolatry in Comparative Perspective,” Wilfred Cantwell Smith,
> one of the founders of interreligious dialogue, points out that theologies, which he defines as “conceptual images of
> God” (56), can also be idolatrous and should be distinguished from the transcendence of God: “Thus even for those
> few nowadays who do not make the recent error of reifying their religion, it is nonetheless easy to idolize the
> conceptual content of a theological position or tenet.... Some intellectuals would in this fashion absolutize—
> idolize—the role of rational propositions—a still lower form of the rational” (60). Smith’s remarks are pertinent to
> any theologizing, Bahá’í or other.
> 11. This poetic phrase appeared in one of the responses to an informal opinion survey on Bahá’í theology that I
> conducted. It is similar to one of Mao Tse Tung’s sayings pertaining to the cultural revolution of “letting a hundred
> flowers blossom . . .” (speech in Peking, Feb. 27, 1957).
> 12. That is, purely rational human attempts to understand God outside of revelation. For Barth, revelation meant
> the Christian revelation exclusively.
> 13. See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Toward a World Theology. Smith writes: “Throughout I have spoken of
> ‘theology’, never of ‘Christian theology’. Indeed, the phrase ‘Christian theology’, once one stops to reflect about it,
> is a contradiction in terms.... Historically, however, it is the phrase ‘Christian theology’ that, rather, is recent, odd
> and finally untenable. It is virtually unknown before the nineteenth and rare before the twentieth century” (70).
> “There may be an attempt at Christian theology; and indeed there should be. An attempt at Christian theology, on
> the other hand, is too narrow a goal; and in the end, is self-contradictory” (71).
> 14. The classical expression of dogmatic theology deals preeminently with the life, works, and person of Christ
> as expressed in the dogmas of the incarnation and the trinity, questions that preoccupied the Church for the first five
> centuries.
> 15. Comparative religionist Huston Smith describes post-modernism as a rejection of all systems and
> worldviews: “Doubting that a deep structure exists, it settles for the constantly shifting configurations of the
> phenomenal world” (“Postmodernism’s Impact” 262).
> 16. Comparative religionist Raimundo Panikkar mentions the “surfeit of opinions” that both Western and
> Eastern scholars hold about the Buddha’s teachings including that of atheism or agnosticism. Panikkar cites von
> Glasenapp (Buddhismus und Gottesidee), Junjiro Takakusa (The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy), Haridas
> Bhattacharaya (The Foundations of Living), and G. van der Leeuw (Phänomenologie der Religion) as having
> affirmed the atheism of Buddhism (Silence of God nn. 6, 14, p. 179). Panikkar treats the Buddha’s “atheism” and
> “agnosticism” in the chapters entitled “Buddhism: Atheistic Religion” (16–23) and “Religious Atheism” (92–100).
> See also “Agnosticism” (9– 10) and “Negation of Being: Atheism” (122–129). Panikkar maintains that the
> conviction of agnosticism is more widespread among scholars than that of atheism (Silence n. 5, p. 179). Far from
> supporting the notions of the Buddha’s agnosticism and atheism, however, Panikkar maintains that the Buddha
> cannot qualify either as an agnostic or an atheist: “But Buddha never stated that he was an agnostic. On the contrary,
> his whole comportment was that of the ‘Enlightened One’, indeed, the one who knows, who has seen, who has
> ‘arrived’. The Buddha never entertained the least doubt as to his own position and solution. The Buddha knows. He
> knows, and makes manifest, the road to salvation. Nothing could be further removed from the attitude of an
> agnostic” (Silence 9–10). On Buddha’s so-called atheism, Panikkar states that the Buddha defended himself against
> such a charge: “The Buddha has not affirmed God, but neither has he denied God. On the contrary, as we have seen,
> he defended himself against the latter accusation ever more earnestly than against the former” (174). “God remains
> obscure, unknown, incomprehensible, mysterious. On his salvation journey, Śákyamuni prescinds [leaves out of
> consideration] from God.... The Buddha is silent of God” (175). Further on the basis of the following passage, one
> could argue that the Buddha rejected nihilism, one of several versions of atheism: “Wrongly, basely, falsely, and
> without foundation do certain ascetics and Brahmins accuse me, saying that Gautama the ascetic is a nihilist, and
> that he preaches annihilation, destruction, and nonexistence. Such I am not, such I do not assert. Today, monks, as
> before, I proclaim one thing alone: sorrow, sorrow’s destruction . . .” (Mahihima-nikáya 1:139, in Fatone, Nihilismo
> buddhista 30, quoted in Panikkar, Silence 10).
> 17. The Encyclopedia of Religion states: “The term theology as used here does not necessarily imply a belief in
> ‘God’” (s.v. “comparative theology”). See also, for example’ Paul Ramsey, “Religious Aspects of Marxism.” What
> Ramsey does here is to take several key Marxist notions such as the function of the State, materialistic and
> economic determinism, the passion for social justice, ideology, the Marxist interpretation of history, and reinterpret
> them sociologically in the light of Christian theology, using
> such notions as the kingdom of God, biblical faith, the overlordship of God, and the Christian notion of sin.
