# Scholarship: A Baha'i Perspective

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> Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: William S. Hatcher, Scholarship: A Baha'i Perspective, bahai-library.com.
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> 
> Published in the Journal of Bahá’í Studies Vol. 1, number 2 (1988)
> © Association for Bahá’í Studies 1988
> 
> Scholarship: A Bahá’í Perspective
> William Hatcher
> 
> Abstract
> This paper defines scholarship as disciplined intellectual activity undertaken to help determine the truth of some
> matter or else to apply in a practical way some previously determined truth. More specifically, Bahá’í scholarship
> seeks to understand and/or apply truths contained in the writings of the Bahá’í Faith; it may also involve
> historical/critical studies of the Bahá’í Faith as a social phenomenon. With regard to the first type of Bahá’í
> scholarship, we examine certain passages in the Bahá’í writings which comment on these writings themselves and
> which describe the kinds of truths they contain. In particular, it is seen that the Bahá’í writings contain important
> propositional truths and not just moral injunctions (so-called normative propositions). The relationship between
> scholarship and other human enterprises is also discussed. The Bahá’í conception of scholarship is seen to be
> unusually broad in scope and to provide thereby the basis for a much greater harmony between scholarship and the
> various other activities carried on within the Bahá’í community.
> 
> Résumé
> Cette étude définit l’érudition comme une activité intellectuelle disciplinée entreprise dans le but de déterminer la
> vérité d’une chose ou alors dans le but d’appliquer de facon concrète une vérité préalablement prouvée. Plus
> spécifiquement, l’érudition bahá’ìe s’efforce de comprendre et⁄ou d’appliquer les vérités contenues dans les écrits de
> la foi bahá’íe; elle peut également comprendre des études historiques ou critiques de la foi bahá’íe en tant que
> phénomne social. Par rapport au premier type d’érudition bahá’ìe, nous examinons certains extraits des écrits bahá’ìs
> qui portent des commentaires sur ces écrits mêmes et qui décrivent les vérités qui y sont contenues. En particulier,
> nous constatons que les écrits bahá’ís contiennent d’importantes vérités propositionnelles et non seulement des
> injonctions morales (appelées propositions normatives). La relation entre l’érudition et d’autres activités humaines
> est également examinée. Le concept bahá’í d’érudition est perçu comme ayant une perspective exceptionnellement
> vaste, permettant ainsi une plus grand harmonie entre l’érudition et les diverses activités qui ont lieu au sein de la
> communauté bahá’íe.
> 
> Resumen
> Este artículo define la erudición como una actividad intelectual disciplinada llevada a cabo para ayudar a determinar
> la veracidad de un asunto o para aplicar de una forma práctica una verdad ya determinada. Más específicamente, la
> erudición Bahá’í trata de entender y/o aplicar las verdades contenidas en las escrituras Bahá’ís; también puede
> implicar estudios históricos/críticos sobre la Fe Bahá’í como unfenómeno social. Concerniente a la primera clase de
> erudición Bahá’í, nosotros examinamos ciertos pasajes en las escrituras Bahá’ís que comentan sobre estas mismas
> escrituras y que describen las clases de verdades que ellas contienen. En particular, se puede ver que las escrituras
> Bahá ís contienen importantes verdades proposicionales y no solamente entredichos morales (llamados
> proposiciones normativas). También se examina la relación entre la erudición y otras actividades humanas. Se ve el
> concepto Bahá’í sobre la erudición como extraordinariamente amplio en alcance y por lo tanto proveyendo la base
> para una armonía mucho mas estrecha entre la erudición y las muchas otras actividades llevadas a cabo dentro de la
> comunidad Bahá’í.
> 
> Introduction
> 
> T    he value and importance of scholarship within the total human enterprise is generally recognized and accepted.
> However, the relationship between scholars, or communities of scholars, and society at large has never been
> easy. In many societies, the public image of the scholar contains a number of negative features, typically evoking
> the picture of an impractical dreamer obsessed with trivia and minutiae interesting only to others of their kind.
> Where cultures have a strong pragmatic bent, as in contemporary North America, this negative image has
> become an entrenched caricature, but it prevails in European and Asian milieus as well.
