# Reason and the Baha'i Writings

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> Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Ian Kluge, Reason and the Baha'i Writings, bahai-library.com.
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> 
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings
> 
> Ian Kluge
> 
> Part I
> 
> 1. Introduction
> 
> One of the hallmarks of the Bahá’í Writings is that they place
> an enormous emphasis on the power of reason. Indeed, few, if
> any, religious Scriptures have as much to say about reason as the
> Bahá’í Writings. While other religions such as Judaism,
> Christianity, Islam and Buddhism certainly have strong
> traditions of rational theology and philosophy — for example,
> Maimonides, Aquinas, Avicenna and Nagarjuna — these are
> derived and inferred from revealed Scripture. In contrast, the
> Bahá’í Writings themselves contain a large number of direct and
> indirect statements about the nature and importance of reason,
> as well as its appropriate uses and limitations.
> The importance of reason in the Bahá’í Writings is directly
> emphasized in various ways which will be explored below. Let us
> begin with ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s affirmation that “If a question be
> found contrary to reason, faith and belief in it are impossible,
> and there is no outcome but wavering and vacillation” [PUP 181].
> That fact that reason is necessary for a steady faith makes the
> clear the fundamental importance of reason for the Writings.
> For now, it suffices to note ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s declarations that
> “The foundations of religion are reasonable” [PUP 128] and that
> “If religion were contrary to logical reason then it would cease
> to be a religion and be merely a tradition” [PT 143]. In other
> words, reason is a sine qua non for religion to retain its identity
> as religion; it is an essential attribute of religion. Elsewhere, he
> adds that religion is “founded upon the premises and
> conclusions of reason, and both (religion and science) must bear
> 164                                     Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> its [reason’s] test” [PUP 107]. Reason, in effect, is a touchstone
> by which we may distinguish true religion from superstition.
> The use of the imperative word “must” indicates not only an
> obligation to “test” or assess religion by reason, but also that
> religion is obligated to meet the standards of reason. Further
> emphasizing the essential nature of reason in religion, ‘Abdu’l-
> Bahá asserts that “in this age the peoples of the world need the
> arguments of reason,” [SAQ 7, emphasis added] indicating, thereby,
> that the contemporary world has a special need for teaching
> reason in religion.
> To some extent, of course, the need for reason in religion
> occurs in any age insofar as the Bahá’í Writings view reason or
> rationality as a defining i.e. essential attribute of humankind:
> 
> The human spirit which distinguishes man from the
> animal is the rational soul, and these two names — the
> human spirit and the rational soul — designate one thing.
> [SAQ 208, emphasis added]
> 
> Consequently, all revelations appeal to rationality though to
> different degrees according to humankind’s stage of
> development in the process of progressive revelation. The
> extraordinary importance of the “human spirit” or “rational
> soul” is emphasized by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s declaration that “the
> spirit of man is the most noble of phenomena ... the meeting
> between man and God” [PUP 239]. This assertion shows the
> “rational soul” has a special place in phenomenal creation and
> even a special spiritual status. From this we may infer that
> rationality, as an essential attribute of the soul, holds an exalted
> place the gifts bestowed upon humankind. Furthermore, Shoghi
> Effendi’s intriguing reference to the “invisible yet rational
> God” [WOB 112] also points to a close link between religion and
> reason, though it should be remembered that the ‘rationality of
> God’ is not assessable to human thought. We know from Shoghi
> Effendi that God is rational, but as humans, we do not
> necessarily understand that rationality.
> There are at least five reasons why the ubiquitous direct and
> indirect references to reason in the Writings require study.
> First, without such an examination, our understanding of the
> divine Texts will remain incomplete. For example, ‘Abdu’l-
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                     165
> 
> Bahá’s declares that “The foundations of religion are
> reasonable” [PUP 128; cf. 63] — i.e. that the very basis of religion
> is reasonable or rational — but that requires some understanding
> of the nature of reason and how it is exemplified in the
> Writings.
> Second, self-knowledge also demands understanding of
> reason insofar as the human spirit and the “rational soul” are
> identical, as we have seen above. In short, humans have a
> divinely bestowed rational essence. As Bahá’u’lláh writes,
> 
> Consider the rational faculty with which God hath
> endowed the essence of man. Examine thine own self,
> and behold how thy motion and stillness, thy will and
> purpose, thy sight and hearing, thy sense of smell and
> power of speech, and whatever else is related to, or
> transcendeth, thy physical senses or spiritual
> perceptions, all proceed from, and owe their existence
> to, this same faculty. [GWB LXXXIII, p. 163; emphasis added]
> 
> The physical senses as well as the “spiritual perceptions” depend
> on the “rational faculty” and are informed by it. Bahá’u’lláh’s
> statement also makes it clear that the spiritual aspects of our
> being are dependent on the “rational faculty” and, therefore,
> influenced by it. Clearly, without some knowledge of the soul’s
> rational nature, we cannot fully understand our own nature.
> Third, the requirements of effective teaching work in the
> modern world necessitate a better comprehension of reason in
> the Writings. Contemporary culture is increasingly shaped by
> science and the scientific method both of which put reason at a
> premium. This emphasis on rationality is reflected in ‘Abdu’l-
> Bahá’s assertion that “in this age the peoples of the world need
> the arguments of reason” [SAQ 7, emphasis added]. The phrase “in
> this age” draws attention to a special need for rationality in our
> time. This applies even to spiritual matters: “Therefore, it must
> be our task to prove to the thoughtful by reasonable arguments
> the prophethood of Moses, of Christ and of the other Divine
> Manifestations” [SAQ 11].
> Fourth, the intended audience of the Writings is humankind
> as a whole which will study and learn from the models of
> 166                                   Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> reasoning given in the divine Texts. These models will influence
> the way humanity thinks about religion per se, about religious
> issues as well as about the other problems confronting us. It is,
> therefore, a matter of considerable significance to understand
> what the Writings say about reason, its nature, its uses and its
> limitations and how reason is exemplified in the Writings.
> Fifth, Bahá’u’lláh’s and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s statements identifying
> reason with the essence of humankind have far-reaching
> implications especially for the goal of unifying human kind into
> one global commonwealth. Because rationality is a universal
> aspect of humanity, a connective principle applying to all
> peoples and cultures across historical epochs and geographical
> barriers, it forms the basis for a positive global dialogue and a
> unified world order.
> This paper concludes that the Writings make in-depth and
> far-reaching use of reason in four senses of the term: (1) the
> powers of reasoning, [PT 90] i.e. the “rational faculty” [GWB
> LXXXIII 163]; (2) ‘reasonableness’ as in thinking that is
> appropriate to its subject matter; (3) ‘reasonableness’ in the
> sense of not being random and having a purpose; and (4) the use
> of logic as in “logical reasoning” [SAQ 143, emphasis added]. The
> most extensively used aspect of reason is logical reasoning
> which is found in almost all explications of the Teachings and
> principles. Logical reasoning exemplifies what has traditionally
> been called ‘Aristotelian’ logic but is also referred to as
> ‘classical’ or ‘standard logic.’1 The pervasive presence of such
> logic should come as no surprise in light of the confirmation of
> a variety of Aristotelian concepts and arguments in the
> Writings.2 Indeed, as noted in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, in London,
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’ had a deep knowledge of Aristotle’s philosophy:
> “The talk [by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’] developed into a learned
> dissertation on the Philosophy of Aristotle” [ABL 95]. This
> suggests that ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’ thought Aristotelian philosophy
> important enough to discourse on it in some detail. We will,
> however, also examine whether the Writings include other
> forms of reasoning.
> The first and major part of this paper explores how reason is
> defined and exemplified in the Bahá’í Writings. Portions of this
> part may strike some readers as overly technical in regards to
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                               167
> 
> logic, but this is unavoidable to cover the topic thoroughly. It
> also demonstrates the intellectual richness of the Writings.
> However, every effort has been made to reduce coverage of
> technicalities to an absolute minimum. The second part
> concerns itself with various issues surrounding this subject.
> These include standard logic and quantum science, standard
> logic and non-western logical systems, the preservation of
> diversity and standard logic, and post-colonial critiques of
> standard logic.
> It must be emphasized that this paper concerns itself with a
> philosophical understanding of the Bahá’í Writings and does not
> in any way reduce the Writings to a “mere philosophy” [WOB
> 196]. A philosophical understanding studies the philosophical
> aspects of the Writings just as a historical understanding
> examines them from a historical point of view without reducing
> them to history. As divine revelation intended for humanity’s
> future development, the Writings are multifaceted and thus, can
> be understood from many perspectives, without being
> diminished to any one of them. Thus, a philosophic study of
> reason in the Bahá’í Writings will help us broaden and deepen
> our understanding and appreciation as we seek to cultivate and
> develop our faith.
> 
> 2. The Meanings of Reason and Rationality
> 
> In one of its meanings, ‘reason’ refers to a particular human
> power, capacity or ability: “the power of comprehending,
> inferring, or thinking especially in orderly rational ways.”3
> Reason, in this sense, is a ‘power’ or ability or faculty that
> humans possess. According to Bahá’u’lláh, this is the “rational
> faculty with which God hath endowed the essence of man ...
> [which] should be regarded as a sign of the revelation of Him
> Who is the sovereign Lord of all” [GWB LXXXIII 163] and which,
> as we have seen above, distinguishes humans from animals. As a
> particular human capacity, reason carries out such functions as
> analysis; argumentation, i.e. giving reasons and/or analysis;
> evaluation; application; synthesis; identification of cause and
> effect; abstraction; identifying purpose; analogizing; inferring;
> induction and deduction. It performs these operations in an
> 168                                     Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> orderly, step-by-step manner that others can follow and test for
> themselves.
> We can observe many of these specific functions of reason in
> virtually all explications throughout the Writings. For example,
> it is obvious in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s discussion about why the human
> species undergoes no essential change in evolution, i.e. it does
> not change from one species to another as “[c]ertain European
> philosophers”4 claim. In the course of explication, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
> presents a critical analysis of the scientific view and then
> evaluates it, i.e. he assesses its merits and rejects it. What the
> scientists say is “not a proof of the change of species” [SAQ 191].
> In so doing, he presents an argument for his alternative view,
> and gives reasons for accepting it [SAQ 191]. To strengthen his
> argument, he presents the analogy of the infant’s development
> in the mother’s womb from which he infers that despite physical
> changes in form, our human essence does not change. As part of
> explaining this analogy, he gives a purpose for this growth, i.e.
> to embody God’s image [SAQ 191] in the world. This analogy is
> also a synthesis insofar as it integrates the concept of changes in
> bodily form with the concept of a stable, unchangeable human
> essence and spiritual nature. He uses induction in his references
> to specific creatures such as the serpent. Finally, he leads us to
> the principle from which we can deduce his teaching from a
> spiritual source, i.e. the Bible: “We will make man in Our image
> and likeness.”5 Any reader of his talk can observe the careful
> step-by-step manner in which he constructs his argument.
> A similar process can be observed in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s
> discussion of the Bahá’í teachings about the trinity. He says,
> “All have confessed that the question is beyond the grasp of
> reason, for three cannot become one, nor one three. To unite
> these is impossible; it is either one or three” [TAB3 512, emphasis
> added]. Consequently, the Trinity cannot be accepted as
> Christians understand it because it is irrational i.e. violates
> several logical laws as we shall see below. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá performs
> a reducto ad absurdum argument by showing that any “division”
> in God would lead to an impossible conclusion since “division
> and multiplicity are properties of creatures which are
> contingent existences, and not accidents which happen to the
> self-existent [God]” [SAQ 113]. This conclusion is absurd because
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                  169
> 
> God cannot be subject to accidental changes. Indeed, as we shall
> see below, the Christian concept of the trinity violates the
> logical laws of identity, of non-contradiction and the excluded
> middle. In the course of explicating the Bahá’í view, ‘Abdu’l-
> Bahá analyses and evaluates Christian view and then gives
> reasons why an alternative explanation is needed. The first
> reason is that “For God to descend into the conditions of
> existence would be the greatest of imperfections” [SAQ 113]
> while the second is that the “Lordly Reality admits of no
> division” [SAQ 113]. He then presents an analogy and a logical
> synthesis to clarify his argument:
> 
> Now if we say that we have seen the Sun in two mirrors
> — one the Christ and one the Holy Spirit — that is to
> say, that we have seen three Suns, one in heaven and the
> two others on the earth, we speak truly. And if we say
> that there is one Sun, and it is pure singleness, and has
> no partner and equal, we again speak truly. [SAQ 113]
> 
> Thus, by using the capacities of human reason, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
> rationalizes, i.e. gives a rational, non-contradictory form to the
> doctrine of the Trinity. That which had hitherto been regarded
> as a ‘mystery’ beyond reasonable explanation receives a logically
> rational explanation. Significantly, he finishes his explication of
> the trinity by saying that either his explanation is true or
> 
> the foundations of the Religion of God would rest
> upon an illogical proposition which the mind could
> never conceive, and how can the mind be forced to
> believe a thing which it cannot conceive? A thing
> cannot be grasped by the intelligence except when it is
> clothed in an intelligible form; otherwise, it is but an
> effort of the imagination. [SAQ 113, emphasis added]
> 
> It is important to note that even when discussing a spiritual
> issue, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá emphasizes that the mind cannot “conceive”
> of an “illogical proposition” i.e. cannot genuinely understand it
> and, therefore, cannot be expected to believe it. Moreover,
> even the “form” of a proposition must be “intelligible,” i.e.
> reasonable and conforming to logic. It is no longer sufficient to
> call the trinity a ‘mystery’ and leave it at that. Moreover, this
> 170                                    Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> passage also shows that he does not accept the idea that the
> “Religion of God” could rest on illogical, irrational premises:
> “The foundations of religion are reasonable” [PUP 128]. We
> observe this principle at work in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s efforts to
> rationalize various Biblical passages such as those dealing with
> Adam and Eve: “if the literal meaning of this story were
> attributed to a wise man, certainly all would logically deny that
> this arrangement, this invention, could have emanated from an
> intelligent being” [SAQ 122].
> It is worth noting that ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s explication clearly
> demonstrates that rationality has a place in considering spiritual
> issues. In other words, the scope of rationality is not limited to
> the earthly phenomenal realm.
> A second meaning of reason refers to ‘being reasonable,’ in
> the sense of thinking or acting appropriately. All things, actions
> or situations have an inherent nature or essence and our
> responses must be in harmony with this essence, or at least,
> must not offend against it. An action is reasonable or rational if
> it is appropriate to the essence of a situation or the object of
> the action. For example, under normal circumstances, it is not
> appropriate, and not reasonable to treat an adult like an infant
> or a crime like an act of charity; their essential natures are too
> different. Indeed, such treatment commits a logical error, a
> category mistake, i.e. in treating one kind of thing as if it were
> another kind of thing. Bahá’u’lláh, advises that a speaker should
> “deliver his words at the appropriate time and place” [TAB 172],
> i.e. that words should be in harmony with the nature of a
> situation and an audience. Words delivered as Bahá’u’lláh
> prescribes will inevitably be reasonable. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá asks,
> “How can man be content to lead only an animal existence when
> God has made him so high a creature?” [PT 122] Underlying this
> rhetorical question is the premise that acting against our higher
> nature is unreasonable or inappropriate to our nature; it is a
> logical category mistake in which we illogically treat ourselves
> as something we are not. A similar idea underlies ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s
> statement, “It is not reasonable that man should hold to the old
> tree, claiming that its life forces are undiminished, its fruit
> unequaled, its existence eternal” [PUP 141]. Here, too, we
> observe the concept of ‘inappropriateness’ at work; clinging to
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                  171
> 
> the “old” revelation is inappropriate and, therefore,
> unreasonable in light of its diminished vigor. By implication,
> accepting Bahá’u’lláh’s new revelation is appropriate and
> reasonable.
> The concept of reasonableness as appropriateness is the
> foundation of the doctrine of progressive revelation. ‘Abdu’l-
> Bahá says, “All religious laws conform to reason, and are suited
> to the people for whom they are framed, and for the age in
> which they are to be obeyed” [PT 141]. The fact that revelations
> are “suited to the people for whom they are framed” means that
> they are appropriate and, therefore, reasonable. This supports
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s statement that “The foundations of religion are
> reasonable” [PUP 128]. Religious law must be appropriate to the
> nature of the culture to which is applied. If they were not
> appropriate to the cultures for which they are revealed, such
> revelations would make no sense; it would be irrational to obey
> them. The statement that “religious laws conform to reason”
> can also mean that such law is consistent with standard logic,
> i.e. the logic of everyday experience. We shall explore this in
> greater depth below.