> 18. Panikkar refers to the “numerous works and translations of Caroline Augusta Foley Rhys Davids” that
> espouse this point of view The pertinent texts can be found in G. R. Welbon, “On Understanding the Buddhist
> Nirvana” quoted in Panikkar, Silence, n. 30, p. 180. In the Bahá’í perspective, the Buddha first promoted the belief
> in one God. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says of the Buddha, “He established the Oneness of God, but later the original principles
> of His doctrines gradually disappeared, and ignorant customs and ceremonials arose and increased until they finally
> ended in the worship of statues and images” (Some Answered Questions 165).
> 19. Such a comprehensive view of theology is that of F. R. Tennant. Tennant writes: “It [theology] also includes
> the comparative study of religions and the psychology of religious experience” (s.v. “theology,” Encyclopaedia
> Britannica). Tennant elaborates on his view of theology as a comprehensive science in his two-volume work
> Philosophical Theology and in Philosophy of the Sciences where he writes: “Theology is not an isolated nor an
> isolable science; it is an outgrowth of our knowledge of the world and man. Revealed theology presupposes natural
> theology, and natural theology has no data other than those which experience supplies to science” (187). Tennant’s
> view of theology is somewhat atypical, and it also separates theology from dogmatism and confessionality.
> 20. During a talk at Eighth Street Temple, a synagogue in Washington, D.C., ‘Abdu’l-Bahá said: “Praise be to
> God! You are living in a land of freedom. You are blessed with men of learning, men who are well versed in the
> comparative study of religions. You realize the need of unity and know the great harm which comes from prejudice
> and superstition.... This [prejudice] must be abandoned, and the way to do it is to investigate the reality which
> underlies all the religions” (Promulgation 410).
> 21. F. Max Müller, in his Introduction to the Science of Religion (1873), one of the seminal works in
> comparative religion, used “comparative theology” to refer to the beliefs of Hinduism and Buddhism as well as to
> the gods of Greece and Italy and those of ancient Scandinavia in the light of comparative philology and the history
> of religions. Today “comparative theology” usually refers to a comparative study of the theologies of two or more
> of the world’s religions. This approach recognizes religious pluralism. See “comparative theology” in the
> Encyclopedia of Religion, vol. 14.
> 22. The term “world theology” forms part of the title of Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s Toward a World Theology.
> Smith posits a unity among the world religions: “Those who believe in the unity of mankind, and those who believe
> in the unity of God, should be prepared therefore to discover a unity of mankind’s religious history” (4). Smith’s
> view of the unity of the religions seems to lie in the vision that there is a historical interconnectedness among the
> world religions, in a larger way than, for example, all Christians share a common history. He does not affirm that “A
> equals B, or even resembles it” (5), that is, that all religions are the same. He looks upon religious unity as some sort
> of world history of the religions, in which the religions have “grown out of” or been “influenced by” one another
> (5). The tapestry analogy comes to mind. All religions are seen as strands that form part of a larger pattern. In part
> three of his book, Smith puts forward the view that there cannot be any valid theology of another religion by an
> observer, no matter how generous he or she may be. Only the participant can theologize. It is not valid for one to
> objectify another’s faith. For Smith, “world theology” would mean that we all see ourselves as participants in one
> community. “World theology” would be a theology of the religious history of humankind. A major obstacle in
> praxis persists however. What will induce the adherents of the world faiths to abandon their absolutist convictions
> and embrace the new world theology, even if such a theology were to be satisfactorily worked out? One can
> certainly concur with Smith, however, that we attempt to work out a theology of the whole.
> 23. “The Book of Creation is in accord with the written Book.... The Book of Creation is the command of God
> and the repository of divine mysteries” (Makátíb 436–37). Unpublished in English. Cited by Bahíyyih Nakhjavání
> in Response 13. The Bahá’í writings even speak of a third book, that of “man”: “Man is said to be the greatest
> representative of God, and he is the Book of Creation because all the mysteries of beings exist in him” (‘Abdu’l-
> Bahá, Some Answered Questions 236).
> 24. It hardly needs to be stated that theology (Gk. theos=God, logia=word) means speaking about God. God-talk
> is not a theological school of thought. It is simply a way of deflating the more onerous word theology. I, for one,
> however, share Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s view that the colloquial expression “God-talk” trivializes theology. In an
> essay devoted to universal theology (“Theology and the World’s Religious History”), Smith asserts that “theology is
> speaking the truth about God” (“Theology” 54). Smith also makes the point that virtually every people on the face
> of the earth has talked about God, but relatively few have elaborated theologies which are “systematic” and
> “rigorous.” He also states that “theology is as much more than talk about God as logic is more than talk in general”
> (“Theology” 53).