> In the religious context, scholarly activity can be perceived not only as impractical but also as a threat.
> Especially when religious beliefs are held primarily on an uncritical, emotional basis, scholarship may appear as an
> unwelcome intruder seeking to undermine the integrity of the belief system in the eyes of its adherents.
> However, we should beware of concluding too hastily that the uneasy relationship between scholars and society
> is principally attributable to ignorant or defensive attitudes on the part of non-scholars. Scholars and scholarly
> communities have often been their own worst enemies. With discomforting frequency they have exhibited
> arrogance, a repugnant sense of their own importance, and a complacent insularity with regard to the everyday
> struggles that are the lot of the vast majority of humanity. Traditionally, scholarship has been viewed as an
> intrinsically elite activity which can be carried forward only by that small segment of society having the ability and
> inclination to do so. Thus, scholarly communities have traditionally been elite communities, and elite communities
> tend to be either unreasonably privileged or unreasonably persecuted. Clearly, either of these extremes represents an
> unhealthy situation.
> In the light of these considerations, there are several reasons why a Bahá’í perspective on scholarship is of
> potential interest. The Bahá’í Faith is historically recent, having come into existence in the mid–nineteenth century
> when the European scientific revolution was already well advanced. The Bahá’í Faith affirms the basic unity of
> religion and science, and insists that its belief system, though capable of stirring powerful emotions within the
> human soul, is nonetheless scientifically and rationally based. Moreover, the Bahá’í Faith has no priesthood or
> clergy and affirms that scholarship is an activity which can and should be undertaken, to some degree, by every
> normally endowed human being. So, within the Bahá’í community there is a much greater continuity between
> general activities and scholarship than appears to have been the case for many traditional religious communities.
> Undoubtedly, certain forms of scholarship may well require special social and material conditions to be pursued
> successfully, and the Bahá’í teachings explicitly accord a certain respect to scholars. But respect is also paid to a
> host of other vital social functions (e.g., agriculture, teaching, or medicine). Consequently, the social distance
> between scholarship and other roles within the community is, according to the Bahá’í conception, very small indeed.
> In other words, if the Bahá’í viewpoint on scholarship is valid, and if Bahá’í norms and values are properly
> implemented on the social level, we can reasonably expect the Bahá’í Faith to make a significant contribution
> towards healing some of the unhealthy aspects of the traditional relationship between scholars and society.
> 
> Scholarship Defined
> The following definition of scholarship is basic to all of our subsequent discussion of this notion: Scholarship is
> disciplined intellectual activity undertaken to help determine the truth of some matter or else to apply in a practical
> way some previously determined truth.1 Let us comment briefly on certain aspects of this definition.
> In the first place, intellectual activity, even intellectual activity undertaken in the pursuit of truth, does not
> necessarily count as scholarship. We may sincerely seek the truth of some matter, and even pour great energy into
> this pursuit, but if our effort lacks discipline, if it is frantic, unsystematic, purely spontaneous, or haphazard, it is not
> scholarship. Of course, there are times when a disciplined approach to truth-seeking is not appropriate—when we
> are under extreme pressures of time and circumstance, for example. Thus, a scholarly approach to truth is not
> always the best approach.
> In the second place, there are many forms of disciplined intellectual activity that do not count as scholarship
> because they are not directed towards the goal of seeking or applying truth. Game-playing and other such
> recreational uses of the intellect are thus not scholarship (though a systematic study of the theory of a particular
> game could be scholarship). Uses of the intellect to pursue social goals not related to truth-seeking are also
> examples of non-scholarly disciplines. We may engage in certain intellectual disciplines in order to intimidate or
> control others, to sell them products or ideas, or to elicit from them or from ourselves any number of desired forms
> of behavior. In some instances, such activities may be based on or related to scholarship, but they can nonetheless
> be carried on in the absence of scholarship, and they do not themselves constitute scholarship.
