# Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics

*Exported from [Holy-Writings.com](https://www.holy-writings.com/) on 2026-06-18 — 1 clipping.*

---

> Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Charles O. Lerche, Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics, bahai-library.com.
> ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
> 
> Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics*
> Charles O. Lerche
> 
> Abstract
> This article explores the impact of' cosmopolitctn mOrc/lity 011 international
> statecrajt in an era of' globalization. The historical roots (if the main schools oj
> thought on morality and international relations {Ire discussed, and three
> alternative views developed. Globalization, as Cl process (if 'yl!orld economic,
> political, and social change is introduced, and its implications for statecraft
> outlined. In this regard, globalism is put forth as (l positive, and potentialiy
> corrective, dimension of globalization, and the Bahci'[ teachings drawn upon as
> a source of globalist ethical vision for the future.
> 
> Resume
> eet article explore l'impact de la morale cosmopolite sur la diplom.atie
> internationale dans une ere de globalisation. Il discule des racines historiques
> des principales ecoles de pensee sur la morale et les relations internationales et
> developpe trois points de vue alternatives. If introduit La globalisation en tant
> que processus mondial de changement economique, poTitique, et social et decrit
> ses implications pour la diplom.atie. Dans ceUe perspective, Ie globalismc est
> presente com me une dimension positive et potentiellement corrective de la
> globalisation et les enseignements Bah6'(s comme IInc source de vision iithique
> globaliste pour l'avenir.
> 
> Resllmen
> Este artIculo sonde a e1 ill1pacto de la I1wralidoc! cosmopolita sobre el arte de
> gobemar en una era de globalizacion. Se disculen las rain's his/oricas de las
> principales doctrinas referentes a la morulidad y las relacione.s
> internacionales, y los Ires puntos de vista disyuntivos desarrollados. Se
> presenta la globalizaciol1 como proceso de cambios sociales, polfiicos, )
> economicos, y se peljilan sus insinuaciones para el urte de gobenwr. Ell cuantc
> a 10 referido, se adelanto el globalislno como una dimensir5n positiva, )
> potencialmente correctiva, de la globalizacion, voliendose de las ensefianza,bah6'{s comofuente de llna vision hiCCl globalista pam el/ilturo.
> 
> 'J' Paper presentedlo lbe Baba'i Inlernalional Polilics and Law Interest Group (BlPOLlG) seminar
> Association for Baba'i Studies-English Speaking Europe, London School of Economics, June ILl
> and 15, 1997.
> 72         THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'I STUDIES                                   9.2.1999
> 
> We have also heard that thou has entrusted the reins of counsel into the
> hands of the representatives of the people. Thou, indeed, hast done well,
> for thereby the foundations of the edifice of thine affairs will be
> strengthened, and the hearts of all that are beneath thy shadow, whether
> high or low, will be tranquillized. It behoveth them, however, to be
> trustworthy among His servants, and to regard themselves as the
> representatives of all that dwell on earth. This is what counselleth them,
> in this Tablet, He Who is the Ruler, the All-Wise .... (Emphasis added)
> -Baha'u'llah, Tablet to Queen Victoria, Proclamation of BaM 'u' lldh
> 
> ebate over the ethics of statecraft has gone on for centuries, and the
> D     contours of the "big questions" are well defined in the literature of political
> philosophy and international relations. In both the theory and practice of
> intemational politics, tension has always existed between the demands of the
> nation-state as a provider of security and focus of loyalty and identity, and the
> injunctions of cosmopolitan morality. Even the great revealed religions,
> arguably the real sources of categorical morality, have over time become
> identified with particular cultures and been used to rationalize the pursuit of
> particularistic national ambitions.
> The vexing question of finding criteria to detennine the responsibilities and
> judge the actions of sovereign states is still very much with us, as exemplified
> by the debates over who is responsible for what in the post-Cold-War
> intemational system; and many of the same issues of power and justice raised in
> classical philosophy centuries ago remain relevant today. Nonetheless, as we
> approach the millennium, something is changing. More and more, one hears
> talk of globalization and its implications for economic life, for the state, and for
> identity. At the very least, the context in which the state's representatives make
> their choices has been altered in significant ways, as constructive and
> destructive social forces transcend borders and span (albeit unevenly) the entire
> planet; and it seems likely that the choices themselves are being redefined by
> the impact of these developments.
> In what follows, certain aspects of the debate about ethics in international
> politics are briefly summarized, and the implications of globalization for this
> debate explored. A case is made that to fulfill its responsibility to increasingly
> demanding citizens, statecraft requires not only a renewed moral integrity but
> also a new conception of its mission and purpose in an interdependent and
> shrinking world. In this regard, globalism is put forth as a positive, and
> potentially corrective, dimension of globalization, and the BaM'i teachings
> drawn upon as one important source of globalist ethical vision for the future.
> 
> Power and Justice
> As any beginning student of international relations learns, the field was for
> many decades characterized by a highly exaggerated division between "realists"
> Statecraft, Globalization, and Elh ics
> 
> and "idealists." The realist outlook, arguing that nothing fundamental ever
> changes in the struggle for dominance among states, traces its roots back to,
> among others, Thomas Hobbes, who stated in Leviathan that the interaction of
> Sovereigns was like a state of nature. He suggested further that:
> 
> To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing call
> be ulljust. The notiolls of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place.
> Where there is 110 C0111111011 power, there is no /e/lv: where no law, 110 injustice.
> (Emphasis added) (Hobbes, Leviathan l88)
> 
> Though the state of nature is a myth, Hobbes's point was that sovereign equals
> co-exist in a state of anarchy,1 and in an anarchy, morality has, at best, a
> questionable status. Thus, the most common argument or the modern period bas
> been that morality and ethics were only possible within coherent political
> communities, i.e., sovereign states. In international relations, either no moral
> principles applied, or the pursuit of the national interest itself took on the
> character of a moral principle.