> If a thought or action is appropriate and reasonable, it is also
> just. This principle underlies ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s assertion, “Know
> that to do justice is to give to everyone according to his
> deserts” [SAQ 266]. In other words, justice is dispensing an
> appropriate or reasonable response to an act or statement. This
> may even apply to ourselves. Bahá’u’lláh’s injunction, “Be fair
> to yourselves and to others” [GWB CXVIII 277, emphasis added]
> illustrates this. If we do not behave according to our nature, i.e.
> according to our essence, if we behave inappropriately to
> ourselves, we are not only being unreasonable or irrational but
> also being “unfair” to ourselves. We are diminishing ourselves.
> To be fair or just to ourselves we must treat ourselves
> according to our immortal spiritual nature and not our
> transient animal nature. This applies to intellectual justice as
> well. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá declares that “I wish you to be fair and
> reasonable in your judgment, setting aside all religious
> prejudices” [PUP 364]. In other words, in order judge a subject in
> a “fair and reasonable” manner, we must judge it according to
> 172                                     Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> its true, i.e. essential nature by setting aside inappropriate
> prejudices.
> The third sense of reason or being reasonable refers to having
> a purpose. Actions that have no purpose are simply arbitrary
> and random and, therefore, are not informed or shaped by
> reason. This is one of the aspects of purpose that seems
> appropriate to Shoghi Effendi’s reference to a “rational God”
> [WOB 112]. The Writings tell us that God had a purpose in
> creation: “the purpose of creation ... is the knowledge of Him
> Who is the Eternal Truth” [KA 176]. Creation is not “fortuitous”
> [SAQ 181] or accidental but is informed by a plan and purpose.
> Since creation has a purpose, it also has a certain consistency
> underlying and guiding its processes, which is to say, creation is
> fundamentally one. The Universal House of Justice makes this
> clear in its assertion that “there is a consistency in the
> universe.”6
> 
> 3. Reason as Logic in the Writings
> 
> In its fourth, technical sense — which we will explore in some
> depth — ‘reason’ refers to the use of logic which is often
> mentioned through the Writings. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá states, “The
> human spirit consists of the rational, or logical, reasoning
> faculty” [TAB1 115, emphasis added]. The “human spirit,” of course,
> is the rational soul which is identified here as a “logical
> reasoning faculty” which distinguishes humanity from animals
> [SAQ 208]. This identification of reason with logical thought also
> applies to religion: “If religion were contrary to logical reason
> then it would cease to be a religion and be merely a tradition”
> [PT 142]. In short, religion must not violate “logical reason.” The
> association of ‘reason’ and ‘logic’ are also seen in statements
> like the following: “By intellectual processes and logical
> deductions of reason this superpower in man can penetrate the
> mysteries of the future and anticipate its happenings” [PUP 49,
> emphasis added]. We must note that reason is described as a
> “superpower” that transcends nature and, therefore, reveal its
> secrets. He also declares,
> 
> If we insist that such and such a subject is not to be
> reasoned out and tested according to the established
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                 173
> 
> logical modes of the intellect, what is the use of the
> reason which God has given man? [PUP 63, emphasis added]
> 
> In other words, all subjects — mundane or spiritual — must be
> “reasoned out” i.e. examined by such rational procedures as
> analysis, inference, extrapolate as well as “tested” by logical
> reason. Failing to do so is neglect of the divine gift of reason
> bestowed on humankind. Conversely, the gift of reason imposes
> on us an obligation to use it.
> The reference to the “established logical modes” is significant
> because it suggests that ‘Abdu’l-Bahá is thinking of the kind of
> logical reasoning that is generally established in Europe and
> America at the time. Hegel’s dialectical logic was not generally
> used, and other developments in non-standard or non-
> Aristotelian logic were only beginning and were still the
> province of specialists in a few universities. Thus, ‘Abdu’l-
> Bahá’s reference to the “established logical modes” is most likely
> to Aristotelian or standard logic which had widespread use.
> Indeed, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá believed that Aristotelian logic was
> globally known: “Today the philosophy and logic of Aristotle
> are known throughout the world” [PUP 327]. Given that belief, it
> makes sense for him to make considerable use of Aristotelian
> logic in the Writings since it would help the Teachings reach a
> world-wide audience. Furthermore, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá marks
> Aristotle for special praise because he was “interested in both
> natural and divine philosophy” which is one of the reasons for
> the survival of his teachings [PUP 327].
> Standard, classical or Aristotelian logic is based on three
> rules: the law of identity; the law of non-contradiction and the
> law of the excluded middle. We shall examine in some depth
> how each of these laws is exemplified in the Bahá’í Writings.
> 
> 3.1 The Law of Identity (LI)
> 
> Logical reasoning and all coherent discourse must obey the
> law of identity (LI) according to which at any given moment, a
> thing, situation, or process is the same as itself and not
> something else. A thing can only have one identity, not two at
> the same time in the same sense and in the same context: a
> 174                                      Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> cactus cannot be a dinner plate, and a horse cannot be a
> crescent wrench. Of course, a thing may have a variety of
> characteristics — a horse may be brown, with white feet and a
> variegated tail — but these characteristics are parts of its
> existence as a single, specific thing.
> When applied to discourse, i.e. discussions and explanations,
> the LI means that terms must be used consistently; if words
> change their meanings or slip from one sense of a word into
> another, confusion ensues and understanding becomes
> impossible. We are all familiar with disagreements caused by
> people using a word in different senses, e.g. gendered and
> ungendered uses of the word ‘men.’ The statement ‘All people
> are equal’ is another example. We must, for example, be careful
> to use the word “equal” consistently, i.e. not slip from spiritual
> to legal to economic to sociological equality. We may, of
> course, discuss how these distinct forms of equality are related
> but we cannot conflate one meaning into another. In this sense,
> the Writings, like every other explicatory text, follow the LI.
> More important, the Writings apply the LI to a number of
> metaphysical and spiritual teachings. For example, the principle
> of identity underlies the Bahá’í teachings about the unique
> existence of all things, i.e. the teaching that each thing is what it
> is and never has been or will be something else `Abdu’l-Bahá
> also applies the LI when he says, “in the sensible world
> appearances are not repeated” [SAQ 282, emphasis added]. He
> informs us that no two seeds of grain are alike. Elsewhere he
> applies this principle to the sun: “the sun is one in its essence,
> unique in its real identity, single in its attributes” [TAB1 117]. We
> also observe the LI exemplified in the teachings about human
> evolution; as noted in a foregoing discussion, `Abdu’l-Bahá
> declares that humans have always been human despite any
> animal-like appearances in their outward form. The human
> essence or identity has not changed, i.e. is itself and nothing else
> despite variations of outward form or which of its inherent
> potentials it exhibits. The identity or essence of a thing is
> stable.
> This principle even applies to things involved in processes.
> For example, `Abdu’l-Bahá sees humankind as involved in an
> evolutionary process but, as we have seen above, he is emphatic
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                  175
> 
> that the human essence is always the same regardless of our
> stage of development: [PUP 358] “Throughout this journey of
> progression [through the mineral, plant and animal stations] he
> has ever and always been potentially man” [PUP 225]. The inner
> potentials of our essence are present from the beginning and are
> actualized or externalized over time — which only makes it
> appear as if a change in essence or identity had occurred. In his
> potential, i.e. in his essence “Man from the beginning was in
> this perfect form and composition”7 These ever-present
> potentials are revealed over time.
> `Abdu’l-Bahá makes theological use of the LI in his argument
> to explain the impossibility of reincarnation. This is important
> because it clearly demonstrates that he does not see the laws of
> logic as applying only to worldly or empirical matters but also
> to spiritual matters. He states that a rose’s “specific identity can
> never return” [SWAB 184]. The general or essential qualities that
> return are shared by all roses but they do not return in the
> unique form of one particular rose; that rose is what it is, and
> cannot be replaced by anything else. Its “intrinsic elemental
> reality” [PUP 421] is absolutely unique. He applies the same
> principle to the return of Elijah [SAQ 134].
> Another theological or spiritual application of the LI is
> found in `Abdu’l-Bahá’s discussion of the Trinity.
> 
> If we say that the Trinity was originally one and was
> later divided, change and transformation will be
> necessarily applied to the Essence of Oneness, and
> change and transformation are necessities of the
> contingent world and not of the Essence of Divinity.
> [TAB3 512]
> 
> He faults this argument with violating the LI. God, Who is the
> “Essence of Oneness” cannot be divided and changed; to derive
> the doctrine of the trinity from such a division denies God’s
> identity with Himself, and is, therefore, a logical error. It
> violates the LI by treating God as if He were an ordinary being
> subject to division, time and space.
> 176                                    Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> 3.2 The Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC)
> 
> The second — and central — law of standard, classic or
> Aristotelian logic is the law of non-contradiction (LNC). In
> general terms, this means that a statement cannot
> simultaneously make two contradictory claims about the same
> issue. More technically, the LNC says that a thing cannot have
> and not have the same attributes at the same time in the same
> sense and from the same perspective or context. We cannot
> weigh 180 pounds and not weight 180 pounds at the same time,
> in the same sense and in the same context i.e. our place on earth.
> On the moon, we would only weigh 29.8 pounds, but that is the
> result of a change of context or perspective. Another example:
> an act cannot simultaneously be just and unjust in the same
> sense and from the same viewpoint. However, we can argue that
> a punishment is just from the perspective of a person’s act, but
> unjust from the viewpoint of the person`s deficient mental
> capacity.
> The Writings’ strong commitment to the LNC is based in an
> equally strong commitment to the unity of truth. Since truth is
> one, it cannot be divided by contradictions because these
> fracture truth into mutually exclusive parts. As `Abdu’l-Bahá
> affirms, “No one truth can contradict another truth” [PT 136].
> This pithy statement is the essence of the LNC and logically
> obligates us to resolve contradictions to avoid clashing truths.
> The same may be said of the declaration that “truth or reality is
> not multiple; it is not divisible” [PUP 106]. This is further re-
> enforced by his assertion that “truth is one, although its
> manifestations may be very different” [PT 128, emphasis added].
> Differences in the “manifestations” of truth do not necessarily
> imply logical contradictions which `Abdu’l-Bahá seeks to avoid.
> Here, too, is an implied obligation to resolve apparent
> contradictions. Shoghi Effendi re-affirms this theme, saying,
> “Truth may, in covering different subjects, appear to be
> contradictory, and yet it is all one if you carry the thought
> through to the end”8 which he emphasizes by asserting that
> “Truth is one when it is independently investigated, it does not
> accept division” [JWTA 35]. Again, we detect the implied
> obligation to “carry the though through to the end” in order to
> resolve contradictions and, thereby, comply with the LNC.
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                   177
> 
> There are two main ways of resolving a contradiction to
> comply with the LNC: the first is to eliminate one part of the
> contradiction; the second is to show that each statement is
> refers to a different perspective, or a different sense or time;
> and the third is to demonstrate an underlying unity. `Abdu’l-
> Bahá applies the first method in his philosophical argument for
> the unity of God:
> 
> For the realities of the Essence of Unity, knowledge,
> and the things known, have an absolute unity which is
> real and established. Otherwise, the Essence of Unity
> would become the place of multiple phenomena ...
> which is absurd. [SAQ 291]
> 
> In other words, God, the “Essence of Unity” cannot at the same
> time and in the same sense be both one and multiple. It is worth
> noting that he declares the denial of the LNC in this case to be
> “absurd,” i.e. irrational and, therefore, not only beyond human
> thought or conception [SAQ 114] but also to be avoided. In
> addition, he follows this method when dealing with the
> contradiction between accepting God as an “Ultimate Cause”
> and asserting that a causal process can go on forever without
> God. He dismisses the second alternatively as “manifestly
> absurd” [TAF 18]. In logical terms, He is saying that the causal
> sequence of creation cannot both go on forever and not go on
> forever, i.e. end with God. By dismissing one alternative, He
> enjoins the other.
> Generally,      resolving   contradictions     by     taking
> viewpoint/context, time and sense into consideration allows us
> to reconcile the conflicting sides insofar as conflict is
> eliminated thereby allowing us to accept the truth of both sides.
> This allows us a more inclusive view that encourages acceptance
> of complexities and nuances. In The Seven Valleys, Bahá’u’lláh
> illustrates the first — and more commonly used in the Writings
> — alternative of resolving contradictions by referring to
> different perspectives.
> 
> let thine Eminence consider his own self; thou art first
> in relation to thy son, last in relation to thy father. In
> thine outward appearance, thou tellest of the
> 178                                     Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> appearance of power in the realms of divine creation; in
> thine inward being thou revealest the hidden mysteries
> which are the divine trust deposited within thee. [SV 26]
> 
> Bahá’u’lláh reconciles these contradictory differences — first,
> last; outward, inward — not by asserting relativism but by
> correlating these contraries to differences in viewpoint or
> perspective, i.e. “in relation to” father and son; and to “outward
> appearance” and “inward being.” Nowhere does He suggest that
> the father can be both first and last in “relation to [the] son.”
> In regards to time sequence, “firstness” is the only possible
> relationship. Here is another example of Bahá’u’lláh modeling
> this method of resolving contradictions:
> 
> Wonder not, if my Best-Beloved be closer to me than
> mine own self; wonder at this, that I, despite such
> nearness, should still be so far from Him.... Consider
> what God hath revealed, that “We are closer to man
> than his life-vein”. By this he meaneth that his heart,
> which is the seat of the All-Merciful and the throne
> wherein abideth the splendor of His revelation, is
> forgetful of its Creator. [GWB XCIII 185, emphasis added]
> 
> From the perspective of our human spiritual condition, we can
> be distant from God, whereas ontologically, from the
> perspective of our dependence on God as the pre-condition for
> our existence, God is “closer to us than our own selves. Once
> this shift is taken into account, the contradiction is harmonized
> with the LNC.
> What the foregoing examples teach us is that the LNC readily
> accommodates seemingly contradictory statements made from
> different perspectives or viewpoints. However, while
> differences of perspective are quite compatible with
> Aristotelian or standard logic,9 they do not necessarily imply
> relativism. Relativism allows contradictory truth-claims — even
> from the same perspective — because there supposedly is no
> ultimate standard by which to judge between various truth-
> claims. Thus, all truth-claims must be accepted. Standard logic
> rejects contradictory truth-claims from the same perspective
> since they cancel each other out. My chair cannot be under me
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                     179
> 
> and not under me at the same time, in the same sense from the
> same perspective or context. Similarly, because the spiritual and
> physical perspectives are different, there is no violation of the
> LNC in claiming that spiritually, humans are the acme of
> creation [GWB XC 177; cf. GWB XC 179] while at the same time
> claiming that physically “the animal is nobler, more serene,
> poised and confident” [PUP 184]. The statements come from the
> spiritual and physical perspectives, and, therefore, do not
> contradict each other. Another example: `Abdu’l-Bahá uses
> differing perspectives to resolve the contradiction between
> sophists who claim the external world is “an absolute illusion”
> [SAQ 278] and those who claim the external world is real. He says
> that from God’s perspective, our existence is an “illusion,” but
> from our own perspective, it is not. In this case, he uses the
> difference of perspective to synthesize apparently conflicting
> beliefs. Similarly, he informs us that while a scorpion is evil
> from the perspective of man, it is not evil from its own
> perspective [SAQ 263] thereby reconciling two seemingly
> conflicting views.
