# Universal Values

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> Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: William S. Hatcher, Universal Values, bahai-library.com.
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> 
> Universal Values
> 
> William S. Hatcher
> 
> Everyone acknowledges that we humans have preferences -- that we make
> judgments of worth or value about our experience of life. Whatever we may actually say or
> think about our value judgments, it is our actions that reflect them most faithfully. I may say
> I don't like chocolate, but if I regularly eat large quantities of it, without any external duress,
> you would be most reasonable to conclude that I do like chocolate in truth of fact.
> More generally, the sign of a positive value judgment is our attempt to repeat the
> valued experience, consistent avoidance behavior being the corresponding sign of a
> negative judgment. It is sometimes held that there is no ultimate, common basis for such
> judgments -- that they are potentially arbitrary or gratuitous in the extreme. On this view, a
> given individual may, depending on his life circumstances and his particular reaction to
> them, come to prefer (value positively) anything: pain, cruelty, suffering, death, the ugly or
> the hideous. Those who support this view usually do so by citing cases of individuals who
> indeed seem to have exhibited such preferences (e.g., sadomasochists).
> But there is a fundamental flaw in this kind of argument. There is of course no doubt
> that individual differences in preference -- even extreme individual differences in
> preference -- may be shown to exist in certain matters. But such differences do not in
> themselves refute the idea that there may be a more fundamental, underlying, universal
> basis for most preferences, and that deviations from them take place only within certain
> limits and under extreme circumstances.
> 
> Similarities and Differences
> We live in a world that is rich with difference and multiplicity. Any two entities in
> existence may be compared according to their similarities or according to their differences.
> On one hand, some degree of similarity holds between any two existents -- if nothing else,
> the fact that they both exist. On the other hand, any two existents must also differ in some
> respect -- if nothing else by the very fact of being two (distinct existents) instead of only
> one.
> Moreover, if it is we humans who are making the comparison, there is a question not
> only of the objective similarities and differences between two existents but also of our
> subjective perception. Superficial similarities may mask deep differences while superficial
> differences may blind us to more fundamental similarities. Finally, there is the question of
> the relative importance (value) we assign to differences vs. similarities in any given case. It
> is the last question that will concern us most particularly in this paper.
> Let us consider a newborn human infant, who has just been expelled from the
> mother's womb into this world. The infant is not just a tabula rasa on which experience
> writes. From the beginning, the infant brings something of what he is to every encounter
> with reality. For example, if we place a bit of quinine on the infant's tongue or lips, he will
> immediately recoil in obvious avoidance, perhaps cry in distress. If, instead, we place a
> drop of honey, he will smack his lips in evident satisfaction. These are value responses to
> reality. They indicate innate preferences, because the infant has not yet undergone any
> socialization. He has not learned that society expects him to consider certain tastes as bitter
> 
> Copyright 2008, The Estate of William S. Hatcher. Source: The William S. Hatcher Library. Can be used
> under terms of the Library’s license found at http://william.hatcher.org/license.
> 
> (and thus unpleasant) and others sweet (and therefore pleasant). He is reacting to the raw
> fact of the bitterness of quinine and the sweetness of honey.
> One may protest that this is a purely instinctive reaction, a reflex deriving from the
> structure of the newborn's nervous system. So be it. The point is that the quality of reaction
> is universal. All newborns will recoil from a bitter taste, experiencing it negatively, and
> embrace a sweet taste, experiencing it positively and seeking to repeat it. Thus, some purely
> individual value judgments are universal in that (1) they are shared and exhibited by all
> normally endowed humans and (2) they are rooted in a human nature that is essential in
> the precise sense that it inheres in the human genome and precedes socialization.
> This example, and a multiplicity of other similar examples, shows conclusively that
> cultural (socially learned) values are not the ultimate values. Indeed, socialization and
> individual learning build upon these fundamental, innate value preferences. For example,
> the fact that societies all over the worlds have organized the production of honey on a scale
> and in a manner that is different from the production of quinine is not just an arbitrary
> social value. It is a social value based on a collective learning process, but fundamental to
> all that process is the primal fact that honey tastes good (and is nutritious) and quinine
> doesn't.