> Another view, historically associated with the vvork of Immanuel Kant, is
> called cosmopolitan, and argues that all people have moral obligations to all
> other people in the macrosociety of human beings. It denies that there are any
> relevant 1110ral distinctions between "us" and "them":
> 
> The cosmopolitan position asserts that international political and ecollomic
> processes are not all that different ti-om, and may even be considered an extension of,
> those conducted within the boundaries of a given slale. From this standpoint, slates
> arc not self-contained, closed societies. Instead, lhey are increasingly ['jnding their
> domestic affairs to be influenced and, in some aspects, directly controlled by
> outside forces. Given this interdependence '; .. the world is not, and hardly will be
> again, one in which a standard of global justice is ll11neCessary or undemanding'.
> (McCleary, Seekillg Justice 16).
> 
> Fiona Robinson has described the ethical foundatiolls of cosmopolitanism in
> this way:
> 
> From a cosmopolitan perspeclive, the moral agent exists as an individual and a human
> being, prior to territorial or ancestral communilies, andUnenC1ll1lbered by social roles.
> Morality from this perspective is neither relative nor contingent; it is not limited by
> nationhood or statehood, time or place. Rather, it is timeless, universal and global.
> Cosmopolilanism is the moral universalism of international relations: it accepts the
> possibility of something which might be called a 'world community', anc! aspires to a
> 
> 1. It can be argued that scholars of il1ternational relations have placed toO much emphasis on
> Hobbes's discussion of international anarchy, since most of Leviatilol/ deals with how to create
> order by empowering a sovereign to rule a group.
> 74            THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'I STUDIES                                           9.2.1999
> 
> global order in which individuals regmd themselves and all others as 'world citizens',
> and where the boundaries of rights, obligations and justice me unrestricted across the
> globe. (Robinson, "Rethinking Ethics" 4)
> 
> Furthermore, " . . . what is crucial to a cosmopolitan attitude is the refusal to
> regard existing political structures as the source of ultimate value" (Brown,
> International Relations Theory 24, qtd. in Robinson, "Rethinking Ethics" 4).
> This attitude can be contrasted with a more statist ethic, quite close to some
> variants of realism, which accepts existing divisions of humanity as real and of
> moral significance. Robinson calls this tradition communitarian and explains
> that:
> 
> According to the communitarian argument, the individual cannot and does not exist
> prior to her social existence. As persons, and as moral agents, we have identities
> which are created through our social situations .... While communitarians may
> recognize the multiple nature of these identities, in political philosophy, and in
> International Relations theory, communitarian philosophers have tended to privilege
> the community of citizenship. Thus, in emphasizing particularism over the
> universalism of cosmopolitanism, communitarianism regards the foundation for
> morality as existing within the particular political community-specifically, the
> nation-state-rather than in the 'global community of humankind'. (Robinson,
> "Rethinking Ethics" 4)
> 
> In practice, of course, rulers have always recognized common norms that
> ordered to some extent their interaction. Many of these-particularly those
> defining sovereignty and its privileges-initially achieved the status of
> customary international law and were subsequently codified. Others remained
> less formal but were generally accepted as common practices or even
> "institutions" of what Hedley Bu1l2 (and others) called an international society.
> Bull, writing in 1977, argued further that all three of these views-which he
> called the Hobbesian, the Kantian, and the Grotian (after Hugo Grotius)-were
> in fact always present in international relations to some extent, but that one or
> the other was dominant at any given time.
> In a similar vein, Stanley Hoffman, in a series of lectures on "duties beyond
> borders," debunked the "pessimistic inevitability" school of realism, which
> views conflict as perpetual and inescapable, and then argued that political
> leaders have a moral responsibility to promote and practice an orderly and
> civilized style of statecraft:
> 
> Indeed, the ethics of the statesman ought to be guided by the imperative of moving
> the international arena from the state of a jungle to that of a society, because the
> 
> 2. Bull, The Anarchical Society. Bull refers specifically to the balance of power, international law ,
> diplomacy, war, and the role of the Great Powers as institutions of international society.
> Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics                                        75
> 
> moral opportunities available to all of us~not only to the statesman~depend on the
> state of the international system. Moral opportunities, in every milieu, depend on the
> social framework. ... The closer the international system lS to a jnngle, the closer we
> are to the floor of survival, the less opportunity for choice we have, the more values
> we have to sacrifice, the more plausible the statesman's claim of necessity becomes,
> the more we will be tempted to accept the 'morality of struggle' ~ancl either resign
> ourselves to endless competition, or put a moral dressing on it, in either case
> restricting our duties to our own community and, at most, to lts supporters and clients.
> On the contrary, the more moderate the system is, the greater the range of moral
> choice for all of us, the greater the possibility for the statesman to look at the world in
> terms other than us vs. them~to try to move from what I call a Machiavellian
> morality of public safety to a more universal morality that accepts the rightful claims
> of others; so that the question: right or good for whom? is no longer answered:
> exclusively for the statesman's community. (Hoffman, Duties Beyolld Borders
> 35-36)
> 
> These passages suggest three different points of departure for statecraft in an
> anarchic state system. National decision-makers can act either to:
> 
> Promote the interests of their state, defined in narrow and aggrandizing terms~
> even to the point of violent subjugation and exploitation of other peoples
> (Hobbesian);
> Promote the interests of their state, taking into account the need to maintain
> good relations with other states, and to preserve, except under exceptlonal
> conditions, oreler and peace (Grotian); or,
> Promote the interesl of their state defined in light of and in harmony with a
> broader conception of the "global interest" (Kantian).
> 
> This scheme indicates that while statecraft in pursuit of categorical values is
> possible to some extent, it is difficult to imagine ethical statecraft ever
> becoming an acquis of an anarchic state system. Rather, interstate politics can
> always deteriorate in the direction of a "state of nature" because statesperSolls'
> obligations to their constituents seem necessarily to take priority over
> obligations to the rest of humanity. Furthermore, as Bull explains, in a world
> organized politically into sovereign states, there really is no authoritative
> spokesperson for the "global interest" (Bull, Anarchical 85-86). Despite the
> numerous people, groups, and organizations who invoke this concept, there is
> no legitimate political institution that embodies and promotes it. Even the
> United Nations is fundamentally an ill.ternational organization, which, despite
> much of its rhetoric, is at its best more Grotian than Kantian in both conception
> and practice. Thus, there are structural, as well as ideological and philosophical,
> underpinnings to a narrowly self-regarding statecraft. However, ,there are
> indications that this very structure is undergoing significant change.
