# Modern Movements among Moslems

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> Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Samuel Graham Wilson, Modern Movements among Moslems, bahai-library.com.
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> 
> Modern Movements Among Moslems
> Modern Movements Among
> Moslems
> 
> By
> 
> SAMUEL GRAHAM WILSON, D.D.
> 
> Thirty-two Years Resident in Persia
> Author of “Persian Life and Customs”
> “Bahaism and Its Claims,” etc.
> 
> NEW YORK CHICAGO TORONTO
> Fleming H. Revell Company
> LONDON AND EDINBURGH
> 
> Copyright, 1916, by
> 
> FLEMING H. REVELL COMPANY
> 
> New York: 158 Fifth Avenue
> Chicago: 125 N. Wabash Ave.
> Toronto: 25 Richmond St., W.
> London: 21 Paternoster Square
> Edinburgh: 100 Princes Street
> 
> PREFACE
> 
> THE Western world is showing increasing inter-
> est in Moslems. The great movement which
> has developed so marvellously in Eastern Asia
> affects Moslem peoples as well. Recent political up-
> heavals in the Near East resulted in the proclamation
> of Constitutional governments in Turkey and Persia.
> In one year three autocratic Moslem rulers were de-
> throned. A spirit of Nationalism is growing. Events
> have followed in quick succession, leading up to the
> participation of Turkey in the World War. Her call
> has gone forth to all Islamic peoples to engage in a
> Holy War of deliverance. The Ottoman Empire
> occupies a unique position in the great contest of arms.
> 
> Study of Islam as a religion has made great prog-
> ress in recent times; critical examination of its his-
> tory and traditions by eminent scholars has thrown
> much new light upon it. Its present remarkable ad-
> vance in Africa and Indonesia and the entrance into
> it of modernist influences from Western civilization
> have engaged the attention of all students of religion.
> The awakening of the Christian Church to its duty
> to evangelize the Moslems and its undertaking work
> to this end is enlisting another large element to con-
> sider Islam. So it has come about that the statesman,
> the historian, the sociologist, the theologian, the mis-
> sionary give thought to the affairs of the Islamic
> 
> world as never before. Contemporary literature indi-
> cates the spread of this interest, especially new period-
> icals in different European languages which are de-
> voted exclusively to Islam. Even fiction is seeking
> its themes and plots among the followers of Mo-
> hammed.
> 
> Residence in the Near East, for a generation, in
> personal contact and converse with Moslems, with
> opportunities of travel among them in Persia, Russia,
> Turkey, Syria, and Egypt, and study and observation
> of contemporary events, supplementing knowledge of
> the history and doctrines of Islam, have given Mos-
> lem peoples a large place in my vision and thought.
> For this reason, when I was elected to deliver the
> course of lectures on the L. H. Severance Founda-
> tion before the Western Theological Seminary of the
> Presbyterian Church, at Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, I
> chose a subject connected with Islam. These lectures
> on “Modern Movements Among Moslems,” in a
> much enlarged form, constitute the present volume.
> Study about the Moslem world has a fascination for
> me, and I trust this review of present-day events and
> movements in the life, thought, religion, society, and
> politics of Mohammedan lands may arrest attention
> and inspire efforts for the welfare of these millions
> of our fellow-men.
> 
> S. G. W.
> 
> CONTENTS
> 
> I. INNOVATIONS IN ISLAM                       11
> 
> Is Islam Inflexible? Opinions of Fairbairn,
> Muir, Cromer, Palgrave—Modifications: In
> Lifetime of Mohammed; by Sufiism, Panthe-
> ism, Darvishes—The Stages—Zikr—Sheikhs
> —Saint-worship—Veneration of Tombs—
> Intercessors—Apotheosis of Mohammed—
> Uncreated Koran—Development of Clergy
> —Their Orders—Pirs—Marseyakhans—The
> Shariat, Law—Its Growth—Adaptation from
> Romans and Christians—Urfi in Persia—Code
> Napoleon in Turkey—Accommodations about
> Commerce, Jihad, Caliphate, Superstitions—
> Caste—Rites—Present-day Question: Shall
> Islam be Modified?—Possible Methods—Dif-
> ferent Parties—Subjects to be Treated.
> 
> II. THE REVIVAL IN ISLAM                      52
> 
> Eighteenth-century Decline—“The Revival”:
> Its Cause—(1) Wahabism: Its Founder—
> Doctrines, History, Influence; in India;
> Faraiis; Danfodio; Revival in Turkey—(2)
> Pan-Islamism: Its Purpose—Racial Divisions
> —Osmanli Caliphate—Qualifications—Not
> Character—Attitude of Arabs—Its Propa-
> ganda—Khojas—Dallals—With Shiahs—
> Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din—From Mecca—Hajis—
> In Malaysia, China, Russia, India, Africa—
> Repression of Christianity—Armenian Mas-
> sacres, as a Victory for Islam—Triumph over
> Greece—Anger at Christian Aggression—
> Holy War—Its Doctrinal Basis—Dar-ul-Harb
> —Recent Jihads—The Present Jihad—Mili-
> tary Pan-Islamism a Failure.
> 
> III. ISLAMIC MISSIONS                            94
> 
> Zeal in Propagating Faith—Darvish Orders—
> Conversions by Sword, by Persuasion; in
> Africa—Methods—Their Spirit—The Sanusi-
> yahs: Founder, Organization, Zeal, Principles,
> Results—Other Islamic Missions—Russia—
> India—Malaysia—Japan—Mission Societies
> and Congresses.
> 
> IV. Mahdiist Movements                           112
> 
> Expectation of a Mahdi—Traditions—History—
> Modern Mahdis—(1) The Bab: His Claim;
> the Name; Life; Imprisonment; Insurrec-
> tions; Doctrines—Abrogation of Islam;
> Morals; Effect; Offshoots of Babism—(2)
> Subh-i-Azal—(3) Baha Ullah; Their Quar-
> rel; Baha’s Claim; Doctrines; an Incarna-
> tion; “Return”; Allegorizing; Symbolism;
> Rites; Laws; Quarrel over the Succession;
> Propaganda in America; Pilgrimage; Abdul
> Baha; Visits Occident—(4) Gulam Ahmad:
> Ahmadiyas; His Claim; Teaching About
> Christ; Peaceful Mahdi; Prophecies; Propa-
> ganda; Results; Mission in England; Com-
> parison with Bahaism—(5) Mohammed Ah-
> mad of the Sudan: His Preaching; Egyp-
> tian Rule; Mahdi’s Conquests; Doctrines and
> Laws; Character; Death; Khalifa Abdullah;
> Gordon at Khartum; Overthrow; Results.
> 
> V. Modernism in Islam                            149
> 
> Neo-Islam. Source of—Influence—Repressed in
> Turkey—Later Liberalism—Sheikh-ul-Islam
> —In Persia—Restrictions—Mullah Sadra—
> Sheikh Ahmad—Sigat-ul-Islam—Haji Hadi—
> Egypt—Sheikh Mohammed Abdu—El Bakri
> —“Back to the Koran”—Actual Reforms—
> Malaysia—Society of Islam—Russia—Con-
> forming in Social Life—Gasparinski—Among
> the Tartars—Congress at Petrograd—India—
> Advanced Position—Ahmad Khan—Aligarh
> —Justice Amir Ali: On Inspiration; the
> Supernatural; Right of Private Judgment—
> Ali Hasan—Khuda Bakhsh—Mulvi Abdullah
> —Reformers on Assassination—Loyalty to
> Mohammed—Mutazalis—Influence of Neo-
> Islam.
> 
> VI. The New Education in Islam                 172
> 
> Modernism in Education—Mosque Schools—
> Curriculum—Arabic a Hindrance—Madressas
> —Al Azhar—Its Conservatism—Influences
> from Europe—Students Abroad—Aspirations
> —Persia—Shah’s College—Modern Schools—
> Turkey—Schemes of Reforming Sultans—
> New Vernacular Literature—Under Abdul
> Hamid—Under Constitution—Turkish Boy
> Scouts—Egypt—Khedive’s Schools—Girls’
> Education—French Africa—India—Con-
> gresses—Aligarh College—The New Educa-
> tion, a Reflex of the Christian Learning—Not
> under Mullahs—Is Liberalizing—The Press
> —Newspapers—Translating of Koran.
> 
> VII. Neo-Islam and Society                     194
> 
> In Social Life—Islam and Society—Woman
> before Islam, in Arabia, Africa, East In-
> dies—Marriage Law—Seclusion—Neo-Islam
> against Polygamy and Harem—Review of
> Countries—Under Young Turks—Slavery—
> Decreasing—Abolition of Slave Trade—Neo-
> Islam Concerning Religious Liberty—Disap-
> pointing—Advance in Practice—Can Modern-
> ism Change Islam?—Opinions.
> 
> VIII. Political Movements Among Mos-
> lems                                           217
> 
> Christian Rule over Moslems—Extent—Process
> —Influence of Opposition to—Expatriation—
> Legal Adjustments—Attitude of Christian Gov-
> ernments; Partial; Favourable to Its Prog-
> ress—Moslems Unreconciled—Nationalism—
> Influence of Japan on—In India—In Egypt
> —Khedive Ismiel—Arabi Rebellion—Assassi-
> nation of Poudros Pasha—Young Egyp-
> tians—Roosevelt—Kitchener—National As-
> sembly—British Protectorate—Sultan Husain
> —In North Africa—Russia—Arabia—Al-
> bania—Moslem Countries Influenced by
> Christian Civilization—Dependent Economic-
> ally—Persia—Reformers—Amir-i-Nizam—
> Malcom Khan—Jamal-ud-Din—Tobacco Mo-
> nopoly—Assassination of Shah—Constitution
> —Revolution—Causes—Participation of Mul-
> lahs—Effects, Religious, Civil—Economic
> Conditions—Political Outlook.
> 
> IX. Political Reforms in the Turkish
> Empire                                       255
> 
> Reforming Sultans—Hatti Sherif—Humayun—
> Constitution of 1876—Abdul Hamid—Reign—
> Armenian Massacres—Young Turks—Revo-
> lution—Constitution—Mutiny—Sultan Mah-
> mud V—New Régime—Italian and Balkan
> Wars—Ottomanization—Abolition of Capitu-
> lations—Of Privileges—Of Millats—Of Lib-
> erty of Religious Instruction—The Holy War
> —Germany and England—The Jihad in Per-
> sia—In Egypt—British Protectorate—Sultan
> Husain—Attempts on His Life—Results of
> War on Turkey—Armenian Atrocities—Need
> of Christian Missions.
> 
> Index                                        293
> 
> INNOVATIONS IN ISLAM
> 
> THE modern age is one of movement and change.
> The Moslem world is swept by currents of
> thought and life. The action and reaction of
> influences local and worldwide are affecting Islam.
> The Faith, to the Moslem, has intimate relation to all
> affairs, whether political, social, or religious. I wish
> to review Modern Movements among Moslems,
> whether these have been set in motion within Islam or
> from without, whether they have resulted in its de-
> terioration or reform, in its decline or progress.
> 
> As a preliminary question, it is well to inquire how
> far it is possible to influence Islam by new forces,
> external and internal, and to what extent this has
> occurred. Is Islam changeable or not? Do Moslems
> vary their belief and worship? Has the mode of in-
> terpreting and executing their Law remained station-
> ary? True conceptions of the past and the present
> will show what it is reasonable to expect in the future.
> 
> It is a common conception that Islam is fixed and
> stationary. It is said to be its boast that “it is always
> the same,—inflexible, neither requiring adaptation nor
> capable of it.” Concerning this, Principal Fairbairn
> says: “It is the most inflexible of all positive religions.
> A religion, to be permanent, must be progressive,—
> 
> capable of formal without essential change. But a sys-
> tem in which the form is as divine as the spirit, the
> institution as the truth, is a system which can allow
> no change, no progress. Islam is an elastic spirit
> placed in an iron framework. The progressive is sacri-
> ficed to the stationary” (Contemporary Review, Vol.
> XL, p. 806). In accordance with this opinion are the
> words of Sir William Muir (“Caliphate,” p. 594):
> “Swathed in the bands of the Koran, the Moslem
> faith, unlike the Christian, is powerless to adapt itself
> to varying time and place, keep pace with the march
> of humanity, direct and purify the social life, and
> elevate mankind.” And with the philosopher and the
> historian agrees the statesman. Lord Cromer writes
> (“Modern Egypt,” Vol. II, p. 202): “The Moslem
> stands in everything on the ancient ways, because he
> is a Moslem, because the customs which are inter-
> woven with his religion forbid him to change.”
> Lastly I quote the opinion of the great traveller in
> Arabia, Palgrave (“Arabia,” Vol. I, p. 372): “Islam-
> ism is in itself stationary, and was framed thus to
> remain. It justly repudiates all change, all develop-
> ment. To borrow the forcible words of Lord
> Houghton: ‘The written book is there, the dead man’s
> hand, stiff and motionless; whatever savours of vitality
> is by that alone convicted of heresy and defection.’”
> 
> Undoubtedly these views state correctly the genius
> of Mohammedanism. Such has been the orthodox
> position. It asserts that “no advance, no change has
> been admitted into orthodox Islam during the past
> thousand years” (Stanley Lane-Poole). Islam, as
> settled from the traditions by the great Imams, Abu
> 
> Hanifa, Shaft, Ibn Malik, and Ibn Hanbal, must re-
> main fixed.
> 
> But this is only one side of the shield. Historically
> and actually these dicta of our great writers are but
> partially true. Let it not be considered strange that
> I should take as a subject, “Movements Among Mos-
> lems.” For remarkable modifications have taken
> place in Islam in the past, and conspicuous changes
> are occurring and are being attempted at the present
> time. It is all the more interesting to consider these
> movements because of the idea that is in many minds
> that Islam is immovable.
> 
> In his own day the Prophet exercised his authority
> to make modifications, such as changing the Kibla
> from Jerusalem to Mecca and introducing the semi-
> idolatrous and superstitious rites of the pilgrimage
> around the Kaaba. After his death many things were
> added on the authority of traditions,—reputed sayings
> of the Prophet, created to suit circumstances. The
> details of the system had not been fixed, and disputes
> over doctrines, forms, and polities culminated in fierce
> and bloody struggles. Persecution fixed the religion
> and made disputes dangerous. The spirit arose which
> is shown in the story told of Omar, that he appointed
> a commission of six to settle certain points and decreed
> that the minority, if any, should be decapitated. Under
> such persuasion to agreement, unanimity would doubt-
> less prevail. But notwithstanding the often arbitrary
> rule of the Caliphs, Islam has been influenced and
> modified. Some changes have been wrought from
> within; more have come through the influence of con-
> verted races; not a few from the creeds and philoso-
> 
> phies of rival and alien peoples. Most modifications
> have been received unconsciously by accommodations
> and adaptations. Doctrines and rites have been as-
> similated which seem even contrary to the spirit and
> to the letter of the Faith. The conceptions of Mo-
> hammedans have varied and do vary. So much is
> this the case that “The Report on the Special Prepara-
> tion for Missionaries to Moslems in the Near East”
> says: “One cannot obtain a complete knowledge of
> Mohammedanism from books, especially those that
> deal with its early history and the claims and contents
> of its Faith. The modern missionary meets and deals
> with a modified Mohammedanism, and it is this he
> should know and understand.”
> 
> Only from a knowledge of what changes Islam has
> undergone in the past, can it be rightly estimated
> what may be the effects of the present-day move-
> ments. And only from the knowledge of the latter
> and the conditions that prevail can the agents of the
> Christian propaganda rightly direct their efforts and
> exert their influence.
> 
> SUFIISM MODIFIES ISLAM
> 
> One element which has permeated and modified
> Islam is Sufiism. This is universally recognized.
> Sufiism is a pantheistic mysticism. It is a philosophy,
> almost a religion, which has been added to and mixed
> with the religion of the Prophet and wrought a strange
> transformation. Its first great development was in
> Persia. Persian thought and literature are imbued and
> permeated with it. And the influence of Persia on
> Mohammedan thought has been without measure.
> 
> The Arab historian Ibn Chaldoun says: “The ma-
> jority of those who taught and preserved the sacred
> traditions were Persians, and the same is true of our
> systematic theologians and commentators on the Ko-
> ran.” Many of these were pantheists in philosophy,
> and they sought to find a basis for it in the new re-
> ligion by explaining texts of the Koran in accordance
> with it. By Sufiism the rigid monotheism of Islam
> has received a pantheistic mode among millions of its
> votaries. The simple creed, “There is no God but
> God” has come to mean to them, God is the only be-
> ing,—the universe is but a mode of God’s existence.
> As the poet Jami says (Browne, in “Religious Sys-
> tems of the World,” p. 327),
> 
> “Thou art absolute being, all else is but phantasm,
> For in thy universe all things are one.”
> 
> The absolute supreme Being, perfect Goodness, per-
> fect Beauty, manifested the world that he might be
> known and loved, according to the saying of the
> Koran, “I desired to be known, therefore I created
> the world.” The first creation was the Primal Intelli-
> gence or Will, and from it and through it came into
> being all spirits, intelligences, and the elements.
> Man’s soul is from God and “verily unto Him do we
> return.” Belief in the tohid, or unity of God, means
> to hold to, and to desire to attain to, union with Him
> as the aim of all things. Man is God. Mullah Jalal-
> ud-Din exclaims to his spiritual Guide, “Oh, my
> Master, you have completed my doctrine by teaching
> me that you are God and that all things are God.”
> The waves when they settle down become the sea,
> 
> so men are the waves of God and after death return
> to His bosom. Hence the injunction, “Adore God in
> His creatures” (J. P. Brown: “The Dervishes,” p.
> 333). Since all is God, there is no idolatry, for all
> worship is rendered to the One, though maybe with
> imperfections.
> 
> Sufiism gives allegorical and mystical interpreta-
> tion to the doctrines and rites of Islam. It delights
> to picture the relation of the soul to God as that of
> Lover and Beloved, the enraptured, entranced one con-
> templating the Supreme Beauty. All the imagery of
> love and the thrill of amorous passion set forth spiritual
> communion. The delights of the senses, the intoxica-
> tion of wine and hasheesh, are symbols of divine things.
> The great Persian poets, Fardusi, Saadi, Hafiz, and
> Nizami, abound in praises of wine and love. One party
> considered them unorthodox. Fardusi was on account
> of this accusation refused his reward for his poem
> and burial in the public cemetery. A Shiah Mujtahid
> destroyed the first monument erected over Saadi’s
> grave at Shiraz. Hafiz, now regarded as a saint and
> his tomb as a shrine, was at first refused burial by
> Mohammedan rites. Finally they drew lots to settle
> it. A child opened at random upon the following
> verse of Hafiz:
> 
> “Withhold not thy foot from Hafiz;
> For though he be drowned in sin,
> He fareth to heaven.”
> 
> He was considered a libertine, fond of wine, women,
> and music. Sufis pretend that his amorous and bac-
> chanalian poetry is allegorical. He has the fortune
> to be “adored by both saints and sinners.” It requires
> 
> much credulity to believe that their antinomian verses
> relate to spiritual desires. Even this summer, a Mos-
> lem writer (Islamic Review, July, 1915) interprets
> the secularism and pessimism of Omar-i-Khayyam as
> spiritual and orthodox. In truth, Sufis are free from
> the Law, and not only from its rites but from its re-
> strictions on conduct. Shams-i-Din says (quoted in
> Canon Sell’s “Sufiism,” p. 64):
> 
> “The man of God is beyond infidelity and religion,
> To the man of God infidelity and religion are alike.”
> 
> The “Masnavi” of Jalal-ud-Din says: “When one is
> out of the Kaaba, he looks towards it, but for him who
> is in the Kaaba, it imports not what direction he
> turns.” One in God’s love need not fulfil the Law.
> 
> Sufiism involves a different conception of salvation
> from Islam. Salvation, according to it, is to be freed
> from self, to be in union with God, by means of in-
> crease in the knowledge and love of Him. Man the
> seeker after the Truth is a traveller on life’s journey.
> The goal is God. The Way has various stages or
> degrees. Beginning with the Law, obedience to the
> Shariat, the traveller passes to the Path of Mystic
> Rites, bringing purity, then to Knowledge, immediate
> communion with God, and further on to the stage
> when he is in Truth itself, united to God. The last
> stage is called fana, which is usually translated “anni-
> hilation.” The word is interpreted by Al Sarraj, a
> philosophic mystic (R. A. Nicholson, Roy. Geog. Soc.,
> 1913, p. 61), to mean a “passing away,” in opposi-
> tion to the word baga, “continuance,” a passing away
> of conscious thought of self, a passing away from pas-
> 
> sions and desires and even perceptions and the concen-
> tration of all entirely on God. Others regard it as
> such an entire absorption of self in God that the
> individual can say, “I am God.”
> 
> The means of progress in the Way are contempla-
> tion, meditation, adoration, remembrance of God, in-
> duced and aided by rites peculiar to Sufiism. After
> the first stages, ordinary forms of prayer and worship
> and reading of the Koran are neglected, and emphasis
> is placed on the inner light, “the eye of the heart,” as
> the instrument of direct communication with God.
> The ritual used to incite this condition is called the
> Zikr. This includes various recitations, repetitions,
> and physical and mental gymnastics, by which the mind
> is fixed on God and the emotions and nerves excited.
> The formula for repetition is varied, but the most
> common words are the name Allah, repeated 1,001
> times, or the ninety-nine names of God, or the first
> clause of the Creed, the kalima, “La ilia ill Allah.”
> These words are repeated until an ecstatic or hypnotic
> stage is reached. This zikr is pronounced by no less
> an authority than Professor Margoliouth to be a com-
> pound of “various hysterical and hypnotizing proc-
> esses.” The zikrs are of two kinds, silent and vocal.
> They are sometimes accompanied by a variety of mo-
> tions, as swaying, whirling, dancing, or by ejacula-
> tions, singing, or howling like a dog. Musical instru-
> ments are used either for the soothing effect or to give
> vivacious movement. The order of the Maulavis have
> a band of six or more instruments. This is a striking
> innovation, for tradition says that Mohammed stopped
> his ears when he heard the music of a pipe. Some
> 
> orders prepare for the zikr1 by long periods of soli-
> tude, fasting, and vigils. The disciples, who are called
> darvishes or fakirs, when in this state of trance see
> visions, experience ecstasies, are excited to frenzy, or
> fall into unconsciousness. In this state some of them
> perform wonderful feats, such as eating, without pain,
> red-hot coals, handling and placing in their mouths
> red-hot irons, eating live snakes and scorpions, pound-
> ing their bodies with rocks, or lying prostrate to be
> trodden upon by the Sheikh’s horse.
> 
> ORDERS OF DARVISHES
> 
> The one who has passed through the stages and at-
> tained oneness becomes a Sheikh or Murshid, to guide
> others to attain. The disciple must submit his will to
> the Sheikh’s will, vow to obey him and forsake self,
> surrender all control of his thought and personality
> to the Sheikh. Certain classes of darvishes take vows
> of poverty and beg from door to door. From this the
> name is derived, dar meaning door in Persian. There
> are many Orders. A very few of them have the vow
> of celibacy as the Baktashi had at first. But this is
> contrary to the genius of Islam. Tradition reports
> that Mohammed said: “When the servant of God
> 
> 1 Some students of Islam attach considerable value to its mys-
> ticism and to more spiritual forms of the zikr as a means of
> soul-uplift. Among these are Prof. D. B. Macdonald and Rev.
> G. Swan of Egypt. The latter (Moslem World, 1912, p. 380) ex-
> presses the conviction that the study of the aims and effects
> of the zikr might aid the evangelistic missionary, and that
> Christians, by imitating it or by finding a substitute for it, might
> disclose a source of satisfaction to the heart. He puts the query
> whether it is not in it that the secret power of Islam lies. Most
> observers despise the zikr as a religious rite of little value.
> 
> marries, he perfects half his religion,” and “One
> prayer of a married man is worth seventy of a
> bachelor.” Sheikh Abdul Kadir, the founder of the
> Kadiris, had four wives, some concubines, and forty-
> five children. A Nakshbandi Sheikh told Dr. Hughes
> that he had wished to remain celibate, but his disciples
> insisted that he should perfect his religion by taking a
> wife. Asceticism is practised by neglect of the body
> and indifference to worldly comforts. A Persian dar-
> vish, half naked, covered with rags and vermin, suf-
> fering from hunger and exposure, said to me: “Will
> not this subjection of my body purify my soul?” It
> is common for darvishes to live in takias or lodges,
> sometimes in the crowded city, sometimes in solitary
> spots.
> 
> The traditions attributing the founding of orders
> of darvishes to Abubekr or Ali are no doubt apoc-
> ryphal. But Sufiism certainly manifested itself early
> in the history of Islam. By the second century this
> innovation began to creep in. Perhaps the first order
> was that founded by Sheikh Alwan, a Sufi celebrated
> for his knowledge and worth ( A.H. 149, A.D. 766).
> The movement met with great opposition as contrary
> to the orthodoxy of Islam. Some Sufis were punished
> as heretics. In A.D. 923 Al Hallaj, a disciple of Al
> Junaid and of Imam Reza, uttered the celebrated
> words, “I am the Truth, I am God,” and was put
> to death for blasphemy. But Al Junaid claimed that
> they were not breaking with Islam, and said: “Our
> system of doctrines is firmly bound up with the dog-
> mas of the faith, the Koran, and the Traditions.”
> Imam Al Gazzali, called the Plato of Moslems, se-
> 
> cured recognition in Islam for Sufi mysticism as a
> system in opposition to scholasticism. Ibn Tufail ac-
> complished the same in the West, i.e., Spain and North
> Africa. Palgrave says (“Essays on Eastern Ques-
> tions,” p. 52): “The Darvishes, secretly subverting
> the very foundations of Islam, have nevertheless,
> thanks to legists like Abu Hanifa, doctors like Ahmad
> al Ghazali, and Sultans like Bayazid II, succeeded in
> vindicating to themselves a sufficient though not an
> unquestioned reputation for Orthodoxy. Different
> orders were organized from time to time and spread
> throughout Islam. Each founder gave a distinct prac-
> tice and rules to his order. The coming to the throne
> of Persia of a Sufi dynasty, in 1501, was the signal
> for an effort to suppress the darvish orders in the
> Ottoman empire, as the enemies of Sunniism. In
> 1656 the suppression of the orders was again at-
> tempted, by the government combined with the Ulema,
> and aided by the popular passion of the orthodox
> Sunnis. Again on the destruction of the Janisaries,
> 1826, the darvishes of Constantinople were exiled and
> some of the Sheikhs of the Bektashi executed. But
> all these attempts came to naught.
