# The Process Approach

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> Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Daniel C. Jordan, The Process Approach, Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1976, bahai-library.com.
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> 
> THE PROCESS APPROACH
> 
> Daniel C. Jordan
> 
> Chapter 11 in Seefeldt, Carol (Ed.)
> 
> Curriculum for the preschool-primary child: a review of the research.
> 
> Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1976
> 
> Developing full human potential.
> 
> Introduction
> In one way or another, curriculum has been a central concern of formal
> education since its inception. But as a recognized field of inquiry in the United States,
> it did not come into being until the 1920s. Since then it has gone through a number of
> "identity crises" related to such fundamental issues as the definition of curriculum
> itself; whether or not there is, should, or could be a theory of curriculum; who
> should determine what a curriculum is; how to make it socially relevant; and,
> assuming the legitimacy of theoretical notions concerning curriculum, how to
> reduce the gap between theory and practice and effect a rapprochement between
> theoreticians and practitioners. More recently, the struggle over the issue of what should
> be done to the curriculum to help equalize educational opportunity has been added to
> the list of concerns facing curriculum developers.
> Other equally important questions have yet to be raised in any systematic way :
> What is the relationship between a theory of curriculum and a theory of teaching ?
> Does the nature of learning itself have a bearing upon what is meant by curriculum ?
> What implications for curriculum arise out of the nature of knowledge and how can
> one come to acquire knowledge? How comprehensive should the curriculum be? [273/4]
> Since the knowledge explosion is upon us and there is no way to teach anything but
> the tiniest fraction of man's accumulated knowledge, what criteria should be used in
> determining what should make up that tiniest fraction?
> With a few notable exceptions, the past fifty years of curriculum development have
> been characterized by fragmentary and piecemeal efforts to deal with the basic issues
> outlined above. Educators, theorists, researchers, practitioners, psychologists, and a
> variety of local, regional, and national commissions have participated in these efforts .
> Any field of inquiry beleaguered by the continuing irresolution of so many of its
> fundamental issues is bound to become paralyzed. Schwab says:
> The field of curriculum is moribund. It is unable, by its present methods and
> principles, to continue its work and contribute significantly to the advancement
> of education. It requires new principles which will generate a new view of the
> character and variety of its problems. It requires new methods appropriate to the
> new budget of problems. (Schwab, p. 1)
> Schwab believes that the curriculum became moribund because of an "inveterate,
> unexamined, and mistaken reliance on theory" and that the only way we can salvage it
> is to leave theoretical pursuits and concentrate on dealing in a practical way with
> problems and issues as they arise through the process of deliberation (Schwab, p. 1).
> At the same time, he advises that an eclectic approach should be used in arriving at a
> decision as to what ought to be done in response to a given issue or problem. By
> eclectic, Schwab means appropriately applying the knowledge which theories represent to
> different practical problems. He does not believe that the eclectic approach means
> combining alternative theories into one coherent theory —an achievement which,
> according to him, may take a hundred years. Because things are in such a bad state of
> affairs, he believes that educators cannot afford to wait a hundred years; it is there fore
> necessary for them to deal with educational problems on an ad hoc basis through the
> process of deliberation.
> While Schwab's approach might relieve short-term tensions, it will not bring us any
> closer to a long-range solution to the problems surrounding the field of curriculum.
> On the contrary, the solution to complex curriculum issues lies essentially in the
> construction of a comprehensive theory, whose propositions, definitions, and
> explanations will function as an efficient guide to practices that lead to the
> achievement of specific educational objectives. If the objectives are efficiently
> achieved by applying the theory, the theory becomes substantiated . If not, the
> theory is challenged and must be modified; but that does not mean theory
> construction and research is unimportant.
> For several years, my colleagues and I have been working on the construction of a
> theory of curriculum which forms a part of a comprehensive theory of education. This
> body of theory and the procedures for translating it into practice are known as the
> Anisa model (Streets and Jordan) . In the course of working on the model, we
> attempted to deal with every one of the issues concerning curriculum development
> previously mentioned. There are therefore many different aspects of this work which
> are beyond the scope of this chapter, but the efforts we made to define curriculum in a
> comprehensive way and the endeavor to create a process curriculum are directly
> relevant. Our experience has led us to conclude that if the field of curriculum
> is [274/5] moribund, it is because curriculum has been defined too narrowly in
> terms of subject matter or content rather than in the broader context of
> human development. To rescue it from that condition, we believe that
> curriculum development must be given a broader theoretical base that
> takes into account the nature of development and directly reflects the
> idea of process. Understanding a process approach to curriculum necessarily depends
> upon knowing something about human development and the nature of process. For
> this reason, the process curriculum of the Anisa model, which is derived from a
> comprehensive theory of development, can only be understood by knowing the theory to
> which we now turn our attention.
> The Nature of Development and the Meaning of Process
> Development refers to a change in an organism from one state to a more complex and
> highly integrated state; process refers to a patterned expression of energy utilization
> that depends on some structure in the brain that produces the pattern .
> Developmental change is therefore accompanied by the accumulation and integration of
> new structures and their associated functions . Generally speaking, new structures
> and their integration occur as a result of biological maturation on the one hand and
> learning on the other.
> Developmental psychology is the primary discipline concerned with a description
> and explanation of changes in patterns of human behavior over time. It therefore has
> a special interest in process. Understanding the nature of change and process has
> been problematical not only for psychology but also for philosophical thought and for
> the world of practical action as well. While much remains to be learned about the
> nature of human development and the processes involved in the organism's
> progression from conception to death, a great deal of knowledge has accumulated that has
> implications for educational practice in general and for the development of a process
> curriculum in particular.
> The following list highlights certain features of the nature of development and the
> meaning of process, each one of which had an important bearing upon the development
> of the Anisa theories of development and curriculum.
> 1. Development presupposes potentiality—Once we agree that being is not
> characterized by static actuality, we are impelled to consider process, and process
> presupposes potentiality. Anything that develops must have the potential for
> becoming what it eventually does become (e.g., the oak tree, not the pine tree,
> is potentially present within the acorn).
> 2. Development presupposes some end state—This proposition is perhaps one
> of the more controversial issues in development. Such an assumption
> immediately raises a question as to what the end state is, and many scientists
> and theorists object to any idea of teleology (purpose or final cause) which such an
> assumption entails.
> 3. Development is orderly—If the movement from one state of being to a
> subsequent one is orderly, processes (i.e., the functionings associated with particular
> structures) must be characterized by a pattern and occur sequentially. [275/6]
> 4. Development is progressive—If the nature of change over time is progressive, a
> later developmental stage will always be different from a previous one and
> identifiably so on the basis of some criteria, usually complexity and level of
> integration.
> 5. Development is cumulative and continuous—For all practical purposes, a
> later state of being is the consequence of the preceding stages of development.
> In other words, all subsequent stages have their roots in earlier stages; something
> cannot come out of nothing.
> 6. Development has a rhythm—Not only are the changes comprising development
> orderly in terms of their spatial configuration but there is also a temporal
> orderliness or pattern as well. Timing is important. For instance, certain
> nutritional elements or experiences are more critical at certain times than they are
> at others.
> 7. Development is irreversible—Changes take place in succession and are
> irreversible. Development proceeds irreversibly in one direction. For instance, it
> is not possible to "unlearn" something; it is only possible to add additional
> learning which may have the effect of altering a behavior that emerged out of
> some kind of prior learning.
> Using the above characteristics of development as a point of departure, we
> formulated a comprehensive theory of development which defines development as the
> translation of potentiality into actuality and equates the translation with creativity,
> the "universal of universals". (Whitehead) The theory accounts for the means
> (process) by which the translation takes place, classifies potentialities, establishes
> three basic categories of environment, and describes the nature of actuality in terms of
> value formation (see Kalinowski and Jordon). This comprehensive theory of
> development serves as the generative base for the construction of a theory of curriculum
> which deals with both process and content. It affirms that the translation of
> potentiality into actuality is sustained by the organism itself at whatever state it is in at
> any given moment in time, by the environment, and by the interaction between
> them. All three have basic implications for the definition of curriculum.
> The theory establishes two fundamental categories of potentialities: biological and
> psychological. It cites nutrition as the key factor in the actualization of biological
> potentialities and fixes learning as the key factor in the actualization of psychological
> potentialities. While the process curriculum of the Anisa model includes nutrition
> and the development of biological potentialities, this chapter focuses only on the
> process curriculum related to the actualization of psychological potentialities (see
> Raman, "Nutrition and Educational Planning"). Psychological potentialities are
> broken down into five basic categories: psychomotor, perceptual, cognitive, affective,
> and volitional. Because the translation of these potentialities into actuality is regarded
> as synonymous with creativity in the most fundamental sense of that term, we believe
> that any school system intending to foster creativity must necessarily emphasize
> process rather than product in its conception of the total curriculum. In the model,
> each category of potentiality has been broken down further into important processes
> which by virtue of their fundamental nature are keys to large numbers of subsequent
> developments. These processes form the basis for the development of the Anisa
> process curriculum. Explanations and examples of these processes will be presented
> later, and their implications for practice will be explored. [276/7]
> If learning is the key factor in the translation of psychological potentialities into
> actuality, then learning is the essential creative process around which the process
> curriculum should be developed. Thus, understanding the nature of learning is for all
> practical purposes the same as understanding the nature of process and a prerequisite to
> the development of a process curriculum.