> 76            THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'I STUDIES                                  9.2.1999
> 
> Globalization 3
> Definitions
> There are a variety of definitions and descriptions of globalization, which,
> though overlapping in many respects, do emphasize different dimensions of the
> process. Roland Robertson, one of the first scholaTs to specialize in this area,
> provides the following general definition of globalization from a
> macrosociological viewpoint:
> 
> Globalization as a concept refers both to the compression of the world and
> intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole ... both concrete global
> interdependence and consciousness of the global whole in the twentieth century.
> (Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture 8, qtd. in Waters, Globalisation 41)
> 
> Writing in a similar vein, Malcolm Waters highlights changes in the influence
> of space on society:
> 
> We can therefore define globalization as: A social process in which the constraints of
> geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become
> increasingly aware that they are receding. (Globalisation 3)
> 
> Finally, Anthony Giddens's approach focuses on globalization as an interactive
> or dialectical process:
> 
> Globalization can thus be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations
> which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events
> occurring many miles away and vice versa. This is a dialectical process because such
> local happenings may move in an obverse direction from the very distanciated
> relations that shape them. Local transformation is as much a part of globalization as
> the lateral extension of social connections across time and space. (Giddens,
> Consequences of Modernity 64, qtd. in Waters, Globalisation 50)
> 
> Though the sociological studies are more comprehensive in scope, it is really in
> regard to business and economics that the term "globalization" is most
> frequently invoked. What is referred to here is "a qualitative shift toward a
> global economic system that is no longer based on autonomous national
> economies but on a consolidated global marketplace for production,
> distribution, and consumption" (Holm and S0rensen, "What Has Changed?" 5)
> and in which "distinct national economies are subsumed and rearticulated into
> the system by essentially international processes and transactions" (Hirst and
> Thompson, "The Problem of 'Globalization'," qtd. in Holm and S0rensen,
> "What Has Changed?" 5). The primary vehicles for this process have been the
> 
> 3. This section draws on the author's "The Conflicts of Globalization."
> 5ta tee raft, Gl obalizati on, and Et hies                                     77
> 
> increasing transnationalization of production, the resulting rise in influcnce of
> multinational enterprises, and even more importantly, the explosion in the
> volume and scope of transactions on international financial markets. In this
> regard, consider the following commentary on contemporary change ill the
> banking industry:
> 
> Banking is rapidly becoming indifferent to the constraints or time, place and
> currency ... an English buyer can get a Japanese mortgage, an American can tap his
> New York bank account through a cash machine in Hong Kong and a Japallesc
> investor can buy shares in a London-based Scandinaviall bank whose stock is
> denominated in sterling, dollars, Deutsche Marks, and Swiss ('rancs. (Final/cial Times
> 8/5/78, qld. in Walers, Globalisolion 89)
> 
> One of its most often noted effects is the homogenization of consumer markets
> around the world, at least in certain areas-the so-called McDonaldization of
> global consumption.
> Though often touted as representing the height of economic rationality.
> globalisation has also been portrayed as having it very dark side. Critics
> repeatedly point out that the contemporary form of globalization,4 driven by
> economic power, clearly promotes the hegemony of Western culture and
> corporations; puts jobs and communities at risk in the rich countries and exploits
> cheap labor in the poorer countries; increases threats to the environment; and
> undermines the foundations of democracy and social stability by subjecting
> national political institutions to forces of economic change beyond their control.
> Furthermore, as a recent volume of essays (Holm and S0rensen, Whose World
> Order) has highlighted, globalization is unel'en both in its processes and in its
> effects. It produces concentrations and deprivations which, in t.he aggregate,
> constitute an increasingly well-defined global power structure.
> 
> Consequences for the State
> Though the implications of these trends extend far beyond the scope of this
> article, certain ramifications of globalization for the state and statecraft can be
> highlighted. First, though the system of individually sovereign states is still the
> prevalent pattern in world order and nationalism the dominant form of political
> consciousness, the fact remains that the borders of the state do not define the
> limits of either political or economic life today. Rather, states themselves have
> become just one set of actors in a world system that transcends them; and
> governments find themselves increasingly obliged to follow policies largely
> dictated by global trends, rather than formulated independently in response to
> domestic priorities. This is what is intended when scholars of international
> 
> 4. Several writers have argued that globalization has been underway for a long time. Robertson,
> for instance, charts its evolution from the fifteenth century. See Robertson, Globalizatioll.
> 78            THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'i STUDIES                                   9.2.1999
> 
> relations characterize the international system as "system-dominant," or
> analysts of political economy speak of the "internationalizing" of the state.
> Second, globalization undermines citizens' habit of obedience to public
> institutions, as people become more reflexive through exposure to the higher
> volume of information generated by economic and technological globalization.
> Waters argues, for instance, that modern society is
> 
> specifically reflexive in character. Social activity is constantly informed by flows of
> information and analysis which snbject it to continuous revision and thereby
> constitute and reproduce it. ... The particular difficulty faced by moderns is that this
> knowledge itself is constantly changing so that living in a modem society appears to
> be uncontrolled, like being aboard a careening juggernaut. ... (Emphasis added) 5
> 
> Anthony Giddens argued that the industrial nation-state was the embodiment of
> "modern" society, and that it has been characterized by what he called "expert
> systems"-repositories of technical knowledge that can be deployed across a
> wide range of social contexts. These expert systems have, for instance, given
> lise to a technocratic style of civil administration. However, this dimension of
> modernity rests on the trust which, in the face of multiple risks and uncertainty,
> individual people-citizens, consumers, clients, passengers, or patients,
> depending on the context-place in these rather abstract and socially distant
> expert systems. Growing reflexivity is, however, undermining trust in expert
> systems around the globe. In regard to more and more issues there is a feeling
> that experts have either failed, or do not have the public interest at heart.
> Spybey, for instance, describes how in "late modern society" there is a
> "growing refusal of people to accept expert assurances about its dangers"
> (Spybey, Globalization and World Society 153). He goes on to state:
> 
> If, in the nineteenth century, those people who understood it and had access to its
> benefits rejoiced in the bounty of modernity and its scientific-technological wonders,
> the people of late modernity are cultured to expect mass consumption but are
> increasingly sufficiently well informed to develop doubts about its benefits. This is
> self-reflexivity and it is stimulated by negative experiences shared on a global scale,
> like for instance the Chernobyl disaster. It is individualism, enabled by mass
> education and encouraged by post-1960s permissiveness and self-awareness.