> It is essential to understand that the principle of the LNC
> also applies to religion and spiritual issues. Bahá’u’lláh teaches
> that “the foundation of all the religions of God is one; that
> oneness is truth and truth is oneness which does not admit of
> plurality” [PUP 454, emphasis added]. In logical terms, truth cannot
> have the attribute of oneness and not have this attribute (i.e. be
> multiple) in the same sense etc. By returning to the foundations
> we recover the lost oneness of truth because we resolve any
> contradictions: the “unity of truth, through the power of God,
> will make these illusory differences [among religions] to vanish
> away” [SWAB 30, emphasis added]. Here, too, the LNC is affirmed
> insofar as differences, including contradictory differences, will
> be dissolved. The “different religions have one truth underlying
> them; therefore, their reality is one” [PUP 106]. If their “reality is
> one,” they cannot be contradictory. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá makes a
> similar affirmation in regards to science, reason and religion:
> “weigh carefully in the balance of reason and science everything
> that is presented to you as religion. If it passes this test, then
> accept it, for it is truth” [PT 144, emphasis added]. Instructing us to
> use the “balance of reason” includes employing the tools of
> 180                                     Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> logic. If an idea cannot pass this test, “reject it, for it is
> ignorance!” [PT 144]
> By following Bahá’u’lláh’s and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s example, we
> can resolve even seemingly intransigent contradictory
> statements. One of the most challenging is Bahá’u’lláh’s
> declaration about the origin of creation:
> 
> The world of existence came into being through the
> heat generated from the interaction between the active
> force and that which is its recipient. These two are the
> same, yet they are different. [TB 140]
> 
> The statement appears to violate the LNC insofar as it says
> these two forces are “the same, yet ... different.” However,
> there is no self-contradiction in saying that these two are the
> same in origin and substance but are different in form and
> function. In terms of origin and substance they both
> instantiations of God’s Will, while in terms of form and
> function one is active and the other is receptive. In either case,
> they are manifestations of God’s Will. We may also analyze this
> paradox with the aide of the Writings endorsement of
> Aristotle’s four causes: the material, efficient, formal and final
> causes [SAQ 280]. Both the active and passive parts share a
> material cause, i.e. a substance which is a manifestation of
> God’s Will; in this sense they are alike. However, they differ
> formally, i.e. in form and, therefore, they differ in function.
> Yet, they are alike vis-à-vis their efficient cause which is God
> Who brings them into existence and is the origin of their
> action. Finally, they are alike in their final cause — which is
> creation — by means of the “heat” or energy released by their
> interaction. In both of these interpretations, the contradiction
> has been settled by observing that different perspectives explain
> the otherwise contradictory attributes.
> Interestingly, two real-life phenomena illustrate this
> situation. The first, and clearer of the two is magnetism. Every
> magnet has two poles, i.e. it is one thing or substance but
> always has two polar opposite functions which generate an
> electromagnetic field just as the active and receptive forces
> generate the heat “from which existence [comes] into being.”
> The second example is water. Both ice and steam have the same
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                  181
> 
> substance, i.e. water, yet these two obviously differ in form and
> function, and in these different forms can also interact.
> 
> 3.3 The Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM) in the Bahá’í
> Writings
> 
> The Bahá’í Writings are consistent with the LNC and,
> therefore, exemplify a two-value logic — the two values being
> ‘true’ and ‘false.’ The law of the excluded middle (LEM) says
> that a statement or its negation must be either true or false:
> either an elephant is heavier than a flea or an elephant is not
> heavier than a flea. There is no middle ground and one of these
> two propositions must be true. (The difference between the
> LNC and the LEM is that the LNC says no proposition can be
> both true and false, and the LEM says that a statement or its
> specific negation must be either true or false.) There is no
> middle ground between them.
> The Writings, of course, are not a logic and philosophy text,
> but they contain numerous passages which are consistent with
> the LEM’s principle that there is no middle ground between a
> proposition and its negation. For example, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says,
> “This is the Truth and beyond the Truth there is only error”
> [TAB1 115]. In other words, a statement is either true or not true
> — and by implication, we must choose one or the other. There is
> no valid third alternative. The same thinking underlies statement
> as such as “This is the truth and there is nothing beyond the
> truth but manifest error” [TAB2 304] as well as “This is the truth
> and there is naught beyond the truth save error” [TAB3 524]. By
> asserting that ‘outside’ the truth there is only “error” or falsity,
> these statements affirm the principle of the LEM that there is
> no middle ground between falsity and truth. It also implies that
> we must choose one or the other. The same is true of the
> following statement: “‘Verily this is the truth and naught is
> there beside the truth but manifest error’” [TAB 25]. According
> to ‘Abdu’l-Bahá we should all have “a sword which divides truth
> from falsehood” [TAB1 166]. This metaphor shows a clear
> division between true and false without any suggestion of a
> middle ground; moreover, the rigor of the language used
> strongly suggests we are obligated to choose between the two.
> 182                                      Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> Two-value reasoning also applies to theological matters.
> Speaking of Christ, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says, “The sword [Christ]
> carried was the sword of His tongue, with which He divided the
> good from the evil, the true from the false, the faithful from
> the unfaithful, and the light from the darkness” [PT 55, emphasis
> added] He also says, “When Christ appeared, He possessed a
> sword; but it was the sword of His tongue with which He
> separated the false from the true” [PUP 292, emphasis added].
> Referring to Biblical issues, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá asks, “Question: How
> shall we determine the truth or error of certain biblical
> interpretation?” [PUP 212] We observe the principle of the LEM
> at work in these choices between negations.
> The same rigorous division between truth and error is
> observed in Bahá’u’lláh’s statement that “This, verily, is the
> truth, and all else naught but error” [GWB CXX 255]. The
> unmistakable implication here, as in all other such statements, is
> that we should choose truth. Bahá’u’lláh also says, “Behold how
> the divine Touchstone hath, according to the explicit text of the
> Book, separated and distinguished the true from the false” [KI
> 227, emphasis added]. Third alternatives are clearly excluded as they
> are in His statement that one of the tasks of the Manifestations
> is to ensure that “the true should be known from the false, and
> the sun from the shadow” [KI 53, emphasis added; cf. KI 228]. In
> other words, the mission of the Manifestations is to help
> humans distinguish between truth and falsity and to choose one
> or the other. There is no suggestion that we evade such choices
> by trying to find a middle ground. Indeed, God tests our ability
> to distinguish “truth from falsehood ... guidance from error”
> [KI 8; cf. KI 202, 221]. As required by Aristotle’s definition of the
> LEM, each of these terms is a negation of the other, e.g.
> happiness and misery, “guidance and error.”
> As we have shown, ‘LEM-statements,’ i.e. statements that
> demand either affirmation or denial without recourse to an
> alternative or ‘middle’ are consistently found throughout the
> Writings. For example, in discussing the trinity, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
> asserts “for three cannot become one, nor one three. To unite
> these is impossible; it is either one or three” [TAB3 512]. God is
> one or not. God is three or not. There is only one correct
> answer in each proposition — which is that God is one and He is
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                  183
> 
> not three. In criticizing the doctrine of the trinity, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
> is, in effect, asserting that no middle ground exists, i.e. that the
> Christian view of God as being one and three is false, i.e. a
> violation of the LEM. Here is another example: “Absolute
> repose does not exist in nature. All things either make progress
> or lose ground. Everything moves forward or backward,
> nothing is without motion” [PT 88]. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá clearly
> eliminates any middle ground — that repose exists — and gives
> us a choice between progress and not making progress. The
> LEM is also applied to spiritual or theological issues: “Now,
> either one must say that the Blessed Beauty hath made a mistake,
> or He must be obeyed” [SWAB 214]. Once again, the middle
> ground has been eliminated. In logical form, this argument reads
> as follows: Bahá’u’lláh has made a mistake or He has not made a
> mistake; if He has not made a mistake, He must be obeyed and
> if He has made a mistake, He must not be obeyed. One of the
> two alternatives must be accepted.
> There are also other forms of the LEM statements in the
> Writings. These are statements about the existence of God, the
> existence and immortality of the soul, progressive revelation
> and the essential infallibility of the Manifestation. The Writings
> leave no room between accepting these teachings as divine
> revelation or rejecting them outright. For example, “The human
> spirit which distinguishes man from the animal is the rational
> soul” [SAQ 208] is a LEM statement that is either true or false.
> Either the human spirit is the rational soul or it is not. Even to
> have a degree of rationality is to have rationality. Of course,
> LEM statements can be interpreted by different readers, but
> such interpretation must rest on either acceptance or rejection.
> Appearances to the contrary, agnosticism is not a viable middle
> ground since agnosticism is a statement of one’s inner mental
> condition and not a statement about the propositions
> themselves.
> In reflecting on the LEM in the Writings, we should not be
> misled by apparent paradoxes which seem to undermine it. For
> example, in order to explain why He does not, contrary to the
> custom in Persian writing, use numerous quotations, Bahá’u’lláh
> quotes,
> 184                                      Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> If Khidir did wreck the vessel on the sea,
> Yet in this wrong there are a thousand rights. [SV 26]
> 
> At first glance, it seems as if right and wrong were conflated to
> make some middle ground between them. This does not
> necessarily follow. Rather than conflating the two and positing
> a hypothetical middle ground, it is more logical to say that the
> “wrong” is, indeed, “wrong” in itself, but that it has some
> “right” consequences. Because an act and its consequences are
> not the same things, there is no logical necessity to interpret
> this example as violations of the LEM.
> 
> 4. The Principle of Sufficient Reason
> 
> In addition to the three laws of standard logic, the Writings
> also implicitly employ the principle of sufficient reason (PSR).
> According to this principle there must be a necessary and
> sufficient reason why every thing or event is what it is and not
> something else. All of science is based on the PSR since science
> is a quest for necessary and sufficient reasons why certain
> events happen and why they happen in the way they do. All
> humans, regardless of culture or historical time, implicitly or
> explicitly use the PSR insofar as they ‘troubleshoot’ problems,
> i.e. try to find the causes of problems. A potter seeking to
> know why a pot shattered in a fire, uses the PSR to explain and
> correct the problem.
> `Abdu’l-Bahá appeals to the PSR when he says that the order
> and complexity of nature “is the creation of God, and is not a
> fortuitous composition and arrangement” [SAQ 181]. In other
> words, physical nature alone does not meet the PSR, i.e. it is not
> sufficient to explain its own existence, order, composition and
> arrangement. Thus all purely naturalist/materialist explanations
> are incomplete. `Abdu’l-Bahá confirms this, saying, “The divine
> philosophers declare that the world of nature is incomplete”
> [PUP 329]. Precisely because physical nature cannot explain itself
> even in principle, logic forces us to posit something else that
> transcends physical nature as a sufficient cause. Elsewhere,
> `Abdu’l-Bahá amplifies this argument by appealing to God as the
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                    185
> 
> only sufficient reason or explanation for the order in the
> universe:
> 
> were it not for this Director, this Co-ordinator, the
> universe would be flawed and deficient. It would be
> even as a madman; whereas ye can see that this endless
> creation carrieth out its functions in perfect order ... it
> is clear that a Universal Power existeth, directing and
> regulating this infinite universe. Every rational mind
> can grasp this fact. [SWAB 48, emphasis added]
> 
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s final remark is significant because he
> associates his argument which is based on the PSR with
> rationality itself. Not paying attention to the PSR which
> provides the logical foundation of his argument, is a failure in
> rationality itself. Another demonstration of the PSR is `Abdu’l-
> Bahá’s argument to show the necessity for God by means of a
> First Mover. There must be a First Mover because no sequence
> of causation can go on forever. He rejects the concept that a
> causal series can be infinite:
> 
> to maintain that this process goes on indefinitely is
> manifestly absurd. Thus such a chain of causation must
> of necessity lead eventually to Him who is the Ever-
> Living ... the Ultimate Cause. [TAF 18]
> 
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá rejects an infinite causal sequences as
> “manifestly absurd,” though he does not specifically say why.
> However, the reasons are not hard to fathom. Explaining the
> existence of contingent beings by even more contingent beings
> leads to an infinite regress which explains nothing and can only
> be stopped by an “Ultimate Cause” that is not Itself a
> contingent being. Second, an infinite causal sequence has the
> “present problem.” If the causal sequence is made up of an
> infinity of individual causal acts, how can it ever arrive at the
> present? There are an infinite number causal acts between each
> causal act.10 Third, how can there be an infinite, i.e. indefinite
> number of individual things or acts? Any collection of
> individual things/acts, must be definite, countable, though it
> may of course be very large. This renders the notion of an
> infinite causal chain implausible.
> 186                                     Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> In the Writings, there is another aspect to the PSR based on
> the Bahá’í theory of causality which explicitly confirms
> Aristotle’s four causes: material, efficient, formal and final
> [SAQ 280, emphasis added]. According to ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, a chair has
> a material cause, i.e. wood; an efficient cause, i.e. the carpenter;
> a formal cause, i.e. a plan, or the way the parts are put together;
> and a final cause i.e. the reason(s) for building the chair. This
> final cause activates and guides the other three causes. Without
> it, there is no PSR for building the chair in the first place. Since
> all “phenomena are preceded by causes,” [SAQ 280] it follows
> that all things have a PSR or final cause. For humans, this PSR is
> explicitly noted in the Noonday Prayer: “I bear witness that
> Thou hast created me to know Thee and to worship Thee.” It is
> also implicitly contained in Bahá’u’lláh’s statement that “All
> men have been created to carry forward an ever-advancing
> civilization” [GWB CIX 214]. No explanation of natural
> phenomena that fails to include a final cause or satisfy the PSR
> is complete or valid. For example, `Abdu’l-Bahá says, “For the
> noblest part of the tree is the fruit, which is the reason of its
> existence. If the tree had no fruit, it would have no meaning”
> [SAQ 196-197; cf. PT 98]. Without the fruit, the tree lacks a
> sufficient reason to exist. This has enormous implications for
> the practice of science which seeks to make its explanations as
> complete as possible but is averse to the concept of final
> causes.
> 
> 5. Deductive Reasoning
> 
> Standard logic provides the basic laws that correct reasoning
> must obey regardless of whether our reasoning methods or
> procedures are deductive, inductive, analogical or Socratic
> dialectical. We shall now examine how the Writings make use of
> these methods.
> Deductive reasoning begins with a general or universal
> statement and then deduces specific consequences entailed in
> the general statement. For example, the universal statement ‘All
> birds have two wings’ entails the conclusion that ‘My parrot has
> two wings.’ This conclusion follows the LI, the LNC and the
> LEM. My bird cannot both have and not have two wings; it
> must be either true or false that it has two wings.
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                187
> 
> Deductive reasoning is especially suited to the Writings
> because it depends primarily on the truth of the initial universal
> statement. This makes deduction the appropriate mode of
> reasoning for those in authority with completely trustworthy
> knowledge. Unlike scientists still looking for the truth, the
> essentially infallible Manifestation and His interpreter (who has
> acquired infallibility) are able to give us absolutely reliable
> universal propositions — e.g. humans are made in God’s image —
> from which we can draw specific conclusions. Their universal
> propositions provide the guidance we need for our own
> reasoning process so that we do not wander too far from the
> truth.
> Deductive arguments can be presented formally as one or a
> series of syllogisms, i.e. a three-part argument in which a
> conclusion is inferred from first two premises. Here is the most
> famous deductive syllogism in western philosophy.
> 
> 1) All humans are mortal;
> 2) Socrates is human;
> 3) Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
> 
> The conclusion is implicitly embedded or entailed in the first
> universal premise. If the first two premises are true, the
> conclusion is necessarily true; no other answer is logically
> possible without violating one of the rules of reasoning. The
> conclusion can only be challenged by disproving the first and/or
> second premises. If ‘Socrates’ is my cat, the syllogism is false.
> We must also realize that all universal premises are
> embryonic syllogisms, i.e. fully developed syllogisms can be
> inferred from them. The second premise and conclusions are
> implied but easily ‘unpacked.’11 For example, to say that “All
> humans are mortal” automatically includes every individual
> human being. The syllogistic form is simply an efficient way of
> ‘unpacking’ the implicit steps to a conclusion. Take, for
> example, Abdu’l-Bahá’s declaration that “[t]he human spirit
> which distinguishes man from the animal is the rational soul”
> [SAQ 208]. This is a universal premise about all humans, which
> 188                                       Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> includes everyone, including our friend, Bill. A syllogism makes
> this clear:
> 
> 1) The human spirit distinguishes man from animal;
> 2) Bill has a human spirit, i.e. is human;
> 3) Therefore, Bill is distinguished from animals.
> 
> Wherever we find a universal premise in the Writings (or any
> other work) we can test its conclusion by putting it into
> syllogistic form.
> We shall use syllogisms to illustrate the careful deductive
> structure of the arguments presented in the Writings. Although
> the Writings do not contain any formalized deductive
> syllogisms as shown above, many of the arguments they present
> have a syllogistic structure embedded in them. A well known
> example of an explicit universal statement from the Writings is,
> “All men have been created to carry forward an ever-advancing
> civilization ... To act like the beasts of the field is unworthy of
> man” [GWB CIX 214], from which Bahá’u’lláh immediately draws
> the conclusion that we should not behave like animals. The core
> logical argument can be expressed as a syllogism:
> 
> 1) “All men have been created to carry forward an ever-
> advancing civilization;”
> 2) Behaving like beasts will not advance a civilization;
> 3) Therefore, humans should not behave like beasts. (“To
> act like the beasts of the field is unworthy of man.”)