> 
> Of late years the growth of the darvish orders in
> number and influence has been striking. Dozy says:
> “The influence which Sufiism has exercised over the
> Moslem world, and which in our day is rather in-
> creasing, has been extremely great.” Since his time
> there has been a greater increase. Now Von Kremer
> says: “Sufiism is the preponderating element in Mos-
> lem civilization.” The system is spreading in Turkey
> and Syria. Abdul Hamid is said to be a member of
> 
> the Rufai, or Howling darvishes, as well as of the
> Sanusiyah, and to have often attended the zikrs
> (Ramsay: “Impressions of Turkey,” p. 150). The
> present Sultan, Mohammed V, is of the Maulavi or-
> der. There are two hundred lodges in Constantinople.
> Professor Macdonald says, in “Aspects of Islam”:
> “To the bulk of the population of Egypt, their real
> religion is Sufiism as represented in the zikr.” Simon
> says: “Nearly every devout Mohammedan in the
> Dutch East Indies is a member of such an order”
> (“Progress, etc.,” p. 145). In North Africa public
> sentiment strongly insists on every person being a
> member of some order, and pressure is used to ac-
> complish this end. In some provinces every one is an
> initiate. The majority of the people of the Sudan
> belong to a darvish order. The opposition of the
> mullahs has been silenced and conquered, for as Dr.
> Hughes says (“Dictionary of Islam,” p. 116):
> “There is scarcely a maulavi or learned man in Islam
> who is not a member of some religious order.” The
> separate orders number well-nigh a hundred.
> 
> If Sufiism was a natural expression of religious
> conception among the Aryans and owes its origin to
> Hindu, Greek, and Persian philosophy, its propaga-
> tion in Islam is a striking instance of Persian con-
> quest over the religion of its conquerors. The
> Semitic races, as well as the Turanian, African, and
> Malay, have adopted Sufiism. Even if it did not
> spread from Persia as a reaction against Islam, but
> took its inception subsequently and independently in
> Islam, it is anyhow a foreign element and one that
> has influenced the whole fabric of the religion, its
> 
> doctrines, its worship, its life. It shows how foreign
> elements have been and can be introduced into the
> system of Mohammed. It shows that the need was
> felt of something more than Islam provided; that
> Islam had not that which would satisfy the religious
> instincts of the heart, that man desires to draw near
> to God and to find a Path, a Way of Approach, and
> that he knows that the performance of rites and the
> merit of his own works do not secure him this access.
> It shows that the Moslem heart yearns for that which
> the Christian finds in his union with Christ and com-
> munion with the Holy Spirit and in his worship of
> the Father in spirit and in truth, not in a formal
> prayer-ritual.
> 
> SAINT-WORSHIP
> 
> Another modification and corruption of Islam is seen
> in the prevalence of saint-worship. Veneration of
> the Imams, regarding them as manifestations of God,
> and rendering them honours as semi-divine, has pre-
> vailed among Shiahs and their sects; the development
> of creature worship among the Sunnis is connected
> with the spread of the darvish orders. Many Sheikhs
> or Pirs are regarded as Valis, blessed spirits, possess-
> ing superhuman powers, capable of working miracles
> of healing by the touch, the breath, or the saliva. Vo-
> tive offerings are brought to them to procure their
> intercession for blessings. Kissing their hands, with
> the expression “I repent on your hands,” is
> common, with accompanying trust in their media-
> tion. It is believed that pardon is secured through
> them for the living suppliant and for the dead.
> 
> Ill-gotten gains receive purification through their pro-
> nouncement, a percentage being retained. These
> Sheikhs are friends of God; they see -visions and
> dream dreams for the guidance of the people. Sheikh-
> al-Akbar Ibn Arabi claimed that his book was re-
> vealed to him in a dream by the Prophet Mohammed.
> They are credited with interpreting dreams, exorcis-
> ing evil spirits, empowering charms and talismans
> against witchcraft, sickness, theft, snake-bite, and all
> calamities. Some are supposed to have spiritual
> power over souls as kings have over temporalities.
> God makes known to them His will with regard
> to the actions of men and all the purposes of men
> come under their cognizance previous to their being
> carried out in deeds (Brown’s “Dervishes,” pp.
> 80-81).
> 
> The takia of the order, the cave or hut of the dar-
> vish, or especially the tomb of the venerated Sheikh,
> becomes a shrine. For example, Bagdad is called the
> City of Saints. In that seat of the Abbasides are
> many sacred tombs, including that of Sheikh Abdul
> Kadir Jilani. Professor Siraj-ud-Din refers (“Vital
> Forces,” p. 168) to the “divine honours paid to this
> great Pir,” and adds, “There is nothing more soul-
> stirring in Mohammedan worship than to hear these
> prayers and hymns chanted in the service of the Pir
> Sahib,—continued until early morning.” These dead
> Sheikhs are invoked everywhere; vows are made to
> them; healing is expected from them. Especially the
> pilgrim expects the blessing. He salutes the grave,
> prostrates himself, kisses it, holds sacrificial feasts at
> it, endows the shrine, carries earth away from the
> 
> grave to rub on the sick or a pressed cake of it to
> place under his forehead, when he prostrates himself
> in prayer. These shrine tombs are very common.
> For example, near my home, at Tabriz, on a ridge of
> the mountain, there is one called Ainal-Zainal, the
> reputed grave of two descendants of Ali. To visit
> this on seven successive Fridays is said to be equal
> to a pilgrimage to Mecca. So in the surrounding vil-
> lages, at Sofian, Sardarud, Ilkachi, on the Ujan, on
> Mt. Sahend there are others. So everywhere in trav-
> elling one sees Imamzadahs and zayaretgahs. So not
> only in Persia, but all over the Islamic world, these
> centres of superstition and creature-worship are scat-
> tered. Though unauthorized by the Koran or
> Shariat, this innovation has spread far and wide in
> Islam. The transformation wrought in the religion
> by this doctrine of human mediation and intercession
> is striking. On the part of the Shiahs it is very deep-
> rooted. Imam Husain is deemed a real atoning medi-
> ator who by his death at Kerbala has merited the
> position of availing intercessor. (See writer’s article,
> “The Atoning Saviour of the Shiahs,” Presbyterian
> and Reformed Review, V. 1891.) This is constantly
> kept in mind by the Muharram month of mourning,
> the Passion Play, and the Readers of Lamentations.
> The saint-worship has spread everywhere among the
> Sunnis in Turkey and Arabia. In Afghanistan
> “adoration of the Pirs is universal and constitutes the
> religion of the masses.” In Beluchistan Pir worship
> at pre-Islamic shrines is widespread. In truth, shrines
> of pagan saints are usually turned into Moslem ones.
> In Algeria and Maghrib and among the Berbers
> 
> Maraboutism is a special characteristic of Islam.
> Revered marabouts swarm everywhere and the tend-
> ency to deify men and worship saints has eclipsed
> the primitive faith (“Encyclopedia of Islam”; Arts.:
> Afghanistan, Algeria, Beluchistan). In other parts
> of Africa the same is true. There, as well as in
> Malaysia, these Sheikhs and the maalims or teachers
> have a powerful influence. They are representatives
> of God and inherit the reverence given to the heathen
> sorcerers. In Java the drosky driver, even with a
> European passenger, dismounts when he meets one of
> them. Says Mr. Simon: “They are worshipped as
> demi-gods. Many people look upon them as their
> god. For they are Allah’s friend and work miracles
> before one’s very eyes; their curse brings misery;
> their blessing happiness. They know the hearts of
> all men.” Their supposed influence as intercessors
> is very real. As Professor Macdonald says, “In the
> lives of the saints we find them exercising again and
> again flat pressure upon Allah” (“Vital Forces,” p.
> 234). To many a Moslem the Vali has become more
> real than the Prophet; the Sheikh more powerful than
> the mullah; the zikr more efficacious than the namaz
> (prayer-rite); the Path more holy than the Law; the
> brotherhood of the Order more intimate than the fel-
> lowship of the Faith.
> 
> THE GLORIFICATION OF MOHAMMED
> 
> Another modification of Islam is seen in the glori-
> fication of Mohammed. Wahabis, stating the primi-
> tive doctrine of Islam, deny Mohammed’s pre-exist-
> ence, his power of present intercession, and the law-
> 
> fulness of the reverence given to his person and his
> tomb. The majority of Moslems, disregarding the
> accusation of sacrilege, are increasing in this tend-
> ency. The traditions which have grown up may be
> seen in the “Life of Mohammed,” the Hiyat-ul-
> Qulub, translated by my predecessor in Tabriz, the
> Rev. J. L. Merrick. The traditions referring to the
> creation and the pre-existence of Mohammed are re-
> ceived by Sunnis as well as by Shiahs. According to
> these the first creation was the Light of Mohammed—
> the Nur-i-Mohammed. Before all else it was created
> from the Light of God. This Light of Mohammed
> existed alone through several periods of seventy
> thousand years and its dwelling-places and experiences
> are described with the details of a Milton. When
> God decided to make the worlds, He divided the Light
> of Mohammed into four portions and from these cre-
> ated the Word, the Tablet, the Throne, and from the
> fourth portion the angels, the heavens and the earth,
> and all intelligences. So Mohammed was before all
> things and from him were all things made. It is the
> Sufi doctrine of the Primal Will, the Arian doctrine
> of Christ, of which it is an evident imitation. In
> Shiah Islam, Ali and the other Imams are exalted
> almost to the rank of divinity, but orthodox Islam has
> not been content without the apotheosis of Moham-
> med. Not only is there ascribed to him an unparalleled
> glory in the pre-existent state, but there is an idealiza-
> tion of his earthly life. His sinlessness is taught,
> contrary to the plain statements of the Koran itself
> and of the Traditions, which, in the deathbed scene,
> among his last words report prayers for pardon. That
> 
> which would be sin in other men is made to be only
> a sign of divine favour to him, who was granted every
> privilege, even though contrary to the Law. He is
> regarded as the mediator not only at the Day of Judg-
> ment but now and under all conditions,—the inter-
> cessor, supreme and all-efficient and availing for his
> sinful followers. One cry for pity in the name of
> Mohammed blots out the sins of two hundred years.
> “Ya Mohammed,” says Dr. Zwemer, “is the open
> sesame to every door of difficulty—temporal or spirit-
> ual. Sailors sing it while hoisting their sails; ham-
> mals groan it to raise a burden; the beggars howl it,
> to obtain alms; it is the Beduin’s cry in attacking a
> caravan; it hushes babes to sleep, as a cradle song;
> it is the pillow of the sick and the last word of the
> dying; it is written on the doorposts and in their
> hearts as well as since eternity on the throne of God;
> it is to the devout Moslem the name above every
> name (“Islam: A Challenge,” p. 47). Professor
> Siraj-ud-Din, a convert from Islam, now professor in
> Forman Christian College, Lahore, says: “No Mo-
> hammedans, except perhaps the Wahabis, are truly
> unitarian; all others have been led to deify Moham-
> med more or less. … Hymns to the Prophet are
> sung most enthusiastically and devotionally. Their
> whole nature is stirred up and their whole heart goes
> out in worship and adoration when these hymns are
> sung. The entire popular religion as well as litera-
> ture is filled with the deification and glorification of
> Mohammed. One popular hymn runs thus:
> 
> “‘In every flower and in every plant,
> The Light of Mohammed is reflected.’”
> 
> (“Vital Forces,” pp. 167-68; comp. pp. 228-30). Pro-
> fessor Simon testifies that a similar exaltation of the
> personality of Mohammed has occurred in Malaysia.
> The same is seen also in the manner of celebrating the
> birthday of Mohammed (molud) with increasing en-
> thusiasm and devotion. Prof. Stewart Crawford de-
> clares that in Syria (International Missionary Review,
> 1912, p. 608) it amounts to “a practical deification of
> the Prophet.” The worshipper, “with all the florid
> rhetoric of Oriental imagery,” in direct address sa-
> lutes Mohammed “with enthusiastic expressions of
> loyalty and devotion, and associates himself with the
> heavenly beings in adoration for his person.” Thus
> that which we see in Persia occurring with reference
> to Ali is occurring all over the Moslem world in refer-
> ence to Mohammed.
> 
> Besides all this, which seems so like an imitation
> of Christianity, there is that other importation into
> Islam, in an earlier age, of the doctrine of the uncre-
> ated Koran, on the Eternal Tablets—an eternal Word
> which was made a book and stayed among us,—a
> doctrine which caused such fierce and bloody con-
> tests and which finally became a criterion of ortho-
> doxy. It is an innovation in Islam as strange as it
> is embarrassing to the unitarian Moslem who
> would find fault with the Logos doctrine of John’s
> Gospel.
> 
> MOHAMMEDAN CLERGY
> 
> Another modification of Islam in the course of its
> history is the development of a clergy—of various
> ranks and classes. It is the claim that there are no
> 
> priests in Islam. This was true, as it was true also
> of primitive Christianity.1
> 
> Islam was modelled on the synagogue as was the
> Church. Islam has developed a clergy, with grada-
> tions and ranks. These vary in different countries.
> In Persia there are first the talabas, theological stu-
> dents; then the mullahs, who, if assigned to be leaders
> of prayers, are called peesh-namaz, or, if preachers,
> vaiz. Many mullahs are connected with the local
> mosque in the village or the ward of the city, and
> act like pastors in performing marriages, funeral
> services, as well as tending to matters of divorce and
> inheritance. One lucrative portion of their work is
> the writing of deeds and contracts. They also solve
> questions of conscience for the people. Of higher
> degree is the Kazi, who is a judge in matters coming
> under the Canon Law. Still higher in rank is the
> Mujtahid, who preaches in his special mosque, is pro-
> fessor for the talabas, decides questions of the Canon
> Law, and judges in civil and criminal suits which per-
> tain to it. Over the Mujtahids of each city and prov-
> ince are the Chief Mujtahids who reside at Kerbala
> and Najef, the centres of the Shiahs, direct the re-
> ligious affairs of the sect, issue binding fatvas or de-
> crees, and train the mullahs in higher studies. The
> Persian Mujtahid has more independent influence and
> 
> 1 The word hieros is not once used of ministers of the Church
> in the New Testament. The Christian presbyter is only a
> “priest” in the way that the latter word is a contraction of the
> former. The word used by Mohammed in Surah V, 85, for the
> Christian clergy is kassisin, the equivalent of presbyter, elder,
> Syriac Kashish-a,kasha, Persian Kashish. The word kohen,
> priest, was used by the Arabs as the equivalent of sorcerer.
> 
> power than the Ulema of Turkey. The Shah has no
> religious authority over him, and he is not dependent
> on the state for authorization. He has more control
> over property right, endowments, and tithes, and is
> less accountable for religious funds than in Turkey.
> In Turkey the grades of the Mohammedan clergy are
> even more numerous. (See H. Dwight’s “Constanti-
> nople,” pp. 213-14.) The softas, or students, are
> trained in theology and Canon Law in many schools,
> the chief of which are at Damascus, Aleppo, Brusa,
> and Adrianople. Over all these are one at Constanti-
> nople and the Al Azhar at Cairo. In Constantinople
> the mosque schools have from ten thousand to twenty
> thousand students, half of whom are studying Sacred
> Law. Grades whose duties are almost wholly reli-
> gious are the Imam, the leader of prayers, and the
> Khatib or mudarris, the mosque preacher. Four de-
> grees higher than the Khatib is the Mufti, who re-
> sembles the lawyer among the Jews in New Testament
> times. From this grade are appointed the Kadis;
> seven ranks higher is the Grand Mufti, Chief Judge
> according to Canon Law; and five grades higher yet
> is the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the head of the religious clergy
> and of the religio-civil judges. The Sheikh-ul-Islam
> is ex-officio Minister of Public Worship and does not
> change with the other ministers of the Sultan. He is
> also official Interpreter of the Shariat. His decision
> for the time is effective, even if it be a fatva deposing
> a Sultan. But decisions by him have not binding
> force on others of the Ulema. He continues to wear
> a long white robe and a yellow turban with a grey
> aba, cloak, though the viziers have changed to Euro-
> 
> pean dress. All these higher grades are called Ulema,
> Doctors, the alim or learned. There is in Turkey no
> ordination. The diploma is the authorization and pre-
> pares one for appointment, but in Central Asia the
> binding of the turban on the head is a sign of author-
> ization. In Turkey the duties of many of the Ulema
> are both religious and civil, but in Persia as well as
> in countries like Russia, where their civil duties are
> more restricted, it is more easily realized that their
> prime function is religious. In the thought of the
> people they are the clergy. Dr. Dwight facetiously
> refers to them as “the Ulema who deny that they
> are priests, yet act like them.” Palgrave, after stoutly
> maintaining the non-priestly character of the Moham-
> medan mullahs, says: “Still social fact recognizes
> what dogmatic theory denies. Gradations and classi-
> fications exist and the functions are intimately con-
> nected with and even essential to the religion.” And
> as regards India he regretfully admits (“Essays, etc.,”
> p. 138) that “Sacerdotal superstition, so proper to
> the Hindu, has re-arisen and afflicted Islam with its
> taint, so that we see the Indo-Mohammedan investing
> the Kazi with a semi-priestly character and function.”
> Mr. S. Khuda Bakhsh of India says (quoted by Dr.
> Zwemer in Missionary Review): “In its decadence
> Islam is priest-begotten and priest-ridden.” Mr.
> Simon says: “The Moslem has been delivered over
> bound hand and foot to his priesthood in matters that
> concern his welfare equally in this world and in the
> next” (“Vital Forces,” p. 87). “They have an un-
> holy power over the masses of the people. A quiet nod
> from these masters of Islam is quite sufficient for an
> 
> outbreak of fanaticism in the name of God” (“Prog-
> ress of Islam, etc.,” p. 164). Justice Amir Ali con-
> tinually refers to the mullahs as clergy. He specially
> refers to those of the Shiahs as the “Expounders of
> the Law who have assumed the authority and position
> of the clergy in Christendom.” Professor Becker of
> the Hamburg Colonial Institute (“Christianity and
> Islam,” pp. 50-51) says: “The force of Christian
> influence produced a priestly class in Islam. …
> This influence could not create an organized clergy,
> but it produced a clerical class to guard religious
> thought and to supervise thought of every kind.” In
> Malaysia and Africa, and among the ignorant in many
> Moslem lands, the custom is prevalent for the mullah
> or mualim to write charms, talismans, and amulets,
> use incantations, divination, astrology, and magical
> arts, thus degenerating into the status of the kohen
> or soothsayer of Mohammed’s times. Besides all this
> the mullahs have in some countries added the last
> resort of priestcraft, selling indulgences for cash. The
> mualim of the East Indies (Simon, p. 82) has a list
> of fees for the ransom of the souls of the dead. For
> a fee of thirty dollars he will testify on the Day of
> Judgment that the dead man has been to Mecca; for
> another fee certify that he was a blameless Moslem;
> for ten dollars all his sins will be blotted out; for the
> “instruction fee” a certificate is given that the man
> knew the entire Koran, though the fact be otherwise;
> another fee will insure the dead man an animal to
> ride on in the Day of Judgment; for five dollars re-
> demption-money a son who died a heathen can be
> received into Islam and paradise after his death. For
> 
> all these fees, amounting to about seventy-five dollars,
> salvation is assured to the departed and protection to
> the survivors from being tormented by his ghost. So
> far has Islam changed in Indonesia. That the re-
> wards of priesthood are enjoyed by some of them is
> seen in the High Sherif of Mecca. It is said that
> this functionary has a paltry income of $400,000 a
> year with an added mudakhil or graft of $1,200,000,
> and that his Vali has $800,000. Every guide must
> pay them a fee of $250 a year. The drawers of the
> water from Zem-Zem; the doorkeepers of the Kaaba,
> the cameleers who transport the pilgrims,—each pays
> his fee. Though most of this money must be passed
> up to the coterie at Constantinople to secure the tenure
> of their positions, yet when the Vali was arrested by
> the Young Turks in October, 1908, and taken to Con-
> stantinople, he had amassed a million in money and
> an untold treasure in jewels (Simon, p. 121).
> 
> Besides the regular mullahs, Islam has a kind of
> priest in the Sheikhs of the darvish orders, whom I
> have described above. Palgrave confirms what I have
> already said, that they “not infrequently arrogate to
> themselves supernatural and mystical powers.” They
> act as mediators of God’s blessings. They introduce
> the murid or neophyte to communion with God,
> taking, as it were, for a time the position of God to
> him. The Shiahs have, in addition to these, a clerical
> class called Marseyakhans, who are influential and
> numerous. Their business is to tell stories of the
> martyred Imams during Muharram, Ramazan, and at
> funerals. Tears that are shed at the recital of these
> lamentations are very meritorious, bringing forgive-
> 
> ness. These tears are sometimes caught in bot-
> tles.
> 
> In all these we see large additions to original Mo-
> hammedanism. They show how it has been greatly
> modified. Bosworth Smith says (“Mohammed and
> Mohammedanism,” p. 211): “As instituted by Mo-
> hammed it had no priest and no sacrifice. In orthodox
> Islam there is no priestly caste, and therefore no fic-
> tions of apostolic succession, inherent sanctity, indis-
> soluble vows, or powers of absolution.” How
> changed it is! We now have an apostolic succession
> in the line of Imams, inherent sanctity in the Sayids,
> or Sherifs, vows and absolutions connected with the
> Pirs, offerings at the tombs to secure the mediation
> of the living or of the dead saints, and even the sale
> of indulgences in Islam. Kuenen says (quoted in
> Missionary Review, 1889, p. 302): “The Moslem
> seeks what his faith withholds from him, and seeks
> it when the authority which he himself recognizes
> forbids him to look for it.”
> 
> THE CANON LAW, OR SHARIAT
> 
> The Sacred Law was for a thousand years the re-
> ligious, civil, and criminal code of Islam. It purports
> to be founded on the Koran and the Traditions, which
> are reports of the life, conduct, and words of Mo-
> hammed,—what he said, what he did, and what he
> allowed to be done without rebuke. Traditions are
> regarded as authoritative by all sects of Islam, Sunnis,
> Shiahs, and Wahabis, but they receive different collec-
> tions of traditions as valid. Out of 500,000 traditions
> from 4,000 to 6,000 are selected as true, and about
> 
> the authenticity of these, even Doctors of the same
> sect differ. A third foundation of Law is the ijma,
> the agreement or unanimous consent of the Mujtahids
> in a decision or interpretation of what is Law. A
> fourth foundation is kiyas or inference, reasoning
> from analogy from what is in the accepted law.
> 
> A small portion of the Law is found in the Koran
> itself. Only two hundred verses out of six thousand
> are about legal matters. It has no elaborate system.
> Stanley Lane-Poole says (“Studies in a Mosque,”
> pp. 152-58): “Mohammed never attempted to ar-
> range a code of laws. His scattered decisions are few
> and often vague. It is surprising how little definite
> legislation there is in the Koran. Mohammed had no
> desire to make a new code. He seldom appears to
> have volunteered a legal decision, except when a dis-
> tinct abuse had to be removed; and the legal verses
> of the Koran are evidently answers to questions put
> to him.”
> 
> It has been commonly supposed that the traditions
> upon which the Mujtahids founded their codes were
> at least of Arabic origin, however much or little may
> have been founded on Mohammed’s instruction. But
> as the result of scientific research and modern study of
> the origin of Mohammedan Law, it is coming to be
> clearly recognized that Roman Law lies at the basis
> of and is the source of the Shariat. The learned Dr.
> I. Goldziher, professor in Vienna University, whom
> I had the privilege of hearing discuss Islam at the
> Congress of Arts and Sciences at the St. Louis Ex-
> position, has made a study and exposition of this
> subject. The laws in the Koran and Arabia were
> 
> utterly insufficient for the new Arab theocratic em-
> pire. In taking charge of the conquered provinces,
> the Arabs adopted from and incorporated with their
> ordinances the system in vogue among the people over
> whom they were ruling. The substance of the Law
> was from “alien sources—from contact with foreign
> elements” (“The Historians’ History of the World,”
> Vol. VIII, p. 296). “The first impulse to the crea-
> tion of a Mohammedan system of law was given by
> contact with the great spheres of civilization—the
> Roman and the Persian. The influence of Roman
> Law on the sources of a legal system in Islam is wit-
> nessed by the very name given to jurisprudence in
> Islam in the beginning (fikh equals prudentia; fakih
> equals prudens, lawyer). The influence extended both
> to the principle of legal deduction and to particular
> legal provisions. In regard to property the new gov-
> ernment had to take over many ordinances of Roman
> Law, not only particular laws but principles of law.”
> Among such principles, he instances that of legal de-
> duction from analogies, kiyas, the opinion of the
> jurists or rai, which is a literal translation of opinio,
> and regard for public utility and interests or istalah,
> the equivalent of utilitas publico. “The influence ex-
> ercised by Roman legal method in the system of legal
> deduction in Islam is more important than the direct
> adoption of particular points of law” (Goldziher,
> quoted in Khuda Bakhsh: “Essays Indian and Is-
> lamic,” p. 393). Professor Macdonald, another inves-
> tigator in this department, agrees with these opinions.
> He says that the Moslems “learned willingly of the
> people among whom they had come. Roman Law
> 
> made itself felt. It was the practical school of the court
> that they attended. These courts were permitted to
> continue in existence till Islam had learned from them
> all that was needed. We can still recognize certain
> principles which were so carried over. That the duty
> of proof lies upon the plaintiff and the right of de-
> fending himself with an oath upon the defendant; the
> doctrine of invariable custom and that of the different
> kinds of legal presumption. These as expressed in
> Arabic are almost verbal renderings of the frequent
> utterances of Latin Law” (“Development of Muslim
> Theology, etc.,” p. 84). An eminent jurist writes
> in the Moslem World (1912, p. 354): “The Law of
> Justinian lies at the base of the Moslem shariat.” The
> latter “resembles in a most striking manner the com-
> mon principles and even the specific rules of Roman
> Law.” Some of the words are almost translations of
> it. The methods of judicial procedure were adopted
> from it. “The more developed rules of intestate
> succession resemble it; the inheritance is divided legally
> into parts similar to the Roman;—in the developed
> law of contract we find echoes of the Roman Law;
> even vakf, endowment, contains much that resembles
> it.” It is even shown that the foundations of the
> Shariat to which we referred, namely the Ijma or
> Consensus of the Mujtahids and Kiyas, or Deduction
> by Analogy, had their counterpart in Roman Law.