> (Spybey, Globalization and World Society 153)
> 
> In a similar vein, James Rosenau has written at length about what he calls the
> "global authority crisis," and his analysis provides insight into the nature and
> scope of political conflict in a world of globalized "postinternational politics."
> He explains that, as a result of greatly increased access to information and a
> general impression of the diminished competence or declining effectiveness of
> 
> 5. Waters, Globalisation 51. The juggernaut image is from Giddens.
> State craft, Globalization, and Et hie s                                          79
> 
> public institutions, citizens have lost their habit of obeying. If leaders are not
> able to find more effective means to gather support, people "begin to consider
> redirecting their loyalties and legitimacy sentiments" (Rosenau, Turbulence
> 389). He goes on to illustrate how crises of this kind interact and "cascade"
> around the planet:
> 
> The world is now so interdependent that "crisis networks" evolve, as information
> about a crisis in one collectivity Hows to others, and as its consequences ramify. By
> virtue of the information flows and of the interaction engendered by refugees, traders,
> terrorists, and other boundary-spanning individuals and groups, authority crises
> overlap and cascade across collectivities, forming linkages among them on an issue or
> regional basis. (Rosenau, Turbulence 390)
> 
> Giddens and Rosenau describe a world in which people are more aware. more
> empowered, and more critical through their access to information. However,
> populations have become less compliant and more demanding at precisely the
> time when national political institutions, as described below, are in most cases
> reducing their budgets and programs.
> A third effect is that in the post-Colcl- War world subnational and
> transnational groups (whose identities and solidarities are based on race,
> ethnicity, religion, or language) have become increasingly vocal and have used
> the global media to make their discontent known. The Cold War was a conflict
> among states and served to perpetuate the primacy of national identity in world
> society; but in the 1990s the state, weakened by globalization, is less etJective
> in either coercing compliance or integrating national society, and minorities are
> able to reassert their identity more effectively in reaction to hegemonic cultural
> forces. These minorities often see the state as no longer a promoter ancl
> protector of clomestic interests, but rather a collaborator with outside forces
> (Scholte, "Constructions"). Thus, in the 1990s it can be argued that the primary
> locus of conflict may no longer be found between and among states, but
> between the state and subnational groups.6
> Lastly, economic globalization, and particularly the incredible volume and
> mobility of global capital, have completely discredited the notion that a state
> can have truly independent economic policies. Rather, "the markets" set
> constraints on government action which politicians ignore at their own peril,
> suggesting that financial markets have become in some respects institutions of
> global governance whose "power" is greater than the state. Claude Ake, il
> leading African critical thinker, has written in this connection that
> 
> [e]collo111ic forces are constituting the world into Olle economy ancl. to a lesser eXlenl,
> one politicill society. Nations pmticipate in global governance according to lheir
> 
> 6. T. R. Gurr has presented data to show that the vast majority 01' wars in the mid-1990s involved
> ethnic conflicts. See Gurr, "Peoples against States" 347-77.
> 80            THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'I STUDIES                                  9.2.1999
> 
> economic power, which is coextensive with their rights. The global order is ruled by
> an informal cabinet of the world's economically most powerful countries; its law is
> the logic of the market, and status in this new order is a function of economic
> performance. (Ake, "The New World Order" 26)
> 
> One major effect of these changes is that efforts to maintain an attractive
> fiscal environment have obliged governments in industrialized nations to reduce
> the unemployment and welfare benefits which, to some degree, protected
> workers in the industrial countries from the creative destruction of capitalism
> during the decades immediately after World War II. Globalization has, in fact,
> radically shifted the balance of economic power in favor of capital (which is
> highly mobile and thus able to move where profits are to be gained) and against
> labor (which is much less mobile even in an economic community like the
> European Union, and whose basis of organization is still more national than
> international). As Ethan Kapstein has argued:
> 
> The forces acting on today's workers inhere in the structure of today's global economy,
> with its open and increasingly fierce competition on the one hand and fiscally
> conservative units-states-on the other. ... Growing income inequality, job
> insecurity, and unemployment are seen as the flip side of globalization. ("Workers" 17)
> 
> This perception poses its own problems for governance:
> 
> It is hardly sensationalist to claim that in the absence of broad-based policies and
> programs designed to help working people, the political debate in the United States
> and many other countries will soon turn sour. Populists and demagogues of various
> stripes will find "solutions" to contemporary economic problems in protectionism and
> xenophobia. Indeed, in every industrialized nation, such figures are on the campaign
> trail. (Kapstein, "Workers" 17)
> 
> These points highlight a fundamental problem of contemporary world order: a
> process of globalization is fully underway, but institutions with sufficient scope,
> power, and authority to regulate and direct this process toward beneficial ends
> are not in place. The state, as an institution embedded in broadening and
> accelerating global cultural and economic flows, finds its means of both action
> and control greatly reduced and its credibility undermined. Even the much
> debated question of "giving up sovereignty" to international institutions seems
> more and more to be a "red herring," since much of what sovereignty connotes
> in the popular imagination has already begun to erode.
> 
> Globalism
> The previous section indicates a need for new thinking about old questions, and
> in that sense, globalization issues are world order issues. As the existing
> institutions of international politics and society have confronted these issues,
> Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics                                        81
> 
> basic questions of political philosophy having to do with power, authority, and
> distributive justice-resolved, to some extent, for tbe nation-state i It the
> eighteenth and nineteenth centuries-are increasingly being raised again, but
> this time in regard to the planet as a single political, social, and economic
> system. Again, somewhat paradoxically, globalization lays a foundation for
> such new thinking by creating a growing awareness of tbe planet as "one
> place," a perspective which some have callee! glohalism. Mark Ritchie, for
> instance, defines globalism as
> 
> the belief that we share one fragile planet whose survival requires mUlual respect anc!