> In a general way, the social value of scholarship derives primarily from the degree of systematization it
> involves. Experience has shown that determining the truth of some questions takes long periods of time, possibly
> extending over several human lifetimes. If a scholarly community is formed with a view to a systematic exploration
> of such a question, then generations of individuals who have acquired a common discipline and who build on the
> results of previous scholarship may succeed where a less systematic approach has failed.
> In most cases, scholarship of this type can only take place under special social conditions, for it requires of the
> scholar a temporary disengagement from the immediate practical concerns of everyday life. Thus, no matter how
> great the passion for scholarship, the potential scholar who receives no cooperation or understanding from society is
> not very likely to succeed. At the same time, society rightfully expects scholars to recognize that the special
> conditions they enjoy entail economic sacrifice on the part of others and, as a consequence of this recognition, to
> refrain from abusing their privileges.2
> 
> Scholarship in the Bahá’í Context
> Broadly speaking, we can distinguish at least three basic types of scholarship that may be properly labeled
> ‘Bahá’í’. The first two types derive from the Bahá’í conviction that the writings of the founder of the Bahá’í Faith,
> Bahá’u’lláh (1817–1892), are divinely inspired and contain significant truths and insights about the nature and
> structure of the human personality and of the social and physical environment in which we humans live, move, and
> have our being. The first category of Bahá’í scholarship, then, is the concentrated and systematic study of these
> writings in an effort to uncover the truths they contain. The second, related category is the study of some natural or
> social phenomenon from the Bahá’í viewpoint, i.e., in the light of the truths gleaned from previous or parallel study
> of the Bahá’í writings. Representative of this kind of scholarship would be attempts to apply Bahá’í moral, spiritual,
> or psychological principles in the context of one’s profession as, say, a psychologist, doctor, or teacher. The third
> category of Bahá’í scholarship is study of the Bahá’í Faith itself as a social and historical phenomenon.
> The successful pursuit of the first two types of Bahá’í scholarship would seem to presuppose acceptance of the
> basic Bahá’í belief in the divine inspiration of the Bahá’í writings. Though it is quite possible to imagine situations
> when this would not be so, our discussion of the first two categories of scholarship will not consider the problems
> that might arise for non-Bahá’ís who attempt to understand and apply Bahá’í concepts and principles outside the
> context of Bahá’í conviction.
> However, the third category of Bahá’í scholarship can just as easily be pursued by non-Bahá’ís as Bahá’ís.
> Indeed, some would maintain that non-Bahá’ís are better suited to undertake such a study, being presumed free
> of any pro–Bahá’í bias. However, non-Bahá’ís may well have anti-Bahá’í biases, and no historical or critical study
> is ever totally value free. We will thus suppose that studies in the third category can be undertaken with equal
> integrity by both Bahá’ís and non-Bahá’ís.
> Our discussion in the remainder of the present paper will focus almost exclusively on the first type of Bahá’í
> scholarship identified above.
> 
> Studying the Bahá’í Writings
> Each of the great religions of the world has been based on the belief that its founder was divinely inspired, a
> sanctified human instrument chosen by God as his mouthpiece and spokesman. The sayings and writings of these
> founders have therefore been regarded as the Word of God Himself, as truths revealed by God to humankind.
> Thus, the writings and/or the recorded sayings of these great religious founders have been accorded the status of
> holy books or sacred scriptures.
> Whatever validity one wishes to accord this view, it has been traditionally plagued by problems of higher
> criticism (textual authenticity), at least where the older religions are concerned, and of lower criticism (textual
> interpretation). Concerning the former, the realization that generations of oral tradition have intervened between,
> say, the historical Jesus and the first written records of his sayings, has certainly undermined many scholars’
> confidence in ancient documents purporting to be the authentic sayings of historically remote religious founders.
> For the historically more recent religions, such as Islam, there is relatively little, if any, serious doubt as to the
> authenticity of the holy book (the Qur’án), but continued dispute about oral tradition (hadíth). Indeed, Islam has held
> that the Qur’án is the first and highest proof of the divine origin of Muhammad’s teachings, and Muslims regard the
> Qur’án as the literal Word of God.