> We conducted an extensive review and analysis of all major learning theories in
> hope of distilling from them a common denominator that would shed light on the
> nature of learning and lead to a fuller understanding of process . After an intensive
> effort at comparative analysis, we finally arrived at the following definition: learning is
> the ability of the organism to differentiate experience by breaking it down into
> contrastable units; to combine or integrate these contrastable elements in novel ways thereby
> generating new patterns of movement, perception, thoughts, feelings, and intentions; and to
> generalize these patterns to new situations.
> Differentiation, integration, and generalization, then, constitute the essential
> characteristics of process; they depend on the development of particular structures in the
> brain and are applicable to whatever category of potentiality is being addressed . For
> instance, processes pertinent to psychomotor potentialities will concern differentiation of
> the movements of the various muscles of the body, their integration into particular
> movement patterns such as walking, skipping, or swimming, and the generalization
> of these patterns to a variety of other situations. If the process being developed is an
> important and obvious one, we sometimes refer to it as a stage. When a child, for
> example, is learning how to differentiate the movements of muscles which then become
> integrated in a particular way so that locomotion in an upright position is possible, we
> say that the child is at the "walking stage" that was preceded by a "crawling stage."
> Because there is an infinite number of processes, some decision has to be made
> concerning which processes are important enough to be included in a process curriculum.
> Our most difficult tasks continue to be identifying the processes which seem to be
> critical for subsequent major developments, researching them, and expressing them as
> elements in the process curriculum. Some processes are evidently essential or prerequisite
> to the development of large numbers of additional processes, while others are not.
> Taking this as a given, it follows that those processes which lead to the largest number of
> important subsequent developments^ would be the ones which should be first in line
> for inclusion in the process curriculum. Degree of probable necessity for subsequent
> developments^ is one of the basic criteria we applied when deciding whether or not
> to include a particular process in the curriculum.
> We use the word process to refer to the functioning that is made possible by some
> structure in the brain which is built up out of the organism's particular interactions
> with particular environments. Process is not to be confused with activity that is
> provided for a child. We reserve the phrase interaction with the environment to
> describe what the child does. It is the purpose of the process curriculum to specify
> what kinds of environments and what kinds of interactions with those environments are
> necessary for particular structures to emerge, thereby endowing the child with competence
> to function in terms of their associated processes. We cannot, as yet, isolate specific
> anatomical structures in the tissues of the brain and their analogous physiological
> functions on which the processes depend. We therefore infer the presence of the
> structures and their functioning by patterns of behavior which we can [277/8] observe.
> However, we should not make the mistake of believing that a given structure is not there
> if the person does not perform a particular behavior. It is possible to know how to do
> something without ever doing it so that if and when it is done, it is done right the first
> time. In our view, an excessively behavioristic orientation to learning is like wearing
> blinders. Much of what is important about the nature of human development and
> learning is not directly observable, but just because we cannot see it is no justification for
> believing it does not or cannot exist. What goes on inside the head is tremendously
> important for psychology as a science . Thought does not necessarily have any
> immediate or directly related behavioral manifestations; yet few people would deny
> its importance.
> A Comprehensive Theory of Curriculum
> Ultimately, any satisfactory theory of curriculum must derive from a superordinate
> theory that explains the nature of the human being whom the curriculum is supposed to
> serve; thus a curriculum theory cannot be completely independent and autono mous.
> If it is not derived from a theory of development, it is likely to be unworkable because
> it fails to take into consideration the characteristics of man. For example, a curriculum
> theory that does not take into consideration characteristics such as interest,
> motivation, attention, and fatigue, or even more importantly, the develop mental
> characteristics associated with the acquisition of knowledge, will be doomed to failure when
> implemented and will survive only because other parts of the educational system
> compensate in some way for its deficiencies. Unfortunately, there has been no adequate
> theory of development from which a satisfactory theory of curriculum might be derived.
> This accounts for the inability of theorists up to this time to produce such a theory of
> curriculum.
> A theory of teaching, like a theory of curriculum, can also only exist as a derivative
> from a theory of development. To teach is to help children learn; a successful theory
> of teaching must therefore be derived from a theory of development that explicates the
> nature of learning. In other words, if somebody is teaching, children must be learning;
> if they are not, then we cannot say any teaching is going on (see Streets and
> Jordan).
> From the Anisa theory of development we have derived compatible theories of curriculum
> and teaching. There will no doubt be other theories of development emerging in the
> future, and the Anisa theory will probably undergo perpetual modification and refinement.
> However, the present Anisa theories of development and curriculum will suffice for our
> purposes of explaining a process approach to curriculum and the rela tionship of process
> to content.
> On the propositions set forth by the Anisa theory of development, we based the
> Anisa theory of curriculum which defines curriculum as two interrelated sets of
> educational goals and what children do, usually with the help of peers and adults,
> to achieve those goals. In essence, curriculum consists of goals and a specification of
> interactions with particular environments to achieve those goals. For example, one set
> of goals concerns assimilation of information about the world in which we live; they
> form part of the content curriculum. Culture and direct experience are the primary
> sources of this information, the organization of which rests on the classification of [278/9]
> environments as set forth in the theory of development. The other set of goals
> concerns the potentialities of man and the means by which they become actualized
> through learning; they form part of the process curriculum. Achieving these two sets
> of goals (i.e., content and process), results in the emergence of a personal identity—a
> Self. As this Self gains mastery over its environment and over the processes of its own
> becoming, it can take charge of its own destiny; this is the overarching purpose of the
> Anisa model.
> The five categories of potentialities established by the theory of development
> provide the basic organization of the process curriculum. Designed to develop
> competencies in each of these areas, the process curriculum sets the guidelines
> for creating experiences for children that enable them to develop structures in the brain
> which when functioning are evidence that the child has developed a particular
> process. Each category of potentiality has been broken down into the processes which
> underlie learning competence in that area . All of the processes, regardless of the
> category of potentiality to which they are related, are comprised of differentiation,
> integration, and generalization in some combination or another. The emphasis of a
> process curriculum is on the "how" as opposed to the "what" of a content
> curriculum. For instance, the content curriculum may focus on what a child should
> be thinking about whereas the process curriculum focuses on enabling a child to learn
> how to think. The process curriculum of the Anisa model is thus organized to enable a
> child to know how to move his muscles and gain maximum control over them, how to
> perceive, how to think, how to feel, and how to formulate intentions and consummate
> them. As the child masters the basic processes in each of these areas, he becomes a
> competent learner—he learns how to learn. Learning how to learn is therefore the
> basic objective of the process curriculum; it is the means whereby one takes charge of
> one's own becoming.
> It is the function of theory to guide practice toward some end. That is why the Anisa
> theory of curriculum not only specifies the ends but sheds light on how they are to be
> achieved. This is set forth by the interaction component of the curriculum theory .
> Detailed explanations of the content curriculum of the Anisa model and the
> interaction component are beyond the scope of this chapter. However, it should be
> noted that no curriculum theory can be comprehensive if it does not include both
> content and process goals and specify what the children must do in what kind of
> environments in order to master the processes and assimilate the contents outlined in the
> goals.
> Design for a Process Curriculum
> The major tasks in designing the Anisa process curriculum were to identify the basic
> processes that make up learning competence in each of the five categories of
> potentialities and to determine what interactions with what kinds of environments
> are necessary to internalize them. In the following sections, a selected number of
> processes from each category will be identified and briefly explained . A few of the
> processes will be treated more fully than the others and serve as examples of how
> particular activities planned for the children are related to the mastery of the
> processes.
> [279/80]
> 
> The Psychomotor Process Curriculum
> The general definition of psychomotor competence which follows will provide a
> framework for understanding each of the processes on which the psychomotor process
> curriculum is based.
> Psychomotor competence is an inner awareness of all of the muscles (which can
> come under voluntary control to whatever degree), all of the differentiated
> movements of body parts they are capable of effecting, and the ability to execute
> an infinite variety of combinations (integrations) of such movements into
> patterns which express purposes of the organism. By 'body parts' we mean
> more than head, limbs, and trunk; included are muscles which control the size
> of the blood vessels, muscles which move the eyes, the tongue, the lips, and the
> bladder and anal sphincters, the muscles producing speech sounds, muscles
> which comprise the genital organs, and the diaphragm which controls breathing.
> (Blane and Jordan)
> Since various muscle movements are patterned to carry out certain functions associated
> with different bodily systems, we have organized the basic process underlying psychomotor
> competence in terms of these systems.