> 25. Adolph von Harnack (1851-1930) makes the point that one of the original meanings of dogma was that of a
> revealed doctrine: “But the moment in which the product of theology became dogma, the way which led to it must
> be obscured; for, according to the conception of the church, dogma can be nothing else than the revealed faith itself”
> (History of Dogma 1: 9). See also p. 15, where he makes the same point: “But they [Christians] differ from such a
> school in so far as they have always eliminated the process of thought which has led to dogma, looking upon the
> whole system of dogma as revelation....” Von Harnack’s seven-volume Dogmengeschichte (History of Dogma) is a
> classic in the field.
> 26. Bahá’u’lláh quotes the Islamic tradition: “Every knowledge hath seventy meanings, of which one only is
> known amongst the people. And when the Qá’im shall arise, He shall reveal unto men all that which remaineth”
> (Kitáb-i-Íqán 255). And also, “The heart must needs therefore be cleansed from the idle sayings of men, and
> sanctified from every earthly affection, so that it may discover the hidden meaning of divine inspiration, and
> become the treasury of the mysteries of divine knowledge” (Kitáb-i-Íqán 70).
> 27. “These principles and laws, [of the world’s religions] these firmly-established and mighty systems, have
> proceeded from one Source, and are the rays of one Light” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 287-88). Also: “From the days
> of Adam until today, the religions of God have been made manifest, one following the other, and each one of them
> fulfilled its due function, revived mankind, and provided education and enlightenment” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Selections
> 51).
> 28. Since the coined phrase “source theology” could be interpreted in various ways, I add here a word of
> clarification. By “source theology” I intend two basic and familiar ideas: that revelation is the source of theology
> and that revelation is theological in content. I fully recognize, nonetheless, the dependence of theology on revelation
> and do not infer from “source theology” that theology is equal to revelation.
> 29. There is, however, an article on mysticism in the forthcoming Bahá’í encyclopedia. See also Moojan
> Momen’s “The Psychology of Mysticism and its Relationship to the Bahá’í Faith.” Momen’s views on mysticism
> appear to be ambiguous. The reader is not sure whether Momen is simply anticipating criticism from those who
> would reduce mysticism to mental pathology, or whether he questions the validity of mystical experience itself. The
> research he cites involves psychiatric patients with severe personality disorders such as schizophrenia, or states of
> mind induced by such drugs as L.S.D., mescaline, alcohol, and diazepam. Momen underscores, however, that he is
> not saying that mental pathology or drugs can produce genuine mystic states, but rather that there are some common
> objective features between mystical states of mind and those induced by drugs and mental disorders (“Psychology”
> 11). Further, science can make no value judgment as to the “truth” of mystical experience (“Psychology” 11).
> Momen concludes by advocating a “middle position” between the pro- and anti-mystical positions, somewhere
> between “the monist pathway in trances” on the one hand, and “codes of rationalism and positivism” on the other,
> which will satisfy our needs for “creativity, fulfilment and advancement” (“Psychology” 20).
> 30. The relativity of religious truth is a large question, and limitations of space exclude an in-depth treatment of
> the subject. In addition to giving a brief account of how relativity relates to the Bahá’í view of progressive
> revelation, and following Langdon Gilkey’s understanding, I basically address the question of the interplay between
> the absolute nature of our religious beliefs and values and how these are relativized in interreligious dialogue. I have
> not addressed here certain key parameters of the discussion. Such questions as the relative and subjective viewpoint
> of the observer, the immutability of spiritual truth, the metaphysical unity of the prophets which Bahá’u’lláh
> qualifies as “absolute,” the whole question of the nature of God as the Absolute, the relative and absolute nature of
> spiritual values and experiences, and the concept of the absolute as a unified field of reality, have been largely
> omitted, although there are references to some of these.
> 31. Moojan Momen treats the relativity of religious truth in “Relativism: A Basis for Bahá’í Metaphysics.”
> Following the progressive revelation line of reasoning, Udo Schaefer also treats relativity in “Die Relativitat der
> Offenbarung” (The Relativity of Revelation) 116-20 (untranslated). Nader Saiedi also deals with relativity in order
> to relate it to a view of progressive social reality in “A Dialogue with Marxism” 242 46.
> 32. The above is the more well-known translation. John Mansley Robinson translates the complete and obscure
> proposition that is found in Protagoras’s On Truth thus: “Of all things the measure is man: of existing things, that
> they exist; of nonexistent things, that they do not exist” (Introduction 245).
> 33. See Protagoras’s response to Plato’s critique in Robinson, Introduction 247.
> 34. Reacting to Protagoras’s affirmation of the subjectivity of perception, and through Socrates’ voice, Plato makes
> a personal criticism of the Sophist, viz. if no one opinion is better than another, and if all opinions are true, how can
> Protagoras presume to teach other people and to charge them “huge fees”? Plato also indicated that with his
> relativity of sensations, Protagoras was making no distinction between the human being and the animal. Why not,
> therefore, take the animal as the measure of all things? (See Robinson, Introduction 246). Plato maintained,
> however, that in contrast to mere fluctuating opinion, there was sure knowledge and fixed concepts authoritative for
> all— his doctrine of the Ideas.