> careful treatment of all its people and its environment. Globalism is also a set of
> values and ethical beliefs requiring active practice in OLlr day-to-day lives. Active
> COillil1unications to foster understanding, the sharing of resources on the basis of
> equity and sustainability, and mutual aid in times of need are three central aui vities
> that undergird globalism. (Ritchie, "Globalization vs. Globalism" 1-2)
> 
> Globalist thinking grows out of a perception of the world as steadily
> becoming more interdependent and integrated, a trend which the Bah,i'f
> International Community (BrC) argues is reflected in
> 
> wide-ranging phenomena, from the fusion of world financial markets, which in turn
> reflect humanity's reliance on diverse and interdependent sources of energy, fooel,
> raw materials, technology and knowledge, to the construction of globe .. girdling
> systems of communications and transportation. It is reflected in tbe scientific
> understanding of the earth's interconnected biosphere, which has in lnrn given a new
> urgency to the neeel for global coordination. It is manifest, albeit in a destructive way,
> in the capacities of modern weapons systems, which have gradually increased in
> power to the point where it is now possible for a handful of men (0 bring an end to
> human civilization itself. It is the universal consciousness of this trend-in both its
> constructive and destructive expressions-that lends such poignancy to the familiar
> photograph of the earth as a swirling sphere of blue and white against tbe infinite
> blackness of space, an image crystallizing the realizalioll that we are a single people,
> rich in diversity, living in a common homeland. (Baha'i International Community,
> Turning Point/or All Nations 1-2)
> 
> Globalism, through a vision of the Global Commons and a respect for human
> diversity, can counter what critics see as globalization's unbridled exploitation
> of resources and "standardization or homogenization of almost everything and
> everybody" (Ritchie, "Globalization" 2). Ritchie argues further that:
> 
> In the case of inter-tribal, ethnic and religions wars a sense of globalism can reduce
> the xenophobia and chauvinism that bring on these wars. Globalism is also needed in
> order to encourage others far away from these conflicts to get involved and to share
> their resources to help resolve them. ("Globalization" 2)
> 82            THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'i STUDIES                                      9.2.1999
> 
> Finally, in a very concise statement of the contemporary dilemma, Ritchie
> argues that the longer a creative response to the negative trends of globalization
> is delayed, the more difficult it becomes:
> 
> As globalization causes greater poverty and hunger, it fuels involuntary emigration,
> which in turn may result in racism and fear of immigrants. In this way, globalization
> destroys the feelings of globalism, love and concern with neighbors around the planet,
> while creating the economic and ecological conditions that cry out for more, not less,
> globalism.
> My fear is that if we do not challenge globalization it will not only destroy the
> ecology and the society but it will also engender so much resentment, greed, and
> violence that we will no longer have the ability as a people to work together to tackle
> global problems. ("Globalization" 2)
> 
> What then should be our priorities, defined from a globalist perspective?
> Over the last several decades, there have been numerous efforts to define such a
> "global agenda," and, particularly since the end of the Cold War, a consensus
> has begun to emerge on a number of major questions, which are summmized in
> the following list. 7
> 
> A Draft Global Agenda
> • Strengthening Global Governance. Global issues require global solutions, and
> global solutions can only be formulated through processes of global decision
> making. This being said, only truly global issues should be decided at the world
> level. Centralization and bureaucratization should be avoided; other tiers of
> decision making and administration should be maintained and, in the case of
> local administration, strengthened. Finally, democracy, in the sense of a true
> empowerment of the masses and the institutions of civil society to participate in
> decisions affecting them, needs to be strengthened at all levels of governance.
> • Sustainable Development. Continuing to think of economic growth and
> ecological balance as incompatible alternatives is dangerously shortsighted. The
> principle of sustainability is already acknowledged (albeit grudgingly) by
> governments and economic elites, but it needs to find a much wider application
> in public and corporate policy at all levels. Governments and international
> development agencies can provide positive incentives for firms to adopt "green"
> technologies, and markets should be regulated to ensure that polluters pay for
> the social costs of their actions.
> • Collective Security. Though governments have hesitated to commit themselves
> to this principle, it is now clear that a world without effective collective security
> 
> 7. The discussion that follows draws primarily on 1be work of Ervin Laszlo, the Commission on
> Global Governance, the World Order Models Project, the Baha'i International COIIlII1unity, and
> vmious scholars in the field of Peace and Conflict Resolution Studies, such as John Burton and my
> colleague Abdul-Aziz Said.
> Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics                                       83
> 
> is a world in which major political crises are either met with interventionS by
> self-interested powers (individually or in coalition) or with indifference. In
> either case, the result is resentment and suffering. Most economies could also
> benefit greatly from a reduction in the costs of national defense. I-Ience, a
> functioning collective security system would be both a more equitable and a
> more cost-effective foundation for world order.
> • Human Rights/Basic Needs. The idea that all human beings have inherent
> rights of some kind is widespread-though views differ over which rights are
> contained within this description. Furthermore, there are basic human needs
> (physical, emotional, and spiritual) which cannot be erased through
> socialization or denied indefinitely through coercion. No long··term social
> stability or progress is possible in a world or a society characterized by large-
> scale abuse of human rights or denial of basic needs .
> • Fostering Planetary Citizenship. The average person is increasingly aware that
> global forces influence her or his life, but this is frequently perceived as an
> intrusive threat to economic security or cultural identity. Educational
> institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and the media can all assist in
> creating and strengthening a positive popular perception of world citizenship,
> without which a constituency supportive Of creative global change will be
> lacking.
> 
> However, while this list, or one like it, represents a positive value framework
> for political action as we approach the millennium, it must be acknowledged
> that leadership adequate to these tasks has not yet emerged. What seems to be
> needed, as argued in the following passage from the Commission on Global
> Governance, is a radically different kind of statecraft:
> 
> As the world faces the need for enlightened responses to tl1e challenges that al'ise on
> the eve of the new century, we are concerned at the lack of leadership over a wide
> spectrum of human affairs. At national, regional, and international levels, within
> communities and in non-governmental bodies, the world needs credible and sustained
> leadership.
> It needs leadership that is proactive, not simply reactive, that is inspired, n01 simply
> functional, that looks to the longer term and future generations for whol1l the present
> is held in trust. It needs leaders made strong by vision, sustained by ethics, and
> revealed by political courage that looks beyond the next election.