> Those who insist that cultural relativism is primary, might point out that it is
> possible to train and condition someone to the extent that they would prefer quinine to
> honey, or even find honey loathsome and repugnant. Such examples show that natural value
> preferences can be altered by socialization, but they do not constitute an argument against
> the existence of primal, natural value preferences in the first place. Or, put it another way.
> Such socialization would be universally recognized as an exception, which would require
> explanation (how is it that this person has acquired such a distaste for honey?). But if told
> that the individual loves honey, we would not require an explanation, because that is the
> "natural" state of affairs (the "default position" if you will).
> In the example given above, the reaction of the infant is spontaneous and instinctive.
> Nonetheless, it can be legitimately analyzed into at least the following stages or
> components: (1) there is the fact of the objective difference between honey and quinine.
> This is due ultimately to objective differences in their molecular structure; (2) there is the
> capacity of the human sensori-neural apparatus to detect or experience this objective
> difference in some manner; (3) there is the relative value given to the difference -- the fact
> that the encounter with the substances is experienced positively (and to a certain degree of
> intensity), or else negatively (to a certain degree of intensity).
> The transition from objective to subjective takes place in the second stage. The
> objective difference between the two substances is translated into or reflected by a
> difference in subjective, inner states provoked by encounters with the two substances.
> However, this subjective difference in experience does not in itself imply a discriminating
> value judgment. For example, it could be the case that the organism experiences each
> substance in a different way, but that these different experiences are perceived as equally
> pleasant (or equally unpleasant).
> In the case where two stimuli produce experiences of opposite valency, we have, in
> psychological terms, an approach-avoidance configuration. When the two stimuli both
> induce reactions of either positive valency or else of negative valency, the subject would be
> motivated either to repeat (or to avoid) further encounters with each of the stimuli. In
> psychological terms, we would have either an approach-approach or an avoidance-
> 
> Copyright 2008, The Estate of William S. Hatcher. Source: The William S. Hatcher Library. Can be used
> under terms of the Library’s license found at http://william.hatcher.org/license.
> 
> avoidance configuration. In both of these latter cases, there would be either no value
> discrimination, or else a value discrimination in the relative intensity of the motivation to
> approach (or to avoid).
> In any case, the point is that stage (3) above, in which a value judgment is made, is
> distinct from stage (2) in which there is a subjective difference in the quality of the
> experiences induced or provoked by the two encounters. In other words, the making of
> value judgments presumes, or is based upon, the ability of the organism to discriminate
> between two different experiences, but the value judgment itself cannot be reduced to the
> simple fact of difference.
> We may say that the value judgment arises from a second-order experience, the
> experience of experience (or the perception of perception). On the first level (stage (2)
> above), we in fact experience the encounters with the two substances as different. On the
> second level (stage three above), we perceive our experience as positive (relatively
> pleasant) or negative (relatively unpleasant). In other words, value judgments are not
> inherent in (primal) experience itself, but arise from the consequences of experience. In the
> simple instance above, the consequences are simply the emotions "pleasant," on one hand,
> and "unpleasant," on the other.
> It is obvious that more complex experiences will give rise to more complex
> consequences. In particular, once the individual has matured to the point of acquiring not
> only sensori-neural sensibility but also human self-awareness, the third, evaluation stage
> can become more explicit and thus more autonomous. For example, the mature and
> autonomous human being may be able to say, of an initial experience of drug euphoria,
> "This was intensely pleasant but dangerous for my ultimate well-being and should be
> deliberately avoided in the future."
> Value judgments of this sort are very sophisticated, and definitely involve a
> significant degree of conscious knowledge, both of the self and of reality. But they still fit
> the basic paradigm above, namely that the individual's value judgments are based on the
> consequences of experience. It is just that the self-aware subject has a certain knowledge
> not only of the short-term consequences of the experience (e.g., that it feels pleasant) but
> also of the longer-term consequences (e.g., that repeating the experience can lead to drug
> dependency and thus a significant loss of valued autonomy).
> Thus, we repeat and amplify the fundamental point made a few paragraphs above.