> 35. “Syllabus Condemning the Errors of the Modernists” is not a translation of Lamentabili Sane Exitu, which
> translates as “with truly lamentable results.” The titles of papal encyclicals are not always translated, and they
> usually bear as their title the first few words of the papal letter. Even though relativity or relativism is not mentioned
> by name in the syllabus, its condemnation is implicit in numbers 58, 59, 62, 63, and 64 of the missive. No. 58 reads,
> for example, “Truth is no more immutable than man himself, since it evolved with him, in him, and through him.”
> No. 59 reads, “Christ did not teach a determined body of doctrine applicable to all time and all men, but rather
> inaugurated a religious movement adapted or to be adapted to different times and places.” No. 59 is almost certainly
> aimed at Alfred Loisy, whom the church excommunicated in 1908. The letter was written as a reaction to the
> growing and influential conclusions of scholars engaged in scriptural exegesis and historical research that cast doubt
> on fundamental Catholic dogmas.
> 36. Niebuhr recognized that our spiritual convictions were determined by historical relativism: “The patterns and
> models we employ to understand the historical world may have had a heavenly origin, but as we know and use them
> they are, like ourselves, creatures of history and time; though we direct our thought to eternal and transcendent
> beings, it is not eternal and transcendent; though we regard the universal, the image of the universal in our mind is
> not a universal image” (Meaning 10). His view of relativity, however, did not culminate in unbridled subjectivity
> and a skepticism that undermine one’s basic convictions: “It is not evident that the man who is forced to confess that
> his view of things is conditioned by the standpoint he occupies must doubt the reality of what he sees” (18).
> 37. In The Meaning of Revelation, Niebuhr uses the phrase “progressive revelation” to refer to a continuous
> working out of the meaning of revelation in the on-going history of the human community: “…by being brought to
> bear upon the interpretation and reconstruction of ever new human situations in an enduring movement, a single
> drama of divine and human action” (135–36). On the individual level, it refers to a continuing understanding,
> reconstruction, and unity of the self in a dialectic of the ever-widening circle of reason and experience in
> understanding “first principles.” This understanding of “progressive revelation” points to a moment of mystical
> illumination of the heart that Niebuhr likens to the journey and the mountain ascent during which there are moments
> of “new understanding,” “wonder,” and “surprise” (137). Söderblom’s view of revelation was something he called
> “continued revelation.” His Gifford Lectures, published as The Living God, held that revelation was ongoing in the
> creative genius, in secular history, and in the regeneration of the individual.
> 38. The context is Bahá’u’lláh’s affirmation that the Manifestations of God are the greatest sources of the mercy
> and grace of God, and the appearance of these “clouds of Truth” has had no beginning and will have no end.
> 39. Among the practitioners of world theology, the word relativity is preferred to relativism, which results in
> skepticism. While David J. Krieger points to the limitations of relativism, he is also aware of the dangers of
> “imperialistic objectivism.” See “The Problem of Ideology” and “Objectivism versus Relativism in Intercultural
> Understanding” in Krieger, The New Universalism. For Panikkar, relativism is “a premature renunciation of any
> attempt to make valid assertions. Relativism is pessimistic. It surrenders all possibility of arriving at any criteria of
> truth” (Silence 134).
> 40. For an elucidation of the “primordial tradition,” see Huston Smith, Forgotten Truth. See also Frithjof
> Schuon, The Transcendent Unity of Religions.
> 41. See n. 45, reference to American idealist philosopher Josiah Royce.
> 42. With memories of World War II fresh in his mind, Popper launched a particularly and uncharacteristically
> virulent ad hominem attack on Hegel in Hegel and the New Tribalism” passim 27–81. Popper maintained that
> Hegel’s philosophy of the Absolute deified the State because he wanted to curry the favor of Prussian emperor
> Friedrich Wilhelm III who was his employer; that he favored absolute monarchy above a more liberal constitutional
> form of government; that Hegel claimed that the emerging German nation was about to triumph over other
> European nations in a coming culmination of the dialectic of history, and that warfare was the acceptable means of
> advancing the dialectic; that his doctrines led to a “new tribalism or totalitarianism” and racialism. Shoghi Effendi,
> writing earlier than Popper in 1936, and in strongly worded language, also presents succinct summary arguments
> against Hegel, several of which are substantially identical with Popper’s (The World Order 182–83). Shoghi
> Effendi, however, portrays Hegel as making a fifth-column attack against the Christian church, an attack which
> Shoghi Effendi claims was upheld by “Christian rulers and governments” (182). Shoghi Effendi also connects
> Hegel’s doctrine with the materialistic philosophy characteristic of secular modernism, which also alienates religion
> from daily life (183). It is difficult to determine whether Shoghi Effendi’s remarks about Hegel were based on his
> own reflections on European history and political theory, or whether he was echoing the views of British anti-
> Hegelians with whom he may have become familiar while he was a student at Balliol College, University of Oxford,
> 1920–21. British philosopher and sociologist Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse (1864–1929) published The
> Metaphysical Theory of the State: A Criticism in 1918, which was the main British anti-Hegelian critique of its time.