> This cannot be leadership confined within domestic walls. It lllust reach beyond
> country, race, religion, culture, language, life-style. It mllsl embrace a wider human
> constituency, be infused with a sense of caring for others, a sense of responsibility to
> l.he global neighborhood. (Our Global Neighbourhood 353)
> 
> 8. Intervention lakes many forms, and I am not lilTliting it here to military force.
> 84            THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'I STUDIES                                       9.2.1999
> 
> It should be appreciated that the prescriptions of the Commission on Global
> Governance mn counter to the priorities and style of political leadership that has
> characterized most nation-states during the modern period. The Commission
> argues, in effect, that a Kantian world politics is not just desirable, but essential
> if current challenges are to be successfully met. What is also striking is the
> extent to which the tasks and values mentioned here parallel those outlined
> more than a hundred years ago by Baha'u'llah, the Prophet-Founder of the
> BaM'i Faith, as promoting the best interests of the human race. This parallel
> suggests, in fact, that the Baha'i teachings can serve as an important source of
> inspiration and insight for the further development of globalist ethical thinking,
> a premise that is explored in more depth in the next section.
> 
> "Let your vision be world-embracing . .. "
> More than a century ago, BaM'u'llah declared that the human race had come of
> age and was embarking on a new, divinely ordained stage in its collective
> evolution that would witness the gradual emergence and fmition of a fully
> integrated, tmly planetary civilization. He also stated unequivocally that the
> "prevailing order" was "lamentably defective" (BaM'u'Hah, Tablets 171), that
> it would "[s]oon ... be rolled up, and a new one spread out in its stead
> (BaM'u'Hah, Gleanings 7). Thus, to Baha'is there is no "going back": the past
> can no longer be a guide to the future, and, rather than being at the "end of
> history," far-reaching vistas of challenge and opportunity stretch out before the
> inhabitants of this planet. 9 This vision inspires the world BaM'i community
> with optimism about the future and is combined with a profound conviction that
> the current era, despite its crises and tragedies, is pregnant with creative
> potential for positive change:
> 
> The turmoil now convulsing human affairs is unprecedented, and many of its
> consequences enormously destructive. Dangers unimagined in all history gather
> around a distracted humanity. The greatest error that the world's leadership could
> make at this juncture, however, would be to allow the crisis to cast doubt on the
> ultimate outcome of the process that is occurring. A world is passing away and a new
> one is struggling to be born. The habits, attitudes, and institutions that have
> accumulated over the centuries are being subjected to tests that are as necessary to
> human development as they are inescapable. What is required of the peoples of the world
> is a measure of faith and resolve to match the enormous energies with which the Creator
> of all things has endowed this spiritual splingtime of the race. (Emphasis added)!O
> 
> 9. In fact, it conld be argued that the Baha'i writings present a perspective in which humanity
> should be seen as currently nearer to the "beginning" than to the "end" of its collective history.
> 10. Baha'i International Community, The Prosperity of Humankind, attachment to a letter of 23
> January 1995 from the Universal House of Justice 'To the National Spiritual Assemblies of the
> Baha'IS throughout the World," page 19. In this document the Baha'i International Community
> Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics                                       85
> 
> Furthermore, the Bahcl'} teachings reflect an unequivocally globalist
> perspective. These two brief quotations from Baha'u'llah are indicative of this
> theme:
> 
> The well-being of mankind, its peace and security, are unatlainable unless and until
> its unity is firmly established. (Gleanings 286)
> 
> Of old it hath been revealed: 'Love of one's country is an element or tbe Faith of
> God.' The Tongue of Grandeur hath, however, in thc day of His manifestatioll
> proclaimed: 'It is not his to boast who loveth his country, but it is his who loveth the
> world.' Through the power released by these exalted words He hath lent a fresh
> impulse and set a new direction to the birds of men's hearts .. ". (Tavle/s 87-88)
> 
> Consider also the following distinctly cosmopolitan passage in which 'Abdu'l-
> Baha critiques the origins and excesses of nationalism:
> 
> Why, then, all these fallacious national and racial distinctions? These boundary lines
> and artificial barriers have been created by despots and conC]uemrs who sought to
> attain dominion over mankind, thereby engendering palriotic feeling and rousing
> selfish devotion to merely local standards of government. ...
> God created one earth and one mankind to people it. Man llas no olher habitatioll,
> but rnan himself has come forth and proclaimed imaginary bounclary lines and
> territorial reslrictions, naming them Germany, France, Russia, etc. And lorrents of
> precious blood are spilled ill defense of these imaginary divisions of our one human
> habitation, uncler the delusion of a fancied and limited patriotism. (,Abelu'I-Baha,
> Promulgation 354-55)
> 
> In numerous letters and messages during his mll11stly, Shoghi Effendi further
> explicated the implications of the Baha'i principle of unity for contemporary
> and future world affairs. For instance, he wrote in 1936 that:
> 
> Unification of the whole of mankinel is the hall-mal"k of the stage which human
> society is now approaching. Unity of family, of tribe, of city-state, and nation have
> been successively allempted and fully established. \Vorld unity is the goal towards
> which a harassecl humanity is striving. Nation-building has come to all end. The
> anarchy inherent in state sovereignty is moving towards ,1 climax. A world, growing
> to maturity, must abanelon this fetish, recognize the oneness and wholeness or human
> relationships, and establish once for all the machinery that can best incarnate this
> fundamental principle of its life. (Shoghi Effendi, World Orcin 202)
> 
> However, the Baha'i Teachings also address the concerns of communitarians,
> arguing that the integrity of both the universal and the particular can and must
> 
> (Bre) draws on relevant Baha'i principles to analyze major contemporary economic problems and
> to propose solutions.