> Vital Functions Systems
> Respiratory System.. Movement patterns involved in breathing involve the
> diaphragm and muscles controlling the movement of the ribs, throat, and nasal passages.
> Circulatory System.. Movement patterns involve cardiac muscle and muscles in the walls of
> blood vessels controlling dilation and constriction.
> Digestive System.. Movement patterns involve muscles used in chewing, swallowing,
> carrying the food to the stomach; the actions of the stomach muscles and intestines; and those
> involved in elimination.
> Reproductive System.. Movement patterns concern muscles of the female and male
> genitals and muscles in the uterine wall.
> The movement patterns of all of the muscles involved in these vital functions systems are
> largely determined by reflex action and maturation rather than consciously directed learning.
> However, there are a variety of exercises that can increase voluntary control over them. For
> instance, it is possible for a person to gain control over the muscles in the walls of the blood
> vessels so that his high blood pressure can be voluntarily reduced through learning how to
> dilate them. Many of the detailed aspects of this part of the Anisa process curriculum have yet to
> be researched and developed. We include them here to demonstrate what comprehensiveness in
> planning a psychomotor process curriculum requires.
> Skeletal Muscle System
> Balance and posture. This refers to the ability to maintain balance and posture through
> movement accommodations to the forces of gravity while maintaining a [280/1] position in
> space. Balance and posture are made up of several subprocesses as follows:
> 1. Verticality—One must have a functional awareness of different muscles and
> their movements in relationship to the direction of gravity and awareness of
> what neural muscular operations (i.e., integrations ) stabilize the body with
> reference to this direction (i.e., verticality). This includes the awareness of which
> muscles are down and which ones are up and how to move the required muscles to
> maintain stability.
> 2. Laterality—This refers to a functional awareness that the body has sides :           right
> and left (i.e., symmetrical laterality) and dorsal and ventral (i.e., asymmetrical
> laterality).
> 3. Directionality—This refers to a functional awareness of the integration of
> verticality and laterality and their corresponding movement patterns to maintain
> the organism in its relationship to the forces of gravity. Different combinations
> of verticality and laterality are reflected in movement patterns which are
> recognized as sitting, lying down, bending over, standing, kneeling, etc.
> Directionality does not include movement from one locality to another.
> Locomotion.      This refers to the ability to execute a series of muscular movements
> which carries the whole organism through space over time while maintaining balance
> and posture. The subprocesses of locomotion are:
> 1. Sequence—This is the ability to organize the movement of body parts in an
> ordered series which can culminate in activities such as walking or running.
> 2. Synchrony—This refers to the ability to make movements of body parts
> simultaneously.
> 3. Rhythm—This is the ability to perform a regular succession of repeated motor actions
> where there are alternations of tensing and relaxing the muscles or particular
> groups of muscles.
> 4. Pace—This refers to the ability to establish the appropriate timing of locomotor
> movements given the intentions of the organism . This includes being able to
> speed up or slow down movements for a particular purpose.
> There are an infinite number of combinations of the above subprocesses that yield
> different patterns of locomotion such as walking, hopping, jumping, swimming,
> galloping, skating, and diving.
> Manipulation. This refers to the ability to handle or cause some aspects of the
> environment to be moved in accordance with some purpose . The subprocesses
> of manipulation are:
> 1. Making contact—This is the ability to reach and grasp an object or to receive it by
> catching.
> 2. Maintaining contact—This refers to holding the object as long as required to
> achieve a particular purpose.
> 3. Handling—This is the ability to squeeze, rub, pierce, roll, or otherwise control the
> object.
> 4. Termination of contact—This refers to releasing or dropping objects or
> propelling them by throwing.
> [281/2]
> Manipulation occurs, of course, in conjunction with maintaining balance and posture or
> during locomotion. It also includes the use of objects as extensions of the body such as
> when one uses a hammer, a shovel, a surfboard, or a pole for vaulting.
> Speech System
> This system involves the control of muscle movements that cause air to
> be propelled through the vocal cords. Some of these movements are made by
> the same muscles which control the respiratory system, but there are
> additional voluntary elements in the case of speech, laughing, or singing.
> A special kind of timing and control are required when speech is
> introduced. Speech also depends upon one's control of muscles of the
> pharynx and larynx involved in the production of sound and the vocal
> chords which provide alteration of pitch, amplitude, and timbre. In
> addition, speech involves the muscles of. the face, throat, jaw, tongue, and
> lips. (ref?)^
> Most of the muscle movements involved in producing articulate speech come under
> voluntary control with maturation, and very little conscious effort is required to learn
> how to speak. However, children who develop speech problems may require particular
> exercises that enable them to make appropriate differentiations, integrations, and
> generalizations in relationship to the production of particular sounds . Part of the
> problem associated with a speech disorder may also be of a perceptual -auditory
> nature, or it could be the result of a failure to associate causally (i.e., integrate ) a
> particular set of muscle movements with the particular kind of speech sound desired.
> Perceptual Systems
> A variety of muscles are used to support or increase perceptual acuity through
> different modalities. For instance, vision is related to eyelid movements,
> the movements of the eyeball (circular, vertical, horizontal), and lens
> accommodation. Olfactory perception is dependent in part upon the
> muscles which control breathing. Auditory perception is enhanced by
> posturing and/or turning the head in order to pick up the sound waves more
> directly. Taste is enhanced by the movement of the tongue. Stimulation of
> the cutaneous receptors for touch is dependent in part on other bodily
> movements. (ref?)^
> The Anisa psychomotor process curriculum consists of statements of objectives
> pertinent to each of the processes and subprocesses outlined above and the actual
> exercises (i.e., interactions with particular environments ) that children go through in
> order to develop the specific competencies desired. In most cases, not one but several
> processes are involved in a given activity, and they are therefore internalized
> collectively rather than individually. In the Anisa model, movement and dance
> (one element of the arts curriculum which also involves music and sound, the visual
> and plastic arts, theatre arts, and poetry and literature) provide the chief vehicle for the
> development of psychomotor competence in the early grades . In addition there are a
> variety of exercises, games, and sports activities which engage the whole child—his
> perceptual faculties, thinking, feeling, volition, as well as his psychomotor abilities .
> The advantage of having a process curriculum is that it attempts to make certain that
> nothing important is left out. In the case of special problems where a child is having
> coordination difficulties, for instance, it is useful to analyze the muscles involved and
> [282/3] prescribe particular kinds of exercises that will enable the child to make the
> appropriate differentiations and integrations of movements and to generalize them
> under a variety of circumstances.
> As an example, let us single out the process of directionality and discuss some of the
> activities that children might go through in order to achieve maximum functional
> awareness of this process.
> Activity I
> Set a particular problem for each group of children and let them work it out in
> their own way, as follows:
> Ask the children to see how many ways they can maintain their balance by
> assuming a particular posture in which there is only one contact point with
> the floor. The most obvious solution to this problem is to stand on one foot .
> Since we do not ordinarily stand on one foot for very long, maintaining
> balance with only one contact point requires moving all other muscles in a
> variety of directions in order to maintain balance. This exercise enables the
> children to gain experience in directing the pattern of movement of muscles over
> which they would not ordinarily gain full control. Different levels of
> complexity can be introduced to meet different developmental levels. For
> instance, ask those children who find it too easy to stand on one foot to squat
> down as far as they can go and maintain their position and balance on one foot
> alone.
> Ask for other solutions to the same problem (e.g., rolling the body up into a ball
> and using the back or perhaps the buttocks as the one contact point).
> Activity II
> Ask the children to strike a posture having only two contact points with the floor,
> only one of which can be a foot, and maintain balance. The solution might be
> to use one foot and one hand. Advanced students may use both hands. Some
> could use a knee and a foot, a knee and a hand, or a knee and the head, and so forth.
> Activity III
> Ask the children to assume a posture with three contact points, only one or none
> of which can be the feet.
> Activity IV
> Ask the children to strike a posture which involves four contact points with the
> floor, none of which can be made with hands or feet . They can use elbows
> and knees.
> Activity V
> The complexity of the above problems and their solutions can be increased by
> adding the dimension of locomotion to balance and posture. For instance,
> when the child tries to move maintaining only one contact point, his most obvious
> [283/4] solution is to hop on one foot. Trying to move while maintaining balance
> and posture under the constraints of each problem activity requires the patterning of
> muscle movements in unusual ways and leads to an increased voluntary
> control over skeletal muscles. These problems can be very interesting and
> entertaining. New kinds of movement patterns can be discovered which might
> later be introduced into more serious choreographic efforts.