> 43. This notion of Bahá’u’lláh’s possessing the standard of truth is a repeated theme in Bahá’u’lláh’s writings.
> He makes such a weighty but nonetheless unambiguous claim in a tablet addressed collectively to the leaders of
> religion: “Say: O leaders of religion! Weigh not the Book of God with such standards and sciences as are current
> amongst you, for the Book itself is the unerring balance established amongst men. In this most perfect balance
> whatsoever the peoples and kindreds of the earth possess must be weighed, while the measure of its weight should
> be tested according to its own standard, did ye but know it” (Gleanings 198).
> 44. Hegel’s notion of the Absolute Idea was typically ambiguous. According to Popper, the Absolute Idea in
> Hegel is just too big to be meaningful. It is “all in one, the Beautiful; Cognition and Practical Activity;
> Comprehension; the Highest Good; and the Scientifically Contemplated Universe.” Popper adds a note of irony:
> “But we really need not worry about minor difficulties such as these” (Open Society 36–37). For further criticism of
> the Hegelian view of the Absolute Idea or Absolute Reality, see Bertrand Russell, “The Limits of Philosophical
> Knowledge” 82–88. Russell critiques Hegel’s understanding and use of the concept of “nature” to reject Hegel’s
> view that the universe forms a “single harmonious system” (84). Russell proposes a more “piecemeal investigation
> of the world,” an approach he claims is “in harmony with the inductive and scientific temper of our age” (84). Like
> Popper, he also notes: “Hegel’s philosophy is very difficult, and commentators differ as to the true interpretation of
> it” (82).
> 45. Royce pursued the question of reconciling a personal God with the Absolute in The World and the
> Individual. Frederick Coplestone sees, however, an ambiguity in Royce’s use of the term “individual” and in his
> relationship of the One to the Many. See Coplestone, “The Philosophy of Royce” 42–44. According to Coplestone,
> Royce was, however, aware of the ambiguities in his own position. It remains, however, a matter of dispute exactly
> how his absolute idealism changed in later years in an attempt to reconcile previous ambiguities (Copleston, “The
> Philosophy of Royce” 8, 44). Royce asserts the paradox of the one and the many, which is perhaps the only way out
> of the logical dilemma of reconciling the one with the many, a kind of coincidentia oppositorum à la Nicholas of
> Cusa (1401–1464), the mystical view in which all contradictions meet and are resolved: “Simple unity is a mere
> impossibility. God cannot be One except by being Many. Nor can we various Selves be Many, unless in Him we are
> One” (Royce, The World and the Individual 2:331, quoted in Coplestone, “The Philosophy of Royce” 8, 42).
> Royce’s personal view of the Absolute is revealed in passages such as this: “We long for the Absolute only in so far
> as in us the Absolute also longs, and seeks, through our very temporal striving, the peace that is nowhere in Time,
> but only, and yet Absolutely, in Eternity” (The World and the Individual 2: 386).
> 46. Reinhard Pummer explored the question of terminology at length in “Religionswissenschaft or Religiology?”
> In a very detailed article examining the terminology, Pummer defends the traditional German term
> Religionswissenschaft against the newcomer “religiology,” which such scholars as R. A. McDemmott, H. Kishmoto,
> L. Rousseau, and R. Bourgeault claimed was an equivalent of the German term. Pummer rejects this contention on
> the basis that “religiology” has pastoral, philosophical, and ecumenical concerns that are not part of
> Religionswissenschaft, which is strictly a historical-philological and empirical study. Pummer is not opposed to the
> concerns of religiology, but he contends that the term itself can not be justifiably equated with
> Religionswissenschaft. “Religiology” has not succeeded in becoming part of the language.
> 47. The point is not entirely speculative. Generally, idealism posits at its basis that reality is spiritual, that is,
> spirit or Spirit (God) is the ultimate reality and that the perceptions of the mind or the spirit of ideas are the
> essentials in epistemology. Some idealists held that spirit was not confined alone to nature and to the human mind,
> but expressed itself in religion through form, myth and symbol, and the arts. One school of idealist philosophers
> posited an ethical theism. Idealism raised the whole question of monism and plurality, which is very pertinent to
> Bahá’í theology. In its various forms of absolute idealism, personal and ethical idealism, and philosophies of spirit,
> idealism remains a strong current of philosophy that can sustain fruitful parallels to Bahá’í teaching.