> The fact that knowledge (socialization) profoundly affects value judgments does not mean
> that all value judgments are arbitrarily or wholly social in nature, because many value
> judgments are rooted in that primal experience in which we all naturally perceive various
> aspects of reality as relatively pleasant or relatively unpleasant. This primary, binary
> experience of pleasant/unpleasant (pleasure/pain, good/bad) is rooted in essential and
> universal human nature, and is thus fundamentally transcultural. In other words, there may
> indeed be value judgments that are arbitrarily generated by a given culture (process of
> socialization) but there are also value judgments that are universal and transcultural.
> The examples we have given so far might be said to involve only the most primal
> physical instincts of man. One could still ask whether the higher order or moral value
> judgments are not wholly cultural in nature. Given that there are universal value judgments,
> are there universal moral values or value judgments?
> 
> Copyright 2008, The Estate of William S. Hatcher. Source: The William S. Hatcher Library. Can be used
> under terms of the Library’s license found at http://william.hatcher.org/license.
> 
> Copyright 2008, The Estate of William S. Hatcher. Source: The William S. Hatcher Library. Can be used
> under terms of the Library’s license found at http://william.hatcher.org/license.
> 
> Moral Values
> When we speak of "moral values" we are still speaking, first of all, of values
> generically, as generated by the three-stage process mentioned above. Specifically "moral"
> values are those values which arise primarily from interhuman (social) interactions, and
> which involve judgments about how we experience both ourselves and others. The
> universality of such judgments arises from the fact that all humans experience love and
> kindness positively, while experiencing cruelty and hatred negatively. This universality is,
> again, rooted in essential human nature.
> That humans respond positively to love, acceptance, and kindness is not just a
> dictum of moralists, but a scientific fact of human nature. For example, Sigmund Freud was
> an atheist who held an extremely negative view of human nature and intrinsic human
> potential. He was anything but a moralist. Yet all of his observations and theories support
> the thesis that the human personality is significantly determined by early experience, and
> particularly by the quality of early interhuman relationships, beginning with the mother and
> moving out gradually to the father and other significant adults. And the thrust of his
> findings was that children who receive love, acceptance, and nurturing from these
> significant adults are relatively healthy and happy, and those who are subject to the trauma
> of rejection, abuse, hatred, or (alas) aggressive cruelty generally suffer its negative effects
> for the rest of their natural lives.
> These initial findings of Freud have been validated and revalidated by a host of
> other psychologists using many different approaches. But does anyone really doubt that
> intrinsic human nature responds positively to love and kindness and negatively to hatred
> and cruelty? Who has not experienced the warmth of being loved in contrast to the anxious
> knot in the stomach when aggressed, insulted, or rejected?
> Moreover, this essential human nature is the ultimate source of all value judgments,
> whether positive or negative. This observation suggests that the highest value in creation
> (the highest value in existence other than God) is that intrinsic and essential human nature
> from which all value judgments flow. That there is such a universal human nature is a
> Platonic hypothesis, which can be confirmed but not proved by observation alone. Let us
> examine this more carefully.
> 
> Copyright 2008, The Estate of William S. Hatcher. Source: The William S. Hatcher Library. Can be used
> under terms of the Library’s license found at http://william.hatcher.org/license.
> 
> The Platonic Underpinnings of Universal Morality
> We observe that there are certain stimuli to which all but a negligible minority of
> infants respond positively -- honey and love, for example -- and other stimuli to which all
> but a negligible minority of infants respond negatively -- quinine and cruelty, for example.
> Does this not prove that there is indeed a universal human nature?
> It certainly suggests strongly that there may be a universal human nature, but to
> answer the question in the affirmative, we have to consider the metaphysical basis of human
> nature itself. If we are materialists who hold that humans are just a particularly evolved
> species of animal -- whose nature at any moment of evolution is totally determined by the
> currently existing physical parameters -- then the answer may well be "no," because under
> such an hypothesis we cannot exclude the possibility that the physical parameters of our
> species will change in such a way that these intrinsic value responses are significantly
> altered. Perhaps there could be such drastic mutations that there would be no uniformities
> whatsoever in our spontaneous value responses to stimuli.
> All available evidence suggests that there has been no fundamental change in human
> nature over the last, say, ten thousand years, so such a drastic change does not seem very
> likely in the foreseeable future. But that is not the point. The point is that if we attribute
> present uniformities in spontaneous human value responses solely to a presently existing
> fortuitous genetic configuration, then we cannot consistently talk about essential human
> nature as an existing entity in itself. We will only have human nature today, human nature
> tomorrow, etc. We cannot make any general statements about what is essentially human,
> since we have no guarantee that some subtle, even apparently trivial, genetic mutation could
> alter something we now consider essential.