> Since the Anisa theory of development cites interaction with the environment as the
> means by which potentiality is translated into actuality, the implications of
> psychomotor competence for the development of all other competencies is heavily
> implicated. We interact with the environment chiefly by means of moving our
> muscles, whether we are moving our bodies through space or interacting with the
> human environment through speech, gestures, or bodily contact. Furthermore,
> when a child activates his muscles, it is impossible for him not to be involved in what he is
> doing. In other words, a kind of intrinsic motivation accompanies the movement of
> muscles. The more the content curriculum and other aspects of the process
> curriculum involve the movement of muscles, the more enthusiastic the pursuit of
> learning is likely to be. For these reasons, the psychomotor process curriculum is
> given great emphasis in the Anisa model.
> The integration of content with process and some processes with other processes is a
> paramount feature of the Anisa model. Because the number of possible
> combinations for children at different levels is practically infinite, descriptions of all
> of them cannot be written down. That is why teachers must understand the theory
> thoroughly, for on that basis they can generate any number of activities designed to
> achieve any number of particular objectives, process or content, which can be
> associated with the basic psychomotor objectives. For example, an important part
> of the content curriculum in the Anisa model concerns the names of all of the body
> parts, descriptions of the movements they can make, and general knowledge about the
> body as it relates to physical health. The vocabulary required to explain and deal
> with all of the movement and balance problems possible in developing
> psychomotor competence is extensive, and exposure to such terms helps the child
> enlarge his vocabulary. To sit passively at a desk and hear someone explain all of
> the body parts, all of the movements, or the kinds of joints we have and to
> memorize the vocabulary would be excessively boring; and the child would have
> difficulty remembering the information. But when learning such a vocabulary and
> information about body parts and their functioning is integrated with movement and
> dance, it is accomplished in a way that is simple for the child. When the child is out on
> the floor and involved in moving his own body, he is able to assimilate a tremendous
> amount of content efficiently while at the same time learn how to gain voluntary control
> over his muscles.
> Combining vocabulary development and learning facts about the human body with
> the psychomotor curriculum is one thing; combining it with reasoning and
> mathematical thinking is another. However, it can be done. For example, the
> child grasps rhythm easily when he experiences the movement of body parts .
> Rhythm means timing and timing means a coordination of patterned durations of
> movement. Duration means measurement, numbers, mathematics .
> Classification, seriation, and conservation are important cognitive processes in
> understanding number relations [284/5] (see "The Cognitive Process Curriculum," ^P.
> 289). Movements can be classified (smooth or jerky, slow or fast, complex or
> simple); they can be seriated (from slow to fast, from high to low, from fine to gross); or
> they can be conserved (length of arm movement is not changed when speed is altered).
> Movement, coupled with problems involving these cognitive processes, has important
> implications for establishing the cognitive base required for a full understanding of
> mathematics.
> The Anisa process curriculum not only specifies goals but also provides the conceptua l
> frame work through w hic h teac he rs ca n c ollabora te . Tha t is, mus icians,
> dancers, and specialists in exercise, science, and mathematics can come together to
> discover how their various disciplines might be expressed through integrated activities
> which would strengthen a variety of processes while at the same time enable children to
> assimilate an enormous amount of content. It is not difficult to see that there is an
> endless number of possibilities for providing highly motivating ways of assimilating
> content by integrating it with a psychomotor process curriculum.
> The Perceptual Process Curriculum
> Perceptual competence refers to the capacity to differentiate sensory information
> and then integrate that information into generalizable patterns, which constitute
> interpretations of reality, that enable the organism to make meaningful decisions and
> to act. Interpretation always concerns the organization of incoming stimuli in terms
> of past experience, present needs, and aspirations or intentions which involve the future.
> Perceptual competence rests upon an internal structuring which functions as a set of
> rules which generate and direct the basic processes of differentiation, integration, and
> generalization on which the interpretation or organization depends (Conway, 1974).
> Perceptual processes include those underlying vision, audition, olfaction (smell),
> gustation (taste), the cutaneous senses (those relating to the skin, such as pressure,
> cold, hot), and the vestibular senses (equilibrium).
> Following is a breakdown of visual perception into a large number of processes,
> each one of which constitutes an element in the process curriculum dealing with visual
> perception. There are similar breakdowns of processes underlying each of the other
> subcategories of perceptual competence, but they are too extensive to be included
> here.
> Visual Perception of Movement
> This refers to seeing objects move rather than the perception of movement through
> kinesthetic and vestibular senses. Vision is not required to determine that the body as
> a whole is moving through space. Visual input while on an enclosed elevator, for
> example, will not be related to its movement or the movement of the body; one
> determines that the body is moving through vestibular and kinesthetic senses. Movement
> perception depends on a wide variety of subprocesses, such as those listed below.
> 
> 1.     Directionality—This is one aspect of movement perception and consists of
> several elements: fixation (holding an object centrally in the visual field), [285/6]
> horizontal pursuit (following movement from right to left or from left to
> right), vertical pursuit (following an object moving up or down), circular
> pursuit (following objects moving in circular motion, clockwise or
> counterclockwise), depth pursuit (following an object that is moving towards the
> eyes or away from the eyes), and combinations of the above.
> 2. Duration (Time Perception)—This is another aspect of movement perception
> and consists of several elements: velocity (being able to see the relative speeds
> of moving objects—slower/faster—and to see changes in speeds), synchrony or
> simultaneity (being able to ascertain that objects are moving at the same time), rhythm
> (being able to see a pattern in movement), sequence (being able to see a repetition of
> patterned units or that one thing comes after another temporally), pace (being able
> to see variations in the size of temporal units as represented by movement patterns
> even though the relationship between rhythm and sequence remains constant), and
> cause/effect (being able to see that one event, B, occurs only after a prior event, A.
> [This is a perceptual form of inference]).
> 3. Space (Two-dimensional and Three-dimensional)—This is a third aspect of movement
> perception and consists of two elements. Figure-ground or form perception
> encompasses several aspects: contour (being able to see the characteristics
> of the outer form of an object), edge (being able to locate the demarcation that
> forms the outer limits of an object), proximity (being able to distinguish the nearness
> or farness of objects in relationship to one another, such as above/below—height or
> verticality, left/right—width or laterality; front/back or before/behind—judgment
> of depth, and size/area—judgment of distances), separation (being able to
> discern disconnectedness among objects), closure (a filling in of gaps to create
> a figure [another form of perceptual inference analogous to interpolation in
> cognition])^, continuity (being able to organize objects into a sequence [a form of
> perceptual inference analogous to cognitive extrapolation]), and constancy (being
> able to interpret the apparent changes in shape that occur when perspective
> changes as a function of perspective and not a change in the actual shape of an
> object. The visual image of both shape and size changes with shift in
> perspective; the objects themselves remain constant). The second element is
> projective space which is three-dimensional only and is determined by a number of
> cues, some of which can be perceived by one eye alone and some of which
> require both eyes. Monocular cues consist of proximal size (closer objects appear
> larger), brightness (closer objects are brighter), shading (shadows create
> perspective and depth), texture gradient (closer gradients are coarser in texture),
> linear perspective (parallel lines converge as they recede from the viewer),
> interposition (closer objects obscure objects behind them), and movement
> parallax (closer objects appear to move faster). Binocular cues consist of
> convergence (the closer the object, the more the eyes must turn inward toward each
> other) and retinal disparity (the closer the object, the greater the disparity
> between the images falling on the two retinas).
> 4. Color—This is yet another aspect of perception and consists of several elements:
> hue (being able to discriminate among different wave lengths, for example,
> being able to tell the difference between red, blue, yellow ^), saturation (being
> able to discriminate among complexities of light waves, determining the relative
> [286/7] amounts of gray present within a given hue), brightness (being able to
> discriminate among different amounts of light reflecting from a given object
> [being able to tell the difference between shades of one hue such as red, which
> might be broken down into pink, red, and maroon])^, and contrast
> (combinations of all of the above).
> 5. Translation of Two-dimensional Representations into Their Three-dimensional
> Referents—Since a great deal of education in the classroom is mediated through two-
> dimensional representations of three-dimensional reality, children need
> particular experiences in order to make this kind of translation.
> 6. Translation of Three-dimensional Reality into Two-dimensional Representations—
> This occurs primarily through drawing pictures and involves knowledge of the
> various monocular cues, such as texture gradients, other depth cues created
> by shadows, diminishing size with increased distance from the viewer, etc.
> As a case in point, let us examine in some detail the process of figure -ground
> perception, which we define as
> The ability to differentiate certain features from a previously undifferentiated
> perceptual field and integrate these features into a figure or pattern that is
> distinctly separate from and predominant over the remaining information in the
> perceptual field. Those aspects of the field unassociated with the figure
> become the background, or simply ground. (Anisa, p. 1)
> A large variety of simple visual discrimination tasks or games can be devised to
> facilitate the development of figure-ground perception. Such tasks may also serve a
> basic diagnostic function as well. For example, the teacher might present a picture
> containing a variety of different overlapping shapes and objects to the child and ask
> him to pick out particular shapes such as circles and triangles . More difficult
> exercises might include a variety of familiar shapes, such as birds, rabbits, and fish,
> all of which can be embedded in a confusing background of competing lines . The
> child can then be asked to locate each shape and trace it with a finger.