> 48. Sir Arthur Eddington (The Nature of the Physical World and Science and the Unseen World) and Erwin
> Schrödinger (What is Life? and Mind and Matter) became the leading philosophical scientists of the New Physics
> that emerged between 1900–1930. The main tenet of a group of philosophical scientists in the 1930s that included
> Sir Arthur Eddington, Sir James Jeans, Bertrand Russell, and Alfred North Whitehead was “the stuff of the world is
> mind stuff” (Eddington, Nature of the Physical World). In other words, science not only is empirically tested matter
> but also depends on the perceptions of the mind itself. “Mind is the first and most direct thing in our experience; all
> else is remote inference” (Science and the Unseen World). The fact that the mind has some central role in perception
> is pure subjective idealism and is not far removed Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Schrödinger, who created
> wave mechanics, also posited that there is only one Self or Mind in the universe. This one-mind theory is very close
> to the absolute idealist’s one Absolute Spirit (Mind) and the idealist’s claim that reality is based in the mind: “The
> overall number of minds is just one. I venture to call it indestructible since it has a peculiar time-table, namely mind
> is always now. There is really no before and after mind…. I also grant, should anyone wish to state it, that I am now
> talking religion, not science—a religion, however, not opposed to science, but supported by what disinterested
> scientific research has brought to the fore” (Mind and Matter).
> 49. I thank Moojan Momen for forwarding this text.
> 50. Stephen Lambden, referring to the original text, has pointed out that “the phrase ‘theological obscurities’
> does not directly occur in the Persian. Rather, it forms part of an ‘interpretive paraphrase’ intended to highlight the
> fact that the Islamic divines (ulamá’) remain uncertain about concrete (‘literalistic’) legalistic issues (shar’íya), yet
> they claim knowledge of the abstruse aspects of divine fundamentals. Reference to the shar’íya (=‘legalistic issues’)
> in the original Persian in other words seems to be non-literally rendered as ‘…the theological obscurities of their
> faith…’ “ (letter to the author). Bahá’u’lláh indicts the ability of the Muslim divines to fathom their scriptural
> tradition adequately in the light of the Prophetic hadíth: “Verily Our Word is abstruse, bewilderingly abstruse”
> (Kitáb-i-Íqán 82).
> 51. I thank Dann J. May for drawing this passage to my attention.
> 52. Schaefer’s use of the word theology comes up in his background discussion of the interface of theological
> and legal questions in the Bahá’í administrative order. He argues that any legal implications of the Bahá’í
> administrative order can be considered only in the sight of the theological and metajuristische (metalegal) content of
> Bahá’í teachings, a perspective that he also considers to be that of canon law: “Hierbei ist nicht zu vermeiden, daß
> auch auf theologische und metajuristische Fragen eingegagen wird. Die juristische Betrachtung und Erörterung
> kann vielfach erst einsetzen nach einer vorangogangenen Klärung der uns auf Schritt und Tritt begegnenden
> theologischen Fragen.... Ein solches Eigehen auf diese Fragen ist bie unserem Gegenstand umso unvermeidlicher,
> als es im westlichen Bahá’ítum zu einer systematischen, intellektuellen Durchdringung des geoffenbarten Stoffes,
> d.h. zur Ausbildung einer Theologie, auf deren Ergebnisse sonst verweisen werden könnte, noch kaum gekommen
> ist” (4–5). “In this case it is unavoidable that theological and ‘metalegal’ questions will also be considered. The
> legal considerations and discussions can only be pursued in their various ways after a preliminary clarification of
> the on-going theological questions that we will encounter…. Such a consideration of this question [the theological
> one] is all the more unavoidable with our subject since the Bahá’í Faith in the West has not yet reached the point of
> a systematic, intellectual penetration of the content of the revelation, namely, the framing of a theology to whose
> results the reader could otherwise be referred” (translation mine).
> 53. Schaefer’s recent book consists of two major essays in Bahá’í theology. In the first one Endzeit oder
> Zeitwende? Versuch einer Standortbestimmung unserer Zeit (The End of Time or Turning Point? Determining
> Where We Stand in Historical Time), Schaefer deals with the apocalyptic theme in both biblical and Bahá’í
> perspective to propose that we live, not in the age of universal destruction, but at a critical turning point in time that
> is characterized by new modes of thinking and new offers of salvation (Heilsangebote). Comparisons are drawn
> between the New Age movement and Bahá’u’lláh’s revelation. In “Bahá’u’lláh’s Einheitsparadigma und die
> Konkurrenz religiöser Wahrheitsansprüche” (Bahá’u’lláh’s Unity Paradigm and Competing Truth Claims), and
> within the perspectives of pluralism and the history of religions, Schaefer treats the question of religious unity and
> diversity. He points out that although over the centuries there have been claims to uniqueness, exclusivity, and
> finality (especially in the Semitic faiths) that have caused suffering and misunderstanding, there have at the same
> time always been more liberal-minded representatives (Vertreter) in these same faiths who have opposed narrow
> dogmatism and have promoted an understanding and appreciation of other religions. Schaefer sees in the
> perspective of these enlightened souls the preconditions for the current interreligious dialogue and the starting point
> of a new theology characterized by the unity of the religions.
> 54. Negative here does not imply denial as it does in grammar. It means, rather, the lack of positive theological
> affirmations. Manifestation theology speaks. Negative theology is silent. See further below, pages 54–55.