> 
> Thus, says Professor Becker, of the Hamburg
> Colonial Institute (“Christianity and Islam,” p. 34),
> “In a few centuries Islam became a complex religious
> structure, accurately regulating every department of
> human life from the deepest problems of morality to
> 
> the daily use of the toothpick and the fashions of dress
> and hair. It had high faculties of self-accommoda-
> tion to environment, was able to enter upon the heri-
> tage of the mixed Greco-Oriental civilization in the
> East” (ibid., p. 98). Professor Becker discovers also
> a large influence of Christian doctrine and ritual. He
> says (p. 73): “The state, society, the individual
> economics and morality, were thus collectively under
> Christian influence during the early period of Moham-
> medanism. Christian ideas came into circulation
> among Mohammedans … as utterances given by
> Mohammed himself.” “The development of ritual
> was derived from pre-existent practices which were
> for the most part Christian” (p. 83): such are the
> ceremonies of marriage, funerals, preaching, and the
> niche in the mosque wall. We have been long accus-
> tomed to recognize that Islam received its philosophy
> and science, medicine and art from the Greeks, Syrians,
> and Persians, and was greatly influenced by Neo-
> Platonism and by the dialectics of Aristotle, in its
> theology. To these we must add this conviction also,
> that its Canon Law, the Shariat, so holy and sanctified
> in their eyes, is largely the result of borrowing from
> the Romans and Persians.1 Laws and usages adopted
> from them were made to appear a part of original Is-
> lam. And traditions were invented to suit the circum-
> 
> 1 Goldziher says further that “contact with the people and
> religion of Persia had an influence which was very important in
> the development of its legal system. It is hardly possible to over-
> estimate the importance of the part played in the development
> of Islam by Persia.” Von Kremer mentions Rabbinical Litera-
> ture as an influence on Islam, besides the Roman-Byzantine Law
> and daily intercourse with the subject nations.
> 
> stances and words put into the mouth of Mohammed
> or an incident narrated as occurring in his life to give
> the sanction of authority to them. After several cen-
> turies this Shariat became crystallized and stereotyped
> and came to be regarded by the Ulema and by
> the whole Islamic world as the unalterable divine
> law.
> 
> The nineteenth century witnessed remarkable action
> regarding the Shariat. Several Moslem states broke
> away from its observance, and introduced modern
> civil and criminal codes. In Persia the common law,
> called the urfi, has been determined by the Shah, his
> ministers and custom, and administered by Hoikims,
> the judge-governors of the provinces and the districts.
> These have regard to the provisions of the Shari but
> do not follow it. Indeed a condition of friction and
> opposition has existed between the governors and the
> Ulema, the Shah’s government trying more and more
> to restrict the operation of the Shariat.
> 
> In Turkey the reforming Sultans, as they are called,
> Sultan Mahmud and Sultan Abdul Mejid, largely set
> aside the Shariat. Under the influence of European
> civilization and chiefly through the “Great Ilchi,” the
> British ambassador, Lord Strafford de Redcliffe, the
> Hatti Sharif of Gulkhana was promulgated in 1839
> and the Hatti Humayun in 1856. These decrees were
> designed to turn the face of Turkey toward progress
> and granted a large measure of civil and religious lib-
> erty. These were followed by the promulgation of
> codes, modelled on the Code Napoleon, and by the
> establishment of civil courts. This inaugurated a sys-
> tem foreign to Islam, and brought the administration
> 
> of law largely under direct control of the state. It
> limited the courts of the Ulema, the Mahkama, to
> such special subjects as are treated in the Koran, as
> marriage, divorce, and inheritance. The Ulema were
> greatly dissatisfied. But even when Sultan Abdul
> Hamid, in his strong reaction, abolished the Constitu-
> tion of 1876, he confirmed the secular Courts and
> Codes. “The greater part of the new law,” says
> Jurist, “is not in accordance with the Shari.” In re-
> gard to penalties, the change is strikingly evident. The
> old penalties are simply disregarded. Modern ideas
> are conformed to. Instances of conflict between the
> Kazis and the judges are not uncommon. For exam-
> ple, a Moslem was found guilty of eating food during
> the fast of Ramazan. The Kazi condemned him to
> have melted hot lead poured down his throat. The
> governor declined to inflict the penalty, and referred
> the case to Constantinople, where it was pigeonholed
> and forgotten. In another case the penalty decreed
> was that the man’s tongue should be pulled out. Com-
> pliance was refused by the Executive. The only re-
> source of the Kazi was to say, “My duty is to decide
> according to the law, yours is to execute. My responsi-
> bility ends.” An example in the change of law is seen
> in commercial transactions. The Shari forbids not
> only usury, but all interest, profit on loans and de-
> posits, insurance, annuities, conditional contracts, deal-
> ing in futures and even a bona-fide sale of crops before
> the harvest time or advanced payment on the same.
> Even certain exchanges of one commodity for another
> are illegal. In accordance with this I have known
> Moslems to deposit money solely for safety and re-
> 
> fuse to take any interest on it. In Egypt in 1901
> the postal deposit law was put into operation by Great
> Britain. Of the depositors 3,195 refused to take in-
> terest. Following this the Grand Mufti issued a
> decree that it was permissible. The next year 30,000
> Moslems, including 94 mullahs and Sheikhs, took ad-
> vantage of the privilege (Gairdner’s “Reproach of
> Islam,” p. 200). Though this antiquated law does
> not fit into modern commercial life, yet the banking
> business flourishes. The law is the cause of all kinds
> of disguises and subterfuges and of fictitious transac-
> tions having the appearance of the real. Even a
> usurious rate of twenty-four or thirty-six per cent is
> collected. Some person desired to sell a future crop
> of wheat; a cat was brought in, around the neck of
> which a stalk of wheat was tied. A bill of sale of
> the cat was written out in due form and phrase, it
> being understood that in the transfer of the cat, the
> crop was made over to the purchaser. Not only in
> Persia and Turkey but practically everywhere the
> Shari is being set aside. Even in Afghanistan the
> process has begun. A decree of Amir Habibullah
> has been issued abolishing the punishment of cutting
> off the hand. The reason assigned for this change
> was that he had been in danger of the loss of his
> hand from blood poison and it had been saved to
> him by an English surgeon. In Egypt, between 1876
> and 1883, the French Codes and Courts were estab-
> lished. Throughout the whole of North Africa the
> Shari is superseded. In India it is only applied in a
> certain defined sphere. Such is the case in other
> countries under European jurisdiction.
> 
> Aside from the action of governments there is a
> tendency among the Ulema to accommodate the Shari
> to existing conditions. By strict construction every
> non-Moslem land or land under non-Moslem rule is a
> Dar-ul-Harb, a land of war, and it is the duty of
> Moslems to attack and fight against it. But in India
> the Ulema have decreed that a country in which some
> of the peculiar customs of Islam prevail can be con-
> sidered a Dar-ul-Islam, and the Muftis of Mecca have
> confirmed the principle. Regarding the jihad they
> have decided that it is not to be entered upon “unless
> it is likely to be successful.” When there is no proba-
> bility of victory, proclamation of a jihad is unlawful.
> Strictly the law forbids Moslems to have Christian
> troops as their allies, but not only now but at other
> times Moslems have fought “Holy Wars” against
> Christians with the help of Christians. Even in By-
> zantine times this was so, and Egyptian Moslems
> helped the Crusaders in their invasion of Palestine
> (Margoliouth’s “Mohammedanism,” p. 86). Strictly
> the proclamation of the jihad was the prerogative of
> the one caliph, but it has become a power attached to
> each independent Moslem ruler in conjunction with
> his Sheikh or Mujtahid. The law of the succession to
> the caliphate is in abeyance. It was restricted to the
> Arab tribe of the Koreish. But victory of the Osmanli
> Sultanate has given to a Turk the name, prerogative,
> and prestige of the caliphate—by the power of the
> sword—as one of the spoils of war. So it has con-
> tinued four hundred years, abrogating the Law and
> Traditions in so fundamental a matter.
> 
> MODIFICATIONS IN RELIGIOUS CUSTOMS
> 
> There are a large number of modifications in Islam
> which affect its religious customs among millions of
> its adherents. These also show that Islam is not the
> fixed, uniform, and inflexible thing it has been deemed.
> I shall briefly indicate some of them. It was the law
> of Islam that idolaters should be exterminated, while
> peoples of a Book, as Jews, Christians, and possibly
> Zoroastrians, might be tolerated as zimmis or rayats,
> subjects. According to this law idolatry was extermi-
> nated from Arabia. But in India, Moslem rulers finally
> tolerated idolatry in their subjects, though after perse-
> cutions. Moslems also marry Hindu women who have
> not accepted Islam. Moslem Emperors married Hin-
> du, Rajput, ladies. The Sunnis of the Turkish Empire
> regard the people of the Book as pure and will buy
> bread and meat from them, but the Sunnis of India,
> following the Shiahs, regard Christians as unclean
> ceremonially and contact with them and eating their
> food as an abomination. The Law is changed accord-
> ing to environment. In China Moslem women do not
> wear the veil and do bind the feet; men wear the
> queue. They include the old Chinese feasts in their
> calendar.
> 
> In India Islam has taken up many elements of
> Hinduism. Not only is this seen in the sects like the
> Sufis, who mingle the fire-worship of the Persians
> and the Pantheism of the Hindus with some tenets of
> Islam, look upon AH and Mohammed as incarnations
> of the Supreme Spirit, and acknowledge the Koran
> only in a spiritualized sense (C. R. Haines: “Islam
> 
> as a Missionary Religion,” p. 93), but among the
> more orthodox Moslems. Even the caste system has
> affected them. Tribes of Hindus and other races have
> accepted Islam, but retained their caste, with their cus-
> toms, and do not intermarry with Moslems of other
> castes. Moslems of a certain caste will draw water
> from a well with Hindus of the same caste, but not
> permit Moslems of a lower caste to use the well (Dr.
> Wherry: “Christianity and Islam, etc.,” pp. 108-09).
> There are Mohammedan castes which refuse to eat
> beef, stick to certain trades, wear Hindu dress, rarely
> go to the mosque, but take part in Hindu festivals
> and openly worship idols and many gods. The Mo-
> hammedan Rajput Hindus preserve unaltered the so-
> cial customs of the clan (T. W. Arnold: “Interna-
> tional Congress of History and Religion,” Vol. I, p.
> 314). The sayids of India are as strict to maintain
> the purity of their blood as the Brahmans and exclude
> intermarriage with other Moslems. In the Punjab,
> the Shariat regarding marriage is a dead letter. There
> is no dowry and no inheritance for daughters. One-
> sixth of the Moslem widows remain widows through
> the influence of Brahmanism (Arnold: ibid., p. 314).
> Moslem villagers may be seen utilizing the Hindu
> astrologer and even praying to the idol god to give
> his wife a son. Not only the accustomed saint-worship
> but demonology and witchcraft have corrupted the
> original faith (Imperial Gazetteer of India, p. 435).
> The sect of Pachpiriyas is a fusion of Islam and
> animism, worshipping five local saints or gods. The
> Egyptian fellahs celebrate the cult of Bubastis as if
> honouring a Moslem saint. In Algeria the Moham-
> 
> medan law has failed to replace the old tribal customs.
> Superstition, magic, and relics of paganism hold sway.
> Circassians, too, retain much of the old heathen re-
> ligion and worship gods many (“Encyclopedia of
> Islam,” p. 835). In the East Indies, Islam has mixed
> with animism to such an extent as to be thoroughly
> corrupt and is called Javanism. Magic has become as
> a divine institution. Spiritualism has been adopted
> and ancestor worship and angels and prophets have
> been substituted for their ancestors. The worship of
> spirits is not abolished. The Shariat has become mixed
> up with animism. Mr. Simon says: “The old and
> new jurisprudence have been amalgamated. Malay
> common law was given elbow-room, with unscrupulous
> adaptation” (pp. 200 and 66). In some respects, as
> in regard to slavery and the treatment of women,
> Malay custom has improved Islam. The mode of
> receiving new converts has been modified. As the
> heathen tribes often have circumcision, it has no fur-
> ther significance. The kalima is not even committed
> to memory, though but a sentence in length. The
> convert is asked, “Do you wish to become a Moslem?”
> On his answering “Yes,” a lemon is squeezed over
> his head as a rite of purification (Simon, p. 110). Re-
> garding Islam in Annam, M. Doutte says (Margo-
> liouth: “Mohammedanism,” p. 40): “In our colonial
> empire we have a good example of Islam entirely
> changed and brought back to quite primitive belief,
> among the Chams.”
> 
> ISLAM DOES UNDERGO MODIFICATIONS
> 
> It is evident, therefore, that Islam has in the course
> of its history undergone many modifications. These
> changes have been of varying degrees of importance,
> from simple accommodations to the customs and ways
> of peoples to such beliefs and practices as compromise
> the monotheism of the Faith. Of some things we
> have been able to see the origin and the process by
> which they obtained admission. Of others this is not
> possible, only it is evident that they were not in primi-
> tive Islam. Islam has shown power of adaptation.
> And in order to get a true conception of it as a re-
> ligion this needs to be emphasized. This fact has been
> obscured, though students of Islam have not over-
> looked it. T. W. Arnold calls attention (“The
> Preaching of Islam,” p. 371) to “the power of the
> religion to adapt itself to the peculiar characteristics
> and the stages of development of the people whose
> allegiance it seeks to win”; and Oscar Mann (“Great
> Religions,” p. 58) speaks of it as showing a mar-
> vellous adaptability in shaping its religious ordinances
> to old customs. Stanley Lane-Poole (“Studies in a
> Mosque,” p. 169) makes the emphatic statement that
> “the faith of Islam has passed through more phases
> and experienced greater revolutions than perhaps any
> other of the religions of the world.” Professor Gold-
> ziher (“Historians’ History,” p. 298) says on this
> theme: “The first step which Islam took on its vic-
> torious career taught it to accommodate itself to an
> alien spirit and to mould its intellectual heritage by
> influences which seem absolutely heterogeneous to a
> 
> superficial observer. It was a borrower. That it
> makes inflexible protest against the influence of for-
> eign elements is an illusion.” Bosworth Smith (“Mo-
> hammed and Mohammedanism,” p. 255) says: “It
> may be safely said that there is nothing more extraor-
> dinary in the whole history of Islam than the way
> in which the theory of … the stereotyped and un-
> alterable nature of its precepts, have by ingenuity, by
> legal fictions, by the Sunna, and by responsa pru-
> dentum, been accommodated to the changing circum-
> stances and the various degrees of civilization. …
> It is quite possible that where so much has been done
> already, more may be done in the future and means
> be found of reconciling the laws … with the re-
> quirements of modern society.”
> 
> THE PROCESS OF CHANGE
> 
> What are we to expect will be the process of
> change in Islam? One possible method that lies open
> is by Ijma, the consensus of opinion of the Ulema.
> The Shiahs follow the interpretations of their Muj-
> tahid, and there is no legal reason why this method
> cannot be utilized among Sunnis, for tradition affirms
> that Ijma cannot err. This is a legitimate way of
> escape from the bonds of tradition and the Shariat.
> Professor Macdonald, while believing that this may
> be the solution, suggests that a more probable alter-
> native is for Moslems to take refuge more fully in
> the mystical way and follow Islam as an abstraction
> but Sufiism as the reality to live by (“Aspects of
> Islam,” p. 112). Some have suggested that Islam
> may undergo change by revelations through Pirs,
> 
> Sheikhs, and Valis, since they profess to have this
> power, and belief in them is increasing. Professor
> Margoliouth finds a loophole for progress in the Mos-
> lem simply allowing to pass into desuetude any unde-
> sirable rites or injunctions; for to formally deny or
> reject a law is regarded as infidelity, but simple dis-
> obedience or neglect is pardonable (“Mohammedan-
> ism,” p. 129). Judging by past history, the causes
> of change will be varied. Some changes, as the as-
> sumption of the caliphate by the Turks and the modi-
> fication of the doctrine of the jihad in India, have
> been the result of conquest. At other times they have
> come through compromise with the conquered. Most
> modifications, whether due to Greek philosophy, Ro-
> man Law, Persian Sufiism, to Christianity or to the
> Aliites, whether from internal or external influences,
> have been received without formal action or decision.
> It is possible that Islam may be changed by definite
> revolts and reforms, which shall cause schisms from
> the orthodox Sunnis. There are some indications of
> this.
> 
> In the present age Islam is undergoing further
> changes. There is movement. There is a condition
> of unrest and dissatisfaction, of misgivings, fear, and
> anxiety. New thoughts, ideals, and aspirations are
> clashing with old tenets, prejudices, and superstitions.
> It is a period of controversy. Doctrines and policies
> are in debate. Many are moving from the old moor-
> ings. Contentment with their condition, civilization,
> and environment have passed away. Old-time arro-
> gance and pride are gone. Self-assurance is weak-
> ened. Many lament the conditions of the Moslem
> 
> world as one of decadence and of material, social, and
> intellectual inferiority. They feel that Islam and
> Moslem peoples are both at a low ebb. Different par-
> ties assign diverse reasons for these conditions and
> propose different remedies according to their various
> attitudes toward the modern age.
> 
> Some cry out: Hold to the Old Faith! Observe
> the Law and the Traditions and Almighty God will
> bless our people and give our armies victory as of old.
> Our weakness comes from ignoring the Shariat.
> 
> Others cry out: Back to Mohammed! Back to the
> Koran! The Traditions have led us astray.
> 
> Others, with a free use of criticism and of rational-
> ism, would interpret in accordance with the spirit of
> Islam and reconstruct it in conformity with modern
> ideas and twentieth-century conditions and culture.
> 
> Others again, counting themselves superior to creed
> and law, and setting them aside by allegorical inter-
> pretations, would have all to walk in the divine Path
> by means of mystical communions and hypnotic ex-
> ercises.
> 
> Others, feeling that only a new divine Guide and
> a new revelation can solve the perplexities and right
> the wrongs of the age, have fixed their faith and hope
> on Mahdis, Imams, and so-called Lights.
> 
> Others would adopt Western political institutions
> and learning as the framework for a reformed Moslem
> state, subordinating affairs of Islam to national prog-
> ress and civilization. With a secularistic spirit, they
> would side-track religion, unless perchance it be to
> use it for nationalistic purposes.
> 
> None of these parties are animated by a spirit of
> 
> friendliness to Christianity, though all of them are
> willing to take advantage of Western military and
> industrial science and some of them of all the Chris-
> tian world can furnish, except the Gospel.
> 
> Lastly there are some, all too few, in the Moslem
> world who are earnest inquirers and who are learning
> to look to the Lord Jesus Christ as the panacea for
> their ills. This day of unrest in Islam is a special
> opportunity for Christian missions. It is a fit time to
> bring the impress of the Gospel, the impact of Chris-
> tian truth to bear on Islam. We cannot rely on our
> civilization to Christianize it. Islam, be assured, will
> find a way to adopt our civilization and remain Islam.
> Special and mighty and immediate efforts are neces-
> sary if we wish to draw them Christward. This day
> of Movement is a crisis in their spiritual history.
> 
> I wish to present to your consideration Modern
> Movements among Moslems. I will consider:
> 
> First, those movements which spring from and are
> inspired by doctrines or aspirations within Islam itself,
> as Wahabism, Pan-Islamism, and Moslem Missions,
> especially as carried on from Mecca and by the Dar-
> vish Orders.
> 
> Secondly, those connected with eschatalogical hopes,
> as the Return of the Imam, or Mahdiism.
> 
> Thirdly, those movements inspired by or due to the
> impact of Christian civilization, as Neo-Islam.
> 
> Fourthly, Political Movements in Moslem Lands.
> 
> II
> 
> THE REVIVAL IN ISLAM
> 
> I HAVE referred to the fact that Islam is being
> moved by opposing currents of thought. Zealous
> leaders have come forth, antagonistic to each
> other, yet all professing the purpose to assist the
> Faith and the Faithful. I will first of all describe a
> vast conservative movement.
> 
> A remarkable phenomenon of the last century was
> a revival in Islam. As a religion, Islam, at the end
> of the eighteenth century, was like a palsied, decrepit
> old man. It showed signs of disintegration and
> decay. No less an authority than Palgrave (“Essays
> on the Eastern Question,” pp. 114, 115), describing
> its condition, writes: “Where the Caliph and the
> Koran retained their apparent, they had lost their real
> supremacy. Throughout the Turkish Empire, the
> most distinctive precepts of the Book were publicly
> set at naught, nowhere more than in Constantinople
> itself. Nor were the sacred cities themselves, Mecca
> and Medina, much better. The wine taverns of the
> janisaries, the raki shops of the citizens, the prosti-
> tutes of the Hejaz, the Bi-lillahs of Bagdad and Cairo
> had become recognized institutions; opium-eating, too,
> was next to universal; the mosque stood unfrequented
> and ruinous, while the public schools and Colleges of
> Mohammedan Law had fallen into dreary decay. An
> 
> eclipse, total it seemed, had spread over the crescent,
> foreboding disaster and extinction.”
> 
> But this expectation was not fulfilled. On the con-
> trary, there came about a renewal of religious loyalty
> and zeal, manifested in a closer adherence to the
> Shariat, the Sacred Law, a more strenuous mainte-
> nance of its creed and observance of its rites, an ag-
> gressive propaganda and a determined effort to renew
> and strengthen the power of Islam, both religious and
> political. The reasons for this awakening were partly
> religious, arising from regret for the low condition
> of the Faith; and partly political, from chagrin on
> account of the weakness and inferiority of Moham-
> medan peoples and determination to yield no further
> to the influence or the pressure of Christian govern-
> ments. The result was, writes Palgrave (ibid., p.
> 123), “that Mohammedan fervour has been thor-
> oughly rekindled within the limits which its half-
> extinguished ashes covered and the increased heat has
> by natural law extended over whatever lies nearest
> but beyond the former circumference.” Claude Field,
> the author of “Mystics and Saints in Islam,” de-
> scribes the movement as the “almost miraculous
> renaissance in Islam which is now proceeding in Tur-
> key and other Mohammedan lands.”
> 
> WAHABISM
> 
> The impetus co this awakening came from Wahab-
> ism. The influence of this puritanic reformation has
> been deep and widespread. It deserves study. It is
> the judgment of Oscar Mann (“Great Religions of
> the World,” p. 58) that “almost the whole of the
> 
> modern progressive movement of Mohammedans may
> be traced directly or indirectly to it.”
> 
> Wahabism took its name from its founder, Mo-
> hammed Ibn Abdul Wahab. He was the son of a
> village Sheikh in Central Arabia and was thoroughly
> educated in Islamic theology at Basra and Medina.
> The divergence of Moslems from the primitive stand-
> ards of rigid monotheism and simplicity of life had
> deeply affected him. He started his career by a pro-
> test against the cult of Sad, at Inayah, where saint-
> worship prevailed. His cry was back to the Koran
> and the primitive Law of the Sunna. He even re-
> jected the interpretations of the orthodox schools of
> the Sunnis. He stood for a literal interpretation of
> the Koran and affirmed the right of interpreting it,
> even contrary to the Imams. He abhorred Sufiism.
> He demanded the strict observance of the prayer-rite,
> fast, and tithes-giving. He denounced the reverence
> paid to the saints, the Sheikhs, and even to Mohammed,
> and all invoking of their mediation as well as making
> pilgrimage or offerings to their shrines or perambulat-
> ing their tombs and all the superstitions connected with
> them, and the use of the rosary. He limited the festi-
> vals and forbade the celebration of Mohammed’s birth-
> day. He denounced luxury in dress and habits and
> the use of silk, jewels, gold and silver ornaments, and
> strictly prohibited wine, tobacco, gambling, and Ori-
> ental vice. In a word, he aimed to reform doctrines,
> purify worship, and purge out innovations and cor-
> ruptions. He protested against the liberty granted to
> the infidels, that is, the Christians, whom he pro-
> nounced unclean abominations. The ordinary Mos-
> 
> lems were no better, being musrik, polytheists, even as
> the Christians. He thoroughly approved of and made
> use of the primitive Islamic method of promoting re-
> form, namely, by the power of the sword. All un-
> believers, even Moslems, who did not reform were to
> be killed. The jihad was indeed holy and the war-
> rior, dying fighting for the faith, passed into Para-
> dise; and to make firm the soldier’s assurance a written
> order on the gate-keeper of the heavenly mansions
> was put into his hand, with the injunction, “Kill and
> strangle all infidels who give companions to God.”
> 
> The message of the reformer was at first rejected.
> He was driven from place to place. But finally Ibn
> Saud, the ruler of Daraiyah, believed. Ibn Abdul
> Wahab gave promise to Ibn Saud that if he would
> draw the sword in the cause of pure Islam, he would
> make him sole ruler in Najd and the first potentate in
> Arabia. Sheikh Saud accepted the terms, married the
> reformer’s daughter, and became the commander of
> the new jihad and the founder of a conquering dy-
> nasty. He and his successors, from 1760 onward,
> brought into subjection the neighbouring tribes, of-
> fering conversion or extermination. Kerbala, the
> shrine of the Shiahs, was despoiled of its treasures
> and destroyed, with its relics and the golden dome over
> the tomb of the Imam Husain. Mecca and Medina,
> the sacred cities, were subdued, 1803-04, and compelled
> to reform, the dome of Mohammed’s grave and all
> the objects of veneration were destroyed, and cere-
> monies which were innovations on primitive Islam
> were prohibited.
> 
> The desecration of the holy cities and the inhibition
> 
> of pilgrimage to all who were not of his sect, aroused
> the Sunni Caliph or Sultan. At his command, Me-
> hemet Ali, the Khedive of Egypt, and Ibrahim Pasha
> subjugated the Wahabis, and their Sheikh, Abdullah
> II, was sent to Constantinople and beheaded in front
> of St. Sophia (1819). Two small Wahabi states sur-
> vived, one with a capital at Riyad, another at Haiel
> in Najd, with a population of 1,500,000.
> 
> The influence of the Wahabi movement extended
> beyond Arabia and was greater in its religious than
> in its political aspect. It was introduced into India
> by Sayid Ahmad of Oudh, who claimed to be the
> Mahdi. His propaganda to purge out Hindu super-
> stitions from Islam excited fierce fanaticism. He
> raised a jihad against the Sikhs, captured Peshavur
> in 1830, and maintained an insurrection for four
> years. He declared that India was a Dar-il-Harb, a
> land of warfare, and that jihad against the British
> government was obligatory. The influence of Wa-
> habis is still felt in India and the sect continues near
> the northwest frontier. Another sect, called the
> Faraisis, arose in India, animated with the same spirit.