> Different levels of difficulty can be introduced into any particular exercise by
> making the differentiations more complex or making the integration of the differentiated
> elements into some kind of figure that is less obvious. For instance, commonly known
> shapes, such as a circle or an outline of a house, are comprised of lines or elements
> that can be integrated into those particular figures. If, however, a more abstract or
> unfamiliar figure is embedded, it will be a greater challenge for a child to make the
> differentiations and integrations necessary to recognize the figure. As an alternative
> approach, an outline of the abstract embedded figure can also be drawn as a separate
> figure, and the child can be asked to locate it in the "ground" of a great number of
> intersecting lines. Here the task is more difficult because elements are arbitrarily
> assigned to figure or ground; there is nothing intrinsic to the abstract figure that will
> help the child separate figure from ground . The separation must take place in his
> mind as he gives salience to certain differentiated elements and then integrates them
> into the desired figure. [287/8]
> A good example of how to integrate this aspect of the process curriculum, figure-ground
> perception, with a science content curriculum concerning information about insects ^arid plant
> life is to design activities for learning about camouflage in nature and its relation to evolution.
> Certain moths, for instance, have patterns on their wings which are exactly the same color and
> have the same configurations as the barks of certain trees. Certain worms have the colors and
> shapes of twigs. The praying mantis looks exactly like the grass. The visual characteristics of
> a large number of plants and animals evolved by virtue of natural selection precisely because of
> the figure-ground phenomenon. In the case of the moths, those visual characteristics which
> enabled them to be part of the ground rather than the figure when they settled on certain trees
> made it more difficult for birds to see them. Over time, the moths which were camouflaged
> became more numerous because fewer of them were eaten by birds. They lived longer and
> reproduced more, while the more conspicuous members of their own species eventually
> became extinct because they were eaten more frequently and therefore could not reproduce as
> rapidly nor as many times. A variety of related activities based on the phenomenon of
> camouflage can be organized. Children can be invited to draw pictures in which they hide (i.e.,
> merge figure with ground) a given insect; or if there is enough time, they can be invited to
> camouflage themselves and hide, while others try to find them. The game of hiding the
> thimble takes on a new dimension of expertise in light of the knowledge of the figure-ground
> process.
> More advanced skills, such as reading, also depend upon figure-ground perception. The
> reason most printed material is black on white is to facilitate figure-ground discrimination.
> Red print on a maroon background would make figure-ground perception extremely difficult.
> Reading music presents an even more difficult task since the musical staff, key signatures, and
> cleft designation are figure, distinguishable from a white background; but these figures function
> more as ground when notes are placed upon the staff. Thus, there are a variety of levels of
> complexity in figure-ground perception where some figures are ground in relationship to
> other figures and so on.
> There are a number of variables that have an influence on figure-ground discrimination and
> which can be manipulated. For instance, Katz showed that a child's recognition of the
> figure is improved if he knows the label for that figure. Several studies indicate that
> complex figures tend to attract more attention than simple figures (Willis and Dornbusch).
> Experience or habit will cause certain elements to be differentiated from a background and
> integrated into a figure. For instance, the experience of looking at the human face and a
> habit of associating certain contours with the nose, the mouth, the eyes, and so forth, will enable
> the child to "see faces" in almost any complex set of lines that contain these elements (Goldstein
> and Mackenburg). A dark-light contrast is positively correlated with the ability to
> distinguish figure from ground (Lit ^and Vicars). Studies have also shown that if a figure does
> not possess integrity or cohesion, it may be easily lost in a larger figure simply because its
> contours provide insufficient contrast with the ground (Gottschaldt). Time is also an important
> variable. The duration of exposure to a perceptual field will have an influence on one's
> ability to differentiate figure from ground. Kahneman showed that a minimum amount of
> time is required if differentiation is to take place and that there is also a saturation point
> beyond which very little further differentiation tends to occur. In generating a particular
> activity as a part of this aspect of the process curriculum, teachers can individualize the
> experience by manipulating the variables of [288/9] labeling, complexity, experience or
> habits, contrast, and timing. With appropriate manipulation, an experience can be
> made extremely simple for young children on lower developmental levels or
> extremely complex and more challenging for older children or higher developmental
> levels.
> The Cognitive Process Curriculum
> Cognition refers to the intellectual processes necessary for thinking and reasoning .
> The problem of defining the exact nature of thinking is an old one, and much work
> remains to be done if we are to achieve the clarity that will enable us to identify all of
> the fundamental processes that make up thinking and which therefore should be
> included in the process curriculum.
> Like the actualization of all the other potentialities, thinking develops from
> interaction with the environment. Piaget says, "Actually in order to know objects,
> the subject must act upon them and therefore transform them: he must displace, connect,
> combine, take apart, and reassemble them" (Piaget, 1970, p. 704)^. Here we see the
> reflections of the general processes of differentiation ("displace" and "take apart" )
> and integration ("connect," "combine," and "reassemble") . Through these
> differentiations and integrations, internal structures are developed which form the basis of
> cognitive competence. The cognitive processes associated with these structures have
> been explored by Piaget, Bruner, and others. All of the processes are interrelated, and
> some serve as developmental predecessors of others . Among the processes which
> make up cognitive competence are the following:
> Object Permanence. Apprehension of the continued existence of a stable object
> when the object is no longer in the immediate perceptual field (called animal
> inference by Bertrand Russell).
> Deduction.    Drawing a necessary conclusion from a given premise or set of premises;
> reasoning from the general to the particular.
> Induction. Logical inference of the existence of a general principle from a given set
> of particulars; reasoning particulars to the general.
> Extrapolation. Estimation of the value or nature of a variable based upon an
> assumed relationship with an observed range of values or particulars; inference of the
> next element which follows logically from a known sequence or pattern (e.g., 1, 3, 5, 7, 9,
> x; in this case, x can be inferred by extrapolation to be 11).
> Interpolation. Inference of the value or the nature of a missing element or an empty
> category from the context in which it exists (e.g., The boy missed the first two balls
> pitched to him but ______ the third ball for a home run. By interpolation we conclude
> that the blank would be filled in with the word "hit").
> Implication. Logically deriving propositions from a given set of relations;
> implication may involve a combination of induction, deduction, interpolation and
> extrapolation. [289/90]
> Classification. Identification and abstraction of a common attribute or property
> from a group of objects, actions, events, or ideas and integration of these properties or
> attributes into a class or category which can be generalized to include all other
> objects, actions, events, or ideas possessing these attributes.
> Seriation. The differentiation of quantitative attributes among objects along the
> single dimension, such as length, and the integration of these differences to form a
> graded pattern which can be generalized to include elements beyond the original
> group.
> Conservation. The abstraction of qualitative and quantitative invariance of an
> object, substance, or idea across transformations of associated secondary qualities.
> Conservation is the ability to recognize that an object remains the same object despite
> certain transformations. For instance, a pint of water in a tall glass is the same pint of
> water when poured into a flat pan even though perceptually it may look like it is more.
> Number Relations. Coordinating three primary logical processes, classification,
> seriation, and conservation, in understanding various concepts associated with the
> construct of number (including: one-to-one correspondence, ordination, cardination,
> and measurement).
> Analogy and Metaphor. Abstracting conceptual relations from one set of conditions
> and then applying them to another set of conditions as a means of achieving
> explanatory insight (e.g., "A hand is to a glove what a foot is to a ______ .". Using
> the process of analogy, one would very likely fill in the blank with "shoe.")
> There are a large number of other processes which make up thinking, but the
> preceding list provides enough examples to convey the general idea of a process
> curriculum in the area of cognition. Let us now use classification to show how the
> process curriculum sets guidelines for activities that will enable a child to classify.
> An individual's control over his environment and over his interactions with his
> environment becomes efficient when he is able to differentiate the many elements
> which comprise the environment and organize them in a pattern congruent with his
> own needs and intentions. One means by which the individual achieves this is to
> reduce the complexities of experience to manageable proportions by categorizing or
> grouping experiences with respect to some shared quality; this process is the first
> function of classification. The formation of entities called classes can thus be
> regarded as an essential ingredient of the thinking process itself (Flavell), and as
> Elkind points out, classification responses help to maintain the psychic economy
> by eliminating the need for fresh adaptation every time a new experience is
> encountered.
> Any curriculum fostering classification processes cannot ignore the developmental
> sequence in which they appear. Up to this time, our knowledge of the step-by-step
> development in this area of cognitive growth comes mainly from the research of
> Inhelder and Piaget. They have identified the following stages:
> 
> 1.     Simple sorting refers to grouping objects according to a single property
> perceptually obvious such as color, shape, or size. [290/1]
> 2.    True classification refers to abstracting a common property in a group of objects and
> finding the same property in other objects in the group.
> 3. Multiple classification refers to grouping objects on the basis of more than one
> common property. Multiple classification also entails a recognition that any
> given object can belong to several classes at the same time.