> But even in cases where authentic texts are available, the problem of lower criticism may still remain. If divers
> elements within a religious community each claim the right of authoritative interpretation of a holy book, and if
> these interpretations are sometimes contradictory, then the existence of authentic texts will not be sufficient to
> generate unity of doctrine—a consensus of understanding of the truths the holy book is considered to contain.
> The Bahá’í Faith deals forthrightly with the problems of both higher and lower criticism. All published writings
> of Bahá’u’lláh are based on authentic original texts either written by Him or else dictated, signed, and sealed by
> Him. Because these original manuscripts are preserved, any possible errors resulting from mistranslation into
> another language or editorial errors in publication of the original can be corrected. All sayings attributed to
> Bahá’u’lláh are based only on such authentic texts. Though a parallel oral tradition of anecdotal sayings of
> Bahá’u’lláh exists, Bahá’ís are specifically forbidden by Bahá’u’lláh’s own written instructions from regarding any
> such sayings as authentic.
> Thus, with regard to higher criticism, Bahá’u’lláh continues the Islamic tradition of considering the authentic
> texts of the founder as the most important single product and proof of divine revelation:
> Say: the first and foremost testimony establishing His truth is His own Self. Next to this testimony is His
> Revelation. For whoso faileth to recognize either the one or the other He hath established the words He hath
> revealed as proof of His reality and truth.... He hath endowed every soul with the capacity to recognize the signs
> of God. (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 105–6)
> 
> With respect to interpretation, Bahá’u’lláh specifically designated his eldest son, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá (1844–1921), as
> the only legitimate interpreter of his writings, and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá subsequently conferred the same authority on
> Shoghi Effendi (1896–1857).3 The body of interpretive writings of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá and Shoghi Effendi, together with
> the writings of Bahá’u’lláh, form an extraordinary corpus.4 Every literate Bahá’í has direct and equal access to these
> writings and is free to search out their meaning for himself. No person’s opinion is considered as having authority
> or as having greater validity than another’s.5
> Since the Bahá’í Faith has no priesthood or clergy, there are no intermediaries between the individual believer
> and the holy texts. Moreover, Bahá’u’lláh has explicitly stated that some portions of his writings can be understood
> on different levels of meaning and that no one, literal interpretation of such passages can possibly be valid.
> Indeed, Bahá’u’lláh does not only invite the individual believer to study his writings, he makes it a moral duty
> to do so:
> 
> Immerse yourselves in the ocean of My words, that ye may unravel its secrets, and discover all the pearls of
> wisdom that lie hid in its depths. (Gleanings 136)
> 
> Recite ye the verses of God every morning and evening. Whoso reciteth them not hath truly failed to fulfill his
> pledge to the Covenant of God....Take heed lest excessive reading… make you vainglorious. Should a person
> recite but a single verse from the Holy Writings in a spirit of joy and radiance, this would be better… than
> reciting wearily all the Scriptures of God…. (Divine Art 58–59)
> 
> Thus, the Bahá’í who would be a scholar of the Bahá’í writings has many favorable initial conditions. He or
> she has direct access to a considerable volume of the texts of Bahá’u’lláh, together with authoritative commentaries
> and interpretations by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá and Shoghi Effendi. Except for an occasional mistranslation, one is faced with
> no higher critical problems. Nor does one have to contend with a priesthood or clergy attempting to impose some
> particular reading of the texts.
> Finally and significantly, the Bahá’í writings contain a number of passages that bear directly on the study of
> these same writings and that indicate the nature and importance of the task awaiting the potential scholar. They also
> suggest those attitudes and approaches most conducive to success. Let us examine briefly a few of these counsels
> and promises.
> Shoghi Effendi has affirmed:
> 
> If you read the utterances of Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá with selflessness and care and concentrate upon
> them, you will discover truths unknown to you before and will obtain an insight into the problems that have
> baffled great thinkers of the world.6
> 
> We see here the stress on the intellectual discipline of careful concentration and on the spiritual discipline of
> selflessness. At the same time, there is the promise of attaining an extraordinarily high level of insight and
> understanding.