> 
> In Sumatra a like movement was started about 1837
> by a pilgrim returned from Mecca. He began the
> correction of the errors and abuses of Moslems, es-
> pecially striving to abolish the use of opium, tobacco,
> and betel nut. From this propaganda grew up the
> Padri sect. They proclaimed the jihad against the
> heathen Bataks, destroyed their villages, outraged
> their women, sold their children into slavery, and killed
> every male who would not accept Islam.
> 
> Wahabism bore fruit in Africa. Osman Danfodio,
> 
> chief of the Fulahs, learned the doctrine at Mecca,
> and on his return preached it. He succeeded in arous-
> ing the people, founded Sokoto and the Fulah king-
> dom, subdued several heathen states and forced them
> to embrace Islam. Wahabism was also the inspira-
> tion of the Sanusi, of whom I shall speak later (Ar-
> nold: “Preaching of Islam,” pp. 230, 265, 299).
> 
> Wahabism greatly influenced the whole Islamic
> body. Just as the Protestant Reformation was fol-
> lowed by a counter-reformation in Roman Catholi-
> cism, so Wahabism was the instrument for arousing
> the Sunni Moslems. Its influence, true to its own
> spirit, has been thoroughly reactionary. That return
> to primitive Islam is the hope of the world’s regenera-
> tion has been the inspiration of modern conservative
> movements. Of it T. W. Arnold (ibid., pp. 345-46)
> says: “It has given birth to numerous movements
> which take rank among the most powerful influences
> in the Islamic world. It is closely connected with
> many of the modern Moslem missions; the fervid zeal
> it has stirred up, the new life it has infused into ex-
> isting religious institutions, the impetus it has given
> to theological study and to the organization of devo-
> tional exercises, have all served to awaken and keep
> alive the innate proselyting spirit of Islam.” Sim-
> ilarly Canon Sell says (Missionary Review, October,
> 1902, p. 732): “Its religious teaching, and still more
> its narrow fanatical spirit, have spread into many
> lands and influenced many peoples.” Palgrave, who
> lived and travelled in Turkey and Arabia in close con-
> tact with Moslems, writes: “The whole school of Is-
> lamic teaching has been modified by it; not only the
> 
> common people but also many of the highest and best
> educated classes, even the Sultan (Abdul Aziz) him-
> self, are distinctly inclined to the stricter school, and
> so are most of the principal Ulema.” He finds in it
> a principal cause of the “Mohammedan revival—a
> worldwide movement, an epochal phenomenon, before
> which the lesser laws of race and locality are swept
> away or absorbed in unity, which we can no more
> check nor retard than we can hinder the tide from
> swelling” (“Essays,” p. 140). He declares that in
> the middle of the last century “the energy and breadth
> of the revival embraced every class from the Sultan
> Abdul Aziz down to the poorest hammal or porter
> on the wharves and every Mohammedan race in the
> Ottoman empire” (ibid., p. 123), “with the public
> adhesion of all and the sincere adhesion of the
> masses.” This was evidenced by a repair of the
> mosques and madressahs, schools, a stricter observ-
> ance of the fasts and prayers, a thronging of the
> shrines, and increase of pilgrimage to Mecca. There
> was also a reform of the habits of drunkenness among
> the soldiers.
> 
> This spirit was also a reaction against the introduc-
> tion of European laws and customs by the reforming
> Sultans, Mahmud II and Abdul Aziz in his first years.
> A strong feeling of opposition to these measures ex-
> isted not only among the Ulema on account of the
> Western code, but also among the beys and pro-
> prietors, because they had been deprived of their lands
> and feudal privileges by the new regulations. So
> political conservatism and zeal for Islam went hand
> in hand. Dissatisfaction with the new codes led to
> 
> a partial return to the jurisdiction of the Mahkamah
> or Courts of the Sacred Law. Opposition to the
> patronage given to the infidels led to the casting out
> from employ of many Europeans who about 1850 had
> overrun the Turkish service, and the employment in
> their places of Moslem doctors, civil engineers, and
> administrators. Rushdi schools which had been
> started for the whole population, including Christians,
> were transformed into strictly Mohammedan schools,
> with teaching of Islam and Islamic languages. The
> Sultan Abdul Aziz became sympathetic with the reac-
> tionaries. The Grand Vizier, Ali Pasha, said to a
> British official: “What we want is an increase of
> fanaticism rather than a diminution of it.” Notwith-
> standing these symptoms, the political reformers re-
> tained superior influence in the government till the
> promulgation of the Constitution of 1876. After its
> abrogation by Sultan Abdul Hamid, he openly became
> the chief of the reactionaries, and made it his whole
> aim to strengthen the Moslem element of his empire.
> This aim soon assumed a wider scope and developed
> into a movement to which is given the name Pan-
> Islamism.
> 
> PAN-ISLAMISM
> 
> Pan-Islamism is a movement with the purpose and
> endeavour to unite for defensive and aggressive ac-
> tion. It aims to combine by the ties of the religion
> Moslems of every race and country, in the work of
> conserving and propagating the faith and of freeing
> it by means of political and military force from alien
> rule and thus making it again a triumphant world
> 
> power. It has a religious side and a political side.
> On the religious side it is conservative and would
> strenuously maintain Islam. Yet it would have a plat-
> form broad enough to include all sects and parties.
> On the political side it would weld into an alliance
> all Moslem peoples and governments.
> 
> This scheme is in accordance with the nature of
> Islam. Mohammed apparently designed that all be-
> lievers should constitute one nation, not intending that
> racial or national aspirations should assert themselves.
> Great effort even was made to spread the Arabic and
> make it a universal language. Islam has much to
> draw it together in unity:—a simple creed formula—
> La illah ill’ Allah, Mohammed rasul Allah—No God
> save God; Mohammed is the Apostle of God—A com-
> mon Koran, Kibla and Kaaba; a Capital, Mecca, the
> centre of Pilgrimage, with its unifying influence; a
> common language of worship, a common prayer
> ritual, a common calendar—a sense of brotherhood
> which excludes distinctions of race and colour.
> 
> By including military action in its programme, Is-
> lam was acting entirely according to its nature. The
> Crusades were contrary to the Gospel of Christ, but
> an organized movement for warfare is harmonious
> with the genius and history of Islam. Such a move-
> ment is facilitated in this age by the very civilization
> introduced by the infidels, for ease of communication
> and transit bring the widely separated sections of
> Islam into closer contact, and even the peace main-
> tained by Christian governments in Asia and Africa
> gives opportunity for the spread of ideas and plans.
> Uniting Islam in a great final struggle is in accord-
> 
> ance with its alleged prophecies, and the ever-present
> hope of its complete triumph. A Holy War is ex-
> pected to precede the judgment and by means of it all
> authority is to pass into the hands of Moslems. The
> year A.H. 1300 (1882) was regarded from these
> prophecies as a crisis destined to bring greater weak-
> ness or renewed strength.
> 
> DIVISIONS OF ISLAM
> 
> One difficulty to be overcome was the condition of
> division into sects and nationalities. Islam has not
> been a unit since the twelfth year after the Prophet’s
> death, nor since the second century of the Hegira has
> it maintained outward unity. It has abounded in op-
> posing sects whose hostility ofttimes unsheathed the
> sword. There is an erroneous impression abroad
> about the unity of Islam. Few people recognize the
> multiplicity of sects there are in it. Mohammed is
> reported by tradition to have said that the Jews have
> 71 sects, the Christians 72, and the Moslems would
> have 73. It would excel even in the number of sects,
> and in truth more than twice the above number have
> been listed. The Mohammedans are no solid mass
> of severe monotheists. Besides the sects of Aliites
> or Shiahs, such as Ismieliyahs, Borahs, Zaidis, Fa-
> timites, Sufis, Usulis, Akhbaris, Sheikhis, Nusairis,
> Kuzil Bashis, etc.; Sunnis include Kurds who do not
> keep the law; Arab tribes who worship jinns; Indians
> who worship idols; Africans and Malays who are
> still fetish-worshippers; Rationalists and free-thinkers;
> Dunma Jews and Stavoirite Christians. Islam is a
> heterogeneous mass whose divisions hold to their
> 
> differences as tenaciously as do any sects in Christen-
> dom. New movements have led to new schisms. The
> Wahabis, the Babis, the Sudan Mahdiists each in its
> turn created antagonisms. The enthusiasm, courage,
> and fanaticism of their followers, which urged them
> on to war and conquest, were expended largely in hos-
> tility to the governments of Islam, for each of them
> regarded the authority of its leader as supreme and
> called upon Sultan and Shah to submit to them.
> 
> Overcoming racial jealousies and hatred was also
> a problem. These exist among Islamic peoples just
> as between Christians. By race Moslems have been
> divided into 80,000,000 Caucasians, 70,000,000 Mon-
> gol-Turks, 44,000,000 Malay-Dravidians, and 36,-
> 000,000 Negros or Negroids. Arabs, Turks, and
> Kurds have their racial and political antagonisms.
> Iran and Turan did not forsake their age-long war-
> fare by accepting Mohammed. The national ambi-
> tions of the Albanians and Egyptians are in opposi-
> tion to those of the Ottomans. Berbers and Arabs
> fought through centuries and the Berbers twelve times
> threw off the yoke of Islam. Even in Central Africa
> Islam has not had influence enough to overcome the
> national peculiarities of the races who have adopted
> it. Professor Westermann declares (International
> Review of Missions, October, 1912, p. 648) that “the
> national consciousness of the Sudanese is stronger
> than their religious attachment. The Hausa and
> Fulah have lived together for centuries side by side,
> but their relations continue to be entirely strained,
> while the Tuareg are equally unfriendly to them
> both.”
> 
> Pan-Islamism aimed by a spirit of accommodation
> to smooth over differences. It was not reformatory,
> it did not emphasize doctrinal unity, but rather con-
> federation for action—a union for the defence, propa-
> gation, and glory of the Faith.
> 
> These difficulties did not seem insuperable and the
> task was entered upon with strong determination. The
> leader of this movement was Abdul Hamid, Sultan
> and Caliph. It is said that during the first years of
> his reign he hesitated as to whether he should support
> the liberal or the reactionary side. But soon it became
> evident that he had determined to make his govern-
> ment a Moslem administration, to magnify Islam and
> repress Christians. The rebellion of Arabi Pasha in
> Egypt and the claims of the Mahdi in the Sudan had
> a tendency to accentuate Moslem desire for supremacy
> and to lead them to deplore Christian prestige. Ab-
> ul-Huda, the chief of the Rafai darvishes—the Sul-
> tan’s astrologer,—gave advice to revive and strengthen
> the influence of the caliphate. So around it the prop-
> aganda was made to revolve so as to throw the shield
> of religion over the political aims.
> 
> THE CALIPHATE
> 
> The office of Caliph, or supreme Head of the Mos-
> lems, has pertained to the Osmanli Sultans for four
> centuries. In 1517 Salim I conquered the Mamelukes
> of Egypt. Living in subordination to the latter,
> treated as underlings and at times almost as prisoners,
> and used to further their political ends, were the suc-
> cessors of the Abbaside Caliphs of Bagdad, who were
> permitted religious authority only. The last of these
> 
> Mutavvakul ceded to Sultan Salim his rights and titles
> as Caliph of the Prophet of God, Commander of the
> Faithful, Imam of Moslems, Refuge of the world, and
> Shadow of God, which the Sultan now bears in addi-
> tion to King of kings, Arbiter of the world’s destinies,
> Lord of the Two Continents and Two Seas, and Sov-
> ereign of the East and West. The insignia of the
> office, the possession of which has high significance,
> were transferred to him, namely, the standard or cloak
> of the Prophet, some hair of his beard, and the sword
> of the Caliph Omar. At the same time the Sherif of
> Mecca tendered his allegiance and brought to Salim
> the keys of Mecca and Medina and transferred to him
> the guardianship of the Sacred Cities.
> 
> Thus, by the power of the sword, the Osmanli Sul-
> tans became caliphs, ignoring however two essential
> requisites according to accepted Sunni tradition,
> namely, that the Caliph should be of the Arab tribe of
> Koreish, and, secondly, that he should be elected to
> the office. The latter is fulfilled nominally at the ac-
> cession of each Sultan, when the form of an election
> is observed by the Ulema of Constantinople and the
> Sultan is invested with the Caliphate. The other con-
> dition is ignored, though a list, which named descent
> from the Koreish as among the qualifications, re-
> mained posted in all the great mosques, even of Con-
> stantinople, until ordered removed by Abdul Hamid.
> The Khavarij held that it was not necessary that the
> caliph should be of the Koreish (“Spirit of Islam,”
> Amir Ali, p. 525). By legists and scholars generally
> the Sultans are regarded as usurpers, yet they are
> acknowledged practically because they are the most
> 
> powerful defenders of the faith. Still considerable
> bodies of Moslems have never acknowledged them, as
> the Shiahs, and the subjects of the Sultans of Mo-
> rocco, Zanzibar, and Oman, and of the Wahabi
> Sheikhs of Arabia. Before the time of Abdul Ha-
> mid, Chinese Moslems cared nothing for the Turkish
> caliphate nor did they recognize the Sherif of Mecca.
> Yet such distant rulers as the Amirs of Bokhara and
> Khotan, the Sultans of Atchin and Panthay have sent
> envoys during the last century. European govern-
> ments with Moslem subjects have acknowledged him
> as supreme, and the United States has seen fit to send
> an envoy to consult about the Sulus of the Philippines.
> The greatest strength of the caliphate is with the
> ignorant populace. Some of them regard him as the
> emperor of all Europe, holding in subjection to him-
> self all Christian states, who acknowledge his sover-
> eignty by sending him tribute and keeping delegates
> at his Court. The kings of Europe cannot be crowned
> without first obtaining his permission and sometimes
> have to come in person to obtain it; not even the em-
> perors of Russia and Great Britain are exempt from
> this necessity. The Emperor of Germany came to do
> obeisance to the Sultan and brought presents of horses
> in token of his subjection. The Sultan will one of
> these days overthrow these Christian governments
> (Simon: “Progress of Islam, etc.,” p. 28; “Turkey
> and Its People,” by Pears, pp. 75, 86; “Turkey and
> the Armenian Atrocities,” E. M. Bliss, p. 75). A
> Moslem, and he not a fellah but a mullah in St. Sophia,
> told Sir Edwin Pears that Queen Victoria was a faith-
> ful servant of their Padishah, but it was not plain
> 
> why he allowed the governor of England to be a
> woman.1
> 
> Among the qualifications for the caliphate, char-
> acter scarcely finds a place. He is to be a “just per-
> son” and supposedly God-guided. Yet Abdul Hamid
> had the astrologer Abul Huda as his constant ad-
> viser. This astute magician is said to have worked
> in collusion with Izzat Pasha, who showed him tele-
> grams from various quarters before the Sultan had
> seen them. He thus many times astonished his Pa-
> dishah. Morality has not been required nor expected
> as a qualification of the caliph. Of course, without
> question, he has legally the privilege of having three
> or four hundred concubines in his haram, and can
> even count the massacring of tens of thousands of
> Christian subjects as a holy work. But even Moslem
> law cannot justify the horrible practice which many
> Sultans successively followed of celebrating the bind-
> ing on of the sword of Osman by putting to death all
> the royal brothers. Mahmud II ordered his seventeen
> brothers to be bowstrung. They were interred in St.
> Sophia around the newly made grave of their father.
> This practice was general (Pears: ibid., pp. 8-10) and
> was continued without concealment until the middle
> of the nineteenth century. How Moslems can look
> upon such a line of assassins as their religious chiefs
> can only be accounted for by their habit of divorcing
> religion from morality. Justice Amir Ali says
> 
> 1 This ignorance is equalled by that in Persia which attributes
> to the Shah’s visit to Queen Victoria a matrimonial purpose, as
> their traditions do to the coming of the Queen of Sheba to
> Solomon.
> 
> (“Spirit of Islam,” p. 470) that the Sunnis do not
> demand that the caliph be just, virtuous, or irreproach-
> able; that neither vices nor tyranny justify his deposi-
> tion. But some of them, as the Omayyad Walid and
> the Abbaside Mutavakul, have been deposed by pop-
> ular revolt against their iniquities. It had happened
> among the Osmanlis several times before Abdul
> Hamid.
> 
> Sunnis claim that there can only be one caliph at
> a time, regarding as unlawful the existence of con-
> temporary caliphs as the Omayyads at Granada, the
> Abbasides at Bagdad, and the Fatimites at Cairo.
> 
> The claim of the Sultan, weak legally and his-
> torically, was rendered more insecure and ineffective
> at the beginning of his reign, by the fact that the
> Sherif of Mecca and the Arabs were inclined to re-
> pudiate him. After the Russo-Turkish war some of
> the Arabs declared that the Sultan had forfeited his
> claim through his defeats and that the caliphate should
> return to the Koreish tribe (H. H. Jessup: “The Mo-
> hammedan Missionary Problem,” p. 21). The Sherif
> Sheikh Husni, an Anglophile, was ready to make good
> his claim, and it was supposed that he was encouraged
> to do so by the British. The Sherif was disposed of
> in true Oriental style by means of an assassin, and a
> supporter of the Sultan was put in his place. Hence-
> forth the religious side of Pan-Islamism was pro-
> moted from Mecca as a second centre (“Fall of Abdul
> Hamid,” F. McCallagh, p. 23).
> 
> Abdul Hamid carried on his propaganda in no half-
> hearted way. He put his untiring energy into it both
> in his own dominions and in the whole Islamic world.
> 
> He called together in secret session many Sheikhs and
> planned schemes. His agents were sent everywhere on
> secret missions. They were liberally supplied with
> funds. Generous presents were sent with them to the
> heads of various sects, orders, shrines, and holy places;
> pensions were given to mullahs, sayids, and influential
> darvishes. It is asserted by Salib el Khalidi that the
> Sultan spent half his revenues for Pan-Islamism. In-
> fluencing and intriguing with the subjects of other
> governments was no small part of the effort, which
> included not only the preaching of union but the en-
> couraging of fanaticism and rebellion. Hurgronje
> says (“The Holy War, etc.,” p. 29): “It secretly
> worked as a disturbing element; it often would oppose
> the normal development of a mutually desirable rela-
> tion between the governing and the governed.” The
> agents used were at one time the able diplomat, at
> another the learned mullah, or again the darvish
> mendicant or the Khoja, dressed as a darvish. Turk-
> ish consuls were established at many points, whose
> manner of life, however, somewhat interfered with
> the scheme, for it was often an offence against Mos-
> lem morals. In Turkey the Ulema were urged to
> engage yet more zealously in strengthening the faith
> of the people, proclaiming the waxing of the Crescent
> and the increasing glory of the caliphate. Above all
> they were urged to be diligent in convincing the faith-
> ful concerning the merit to be acquired before heaven
> by robbing and killing the Christians. The dallals or
> guides to the pilgrimage were made efficient agents.
> Formerly they had been ignorant and untrained men
> who came from Mecca, collected the dues for the
> 
> Kaaba, guided the pilgrim caravan to Mecca, and acted
> as guides while there. At this time a different type of
> men, ably trained propagandists, were assigned to this
> service and went everywhere preaching.
> 
> The press was enlisted in the cause. Not a few
> journals were its advocates. These papers and books
> fostered disloyalty to other governments, proclaiming
> the triumph of the Crescent. Abdul Hamid even went
> so far as to have denunciations of Great Britain
> printed in his palace and distributed in Afghanistan
> and Arabia. A part of the propaganda consisted in
> taking children of prominent families from India,
> Java, and Sumatra to Constantinople to be trained in
> loyalty to the Ottoman caliphate. This was forbidden
> by the colonial governments. The result of “this skil-
> fully planned agitation, carefully engineered from the
> Palace (Sir William Ramsay: “Impressions of Tur-
> key,” pp. 136-39) was all through Turkey a further
> increase of Moslem power and fanaticism.” As Pal-
> grave had noticed it in the previous reign, so Sir Wil-
> liam Ramsay speaks of it under Abdul Hamid. Sir
> Charles Elliot also says: “In this decade, 1880-90, a
> tendency prevailed to accentuate the Sultan’s position
> as caliph—to make it a vital reality. There was kept
> before the minds of the Moslems the idea that the
> Sultan was the head of all Islam on the one side as
> opposed to all Christians on the other” (Sir Charles
> Elliot: “Turkey in Europe”). Abdul Hamid made
> his Moslem subjects believe that their misfortunes
> were due to the interference of Europeans. Hur-
> gronje testifies to the spread of this propaganda, say-
> ing: “There is certainly a very pronounced Pan-
> 
> Islamic tendency in all classes of Mohammedan so-
> ciety.”
> 
> COMBINATION OF SUNNIS AND SHIAHS
> 
> An important factor of the scheme was the bring-
> ing of the Shiahs of Persia into co-operation. This
> was the more important owing to the geographical
> position of Persia, lying between the Moslems of
> India and Afghanistan and those of the Turkish Em-
> pire. For both political and military reasons Persia’s
> co-operation was most desirable. The agents of Pan-
> Islamism showed marked activity, and their presence
> was continually reported in the bazaar rumours.
> Their chief was a remarkable man named Sheikh
> Jamal-ud-Din, whose life-story is a marvellous ex-
> hibition of a powerful personality—a man who left
> his mark on the political and religious life and history
> of Afghanistan, India, Egypt, Turkey, and Persia.
> He was a sayid born at Asadabad, near Hamadan.
> At the age of ten he began his wanderings, studied
> in various cities, and became erudite in almost the
> whole range of Moslem learning. As a youth he
> passed some time in Afghanistan and a year or two
> in India, where he acquired some knowledge of Eng-
> lish and Western science. After making the pilgrim-
> age to Mecca, he returned to Afghanistan and, rising
> to the surface in one of the civil wars, became Prime
> Minister during the brief reign of Amir Mohammed
> Azam. Fleeing thence, he led a life of varied experi-
> ences, influential in many places among the literary
> and official classes. Expelled from India as a precau-
> tion against his political intrigues, and from Constan-
> 
> tinople through the jealousy of the Sheikh-ul-Islam, he
> settled in Egypt and gave lectures on Mohammedan
> theology, philosophy, law, and science, having great
> influence and fame. He was driven thence by the
> Khedive at the instigation of the orthodox mullahs
> and of the British Consul, in 1879, who objected to
> his activities in connection with the Egyptian Nation-
> alists. After the defeat of Arabi Pasha, he was ex-
> pelled from India, and came to America to obtain
> naturalization, but did not remain to carry out this
> plan. Next he became an editor in Paris, and carried
> on controversy with Renan and also with the British
> Government. After residing as a diplomat-at-large at
> Petrograd, he accepted in 1886 the invitation of Nasr-
> ud-Din Shah, came to Persia, and was made Minister
> of War. Later he organized a reform movement and
> preached much about it at the mosque of Shah Abdul
> Azim. In this he offended the Shah, so he took refuge
> at the sanctuary of this mosque. Dragged from there
> by order of the Shah, he was expelled to Turkey.
> After a visit to London and various negotiations with
> its cabinet, he finally took up his residence in Constan-
> tinople, where he was a guest and favourite of Abdul
> Hamid and the active Apostle of Pan-Islamism. In
> this, he did much, says Professor Browne (“Persian
> Revolution,” p. 30), “to awaken the independent Mos-
> lem States to the imminent peril and the urgent need
> of combination to withstand the aggressions of the
> great European Powers,” and “to create a sense of
> brotherhood and community of interest among them.”
> His Arabic biographer says of him: “The goal to-
> wards which all his actions were directed and the
> 
> pivot on which all his hopes turned, was the unanimity
> of Islam and the bringing together of all Moslems
> in all parts of the world into one Islamic empire under
> the protection of one supreme Khalifa. He raised up
> a living spirit in the hearts of his friends and disciples.”
> He founded at Mecca a Pan-Islamic Society, called
> Umm ul Kura. It printed and circulated its rules and
> constitution, but was suppressed by Abdul Hamid, be-
> cause it suggested Kufa as an alternative seat of the
> caliph (Browne: ibid., pp. 2-14). The plan was laid
> to bring the Shiahs into harmony with the Sunni Ca-
> liph. This was a bold and difficult scheme. The age-
> long alienation and bitter enmity, the bloody wars be-
> tween the adherents of the Imam Ali and those of the
> four “rightly directly caliphs” made reconciliation
> seem impossible. Yet the lessening of Shiah hatred
> in latter years gave hope, and it was by smoothing
> over of differences rather than by a change of con-
> victions that they expected to bring about concord.
> There was an example before them; for a union of
> Sunnis and Shiahs had been accomplished in the
> Muridism of Mullah Mohammed and Sheikh Schamyl
> of Daghestan. Both Persia and Turkey felt the neces-
> sity of doing something in the face of the aggressive
> Christian Powers who were pressing in on both sec-
> tions of Islam. Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din corresponded
> with the Shiah Mujtahids of Kerbela and Persia. He
> also sent envoys to work secretly among the Persians,
> especially among the officials of liberal tendency, upon
> whom distinctive Shiahism sat lightly. His plea was
> stated in these words: “If all the Mohammedan na-
> tions would only unite, all the nations on earth could
> 
> not prevail against them.” One of these envoys was
> Mirza Hasan Khan, with whom I had conversation in
> Tabriz at the house of Yusuf Khan, Mustashar-i-
> Doulah. Another promoter of Pan-Islamism was
> Prince Haji Sheikh-ur-Rais, the author of “Ittahad-
> ul-Islam” (“Union of Islam”).
> 
> The effects of these negotiations were evident.
> Some of the influential Shiah Mujtahids of Kerbala
> and Najef, as well as officials like Amin-i-Doulah and
> Mustashar-i-Doulah, the Foreign Agent at Tabriz, be-
> came advocates of the scheme, and of an arrangement
> whereby the Persians should recognize the caliphate
> of the Sultan and the Turks recognize the Shah as
> head of all the Shiahs, and that both should work
> in harmony. An account of these negotiations is given
> in a poem by Mirza Aga Khan. Of the answer of
> the Mujtahids, he writes (Browne: ibid., p. 412):
> 
> “From Persia and Irak they wrote: ‘We have washed from our
> hearts the dust of dissension;
> We will all sacrifice our lives for the Holy Law, we will all
> swear allegiance to the King of Islam.’”