> 55. For a provisional translation of the tablet that gives the historical background and very detailed commentary,
> see Stephen Lambden, “A Tablet of Mírzá Husayn ‘Alí Bahá’u’lláh.” Lambden reckons that the tablet is
> fundamentally an esoteric and Bábí piece of Qur’án commentary, interpreting the verse: “‘All food was lawful to
> the children of Israel (=Jacob) except what Israel made unlawful to himself (or, itself) before the Torah was
> revealed. Say: Bring the Torah and study it if you are upright persons’ (3:87)” (6). According to Lambden, the
> metaphysical realms delineated in the tablet and outlined below are “well known in theosophical Sufism” (40), and
> treated, for example in Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam 270. The tablet is, however, far richer
> than the summary analysis I give below. Lambden interprets its esoteric and mystical references drawn from the
> Qur’án and the writings of both the Báb and Bahá’u’lláh, references that establish correspondences between the five
> grades of paradise and the four elements of earth, air, fire, and water, on the one hand, and chromatic,
> numerological and root lingual configurations on the other hand (40–46). Moojan Momen indicates that the sources
> of the tablet are the Neoplatonic, Jewish, Christian, and Islamic. See “Relativism” 5:189. For the historical
> background of the tablet, as well as a summary, see Taherzadeh, The Revelation of Bahá’u’lláh 1:55–60.
> 56. In Christianity there is a strong apophatic tradition particularly among the Greek founders of the early
> Church. Selected statements are presented here. The gnostic Basilides, whose work survives only in fragments, is
> said to have taught that we should not even call God ineffable since to do so would be to make an affirmation about
> him (Tennant, Philosophical Theology 1:313, n. 1). Clement of Alexandria: “No one can rightly express Him
> wholly.... For the One is indivisible—without form and name.” Origen: “According to strict truth God is
> incomprehensible and inestimable…whose nature cannot be grasped or seen by the power of any human
> understanding, even the purest and the brightest.” Athanasius: “Although it be impossible to comprehend what God
> is, yet is possible to say what He is not.” This last statement is pure apophasis. Gregory of Nyssa: “With regard to
> the Creator of the world, we know that He is, but deny not that we are ignorant of the definition of His essence.”
> The founders of the Roman Church such as Augustine and Hilary of Poctiers (St. Hilaire de Poitiers) made similar
> statements, but they seem generally less impressed by transcendence than the Greek Church founders. See Words
> about God, passim 14–18. Although the concept predated him, the expression via negativa originated with the
> Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus or Proculus (411–485). It was also used by Dionysius the Areopagite (c. 500),
> John Scottus Eringena (c. 810–880), Meister Eckhart (1260–1327), and Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464). (See “via
> negativa,” Encyclopedia of Religion).
> 57. See n. 16 above. As well as the above references, Panikkar also treats the apophatic dimension as
> background to the Buddha’s silence, in contradistinction to his presumed atheism, in “Ontological Apophaticism” in
> Silence 101–47. Panikkar convincingly justifies the Buddha’s silence about God. Here is one brief passage which
> indicates that the Buddha’s silence about God was meant to indicate that God would not even classify as a “Being”
> in our normal understanding of the word, for God’s Being would not be our being. Hence the Buddha’s silence:
> “But there is also an apophatic argument, whose cataphatic expression translation would say that God is so great
> that the greatness precludes existence, and precludes our conceiving the divine essence, transcending all our
> thoughts and all our forms of thinking being or even of being” ( 130).
> 58. In my explanation of the five stages of Háhút, Láhút, Jabarút, Malakút, and Násút, I have used Moojan
> Momen’s commentary on Bahá’u’lláh’s “Tablet of All Food” (Lawh-i-kullu’t-ta’ám) (Iraqi period) which he calls a
> “cosmology” (189) as my point of departure. Much of the commentary here, however, is my own. Readers who
> refer to Bahá’u’lláh’s original tablet will find it quite bald compared with Momen’s more elaborate interpretation.
> Stephen Lambden calls the same tablet a “mystical commentary” (“Sinaitic Mysteries” 110).
> 59. Bahá’u’lláh quotes a Muslim tradition attributed to ‘Ali: “‘Absolute Unity excludeth all attributes’” (Seven
> Valleys 15).
> 60. Vedanta means literally “the end of the Vedas” and refers to that group of philosophies set forth in the
> closing portions of the Vedas and the Upanishads. Śankará’s fundamental teachings were three: (1) Brahman alone
> is real; (2) the world is illusion; and (3) the individual soul (jiva) is Brahman.
> 61. In Mysticism in World Religion, Sidney Spencer takes these points from Śankará’s Vivekachudamani (The
> Crest-Jewel of Wisdom) based on Charles Johnston’s translation (39).