> In a similar vein, Shoghi Effendi has written: “There is no limit to the study of the Cause. The more we read
> the writings, the more truths we can find in them and the more we will see that our previous notions were
> erroneous.”7 Regarding the moral duty of the individual believer to undertake such a study, Shoghi Effendi has
> written: “To strive to obtain a more adequate understanding of the significance of Bahá’u’lláh’s stupendous
> Revelation must, it is my unalterable conviction, remain the first obligation and the object of the constant endeavour
> of each one of its loyal adherents” (The World Order 100).
> The nature, extent, and importance of the knowledge to be gained from a study of the Bahá’í writings has been
> set forth by Bahá’u’lláh in a remarkable passage:
> 
> Consider...the revelation of the light of the Name of God, the Educator. Behold, how in all things the evidences
> of such a revelation are manifest, how the betterment of all beings dependeth upon it. This education is of two
> kinds. The one is universal. Its influence pervadeth all things and sustaineth them....The other is confined to
> them that have come under the shadow of this Name, and sought the shelter of this most mighty Revelation.
> They, however, that have failed to seek this shelter, have deprived themselves of this privilege, and are
> powerless to benefit from the spiritual sustenance that hath been sent down through the heavenly grace of this
> Most Great Name. How great the gulf fixed between the one and the other!
> (Gleanings 189–90)
> 
> Let us consider for a moment some of the possible implications of this pregnant statement by Bahá’u’lláh. First
> comes the affirmation that the ultimate source and ground of human knowledge is God and, in particular, God’s
> specific intention that humanity be educated (expressed by God’s act of revealing “the light of the Name of God, the
> Educator”). Because God is Creator, because He is that ultimate Force or Entity responsible for all other forces and
> entities in existence, his intention that humans attain knowledge is reflected to some degree “in all things,” i.e.,
> within every aspect of reality, including, of course, human beings themselves.
> Undoubtedly, the human capacities for abstract reason and creative imagination are the “manifest evidences”
> within ourselves of God’s desire that we be capable of attaining knowledge. Indeed, Bahá’u’lláh has elsewhere
> confirmed that the human intellect is the most important faculty God has bestowed upon humanity: “First and
> foremost among these favours, which the Almighty hath conferred upon man, is the gift of understanding”
> (Gleanings 194).
> The expression of God’s educative intention in other, non-human aspects of creation can be seen in their
> lawfulness, orderliness, and coherence—in the universal law of cause and effect that alone allows man’s intellect to
> comprehend the phenomena of reality. “...all things, in their inmost reality, testify to the revelation of the names and
> attributes of God within them. Each according to its capacity, indicateth, and is expressive of, the knowledge of
> God. So potent and universal is this revelation, that it hath encompassed all things visible and invisible”
> (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 178). Indeed, we might reflect that, no matter how great our intellectual and experiential
> capacities, if we were confronted with a fundamentally chaotic and incoherent world, then the exercise of those
> capacities would be utterly in vain. We could not make sense out of a senseless world.
> In summary: according to Bahá’u’lláh, God (the Creator) is a conscious being Who has definite purposes for
> humankind, and in particular the intention that humans attain knowledge of reality. God has expressed this intention
> in two basic ways, one general and universal and the other specific and restricted. In a general way, He has
> embedded a coherent structure within all aspects of reality and endowed humans with the mental capacities that
> allow them to perceive and comprehend this structure. The process of the interaction between the innate human
> intellectual capacities on the one hand and the inherent structure of reality on the other constitute the first kind of
> education. This process is continual and takes place, in various degrees, under all conditions.8
> The second kind of education “is confined to them that have come under the shadow of this Name, and sought
> the shelter of this most mighty Revelation.”9 In other words, it results from the spiritual processes that God has made
> available to us only through a particular aspect of reality, namely the Manifestation (Prophethood) of Bahá’u’lláh.