> 4. All/Some relations refers to being able to recognize a distinction between classes
> on the basis of a property which belongs to all members of the class and a
> property which belongs only to some members of the class. For instance, in a
> display of red squares, red triangles, and red circles, understanding all/some
> relationships would enable a child to recognize that all shapes are red while
> only some are squares or triangles.
> 5. Class-inclusion relations refers to an ability to form subclasses of objects or
> events while including the subclass within a larger class . For instance, in a
> container of wooden beads some of which are red and yellow in color, there is a
> subclass of red beads and a subclass of yellow beads, both of which belong to
> the class of wooden beads.
> For those interested in an alternative listing, Koffsky used a scalographic study of
> classification development and presented a more detailed sequence of skill
> development than that presented here.
> An example of the kind of experience a child needs in order to achieve one of the
> subprocesses of classification might prove useful. Let us assume that multiple
> classification is the subprocess of classification to be learned by the child . The
> purpose of the activity suggested is to enable a child to understand how an object classified
> on the basis of one attribute may belong to other classes at the same time
> (intersection) and/or that objects may be classified on the basis of two attributes
> (matrices) at the same time. The activity requires two large rings of sufficient diameter
> to include the following variety of objects when placed on a flat surface: four red
> triangles, four green triangles, four red rectangles, and four black rectangles. The
> child is instructed to place the rings near one another on a table or floor. He is invited to
> place all of the triangles inside one of the rings and then to place all of the remaining
> red objects inside the other ring so that the first ring can only have triangle s. The
> second ring is allowed to have red objects only. The two rings can then be intersected,
> and the child can be asked which of the objects can be placed in the intersection area on
> the basis of this rule. If he places only red triangles in the intersection, he understands
> multiple classification. A similar exercise can be done using a matrix where a
> given object appears in both a column and a row. ^Rows could be set up on the
> basis of geometric shapes and columns could be established on the basis of color.
> A teacher who understands the Anisa theories is able to integrate the process
> curriculum with the content curriculum. In zoology, all of the animals have to be
> classified; in music, particular pieces can be placed in different classifications
> (e.g., romantic, classical, baroque, impressionistic, etc.); in social studies, societies can be
> classified in terms of the basis of their economy (i.e., hunting, food gathering,
> agricultural, fishing, etc.); in anthropology, men are classified according to races (i.e.,
> biologically inherited physical attributes). Understanding both science and the arts as
> disciplines depends upon the ability to classify; yet children are rarely taught what the
> process of classification is so that they understand that they are applying or making
> use of the same process no matter what the content might be. If they were taught the
> [291/2] process with an emphasis equal to that given to content, what they learned about
> classification in zoology, for instance, would be transferable to classification tasks in
> social studies. It is the transferability of knowledge through the generalization of
> process that is the hallmark of a competent learner . Thus, from an Anisa point of
> view, process is the primary means of integrating the content curriculum.
> The Affective Process Curriculum
> Affective competence depends on the degree to which the organization of emotions
> and feelings predispose the child to interact with the environment in ways which
> support the release of further potentiality . Emotions are always associated with
> processes from all other categories (i.e., perceptual, psychomotor, cognitive, etc.),
> though in varying degrees of intensity. If the emotions are not properly organized, the
> functioning of other areas may also be impaired. How to feel about things, people,
> events, and ideas is for the most part learned but rarely "taught" in any direct or
> conscious way in school. Because the organization of a child's emotional life takes
> place through learning, it concerns the ability to differentiate feelings, to associate
> (i.e., integrate ) them with particular objects, people, events, or ideals, and to
> generalize them to other environments . If this is done in a way that creates a
> reality-based stability in the relationship between the child and his environment,
> interactions will promote further growth.
> We find it useful to regard emotional states as subjective assessments of the
> viability of the organism at any given time. Since viability depends on the integrity of
> the organism itself and involves its relationship to the rest of the environment,
> emotional states always have a direct implication for doing something about oneself or
> altering one's relationship to the environment in some way. If, for instance, one has
> learned to be afraid of some object which is not harmful and for which there is no
> reason to be frightened, one's relationship to that object will be unstable in the sense
> that it is not based on reality but on error. If being frightened is uncalled for, the
> subjective assessment of viability represented by the fright is inaccurate and
> unreliable; it leads to behavior patterns which reduce one's effectance as he interacts
> with the environment. "Effectance" is a word proposed by Robert White. In his
> discussion on competence and motivation, he writes:
> My proposal is that activity, manipulation, and exploration, which are all pretty much of a
> piece in the infant, be considered together as aspects of competence, and that for the
> present we assume the one general motivational principle lies behind them. The word I
> have suggested for this motive is effectance because its most characteristic feature is seen in
> the production of effects on the environment (White, 1959)
> Because emotions are powerful determinants of behavior, it is important that they
> become organized in ways that enable the organism to maintain the best possible
> relationship with its environment. Affective competence means having emotional
> reactions to situations which represent accurate assessments of viability . Behavior
> based on erroneous assessments will very likely lead to more pathology.
> Mowrer suggests two fundamental emotions : fear and hope. In essence,
> they function as appraisals of viability. If we find ourselves in a threatening situation, we
> [292/3] have the subjective experience of fear and this directs us to try out a number of
> things to reduce the fear. If what we try out increases the fear, we usually stop doing
> them and try something else until we find something that gives us a little bit of hope. The
> experience of hope causes us to increase our efforts along those lines until a condition of
> complete viability is attained.
> Several researchers, such as Arnold, Black, Brown, Cofer, Hillman, Plutchik,
> Stronguran, and Young, have proposed paradigms for explaining the nature of
> emotions and how they are interrelated, but further research is required to clarify
> a number of unresolved issues (i.e., the difference between sensations, feelings, and
> emotions; relationship of physical pain to psychological pain). Even though much
> work remains to be done before we have a clear understanding of how emotions are
> organized to help create stable personalities, one thing is certain; namely, any
> educational system neglecting the emotional life of the child runs the risk of doing
> more harm than good. A person whose emotions are disorganized becomes his own
> worst enemy; his relationship to his environment, particularly other human beings, will be
> perpetually disturbed, and the general effect will be suppression of his potentialities .
> To be comprehensive, any process curriculum will inevitably include as one of its
> main goals the cultivation of a rich and stable emotional life.
> Teachers can assist children in achieving affective competence primarily through
> the relationships which they establish with them and the clarity and consistency of
> feedback they provide the children as they interact with the environment. Reward and
> punishment, two kinds of feedback, are particularly powerful means of helping a
> child to organize emotions in reference to objects, people, events, and ideas. Excessive
> inconsistency in rewarding and punishing a child leads to conflict in the organization of
> emotions and therefore disturbances in behavior. A comprehensive and detailed
> theory concerning emotional development and the processes which comprise it awaits
> further research and elaboration. In the meantime, we are studying a number of
> processes pertinent to gaining affective competence which involve inhibiting,
> coping, managing, and facilitating emotions and feelings in terms of subjective aim or
> sense of purpose. For example, it is important to be able to cope with sadness,
> disappointment, or feelings of persecution, particularly if the sadness or disappointment
> leads to behavior that undermines the achievement of a higher purpose. Similarly, it
> is essential for children to learn how to manage anxiety, how to inhibit a destructive
> impulse, and, perhaps more significantly than we think, how to facilitate expressions of
> joy, happiness, and gladness on appropriate occasions. (see Carney)
> The Volitional Process Curriculum
> Volition may be conceived as the central factor of self -causation or self-
> actualization of potentialities. It is intimately connected with one's growing sense of
> purpose and the use of goals consistent with the purpose as a general criterion for
> deciding how to interact with the environment. Thus, the purposive construction of
> experience and its role in actualizing other potentialities depends upon volitional
> capacity. Because purpose and intention both implicate the future, a child's positive
> orientation to his own future rests on the sense of power he has over it by virtue of
> experiencing his inner capacity to intend something and carry it through to a final
> consummation [293/4] compatible with some purpose he has in mind. Children who
> grow up having no experience in setting their own objectives and pursuing the steps
> required to achieve them never become fully independent, responsible, and self-reliant
> human beings. In our view, the critical role of volition in self-actualization makes all of
> the processes underlying the development of volitional competence a necessary part
> of any comprehensive process curriculum.
> We have identified three basic processes on which volitional competence rests :
> attention, goal setting, and will. From a Whiteheadian point of view, these processes
> underlying volitional competence can be regarded as progressive steps in the
> enfoldment of organismic purpose. In other words, will arises out of intention to
> achieve the goals set, the setting of goals presupposes attention which in turn
> presupposes purpose or interest. Keep in mind that these processes are not
> functionally separate elements of volition; we find justification in breaking them down
> into these elements only for the sake of conceptual clarity and because such
> differentiation provides a scheme that has more direct implications for curriculum
> construction (see Conway, in press). Following are fuller descriptions of each of these
> processes and their related subprocesses.