> 
> Of course, we must emphasize that Bahá’u’lláh Himself is not
> dependent on such deductions for His knowledge and
> understanding. However, he uses this form as a pedagogical tool
> to help us grasp His teachings.
> Deductive reasoning does not necessarily use the word “all”
> or “every” explicitly in its general or universal statements, but
> “all” or “every” must be implied. That is what makes them
> universal. For example, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says,
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                     189
> 
> thou wilt see that a lower plane can never comprehend a
> higher. The mineral kingdom, for example, which is
> lower, is precluded from comprehending the vegetable
> kingdom... [SWAB 46]
> 
> There is a syllogism using an implied universal premise and
> syllogism embedded in this passage.
> 
> 1) “A lower plane can never comprehend a higher”;
> 2) The “mineral kingdom ... is lower”;
> 3) Therefore, the mineral kingdom cannot comprehend
> the vegetable kingdom.
> 
> Putting ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s arguments into syllogistic form can be
> quite a laborious step-by-step procedure which is probably why
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá does not do it. It would quickly prove tedious.
> However, what is important is that it can be done in order to
> reveal the rigorous logical structure underlying his and
> Bahá’u’lláh’s arguments. This provides demonstrative support
> to show that the doctrine that the Teachings are reasonable.
> The use of deductive reason includes both “spiritual
> proof[s]” [SAQ 197] and logical proofs. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá identifies
> the following as a “spiritual proof,” i.e. one that does not
> depend on empirical knowledge.
> 
> it cannot be said there was a time when man was not ...
> from the beginning which has no beginning, to the end
> which has no end, a perfect manifestation always exists.
> This man of whom we speak is not every man; we mean
> the perfect man. For the noblest part of the tree is the
> fruit, which is the reason of its existence; if the tree had
> no fruit, it would have no meaning. Therefore it cannot
> be imagined that the worlds of existence ... were
> without man! [SAQ 196]
> 
> The core of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s explanation, parts of which
> expressed metaphorically, can be formalized in the following
> syllogism:
> 190                                      Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> 1) The “Perfect Man” is the final cause (“noblest part”)
> of existence;
> 2) The “worlds of existence” require a final cause;
> 3) Therefore, there can be no world without the
> “Perfect Man.”
> 
> Of course, `Abdu’l-Bahá supplements this argument with
> considerably more details than we find in the syllogisms, but the
> two foregoing deductive syllogisms represent the logical heart
> of his argument.
> What follows is an example of what `Abdu’l-Bahá calls “the
> logical evidences for the immortality of the soul” [SAQ 228].
> 
> The logical proof of the immortality of the spirit is
> this, that no sign can come from a nonexisting thing —
> that is to say, it is impossible that from absolute
> nonexistence signs should appear — for the signs are the
> consequence of an existence, and the consequence
> depends upon the existence of the principle. So from a
> nonexisting sun no light can radiate ... [SAQ 225]
> 
> In this and the subsequent passages, `Abdu’l-Bahá goes to
> extraordinary lengths to show how the soul or spirit can operate
> without the body. If we focus on the main ideas to be proved in
> his detailed argument, we can detect two central deductive
> syllogisms at work. The first proves the existence of the spirit
> and the second, the spirit’s immortality.
> 
> 1) All things that exist show signs of existence (“No sign
> can come from a nonexisting thing”);
> 2) The spirit shows signs of existence;
> 3) Therefore, the spirit exists
> 
> and
> 
> 1) All things that depend on the physical body to exist
> cannot survive the dissolution of the body;
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                    191
> 
> 2) The spirit (which exists) does not depend on the
> physical body for existence;
> 3) Therefore, the spirit can survive the dissolution of
> the body i.e. is immortal.
> 
> These two deductive syllogisms represent the formal structure
> of `Abdu’l-Bahá’s argument. Of course, he goes into far more
> detail than these core syllogisms but the logical nucleus of his
> argument is readily apparent.
> The other common form of deductive reasoning has its first
> premise in the conditional i.e. ‘if-then’ form. For example, here
> is a passage from Paris Talks:
> 
> I say unto you: weigh carefully in the balance of reason
> and science everything that is presented to you as
> religion. If it passes this test, then accept it, for it is
> truth! If, however, it does not so conform, then reject
> it, for it is ignorance! [PT 144]
> 
> The formalized logical argument embedded in this statement
> can be written as follows:
> 
> 1) If statement X is presented “as religion”;
> 2) X passes the test of reason and science;
> 3) Therefore, we must accept X.
> 
> There are numerous examples like this throughout the
> Writings.12
> We have demonstrated that deductive reasoning is pervasive
> throughout the Writings and that it is rigorous enough to be
> formalized in syllogistic form. This demonstrates that careful
> logical reasoning is embedded in the Texts which not only
> advocate but also practice reason. This point becomes more
> salient when we realize that deductive reasoning follows the
> four laws of classical reasoning we have discussed.
> 192                                       Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> 6. Inductive Reasoning
> 
> Instead of working from the top down, as deduction does,
> inductive reason works from the bottom up and draws general
> or universal conclusions on the basis of specific examples. We
> observe that in the past, ants were always attracted to the food
> at our picnics, and conclude that ants are attracted by picnic
> food. Unlike deductive conclusions which are logically certain,
> inductive conclusions have only a degree of probability. For
> example, we could improve the probability of our conclusion
> by observing 20,000 picnic sites instead of six. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
> illustrates inductive reasoning when he writes, “Also
> [humankind] bringeth to light the past events that have been
> lost to memory, and foreseeth by his power of induction future
> happenings that are as yet unknown” [TAF 11, emphasis added]. In
> other words, on the basis of past events, we can reach a
> conclusion about future events or likely future events. This is
> exactly what science does which studies numerous examples of a
> phenomena and then reaches a conclusion. Elsewhere ‘Abdu’l-
> Bahá says that “through processes of inductive reasoning and
> research” [PUP 50] we can learn a great deal about humanity. In
> other words, we learn from or conclude from specific individual
> events.
> The Writings nonetheless show us many examples of
> induction in practice. For example, here is a complete inductive
> argument with its conclusion stated at the end:
> 
> But when you look at Nature itself, you see that it has
> no intelligence, no will. For instance, the nature of fire
> is to burn; it burns without will or intelligence. The
> nature of water is fluidity; it flows without will or
> intelligence. The nature of the sun is radiance; it shines
> without will or intelligence ... Man is able to resist and
> to oppose Nature because he discovers the constitution
> of things ... all the inventions he has made are due to his
> discovery of the constitution of things ... It is evident,
> then, that man rules over Nature. [SAQ 3, emphasis added]
> 
> Because humans have knowledge and the will to resist nature
> which has no will of its own, “man rules over nature.” This
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                  193
> 
> example models the proper form of an inductive argument:
> evidence from specific examples is accumulated and then a
> general or universal conclusion is reached. Here is another
> example of induction:
> 
> Alas that humanity is completely submerged in
> imitations and unrealities ... They follow superstitions
> inherited from their fathers and ancestors ... That which
> was meant to be conducive to life has become the cause
> of death; that which should have been an evidence of
> knowledge is now a proof of ignorance; that which was
> a factor in the sublimity of human nature has proved to
> be its degradation. [PUP 179, emphasis added]
> 
> In this passage we observe how ‘Abdu’l-Bahá bases his
> conclusion — that we have turned the opportunities for new life
> into our degradation — on a wide variety of examples
> specifically named or alluded to. We should note that in this
> example, he is drawing a spiritual conclusion from these worldly
> examples.
> Bahá’u’lláh also uses inductive arguments. He lists a series of
> historical examples in which people have yearned for the
> Manifestation and then, ironically, turned away from Him when
> He appeared. Indeed, Bahá’u’lláh goes into considerable detail
> in each case to give us evidence to support His argument. He
> then provides us His conclusion:
> 
> It behoveth us, therefore, to make the utmost endeavor,
> that, by God’s invisible assistance, these dark veils,
> these clouds of Heaven-sent trials, may not hinder us
> from beholding the beauty of His shining Countenance,
> and that we may recognize Him only by His own Self.
> [GWB XIII 26]
> 
> From this litany of failures to recognize a new Manifestation,
> Bahá’u’lláh draws the practical conclusion that we must strive
> not to make the same error and that, with God’s assistance, we
> learn to recognize the Manifestation for Himself.
> 194                                   Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> 7. Analogical Reasoning
> 
> The Bahá’í Writings make frequent use of analogical
> reasoning to explain and support the teachings. In analogies, we
> observe that two things are similar but not identical, and then
> reason or draw conclusions about one thing, i.e. the target, by
> comparisons with something else, i.e. the source.13 The more
> similarities between the source and the target, the stronger the
> conclusion will be. However, while analogical arguments
> provide good reasons to accept a conclusion, they do not
> provide logically necessary proof.
> One of the most striking arguments by analogy in the
> Writings concerns the organic nature of human society.
> According to Bahá’u’lláh, we should
> 
> Regard the world as the human body which, though at
> its creation whole and perfect, hath been afflicted,
> through various causes, with grave disorders and
> maladies. [GWB CXX 254]
> 
> The underlying analogy is that initial appearances not
> withstanding, both the human body and the world/society are
> living organisms. Because they are the same kinds of things, we
> can transfer attributes from one to the other, i.e. from the
> source — the human body — to the target — the world/society.
> Thus, He says that the world/society, like the human body, can
> also suffer “disorders and maladies.” For health, we need
> properly integrated parts functioning for the good of the
> whole.
> Shoghi Effendi uses this organic concept of society to build
> his argument for dealing with Covenant breakers. He describes
> the Faith “as a living organism” [WOB 23], which, like an
> organism is able “to expand and adapt itself to the needs and
> requirements of an ever-changing society” [WOB 23]. He
> transfers the attributes of an organism, i.e. the source, to the
> target, i.e. the Bahá’í Faith. Consequently, Shoghi Effendi
> concludes that internal existential threats to the Faith must be
> excised from the Bahá’í community like “a cancer” [DG 16,
> emphasis added]. Tolerating internally rebellious and destructive
> elements within itself would expose the Faith to mortal danger.
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                   195
> 
> Another example of an argument from analogy is ‘Abdu’l-
> Bahá’s use of the sun and its planets to show why an
> intermediary between God and humankind is necessary. He
> informs us that “An intermediary is needed to bring two
> extremes into relation with each other” [PT 57]. This is the
> principle on which ‘Abdu’l-Bahá constructs his analogy. It
> asserts that when two extremes are to be connected, a third
> connecting entity is necessary.
> 
> The Divine Reality may be likened to the sun and the
> Holy Spirit to the rays of the sun. As the rays of the sun
> bring the light and warmth of the sun to the earth,
> giving life to all created beings, so do the
> ‘Manifestations’ ... bring the power of the Holy Spirit
> from the Divine Sun of Reality to give light and life to
> the souls of men. [PT 57]
> 
> The rays are the necessary intermediaries between the sun and
> the earth because the sun itself cannot descend to earth just as
> God does not descend into materiality. Consequently, “there
> must be a Mediator between God and Man, and this is none
> other than the Holy Spirit, which brings the created earth into
> relation with the ‘Unthinkable One’, the Divine Reality” [PT 57].
> 
> 8. Socratic Dialectical Reasoning
> 
> In his guidance to the conduct of consultation by a Spiritual
> Assembly, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says, “The shining spark of truth
> cometh forth only after the clash of differing opinions” [SWAB
> 87, emphasis added]. This statement encapsulates the essence of
> Socratic dialectic reasoning14 in which we seek the truth by
> carefully cross-examining all ideas, by trying them against
> contradictory or alternative suggestions and by analyzing them
> in light of divine revelation and for logical consistency.
> Naturally, we must take into account the spiritual context of
> this intellectual procedure for it is this spiritual context which
> forms the psycho-spiritual environment that helps us find the
> truth. This spiritual focus is essential because it discourages
> human idiosyncrasies, foibles and/or personal agendas from
> derailing the dialectical reasoning process.
> 196                                     Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> Two words stand out in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s statement: “clash”
> and “only.” The former strikes a somewhat ‘Hegelian chord’ in
> its allusion to a “clash” or collision to test viewpoint and its
> rivals. The word “only” seems to re-enforce this ‘Hegelian
> chord’ insofar as the “clash” of opinions (not individuals) is
> necessary for testing viewpoints. However, in contrast to the
> Hegelian dialectic, Socratic and Bahá’í dialectical reasoning does
> not necessarily end in a synthesis of views; truth may be with
> one point of view or another.
> Although dialectical reasoning is necessary to Bahá’í
> consultation, it is not sufficient. Bahá’í consultation makes a
> key improvement in the process of dialectical reasoning by
> requiring participants to surrender personal ownership of ideas.
> 
> When an idea is put forth it becomes at once the
> property of the group. Although this notion sounds
> simple, it is perhaps the most profound principle of
> consultation ... When followed, this principle
> encourages those ideas that spring forth from a sincere
> desire to serve, as opposed to ideas that emanate from a
> desire for personal aggrandizement or constituency-
> building.15
> 
> Eliminating the concept of ‘ownership’ of ideas is essential to
> dialectical reasoning because the required objectivity is easily
> lost if the participants are side-tracked by personal ‘politics.’ As
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says, “They must in every matter search out the
> truth and not insist upon their own opinion” [SWAB 87]. Truth is
> all that matters.
> The role of dialectical reasoning is seen primarily in the
> requirements of consultation and less so in the Writings which
> have few clear-cut examples of dialectic reasoning. This is not
> unexpected since the Writings characteristically reason
> deductively from infallibly given universal premises and do not
> generally show the ‘debating’ process by which actual
> conclusions are reached. However, we do have an example of
> dialectical reasoning in its embryonic stage in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s
> discussion of pantheism in Some Answered Questions. Here we
> observe the pattern of exposition and refutation and/or
> improvement that characterizes dialectical reasoning. In the
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                 197
> 
> discussion of pantheism, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá explains Sufi and
> Theosophist beliefs about God’s relationship to the phenomenal
> world and then contrasts them with what the Prophets have
> taught. According to him, the Prophets teach that phenomenal
> reality emanates from God Who “remains and continues in the
> exaltation of Its [God’s] sanctity” [SAQ 293]. Manifestation,
> however, means something appears in various forms. He
> demonstrates the weaknesses of the Sufi-Theosophical
> arguments for manifestation and why emanation is the correct
> alternative. A similar pattern of exposition and refutation is
> found in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s discussion about reincarnation [SAQ
> 282] and “The Birth of Christ” [SAQ 87].
> 
> It should be mentioned in passing, that dialectical reasoning
> requires adherence to the four laws of reasoning discussed in
> previous sections. A dialogue in which terms are not used
> consistently, in which the choice of truth or falsity is evaded, in
> which logical self-contradictions are rampant and in which
> reasons are not adequate to the subject matter quickly
> degenerates into nonsense that communicates nothing except
> confusion. No one will know what anyone else is talking about
> and that makes communication impossible. It destroys the very
> possibility and purpose of consultation.
> 
> 9. A “Rational God”
> 
> Perhaps the most intriguing statement about rationality in
> the Bahá’í Writings is Shoghi Effendi’s reference to
> 
> that invisible yet rational God Who, however much we
> extol the divinity of His Manifestations on earth, can
> in no wise incarnate His infinite, His unknowable, His
> incorruptible and all-embracing Reality in the concrete
> and limited frame of a mortal being. Indeed, the God
> Who could so incarnate His own reality would, in the
> light of the teachings of Bahá’u’lláh, cease immediately
> to be God. So crude and fantastic a theory of Divine
> incarnation is as removed from, and incompatible with,
> the essentials of Bahá’í belief ... [WOB 112, emphasis
> added]
> 198                                    Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> Shoghi Effendi’s explanation tells us that an infinite and perfect
> God cannot incarnate Himself in finitude and imperfection
> without losing His identity as God. As Shoghi Effendi says,
> were God to do so, He would “cease immediately to be God.”
> i.e. God must be infinite and perfect to be God. Therein we see
> consistency with the law of identity (LI). Shoghi Effendi’s
> statement is also consistent with the law of non-contradiction
> (LNC) which tells us that God cannot be infinite and perfect as
> well as finite and imperfect at the same time in the same sense.