> Bahá’u’lláh has elsewhere explained that the great religious founders of history are all chosen vehicles
> (Manifestations) of specific revelations of God to humankind. “As a token of His [God’s] mercy...and as a proof of
> His loving–kindness, He hath manifested unto men the Day Stars of His divine guidance, the Symbols of His divine
> unity [the Manifestations], and hath ordained the knowledge of these sanctified Beings to be identical with the
> knowledge of His own Self. Whoso recognizeth them hath recognized God” (Gleanings 49–50). These
> Manifestations are all specially endowed human beings, and no Manifestation is superior in rank to any other. But
> their revelation of truth is progressive, adapted to the needs of a constantly evolving human society. Speaking of this
> progression of the Manifestations, Bahá’u’lláh has said that
> 
> any apparent variation in the intensity of their light is not inherent in the light itself, but should rather be
> attributed to the varying receptivity of an ever-changing world. Every Prophet Whom the Almighty and
> Peerless Creator hath purposed to send to the peoples of the earth hath been entrusted with a Message, and
> charged to act in a manner that would best meet the requirements of the age in which He appeared. (Gleanings
> 79)
> 
> According to Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings, his own revelation is the most recent in this progression; it is the
> appropriate revelation for the needs of the present age, and that is the only reason why such strong claims of potency
> are applicable to it. Otherwise, the claims Bahá’u’lláh makes for his own revelation apply equally well to all
> previous or future Manifestations, within the context of the place and time of their appearance.
> This point having been made, it remains nonetheless to understand more precisely the nature of the special
> knowledge afforded those who have “sought the shelter of this most mighty Revelation.” First, and most obvious, is
> knowledge related to ethical norms—propositions that assert how man should act in various circumstances. Such
> normative propositions can be viewed as divinely–inspired moral injunctions.
> Some theologians and philosophers of religion have contended that this is the only kind of knowledge religion
> brings to humanity. In particular, they have claimed that religion does not and cannot bring propositional truth of
> the sort found in science, i.e., empirically grounded propositions about objective reality. Since virtually everyone
> agrees with Hume’s insightful dictum that normative and non-normative propositions cannot be logically deduced
> from each other, such a view of religious truth implies an absolute separation of faith and reason, religion and
> science, values and facts. It is therefore significant that the Bahá’í writings explicitly affirm the unity and harmony
> of religion and science, and also contain a number of assertions about the structure of objective reality. Thus, from
> the Bahá’í point of view, the particular knowledge vouchsafed to humanity through the Manifestations is in no way
> restricted to normative propositions.
> Let us cite a few examples of propositional truths whose assertions are to be found in the Bahá’í writings. With
> regard to individual human nature, Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá affirm that the humans are not just the product of
> some combination of hereditary and environmental influences. Rather, there is a third aspect to individual character
> which derives from an objectively-existing, nonmaterial entity called the soul or spirit. The soul is the locus or seat
> of the individual’s personality and self, and is endowed with certain intrinsic or inherent capacities, which constitute
> one’s spiritual capacities. The capacities for understanding, for action (will), and for love are among those explicitly
> mentioned in the Bahá’í writings as spiritual capacities. It is further explained that the soul and its capacities do not
> depend upon the body and are, in fact, immortal. The proper development of spiritual capacities is thus seen as the
> fundamental goal of human existence, and many of the ethical norms of the Bahá’í Faith are clearly directed to this
> end.
> Concerning the genesis and biological development of humanity, the Bahá’í writings affirm that the human race
> has indeed gradually evolved from lower forms over a long period of time. However, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá asserts that,
> from the beginning of this evolutionary process, humankind has constituted a distinct species.10 Moreover, these
> teachings are not restricted to one or two vaguely-worded statements but are rather part of a considerable body of
> doctrine regarding the laws governing the evolution of more general kinds of systems, including the various social
> systems of human history. The depth and cogency of these teachings have already attracted the interest of both
> Bahá’í and non-Bahá’í scientists.11
> However, in the light of Bahá’u’lláh’s strong statement that those who have not accepted his revelation “have
> deprived themselves of this [special knowledge], and are powerless to benefit from [its] spiritual sustenance,” it
> would seem clear that the knowledge accessible only through his revelation is not primarily knowledge which can be
> independently discovered by science, for the latter is the kind of knowledge that is qualified as “universal.”