> Attention
> Many researchers (Mackworth, Broadbent, Ryan, Neisser, Norman, Vernon, Bakan,
> Hebb, and Conway, 1973) have generated a variety of perspectives and raised a
> number of important issues concerning the nature of attention . The material
> presented in this section draws extensively on the work of Conway who made an extensive
> survey of the literature in preparation for the development of the Anisa process
> curriculum for the development of volitional competence . From that survey, we
> arrived at the definition of attention as the purposive selection (differentiation) and
> organization (integration) of bodily movement, sensory information, feelings, thought,
> and memory into a single focus of conscious experience. This definition represents a
> general synthesis of a large number of definitions and theoretical perspectives put
> forward by different theorists. Although a great deal of research on attention has
> been carried out, there has, up to this point, been no theoretical base broad enough to
> integrate the wide variety of findings and make sense of the extensive body of
> data accumulated.
> We have formulated the preceding definition in accordance with the principle that
> theoretical statements should illumine and explain experience but not contradict
> it. In that regard, we have found the works of Titchener and James useful from the
> experiential point of view and the work of Whitehead to be of critical importance in
> providing the unifying philosophical and theoretical perspective.
> Titchener, taking a structuralist approach to explain attention, concentrated more on
> the qualities and characteristics of the stimulus being attended to (i.e., intensity,
> discreteness, irregularity, suddenness, novelty, rate of change). James, on the other
> hand, took a functionalist approach and viewed attention as a selection process
> determined more by the subject.
> It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form of one out of
> what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought.
> Focalization, concentration [294/5] of consciousness are of its essence. It
> implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others
> and is a condition which has a real opposite in the confused, scatterbrained
> state which in French is called distraction. (James. Vol. 1, p. 403)
> What is it that directs us to "withdraw from some things in order to deal effectively
> with others" and avoid the "scatterbrained" state ? Many different things can
> influence us to leave some things to deal with others; examples are thirst, hunger,
> desires, discomforts, or any of the other so-called primary and secondary drives. In
> man, even these things may be dominated by higher aspirations . In this regard.
> Whitehead's contribution establishes the rationale for accepting subjective aim or
> purpose as the major unifying force that is expressed in the unitary experience we call
> focal awareness. One of the great problems that has plagued psychological inquiry
> concerns the question of how many things one can hold in focal awareness, that is, pay
> attention to, at one time. In simple terms, the answer seems to be that the mind is
> capable of grasping and paying attention to any number of things, provided those
> things are connected in some way and make an integrated whole . If the elements are
> disparate and unconnected, then the mind must make a choice of one or the other . In
> other words, the power of differentiation or abstraction must be accompanied by the
> power to integrate if those differentiated elements are to come into focal awareness at
> the same time. The integrating factor will tend to be the sense of purpose or intention
> of the person. We therefore see attention as an act of constructive synthesis which
> reflects past experience, present needs, and future intentions.
> What is the nature of synthesis? Are all of the elements synthesized held in focal
> awareness with equal clarity? Our experience tells us that we can be aware of some
> things very acutely while at the same time be only somewhat aware of other things. It
> appears that consciousness is comprised of different levels of attention, hierarchically
> organized. Focal awareness is at the peak of consciousness . It arises out of a
> perpetually emerging integration of a number of elements from lower levels of
> consciousness. For example, if we are good readers, we are focally aware of meaning
> that arises out of the sequence of words; on a slightly lower level of consciousness or
> attention, we are aware of words; below that, we are aware of the individual letters
> that make up the words. Reading is a complex process; its purpose is to derive
> meaning from a graphic code made up of letters . If letters themselves are what is
> in focal awareness, reading will be impossible because meaning inheres in the
> relationships among words and not in the letters themselves, although there are no
> words without letters. The purpose of reading determines the hierarchy of awareness
> levels. If the hierarchy is reversed, reading ceases.
> Inasmuch as very little formal learning takes place unless there is an intention to
> learn and an ability to pay attention to the primary elements of the learning task,
> learning how to attend and concentrate becomes increasingly more important as the
> child develops. For this reason, attention occupies a central position in the
> configuration of processes which make up the Anisa process curriculum. While a
> great deal of learning can take place incidentally simply by virtue of the child's interaction
> with the environment, attaining higher levels of competence in all categories of
> potentialities, particularly those requiring exceptionally refined motor movements (e.g.,
> playing the violin) or those that demand well-developed reasoning abilities (e.g., working
> out the solution to a complex and difficult mathematical problem), requires
> highly developed attentiveness. [295/6]
> Goal Setting
> In arriving at a definition of goal setting, we have drawn on the works of a number
> of investigators (Locke, 1966; Locke and Bryan; Ryan; Franken and Morphy;
> Hughes; Winter et al.) who have investigated the dynamics of goal setting and their
> organizing effects on behavior. In the Anisa model, goal setting is defined as the
> process by which an individual organizes his future by differentiating events
> which when sequenced (integrated) appropriately arrive at that anticipated
> future. At the heart of goal setting is making a decision about how one's
> energy will be used. The word decide means to cut off; every decision,
> then, has the consequence of ruling out or saying "no" to any number of
> possible actions which will have to be rejected on the basis that they will
> not lead to the achievement of the goal being set . It is not difficult to
> imagine why children who grow up in circumstances in homes and in
> schools where they are not allowed to set goals and have very little
> experience in making their own decisions become indecisive in their general
> approach to life. Such people are inveterate procrastinators and their
> orientation to opportunity is to wait until circumstances and other people
> force a decision one way or another. They do not take an active hand in
> shaping their own destinies but allow the shaping to be done by forces
> outside themselves. Since one of the basic purposes of the Anisa model
> is to prepare children to take over the responsibility for determining their own
> destinies, it makes provision for definitive guidance in setting goals . In
> systems based on the model, children have daily opportunities for setting
> both short-term and long-term goals which they are encouraged to pursue
> until they accomplish them . Such an accomplishment brings about
> what Whitehead considers to be an essential motivating element in the
> general process of self-actualization, namely, self-enjoyment. Being able
> to decide what it is one wants to accomplish and then being able to achieve it
> are vital to the maintenance of mental health and stability of personality . It
> is the wellspring of reality-based confidence, one of the fundamental sources of
> self-encouragement.
> Because man is fundamentally a social being, there are group or
> community counterparts to most of the processes we are discussing. For
> example, the source of group encouragement, motivation, and morale lies
> in members of the group participating in collective intentions and
> consummating them. If children are to become socially mature, they must
> learn how to participate in the formulation and sharing of group goals and
> cooperate with others to accomplish them. This aspect of the Anisa process
> curriculum is referred to later in conjunction with a discussion on the development
> of moral competence.
> Will
> Will is the realization of an intention or accomplishment of a goal . It is
> expressed in terms of three subprocesses: self-initiation, perseverance, and
> effecting closure.
> The concept of will has been at the center of philosophical inquiry and
> controversy for centuries. Our tentative definition represents a synthesis of
> the views of many thinkers and the findings of a large number of
> researchers (May; James; Kenny; Polanyi; and Arieti). The implications of
> self-initiation, perseverance, and effecting closure for a process curriculum are
> extensive. They are the ingredients of autonomy and independence and can
> be fostered as part of any activity associated with other elements of the
> process and content curricula. [296/7]
> Once we grasp the essential nature of attention, goal setting, and will as an active
> process of differentiating and integrating experience around purpose, it follows that
> we cannot expect a child to stay at a task for any length of time if he cannot intera ct
> with the environment. The findings of empirical studies clearly demonstrate the
> inferiority of a passive modality of learning. A child must be able to manipulate and
> act upon his environment; otherwise, he will not develop high levels of attention and
> sense his own effectiveness, because there is very little feedback on what he is doing in
> the passive modality, simply because he is doing so little. Awareness of and sensitivity to
> feedback comes with active experience where there is an abundance of feedback . For
> this reason, teachers can improve the volitional capacity of their children, particularly
> those concerned with attentional processes, if they will demonstrate and directly
> involve the children in a wide variety of interactions with the environment rather than
> just explain to the children how something should be done but not have them do it .
> Learning how to pay attention, set goals, and effect closure comes from actively doing
> rather than passively observing somebody else's doing.