> We therefore posit, as a fundamental metaphysical truth, that there does exist an
> intrinsic, essential, universal human nature, and that observed uniformities and regularities
> in spontaneous human value response to external stimuli reflect, albeit imperfectly and
> approximately, this human nature. In Platonic terms, we are positing the objective existence
> of the form of the human.1
> The fundamental (but not exhaustive) characteristics of essential human nature are:
> consciousness (the existence of a subjective world of conscious inner states within each
> individual); mind (the capacity of this conscious subjectivity to reflect or model, if not
> perfectly at least significantly, the structure of the world outside our subjectivity); heart or
> affectivity (the capacity to feel certain emotions or subjective sensations, most particularly
> the capacity to experience the emotion of altruistic love); will and intentionality (the
> capacity to contemplate and execute certain courses of action). We might speak of cognitive
> consciousness, affective consciousness, and volitional consciousness.
> We do not claim that this analysis exhausts all of the capacities of essential human
> nature. We assume only that essential human nature --the form of the human -- contains at
> least these capacities. In fact, these are the only capacities that we will need to carry through
> our analysis of universal values.
> All human values and value preferences can be consistently regarded as generated
> by a suitably combined interaction of the fundamental human capacities of consciousness,
> 
> 1 We have elsewhere called such a metaphysical supposition "empirically grounded,"
> 
> meaning that the supposition is consistent with known facts and indeed is the most
> reasonable hypothesis in the light of known facts.
> Copyright 2008, The Estate of William S. Hatcher. Source: The William S. Hatcher Library. Can be used
> under terms of the Library’s license found at http://william.hatcher.org/license.
> 
> mind, heart, and will. Moreover, it is logically reasonable to assume that a cause or origin is
> greater than its effect or product. If we apply this principle in the present context, we arrive
> at the conclusion that essential human nature, as outlined above, is the highest value in
> creation (i.e. the highest value in existence other than God).
> In other words, it is objectively the case (independently of all subjective value
> preferences) that essential human nature is the highest value in creation. Henceforth, we can
> judge our individual, subjective value preferences in the light of this truth. A value
> judgment will be true or accurate insofar as it is based on, and in conformity with, the truth
> of the value supremacy of our common humanness. True or accurate value judgments thus
> arise from a certain kind of knowledge, namely the recognition that there is, in creation, no
> value higher than the human being.
> 
> Copyright 2008, The Estate of William S. Hatcher. Source: The William S. Hatcher Library. Can be used
> under terms of the Library’s license found at http://william.hatcher.org/license.
> 
> The Force of Love
> But what does it mean to recognize that the human being is the supreme value? The
> human response to the recognition of value is a complex of thoughts, feelings, and actions
> that we call love. Our hearts feel deep emotions of attraction towards the valued entity. We
> want to move closer to it, to possess it if possible or else to establish a harmonious
> relationship with it. We want to know everything we can about the object of our love. We
> are fascinated with every facet of it. And we are moved to act so as to enhance and/or serve
> the valued object.
> Love, then, is a force which inhabits us to the degree that we appreciate true value.
> Love is the response of the human being to the perception of value. If the perception of
> value is an illusion, then the love will ultimately prove false. But if the perception is true,
> then love will grow and develop.
> In particular, true or authentic human relationships are based on a true perception of
> the intrinsic value each of the other (and of the self). What we truly perceive is nothing less
> than the essential, intrinsic, and universal humanity which each of us possesses (or, of
> which each of us is a local representative). I recognize that I am a human being who is self-
> aware, who thinks, feels, and acts in accordance with certain natural laws and principles,
> and I recognize that you are also a human being who feels and acts and thinks according to
> the same universal principles as I do. In particular, I know that what makes me suffer will
> likely make you suffer, and what makes me happy will probably make you happy. I will
> therefore feel compassion for your suffering and gratitude for your genuine happiness.
> Moreover, I will shrink from being the deliberate cause of suffering on your part.