> Indeed, if religion only articulated truths that could be discovered without it, then religion would be redundant
> and irrelevant. Thus, we can begin to understand that the special knowledge vouchsafed to those who accept
> Bahá’u’lláh’s revelation is a subtle and intricate knowledge of certain deep spiritual laws and principles which,
> although objective in their operation and thereby potentially discoverable empirically, are nonetheless
> extraordinarily difficult to understand without the aid of a divinely inspired spiritual guide.12
> 
> Conclusions
> It is clear, even from the brief discussion above, that the Bahá’í writings contain a wealth of profound and
> philosophically cogent concepts concerning fundamental issues of human existence. A systematic study of these
> concepts might well be compared to so-called fundamental research in science, while attempts to apply Bahá’í
> principles to the solution of practical problems would correspond to applied research. Finally, study of the history
> and development of the Bahá’í community would be analogous to the scholarship of historians and philosophers of
> science and scientific practice. The development of the most fruitful methodologies for each of these kinds of
> Bahá’í scholarship will undoubtedly take generations of work and experience on the part of many scholars from a
> broad and diverse range of backgrounds.
> At this early stage in the evolution of the Bahá’í Faith, which has not even totally emerged from its primitive
> period as a persecuted and deprecated minority in the land of its birth,13 it seems fair to say that all three forms of
> Bahá’í scholarship are, as yet, relatively undeveloped. However, it also seems fair to say that, given the extremely
> difficult circumstances with which the Bahá’í community has had to contend from the beginning of its existence,
> Bahá’í scholarship is in some ways remarkably advanced. Indeed, there currently exist a number of thoughtful
> studies of the Bahá’í writings as well as important histories, local and global, by both Bahá’í and non-Bahá’í
> authors. Also, several recent works have attempted to apply Bahá’í principles to the solution of social and other
> practical problems.14
> Perhaps it is in this latter direction that the most novel Bahá’í contributions to scholarship will ultimately
> appear. For example, a recent commentary on Bahá’í scholarship by the International Teaching Centre in Haifa
> points out that “All believers can... strive to relate the Bahá’í teachings to the thinking and concerns of the non–
> Bahá’í population around them,” and thus that “Bahá’í scholarship is [not] an activity open only to those who are
> highly educated or who are pursuing an academic career.”15
> In any case, on the basis of the short but rich history of the Bahá’í community around the world and in the light
> of the many statements in the Bahá’í writings which give such importance to all aspects of scholarship, it is
> reasonable to anticipate that Bahá’í intellectual life will preserve and enrich, in both spirit and form, the best of
> traditional scholarly disciplines and will develop imaginative new approaches as well.
> 
> Notes
> 1. By “truth” I mean correspondence with reality. The point is that a proposition or body of propositions (a
> theory) can be true without our knowing it to be so, and my definition of scholarship here clearly embodies the
> (normative) notion that intellectual investigation must have the pursuit of truth (i.e., the pursuit of the positive
> knowledge that a given theory does in fact correspond to reality) as its goal in order to count as scholarship. Of
> course, it is clearly possible that we may be entirely unsuccessful in discovering the truth of some matter, even
> though we approach the question in a sincerely motivated and disciplined manner. Nevertheless, the difference
> between this approach to knowledge-seeking and the approach that is either insincere (e.g., because it seeks rather to
> promote or establish some preconceived view) or undisciplined is important, for the latter is much less able to
> discover the truth than the former. Moreover, the scholar dedicated to truth-seeking is more likely to modify his
> viewpoint in the light of new evidence than one who seeks primarily to defend his own views at all costs.
> 2. Intellectual professions such as scholarship are economically privileged precisely because those who pursue
> these professions consume but do not produce tangibles. Moreover, the ultimate social benefits of scholarly work
> may appear only after several generations, whereas the benefit to society of other intellectual professions (e.g.,
> teachers or administrators) is more immediate, and also more easily assessed. (Indeed, it frequently happens that, in
> the short term, the value of a scholar’s work can only be judged by other scholars.) Thus, the implicit social contract
> between the scholarly community and the greater community requires a more ample measure of trust than is the case
> for most other professional communities. It is this trust that scholars must not abuse if they are to maintain their
> integrity in the eyes of nonscholars.