> 
> To allay antagonism and promote unity of feeling,
> all customs which tended to perpetuate enmity should
> be discontinued. In accordance with this, Shiahs were
> to be no longer molested in their pilgrimages. They
> in observing the mourning of Muharram and the Pas-
> sion Play, though they might curse Yezid, would not
> transfer the rancour to the modern Turks. They
> would drop the festival of Omar and no longer dress
> up an effigy to represent that caliph and heap indig-
> nities upon it. They would no longer make any one
> to represent this enemy of Ali and treat him with
> 
> contumely and maledictions, as Omara laanat olsun
> (“Cursed be Omar”). The effect of these efforts
> at reconciliation were plainly observable in Persia in
> better relations between Sunnis and Shiahs and were
> felt in Russia and India as well. But the Shah of
> Persia did not take kindly to the scheme. It was
> doubtless evident to him that the prominent negotiators
> were Old Babis and that they and Jamal-ud-Din did
> not wish him good. In passing it may be remarked
> that the Sultans of Morocco and Zanzibar, too, re-
> fused to listen to the envoys of Pan-Islamism.
> 
> HAJIS AS PROPAGANDISTS
> 
> Besides all this, the propaganda was carried on
> from Mecca by the Sherif and the Ulema. Abdul
> Hamid cultivated the friendship of the Arabs. As an
> aid in binding them and the holy cities to the Osmanli
> caliphate the Hajaz railway was planned and com-
> pleted to Medina. It was made by the labour of 7,000
> soldiers. The Khedive of Egypt and the Shah of
> Persia joined in the enterprise. A Prince of India
> spent $200,000 on the Medina Station. Popular in-
> terest was aroused and personal subscriptions solicited.
> Large contributions were received from India, Java,
> and the whole Moslem world. Lucknow sent $140,000
> and Rangoon and Madras $300,000. Peculations
> from the fund were put at $3,000,000. Yet in spite
> of this and the Beduin robbers, it was carried to com-
> pletion. One specialty of its trains is the prayer-car
> for the pilgrims. The idea of Pan-Islamism is one
> congenial to the Arabs, for Mecca is a hotbed of
> Islamic fanaticism and its atmosphere is surcharged
> 
> with hatred of Christianity and with assurance of the
> final triumph of Islam over the Christians, even though
> it is the present kismat that the infidels oppress the
> faithful. The new High Sherif was in communion
> of purpose and idea with the Sultan. The power
> which lay in the schools of Mecca and of the mullahs
> who went forth from them was more actively exerted
> to revive Islam. Increasing effort was made to incite
> the Hajis. These pilgrims come from all parts of the
> Mohammedan world to be present at the annual feast
> of sacrifice, and to perform the rites around the Kaaba
> and other sacred places. Each race and language has
> its special groupings and mosques, and are brought
> under instruction with an aim to indoctrinate, inspire,
> and excite them to stronger faith and fanaticism.
> Every year one hundred thousand of these devoted
> pilgrims kiss the black stone and, notwithstanding the
> fact that they are fleeced unmercifully, swindled and
> deceived at every turn, notwithstanding the fact that
> exposure to the broiling sun, cholera, plague, and the
> treachery of the Beduins prevent thirty-eight per cent
> from returning to their homes (see Keane’s “Six
> Months in Mecca”), yet the Haji is more than all
> others a fanatic. Even among the Persians, though
> they have suffered specially as Shiah heretics, the
> most fanatical class of the population are the Hajis.
> They are most ready to treat with scorn and con-
> tumely the Armenians or Nestorians, to revile them as
> infidels, and to gather their honourable robes about
> them lest they be defiled by their touch. The Hajis
> return to their Sunni communities, bound as never
> before to Mecca, with a deep idea of the unity of Is-
> 
> lam and a determination to promote it and to defeat
> and destroy the Christians. This is strikingly true
> of the Malays, of whom Simon and Hurgronje testify,
> saying that “every Haji is an agent of Moslem propa-
> ganda; they return home inspired with the idea of
> living and dying for the realization of that unity.”
> They are permeated with the thought of the greatness
> of Islam, of their position and blessedness in being
> members of it. They are firm in their belief in its
> power and its unparalleled influence in the world.
> They have caused Pan-Islamic principles to penetrate
> the Moslem millions of Java and Sumatra and even
> the most remote mountain villages. They are assured
> that the Supreme Caliph, the Rajah of Stamboul, will
> one day deliver them. Christians are helped by the
> devil, their science is of the devil, their machine-guns
> are called the devil’s guns, and they will go to the
> devil. Their destruction is at hand by the power of
> the Prophet, for they are inferior in power as well
> as cursed in their faith, being like unclean beasts. In
> some such words is described to us (Rev. G. Simon
> in “Islam and Missions,” p. 87) the attitude of
> East-Indian Moslems. No wonder that its outcome
> is disloyalty and insurrection.
> 
> In Russia Pan-Islamic influence is widespread. A
> journal advocating it is published in Petrograd, called
> “The World of Islam,” and another is issued by the
> Academy of Kazan. Agents have travelled far and
> wide among the Tartars along the Volga. Others
> have gone through the Crimea, Caucasus, the Kirghiz
> Steppes, and Turkestan, and inflamed the bigotry of
> the Moslems, inculcating hatred of Christians and col-
> 
> lecting funds for the Sultan. In Bokhara the propa-
> ganda is reported to have been very successful and the
> Amir to have become a leader in the movement. The
> twenty millions of Moslems in Russia are united and
> desirous of attaining to the religious and political
> ideals of Pan-Islamism. In India the propaganda has
> been active. Abdul Hamid sent his emissaries. A
> paper was printed in his palace, called Peik-Islam, for
> circulation in India. The Sultan’s name was intro-
> duced into the Khutbas, or prayer service, in some
> provinces.
> 
> In Africa, the propaganda had wide ramifications.
> Lord Cromer saw its activities and describes it in his
> reports and in his “Modern Egypt.” The great dar-
> vish orders to which I shall again refer, are active
> advocates of its main principles, and have won the
> people to adhesion to them. One of Sultan Abdul
> Hamid’s special agents was Sheikh Jaffar, chief of the
> Madaniyah darvishes in Tripoli and Algeria. He was
> a strong supporter of Pan-Islamism and had his head-
> quarters at Stamboul, whence he sent out his mes-
> sengers (“Islam and Missions,” p. 66). The Sanusi
> Sheikh at first denounced the Osmanli Sultans for
> their friendliness to and imitation of Christians, but
> later was reconciled and strove for the same pro-
> gramme. Regarding North Africa, Canon Sell affirms
> (Missionary Review, 1912, p. 739) that “the Pan-
> Islamic movement is having a power such as has not
> been seen since the early days of the Arab conquest.”
> Dr. Washburn wrote in 1909: “There seems to be a
> general movement in North Africa and all over Asia,
> even in China, the full significance of which We cannot
> 
> understand. But one thing is clear … a determina-
> tion to maintain their faith on the part of Moslems.”
> 
> PAN-ISLAMISM AN ANTI-CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT
> 
> The Pan-Islamic movement aimed to oppose and
> conquer Christianity. It strove not only to promote
> things Moslem but abolish and destroy things Chris-
> tian. Its policy of repression was evident in the Sul-
> tan’s dominions. The condition there was well de-
> scribed as “an increasing stringency directed against
> Christian education, and increasing hostility to the use
> of books by the Christians” in order to “cripple their
> intellectual powers, … an increasing vigilance to
> prevent Christians from exercising their religion …
> and to restrain Christianity.” (Quoted in E. M.
> Bliss: “Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities,” p. 367.)
> The censorship of Christian books was made very
> strict, not only on certain kinds of books but even on
> words and ideas. The censor prohibited the use of
> the word rasul, apostle, for Christ’s disciples, claiming
> that the title should be used exclusively for Moham-
> med; that the phrase “guidance of God” should not
> be used in reference to Christians, for they had not that
> blessing. Even books coming in transitu to Persia
> were seized. Some volumes of the “Life of Henry
> Martyn” in English were burnt at Trebizond by the
> Turkish officials, who thus showed an oversight of
> the interests of their Islamic neighbour. Books such
> as Shakespeare, “Universal History,” and encyclo-
> pedias were taken from our cases. But while zeal for
> the law led to their confiscation, the higher law of
> self-interest often led to their being sold in the bazaars
> 
> of Trebizond. In search for these unclean books, it
> chanced that once a ham was discovered. What should
> be done with this abomination? While officials were
> deliberating on this, the question was settled by a dog
> snatching it and running away with it. Once an agri-
> cultural machine was landed at a certain port. Accom-
> panying it was a description of it which fell into the
> hands of a Turk who could read English. He was
> struck with horror and rushed off to report to the
> police that the machine was a terrible one guaranteed
> to make “eighty revolutions a minute.” A panic fol-
> lowed. Guards were posted and a telegram for in-
> structions sent to Constantinople. The machine was
> ordered out of the country instanter.
> 
> Interference with and repression of Christian work
> in Turkey was reflected in Persia. Not seldom some
> action of the Shah’s officials could be traced to a re-
> port received of some anti-Christian action of the
> Osmanli government.
> 
> Repression of the worship and education of Chris-
> tians was not enough; Christian officials were dis-
> missed by the Sultan. It is definitely stated that they
> were offered continuance in their civil and diplomatic
> posts on condition of accepting Islam; that those in
> arrears of taxes were tendered remission on the same
> condition. All this was a part of Abdul Hamid’s pro-
> gramme to convert the Christian rayats.
> 
> Massacres of the Christians had a religious end.
> They were inspired by religious fanaticism, as well
> as designed to repress political and revolutionary ac-
> tivity. The latter were not sufficient cause for gen-
> eral massacre. Indeed the forcible conversion to Islam
> 
> of seventy or more villages of Yezidees or devil wor-
> shippers of Kurdistan was carried out, though there
> could not be any political danger from them. Sir
> William Ramsay declares his belief that the Armenian
> massacres were part of the plan of Pan-Islamism—a
> deliberate plan to crush Christianity. In any case
> they were promoted and carried out as an anti-
> Christian campaign. Not only in Turkey but else-
> where the whole spirit of the movement was against
> the religion as well as against the governments of the
> Christians. It may readily be admitted that there is
> much in the political dealings of Christian Powers,
> their aggressions and selfish diplomacy, to excite ha-
> tred, but there is very little in their conduct towards
> Islam as a religion to call for reprisal. They have
> treated it impartially and justly, sometimes favoured
> it. Nevertheless the Pan-Islamic propaganda increased
> the hatred for Christians as well as the desire to over-
> throw Christian domination everywhere. Sheikh
> Abdul Hak of Bagdad but voices the feeling of the
> multitude when he fulminates a defiance, saying:
> “Christian peoples! The hatred of Islam is irrecon-
> cilable! We abhor you more than we did in the early
> period of history. Our most ardent desire is that the
> day may soon dawn when we shall wipe out the last
> traces of your supremacy.” The Ijtihad, a Moslem
> journal, says (Dr. Howard Bliss in International Re-
> view of Missions, 1913, p. 647) the Christian is “the
> curse of the world. To reason with him, to lead him
> back to salvation, and when that is impossible, to re-
> move his existence, is the most sacred duty and the
> holiest piety of the faithful. Oh, Christian nations!
> 
> We are now hating you. We want you to understand
> that we hate the civilization and the extraordinary de-
> velopment which has made you so wealthy and so
> powerful.”1
> 
> TURKISH MASSACRES OF CHRISTIANS
> 
> The idea is said to prevail in England that “the
> Turk always showed a contemptuous toleration for
> his Christian subjects.” Of the contempt there can
> be no doubt. Sir William Ramsay says (“Impres-
> sions, etc.,” p. 206): “Armenians and Greeks were
> regarded as dogs and pigs; their nature was to be
> Christians, to be spat upon if their shadow darkened
> a Turk, to be outraged, to be mats on which he wiped
> the mud from his feet. The Turk then did not mind
> what religion these dogs belonged to and he was as
> far as possible from the wish to make them Moham-
> medans.” But with this contempt was also persecu-
> tion. Sir Edwin Pears says (“Turkey and Its Peo-
> ple,” p. 350): “Until the nineteenth century the policy
> was one of constant worry with occasional Bartholo-
> mew massacres” (ibid., p. 42): “I doubt whether at
> any time since Mohammed conquered Constantinople
> a quarter of a century has passed without a big mas-
> sacre.” In another place this close student of Turkish
> history writes (The Nineteenth Century, 1913, p.
> 278): “I assert that ever since the Turk entered Eu-
> 
> 1 This abhorrence is revealed in the incident that Sheikh
> Othman of Batavia was severely criticised for praying for the
> Queen of Holland at the time of her coronation. Another cele-
> brated sayid, Salim ibn Ahmad of Arabia, defended him with
> the remark that it was merely an external performance to con-
> ciliate the infidels, but God knew what was in his heart.
> 
> rope, say five hundred years ago, the whole course of
> Turkish history … was a period of Mohammedan
> fanaticism, during which tens of thousands of Chris-
> tians died for their faith. The persecutions under
> which the Christians suffered after the capture of
> Constantinople, in 1453, were so continuous and strik-
> ing as to terrorize the sufferers. They were far
> greater in each century before 1800 than during the
> last century. Their history under Turkish rule was
> a long and terrible persecution for their faith. On
> three occasions every Christian in Constantinople was
> threatened with death. In 1512 Salim I proposed to
> kill them all unless they would accept the Mohammedan
> faith. The Grand Vizier averted it. One-half of the
> churches of Constantinople were left to the Christians
> at the conquest, but before a century all but one were
> taken from them.” Some were bought back with
> money. Or if instead of the ones of which they were
> dispossessed, they were permitted to build, they must
> be of wood that they might quickly decay or be burnt
> down.
> 
> A mere recapitulation of the massacres in the nine-
> teenth century fills one with horror; such infernal
> brutality and devilish lust, rapine, murder, and bar-
> barity surpass description. In 1822 the Greeks of
> Chios were almost exterminated. The Turkish rabble
> hurried to the scene and enjoyed the slaughter as a
> picnic. Thirty-two thousand boys and girls were sold
> into slavery, 30,000 of the people were killed, and
> 30,000 fled into other lands; but 15,000 remained in
> this most prosperous island. In 1844 10,000 Nes-
> torians were massacred by the Kurds; in 1860
> 
> 30,000 Christians of the Lebanon were slaughtered
> by the Druses; in 1876 the massacre of 40,000 Bul-
> garians aroused the indignation of Europe and brought
> about the Russo-Turkish war; in 1894-96 200,000
> Armenians perished either by slaughter or consequent
> deprivations. In 1909, under the Constitution, oc-
> curred the massacre of Armenians at Adana. “Every
> man that could be found was shot, hacked to pieces,
> or thrown into the flames of the burning houses and
> shops. No Christian woman’s honour was spared.”
> Churches were destroyed. In city and villages all
> were hunted down. Twenty-eight thousand were
> slain. Twenty-one out of twenty-five trained Protes-
> tant pastors were massacred. It was more fiendish
> than the preceding massacre.
> 
> MASSACRES CAUSED BY RELIGIOUS FANATICISM
> 
> Moslem fanaticism was the fundamental cause of
> these massacres. They were ordered by the Sultan,
> the Caliph of Islam, instigated by harangues of the
> mullahs declaring the merit of killing and outraging
> Christians. They were enjoined by proclamations in
> the mosques. The Moslems robbed, desecrated, and
> burnt the churches as well. When they made a holo-
> caust of the Urfa Cathedral, within which were eight
> thousand innocent victims, many of them women and
> children, the Moslems “mockingly called on Christ to
> prove himself a greater prophet than Mohammed.”
> In the time of trial, tens of thousands were compelled
> to choose between death and Islam. Tens of thou-
> sands chose death. Thousands, alas, denied the faith
> especially to save their wives and daughters from the
> 
> vile hands of the wretches who maltreated them in a
> horrible manner or carried them off to their harams
> or sold them as slaves and even compelled them to
> become promiscuous concubines. In the midst of all
> the slaughter and rapine, all that was required of a
> man was to raise one finger as a sign of acceptance
> of the Moslem creed and he was safe. At least forty
> thousand under compulsion became Moslems in
> 1894-95.1
> 
> Such is a brief summary of Turkish atrocities
> against the Christians; a record which well qualifies
> him to be called the unspeakable Turk. Yet we are
> assured, by one who knows, that the Turk shows im-
> provement. Sir Edwin Pears, for forty years the
> sterling representative of Great Britain in Constanti-
> nople, after condemning the Sultan and these massa-
> cres in burning words, assures us that there has been
> a decrease in the fanaticism of the Turks. The bru-
> tality, bloodthirsty savagery, monstrous cruelty, bestial
> 
> 1 E. M. Bliss: “Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities,” chap,
> xxvi. Dr. Bliss gives details. At Chunkush, in the province of
> Diarbekr, there were 6,000 Christians; 880 were butchered, the
> rest were compelled to become Moslems. At Senerek nearly all
> the grown men, 750, were killed, and all the women and children
> were distributed to the Moslem harams. At Urfa most of the
> Christian men were compelled to become Moslems and to put up
> a white flag as a sign of it. After a month, some houses were
> found without the white flags and 1,500 were killed as apostates.
> At Albislaw nearly all accepted Islam; at Adianam out of 800 all
> were slain but 20 who denied the faith. At Arabkir, of 18,000
> Christians, all were plundered and burned out of house, 4,000 were
> killed, the rest accepted Islam. At Tadem, of 1,800, 250 were
> killed, the rest became Moslems. In all, 100,000 to 200,000 per-
> ished; 40,000 accepted Islam.
> 
> sensuality from which Christians suffered in our day
> were exceeded in the atrocities of the sixteenth, sev-
> enteenth, and eighteenth centuries. Even the mas-
> sacres of the Greeks in the beginning of the nineteenth
> century surpassed in inhumanity and horror the inde-
> scribable massacres of the Armenians. This being so,
> we might hope, at such a rate of progress, that after
> several millenniums the lives of Christians, were any
> left, would be safe under the Turks. Victor Hugo
> has an expressive line which runs
> 
> “The Turks have passed here: All is ruin and mourning.”
> 
> These unpunished massacres of Armenian Christians
> were exulted over as a victory for Islam. Even in
> far-off Mandaling, the Moslems announced that they
> would treat the Batak Christians in exactly the same
> way (Simon, p. 39).
> 
> THE HOLY WAR
> 
> An instrument was ready at hand for Pan-Islamism.
> This was the Jihad, or Holy War. Abdul Hamid
> counted on making effective use of it. The Law of
> Mohammed, both in the Koran and the Traditions,
> commands fighting for the Faith. War is a religious
> duty. Their prophet enjoins: “Kill those that join
> other Gods with God wherever ye shall find them: but
> if they shall convert, then let them go their way”
> (Surah IX, 5). Some would interpret this to mean
> only the heathen of Arabia, but this is untenable, for
> verse 29 says: “Make war upon such of those to
> whom the Scriptures have been given, i.e. Jews and
> Christians … who profess not the profession of the
> truth until they pay tribute out of hand and be hum-
> 
> bled.” Surah VIII, 40, commands: “Fight against
> them until religion be all of it God’s.” Mohammed
> declared: “Fighting in the way of God is a divine
> duty. When your Imam orders you to go forth to
> fight, then obey him.” By command of Mohammed,
> says Bosworth Smith (“Mohammed and Moham-
> medanism,” p. 177), “religion became warlike and
> war became religious, with the whole world for a
> battlefield.” Islam conquered and spread by the
> sword. All Moslem historians affirm it. The Per-
> sians call themselves “guluj mussalmani” (“Mussul-
> mans by the sword”). It remained for European
> apologists, like T. W. Arnold, to attempt, however
> unsuccessfully, to show the contrary. In the jihad
> the Moslem warrior gave the option of (1) Islam,
> (2) Subjection, (3) Death. Under the second con-
> dition Christians must live in abject submission, under
> the lordship of the Moslem, inferior in legal status,
> paying a special tax, regarded as zimmis or rayats
> (cattle). If they assert themselves, seem desirous of
> freedom, or are supposed to be planning release or to
> be sympathizing with the enemy, they come under the
> ban of the jihad and they and their families can be
> killed and maltreated without mercy. Dr. G. Herrick,
> a lover of the Turks as a race, condemns their jihad
> in these words (“Christian and Mohammedan,” p.
> 119): “These orgies of carnage and arson, attended
> by treachery and falsehood, by infernal cruelty and
> beastly lust, are the natural fruit of Mohammed’s
> ethical teachings and example at Medina.”
> 
> The Holy War is in force “till the resurrection,”
> and only expediency limits it while non-Moslem gov-
> 
> ernments exist in the world. It is a permanent statute
> of Islam for aggression and propagation as well as
> defence. According to the Shari, it should always
> exist against non-Moslem countries “until they sub-
> mit,” and until every Dar-ul-Harb is converted into a
> Dar-ul-Islam, an abode of Islam. Submission to Eu-
> ropean rule is abnormal, unlawful, only a temporary
> trial. The “Moslem Dictionary,” published in India
> (quoted by Dr. Zwemer, Missionary Review, 1913,
> p. 102), says: “This is an abode of Islam, although
> it belongs to the accursed ones and authority belongs
> externally to these Satans.” Only expediency holds
> them in check. For a new interpretation has been
> given to the law by the Ulema of North India, that
> the jihad is lawful only when there is “a probability
> of victory to the armies of Islam.” This accords with
> the saying of the Koran: “Ye are in no wise bound
> to rush upon your destruction.” Fear and not loyalty
> prevents the jihad, for, as Professor Petrie says of
> Egypt (“Ten Years in Egypt,” p. 180), “the fellah
> looks upon the unbeliever as a miserable minority; and
> it is the unpleasant fact that they cannot be crushed at
> present which prevents his crushing them and assert-
> ing the supremacy of Islam.”
> 
> The jihad is invoked not only against non-Moslems
> but also against heretics, as the Shiahs and the Wa-
> habis. The Shiahs claim that there can only be a
> true jihad when the Imam appears to issue the call:
> Sunnis ascribe the authority to the caliph. In prac-
> tice, the Shiah Mujtahids proclaim it and even mullahs
> in Africa and Indonesia declare local jihads. It has
> been invoked in the Atchin and other insurrections and
> 
> in frequent fanatical uprisings; in the rebellions in
> China; in the Wahabi campaigns in India; by Sheikh
> Abdul Kadir and Schamyl in their stubborn defences
> in Algeria and the Caucasus; by the Sudan Mahdi; in
> every important war of Turkey, except possibly the
> Balkan War. The Sheikh Sanusi issued a call to the
> jihad against Italy in Tripoli, 1912. In it salvation
> and blessing are promised to all “who extend the
> dominion of the Faith with the sword’s sharpness, as
> the Koran has commanded, ‘Battle with unbelievers.’
> For Paradise lies under the shadow of swords; the
> martyr feels death only as the light pressure of the
> finger when he is filled with the hot desire for it. By
> God’s grace, it is the last step to the presence of God.
> The breath of Paradise fans him and the houris seek
> to draw his gaze on themselves when he lies wound-
> covered. Up then, worshipper of God! pour wealth
> and blood into the fight! God has commanded the
> jihad! Endurance! Endurance! God is near to
> help” (Missionary Review, 1912, p. 790).1
> 
> The effect of such proclamations is to excite reli-
> gious fanaticism in a superlative degree, filling the
> soldier with fiery zeal to slay as God’s service, for
> has not the Prophet said “the fire of hell shall not
> touch the legs of him who shall be covered with the
> dust of battle in the way of God”? Indifference to
> death and dauntless courage are engendered. The
> 
> 1 Mr. Simon (p. 141) tells of a Javanese, bent on suicide,
> who rushed in and wounded several Dutch soldiers and shot
> the sentry. Suicide would have been accounted a great sin
> for him, but killing Christians was a merit, deserving a heavenly
> reward, so he committed this act of holy warfare to enter
> Paradise.
> 
> jihad is a tremendously effective weapon, as in days
> of old.
> 
> With such a propaganda, such principles, such a
> following, and such a weapon, Pan-Islamism loomed
> large. The ideal of the Caliph Abdul Hamid seemed
> to have borne fruitage. The successful campaign
> against Greece in 1897 sent a thrill of joy through
> the vast body of Moslems to the farthest extremity.
> Every mosque was illuminated throughout India, even
> to the smallest village in the Deccan (Aga Khan:
> Edinburgh Review, 1914, p. 3). It was one cause
> of the Tirah rising. The Greeks were conquered; the
> Armenians decimated; the Arabs brought into order
> and conciliated; the Sanusiyahs working in harmony;
> the Shiahs friendly; the Moslem leagues fanatically
> active; the Christian Powers flouted; the Colossus of
> the North humbled by Japan; the Sultan’s prestige
> among Moslems was at its zenith. Pan-Islamic ideals
> seemed to them about to be realized. Even European
> writers did not regard their military aspirations as
> impossible. Edward Dicey viewed as reasonable
> (“The Egypt of the Future,” quoted in C. R. Watson’s
> “In the Valley of the Nile,” p. 218) the “widespread
> Moslem belief that the time is at hand when Islam
> might resume her career of conquest and might fulfil
> her mission of exterminating all unbelievers, no matter
> what creed they may profess.” Oscar Mann wrote
> (“Great Religions of the World,” p. 58): “We see
> a fermentation going on in Islam from one end to the
> other. What is not possible if some gifted man suc-
> ceeds in inspiring these tremendous masses!” Some,
> on the other hand, called it a “rope of sand” (Dr.
> 
> G. Herrick), a “chimera” (Dr. W. S. Nelson), an
> “impossibility” (Prof. E. G. Browne), “with no
> prospects of realization” (J. Simon). These esti-
> mates seem undoubtedly true from a military point of
> view. But its possibilities could not be accurately de-
> termined and Christian Powers cautiously watched
> developments.
> 
> Events which followed revealed its failure as a po-
> litical power but its reality as a religious conviction,
> and intensifies its anti-Christian bitterness. The ap-
> parent purpose of Russia and Great Britain to divide
> Persia, the annexation by Austria of Bosnia and
> Herzegovina, the declaration of independence by Bul-
> garia, the Italian war and the loss of Tripoli, the
> Balkan War and its direful consequences, the seizure
> of Morocco,—all together impressed Moslems with
> the thought that Christian governments had formed a
> plot to destroy all Moslem governments. In conse-
> quence Turk and Arab emissaries were sent through
> India and Russia. Intense feeling was created. Sym-
> pathy with Turkey was profound, for, as the London
> Times said (April 19, 1913), “the Moslem looks upon
> Turkey as the embodiment of the temporal power of
> Islam and does not desire to see Islam reduced to the
> position of Israel, a religion without temporal status.”
> A Mohammedan graduate of an English University
> was so affected by the news of the battle of Lulu
> Burgas that he felt like committing suicide. In India
> inflammatory speeches were made, bombs were pur-
> chased, fatvas for boycott were issued, large sums were
> subscribed to help Turkey. Popular meetings passed
> indignant resolutions. Protests and petitions were sent
> 
> from the London Colony and from the Transvaal
> Moslems. The Indian Moslem press denounced the
> conspiracy to overthrow Islam, the British policy in
> Persia, the aggressions of Russia, Italy, and France.