> 86            THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'i STUDIES                                   9.2.1999
> 
> be accommodated in the pattern of world order. Shoghi Effendi, for instance,
> stated openly that a "sane and intelligent patriotism" had its place in world
> society and that it was impossible and undesirable to "ignore" or "suppress, the
> diversity of ethnical origins, of climate, of history, of language and tradition, of
> thought and habit, that differentiate the peoples and nations of the world"
> (Shoghi Effendi, World Order 41). However, he went on to explain that the
> Baha'i Faith
> 
> insists upon the subordination of national impulses and interests to the imperative
> claims of a unified world. It repudiates excessive centralization on one hand, and
> disclaims all attempts at uniformity on the other. Its watchword is unity in
> diversity .... (Shoghi Effendi, World Order 42)
> 
> The Baha'i International Community draws on this principle of unity to
> derive a major globalist ethical principle, collective trusteeship, which, if fully
> integrated into social and economic policy, would contribute significantly to
> reducing the current extremes of wealth and poverty and the tension and
> resentment to which they give rise:
> 
> Since the body of humankind is one and indivisible, each member of the race is
> born into the world as a trust of the whole. This trusteeship constitutes the moral
> foundation of most of the other rights-principally economic and social-which the
> instruments of the United Nations are attempting similarly to define. (Baha'i
> International Community, Prosperity 7)
> 
> Trusteeship involves a number of obligations of society toward its members,
> among which are "employment, mental and physical health care, social security,
> fair wages, rest and recreation" (Baha'i International Community, Prosperity 8).
> This principle also has clear implications for the cultural and identity issues
> discussed earlier:
> 
> The principle of collective trusteeship creates also the right of every person to
> expect that those cultural conditions essential to his or her identity enjoy the
> protection of national and international law. Much like the role played by the gene
> pool in the biological life of humankind and its environment, the immense wealth of
> cultural diversity achieved over thousands of years is vital to the social and economic
> development of a human race experiencing its collective coming-of-age. It represents
> a heritage that must be permitted to bear its fruit in a global civilization. On the one
> hand, cultural expressions need to be protected from suffocation by the materialistic
> influences currently holding sway. On the other, cultures must be enabled to interact
> with one another in ever-changing patterns of civilization, free of manipulation for
> partisan political ends. (Baha'i International Community, Prosperity 8)
> 
> Furthermore, if taken seriously as a basis for new policies, collective trusteeship
> requires "a fundamental rethinking of economic issues" because
> Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics                                                  87
> 
> [t]he classical economic models of impersonal markets in which human beings act as
> autonomous makers of self-regarding choices will not serve the needs of a world
> motivated by ideals of unity and justice. Society will find itself increasingly
> challenged to develop new economic models shaped by insights that arise from a
> sympathetic understanding of shared experience, from viewing human beings in
> relation to others, and from a recognition of the centrality to social well-being of the
> role of the family and the community. (Baha'i International Community, Pl'Osperily
> 16)
> 
> These points in turn raise obvious questions about how such principles are to
> be put into effect and what institutional changes would be necessary for their
> realization. Such issues are addressed in a subsequent statement, Turning Point
> for all Nations, prepared on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the
> founding of the United Nations organization. As an introduction to their
> proposals for reforming and strengthening the United Nations, the Baha'i
> International Community describes the great steps forward in knowledge and
> consciousness and the terrible upheavals and disasters of the twentieth century
> as representing "twin processes-the collapse of old institutions on the one
> hand and the blossoming of new ways of thinking on the other" which
> constitute "evidence of a single trend which has been gaining momentum during
> the last hundred years: the trend toward ever-increasing interdependence and
> integration of humanity." 11
> Our earlier discussion showed globalization to have both creative and
> destructive aspects, and it would seem logical that new institutional
> arrangements are necessary to address the problems without sti fling the positive
> energies released. This is the approach adopted in Tumill.g Point for All
> Nations. While promoting the eventual creation of a fully developed and
> authoritative planetary government as the best long-term goal for world order, 12
> it is suggested that for the immediate future:
> 
> ... in accordance with the principles of decentralization ... international instilut.ions
> should be given the authority to act only on issues of international concern wi1ere
> states cannot act on their own or to inlervene for the preservation of the righls of
> 
> II. Baha'i International Community, TUl'I1ing Point for all Nalion.\' I. Predictions of the 8l'rival and
> intensification of these tW1l1 processes occur frequently in the major writings of BahCt'u'lliih.
> 'Abdu'l-Baha, ami Shoghi Effendi.
> 12. In this regard they cite one of Shoghi Effendi's several statements on this theme:
> Some form of a world super-state must needs be evolved. in whose favor all the nations of the world
> will have willingly ceded every claim to make war, certain rights La impose taxation and all rights to
> maintain armaments, except for purposes of maintaii1ing interrwl order within their respective
> dominions. Such a state will have to include within its orbit all international executive adequate 10
> enforce supreme and unchallengeable authority Oil every recalcitrant member of the commonwealth;
> a world parliament whose members shall be elected by the people in tileil' respective countries and
> whose election shall be confirmed by their respective governments; and a supreme tribunal who,e
> judgment will have a binding effect even in such cases wilere the parties concerned did not
> voluntm'ily agree to submit their case to its consideration. (Shoghi EJlelldi, World Order 40-41)
> 88            THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'i STUDIES                                         9.2.1999
> 
> peoples and member states. All other matters should be relegated to national and local
> institutions. (BaM'i International Community, Turning Point 5)
> 
> Federalism is advocated as a useful model for global governance because it
> "has proved effective in decentralizing authority and decision-making in large,
> complex, and heterogeneous states, while maintaining a degree of overall unity
> and stability."13
> Finally on this note, it is argued that the masses of people who will be most
> directly affected by the process must be actively involved in setting new goals
> and formulating strategies of change. Acknowledging that "international bodies
> have historically remained distant from the minds and hearts of the world's
> people ... " and that "the vast majority of people have not yet developed an
> affinity for institutions like the United Nations"; the Baha'i International
> Community goes on to argue that:
> 
> Paradoxically, international institutions cannot develop into an effective and mature
> level of government and fulfill their primary objective to advance human civilization,
> if they do not recognize and nurture their relationship of mutual dependency with the
> people of the world. Such recognition would set in motion a virtuous cycle of trust
> and support that would accelerate the transition to a new world order. (Baha'i
> International Community, Turning Point 13-14)
> 
> This admittedly brief overview highlights the degree to which in the Baha'i
> teachings spiritual and social values fit coherently into a model of world order.