> We have not devised a great number of experiences specifically for the purpose of
> helping children learn how to pay attention, set goals, and activate their wills,
> although in some cases it might be desirable to do so. Rather, since volitional effort is
> an intrinsic demand of all intentional learning, the pedagogical requirements for
> teaching the child how to attend, adopt goals, and achieve them have to be met in
> every learning task. Therefore, while all experiences planned as part of the Anisa
> process curriculum involve a variety of different processes, they always include
> attention, goal setting, and will. In time children learn how to arrange their own
> environments so that they control the level of distraction, but they also learn how to
> ignore irrelevant stimuli and carry on with the task in hand . A teacher can help a
> child to gain powers of concentration by regularly providing him with feedback on
> what he is doing and assisting him in understanding a need for seeking out
> feedback on his own. Eventually, a person can provide a good deal of his own
> feedback by learning how to establish criteria by which to measure his own
> progress. Once such criteria are established and justified, the person can compare
> what he is doing or producing with the established criteria and determine for himself
> whether or not he is satisfied with his work or whether he should try to improve what
> he is doing. Being able to fantasize the achievement of the goal (i.e., what it "feels
> like" and looks like to have achieved the goal) is important. Such fantasies function
> as an intrinsic source of motivation to persevere. They create the anticipation of
> inner satisfaction that comes when intentions are consummated in accordance
> with expectations. The fantasy is a projection of what it is like for there to be a
> good fit between what one is doing and the criteria by which goal achievement is
> determined. Teachers can use a variety of questioning procedures to encourage a
> child to fantasize in this constructive way. They can also involve children in the
> reading of stories whose basic themes elaborate an idea, relate the idea to specific
> goals, show how the main characters of the stories primarily pay attention to those things
> which lead them towards the goals, and exemplify the function of accurate feedback in
> maintaining high levels of perseverance.
> Timing is also an important element in assisting children to attain volitional
> competence. Since children work at different rates, they finish what they start at
> different times. If the rhythm of the school day is dictated by bells which ring at
> predetermined [297/8] intervals and the bells signal the termination of all activities of one
> kind and a shift to another category of activities, many children will perpetually
> experience a loss of inner satisfaction that comes from consummating their
> intentions. Repeatedly being robbed of such inner satisfaction undermines the
> attainment of volitional competence. Therefore, one of the most important things a
> teacher can do to assist a child in achieving volitional competence is to insist that when
> he begins something, he is not only allowed, but actively encouraged, to finish what he
> begins. In most cases, this will mean going by individual developmental time rather than
> clock time.
> The Process Curriculum, Value Formation, and
> the Emergence of Personal Identity
> The fundamental proposition of the Anisa theory of development, that is, the
> translation of potentiality into actuality is sustained by interaction with the environment,
> has extensive ramifications for both content and process curricula . The theory not
> only provides a means of classifying interactions but also classifies environments . As
> one might expect, interaction with different kinds of environments produces
> different patterns of actualized potentialities . Since a potentiality is a latent
> power or unexpressed energy, it is expressed as power or energy in one or more of the
> categories of potentialities when it is actualized. For instance, before a child learns to
> walk, he has the psychomotor potentiality of walking.
> The model establishes three basic classifications of the environment following the
> ontological levels of creation as set forth by Whitehead, namely, the physical or
> nonhuman environment (minerals, vegetables, and animals), the human environment,
> and the unknown environment. The model also recognizes the existence of a fourth
> environment—the Self, a fusion of the other three in microcosm which emerges over
> time and becomes the most consistent part of its own environment . The theory
> of development explains how the powers or energies are structured as they come
> into being when potentialities are actualized. In other words, the energies which represent
> actualized potentialities are not randomly expressed after they are actualized; they
> are patterned. We call these patterns values. (For additional information, see "Self-
> Actualization as Value Formation: The Anisa Theory of Value" and Biological
> Dimensions of the Value Theory of the Anisa Educational Model by Raman.) Thus,
> as the organism interacts with the physical environment, it forms material values and
> on these values rest a person's technological competence. As the organism interacts
> with the human environment, it forms social values on which the person's moral
> competence rests. As the organism interacts with unknowns (e.g., his future, his
> own potentialities which are not fully known to him, his own mortality, etc.), he structures
> assumptions about the unknowns which incorporate some kind of position on
> ultimate unknowns. Because unknowns can only be approached on faith, we say that the
> interaction of the organism with the unknown environment leads to the formation of
> aesthetic or religious values on which philosophical or spiritual competence rests . It
> is important to note here that we are defining religion in a psychological sense
> rather than in a denominational sense . In other words, faith is a psychological
> phenomenon which is open to scientific inquiry like any other psychological
> phenomenon. Its operation in the human psyche speaks to the organism's orientation
> [298/9] to the future, purpose, ideals, aspirations, and hopes. Seen in this light,
> "religious activity" is manifested in everybody's life, even if he regards himself as an
> atheist. The integration of a person's material, social, and religious values is the
> structural and functional reality of personal identity—the Self. A person's values
> define him. They represent how he deploys his energy and therefore manifests to
> everyone what he believes to be most worthwhile and least worthwhile . We
> refer to the patterns of energy use, that is, how a person invests the most precious
> asset he has, his energies, when we talk about a person's values in some abstract sense.
> When we say we want to get to know somebody, we are really saying that we want to
> know the patterns through which he expresses the energy available to him. This will tell
> us who he is, whether we can get along with him, and whether we will like him. The
> Self, defined in this way, focuses on process and dynamics and thus presents
> character in terms of patterned energy utilization.
> When interacting with the physical environment, these patterns will lead to
> technological competence or incompetence. When interacting with the human
> environment, such patterns might be seen as responsible, irresponsible,
> cooperative, fair, honest, deceitful, aggressive, caring, helpful, disruptive, or
> hostile. These patterns define the moral competence of the Self (see Theroux).
> When the organism interacts with the unknown, it uses energy to form ideas about
> ultimate concerns. This includes the formation of an ideal Self as a part of those
> ultimate concerns. The patterns of energy used to form and nurture these ideas give
> purpose to life; they are the source of its wholeness and stability and the lure for its
> becoming. On these patterns rest the philosophical and aesthetic competence of the Self.
> The model also explains how three basic symbol systems—mathematics, language,
> and the arts mediate the structuring of material, social, and aesthetic values
> respectively. (For a fuller discussion on the role of the arts in education, see "The
> Arts—Neglected Resources in Education," by Jordan.) These symbol systems
> are at the core of the Anisa curriculum and are the connecting links between the
> process and content curricula.
> Conclusion
> To the extent that teachers and educational administrators have felt that the field of
> curriculum is moribund, as Schwab expressed it, they have felt compelled to revive it
> by initiating a number of curriculum innovations. A substantial number of these
> innovations have tried to take into account the idea of development, interaction, and
> process. In the absence of a well-defined theory of development, most of these efforts
> have resulted in a concentration on providing a wide variety of materials as a means of
> keeping children engaged in activities, whether or not these activities lead to any
> particular educational objectives . Kliebard, in reappraising Tyler's curriculum
> rationale, even goes so far as to suggest that "the starting point for a model of
> curriculum and instruction is not the statement of objectives but the activity
> (learning experience), and whatever objectives do appear will arise within that activity
> as a way of adding a new dimension to it" (Kliebard, pp. 268-69).
> While this move in the direction of involving children in more activity may be a
> good one, doing so without having objectives in mind has resulted in a neglect of [299/300]
> content. Special attention must therefore be given to content if children in an "open"
> educational system where varieties of activities are optional are to glean basic
> information about the world in which they live and the culture of which they are a
> part. Children who do not assimilate such information will be at a disadvantage
> when compared with those who do.
> Unfortunately, not only does content tend to be neglected when activities are
> emphasized and goals left to chance but fundamental processes may not be
> internalized either. We take the view that at least for a certain percentage of the
> child's time in the school setting, activities should be organized to achieve particular
> process objectives (e.g., classification, seriation, figure-ground, laterality, etc.) as
> well as content objectives. Optional activities which are not organized to achieve
> particular educational objectives may yield a limited harvest; it is possible for children to
> engage in activity without learning very much. Teachers and parents too easily fall
> into the trap of believing that a great deal of learning is taking place simply
> because the children are busy. While it may be true that a child who is engaged in
> activities is probably learning more than a child who is not, this does not release
> the serious educator from the obligation to make all activities function as a means of
> imparting content and enabling the child to internalize process. The child who is an
> enthusiastic participant in activities and produces many things may be regarded by a
> teacher as a child who is, because of so many achievements, learning at an optimum rate.
> Yet the evidence indicates that achieving is not necessarily the same as
> internalizing a process. A child may be able to give a correct response to a stimulus
> without understanding why it is correct. He can remember that four is the correct
> response to the stimulus question "What is two plus two?" without understanding
> the process of addition. For this reason, it is essential that teachers not regard
> products as evidence that the underlying process has been internalized.
> The problem of distinguishing process from product or process from achievement is an
> old one in education (Werner). It is a problem which developmental psychologists,
> particularly through the work of Piaget, are beginning to solve. Ultimately, the most
> successful educational systems will be those that achieve a balance between content
> and process and find a way to integrate them within a single curriculum . The
> integration of the content and process curricula requires the differentiation of the
> teaching staff and their coordination through effective administration. (For a full
> discussion on the role of administration in staff differentiation an d curriculum
> implementation in the Anisa Model, see Streets.) The Anisa model represents one
> promising effort in that direction.
> 
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>
> — *The Process Approach (Used by permission of the curator)*