> Egypt seemed a hotbed of sedition. Moslem Leagues
> were multiplied. A thrill of sympathy and excite-
> ment went even to the remotest corner of Zanzibar
> (“Vital Forces,” p. 197). Agitation and discontent
> were manifested everywhere. Pan-Islamic feeling was
> tense and aggressive. Remembering the Crusades,
> who can tell but some spark might set on fire the
> Islamic world? We soberly and rightly calculate that
> the devotees of Islam cannot prevail in warfare against
> the armouries of Europe. Without our science, Islam
> is hopelessly outclassed as a fighting power. But Is-
> lam might find her opportunity in a divided Christen-
> dom. Even some great Dreibund might equip and
> finance Pan-Islam. Besides this, the point is not as
> to where the final victory would be. It is rather as
> to the purpose and possible attempt of the Moslem
> world. They await the time to strike. God is great!
> Victory is His! “A consciousness of victory,” says
> Mr. Simon (p. 223), “pervades the whole Moham-
> medan world. Islam’s unfavourable position politically
> has not affected it, because the feeling has its origin
> in the religious conceptions of Islam, more especially
> in the doctrine of the holy wars which are to usher in
> the Last Day. It has a feeling of invincibility.” Not-
> withstanding its collapse, at present, it is Julius
> Richter’s judgment that “the deep and strong convic-
> tion that has grown up into the very fabric of Moham-
> medanism, through thirteen centuries of victory and
> 
> success, of a call to world-wide dominion, cannot be
> uprooted by the reverses” it has met. The Comrade,
> the Moslem journal of Calcutta, voices their sense of
> unity and strength when it says (quoted by Dr.
> Zwemer, Missionary Review, 1914, p. 176): “Mus-
> sulmans have just begun to perceive that Islam is a
> living source of spiritual and social cohesion, binding
> all Moslems in an indissoluble unity of hope, purpose,
> duty, and endeavour. Moslems have never felt its
> vital strength as keenly as they feel it to-day. The
> sufferings of the parts have revived in the whole its
> sense of organic unity.” Palgrave (“Essays,” p. 125)
> writes: “So strong indeed is the bond of union that in
> the presence of the infidel the deep clefts which divide
> Sunni and Shiah are for a time and purpose oblit-
> erated,” and it is “roughly welded into one formidable
> weapon of attack on the common foe, the uncircum-
> cised foe, governed and governing.” Aga Khan, who
> is loyal to Great Britain, writes (Edinburgh Review,
> 1914, p. 4): “All sections of the Moslem world are
> moved. There is between them and their fellow-
> believers in other lands an essential unity which breaks
> through differences of sect and country.” The Tanin
> of Constantinople, even after the failure of the call
> to the jihad, expresses its belief in the reality of Pan-
> Islamism as follows:
> 
> “The wish to abolish existing misunderstandings
> between the various Mohammedan elements and to
> establish as between them a defensive force that will
> permit them to give reciprocal protection to each
> other, is not anywise the result of vast and chimerical
> schemes, but rather the outcome of most natural neces-
> 
> sity and most convincing logic. The movement among
> the Moslems toward union and solidarity, which had
> as its object the respect of the political and national
> rights of others, the respecting of the national fron-
> tiers, and a united effort against common enemies, has
> taken during these late years as a result of events a
> form so serious as to make it most illogical for cer-
> tain indifferent individuals to shrug their shoulders
> over it. The spread of ideas of this sort among
> elements that have for centuries looked askance at
> each other, has proved that a new and very powerful
> movement is manifesting itself in Islam.
> 
> “Thus it happens that Turkey, who in the campaign
> of 1877-78 was compelled to guard her Persian fron-
> tier, on this occasion beheld the whole of Persia, as
> soon as the jihad was proclaimed, rise to her feet with
> her Ulemas, khans, and tribes. The Moslems have for
> a long time been awake, but the movement will have
> to be progressive, for the time necessary for them
> to prepare to move in common at a given moment,
> has not yet passed by. Everybody in the Moslem
> world has been awaiting a time that should strengthen
> this current and hasten its development. This chance,
> which we were hoping for in heaven, we have at last
> found on this earth.”
> 
> III
> 
> ISLAMIC MISSIONS
> 
> ANOTHER aspect of the Islamic revival is a re-
> newal of zeal in propagating the Faith. Islam
> has always been a missionary religion, and it
> retains this characteristic in a marked degree and both
> by the sword and by the word it continues to increase
> its numbers. True its opportunity to use force has
> largely passed from its hand. The restraint of Chris-
> tian governments prevents it. But numerous exam-
> ples have occurred in modern times. Some thousands
> of Greeks in Chios and of Armenians in Turkey were
> made Moslems under threat of death. The Kaffirs
> were forced into Islam by the Afghans. The jihad
> against the Battaks in 1821-28 became “a bloody and
> savage war of conquest” in which they tried to impose
> their faith on the heathen (Arnold, ibid., p. 300).
> But in Achin and Sumatra some regions were kept for
> centuries from becoming Moslems that they might
> continue to be legitimate fields for slave trade, for it
> was considered that they had a God-given right to make
> plundering raids on the defenceless heathen and sell
> them into slavery (Simon, p. 206). Osman Dan-
> fodio, to whom I have already referred, led his army
> (1830-40) against the heathen Hausas, the tribes
> around Sokoto, Yoruba, and Senegambia, compelling
> them all to embrace Islam. He carried the faith to
> 
> the Gulf of Guinea and to the West as far as the At-
> lantic. Four powerful Mohammedan kingdoms of
> the present day owe their religion to his sword (Ar-
> nold, pp. 265-67). The Tijaniyah Darvishes, a militant
> order founded by Sidi Ahmad of Tijani, Algeria, have
> forced Islam by the sword upon tribes from Nigeria
> to the Gold Coast. A number of pagan states were
> converted by their jihads. The Tijaniyah appear now
> to be reconciled with France. The Sheikh receives a
> salary and wears the badge of the Legion of Honour.
> The Sheikh of the Tabbiyah order, the Sherif of
> Wassan, is the son of an Englishwoman and was
> educated in a French school. Yet Professor Wester-
> mann declares that “Even now among the ruling races
> of the Sudan, the Holy War—that is, force—is re-
> garded as the natural and normal means of conver-
> sion and as more effective than preaching (Interna-
> tional Review of Missions, 1912, p. 285). Mungo
> Park narrates (Arnold, p. 285) that the following
> message was sent by the Moslem king of Futa Toro
> to his pagan neighbour: “With this knife Abd-ul-
> Kadir will condescend to shave the head of Damel, if
> Damel will embrace the Mohammedan faith; and with
> this other knife Abdul Kadir will cut the throat of
> Damel, if Damel refuses to embrace it.” A young
> Arab said to Captain Burton at Abeokuta: “Give guns
> and powder to us, and we will soon Islamize those
> dogs.” The Mohammedan ruler in Bambara sent out
> teachers with an armed force to convert the heathen
> to Islam and, in case they did not receive it, to lay
> waste their villages. On receiving it, a fifth of the
> spoils was to be paid to the ruler.
> 
> But now, for the most part, Moslem propaganda
> is carried on by persuasion. The two movements men-
> tioned, Wahabism and Pan-Islamism, have stirred up
> a fervent missionary spirit, the former by renewing
> primitive faith; the latter by strengthening the solidar-
> ity of believers, giving them a sense of their unity and
> so inspiring them with boldness in witnessing for their
> religion. The geographical situation now favours the
> spread of Islam more than Christianity. The latter
> has converted all the races in contact with it in Europe
> and in contact with its colonies in America and Aus-
> tralia. Now separating us from the African pagans
> and the heathen nations of Asia stretches the great
> mass of Mohammedanism. Only in South Africa does
> Christianity have the advantage of close contact. The
> advantage of peaceful penetration and gradual assimi-
> lation through proximity lies with Islam. Influence
> across the seas is not so intimate and effective.
> 
> The most striking and, from a Christian point of
> view, critical progress of Islam has been made in
> Africa. I have described the warlike advance. Much
> also has been accomplished in a peaceable way. Mos-
> lem traders and shepherds are in the habit of settling
> down in new locations, marrying among the people,
> and gradually acquiring an influence among the ne-
> groes. Their somewhat higher culture and the social
> standing and dignity which come from the possession
> of property, create admiration. Marabouts or teach-
> ers go about, write charms, use magic, work faith
> cures, and adapt themselves to the superstitions and
> habits of the tribe. They ingratiate themselves with
> the chief, acquire a standing with him, marry his
> 
> daughter; or, if not, on the contrary, if he is obdurate,
> they instigate rebellion against him and supplant him.
> Merchant and marabout alike enter into relationship
> with the different families by marriage and soon a
> community is established. If there is a European
> sovereignty, they sympathize with the black man
> against this new oppressor and tax-collector, counting
> themselves fellow-sufferers, and the negro, soon for-
> getful of the rapacity and cruelty of the slave-traders,
> feels grateful. Above all, the Arab or North African
> adopts the newly converted negro into the brother-
> hood of Islam, in which there is no colour line.
> 
> Then, too, the Christian missionary, if there is one,
> is of the same race and religion as the foreign sub-
> jugator. If the Moslem were the ruler, he would take
> advantage of it to further his religion, but the Euro-
> pean administration is neutral in principle, and so
> upright at times that he leans backwards. Or per-
> chance he thinks Islam a better faith for the black
> man or is simply careless and indifferent. He is sur-
> rounded by Moslem secretaries, clerks, interpreters,
> and agents. They have some education and more
> clothing than other natives. Through them all gov-
> ernment business is transacted. The subaltern army
> officers are Moslems, and new recruits are circumcised
> to make them acceptable to the older ones. If a
> school is established, it teaches Arabic and the books
> of Islam. So in court, in camp, in school, the heathen
> sees the Moslem preferred and the Christian ignored.
> He finds it to his advantage to become a Moslem. Be-
> sides all this the Moslem appears to a better advan-
> tage under Christian rule than usually, for he is re-
> 
> strained from showing his bad qualities, such as op-
> pression, violence, slave-trading. To some provinces
> the Christian missionary is prohibited entrance, but
> the Moslem goes everywhere and has the roads and
> safety of Christian administration to assist him. In
> the Sudan for many years missionaries were prohib-
> ited, but Gordon College at Khartum, the memorial
> of that Christian saint, is a Moslem institution, in
> which Islam is taught by Sheikhs from Al Azhar.
> The Koran is a text-book, and Friday, not Sunday,
> the school holiday. Professor Westermann says:
> “The College exerts a powerful influence in favour
> of Islam.”
> 
> The strongest influence in Africa for Moslem
> propaganda is wielded by the orders of darvishes. I
> have already told of their origin. As an offshoot of
> Persian Sufiism, they should be latitudinarian and
> friendly to Christians. So were the Kadiriyah, and
> they continue somewhat so in Africa. The Bektashi
> of Turkey are Alivis, and were very tolerant, teach-
> ing that “the paths leading to God are as numerous
> as the breaths of His creatures.” Sir Edwin Pears
> tells of one of their Sheikhs who said he regarded the
> Christians as brothers, and removed his turban and
> showed the sign of a cross embroidered upon it. Yet
> even Bektashi joined in massacring the Armenians.
> Another darvish Sheikh was a member of a Masonic
> lodge in Constantinople. Yet the new orders of dar-
> vishes are actively hostile to everything Christian and
> European. Some of them are fighting orders, as the
> Tijaniah and the Mahdiists of the Sudan; some hold
> to non-intercourse and opposition to foreign influ-
> 
> ences. Among these are the Sanusiyah, who adhere to
> puritanic practices like the Wahabis. Of them Canon
> Sell says: “The object of the founder was to erect
> an impassable barrier to the progress of Western civil-
> ization and to the influence of Christian Powers in
> Moslem lands” (Church Missionary Intelligencer,
> January, 1899). They are ardent adherents of Pan-
> Islamic principles and are notable as the most zealous
> and powerful propagators of Islam, by peaceable
> means, that the world has ever seen. The future of
> their large and influential organization may yet show
> more wonderful development.
> 
> The founder of the order of Sanusiyah was Sidi
> Mohammed Ibn Ali as Sanusi, an Arab of Morocco.
> He studied theology at Fez and other madressas. He
> was initiated into many orders,—“finally acquiring
> the degree of Master Sufi and passing through the
> ordeal of fire” (Achmad Abdullah, a Sanusiyah,
> Forum, 1914, p. 679). He lectured at various places
> in North Africa and latterly at Cairo. Here his
> teachings offended the Ulema by their mystical and
> puritanical tendencies. He was anathematized and
> narrowly escaped death by poison. Proceeding to
> Mecca, he received instructions from the Mufti and
> had as his Murshid or Guide the Grand Sheikh of the
> Kadiriyah, Al Fussi. On the latter’s death, Sanusi
> was disappointed in not succeeding to the headship,
> so he founded a school and order of his own and
> taught in Mecca till 1843. Forced to leave there by
> theological disputes, he returned to Africa and propa-
> gated the order called after him Sanusiyah.
> 
> Sheikh Sanusi strove for a return to primitive Is-
> 
> lam. Following Ibn Abdul Wahab, his great aim was
> to purify and revive Islam and correct abuses. He
> denounced prayers to the Valis or saints, pilgrimages
> to their shrines and undue honour to Mohammed.
> He rejected the use of tobacco, coffee, and music, rich
> clothing and ornaments, but his conscience found no
> offence in tea and perfumes. Yet he held on to
> Sufiism and to worship by means of the zikr. His
> formula for producing the hypnotic trance is by the
> repetition first of “Allah” 100 times; secondly, the
> kalima or creed, with additions, 300 times; and
> thirdly, the prayer, “O God! Bless our Lord Mo-
> hammed, his family and friends,” 1,000 times. Their
> oath is “By the Truth Sidi-es Sanusi.” The book of
> the Sheikh is described as a frenzied writing, recount-
> ing the stages of ecstasy which lead to oneness with
> God. “In the first stage the adept will see 7,000,000
> green stars of surpassing loveliness; in each succeed-
> ing stage there will be different-coloured stars, until
> in the bliss of oblivion he beholds constellations of a
> glory beyond words” (Salib ul Khalili, in Spectator).
> The Sanusiyah are classed by Goldziher as a fifth
> school, distinct from the four orthodox schools of the
> Sunnis.
> 
> The centre of the order was established at Jagbub,
> where the Sheikh procured large estates and had as
> many as 2,000 slaves to work them. There also was
> at one time a college, with 750 students preparing
> for religious work, under Sheikh Mohammed ash
> Sherif. Settlements or colonies of the darvishes were
> made in many places in those semi-civilized Moslem
> countries, the lands were cultivated, and schools for
> 
> boys and even girls established. The chief of each
> zawiya, or lodge, became governor of the district
> round about, combining temporal and spiritual au-
> thority, receiving tribute and offerings to such an
> extent that large funds were accumulated. The order
> has increased greatly. Zawiyas exist in all countries
> from Morocco to Egypt, in the Sudan, around Lake
> Chad, and, it is said, even in Turkey, Arabia, and
> Malaysia. The entrance of Sultan Ali of Wadai and
> Sultan Say id Baldas of Krej into the order has added
> to its influence. The populace about the zawiyas is
> initiated as adherents, so that six million are estimated
> to be affiliated. To call these zawiyas monasteries
> gives a wrong impression, for though they may prac-
> tise austerities, yet celibacy is not commanded. They
> are bound by a secret oath and have passwords and
> signs.
> 
> Mohammed-as-Sanusi first married a woman named
> Manna, whom he received as a present at Mesaad and
> soon afterwards divorced. Another wife was Fatima.
> Their son was called Mahdi, and he had this sign at
> least that he was the son of Mohammed and Fatima,
> as tradition says the Mahdi should be. He was also
> credited with the physical marks which were requisite.
> He refused to accept appointment from the Sudanese
> Mahdi as one of his Khalifas. He died without ful-
> filling a mission, but rumour says that he is in con-
> cealment and will appear to fulfil his work as Mahdi.
> Another son was a diplomat, but a debauchee. After
> the death of the founder in 1859, the seat of the order
> was moved farther into the interior, to Gouro or
> Borku, beyond Wadai. The present Sheikh is re-
> 
> ported to have made arrangement with the Italian
> Government, whereby he will have autonomy within
> his sphere, paying tribute to Italy, and having the
> title and emoluments of Governor-General and at the
> same time be the Sultan’s religious representative.
> 
> The influence of the Sanusiyah has been very great
> in strengthening the faith and arousing the zeal of the
> Moslems of North Africa, awakening within them a
> spirit of intense loyalty and devotion. All through
> that vast region many Moslems were ignorant of their
> religion, steeped in superstition, and addicted to prac-
> tices contrary to Islam. Many had retained their
> heathen practices and beliefs mixed with Moham-
> medan rites and conceptions. These they have in-
> structed and confirmed and developed into strong
> Moslems. Among these were many tribes or parts of
> tribes that had remained heathen. Sanusiyah preach-
> ers and schools have converted them. In some in-
> stances they have bought slaves, educated and Islam-
> ized them and sent them back to their own tribes. At
> a single time they purchased from the Moslem slave-
> dealers two thousand persons. Thus their influence
> as a proselyting agency has been very effective
> through a wide stretch of territory. The results of
> their labours and of the Kadiriyah order and similar
> peaceful orders, as well as the militant ones, coupled
> with the influence of traders, teachers, and soldiers,
> penetrating from the North, from Egypt, from the
> Arabian seacoast and Zanzibar, and even in Cape
> Colony itself, have been to give Islam such victories in
> Africa—such progress in numbers and in power as
> to startle the Christian Church. The campaign has
> 
> been aggressive, rapid, successful. Thousands of
> square miles, numerous and powerful tribes as well
> as millions of the weak and unorganized masses, have
> been brought under the banner of Mohammed. Vast
> regions which for centuries lay beyond Arab influence
> have lately been brought under it, and this has come
> about owing to the peace and security which Euro-
> pean domination is maintaining. This Mohammedan
> awakening and advance in Africa has created a verita-
> ble crisis which calls loudly to the Christian world to
> be up and doing. For though Islam in Africa is an
> inferior and degraded system, adapting itself to the
> passions and superstitions of the heathen, yet it fills
> them with zeal, bigotry, and pride and makes the task
> of the Christian Church in accomplishing their evan-
> gelization a herculean one. Hear what Achmad Ab-
> dullah writes (Sunset Magazine, 1915, p. 99): “Now-
> adays when Christian missionaries discover a new
> and very pagan tribe in Central Africa, and return
> after a year or two with money collected at home to
> distribute the blessings of Christianity and a sam-
> ple line of cheap gin, they discover that the Mos-
> lem has been there ahead of them and the pagans
> greet them with the resounding shout of La ilia ill’
> Allah.”
> 
> Another principle taught by Sheikh Sanusi was in-
> tense hostility to everything foreign to Islam. He
> inveighed against the innovations brought in from
> Christian civilization. He forbade all intercourse
> with Christians and Jews. Because Sultan Abdul
> Aziz was friendly to Christians and was adopting
> Western ways he rejected his caliphate and denounced
> 
> him and the Turks as bad Moslems. He is said to
> have affirmed that he would crush out the Christians
> and Turks in one common destruction (Pears: “Tur-
> key, etc.,” p. 300). But when Abdul Hamid took up
> a fanatical policy, the Sanusiyahs united with him in
> the Pan-Islamic propaganda. In 1886 the Sultan was
> received into the order and in 1898 was acknowledged
> as caliph by the Sheikh, who sent his official repre-
> sentative to Constantinople (A. R. Colquhoun: North
> American Review, 1906, p. 910).
> 
> The Sanusiyahs do not make converts by the sword,
> but they undoubtedly have as one of their objects to
> use the sword, if opportunity offers, to deliver Mo-
> hammedan lands from the infidels. The Sheikh is
> ready for the jihad when victory seems assured. He
> is striving to unite Africa against the white man’s
> supremacy. His zawiyas are storehouses of ammuni-
> tion. Supplies of rifles and some cannon have been
> received from some unknown European sources. He
> has large funds, the offerings of his followers, which
> are used for the purchase of arms. The Sanusiyahs
> are encouraged to enlist in colonial regiments and
> secure European drill. Much intrigue is carried on
> among Mohammedan regiments of European Powers
> in Algeria, Egypt, Tripoli, and the Sudan, to make
> them disloyal. Youths are sent to Europe for edu-
> cation in military art. Reports even say that there
> are manufactories of arms in the oases in charge of
> graduates of European technical schools. The Sheikh
> has a devoted intelligence department in his strolling
> fakirs. (Compare “The Moslem Menace,” Nine-
> teenth Century, September, 1907, by Capt. H. A.
> 
> Wilson of the British army.) The centre of African
> Pan-Islamism, Wadai, was taken by the French in
> 191 o and can no longer be used as a base for prepara-
> tion against European rule. They may not listen to
> the call to the jihad by the caliph in Constantinople,
> but they will listen when the call goes forth from
> their own Mahdi. M. Hanataux, former French
> Minister of the Interior (Zwemer’s “Islam, etc.,” p.
> 170), says: “The religious orders of Islam are yet
> keeping their powder dry for the day of the great
> slaughter and the great victory.” Achmad Abdullah
> (Sunset Magazine, 1915, p. 99) says on this point;
> “Another invisible force at work is the incredible
> number of Mohammedan lodges with which Asia,
> North and Central Africa are honeycombed. Call
> them darvishes, call them Sanusiyah or gentle dream-
> ing Sufis, they all work towards the same object.
> Some of them experiment in practical magic, some of
> them are mystics, some of them are literati, poets,
> grammarians; some of them are beginning to make
> powder, bullets, and guns.”
> 
> The Mohammedan awakening is showing itself in
> the propagation of the Faith in other countries. In
> Russia the mullahs are carrying on a widespread and
> continuous itinerary, confirming those who need it
> and drawing in new converts, to whom pecuniary as-
> sistance is given ungrudgingly. Not only heathen
> Votiaks, Voguls, and Tsheremis on the west of the
> Ural Mountains are being converted, but even some
> Christians. At Atomva ninety-one families of the
> Orthodox have embraced Islam and fifty thousand
> who had joined the Russian Church have returned to
> 
> Islam since the proclamation of religious liberty.
> New mosques and schools are being built (“Islam and
> Missions,” p. 257). A great mosque has been erected
> at Petrograd, the Moslem press is active, Moslems
> sit as members of the Duma; new rights and privileges
> are being petitioned for and received.
> 
> In China, agents from the West have been visiting
> all the Moslem communities, preaching in the mosques
> and trying to revive Islamic faith and enthusiasm.
> There has been much stir. Training schools for prop-
> agandists have been organized, and the one at Peking
> has as its head a graduate of Al Azhar. An impetus
> has been given to the study of Arabic. The relation-
> ship with Western Asia is drawing closer. A Turkish
> missionary has gone to China to reside and preach
> Islam, but the effort to establish Turkish consulates
> failed. Yet success is not altogether unalloyed. Sev-
> eral mullahs some years ago returned from Mecca
> and began a revival. But the movement was opposed.
> The mullahs organized a New Sect. Strife and bit-
> terness arose. The conservatives made complaint
> against the New Sect and the Viceroy put them under
> the ban. When China was at war with Japan, 1896,
> the Old Moslems took advantage of the confusion
> to proclaim a Holy War against the Chinese. Then
> the New Sect took their revenge and were instru-
> mental in bringing about the execution of thousands
> of the others. Yet the slaughter was small compared
> with that meted out to the Moslem rebels in 1862-74.
> Despite these rebellions, the usual attitude of the Mos-
> lem Chinese is to practise conformity, and to worship
> in the Confucian temples and to take part in the
> 
> service to the idols. Now under the Republican gov-
> ernment they have cut off their queues (H. H. Rid-
> ley: Moslem World, 1913, pp. 386-90; Missionary Re-
> view, 1912, p. 722 ff.).
> 
> In India a striking fact is the awakening of the
> Moslem community to its own backward condition.
> They are showing a feverish desire to make up for
> their past neglect of privileges of modern civilization,
> and to regain a status superior to the Hindus. They
> are gaining in numbers much faster than any religion
> except the Christians, partly because they are more
> prolific than the Hindus, and also by the remarriage
> of their widows. They are gaining converts from the
> Hindus, to win whom they are showing much zeal.
> However, many of the conversions of Hindus to Islam
> are what are named by Mr. Takle (“Islam and Mis-
> sions,” p. 213) “love episodes—either elopements of
> Hindu girls or the taking of Hindu widows into Mos-
> lem harams.” Moslems are also beginning to work
> among the low-caste people, not without success.
> This is not the work of individuals only, but societies
> or anjumans have been formed who work through
> paid agents. The Moslem League promotes religious
> and political interests alike, supporting schools and
> preachers, and publishing literature. They have spe-
> cially requested collectors to inform them of any Mos-
> lem orphans, that they may not allow them to fall
> into other hands. In Lahore a Society for the Assist-
> ance of Islam was formed in 1885. It maintains
> schools, orphanages, and the Islamic College, repairs
> mosques, strengthens the wavering, strives to win
> back converts to other faiths, and interferes in every
> 
> possible way with the work of missions. It is also
> directed against Hinduism, which in the form of the
> Arya Samaj has been receiving some converts from
> Islam. This society, as well as those at Lucknow,
> 1894, at Cawnpore, and at other points, is making
> special efforts to educate the mullahs and to prepare
> them for the controversy and to propagate the Faith.
> The apologetic of Islam,1 including the history of
> Christianity, are added to the curriculum, with Eng-
> lish and the sciences. At Lahore there is also the
> Mohammedan Book and Tract Depot to distribute
> publications in defence of the Faith and the Koran
> in cheap popular editions. English books in favour
> of Islam or which lend themselves to Moslem propa-
> ganda, as Carlyle’s “Hero as Prophet,” are published
> and sold. Magazines are issued by different societies.
> Some journals have made a business of publishing all
> the evil reports about Christians which are to be
> culled from the press (Farquhar’s “Modern Reli-
> gious Movements in India,” pp. 347-52). In a word,
> the Moslems in India are alert for defence and ag-
> gression. They are active in the use of modern meth-
> ods for the propagation of their religion.
> 
> In Malaysia, the conversion of the heathen to Islam
> goes forward continuously. It has been marvellously
> successful in point of numbers, though lacking in
> transforming or elevating influence. The modern
> roads open up the way. Darvishes and traders pene-
> trate on them to the heathen interior heretofore un-
> 
> 1 In a new program of study for softas in Stamboul the
> “Szhar-ul-Hak,” a criticism of the Bible and apologetic for
> Islam, is included.