> Next, we observe the law of the excluded middle (LEM) insofar
> as one or the other of following statements must be true: ‘God
> is infinite and perfect’ or ‘God is not infinite and perfect.’ A
> third choice — which is precisely what the Christian
> understanding of the trinity asserts — is not logically possible.
> Shoghi Effendi describes this non-existent third choice as “crude
> and fantastic” which is a very strong rejection of a doctrine
> from another religion. Consistency with the three basic laws of
> standard logic is clearly one reason why Shoghi Effendi refers to
> a “rational God.” We hasten to add that this does not
> compromise God’s absolute freedom to act as He pleases. As
> creator of the laws of logic He is free to choose to act in
> agreement with them.
> Further evidence of God’s rationality is also seen in creation.
> As shown above, creation has a final cause, or purpose, a reason
> for being by which we can begin understanding it as an orderly
> composition and not “as a fortuitous composition and
> arrangement” [SAQ 181]. Order and purpose are essential
> attributes of rationality, and, in this case, signs of a “rational
> God” acting in the phenomenal world. Bahá’u’lláh says,
> 
> And when the sanctified souls rend asunder the veils of
> all earthly attachments ... then will the purpose of
> creation, which is the knowledge of Him Who is the
> Eternal Truth, become manifest. [KA 176]
> 
> Speaking of natural creation, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says, “the creation
> of God ... is not a fortuitous composition and arrangement
> [SAQ 181, emphasis added] and is “composed and combined with the
> greatest strength, conformable to wisdom and according to
> universal law” [SAQ 181]. Here, too, we observe that God reveals
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                199
> 
> Himself as acting consistently with purpose and reason. This
> does not, of course, mean that we humans always understand
> this purpose or the reasons for creation, but it means we can
> rest assured that such reasons and such a purpose exist.
> 
> 10. The Limits of Reason
> 
> There are, broadly speaking, three viewpoints about the
> powers of reason. Rationalism in its strongest form, often
> associated with empiricism and logical positivism, maintains
> that reason can tell us ‘everything.’ Whatever cannot be known
> by reason is not knowledge. Reason alone is both necessary and
> sufficient. At the other extreme is skepticism, in our time
> mainly in its as postmodern guise, which says reason can tell us
> nothing. There is no truth and we only have opinions or
> viewpoints, none less or more true than any other. Reason is
> neither necessary nor sufficient. Moderate rationalism lies
> between these two extremes. It holds that reason can tell us
> some things but not others; it has the ability to provide some
> knowledge but it also has limits. In short, reason is necessary
> but not sufficient.
> In our view, the Bahá’í Writings espouse moderate
> rationalism, i.e. the view that reason is necessary but not
> sufficient. Having examined the necessity of reason in the
> Writings, let us turn our attention to its limitations. Doing so
> requires a brief excursion into ontology since Bahá’í
> epistemology has an ontological foundation. In a nutshell, the
> Writings teach that ontology determines epistemology, i.e. what
> can be known is determined by a thing’s ontological status.
> Because “the degrees of existence are different and various,
> some beings are higher in the scale than others” [SAQ 130]. The
> result is that “everything which is lower is powerless to
> comprehend the reality of that which is higher” [SAQ 146, emphasis
> added] which brings us to the first limitation: human reason
> cannot comprehend God.
> 
> It is evident that the human understanding is a quality
> of the existence of man, and that man is a sign of God:
> how can the quality of the sign surround the creator of
> the sign? ... Therefore, the Reality of the Divinity is
> 200                                     Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> hidden from all comprehension, and concealed from the
> minds of all men. It is absolutely impossible to ascend
> to that plane. We see that everything which is lower is
> powerless to comprehend the reality of that which is
> higher. [SAQ 146, emphasis added]
> 
> The ontological difference between God and humankind is
> intrinsic and cannot be overcome. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá states
> categorically that “it is absolutely impossible to ascend to that
> plane.” This impossibility forbids all claims to know “the
> reality” or Essence of God and rejects all claims to having
> attained and experienced ontological unity with God, even if
> only in a subjective, emotional or ‘mystic’ state. This
> impossibility is “absolute” and, therefore, falsifies any claim to
> have attained such union from any perspective.16
> However, our understanding of this ontological difference
> must be fine-tuned for, as ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says, “The existence of
> the Divine Being hath been clearly established, on the basis of
> logical proofs, but the reality of the Godhead is beyond the
> grasp of the mind” [PUP 47, emphasis added]. In other words, we
> may know by logical proofs that God exists but not what God
> is, i.e. we may know about His existence which can be logically
> demonstrated, but we cannot know His Essence. In a similar
> vein Adib Taherzadeh writes,
> 
> It is essential to differentiate between the ‘Essence of
> God’ which Shoghi Effendi describes as the ‘innermost
> Spirit of Spirits’ or ‘Eternal Essence of Essences’, and
> ‘God revealed’ to humanity. The former is unknowable,
> while the latter is comprehensible to man.17
> 
> The “Essence of God” is unknowable but “God revealed’ to
> humanity” i.e. God as revealed in phenomenal creation — can be
> known. He is known to us through the revelation of the
> Manifestations. What the Manifestation reflects is derived
> from and associated with God — that is precisely what makes
> him a Manifestation — and what He reveals to us about God, is
> knowledge about God appropriate to human understanding.
> Another limitation of reason is identified when ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
> affirms that by “intellectual development and power of reason,
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                  201
> 
> man cannot attain to his fullest degree — cannot accomplish the
> progress effected by religion” [PUP 170]. Yet again, this time
> from a new perspective, the Writings support the central
> contention of moderate rationalism that reason while necessary
> is not sufficient for the full development of humankind. “No
> system of philosophy has ever been able to change the manners
> and customs of a people for the better” [PT 164] — a fact amply
> illustrated by the tragic history of various ideologies in the 20th
> Century. Genuine human development requires the power of the
> Holy Spirit:
> 
> The world of humanity must be confirmed by the
> breath of the Holy Spirit in order to receive universal
> education. [PUP 170]
> 
> Another limitation of reason is that it cannot learn about the
> essence of things directly. This brings us to one of the most
> philosophically important passages in the Writings.
> 
> Know that there are two kinds of knowledge: the
> knowledge of the essence of a thing and the knowledge
> of its qualities. The essence of a thing is known through
> its qualities; otherwise, it is unknown and hidden. [SAQ
> 220, emphasis added]
> 
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s wording in the second statement requires careful
> examination. It asserts that the “essence of a thing is known
> through its qualities; otherwise it is unknown and hidden.” In
> other words, it is, in fact, possible to know about essences but
> only by means of their “qualities” or attributes. Knowledge of
> essences is indirect, mediated by “their qualities.” There is no
> direct knowledge of the essence. Consequently, our reasoning is
> limited to these externalized, manifested qualities and actions of
> things. Abdu’l-Bahá adds,
> 
> the inner essence of anything is not comprehended, but
> only its qualities. For example, the inner essence of the
> sun is unknown, but is understood by its qualities,
> which are heat and light. The inner essence of man is
> unknown and not evident, but by its qualities it is
> characterized and known. Thus everything is known by
> 202                                     Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> its qualities and not by its essence. Although the mind
> encompasses all things, and the outward beings are
> comprehended by it, nevertheless these beings with
> regard to their essence are unknown; they are only
> known with regard to their qualities. [SAQ 220]
> 
> This passage reinforces the interpretation that the essence of
> things is not known in-itself but only externally by manifested
> qualities and their inter-action with the world. Only God has
> such knowledge of “inner essence[s].” Once again, we observe
> that this distinction puts restrictions on the powers of reason
> by forestalling all claims to immediate, ‘inside’ knowledge of
> essences. This prohibits any claims of ontological ‘mystical
> union’ with God since that would obviously provide such
> ‘inside’ knowledge of the divine.
> We must also recognize that reason cannot comprehend the
> higher spiritual realms such as the Abhá Kingdom, i.e. “the
> worlds beyond this, and their condition” [ABL 66]. This is
> another important limitation of reason, one which has a direct
> effect on beliefs regarding the after-life and the existence of
> super-sensory realms of being. Of these worlds, we can only
> know what the Writings tell us.
> Furthermore, reason by itself cannot complete its quest for
> knowledge, i.e. it lacks the power to attain the certainty with
> which the process of reasoning completes itself. (If it did not
> seek certainty what would be the point of the quest for
> knowledge?) Reason is necessary but is not sufficient to attain
> its natural goal of certainty. To attain certainty by itself, reason
> could only rely on still more reason, thus setting up an infinite
> regress which never achieves its goal. To achieve this certainty
> we must go beyond reason.
> 
> How shall we attain the reality of knowledge? By the
> breaths and promptings of the Holy Spirit, which is
> light and knowledge itself. Through it the human mind
> is quickened and fortified into true conclusions and
> perfect knowledge. [PUP 21, emphasis added]
> 
> In our view, the “reality of knowledge” includes the certainty
> that all knowledge seeks. This is only attained by the
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                  203
> 
> “promptings of the Holy Spirit” which enliven and strengthen
> the mind and “fortify[ ]” it into “true conclusions.” In short,
> the reasoning capacities are strengthened so that our findings
> have truth and certainty, i.e. “perfect knowledge.” Abdu’l-Bahá
> also says,
> 
> It is most certain that if human souls exercise their
> respective reason and intelligence upon the divine
> questions, the power of God will dispel every difficulty,
> and the eternal realities will appear as one light, one
> truth, one love, one God and a peace that is universal.
> [PUP 79]
> 
> What makes this statement especially interesting is that
> assistance from the “power of God,” is conditional upon our
> “exercise” of “reason and intelligence.” If we fail in this
> “exercise,” divine help cannot or will not assist us, a situation
> similar to The Arabic Hidden Words which state, “If thou
> lovest Me not, My love can in no wise reach thee” [HW Ar. 5].
> Equally noteworthy is the reference to using “reason and
> intelligence upon the divine questions,” i.e. to using reason in
> regards to spiritual issues thereby emphasizing that reason is not
> only applicable to the phenomenal realm. This passage illustrates
> yet again that reason is necessary but not sufficient in the quest
> for knowledge. The same idea is expressed in the following
> passage:
> 
> He has bestowed upon him the power of intellect so
> that through the attribute of reason, when fortified by
> the Holy Spirit, he may penetrate and discover ideal
> realities and become informed of the mysteries of the
> world of significances. As this power to penetrate the
> ideal knowledges is superhuman, supernatural, man
> becomes the collective center of spiritual as well as
> material forces... [PUP 303, emphasis added]
> 
> Reason, when “fortified by the Holy Spirit,” may acquire
> knowledge of “ideal” i.e. non-material realities and the
> supernatural realm because reason is “superhuman,
> supernatural.” When properly assisted, reason is not confined
> 204                                     Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> to the phenomenal world. However, without help from the Holy
> Spirit, even our natural, scientific knowledge is not possible.
> 
> Without the Holy Spirit he [man] would have no intellect,
> he would be unable to acquire his scientific knowledge
> ... The illumination of the Holy Spirit gives to man the
> power of thought, and enables him to make discoveries
> by which he bends the laws of nature to his will. [PT 58;
> cf. FWU 51]
> 
> Without the Holy Spirit, humans would have no “intellect”
> i.e. no mind and no reason by which to make scientific
> discoveries. Obviously, the “illumination” of the Holy Spirit is
> a pre-condition for the intellect or reasoning power in
> humankind; this divine illumination “gives to man the power of
> thought” and “enables him to make discoveries.” This explains
> why the action of the Holy Spirit cannot be explained in strictly
> rational and empirical terms. Illumination from the Holy Spirit
> is a pre-condition for reason and is therefore, ontologically
> superior to it. As we recall, the ontologically lower cannot
> understand the higher. Thus, the conclusion that the Holy
> Spirit’s actions are beyond reason is not merely a ‘mystification’
> or evasion but rather a strict logical consequence of the
> relationship between the dependent things and that on which
> they depend.
> Finally, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says that the
> 
> Holy Spirit gives the true method of comprehension
> which is infallible and indubitable. This is through the
> help of the Holy Spirit which comes to man, and this is
> the condition in which certainty can alone be attained.
> [SAQ 297, emphasis added]
> 
> Here, too, we find reference to the “true method of
> comprehension” which is available to the “quickened” mind as
> well as to the certainty or infallibility that “perfect knowledge”
> requires. Knowledge acquired with assistance of the Holy Spirit
> is described as “infallible and indubitable.” Elsewhere, ‘Abdu’l-
> Bahá also notes the possibility of certain knowledge: if we have
> proof that is acceptable to the senses, to reason, to “traditional
> authority” [PUP 254] and to the heart, we will have knowledge
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                   205
> 
> that can be “relied upon as perfectly correct” [PUP 254]. Later he
> adds that we can absolutely rely [on] and declare to be
> complete” [PUP 256, emphasis added] a proof that meets these four
> criteria. These statements suggest that in principle it is possible
> for humans to have certain knowledge — a topic we shall now
> examine more closely.
> 
> 11. The Reliability of Reason
> 
> There is yet one more, extraordinarily important limitation
> of reason i.e. the unreliability of the reasoning process itself.
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá refers to this limitation in his discussions when he
> that philosophers cannot come to any final agreement on a wide
> variety of issues.
> 
> Therefore, it is evident that the method of reason is not
> perfect, for the differences of the ancient philosophers,
> the want of stability and the variations of their
> opinions, prove this. For if it were perfect, all ought to
> be united in their ideas and agreed in their opinions.
> [SAQ 296, emphasis added]
> 
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s conclusion is based on the premise that truth is
> one; consequently, if the reasoning process were fully reliable,
> this one truth would be evident to all. Elsewhere he adds that
> these differences among scientists and philosophers are “clear
> proof that human reason is not to be relied upon as an infallible
> criterion” [PUP 21].
> We must carefully examine ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s statements about
> the unreliability of reason because they can easily be
> misinterpreted to undermine virtually everything the Writings
> say about epistemology, i.e. about knowledge and reason. First,
> we must note what the passage does not say. Although it
> discusses the reasoning process, the construction of chains of
> inferences, the formation of “opinions,” and debates among
> philosophers and scientists, it does not discuss what we may call
> the ‘basic knowledge’ we use to build rational inferences and
> arguments. In other words, this limitation of reason does not
> undermine or relativize statements such as fire is hotter than
> ice; a triangle has three sides; an elephant has more mass than an
> 206                                     Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> ant; you either went to bed last night or did not; the sun seems
> to go around the earth. The Writings, of course, make constant
> use of such basic knowledge in developing arguments,
> explicating teachings and illustrating spiritual principles: spring
> is preceded by winter and followed by summer [SAQ 73]; a clear
> sky lets us see the sun [PT 62]; we can travel underwater in
> submarines [PT 41]. The significance of this observation is that it
> limits human fallibility to the process of reasoning and does not
> necessarily apply to all knowledge claims. We may acquire
> certain knowledge or facts and though they are very basic, they
> are absolutely necessary to the construction and explication of
> arguments whether our own or those in the Writings. In fact,
> the Writings depend on basic knowledge being certain and
> universal in order to reach a world-wide audience. The full
> significance of this will become apparent later. For now we shall
> only conclude that the Bahá’í Writings avoid skepticism about
> all knowledge by recognizing the validity of basic knowledge.
> If misinterpreted, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s statements about the
> imperfection of the reasoning process can lead to claims of a
> serious self-contradiction in the Writings. On one hand, the
> Writings note the unreliability of reason while on the other,
> they put enormous emphasis on reason and rationality, even for
> religion and spiritual issues. As we have seen, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
> admonishes us to use reason as a test for distinguishing religion
> from ignorance and superstition. However, if reason is
> unreliable, how can we use it as instructed by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá?
> How can it be useful in recognizing superstitions when reason
> itself is not reliable? On the surface at least, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s
> critique of reason seems to undermine and contradict the
> Writing’s strong advocacy of reason. This confronts us with a
> stark question: Do the Writings contradict themselves?
> Before demonstrating how Shoghi Effendi resolves this
> contradiction, it is important to recall that reasoning
> “fortified” [PUP 22] by the Holy Spirit can attain “certainty”
> [SAQ 299]. Therefore, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s declaration about the limits
> of reason do not apply in such cases. This means that
> infallibility is possible in principle — a fact of immense
> importance in regards to the Universal House of Justice which
> is the recipient of divine guidance.