> 62. Tillich sees the “God above God” as “the ultimate source of the courage to be” in his existential approach to
> the overcoming of anxiety and despair in an age of meaninglessness. Although his meaning of the “God above God
> of theism” is mystical and somewhat obscure, Tillich views it in the context of the paradox of the divine-human
> encounter. The God above God of theism would not be the objectified conceptualized God of theology but rather a
> transcending of that understanding: “They [believers] are aware of the paradoxical character of every prayer, of
> speaking to somebody to whom you cannot speak because he is not ‘somebody’, of asking somebody of whom you
> cannot ask anything because he gives or gives not before you ask, of saying ‘thou’ to somebody who is nearer to the
> I than I is to itself” (Courage to Be 181). Bahá’ís will recognize in this last phrase reminiscences of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s
> prayer, “Thou art more friend to me than I am to myself” The “God above the God of theism” lies in the mystical
> longing to reach such a God.
> 63. Cole makes the point that logos theology is common to the Christian, Islamic, and Bahá’í Faiths (“Concept
> of Manifestation” 8–9). One could also include Judaism as sharing this logos theology in view of the Jewish
> reverence for the holiness (Heb. kadósh) of Torah (“teaching”), as the word of God. Muhammad refers to the Jews
> as Ahl-i-Kitáb (People of the Book). No doubt they see themselves as the first people of the Book.
> 64. The word gloss has several meanings. I use it here to mean a technical or particular usage of a word.
> 65. Shoghi Effendi explained that he used the word theophany to mean Dispensation: “Theophany is used in the
> sense of Dispensation” (quoted in the first edition of Lights of Guidance n. 251, p. 82).
> 66. The word theophany, from the Gk. theophania “to make shine” or “to show
> God,” has two meanings that indicate the divine–human encounter in prophetic religion: (i) The transient,
> supernatural non-human manifestations of the divine, such as the Mosaic flame of angelic annunciation in the
> burning bush, or the pillar of cloud, or fire on Mount Sinai. (ii) More permanent human theophanies, such as the
> manifestation of God in Christ. See “Theophany” in The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible. See also E. Jacob,
> “Manifestations of God.” The Bahá’í understanding of the word suggests the permanent outpouring of spiritual
> guidance to humankind through the Word of God, in the person of the divine Manifestation.
> 67. The phrase Mazhar-i-Iláhí is taken from Twelver Shiism (See Cole, “Concept” 15–17). One cannot,
> however, use the term “Manifestation of God” to refer exclusively to the major prophets (Abraham, Moses, Krishna,
> Buddha, Zoroaster, Jesus, Muhammad, the Báb, and Bahá’u’lláh) or to distinguish them from the minor prophets.
> Although this would be convenient, it is not really justified. Bahá’u’lláh does not restrict his usage of
> “Manifestation of God” to refer exclusively to the revealers of new sacred scripture and laws. He also retains the
> traditional words Prophet and Messenger (nabí, rasúl) to refer to the higher prophets, as well as the minor ones. The
> same was true of Muhammad, who was referred to in the Qur’án as both nabí and rasúl.
> 68. For a fuller discussion of the Primal Will, see Brown, “A Bahá’í Perspective” 22–26.
> 69. Brown restates Theo Gerard Sinnige’s view in Matter and Infinity in the Presocratic Schools and Plato that
> the views of the Presocratic philosophers were first coherently stated in Plato’s Timaeus (Brown, “A Bahá’í
> Perspective” 18).
> 70. Brown develops the Bahá’í view that spirit is the origin of matter in “A Bahá’í Perspective.”
> 
> Works Cited
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. Makátíb-i-’Abdu’l-Bahá. [Collected Letters]. Vols. 2 and 3. Cairo: Kurdistán-i-’Ilmíyyih, 1912 and
> 1921 (respectively). Not published in English.
> ———. Paris Talks: Addresses Given by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá in Paris in 1911. 11th ed. London: Bahá’í Publishing Trust,
> 1969.
> ———. The Promulgation of Universal Peace: Talks Delivered by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá during His Visit to the United
> States and Canada in 1912. Comp. Howard MacNutt. 2d ed. Wilmette, IL: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1982.
> ———. The Secret of Divine Civilization. Trans. M. Gail with Ali-Kuli Khan. 3d ed. Wilmette, IL: Bahá’í
> Publishing Trust, 1975.
> ———. Selections from the Writings of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. Comp. Research Dept. Bahá’í World Centre. Trans. Marzieh
> Gail et al. Haifa: Bahá’í World Centre, 1978.
> ———. Some Answered Questions. Comp. and trans. Laura Clifford Barney. 4th ed. Wilmette, IL: Bahá’í
> Publishing Trust, 1981.
> 
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá in London: Addresses and Notes of Conversations. London: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1987. Commemorative
> edition of 1912 original publication.
> 
> Aristotle. Metaphysics. Book Iota. Trans. Richard Hope. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1960.
> 
> Bahá’í Education: A Compilation. Comp. Research Dept. Bahá’í World Centre. Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1977.
> 
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> — *Prolegomena to a Baha'i Theology (Used by permission of the curator)*