> 
> approachable. One method of the Moslem is to adopt
> an overbearing and lordly air, despising and scorning
> the heathen, so the latter becomes a Moslem to rise to
> the level of him, considering it a favour to be re-
> ceived. The heathen also sees that Islam is the one
> thing with which the Dutch Government does not
> interfere. He interprets this fact to mean that the
> Christian is afraid of Islam. The Moslem assures
> him that this is true and that the Sultan is greater
> than six kings. The converted pagan is full of pride,
> fanaticism, and craftiness. However, the Dutch mis-
> sions have given Islam a check and converted thirty
> thousand Mohammedans. Islam has, I believe, never
> converted any considerable body of Christians except
> those who were subject to its government. But curi-
> ously enough, at the present time, such conversions
> are occurring to a limited extent. I refer not to the
> Wofing, England, movement, which is almost negligi-
> ble. But in Abyssinia some Christian tribes have
> partly gone over to Islam and are in danger of being
> won over entirely. In South Africa, too, Malay and
> Indian Moslems through marriages with white women
> by the Moslem rite, which in law is regarded as con-
> cubinage, and through the adoption by them of Chris-
> tian children and orphans, are making a noticeable
> increase to the Moslem community. These half-breed
> children are all raised as Moslems. Again East-
> Indian coolies who have come to British Guiana and
> Jamaica have become a danger to the Christian and
> heathen coolies in these places and attentive efforts are
> necessary to prevent Islam from propagating itself in
> the New World. Already these immigrant Moslems
> 
> number 158,000. Most of them are in Brazil. They
> have seven Arabic newspapers.
> 
> Another sign of the times is the organization among
> Moslems of foreign missionary societies. In Egypt
> the “Society for Invitation and Instruction” has
> opened schools for the training of missionaries to go
> to heathen and Christian lands to invite to Islam. A
> similar attempt in Constantinople, called “The So-
> ciety for Knowledge and Instruction,” failed because
> the founder wished the language of the school to be
> Arabic, but the government decided it should be Turk-
> ish. Islamic congresses to consider the advancement
> of Islam have been held in Mecca, Egypt, Russia, and
> India. The Mecca congress was wise enough to con-
> sider the ailments of the religion. Fifty-seven reasons
> are said to have been mentioned for its decay, with
> the object of finding remedies for them. That in
> Cairo, 1907, was called by Dr. Gasprinski to “promote
> the moral, social, and spiritual regeneration of Is-
> lam” by a non-political, non-military movement. In
> India, with delegates from Turkey and Egypt present,
> 1910, the congress approved of missions in China and
> Japan. Missionaries were located in these lands. A
> deputation was sent to Japan headed by a professor of
> Lahore Government College. The first Japanese con-
> verts were Baron Hiki, his wife and daughter, who
> took the names Ali and Fatima. A Japanese officer,
> Jama-Oka, has been converted through his admira-
> tion of the warlike spirit of Mohammed. He made
> the pilgrimage to Mecca and a prolonged stay in Con-
> stantinople (Missionary Review, October, 1910, p.
> 722). Another convert started a monthly journal,
> 
> Al Islam. Professor Barakat Ullah started the Is-
> lamic Fraternity, published by Chinese Moslem stu-
> dents in Tokyo. Both were soon discontinued (Mos-
> lem World, 1914, p. 312). The press in all Moslem
> countries has a wide and strong influence. A number
> of weekly journals have been started for the propa-
> ganda; two important ones are in Constantinople.
> “The Spirit of Islam,” by Sayid Amir Ali, is being
> translated into Japanese. The latest sceptical and
> liberal literature is being distributed to show that
> Christianity is undermined. The Taarifi Moslemin
> has sent a delegation around the world to report on
> what will further the interests of Islam. It has a
> world-wide vision as never before.
> 
> What a powerful aggressive opponent Islam is! It
> is the greatest anti-Christian force in the world to-
> day. It is vigorous, active, determined. It is making
> progress, winning victories, planning other victories.
> No easy work lies before the Church if it would stem
> the tide of Mohammedanism and convert these masses
> to Christ. Christians should appreciate the greatness
> of the task. It is indeed a challenge to faith and only
> a faith which overcomes will undertake it. Such a
> faith will not falter.
> 
> The aggressiveness of Islam and its increase are
> calls to us to immediate and all-embracing efforts. A
> revived Islam, newly incited by the spirit of Moham-
> med, must be met by a revived Church inspired by
> the Spirit of Christ. Who can doubt the issue!
> 
> IV
> 
> MAHDIIST MOVEMENTS
> 
> THE coming of the Mahdi is a living hope in Is-
> lam. Mohammed foretold the advent of one
> who would “fill the earth with equity and jus-
> tice, even as it has been filled with tyranny and op-
> pression.” This Mahdi, “a guided or directed one,”
> and therefore able to be the Guide of men, “will
> reign over the earth seven years” (“Dictionary of
> Islam”). All Moslems await his coming. The
> Sunnis hold that he has never yet appeared. But
> Shiahs believe that he has appeared once and his re-
> turn is imminent. All believe that Jesus will accom-
> pany him. The Tradition runs that Mohammed said:
> “The Mahdi will descend from me … a man of
> my tribe and of my name.” The followers of Imam
> Ali, the fourth caliph, believe that he was by right
> the first caliph and that the office was hereditary in
> his line. His descendants in succession were recog-
> nized as Imams or caliphs by the Shiahs until the
> twelfth, but some recognized these only until the sev-
> enth, Jaffar-i-Sadik, and followed his son Ismiel, hence
> were called Ismieliyah. The Ismieliyahs expected the
> return of Ismiel as the Imam Mahdi and the Fatimides
> of Egypt regarded Obeidullah as that return. The
> former, who now prevail in Persia, are called the Sect
> 
> of the Twelve. Under the oppressive caliphs of Bag-
> dad the doctrine of the Mahdi developed among the
> Aliites. The first one who was acclaimed Mahdi
> was Mohammed, son of Ali by the Hanifite
> wife, and his Khalifa was Mukhtar. His fol-
> lowers, accounting that he had not died but
> simply disappeared, remained at Radwa near Me-
> dina, and awaited his return until their death.
> Husain, the grandson of Zaid, raised a standard as
> Mahdi, but the caliph had him hanged on a gibbet.
> The Abbasides came into power as caliphs with the
> aid of Ali Muslim and the Aliites, who believed they
> were aiding the Mahdi. Caliph Mansur named his
> son Mahdi either to engage the loyalty of the Mahdi-
> ists, or possibly to deride their claims. Each of the
> twelve Imams was hailed with expectation by his se-
> cret followers, till poison carried them off one by one.
> The last one, Mohammed Abul Kasim ( A.H. 329,
> A.D. 940), at Suraman Ra near Kufa disappeared into
> a grotto, departing to a land called Jubulsa or Jabulka.
> Expecting his immediate return, his faithful followers
> day by day went forth from their villages, armed and
> on horseback, to meet him. At midday prayer one
> hundred horsemen led forth a horse saddled and
> bridled to the shrine at Hillah, with trumpets and
> drums sounding. At the door they cried out: “In
> the name of God, come forth, O Lord of the Age!”
> Till the time of evening prayers they voiced their ap-
> peal,—but returned disappointed (Darmesteter: “The
> Mahdi,” p. 42).
> 
> So have they waited. The Sarbedarian kings of
> Khorasan in the fourteenth century, the Safavian
> 
> Shahs at Ispahan, the Kajars at Teheran, have kept
> two horses in the royal stables, splendidly caparisoned
> and in readiness for the appearing of the Mahdi and
> his lieutenant Jesus the son of Mary, who is to de-
> stroy Dajjal the Anti-Christ. The new Constitution
> of Persia was established to last only till the appear-
> ing of the Imam Mahdi. At the mention of his name
> the pious Shiah adds a prayer: “May God hasten his
> glad advent.” The dynamic of these movements is
> hope,—hope that springs eternal in the human breast,
> —a hope of amelioration, of material good, bound to
> a coming deliverer.
> 
> Through the Moslem centuries, this hope has
> caused the appearance of many claimants, followed by
> numerous wars, the downfall and rising of kingdoms,
> and the establishment of various sects. Conceived in
> the religious enthusiasm or maybe the ambition of the
> leader, born of the traditional expectation, nurtured
> in the discontent and unhappiness of the people, de-
> veloping soon into a military struggle, characterized
> by fierce fanatical warfare, they have ended either in
> subjugation through fiery persecution or in a triumph,
> bringing political supremacy to the Mahdi or his suc-
> cessor, who continued the same old tyrannical oppres-
> sion with no social amelioration. The Ismieliyahs, the
> Karmatians, the Druses, the Assassins, and the Nu-
> sairiyahs reaped their crop of fanaticism from the soil
> of Mahdiism. The dynasties of the Fatimides and
> of the Almohayes were founded by Mahdis. After a
> claimant by lack of success had proved himself an im-
> postor the hope revived again in a succeeding genera-
> tion; though some, as the followers of Sayid Moham-
> 
> med of Jeypore (“Dictionary of Islam,” Art.:
> “Ghair-i-Mahdi”), may declare that the Imam Mahdi
> has come and gone in the person of their leader and
> no other is to be expected.
> 
> Our own age has seen Mahdis not a few. Such a
> one was Sayid Ahmad of Punjab, who fought against
> the Sikhs in 1826. Another was Sayid Mohammed
> Husain of Persia, who appeared among the Ali Al-
> lahis. I had an appointment to receive him as a
> visitor. My tea-urn was boiling and I awaited him
> four hours before sundown. It reached the third hour
> and passed on towards sundown. Still no heavenly
> visitant deigned to take off his sandals in my hallway.
> On the morrow I was informed that the Governor-
> General had the intention to seize this divinity and he
> had escaped. His followers fought against the Shah’s
> forces in Mezanderan, believing themselves invulnera-
> ble till cold lead convinced them. Another such divine
> leader was Sheikh Kadir Agha of Maragha. A Mahdi
> lately rose in Somaliland; the Sheikh of the Sanusi-
> yahs was regarded as another. Mahdis or their fore-
> runners are constantly rising in Malaysia, making at-
> tempts against Christian rule. In 1882 the people of
> Borneo expected the Imam and cut in pieces all the
> Christians and heathen. Schamyl of Daghestan had
> much the same character. In Syria, living in restraint
> at Acca, is Sheikh Ali Nur-i-Din, called Insan-i-Kamil
> (“the perfect man”), who is regarded as a manifesta-
> tion of Mohammed and his essence as divine. Intox-
> icated by Sufiism, he led his followers into Pan-
> Theism, saying: “There is nothing but God.” He
> claimed to possess all the divine attributes and was
> 
> honoured as a Vali by Moslems (Missionary Review
> of the World, 1914, p. 200). These and other at-
> tempts to move the Islamic world by the fulfilment
> of its hopes need not detain us, for they failed to
> have a conspicuous and lasting influence. Leaders
> of rebellions are fond of taking this title and giving
> a religious aspect to their political schemes. But sev-
> eral of these movements have been remarkable in
> themselves and have made or are making a place in
> the religious and political life of Islam.
> 
> THE BABI MOVEMENT
> 
> The first of these is the Babi movement. The
> Sheikhis (of whom I shall speak, p. 155) had aroused
> keen expectation of the manifestation of Imam
> Mahdi. Haji Sayid Kazim of Resht, successor
> of Sheikh Ahmad Ahsai, is said to have discoursed
> much of the promised appearing, the signs which
> would precede it, and his characteristics. Announcing
> the “True One,” he said: “I see him as the rising
> sun” (“Trav. Narrative,” p. 239; “New History,”
> pp. 31-32, 341). Shortly afterwards Mirza Ali Mo-
> hammed announced himself as the Expected One.
> Born at Shiraz, the son of a cloth-seller, he served
> his apprenticeship in a shop at Bushire. After receiv-
> ing an ordinary primary training, he afterwards at-
> tended the lectures of Haji Kazim at Najef and Ker-
> bala. He did not acquire the correct use of the Arabic.
> He was of dreamy and devout disposition. His first
> book, the “Ziyaret-Nama” (“Pilgrim-Guide”),
> shows no consciousness of a mission, but deep venera-
> tion for the Imams and longing for the Return (Pro-
> 
> fessor Browne, in Journal of Royal Asiatic Society,
> 1899, p. 901). From such longings and contempla-
> tions developed the idea that he had communion and
> communication with the Imam. In the “Best of
> Stories,” a homily on the Surah-i-Yusuf, he definitely
> announces himself, at the age of twenty-four, as the
> Bab, the Door of communication. This was in 1844,
> A.H. 1260, about one thousand years from the disap-
> pearance of the Imam. Though he did not then break
> with Islam nor declare the Koran abrogated, he af-
> firmed that God would accept no one except he came
> to the Bab by the Bab; and he called himself “This
> well-favoured Arabian youth in whose grasp God has
> placed the kingdoms of heaven and earth” (ibid., p.
> 907).
> 
> In announcing himself as the Bab, Ali Mohammed
> was using a term familiar to Shiahs. It had been
> applied to several representatives of the absent Imam,
> after his occultation or disappearance. Abu Jafar
> Mohammed, who had assumed the title Bab, was put
> to death in the reign of Caliph Razi. In the numerous
> trinities of the Nusairiyah, the third person is called
> the Bab; as Maana, meaning; Ism, name; Bab, door.
> One of the trinities is Ali, Mohammed, and Salman
> Farsee (“Asian Mystery,” pp. 57, 111, 131). It was
> a term applied to Ali, also, in the Traditions as in the
> one cited by the Bab himself at his examination sub-
> sequently at Tabriz. He was asked, “What is the
> meaning of the name Bab?” He answered, “The
> same as in the holy tradition, (in which Mohammed
> said) ‘I am the city of knowledge and Ali is the gate
> thereof.’” From this name the followers were called
> 
> Babi. The first disciples, full of zeal and devotion,
> spread the message of the advent far and wide through
> Persia. Their assurance of faith and enthusiasm kin-
> dled responsive fire in many hearts. Soon the Bab
> made more exalted claim for himself and at the
> shrine of Mecca announced himself as the Mahdi or
> Kaim, the long-absent Imam, and finally as the Nukta,
> the Point of Divinity, in some sense a Manifestation
> of God. The number of his disciples grew apace.
> Some were dreamers, mystics, religious enthusiasts
> who had lived in expectation of the Advent; others
> were the discontented in whose hearts the oppressions
> and injustices of the rulers and the clergy had caused
> a longing for that reign of righteousness in which
> iniquities would be righted. These were reinforced
> by those who hoped in some change to serve their
> own interests. (See Mirza Kazim in Journal of Asia,
> 1866.) By the time the Bab had returned from
> Mecca to Bushire the news had been carried to the
> bounds of Persia. In Shiraz even the call to prayer,
> azan, had been made in the Bab’s name. The gov-
> ernment was alarmed. The Bab’s apostles, sent from
> Bushire, August, 1845, were forbidden to preach.
> The tendons of their feet were cut. The Bab was
> brought to Shiraz in chains. Thence he escaped to
> Ispahan, where the Governor, Minuchihr Khan, be-
> lieved on him and befriended him. The Shah’s Gov-
> ernment was supremely interested in these develop-
> ments. If the claim of the Bab were admitted, the
> Shah had nothing to do but to lead forth the waiting
> steed from the royal stables, mount Ali Mohammed on
> it, resign his throne to the Imam, and enlist under his
> 
> banner. Instead of this the Shah and his government
> determined to treat him as a self -deceived and dan-
> gerous enthusiast. He was conveyed under guard to
> the extreme northwest of Persia and confined in the
> fortress of Maku and afterwards at Chirik in Salmas,
> 1847-50, but during the greater part of the time per-
> mitted to write his books of Revelation, called the
> “Bayan,” and to correspond with his followers. (See
> writer’s article, “The Bayan of the Bab,” Prince-
> ton Theological Review, 1915, pp. 633-55.)
> 
> The death of Mohammed Shah was a signal for
> revolts and disturbances in many parts of Persia, on
> the part of claimants for the throne and dissatisfied
> noblemen. In this confusion the Babis, incited by
> persecutions and anxious to take immediate advantage
> of disturbed conditions to bring about the triumph of
> their cause, collected in armed bands. Collisions soon
> occurred with the Persian authorities, which devel-
> oped into insurrections at Sheikh, Tabarsi in Me-
> zanderan, at Zen j an, and at Niriz in Fars. The Babis
> fought with fierce courage, undaunted by the over-
> whelming odds and superior arms of the troops who
> attacked them. They threw up fortifications and,
> aided by their women, endured sieges for some
> months. Savage brutalities were enacted by both
> parties, the cruelties and barbarities of the Shiahs sur-
> passing those of the Babis only from the fact that vic-
> tory gave opportunity to the Shah’s forces. The
> Babis massacred the captive soldiers and unarmed vil-
> lagers at Dih-i-Nazar Khan (“New History,” p.
> 362). They cut off the heads of the slain enemies
> and placed them on posts around the rampart of their
> 
> fortress, by order of their leader, Janab-i-Kuddus
> (ibid., p. 73). Prisoners of war were put to death
> by them at Zen j an, the Shah’s officer being skinned
> alive and then roasted (ibid., p. 155).
> 
> Meanwhile the government, thinking to bring the
> contest to a close by removing the cause, determined
> on the execution of the Bab. He was brought to
> Tabriz, and condemned to death by the clergy and
> government. In the Jabbar-khana, when he and one
> of his disciples were bound and placed for execution,
> a marvel occurred. After the soldiers had fired and
> the smoke had cleared away, the dead body of the
> disciple was seen but not that of the Bab. His fol-
> lowers were ready to shout, “A miracle! A miracle!”
> and the populace to acclaim him. But unfortunately
> for the cause, though the shots had freed him from
> the ropes, the shop into which he fled had no outlet.
> He was discovered, led back, and executed. The in-
> surrection continued for a time, with fierce reprisals
> and barbaric cruelties on both sides. Finally the
> Babis were overcome and slain, many of them after
> they had surrendered. Later a plot by some Babis
> and an attempt to assassinate the Shah led to the ex-
> ecution of several score Babis in most cruel ways.
> Each one was separately allotted to a guild or class
> of the population of Teheran that all collectively might
> be liable to any revenge the Babis might see fit to de-
> vise. The repression and persecution failed to oblit-
> erate the sect. Some fled into exile. Many adopted
> the practice of dissimulation, which, under the name
> of tagiya, deems legitimate the denial of one’s faith
> and conforming to the dominant religion for safety.
> 
> Babism as fully developed was intended to be a
> substitute for Islam. The Bab superseded Moham-
> med; and the Bayan, the Koran. The new law abro-
> gated the old, and the Bab was rightful king entitled
> to supplant the Shah. As to his personality the Bab
> declared himself to be the manifestation and revela-
> tion of God—the Primal Will, the first and eternally
> created, the mirror of God, the Mukta or Point of
> Divinity. This Primal Will had been manifested in all
> the great prophets in an ascending scale of perfection
> and excellence. This manifestation said of himself:
> “I am God, and there is no other God than me, the
> Master of the Universe.” In this theology the Babis
> resembled the Batinis or Ismielis. In teaching the
> eternity of matter, the emanation of the Primal Rea-
> son, giving esoteric meanings to the precepts of the
> Koran, declaring the resurrection to mean the Advent
> of a new Imam, they but followed Abdullah Ibn
> Maimun, the leader of the Batinis (“Spirit of Islam,”
> pp. 489-92).
> 
> The Bab has been called a reformer, and he has,
> maybe, a slight claim to that title. In social matters
> he made scarcely an improvement, for while he taught,
> with the Sunnis and Sheikhis, that men of other re-
> ligions could be associated with and were ceremonially
> clean, yet he ordained that no unbelievers should dwell
> in the five chief provinces of Persia, and this prohi-
> bition excluded Moslems as well as Armenians and
> Jews. He was illiberal, discouraging the acquire-
> ment of sciences and foreign or ancient languages, and
> prohibiting the study of grammar, philosophy, law,
> and logic, and ordering the destruction of books on
> 
> these subjects. He looked with some favour on the
> elevation of women and maintained Kurrat-ul-Ayn,
> his celebrated disciple, when she at times threw aside
> the veil and instructed men in the religion. He en-
> joined marriage as obligatory, favoured monogamy,
> yet allowed bigamy. In practice the Babis continued
> polygamy. He allowed divorce for any cause, such
> as a quarrel; but the divorced should wait a year
> before seeking another partner. But a man should
> not divorce and marry more than nineteen times. A
> woman may go unveiled before the members of the
> family in which she grows up; she may even talk
> with a man outside of her own household, if neces-
> sary; but if the conversation is limited “to twenty-
> eight words it is better for the woman and the man.”
> He prohibited alcohol, tobacco, opium, and begging,
> and enjoined the golden rule, with kindness to chil-
> dren and animals. It is remarkable how little he has
> to say about morals, yet how much about dress, baths,
> and burial. Moslem rites, as the prayer postures, fast
> and pilgrimage, are modified as to time and place but
> with no essential difference. The zikrs or vain repe-
> titions of the name of God are continued. The sym-
> bolism of numbers and letters was greatly elaborated,
> and many doctrines were explained away by alle-
> gorical interpretations. Politically the Bab proposed
> no reform. Supposedly the substitution of himself
> and disciples or “Letters,” as he called them, for the
> old Persian rulers would bring about a reign of
> righteousness. He had assigned governorships to dif-
> ferent ones of his followers. That of Constantinople
> was promised to the Governor of Ispahan when he
> 
> pretended to be a Babi. The value of the Babi move-
> ment for Persia lay not in its ideas, for neither the-
> ologically nor socially did it afford any panacea. But
> it shook and shattered the power of the Shiah Muj-
> tahids. It helped to awaken modern Persia, to bring
> about independence of thought. It prepared some to
> break the bonds of traditions who were far from ac-
> cepting Babism.
> 
> BAHAISM
> 
> The one outstanding result of Babism is Bahaism,1
> which sprang from it and won over almost the entire
> Babi community. The Bab taught that no revelation
> is final and that another dispensation was to be
> founded by “Him whom God would manifest.” It
> is quite certain that the Bab expected an interval to
> elapse between himself and the next dispensation sim-
> ilar in extent to that which had passed between former
> dispensations. This interval is understood by Pro-
> fessor Browne to be either 1,511 or 2,001 years. It
> is irrational to suppose that the Bab delivered a revela-
> tion of several volumes and a detailed ritual to last
> only 19 years.
> 
> The Bab appointed, as his successor and head of
> the sect, Mirza Yahya, called Subh-i-Azal, the Dawn
> of the Eternal. At this time a number of the Babis
> laid claim to be “incarnations.” A sort of hysteria
> or mania seized these men and led them to assert their
> deity and the divine inspiration of their words.
> Finally Azal, who had fled to Bagdad, was acknowl-
> edged as caliph of the religion. He had a half-brother,
> 
> 1 See writer’s “Bahaism and Its Claims,” Fleming H. Revell Co.
> 
> Mirza Husain Ali, called Baha Ullah. Both were
> sons of Mirza Buzurk, steward of the household of
> a vizier of the Shah. They were born in Nur, Me-
> zanderan. Azal was son of the wife and Baha of the
> concubine. Baha Ullah acted as Azal’s assistant for
> a time, but later repudiated his supremacy and an-
> nounced that he himself was in reality “He whom
> God should manifest,” and that by a secret arrange-
> ment with the Bab, they had put forward Azal to act
> as chief for a time that the risk and danger might
> come upon his brother, and he himself escape the per-
> secution of the enemies. This rival claim resulted in
> a quarrel between the brothers which waxed hot at
> Bagdad, then at Adrianople, whither they were trans-
> ferred at the request of the Persian Government to
> remove them from the frontier and from the pilgrim
> highway. At Adrianople the quarrel reached a climax.
> They even plotted to assassinate each other. So Azal
> was sent to Cyprus, and Baha Ullah and his party to
> Acca, Syria. Baha waxed stronger and his preten-
> sions were accepted by the great majority of the
> Babis. A score of the leading Azalis who refused to
> follow him were assassinated. Azal became a negligi-
> ble quantity, though his few followers in Persia have
> been rather conspicuous. Baha worked over the ma-
> terials of Babism and evolved a system which he set
> forth as a new religion and universal dispensation.
> This is Bahaism. The two religions are essentially
> the same in theology, eschatology, hermeneutics, as
> well as in rites and ceremonies. They differ in some
> social and political principles and of course in substi-
> tuting Baha for the Bab.
> 
> Bahaism is a dogmatic religion, imposed by au-
> thority as a “revelation” to be received uncondition-
> ally and without question. It claims to be rational, but
> has as much mystery as any religion, with elements of
> pantheism and mysticism. Baha Ullah is regarded as
> a manifestation of the Deity—a higher one than the
> Bab, possibly of the Divine Essence itself. As God,
> he is the former of the Universe from eternal matter
> and rules over it. He is worshipped as the supreme
> God, the Father, a dignity and degree which he him-
> self assumed and which is granted him by his fol-
> lowers. The doctrine of incarnations is an old one
> among Persians. They regarded their ancient kings
> as divine and expected such an one in their deliverer,
> Saoshyant. They transferred their hopes and ideas
> to the line of Ali and the Imams. According to
> Makrisi, even in the lifetime of Ali there were those
> who exalted him to the divine rank. Afterwards Ab-
> dullah Ibn Wahab taught that “Ali was not dead but
> living, and that in him was a particle of the divinity”
> (“Asian Mystery,” by Lyde, p. 31). The doctrine of
> hulul prevailed, that God descends into human form
> without ceasing to be a unity. Shahristani describes
> it as “a descent of God’s essence or of the whole
> Deity, or of a partial descent or of a portion, accord-
> ing to the degree of preparedness of the person.”
> This doctrine appeared all through Mohammedan his-
> tory, among the Ismieliyahs, Fatimides, Druses, As-
> sassins, and others called in general Ghulats or ex-
> ceeders. One representative of these sects is the Ali
> Alahis of Persia, the same as the Alivi or Kuzul-
> Bashi of Asia Minor and the Nusairiyahs of Syria,
> 
> who altogether number some two millions. The
> Catechism and Manual of the latter says: “Who cre-
> ated us?” “Ali, son of Abu Talib.” “Is not Ali
> your God?” “He is the creator of heaven and earth.