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                  207
> 
> One way of resolving this apparent contradiction between
> advocating and apparently undermining reason is to recall
> Shoghi Effendi’s statement that the Bahá’í Faith is “scientific in
> its method.”18 This has several applications. The first is that
> science recognizes that in principle reason is fallible and that all
> truth-claims are provisional, but at the same time, it recognizes
> that in practice truth-claims are accepted as true until there is
> empirical evidence and demonstrably better reasoning to prove
> otherwise. No mere imaginative speculation about possibilities
> suffice to dislodge a provisionally certain fact; better empirical
> evidence and better reasoning are required. Thus, while from the
> perspective of principle, there are no absolute certainties in
> science, from the perspective of practice there are pragmatic
> certainties we use until contrary concrete observational and
> rational evidence arises. All accepted scientific facts are in this
> position: fallible in principle but having pragmatic certainty.
> For example, in principle the heliocentric theory of the solar
> system is fallible, but in practice no one questions it given the
> absence of empirical evidence. The suggestion that it is simply
> an illusion from Descartes’ clever demon — or the Matrix — is
> of no value to science. In this way, science strikes a balance
> between stability and change.
> Applied to the Writings, this leads to the view that ‘Abdu’l-
> Bahá’s occasional statements about the fallibility of natural,
> unassisted reason concern principle, while his frequent
> statements extolling and recommending reason concern
> practice. This means there is no contradiction between principle
> and practice because they refer to different aspects of
> reasoning. Therefore, they do not really contradict or
> undermine each other.
> We might also say that while the main emphasis is on the use
> of reason, passages on the limitations of reason are meant
> primarily as a heuristic admonition to forestall hubris about our
> reasoning processes and the resulting conflicts. This ‘corrective
> view’ is supported by the enormous disparity between the
> number of passages extolling and recommending reason and the
> very small number of passages about its limitations [SAQ 207; PUP
> 21 and 254]. Like any good teacher, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá highlights the
> main lesson he wants to teach, in this case, the importance of
> 208                                   Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> using reason in the quest for both spiritual and worldly
> knowledge. However, he also provides a corrective if arguments
> get out of hand, and forestalls the hubris of extreme rationalism
> that might even claim to know God in His Essence.
> The inherent fallibility of reason also raises the problem of
> circular reasoning. If reason is fallible, how can we use it to
> judge a work of reasoning with any confidence in the results?
> We are caught in a vicious circle. Is there a way of escape? In
> principle, for science there is no escape since there is nothing
> superior to reason by which to judge its results. One can only
> check and re-check one’s data and conclusions in hopes of
> finding hidden errors — and await the results of other research.
> On the other hand, Bahá’í epistemology distinguishes between
> natural reason working alone and natural reason “fortified” [PUP
> 22] by the Holy Spirit and, therefore, has a superior platform by
> which to judge the results of reasoning. The problem for Bahá’ís
> is knowing which reasoning process has been “fortified” and
> which has not.
> To help us judge the results of our reasoning, the Writings
> are “scientific in [their] method” in a second way. The sciences
> use a “negative gate-keeper” method of excluding inadequate
> viewpoints that cannot meet certain criteria — such as
> quantification, physicality, objectivity or falsifiability. Any
> hypothesis that meets the various criteria is acceptable until
> experimentation or the discovery of an internal reasoning error
> rule it out. For example, although in quantum physics the
> Copenhagen interpretation is most often cited, (a trend that is
> now changing) there are, in fact, several other scientifically
> valid interpretations of quantum data. They all make the same
> predictions and are, therefore, recognized as equally valid, e.g.
> interpretations by Everett, Gell-Mann and de Broglie-Bohm.19
> The negative gate-keeper has two correlated functions. First,
> it tells us what criteria a hypothesis or viewpoint must have to
> be acceptable. In physics, quantification is one of them.
> Second, the negative gate-keeper tells us what to avoid.
> Physicists must avoid Aristotelian concepts of momentum and
> chemists must avoid the phlogiston theory of combustion. The
> negative gate-keeper does not dictate any specific interpretation
> or hypothesis but only criteria which our theories must satisfy.
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                209
> 
> Within that framework, we may believe or hypothesize anything
> we believe is true. The net effect is that both unity of subject
> matter and diversity of exploration and hypothesizing are
> preserved.
> A similar situation prevails in the Writings. They lay out
> certain criteria for our beliefs. For example, they must be based
> on the Writings and at least be conflict-free vis-à-vis guidance
> from the Universal House of Justice. Furthermore, Bahá’u’lláh
> and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá also tell us particular beliefs to avoid. For
> example, the criteria that God does not manifest Himself in His
> creation, leads to the rejection of metaphysical pantheism [SAQ
> 289], and God’s literal incarnation in Christ [SAQ 152]. On the
> basis of the criteria that “there are no repetitions in nature”
> [PUP 285] the concept of re-incarnation [PUP 167] is rejected.
> Ontological materialism [PUP 262], is denied because it asserts
> that spiritual and non-material aspects of existence are not real.
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá rejects the traditional Biblical interpretation of
> the Fall [SAQ 122] because it violates the criterion of logical
> reason: “the intelligence cannot accept it” [SAQ 122]. He rejects
> a host of traditional Biblical interpretations on this ground.20
> Among the other views rejected are the concepts of a real
> infinite regress [SAQ 148], atheism, the materiality of the soul
> and the mortality of the human soul. This list tells us what
> beliefs to avoid, and, thereby, helps us set aside viewpoints
> which imply or directly invoke rejected positions. However, as
> with science, the negative gate-keeper here does not dictate any
> specific understanding per se; it only gives us criteria for
> whatever understandings we may develop.
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá presents this idea in the image of the garden.
> Although he envisages a garden made up of many kinds of
> flowers, he also distinguishes between the plants in the garden
> and those outside in their “wild state” [SAQ 194]. The latter he
> associates with unfruitfulness. However, just as some plants or
> trees can be cultivated to become fruitful, some concepts can
> be revised to meet the criteria of the Writings [SAQ 7]. ‘Abdu’l-
> Bahá’s example gives a concrete illustration how negative gate-
> keeping preserves the unity, i.e. identity of the Bahá’í teachings
> and, at the same time allows the maximal diversity of ideas and
> understandings.
> 210                                   Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> The need for negative gate-keeping is clear. Without the
> ability to make critical judgments and to impose criteria of
> understanding, without some way of distinguishing truth from
> error, the independent investigation of truth would be a
> pointless exercise. Why bother seeking the truth if every
> proposition or viewpoint is true? Indeed, if every proposition
> or truth-claim is true, how can we even try to distinguish truth
> from error or identify “the people of error” [TDP 51; SAQ pp. 59,
> 75]. In such situations, no guidance — even divine guidance — is
> necessary: we can simply believe whatever suits us at the
> moment which is the very antithesis of the Manifestation’s
> mission.
> There are several advantages to the negative gate-keeper
> method used by the Writings. One is that it preserves the unique
> identity and nature of the Bahá’í Faith and its teachings while,
> at the same time, allowing the maximal variety of ideas and
> understandings. It balances unity-in-diversity with as much
> emphasis on the unity as on the diversity. Any ideas that do not
> run afoul of the criteria the Writings establish are acceptable,
> even though they may clash with each other.
> The negative gate-keeper has one other advantage, namely, it
> provides what we have called ‘practical certainty’ in a foregoing
> section of this paper. While reason alone cannot give us
> absolute certainty, our understandings and practices can have
> ‘practical certainty’ as long as they meet the criteria of reason
> and the guidelines given by the Writings. This, too, strengthens
> diversity because it encourages different understandings and
> practices to flourish without threatening the unity of the
> teachings.
> Inevitably, it will be asked ‘How do we determine which
> interpretation is to be passed by the negative gate-keeper?’ In
> our opinion, there is no hard-and-fast answer to this question.
> Instead, there are several means by which an idea may be tested.
> The Bahá’í Faith, of course, has no clergy or ‘official
> philosopher’ to ensure harmony with the Teachings because it
> guarantees that individuals have a duty and right to investigate
> and think for themselves. Thus, in our view, this determination
> is first made by those who suggest an idea; they have an obvious
> interest in seeing that their ideas harmonize with the Writings
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                 211
> 
> or at least are neutral. Second, whether or not an idea can pass
> the negative gate-keeper may emerge in discussion with others
> who might be able to show an explicit or implicit problem.
> Moreover, given the enormous emphasis on reason in the
> Writings, we might also say that the application of reason itself
> can help us make this determination. If an argument logically
> implies conclusions that violate certain Teachings, and/or are
> logically deficient, then obviously there is a problem to be
> rectified. Finally, in the case of papers intended for publication,
> the review process may also play a role under some
> circumstances.
> 
> 12. Non-Discursive Knowing and Thinking
> 
> So far we have examined what is called ‘discursive reason,’
> i.e. reaching conclusions on the basis of chains of inference
> based on universal premises, empirical evidence or analogies.
> Discursive reasoning requires clearly articulated steps according
> to the laws of logic. In our view, this kind of reasoning is
> pervasive throughout the Writings — but does not cover all
> ways of acquiring knowledge and reaching conclusions. The
> Writings, as noted before, espouse a moderate rationalism
> which recognizes the validity of non-discursive methods of
> knowing and finding truth. Some authors such as Ken Wilber21
> refer to these methods as ‘transrational,’ i.e. psycho-spiritual
> processes that include but transcend reason. They do not violate
> rationality but go beyond it.
> Before proceeding, it is important to highlight that non-
> discursive reasoning is not to be confused with irrationality.
> The irrational and the non-discursive differ insofar as
> irrationality involves a cognitive deficiency or confusion in the
> reasoning process. It may involve setting aside reason in favor
> of something else, e.g. a personal preference or desire, a
> political agenda, an advantage to be gained or a sheer assertion
> of will power for its own sake. On the other hand, non-
> discursive reasoning is a way of acquiring knowledge or
> reaching conclusions about reality that does not involve the
> chains of inference we have previously examined.
> 212                                     Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> When speaking of non-discursive reasoning, we must
> distinguish between the process and the result. By definition,
> the process itself is non-discursive i.e. it cannot be
> communicated by laying out a chain of logical inferences.
> About the process we must remain silent, or communicate by
> metaphors, analogies or by various forms of artistic expression.
> However, the result, i.e. the conclusions we reach or the actions
> we take on the basis of the non-discursive process must, at the
> very least, not contradict the Writing’s emphasis on rationality.
> The Writings would be weakened by another serious self-
> contradiction in their epistemology if intrinsic rationality of
> the soul and ‘other ways of knowing’ conflicted with reason
> instead of complementing it. Even if the process of attaining
> knowledge is non-discursive, the results must still make sense in
> and be applicable to this world. If they do not, they will simply
> be irrational — which means they would not pass the test of
> rationality which the Writings recommend. Indeed, if such
> ‘other ways of knowing’ were irrational, they would also be
> violating the very essence of man, i.e. the “rational soul.”
> It is noteworthy that irrationality has only negative
> connotations in the Writings. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá associates the
> irrational with the “foolish” [SWAB 185], and with the “irrational
> drinker” [TAB3 492]. Shoghi Effendi associates it with the
> “illogical,”22 with “irrational instincts of youth, its follies, its
> prodigality, its pride, its self-assurance, its rebelliousness, and
> contempt of discipline” [PDC 117] and “superstition” [WOB 137].
> Irrationality has no place in the Bahá’í quest for knowledge and
> truth.
> 
> 13. Non-Discursive Thinking: The Heart
> 
> Although the heart is the most important ‘organ’ or capacity
> for non-discursive reasoning, it is not in inherent conflict with
> reason. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá tells us, “The world of minds corresponds
> with the world of hearts [PUP 270, emphasis added]. In other words,
> the heart and mind or reason23 are distinct but they are not
> opposed, i.e. do not necessarily contradict one another although
> they ‘deliberate’ in different ways. The Writings show this in
> several ways. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says, “And among the teachings of
> Bahá’u’lláh is, that religion must be in conformity with science
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                   213
> 
> and reason, so that it may influence the hearts of men.”24 It is
> noteworthy that reason is able to “influence the heart.” This
> idea is emphasized in the following:
> 
> If religious belief and doctrine is at variance with
> reason, it proceeds from the limited mind of man and
> not from God; therefore, it is unworthy of belief and
> not deserving of attention; the heart finds no rest in it,
> and real faith is impossible. How can man believe that
> which he knows to be opposed to reason? Is this
> possible? Can the heart accept that which reason denies?
> Reason is the first faculty of man and the religion of
> God is in harmony with it. [PUP 231]
> 
> There are several issues here. First is the suggestion that what
> is rational comes from God, and what is irrational comes from
> the human mind. Here, too, God is associated with rationality —
> as in Shoghi Effendi’s reference to the “rational God” — though
> this trait does not, of course, exhaust His nature. Second, the
> heart cannot find rest in beliefs and doctrines that are “at
> variance with reason.” In other words, the heart cannot find
> rest in the irrational and even more — “real faith” in the
> irrational is “impossible.” The heart cannot accept ideas that
> violate reason which means that in some sense the heart is
> rational too or at least sufficiently sensitive to rationality to
> make it a requirement.
> Throughout the Writings we are instructed to “ponder in
> [our] hearts” [SWAB 241] a variety of subjects such as
> Bahá’u’lláh’s prophesies [SWAB 17], “the mysteries of Divine
> Revelation” [KI 47], and the social principles of the Faith. The
> heart is described as “the seat of the revelation of the inner
> mysteries of God” [GWB CXXV 264]. It is clear that the heart, like
> reason, is able to cogitate, assess, reflect, analyze, understand
> and conclude, albeit it ways that we cannot explain discursively.
> For example, Bahá’u’lláh says, “Ponder this in thine heart, that
> thou mayest comprehend its meaning” [GWB XVII 46], and
> “Ponder this in thine heart, that the truth may be revealed unto
> thee” [GWB XXXII 76] thereby showing that the heart can
> examine, reflect on, understand and comprehend the truth. The
> heart has an epistemological function as indicated by the phrase
> 214                                      Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> “understanding heart” [GDM 51]. The heart’s function in
> acquiring truth is noted elsewhere as well: “May your hearts
> become clear and pure like unto polished mirrors in which may
> be reflected the full glory of the Sun of Truth” [PT 95] and “men
> of enlightened heart worship truth on whatever horizon it
> appears” [PT 128, emphasis added]. It also has a cognitive function
> as indicated by the phrase, “sight of thy heart” [SWAB 37] which
> is to say that in its own way, the heart can perceive things, in
> this case, “intellectual realities” among which ‘Abdu’l-Bahá lists
> “all the qualities and admirable perfections of man” [SAQ 263]
> and “love” [SAQ 83]. The heart is also described as a “spiritual
> faculty” [TAB1 208] gifted in “spiritual susceptibilities” [PUP 7; cf.
> TAB2 286] which is to say, it is open to spiritual influences:
> “reflections of the spirit and impressions of the Divine are now
> mirrored clear and sharp in the deep heart’s core” [SWAB 19].
> However, what can it mean to ‘ponder in our hearts’? How
> can we ‘ponder’ or reach understandings or conclusions without
> abstract concepts or discursive logical operations or, possibly,
> even without words? To what extent can we be conscious of
> these deliberations? On the basis of our studies, we conclude
> that the Writings do not provide us with precise information
> about this because one cannot give exact discursive descriptions
> of non-discursive processes. We can only experience them and
> feel their influences on our thinking as we “ponder in [our]
> hearts” [SWAB 241].
> Given the consistent association of the heart with various
> kinds of love in the Writings, it seems plausible that the
> deliberations of the heart are intimately connected with the
> feelings of love for God and His creation, i.e. the ‘agapeic’25
> aspects of humankind. These include sympathy, empathy,
> personal and existential concern, compassion, and devotion.
> But even this love is rational in the sense of being appropriate
> to the soul that God has created in each person. Thus, when we
> “ponder in [our] hearts,” it seems likely that we deliberate under
> the guidance of, or in the light of, love as the fundamental force
> in the cosmos: “Love is the fundamental principle of God’s
> purpose for man, and He has commanded us to love each other
> even as He loves us” [PT 121]. When pondering in our hearts, we
> observe and reflect about people, things and issues from the
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                 215
> 
> perspective of God’s universal love as reflected in us and, in
> doing so, reach our conclusions. How exactly this happens,
> cannot, as said before, be discursively explained. It is a process
> that must be personally experienced directly to be understood.
> In that way, it resembles what ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says about our
> understanding of immortality:
> 
> But if the human spirit will rejoice and be attracted to
> the Kingdom of God, if the inner sight becomes
> opened, and the spiritual hearing strengthened, and the
> spiritual feelings predominant, he will see the
> immortality of the spirit as clearly as he sees the sun.