> In other words, mutual recognition of intrinsic value gives rise to altruistic love or
> agape. There are two basic components to this love. One is concern: we truly seek the
> well-being and autonomy of the other. The second is acceptance: we love the other
> because of what he is (an imperfect but authentic representation of the form of the human),
> not in spite of what he isn't (perfect and unchallenging to us). Acceptance means that we put
> no preconditions on our love; we do not require the other to be something he is not in order
> to merit our love. Thus, altruistic love is unconditional concern for the well-being and
> autonomy of the other.
> Mutual love is a transaction between human beings in which both parties benefit. It
> feels good to love and it feels good to be loved. And love begets love. Love is the ultimate
> "win-win" interhuman transaction.
> It is important to realize that power cannot control love. We cannot will ourselves or
> others to love. Love is an attractive force (like gravity or magnetism), which operates
> according to certain laws and principles. When we create the conditions necessary for love
> (like magnetizing an iron bar), then we become instruments through which and by which
> the force of love acts (the bar becomes attractive even to unmagnetized bits of iron). The
> process of recognizing and implementing the conditions necessary for the operation of love
> is what we call justice.
> Relationships based on genuine love are necessarily symmetrical, because they are
> based on the mutual recognition of an intrinsic and universal value, thus a value shared by
> both parties. Once I achieve the ability to recognize universal humanness, I can recognize
> its manifestations everywhere, both in myself and in others.
> Relationships based on power or dominance are necessarily asymmetrical, because it
> is logically impossible for each of us to dominate the other in exactly the same manner and
> 
> Copyright 2008, The Estate of William S. Hatcher. Source: The William S. Hatcher Library. Can be used
> under terms of the Library’s license found at http://william.hatcher.org/license.
> 
> at the same time. It is a "zero-sum" game: the extent to which I win is the extent to which
> you loose, and vice versa. But love creates love, and so is inexhaustible. With love, nobody
> loses and everyone gains.
> The seeking of power over others, on one hand, and the seeking of love and justice,
> on the other, are totally incompatible, like fire and water. The more you seek one, the less
> you have of the other. To be successful in seeking power over you, I must give priority to
> my needs over yours and even suppress feelings of compassion for your suffering at my
> hands, because such feelings will undermine my will to power. Thus, the seeking of love
> implies that we renounce the pursuit of power over others.
> Moreover, true love always leads to lasting happiness and well-being, whereas
> power can lead at most to an unstable and temporary happiness on the part of the winner.
> And even this happiness is always tinged with the fear that some more powerful person will
> dominate him and take away his hard-earned power.
> We have proved that love is more valuable than power, because the consequences of
> the love experience are positive whereas the consequences of the power experience are
> ultimately negative, especially when compared with the consequences of love. Thus, the
> presence of altruistic love in a relationship is the most significant indication that our value
> choices are authentic (i.e., in conformity with the value supremacy of universal human
> nature).
> We may ask, in turn, what is the greatest indicator of genuine love in a relationship,
> and the answer is simply how we actually treat others. To treat them with kindness and
> respect is the greatest indication that we do in fact love them and thus recognize their
> intrinsic and universal value. It is rather useless to claim that we really love others if we
> consistently treat them cruelly or unkindly. You cannot consistently claim to be better than
> you act.
> 
> Copyright 2008, The Estate of William S. Hatcher. Source: The William S. Hatcher Library. Can be used
> under terms of the Library’s license found at http://william.hatcher.org/license.
> 
> Hierarchies of value
> The value-supremacy of essential human nature is only the highest step in a
> continuum of objective values that are each inherent in the structure of reality. In other
> words, there is an objective value relation ("greater than"), which holds between any two
> entities A and B whenever A is more valuable than B. In the physical world, governed as it
> is by the second law of thermodynamics, this value hierarchy is more or less directly
> reflected by the relative complexity of entities considered as thermodynamic systems. Let
> us take a brief look at this hierarchy as it presents itself to us in nature.
> At the lowest end of the value scale are inorganic substances such as rocks and
> minerals. These entities have the simplest structure: about the only energy transformation of
> which such entities are capable is to absorb and to radiate energy.