> 3. The passing of Shoghi Effendi in 1957 marked the end of the line of authoritative interpreters of the Bahá’í
> writings. Since 1963, the administrative leadership of the Faith is effected via an elected nine-member body called
> the Universal House of Justice. The administrative plan of the Bahá’í Faith, including the function, role, and
> manner of election of the Universal House of Justice, was clearly set forth in the written texts of Bahá’u’lláh
> Himself, and Bahá’u’lláh left to his appointed successor, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, the task of laying the groundwork for the
> implementation of this plan. For a more detailed discussion of the history and development of the administrative
> order of the Bahá’í Faith, see W.S. Hatcher and J.D. Martin, The Bahá’í Faith (San Francisco: Harper & Row,
> 1985).
> 4. From now on, the term “Bahá’í writings” will refer to this corpus, comprising the writings of Bahá’u’lláh,
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, and Shoghi Effendi.
> 5. This principle has also been explicitly stated by Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá.
> 6. Shoghi Effendi, in a letter to an individual believer dated 30 January 1925.
> 7. Shoghi Effendi, in a letter to an individual believer dated 25 August 1926.
> 8. In one passage, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá gives the name “philosophy” to the knowledge that results from this process:
> “Philosophy consists in comprehending the reality of things as they exist, according to the capacity and the power of
> man.” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá Some Answered Questions [Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1984], 221).
> 9. See the passage from Gleanings 189–90 quoted above. Henceforth, subsequent citations of portions of this
> passage will not be referenced.
> 10. It is perhaps interesting to note that before the advent of modern molecular biology it would have been
> extremely difficult to understand how distinctness of species could be maintained throughout the many
> morphological changes occurring in the course of biological evolution. We now know that specific distinctness
> exists on the cellular level, encoded in the characteristic biochemical structure of the genetic material of each given
> species. Biochemical incompatibility between these characteristic genetic configurations assures specific integrity.
> 11. See, for example, Ervin Laszlo, Foreword, “To the Peoples of the World,” Bahá’í Studies 14 (1986): xiii–
> xiv.
> 12. Further elaboration of some of these ideas can be found in two of the author’s previous monographs in the
> Bahá’í Studies series: “The Science of Religion,” rev. ed., 1980 and the “Concept of Spirituality,” 1982.
> 13. Indeed, as of the present writing, members of the Bahá’í community in Iran continue to be subject to
> arbitrary arrest, torture, and execution for their religious beliefs.
> 14. See, for example, H. Danesh’s “A Violence–Free Society: A Gift for Our Children,” Bahá’í Studies 6
> (1979).
> 15. Contained in a statement on scholarship by the International Teaching Centre of the Bahá’í Faith, dated 9
> August 1984, p.3.
> 
> Works Cited
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. Some Answered Questions. Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1984.
> 
> Bahá’u’lláh. Gleanings from the Writings of Bahá’u’lláh. Trans. Shoghi Effendi. Rev. ed. Wilmette: Bahá’í
> Publishing Trust, 1976.
> 
> Divine Art of Living, The. Comp. Mabel Hyde Paine. Rev. ed. Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1986.
> 
> Danesh, Hossain. “A Violence-Free Society:        A Gift for Our Children.” Bahá’í Studies. Vol. 6.       Ottawa:
> Association for Bahá’í Studies, 1979.
> 
> Hatcher, William S. “The Concept of Spirituality.” Bahá’í Studies. Vol. 11. Ottawa: Association for Bahá’í
> Studies, 1982.
> ———. “The Science of Religion.” Bahá’í Studies. Vol. 2. Ottawa: Association for Studies, 1980.
> 
> Hatcher, William S. and J. Douglas Martin. The Bahá’í Faith: The Emerging Global Religion. San Francisco:
> Harper & Row, 1985.
> 
> Shoghi Effendi. The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh. Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1980.
> 
> Universal House of Justice, “To the Peoples of the World.” Bahá’í Studies. Vol. 14. Ottawa: Association for Bahá’í
> Studies, 1986.
>
> — *Scholarship: A Baha'i Perspective (Used by permission of the curator)*