> [SAQ 225]
> 
> This heart-knowledge is immediate, like the knowledge of our
> own physical sensations and even spiritual insights. According
> to the Writings, the mind and spirit are directly aware of our
> own bodily states as well as our own feelings and “spiritual
> conditions” [SAQ 157].
> Such knowledge is not based on a clear-cut subject/object
> division as are all other kinds of knowledge and thought. When
> we perceive a tree or think about an idea, there is a difference
> between the object of thought and the person thinking, i.e.
> between subject and object, the knower and what is known.
> Consequently, we must consciously exert “effort and study” to
> know and think about them because they are external to us.
> However, with our bodily, emotional and spiritual states, we are
> both subject and object, knower and known. It is a direct,
> immediate, intimate “knowledge of being” not a mediated,
> objective knowledge about being. Moreover, this knowledge is
> not limited to ourselves alone. Because humans are a
> “microcosm” [PUP 69] the laws, principles or ‘mysteries’ of entire
> universe is “expressed or revealed” [PUP 69] within us. This
> suggests that in our heart-ponderings, we may, if we go deep
> enough, also gain knowledge about creation in this way.
> 216                                     Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> 14. Intuition
> 
> Intuitions are another non-discursive way of knowing
> according to the Writings. Speaking about the divine origin of
> the universe, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says,
> 
> These obvious arguments are adduced for weak souls;
> but if the inner perception be open, a hundred thousand
> clear proofs become visible. Thus, when man feels the
> indwelling spirit, he is in no need of arguments for its
> existence. [SAQ 6]
> 
> If we have direct sight or experiential knowledge we have no
> need of discursive, step-by-step inferential reasoning. Opening
> our eyes — not devising arguments — will prove the existence of
> the sun. The direct experience is identified with feelings in this
> passage, once again suggesting that feelings are the medium of
> this kind of direct, non-discursive knowledge. After discussing
> the immortality of the soul, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá declares,
> 
> if the inner sight becomes opened, and the spiritual
> hearing strengthened, and the spiritual feelings
> predominant, he will see the immortality of the spirit as
> clearly as he sees the sun. [SAQ 225, emphasis added]
> 
> Here, too, we observe that direct insight — “inner sight” — and
> “spiritual feelings” give us non-discursive knowledge about
> spiritual topics like immortality. However, we must bear in
> mind that direct “inner sight,” though not subject to inferential
> reasoning, is not inherently irrational, and thereby, opposed to
> the “rational soul.”
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá shows the necessity of intuition for ontological
> reasons. There are “invisible realms which the human intellect
> can never hope to fathom nor the mind conceive” [SWAB 185].
> These cannot be known by discursive reasoning no matter how
> astute; rather we must cleanse the channel of our “spiritual
> sense” [SWAB 185] which leads us to “the sweet scents of
> holiness” [SWAB 185] or intuitions from the “invisible realms.”
> Again, we should note that nothing here suggests that these
> intuitions are not in harmony with reason even though the
> process of receiving them cannot be described discursively.
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                      217
> 
> Like intuitions, ‘transcendent experiences’ also seem to take
> us out of the world of ordinary time and space. Such
> experiences can only be discussed — if at all — only by means of
> poetic metaphors. We find one such described in The Seven
> Valleys. Having explained His statements about firstness and
> lastness, Bahá’u’lláh informs us that these statements apply to
> the “sphere of that which is relative,” i.e. the ordinary world,
> “of variation and oneness, of limitation and detachment” [KI
> 160].
> 
> These statements are made in the sphere of that which is
> relative, because of the limitations of men. Otherwise,
> those personages who in a single step have passed over
> the world of the relative and the limited, and dwelt on
> the fair plane of the Absolute, and pitched their tent in
> the worlds of authority and command — have burned
> away these relativities with a single spark, and blotted
> out these words with a drop of dew. And they swim in
> the sea of the spirit, and soar in the holy air of light.
> Then what life have words, on such a plane, that “first”
> and “last” or other than these be seen or mentioned! In
> this realm, the first is the last itself, and the last is but
> the first. [SV 26]
> 
> A few “personages” have transcended this ordinary plane of
> existence. In some indescribable way, they have attained a realm
> beyond explanation by discursive reasoning, though what
> transpires in that realm is not be incompatible with reason.
> God, after all, is a “rational God” and we would not expect His
> creation to violate His own nature. What we encounter in this
> realm is beyond discursive explanation, a knowledge that must
> be experienced, not discursively described. The acceptance of
> such experiential knowledge emphasizes the moderate
> rationalism in the Writings.
> One of the conclusions we may draw from our discussion of
> the heart, intuition and transcendent experience is that
> rationality and discursivity are not synonymous in the Writings.
> Viewing a work of art may give us experiential knowledge but
> such knowledge is not necessarily non-rational because it is non-
> discursive, i.e. cannot be satisfactorily be explained in
> 218                                       Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> inferential steps. Indeed, given our essential nature as “rational
> souls” and the existence of a “rational God” it is hard to see
> how any true knowledge or understanding of any sort could be
> non-rational even though it is non-discursive.
> 
> 15. The Uses of Reason in the Writings
> 
> Perhaps the most important use of reason in the Writings is
> to test the validity of religion and religious beliefs.
> 
> Consider what it is that singles man out from among
> created beings, and makes of him a creature apart. Is it
> not his reasoning power, his intelligence? Shall he not
> make use of these in his study of religion? I say unto
> you: weigh carefully in the balance of reason and
> science everything that is presented to you as religion.
> If it passes this test, then accept it, for it is truth! If,
> however, it does not so conform, then reject it, for it is
> ignorance! [PT 144]
> 
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá notes that reasoning is humanity’s distinguishing
> feature and, in the form of a rhetorical question, tells us to use
> our “reasoning power” in our “study of religion.” There is no
> suggestion here that reason cannot deal with spiritual issues. He
> then commands us to “test” religion by reason. Elsewhere he
> tells us that “Religion must stand the analysis of reason” [PUP
> 175]. If religion must pass the test of rationality, then obviously
> reason is sufficiently reliable to make such analysis feasible and
> worthwhile. If it were not, there would be no point to ‘Abdu’l-
> Bahá’s command to use it. This demonstrates yet again that
> while we must be aware of reason’s limitations, we should not
> let them deter us from using and relying on reason. He says,
> 
> In divine questions we must not depend entirely upon
> the heritage of tradition and former human experience;
> nay, rather, we must exercise reason, analyze and
> logically examine the facts presented so that confidence
> will be inspired and faith attained. [PUP 327, emphasis
> added]
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                    219
> 
> It is important to note the imperative — “we must exercise
> reason” which implies not only that reason is sufficiently
> reliable for the task but also that we are remiss if we do not use
> it. Noteworthy as well is the command that we must “logically
> examine” religious teachings. Moreover, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá also
> declares that “If religion were contrary to logical reason then it
> would cease to be a religion and be merely a tradition” [PT 142,
> emphasis added]. Here, too, we observe the association of reason
> and logic.
> Further evidence of reason’s ability to deal with and test
> spiritual subjects is ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s declaration that
> 
> The intellectual proofs of Divinity are based upon
> observation and evidence which constitute decisive
> argument, logically proving the reality of Divinity, the
> effulgence of mercy, the certainty of inspiration and
> immortality of the spirit. This is, in reality, the science
> of Divinity [PUP 326].
> 
> Even the existence of God — Who is absolutely non-material —
> can be “decisive[ly]” proven by reason and logic, a view re-
> affirmed elsewhere when he says, the “existence of the Divine
> Being hath been clearly established, on the basis of logical
> proofs.”26 It is significant that he accepts the validity of logical
> proofs of God’s existence as being “decisive” and “clearly
> established” without the slightest suggestion that we should
> doubt these results. Once again we observe that reason and
> logic are not only applicable to metaphysical and theological
> subjects but are also deemed sufficiently reliable to be used in
> this way. Other spiritual topics which reason can demonstrate
> are “the effulgence of mercy,” “the certainty of inspiration” and
> the “immortality of the spirit” all of which transcend the
> empirical-physical aspects of reality. In a similar vein, he
> affirms “The Unity of God is logical, and this idea is not
> antagonistic to the conclusions arrived at by scientific study”
> [PT 141]. He also asserts that “If a question be found contrary to
> reason, faith and belief in it are impossible, and there is no
> outcome but wavering and vacillation” [PUP 181]. Reason is
> necessary to attaining genuine faith that can withstand the tests
> of this world; without such support from reason, faith will
> 220                                       Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> vacillate or waver. This suggests that reason is also necessary to
> faith and that faith without reason is deficient.
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá sums up his teachings about reason and religion
> with the assertion that “The foundations of religion are
> reasonable” [PUP 128]. In other words, reason is at the very base
> of religion and is, fundamentally, a rational enterprise though
> we cannot grasp all aspects of this rationality in logical
> discursive reason. This reasonable foundation is, of course, why
> religion and science can be in harmony: they share the same
> foundation and, therefore, are unified in their beginnings.
> 
> 16. The Search for Truth
> 
> The Writings are clear that reason enables us to discover
> truth; after all, if reason could not discover truth, there is no
> point in requiring us to use it. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says, “God has
> created man in order that he may perceive the verity of
> existence and endowed him with mind or reason to discover
> truth” [PUP 287, 303, emphasis added].27 Similarly, he says, “He
> [God] has endowed him [man] with mind, or the faculty of
> reasoning, by the exercise of which he is to investigate and
> discover the truth” [PUP 291, emphasis added]. He declares that
> “God has created man and endowed him with the power of
> reason whereby he may arrive at valid conclusions” [PUP 312,
> emphasis added]. Indeed, the Bahá’í Writings constantly emphasize
> that truth exists and that reason can discover it. As ‘Abdu’l-
> Bahá says,
> 
> [t]he power of the rational soul can discover the
> realities of things, comprehend the peculiarities of
> beings, and penetrate the mysteries of existence. All
> sciences, knowledge, arts, wonders, institutions,
> discoveries and enterprises come from the exercised
> intelligence of the rational soul. [SAQ 217, emphasis added]
> 
> The last sentence is especially important, telling us that “all
> sciences, knowledge ... come from the exercised intelligence of
> the rational soul.” If all knowledge comes from the rational
> soul, this includes non-discursive knowledge which is still
> rational though not open to discursive explanation. As noted
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                  221
> 
> before, discursivity and rationality are not synonymous in the
> Writings. There are levels of truth which, though rational,
> cannot be set down in step-by-step inferences of discursive
> reasoning. To emphasize reason’s ability to discover truth,
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says,
> 
> God has created man in order that he may perceive the
> verity of existence and endowed him with mind or
> reason to discover truth. Therefore, scientific
> knowledge and religious belief must be conformable to
> the analysis of this divine faculty in man. [PUP 287; cf.
> PUP 291]
> 
> It is noteworthy that he says that “religious belief” must be
> “conformable” to reason, implying, thereby, that irrational
> religious beliefs are unacceptable and that such beliefs are
> unworthy of the “rational soul.” This statement also implies
> that there are real differences between truth and nonsense.
> 
> Part II: Questions Concerning Reason
> In the first part of this study, we have examined the role of
> reason in the Writings. We shall now turn our attention to
> some the issues that may arise in regards to this topic.
> 
> 17. The Issue of Diversity
> 
> Because of the strong and pervasive emphasis on reason
> throughout the Bahá’í Writings, the issue of diversity arises. It
> may be argued that the prominence of reason and especially
> standard or Aristotelian reason throughout the Writings
> undermines the teachings on diversity, notably cultural
> diversity. Standard reasoning is, after all, the associated with a
> particular, i.e. Western culture and is not necessarily relevant to
> all cultures. Some might even argue that the emphasis on such
> reason is little more than a “post-colonialist” attempt to impose
> Western thought forms on the non-Western world. In general
> terms, we may ask, ‘Why is there such a pervasive presence of
> Aristotelian or standard logic when such logic seems to
> 222                                      Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> undermine diversity and privilege works that harmonize with
> reason or at least do not contradict it?’
> Before continuing, we must emphasize the unchallengeable
> right of individuals to hold any view/interpretation of the
> Writings they like, rationally tenable or not. That right is never
> in question and must be vigorously upheld: “at the very root of
> the Cause lies the principle of the undoubted right of the
> individual to self-expression, his freedom to declare his
> conscience and set forth his views” [PBA 43]. Nonetheless, saying
> that nothing can diminish our right to hold even rationally
> untenable views is not the same as saying that all views are
> equally rational and/or tenable. The first is a judicial issue while
> the second is epistemological.
> However, the Writings instruct us to use the “divine faculty”
> [PUP 287] of reason as a tool to distinguish tenable from
> untenable views. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá directs us to
> 
> weigh carefully in the balance of reason and science
> everything that is presented to you as religion. If it
> passes this test, then accept it, for it is truth! If,
> however, it does not so conform, then reject it, for it is
> ignorance! [SAQ 144]
> 
> Elsewhere he tells us that “both [religion and science] are
> founded upon the premises and conclusions of reason, and both
> must bear its test” [PUP 107]. This makes it clear that reason is
> inherently a selective mechanism which involves rejecting some
> views or, at least, setting them aside until they have been made
> rationally tenable. Such a selective mechanism is necessary
> because the whole point of investigating the truth is lost
> without it. Why seek the truth if there is no way of
> distinguishing it from error, or if we have no standard by which
> to differentiate the more plausible from the less plausible?
> Without the standard of reason “anything goes”28 and
> consequently, one of the foundational teachings — seeking the
> truth — of the Bahá’í Faith is lost. Indeed, the concept of
> consultation is also lost without the goal of distinguishing the
> tenable from the untenable. Making such distinctions is
> precisely the point of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s declaration that “The
> shining spark of truth cometh forth only after the clash of
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                223
> 
> differing opinions” [SWAB 87]. Finally, the doctrine of the
> harmony of science and religion is undermined if we refuse to
> recognize that reason is necessary to help us distinguish tenable
> from untenable views, e.g. oxidation versus the phlogiston
> theory of combustion.
> If all viewpoints were equally rational or tenable or all
> harmonized with the Writings to an equal degree it is difficult,
> if not impossible, to explain why Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
> reject some ideas as false. Metaphysical pantheism [SAQ 289],
> ontological materialism [PUP 262], and re-incarnation [PUP 167]
> are explicitly disallowed. Furthermore, Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-
> Bahá refer to some ideas as “absurd” [SAQ 291], “childish” [PUP
> 219], “erroneous” [SAQ 278; TB 124], “mistaken” [PUP 87], and
> “wrong” [SAQ 6] thereby, obviously rejecting them, and, by
> implication, guiding us to reject them too. In other words,
> acceptance and encouragement of diversity does not necessarily
> mean that “anything goes” and that there are no standards by
> which to distinguish the tenable from the untenable. The
> Writings make reason, and specifically standard reason, one of
> those standards.
> It might be argued that making such judgments on the basis
> of the pervasive presence of standard or Aristotelian reasoning
> in the Writings is a manifestation of a ‘post-colonialist’ sense
> of superiority. However, there are several problems with the
> ‘post-colonial’ critique. Most obviously, the objection is, in the
> last analysis, beside the point. Whether it is ‘post-colonial’
> thinking or not, the Bahá’í Writings see rationality as the
> essential attribute of the human soul and pervasively and
> consistently model rationality in the form associated with
> Aristotelian or standard reasoning. In other words, this form of
> reasoning is unavoidable in any encounter with the Writings.
> Regardless of what culture people come from and what level of
> education they have, they will have to enrich themselves with
> this aspect of the Writings if they wish to understand the
> arguments used by Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. Since “in this
> age the peoples of the world need the arguments of reason”
> [SAQ 7, emphasis added] it would especially difficult to overlook
> the ubiquity of Aristotelian reasoning in the Writings simply
> 224                                     Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> because a number of current academic theories find this model
> of rationality problematic.
> The main problem with the ‘post-colonialist’ critique is that
> it commits the genetic fallacy, i.e. a fallacy of irrelevance which
> makes a pejorative judgment about something on the basis of
> its supposed origins or past use instead of by its inherent
> content and application. The fact that standard logic originated
> in the West and spread globally by means of Western
> imperialism does not necessarily make it inapplicable on a
> global basis to other cultures and in our time. Indeed, since the
> Bahá’í Writings make such extensive use of standard logic
> decisively, it seems obvious that neither its content nor its
> application is necessarily and inherently harmful to anyone or
> any culture. Without a doubt, the Writings use and recommend
> such reasoning and provide such models precisely because they
> are deemed helpful and conducive to human development
> during the remainder of this dispensation. Would we expect the
> Bahá’í Writings to model or recommend anything that does not
> have positive potential for human development? Surely, given
> the pervasiveness of standard logic in the Writings, it is more
> likely that such reasoning is essential or necessary to positive
> human development.