> There is, for instance, no ambiguity about the fact that a world civilization
> requires authoritative world institutions, or that the distribution of wealth should
> not be solely determined by the unfettered operation of markets-issues in
> regard to which other globalists have equivocated.
> 
> Conclusion
> The previous discussion was primarily intended to explore some of the
> limitations in prevalent conceptions of international politics and obligation that
> are increasingly apparent in a rapidly globalizing era. Though most populations
> and governments are still somewhere between Hobbesian and Grotian in
> outlook, the Global Agenda demands commitment to Kantian values. This gap,
> or contradiction, is real and threatening, as confirmed by the frequency with
> which large-scale human tragedy is paraded before our eyes by an increasingly
> panoptical global media. Thus, the present moment calls for a statecraft that
> breaks with the past and takes unprecedented steps toward planetary integration.
> 
> 13. Turning Point 6. They also suggest that the commonwealth is another interesting model of
> governance "which at the global level would place the interest of the whole ahead of the interest of
> any individual nation" (Turning Point 6).
> Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics                               89
> 
> In this context, Baha'u'llah's injunction. to parliamentarians to "regard
> themselves as the representatives of all that dwell on earth," acquires great
> significance, since only policies which take the. interests of all the inhabitants of
> the planet into consideration can contribute to long-term stability in an
> increasingly interdependent world. After all, if the world is indeed one system,
> world order must ultimately be a "positive sum" game: in the long run, we all
> either "win" or "lose" together.
> To be effective, however, a commitment to globalism should be felt as well
> as rationally argued-it must reach both the mind and the heart. Though many
> groups in civil society are promoting such a value change,14 the Baha'i
> community stands out among the world's religioLls communities for the
> integration of its theological and ethical teachings with a globalist worldview,
> and for that reason deserves serious attention from those seeking to find a
> "ground" for moral decision in contemporary public affairs.
> 
> Works Cited
> 
> 'Abdu'l-Baha. The Promulgation of Universal Peace: Talks Delivered by
> 'Abdu'l-Baha during His Visit to the United States and Canada ill 19/2.
> Compo Howard MacNutt. 2d ed. Wilmette, Ill.: Bahel') Publishing Trust,
> 1982.
> Ake, Claude. "The New World Order: A View from Africa." [n Whose World
> Order: Uneven Globalization and the End.ofthe Cold War. Eel. Hans-Henrik
> Holm and Georg SlZ\rensen. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1995.
> Baha'i International Community-Office of Public Information. The Pro.sperily
> of Humankind: A Statement Prepared by the Bah6'f International
> Community's Office of Public Information. Thornhill, Canada: National
> Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of Canada, 1995.
> Baha'i International Community. Turning Point for All Nations: A Statem,ent (if
> the Baha'( International Community 6n the Occasion of the Fiftieth
> Anniversary of the United Nations. New York: Baha'i International
> Community, October, 1995.
> Baha'u'llah. Gleanings from the Writings (if Bahci'u'1l6h, Trans. Shoghi
> Effendi. 2d ed. Wilmette, Ill.: BaM'i Publishing Trust, 1976.
> - - - . The Proclamation of Bah6'u'll6h to the Kings and Leaders of the
> World. Haifa: Baha'iWorlel Centre, 1967.
> - - - . Tablets of Baha 'u' ll6h Revealed qfter the Kitab-i-Aqdas. Compo
> Research Dept. of the Universal House of Justice. Trans, H. Taherzacleh et
> a1. 2d ed. Wilmette, Ill.: Bah,1'f Publishing Trust, 1988.
> Brown, Chris. International Relations Theory: New Nonnative App/'Oaches.
> Hempel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.
> 
> 14. Feminists and deep ecologists are two examples.
> 90        THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'i STUDIES                          9.2.1999
> 
> Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New
> York: Columbia University Press, 1977.
> Giddens, Anthony. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity, 1990.
> GUlT, T. R. "Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing
> World System." International Studies Quarterly 38 (September 1994):
> 347-77.
> Hirst, Paul, and Grahame Thompson, eds. "The Problem of 'Globalization':
> International Economic Relations, National Economic Management and the
> Formation of Trading Blocs." Polity and Society 21.4 (1992): 358-59.
> Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Ed. C. B. MacPherson. New York: Penguin, 1979.
> Hoffman, Stanley. Duties Beyond Borders. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University
> Press, 1981.
> Holm, Hans-Henrik, and Georg S0rensen. Introduction. "What Has Changed?"
> In Whose World Order: Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War.
> Ed. Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg S0rensen. Boulder, Colorado: Westview,
> 1995.
> Holm, Hans-Henrik, and Georg S0rensen, eds. Whose World Order: Uneven
> Globalization and the End of the Cold War. Boulder, Colorado: Westview,
> 1995.
> Kapstein, Ethan. "Workers and the World Economy." Foreign Affairs 75.3
> (May/June 1996): 17.
> Lerche, Charles O. "The Conflicts of Globalization." International Journal of
> Peace Studies 3.1 (January 1998): 47-66.
> McCleary, Rachel. Seeking Justice: Ethics and International Affairs. Boulder,
> Colorado: Westview, 1992.
> Our Global Neighbourhood. Report of the Commission on Global Governance.
> New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
> Ritchie, Mark. "Globalization vs. Globalism: Giving Internationalism a Bad
> Name." Conference "trade-strategy," <trade-strategy@igc.apc.org>, 26
> Februal'Y 1996.
> Robertson, Roland. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London:
> Sage, 1992.
> Robinson, Fiona. "Rethinking Ethics in an Era of Globalization." Sussex Papers
> in International Relations No.2. January 1996.
> Rosenau, James. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and
> Continuity. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990.
> Scholte, Jan Aart. "Constructions of Collective Identity in a Time of
> Globalisation." <http://nexxus.com.cwru.edu/amjdc/papersI76>. 6 April
> 1997.
> Shoghi Effendi. The World Order of BaM'u'llah: Selected Letters. Rev. ed.
> Wilmette, Ill.: Baha'i Publishing Trust, 1974.
> Spybey, Tony. Globalization and World Society. Cambridge, u.K.: Polity Press,
> 1996.
> Waters, Malcolm. Globalisation. London: Routledge, 1995.
>
> — *Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics (Used by permission of the curator)*