> Next in value would be plants, which are more structured than minerals and which
> can not only absorb and radiate energy but can also ingest inorganic substances and process
> them in a way that allows the plants to complexify their own structure (to grow, in a word).
> Higher animals cumulate all of these functions but add the capacities of locomotion
> and sensibility. Sensibility, in particular, allows animals to process a wide range of energy
> events by an appropriate special (individual) response.
> Finally, humans have all the abilities of animals but can also process energy in its
> most refined form, that is, as abstract (symbolic) information. Humans have the ability to
> attribute, to arbitrarily chosen symbols, a meaning or significance totally unrelated to the
> physical form or structure of the symbol itself.
> One may protest that I have only described Aristotle's chain of being, imposing upon
> it a more "modern" interpretation. However, the crucial difference is that our hierarchy is no
> longer metaphysical but is totally, objectively definable in terms of the known dynamics of
> systems. More complex organisms are further from thermodynamic equilibrium and
> consequently have a more sophisticated and flexible level of functioning. They are
> "multivalent," to make a metaphorical use of a term from chemistry.
> This cumulative multifunctionality of higher organisms gives us a more precise
> understanding of why the human being stands at the apex of the value hierarchy. Such an
> understanding has become especially important since the advent of computers that can
> outperform human mental functioning in certain specific respects. Why, as some
> philosophers of artificial intelligence have argued, could not some future, sophisticated
> computer not be of equal or greater value than humans?
> The answer is two-fold. On the metaphysical level it will forever be the case that it
> is humans who have created computers, not the reverse. Electronic computers, however
> sophisticated, were not a naturally occurring phenomenon, and had to be conceived
> abstractly by the human brain before they existed concretely. If we accept the highly
> plausible philosophical principle that a cause must always be greater than its effect (which,
> in fact, is just a metaphysical form of the law of entropy), then humans will always be of
> greater value than computers or any other creation of the human mind.
> Faith in the superior value of human beings has, for some people, been shaken by
> such things as the defeat of Gary Kasparov by the computer program Deep Blue. As for
> myself, I am quite willing to accept that it is possible to program a sufficiently complex
> computer to outperform human functioning in any given, specific area of endeavor. Indeed,
> this is already the case for human physical performance: our artificially created machines
> are faster, quicker, stronger than any humans. The superiority of human functioning lies
> 
> Copyright 2008, The Estate of William S. Hatcher. Source: The William S. Hatcher Library. Can be used
> under terms of the Library’s license found at http://william.hatcher.org/license.
> 
> precisely in its seemingly inexhaustible multifunctionality. A single human organism has
> genuine self-awareness, can love, play the violin, do mathematics, invent computers, play
> tennis, reproduce, etc. The very definition of the human is that he is forever indefinable.
> Clearly we will never be able to invent a robot that can, alone, accomplish all the
> various tasks that are accessible to the ordinary human being. For, if we could create such a
> machine, it would, by definition, be the human being: we would have recreated ourselves, a
> highly implausible if not logically impossible achievement (again in view of the known
> laws of systems dynamics, and in particular the law of entropy).
> Thus, in the final analysis, morality and moral values arise, on the one hand, from
> the existence of an objective value hierarchy that is embedded in the very structure of
> reality and, on the other hand, from the universality of essential human nature, which allows
> us to apprehend this value hierarchy and act upon this understanding, if of course we choose
> to do so.
> 
> Copyright 2008, The Estate of William S. Hatcher. Source: The William S. Hatcher Library. Can be used
> under terms of the Library’s license found at http://william.hatcher.org/license.
> 
> Conclusions
> All of this analysis suggests that basic morality is really rather simple. Once we
> acknowledge that human beings are the supreme value in creation, we act on that
> knowledge. We treat human beings as the ultimate value, as ends rather than means.
> However, if morality really is so simple and straightforward, why has it always appeared so
> complicated? Virtually every human being will assent to the proposition that human beings
> are the highest value in creation, yet very few people really act consistently on the principle.
> Why? These are the questions we have striven to answer in another paper entitled
> "Powerseeking and Ideology."
> 
> Copyright 2008, The Estate of William S. Hatcher. Source: The William S. Hatcher Library. Can be used
> under terms of the Library’s license found at http://william.hatcher.org/license.
>
> — *Universal Values (Used by permission of the curator)*