> A second major problem with the ‘post-colonial’ critique is
> that it overlooks the universality of the Law of Non-
> contradiction (LNC), which encapsulates the essence of standard
> or Aristotelian reasoning. No matter what individuals or
> cultures claim to believe about logical contradictions, no matter
> what models of logic they have, in the practice of daily life they
> behave according to the LNC. People in all ages and in all places
> know that we cannot have eaten lunch and not eaten lunch at
> the same time, in the same sense and from the same perspective.
> Recognizing this is a survival skill. Hunters and gatherers know
> that they have either bagged a kill or collected berries — or they
> have not. No tribe’s winter storage both contains and does not
> contain meat. Nor do humans act as if a truck — or a lion or a
> mastodon — is both coming and not coming at them at the same
> time and the same sense. A failure to recognize the LNC and act
> on it is potentially injurious or even fatal. The LNC does not
> even need to be known discursively or consciously. A newborn
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                 225
> 
> ‘knows’ that it cannot be fed and not fed at the same time in the
> same sense — and will let us clearly know which is the case! In
> other words, regardless of what theoretical superstructures or
> models of reason/logic are constructed by various cultures, they
> do not negate the practical, daily application of the LNC.
> In our view, the Writings make use of this daily, practical
> logic which humans apply precisely because it is universally
> accessible to people everywhere and at all times. In that sense, it
> is not culture-bound: no matter what culture we are in or at
> what time we live, my child cannot be fed and not fed at the
> same time and in the same sense. What parent — even one who
> explicitly ‘disbelieved’ in the LNC — would confuse one with
> the other? This universality makes standard, i.e. Aristotelian
> reasoning ideal for meeting the world’s need for a unified,
> global method of reasoning without which human cross-cultural
> communication will be severely hindered and, thereby, impede
> the quest for world unity and peace.
> In reflecting about reason in the Bahá’í Writings, the
> question arises whether or not ‘other kinds’ i.e. non-standard
> logic may be found in the Writings. More specifically, we must
> consider if the Writings rule out the use of logical systems that
> deny the law of non-contradiction (LNC). In our view, the
> answer is negative: there is no mandate to limit such matters a
> priori although it is difficult to see how two such contradictory
> systems can be reconciled. The most we can say is that this study
> has found no evidence of non-standard logic whereas we have
> found plentiful evidence of the implicit and explicit use of
> standard, Aristotelian reasoning. Nowhere, for example, do we
> find we find many-valued logics such as Nagarjuna’s catuskoti.
> We can, of course, debate why anyone would follow adopt such
> logic in light of the persistent and pervasive use of standard or
> Aristotelian reasoning throughout the Writings. Furthermore,
> we may discuss if such a strategy actually succeeds in regards to
> a particular Text.
> More specifically, we have found no intentionally
> paradoxical, i.e. self-contradictory passages that cannot be
> resolved by the resources of standard logic as given in the
> Writings. Two examples follow.
> 226                                     Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> Our first passage concerns the “mystic knower” [SVFV 51] and
> the “grammarian” [SVFV 51] in Bahá’u’lláh’s parable in The Four
> Valleys. When the two travelers arrived at “Sea of Grandeur”
> [SVFV 51], the mystic “flung himself onto the waves but the
> grammarian stood “lost in his reasonings” [SVFV 51]. First
> appearances to the contrary, this story is not a critique of
> reason per se but a critique of the misuse of reason. The moral
> is clear: there is a time for discursive reason and there is a time
> to act. The grammarian’s fault is not in reasoning — after all, his
> reasoning has brought him to the Sea of Grandeur — but in
> failing to distinguish between situations that require reasoning
> and those that require action. He fails to act appropriately i.e.
> reasonably, and he lacks the courage to act on the basis of his
> reasoning. He misuses reason, not having understood that
> reason cannot tell us everything as moderate rationalism asserts.
> Some things can only be learned by doing and experience. That
> is why “the death of self is needed” [SVFV 51], i.e. complete,
> unreserved existential commitment, not further rationalization.
> Another apparent conflict with reason is found in the Báb’s
> statement that “reason, even in its utmost level of abstraction,
> is confined to the understanding of limited phenomena.”29
> Reading this, we must be careful not to assume that “limited
> phenomena” are material/physical phenomena, and, therefore
> reason is limited to these. Reason, as we have seen, can also deal
> with “intellectual realities which are not sensible, and which
> have no outward existence” [SAQ 186] as well as with spiritual
> issues. It is true that reason cannot understand unlimited
> phenomena because reason requires concepts which are
> inherently limited but that is exactly why the Writings espouse a
> moderate rationalism — to allow other avenues of knowing.
> However, as we have shown in regards to other ways of
> knowing, i.e. non-discursive knowledge and reasoning, non-
> discursive is not synonymous with non-rational.
> These examples remind us that the Writings espouse a
> “moderate rationalism” according to which reason cannot tell us
> everything. Other ways of knowing are also available, such as
> ‘action’ in the example of the mystic knower and the
> grammarian. There is also the knowledge of the heart as noted in
> previous discussions. The ubiquity of Aristotelian logic in the
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                 227
> 
> Writings does not necessarily negate the validity of these other
> ways of knowing, so there is no necessary conflict between
> them. Indeed, we would not expect such conflicts because truth
> is one, i.e. it cannot be divided by contradictions. As `Abdu’l-
> Bahá affirms, “No one truth can contradict another truth” [PT
> 136].
> 
> 18. Standard Logic and Modern Science
> 
> One critique of standard or ‘classical’ reasoning is that it is
> limited to the ordinary macroscopic world in which we live, and
> is, therefore, out of step with developments in quantum physics
> which operates at the microscopic level. Our reasoning should
> be in harmony with the microscopic level which is the basis for
> macroscopic reality. It is argued that the Writings would not
> model and recommend standard logic since it is not in harmony
> with quantum logic.
> The most obvious answer to this critique is that
> notwithstanding developments in quantum physics, the Writings
> clearly show a persistent and pervasive use of standard or
> Aristotelian reason. The evidence we have presented — as well as
> the greater volume of evidence excluded — cannot be avoided.
> Moreover, in our view, it is doubtful that Bahá’u’lláh and
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá would make such widespread use of this type of
> reasoning if we were not meant to understand it and use it as a
> model. Nor is it likely that the Writings would present believers
> with insurmountable obstacles vis-à-vis quantum theory and
> logic.
> Furthermore, in daily practice it is difficult to see how we
> would we apply quantum logic — especially in the Copenhagen
> interpretation of quantum phenomena — to life at the
> macroscopic level. What application can there be in the
> macroscopic world of the Copenhagen principle that objects or
> persons do not exist until they are observed and only as long as
> they are observed? How can we use quantum logic derived from
> this fact vis-à-vis trains or mastodons? Is there anything we can
> practically do in our lives with the Heisenberg Uncertainty
> Principle which dictates that we cannot simultaneously ascertain
> the position and velocity of a particle? While this may be true at
> 228                                     Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> the microscopic level, at the macroscopic level traffic police
> seem to have no trouble doing both. The application of
> quantum logic in the macroscopic world seems like a recipe for
> incredible confusion. We must also bear in mind that while the
> Copenhagen interpretation is the best known version of
> quantum theory, it is not the only one. Indeed, there are at least
> six other viable interpretations at least one of which, David
> Bohm’s, is consistent with standard logic. In other words, all
> quantum interpretations do not necessarily lead to the strange
> effects associated with the Copenhagen model.30
> Indeed, the claim that standard logic is out of step with the
> quantum logic used to study events at the micro-level is
> questionable and open to debate. Mathematical physicist
> Roland Omnes, who has done pioneering work in reconciling
> classical (standard) logic and quantum logic, sees no reason to
> abandon standard logic because
> 
> it can be shown that common sense logic is actually a
> logic of consistent quantum histories and that common
> sense arguments are ultimately verbalizations of
> implications that can be demonstrated in quantum logic
> ... the probability for common sense to be wrong is
> practically always negligible as long as it deals with
> macroscopic objects.31
> 
> He adds,
> 
> common sense conforms to the quantum nature of laws
> governing the material world, at least in normal
> conditions, and for objects on our human scale (and
> often, even well below it).32
> 
> In other words, there is no irreducible and necessary conflict
> between standard logic and quantum logic. This is exactly what
> we would expect from a Bahá’í perspective because reality is
> one: “As reality is one and cannot admit of multiplicity,
> therefore different opinions must ultimately become fused into
> one” [SWAB 298]. If reality is truly one, it seems unlikely that it
> is bifurcated into two, mutually contradictory, i.e. absolutely
> incompatible parts or levels. Reality would be fragmented and
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                  229
> 
> multiple. At the very least we would expect that the two types
> of reasoning are complementary and not contradictory.
> A different critique of the standard logic used in the
> Writings is that standard logic does not work in the
> astronomical sciences because of relativity. This argument
> appears to confuse relativity theory in astronomy and relativism
> in philosophy. Unlike philosophic relativism which has no
> absolutes by which to make judgments about various truth-
> claims, scientific relativity theory has an absolute — the speed
> of light — which is the same in all frames of reference i.e. the
> same for all observers regardless of their motion. It is a
> universal constant, a universal speed limit. From this it is readily
> apparent that a particle either has or has not attained light speed
> or some fraction of it. Such measurements — subject to the
> LNC — fall well within the purview of standard logic. In
> addition, even though the same event can appear contradictory
> in different frames of reference, i.e. in different perspectives,
> the same event cannot have all contradictory appearances in the
> same frame of reference or perspective. In other words, the
> LNC still applies.
> Let us examine one more case. Heisenberg accepts that
> standard and quantum logic are related (one is an extension —
> not negation — of the other).33 However, Heisenberg also
> endorses the Aristotelian concepts of act and potency in his
> understanding of the quantum world.34 For him, the
> superposition of a particle refers to its potentials for
> actualization; for potentials — even opposite potentials — to
> exist simultaneously does not violate standard logic.35
> Heisenberg’s view that quantum logic is an “extension” of
> classical logic means that like Newtonian physics, standard logic
> is valid within its own sphere, i.e. the macro-world, which
> means that there is no inherent conflict with quantum physics.
> Standard logic is the appropriate logic for the macro-world
> which is why Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá make use of it.
> 
> 19. Conclusions
> 
> On the basis of this study of reason in the Bahá’í Writings,
> we may reach seven major conclusions.
> 230                                     Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> 1. The Bahá’í Writings assert that “The foundations of
> religion are reasonable” [PUP 128] and consistently
> advocate and even require the use of reason in regards to
> phenomenal and spiritual/religious matters and as a test
> for truth and falsity.
> 2. The Bahá’í Writings pervasively model standard,
> Aristotelian or classical reasoning in their explications,
> illustrations and arguments.
> 3. he Bahá’í Writings espouse moderate rationalism which
> recognizes ‘other ways of knowing.’ They reject the idea
> that non-discursive reasoning is necessarily non-rational;
> 
> 4. The Bahá’í Writings use a negative gate-keeper method to
> protect both the ‘unity’ and the ‘diversity’ in “unity-in-
> diversity”;
> 
> 5. The Bahá’í Writings adopt a scientific response to the
> fallibility of reason;
> 
> 6. Given the pervasive use of standard logic in the Writings,
> it is reasonable to conclude that they intend this as the
> universal logic for humankind;
> 
> 7. Arguments against standard logic in the Writings based on
> post-colonial theory, quantum mechanics or relativity
> theory are untenable and not persuasive.
> 
> B IBLIOGRAPHY
> 
> Al-Khalili, Jim. Quantum: A Guide for the Perplexed. London.
> Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2003.
> Bunin and Yu. The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy.
> Chichester: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009.
> Heisenberg, Werner. Physics and Philosophy. New York:
> HarperCollins, 2007.
> Omnes, Roland. Quantum Philosophy. Princeton. Princeton
> University Press, 1999.
> Reason and the Bahá’í Writings                                             231
> 
> N OTES
> Nicholas Bunnin; Jiyuan Yu (2004). The Blackwell Dictionary of Western
> philosophy, p. 266: “[Logic] is divided into standard (or classical) logic,
> non-standard logic and inductive logic. Standard logic includes traditional
> logic (Aristotelian syllogism) and modern classical logic which is an
> expansion of traditional logic ...” Also L. T. F. Gamut (1991). Logic,
> Language, and Meaning, Volume 1: Introduction to Logic, pp. 156–157:
> propositional and predicate logic (classical logic is propositional) “can
> nevertheless be regarded as standard logic.”
> See Ian Kluge, The Aristotelian Substratum of the Bahá’í Writings in Lights
> of Irfan 4, p. 17–79, 2003.
> Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reason
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 191. cf. Chapter 49, “The
> Growth and Development of the Human Race.”
> Genesis 1:26 in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 192.
> From a letter written on behalf of the Universal House of Justice,
> dated 22 June 1977, online at http://bahai-
> library.com/compilation_bahai_scholarship_khan
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 193; emphasis added; see also
> Shoghi Effendi in The Unfolding Destiny of the British Bahá’í Community,
> p. 458.
> Letter written on behalf of Shoghi Effendi, Feb. 24, 1947 in Lights of
> Guidance, p. 476.; emphasis added.
> However, we must not mistake an acceptance of differences in perspective
> with relativism. Classical, Aristotelian logic asserts that from any one
> given perspective, only one claim can be true whereas relativism asserts
> that no truth-claim can be established because there is no absolute
> standard by which to judge. Relativism accepts even contradictions as
> ‘true,’ whereas standard logic does not.
> This is not a repetition of Zeno’s arrow paradox since Zeno was discussing
> a single trajectory subject to mental divisions and this statement deals
> with real — not mental — divisions between individual, definite acts.
> An incomplete syllogistic form called an ‘enthymeme’ is missing one of the
> propositions, or the conclusion is implied but not stated.
> `Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 7, 90, 177, 258, 293, 304 to
> identify only a few.
> Bunnin and Yu, editors, The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy,
> p. 25.
> These are known as the dialogues of Plato but feature Socrates as the usual
> protagonist.
> 232                                            Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen
> 
> Bahá’í International Community,”Consultation,”
> http://info.bahai.org/article-1-3-6-3.html
> See Ian Kluge, “Relativism in the Baháí Writings,” (Lights of Irfan ) for an
> examination of various passages on this topic.
> Adib Taherzadeh, The Revelation of Bahá’u’lláh v 4, p. 129; emphasis
> added.
> Shoghi Effendi, Extracts from the USBN, # 85, July 1934, p. 6.
> Jim Al-Khalili, Quantum: A Guide for the Perplexed, p. 132 — 153.
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions in Part 2 “Some Christian
> Subjects,” pp. 83–143.
> Ken Wilber, The Marriage of Sense and Soul, p. 92.
> From the Guardian to an individual believer, October 1, 1935: Canadian
> Bahá’í News, February 1968, p. 11) Compilations, Lights of Guidance, p.
> 490.
> Reason and mind are the same in the Writings. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, The
> Promulgation of Universal Peace, p. 22; also p. 360, p. 287.
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Tablet to the Hague, p. 5; emphasis added.
> From the Greek ‘agape’ i.e. love for humanity-in-general.
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Selections from the Writings of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, p. 46. See
> also Some Answered Questions, p. 225 in regards to logical proof for
> immortality.
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá The Promulgation of Universal Peace, p. 303, p. 287;
> emphasis added.
> Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, p. 5. “The only principle that does not
> inhibit progress is anything goes.”
> The Báb, in Nader Saiedi, Gate of the Heart, p, 211.
> Nick Herbert, Quantum Realities.
> Roland Omnes, Quantum Philosophy, p. 190; emphasis added.
> Roland Omnes, Quantum Philosophy, p. 193.
> Werrner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, p. 155.
> Werrner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, p. 154.
> Heisenberg also writes, “The probability wave of Bohr, Kramers, Slater…
> was a quantitative version of the old concept of “potentia” in Aristotelian
> philosophy.” Physics and Philosophy, p. 15.
>
> — *Reason and the Baha'i Writings (Used by permission of the curator)*