> Besides him there is no God, the living, the self-
> existent” (“Asian Mystery,” pp. 234-52). To Ali
> ascription is made as follows:
> 
> “Mysterious Being! None can tell
> The attributes that in thee dwell;
> None can thine essence comprehend;
> To thee should every mortal bend.”
> 
> The persistence and wide acceptance of this doctrine
> is interesting as showing that the cold Moslem creed
> which puts God at a distance as an inaccessible ruler
> did not suffice for the human heart. This doctrine,
> and that of the Trinity, counted among the Christian
> mysteries, are not foreign to the thought of Moslem
> races nor uncongenial to their minds. These sects,
> in some measure perhaps remnants of Christian peo-
> ples, are found not only in Persia and Turkey, but
> among the Kurds, Syrians, Arabs, and Egyptians.
> This doctrine is again emphasized in Bahaism. It
> teaches that divinity was manifested in Moses, Jesus,
> Mohammed, Zoroaster, and others, but in greater ful-
> ness in Baha Ullah, who is set forth to the Jews as
> the fulfilment of the prophecies of the Messiah; to
> the Christians as the Second Coming of Christ; to
> the Moslems as the Mahdi or Husain; to the Parsees
> as Shah Bahram; to Brahmans as the Avatar. He is
> “It” with a capital letter, as I have seen printed in
> their books.
> 
> Another doctrine emphasized by Bahais is “Rijat,”
> 
> the Return of the prominent believers of the former
> dispensation. It is akin to metempsychosis, but is ex-
> plained to mean rather a reappearance in the spirit
> and power of the former Imam or apostle. Another
> aspect is allegorical interpretation. This method is
> said to have been first applied to Islam by Mohammed
> son of Ismiel, son of Imam Jafar-i-Sadik. It is called
> tavil or elm-i-batin, and its adepts were called Batinis.
> By setting forth the inner meaning they explain away
> the precepts and doctrines of Islam. In accordance
> with this, Baha, following closely the Bab and his
> predecessors, explained the general resurrection as the
> rising and appearance of a new manifestation, the
> judgment as condemnation or acquittal by the mani-
> festation, and receiving spiritual life from him. The
> “Questioning by the angels in the tomb” is the sum-
> moning by the messengers of the manifestation to
> those in the tomb of ignorance to believe; and the
> return of the angels to God is the report of the mis-
> sionaries; the “bridge of Sirat” is the testing at the
> call of faith; paradise is the condition of belief and
> hell is unbelief.
> 
> Bahaism makes much of the symbolism of num-
> bers. It takes over the sacredness of 19 from Babism
> and establishes a new calendar of 19 months of 19
> days each, abolishing the week. Baha also sanctifies
> the number 9 because the letters in Baha add to 9 in
> abjad counting. Much is made of the name Baha
> as a charm and talisman; it is inscribed on rings and
> breastpins.
> 
> The “Revelation” is contained in the “Ikan,”
> “Kitab-ul-Akdas,” and numerous other writings
> 
> which surpass, it is claimed, all previous scriptures.
> Faith in Baha is now the supreme duty and the means
> of salvation. Baha condemned Sufiism and darvishes,
> yet his book, “The Seven Valleys,” shows how to
> follow the Sufi Path; he commends the zikr or repe-
> titions of the divine name and his messengers travel
> as darvishes in their rounds. The chief rites are the
> same as in Islam, with variations; prayer has similar
> ablutions, postures, and genuflections, with prescribed
> words, but is made with face towards Acca and ad-
> dressed to Baha Ullah; the fast is for a month of
> nineteen days, with total abstinence from food during
> daylight; the pilgrimage to Acca includes bowing be-
> fore Baha’s image and kissing the shrines. There are
> imitations of baptism and of the Lord’s Supper; ablu-
> tions of the dead are minutely prescribed. There is an
> effort to be different from Islam, but Bahaism has
> nothing new nor superior to it in regard to worship.
> 
> Baha also attempted to lay down laws, criminal,
> civil, and social. Among the punishments prescribed
> are execution for murder, branding on the face for
> theft, small fines for adultery, and burning alive for
> arson. Mohammed never prescribed punishment by
> fire, saying it was God’s instrument. As to woman,
> she should be educated and more social freedom al-
> lowed her. Marriage is enjoined, monogamy recom-
> mended, bigamy allowed. Baha himself took two
> wives and a concubine, all of whom bore him children
> and survived him. Loose divorce is allowed. War,
> the jihad, slavery, wine, and opium are condemned.
> Baha’s contact with the West at Adrianople and in
> Syria somewhat modified the theories he had learned
> 
> in Babism. He revoked the condemnation of learning
> and travel, commended intercourse with all men, gen-
> eral education, and a universal language. The agita-
> tion connected with the great peace-movements of the
> first half of the nineteenth century influenced him to
> advocate peace and arbitration. He bound up the
> Bahai theocracy to a system of constitutional mon-
> archy substituting local and national councils for one-
> man power. But he declared that all members of
> these councils should be Bahais and taxes collected
> and distributed according to Bahai law. It is quite
> evident that in such a newly constituted state Chris-
> tians and Moslems alike would have few rights.
> 
> As a pensioner of the Turkish Government and
> restricted in residence to the neighbourhood of Acca,
> Baha spent the last twenty years of his life in a fine
> house and beautiful garden, surrounded by his dis-
> ciples, receiving the pilgrims and their gifts and freely
> carrying on his propaganda by letters and messengers.
> His efforts at reconciliation with the Persian Govern-
> ment brought relief to his disciples, and their condi-
> tion was rendered more secure by Baha’s permission
> to practise tagiya, concealment or conformity to the
> Shiah religion.
> 
> Baha Ullah died in 1892. After his death a bitter
> quarrel occurred between his sons and wives regard-
> ing the succession. It was full of cursings and male-
> dictions, anathemas and lawsuits. It resulted in a
> second schism and in both leaders being put under
> renewed restrictions by the Turkish Government.
> Finally Abbas, the oldest brother, became chief of the
> sect, with the title of Abdul Baha, the Servant of
> 
> Baha. He claimed to be the Centre of the covenant,
> the Interpreter and Expounder of the Faith and Lord
> of the New Dispensation. Under him Bahaism has
> begun a wide propaganda, and aspires to be the uni-
> versal religion. The zeal of a Christian convert to
> Bahaism, a Syrian named Khairalla, who had come
> to America on business, gave an impetus to this idea.
> He was able in 1894-98 to make some eight hundred
> converts to Bahaism in Chicago and its neighbour-
> hood. The credulity of Americans inspired great
> hopes of success. These American converts began
> to make pilgrimages to Acca, recognizing, in Abdul
> Baha, Christ Jesus in his Second Coming and worship-
> ping and adoring him as Lord and Master. This is
> described by one of the pilgrims, Mrs. Getsinger, in
> the following words (Isaac Adams: “Persia by a
> Persian,” p. 479): “I was waiting for the king to
> come. I reached Him first and knelt down before
> Him, kissing the hem of His robe. He helped me to
> my feet and keeping my hand walked with me into
> the house. He led me into the room where lies the
> most brilliant jewel that ever shone on the earth,
> Baha Ullah. … He led me down a flight of stairs
> and I pressed His hand to my lips.” In another letter
> she describes the meeting with Abdul Baha: “My heart
> gave a great throb and I held out my arms, crying,
> ‘My Lord! my Lord!’ and rushed to Him, kneeling
> at His blessed feet, sobbing like a child. I sat down
> at His blessed feet, while He took my hand. … He
> allowed me to kiss His blessed hand.” An English-
> woman, Mrs. Khairalla, of the same party wrote, “I
> threw myself on my knees before Him and sobbed
> 
> aloud from the emotion that filled my soul. He gave
> me His dear hands to kiss, such fine delicate hands
> they are, and patted me tenderly on my cheeks and
> shoulders.” But this party of pilgrims became af-
> fected by the schism. Khairalla became the leader of
> the sect of the younger brother, Mohammed Ali, in
> America. Though retarded by this, Bahaism has
> gained 2,000 or 3,000 converts in 17 States, compris-
> ing 27 congregations. It has a publication society,
> has issued Baha’s “Revelations” in English, and has
> a monthly paper—i.e. published every 19 days. It has
> a missionary society called the Orient-Occident Unity,
> which sends missionaries to Persia and aids Bahai
> schools there.
> 
> In 1908 Abdul Baha was freed by the Turkish revo-
> lution from all restriction as to residence and spent
> several years in Egypt. Afterwards he made mission-
> ary journeys to Europe and America, being received
> to the pulpits and platforms of the United States with
> friendly cordiality as an honoured guest. His visit
> of eight months showed no special results. The prop-
> agandists have extended their journeys to India,
> Burma, South Africa, and Hawaii. They have
> gained small groups of believers in England and Ger-
> many. Though its success is very limited, and even
> in Persia its numbers have not reached beyond
> one or two hundred thousand, yet the fact that such
> a revolt from Islam has been able to establish itself
> among a Moslem people and to start a partially suc-
> cessful propaganda among Christian people consti-
> tutes it one of the interesting movements in the Mos-
> lem world of to-day. Its failure in Persia to co-
> 
> operate with and assist the Constitutional movement
> and the struggle for the liberties of the people shows
> that expediency rather than the good of mankind
> guides its policy. In relation to Christian missions
> it is a hindrance. One aid that it has incidentally ren-
> dered is in breaking the solidarity of Persian Islam,
> and thus by its struggle to gain religious freedom for
> itself it has promoted freedom for converts to Chris-
> tianity.
> 
> THE AHMADIYAS
> 
> A new religion, similar to Bahaism, was promul-
> gated in India in the last quarter of the nineteenth
> century. Its founder was Mirza Gulam Ahmad, a
> moghul by lineage. He was chief of the village of
> Qadian in the Punjab. From him the sect is called
> Ahmadiya.1 He was a man of some property and
> respectable family. His father was a physician of the
> old Greek school and Mirza Ahmad professed to be
> proficient in the same art. In religion they inclined
> to Sufiism. In his earlier years he was brought into
> contact and controversy with Christian preachers, and
> was perplexed by his inability to answer their argu-
> ments. He became a recluse and cogitated on reli-
> 
> 1 It has been investigated and described by Dr. H. D. Gris-
> wold, in a tract named “Mirza Gulam Ahmad.” I have con-
> sulted also his article, “The Ahmadiya Movement” (Moslem
> World, 1912, pp. 373-79); Professor Siraf-ud-Din, “Mirza Gulam
> Ahmad” (Missionary Review, 1907, pp. 749-56); Dr. J. Murray
> Mitchell, “A New Sect in India” (Missionary Review, 1904, pp.
> 97-100); J. N. Farquhar, “Modern Religious Movements in
> India,” pp. 137-48; Dr. E. M. Wherry, “Christianity and Islam,
> etc.,” pp. 178-82.
> 
> gious themes, till he at last reached the conclusion
> that he himself was a “revelator.” When about forty
> years of age Ahmad laid claim to being the Mahdi,
> according to Sunni traditions, and at the same time
> Jesus Christ who should accompany the Mahdi. In
> 1880 he issued his “Barahin-i-Ahmadiya,” the Argu-
> ments of the Ahmadiya. Among his works is “The
> Teachings of Islam” in English. He seems to have
> identified the Mahdi with Mohammed, and thus he
> was the “return” of both Jesus and Mohammed, not
> literally, but exactly as has been explained in the
> teachings of Baha Ullah. He thus claimed to be the
> fulfilment of the hopes of these religions, professing
> to reform and unite them. He also claimed to be a
> manifestation of God in a certain sense. This he
> states thus: “The mantle of divinity is cast upon the
> person who is thus favoured of God, and he becomes
> a mirror for the image of the Divine Being. This is
> the secret of the words spoken by the holy prophet,
> ‘He that hath seen me hath seen God.’ … I shall be
> guilty of a great injustice if I hide the fact that I
> have been raised to this spiritual pre-eminence.”
> (Quoted from “Teachings of Islam,” Moslem World,
> 1912, p. 319.) As such he is the Lord of the Age,
> Mediator, Intercessor, Revealer, and Reformer.
> 
> Regarding Christ he taught that he was born of a
> virgin, that his miracles were not real but spiritual.
> He held to the swoon theory of Christ’s death, de-
> claring that he was crucified, seemed to be dead, was
> buried in a state of unconsciousness. He cited as
> proof of this the Gospel of Barnabas. The wounds of
> Jesus were quickly healed by a salve called the
> 
> Marham-i-Isa, the ointment of Jesus whose wondrous
> powers, he asserts, are extolled in a thousand medical
> books, Christian, Moslem, Jewish, and Persian.
> After coming out of the tomb and appearing to his
> disciples, Jesus went to Afghanistan and Kashmir.
> This departure is the ascension. The inhabitants of
> these lands were the lost ten tribes to whom Jesus
> preached. Finally he died a natural death and was
> buried in Srinagar, Kashmir. The tomb and shrine
> of a certain Yus Asaf is pointed out as that of Jesus.
> In reality it is the tomb of some obscure Moslem Pir
> of several centuries ago. In proof of his assertion he
> cites the fictitious story of the “Unknown Life of
> Christ,” by N. Notovich, in which an imaginary ac-
> count is given, ostensibly from a Buddhist manuscript,
> of a journey of Jesus to India before his ministry in
> Judea. Mirza Ahmad adds another imaginary jour-
> ney after the crucifixion, and on it, as a basis, refutes
> the Christian religion. He is specially desirous to get
> rid of the doctrines of the atonement and the resur-
> rection. In other ways he condemns Jesus, as for
> associating with evildoers. He denied his “power,
> wisdom, and moral perfection.” He was extremely
> hostile to Christianity, and it was the progress of mis-
> sion work that incited him. He declared Christianity
> to be corrupted. Its great errors were the deification
> of Christ and belief in his expiatory death and literal
> second coming; its corrupting practices are drunken-
> ness, prostitution, and gambling. God has sent Gulam
> Ahmad to rebuke them and call them to a new faith.
> His message to Islam was that they receive him as
> a peaceful Mahdi. The traditions about a warrior
> 
> Mahdi are pronounced forgeries; he, the Mahdi-
> Messiah, had come to bring peace among nations and
> to reconcile religions. The jihad he abolished and de-
> clared it to have been a curse to Islam. His followers
> should be peace lovers and submit to British rule.
> One of the sect, writing in the Review of Religions,
> says: “I do not wish for any Islamic government or
> empire. What I do long for is this, that whoever be
> the ruler, the whole world may turn Moslem.” He
> denounced the tomb-worship and immoralities of Is-
> lam; discountenanced polygamy, yet practised it him-
> self. He excused Mohammed for allowing polygamy,
> divorce, and the seclusion of women, as a preventive
> of greater evils such as appear in Christendom. He
> explained the pleasures of Paradise figuratively. He
> claimed to be the exponent of true Islam and to propa-
> gate it. It is the true religion, as wide in its con-
> ception as humanity itself. It embraces all the in-
> spired religions, and prompts us to love and reverence
> not only for Mohammed, Moses, and Jesus, but for
> Rama Chandra, Krishna, and Buddha. He appealed
> to the Hindus to accept him as an Avatar. Needless
> to say Moslems denounce him as a heretic and im-
> postor.
> 
> The proofs of his mission submitted by Gulam
> Ahmad were from the former scriptures, from mira-
> cles, and from his own prophecies. For example from
> the analogy of John the Baptist being Elijah, from
> the teaching about the Second Adam, from the
> apocalyptic signs of the Millennium, and from the
> prophecy of the paraclete (John xvi, 7), which the
> Koran refers to in the words (Surah LXI): “Jesus
> 
> the son of Mary said ‘I … announce an apostle to
> come after me whose name is Ahmad.’” Gulam
> Ahmad’s predictions frequently took the form of fore-
> telling the death of the individual with whom he was
> displeased. When some of these died a violent death,
> suspicion was aroused. His followers were supposed
> to have helped to bring about the fulfilment. One
> of the men thus threatened, a prominent Christian,
> named Abdullah Atham, took precautions to have
> bodyguards, and the prophecy in his case failed.
> When these predictions of calamity had reached the
> number of one hundred and over, they merited the
> attention of the government and the Mahdi-Messiah
> gave his pledge to refrain from such imprecations.
> In view of these vindictive predictions, the Moslems
> composed a couplet, which I may paraphrase as fol-
> lows:
> 
> The true Christ’s power was such
> He made the dead revive;
> The false Christ’s fatal touch
> Brings death to those alive.
> 
> Ahmad had correspondence with Dowie, the Elijah of
> Zion City, Illinois, and challenged him to a discussion.
> He also proposed a test of the truth of their respective
> dispensations, namely, that whichever one of them
> died first should be proved a false prophet. Dowie,
> whether because he was much the senior in years or
> mistrusted Oriental providence, declined the test as
> irrelevant. In some cases where Ahmad predicted a
> son for his devoted follower, the advent of a daughter
> taxed his ingenuity for an explanation. One of his
> prophecies was that his village would be immune from
> 
> plague without inoculation. He also prepared the
> marham-i-Isa “solely under the influence of divine
> inspiration” and set it forth in a pamphlet as “the
> Revealed Cure for Bubonic Plague.” Neither proph-
> ecy nor ointment exempted his people from the
> scourge. The government also thought best to inter-
> fere with this divine quack-medicine. This latest Mes-
> siah was cut off in 1908 by the cholera.
> 
> Mirza Gulam Ahmad’s method of propaganda was
> vigorous. He was well acquainted with Arabic, Per-
> sian, and Urdu. In words he was an aggressive dis-
> putant. He favoured education and established mid-
> dle and high schools at Qadian. He made much use
> of the press, issuing more than fifty tracts, books, and
> memorials, and two magazines, one in Urdu called
> ‘Al Hakam and one in English called The Review of
> Religions. He organized his congregations with
> weekly meetings and conferences and with the chief
> society at Qadian. The membership has increased in
> the last decade. The Imperial Gazetteer of India,
> which calls it “the wildest development of recent sec-
> tarianism,” reported 10,000 in the Bombay Presi-
> dency in 1911; in the Punjab the census gave 18,695
> as against 1,113 m 1901. There is a branch in the
> Deccan. Dr. Griswold of Lahore, a special authority
> on the sect, estimates the total at 50,000. Some of
> the members are men of respectability and intelli-
> gence, even university graduates. Nearly all are from
> the Moslems, and they regard it as a reform of Islam.
> It certainly works towards the disintegration of ortho-
> dox Islam. Some disciples are reported to be in
> Afghanistan, Persia, Arabia, and Egypt. An inter-
> 
> esting phase of the movement is its propaganda in
> England. Mr. Khoja Kamal-ud-Din, an advocate, has
> established himself at Woking at the mosque erected
> by Dr. Leitner. By lectures and through a magazine
> called The Islamic Review, the doctrines are promul-
> gated. A new translation of the Koran is being is-
> sued. Free literature is distributed. The mission has
> been encouraged by the conversion of Lord Headley
> to its faith.
> 
> In this effort to propagate itself in Christendom, it
> is like Bahaism. In not a few points there is a strik-
> ing resemblance between these offshoots from Moham-
> medanism. Some of these may be accounted for by
> their springing up in a similar soil, a Mohammedan
> soil impregnated with Sufiism and Mahdiism, and in
> which some elements of nineteenth-century Christian
> thought had found lodgment. Both claim that a new
> revelation is needed because Christianity is dead and
> Islam needs reforming. Both claim to be in some
> sense divine manifestations, in another sense the “re-
> turn” of Jesus, of Mohammed, and of Krishna. Both
> propose to unite all religions. Both do away with the
> jihad and advocate peace principles. Both, after the
> example of Mohammed, sent letters to kings announc-
> ing their coming and inviting them to faith. Both
> practised polygamy and praised Mohammed and the
> Koran. Both belittled Jesus Christ, denying his mira-
> cles, his resurrection, his ascension and literal Second
> Coming. Both have some followers in foreign lands
> even among Christians. Both failed to bring about
> moral reformation in the conduct of their disciples,
> who have divided into sects on the death of the found-
> 
> ers. Both claimed as signs of their mission their
> eloquence in the Arabic tongue, the writing of spon-
> taneous verses, fulfilled predictions, their success in
> winning converts, and the good effects as seen in the
> conduct of their followers. Both made large use of
> the press; Baha Ullah sent his books to Bombay to
> be published owing to lack of liberty in Turkey and
> Persia; Gulam Ahmad had a press of his own at
> Qadian. The teachings of Ahmad are free from some
> extravagances and inanities of Bahaism. Neither
> sect appears to have any great future before it. Their
> chief usefulness has been to help towards the break-
> ing down of scholastic Islam—the one among the
> Shiahs, the other among the Sunnis of India. Baha-
> ism has definitely broken with Islam, while the Ah-
> madiya movement continues within its fold.
> 
> THE MAHDI OF THE SUDAN
> 
> Exceedingly interesting is the Mahdiist movement
> of the Sudan. It has been a present-day example
> before our eyes of what has occurred many times in
> the centuries of Islam. It would undoubtedly have
> issued in success and triumph but for the terrible
> machine-gun of the Christians which turned the tide.
> 
> Mohammed Ahmad of Dongola, in 1878, pro-
> claimed himself the long-expected Mahdi. He was
> descended from Mohammed through Husain and was
> of a family of successful boat-makers and worked at
> this trade in his youth. He received religious educa-
> tion at Khartum and at twelve is said to have been a
> hafiz, able to say the Koran from memory. He be-
> came a hermit at Abba, an island in the White Nile,
> 
> and acquired a reputation for austerity and asceticism
> and was venerated as a saint. Moving about among
> tke people, he described to them with thrilling elo-
> quence their oppressions and their wrongs and re-
> called to them the promise of a deliverer who should
> bring in the reign of righteousness. This guide was
> at hand, he declared, right would triumph, and the
> accursed Turks and Egyptians be driven from the
> land; their cruelties would be brought to an end. His
> magnetic appeal to the people, giving hope of release
> from injustice, had a powerful effect. It is said
> (Colonel Wingate: “Mahdism,” pp. 13-14) that
> “men wept and beat their breasts at his moving
> words; even his brother fakirs could not conceal their
> admiration. With rapid, earnest words he stirred
> their hearts and swayed their heads like corn beneath
> a storm. … In every hut and thicket echoed the
> longing for the coming saviour. At last a band said
> to him, ‘You are the promised leader,’ and in solemn
> secrecy he said, ‘I am the Mahdi.’”
> 
> The time was ripe. Conditions facilitated the ac-
> ceptance of such a claim. Half a century before,
> Mohammed Ali, Khedive of Egypt, after establishing
> his power in semi-independence of the Sultan, turned
> covetous eyes on the great south land of the Blacks—
> called the Sudan. He was urged on partly by greed
> of power, partly by the desire to extend the bounds
> of civilization. But instead of gold mines, the revenue
> to enrich him and his successors was from inhuman
> trade in human beings, and the grinding cruelties of
> unjust and oppressive taxgatherers. The rapacity and
> inhumanity of the slave-dealers cried out to God and
> 
> became a stench in the nostrils of Europe. The Khe-
> dive Ismiel saw that to retain a reputation as a civil-
> ized ruler he must suppress the slave trade. Hence
> Colonel Baker and General Gordon and others were
> commissioned for this work. Their service, ham-
> pered while it lasted, was cut short, then the Sudan
> lapsed into a condition of oppression, corruption,
> rapacity, cruelty, and inhumanity,—creating in the
> hearts of the people a soil fit for the springing up of
> Mahdiism.
> 
> The suspicions and fears of the Egyptian governors
> were aroused by the claims of the new Mahdi. They
> made several unsuccessful attempts to seize him, but
> their forces were defeated. He retired to the Nuba
> mountains, Kordofan. This was called his hegira or
> flight. Here he enlisted the powerful Sheikhs of the
> Baggaras. The religious enthusiast declared to them:
> “God himself came near to me and said, ‘Go, reform
> the Moslems and found a kingdom which shall be
> followed by everlasting peace.’ The Prophet came to
> me, laid his sword in my hand, and said, ‘With this
> sword conquer; for Azrael will go before thee and
> terror shall fall upon thy foes.’” The warlike Bag-
> gara professed their allegiance largely to secure power
> for themselves and the gain of the slave trade. They
> provided the Mahdi with wives and concubines from
> among their daughters. Abdullah of their tribe be-
> came his Khalifa. People flocked to his standard.
> The Mahdi subdued the forces of the Egyptians,
> bringing into subjection province after province. The
> defeat of Hicks Pasha and the annihilation of his ten
> thousand men carried conviction to all the land that
> 
> this was the True Guide. Gordon was sent to with-
> draw the garrisons. He was entrapped in Khartum.
> Too late his rescue was attempted. The Mahdi did
> not wish the death of Gordon. He seems to have
> wished him to occupy the place of Jesus, who, accord-
> ing to tradition, should reign with him side by side.
> He sent Gordon the costume of a believer, and a com-
> mand to accept the faith. But Gordon was formed
> in a more heroic mould and had a finer fibre to his
> character than Lupton Pasha, commander of Bahr-il-
> Ghazal, and Slatin Pasha, who denied their faith to
> save their lives. Gordon knew that he that loseth his
> life for the Truth’s sake shall find it unto life eternal.
> So that peerless Christian knight, saint, and soldier
> of immortal fame fell in the final assault of Khartum.
> 
> Victory had certified the Mahdi. The predicted
> marks, the V-shaped space between the teeth, the pos-
> session of Abdullah for a father and Fatima for a
> mother, were not fortuitous; Mohammed Ahmad ruled
> over nearly a million square miles. Before him lay
> the assured conquest of the Turks, the Christians, all
> the world.
> 
> As a religious movement Mahdiism professed to
> be a reform. It was a pitiable attempt. The Mahdi
> gave revelations and laws of his own. The Koran
> was also retained. Belief in the Mahdi was the first
> duty; unbelief the greatest sin. He ruled with a rod
> of iron. A terrible inquisition held sway. Criticism
> of his administration was punishable with mutilation
> or death. Special emphasis was laid on asceticism in
> food and raiment. A costume was prescribed. All
> must wear this jubba or coat to avoid distinction be-
> 
> tween rich and poor. Feasts at funerals or weddings,
> and riding a horse, except in war, if able to walk, were
> not allowed. When riding a donkey, attendants must
> not walk in company. Wearing long hair, wailing for
> the dead, writing with cursive letters were prohibited.
> Three vices were to be avoided—envy, pride, and neg-
> lect of prayer: two virtues to be practised—poverty
> and the Holy War. Of ten commandments, five were
> specifically about women, that they should cover their
> heads and faces, should not go to the graves at
> funerals, not have a dowry above ten dollars, and
> that men should oblige them to pray. The old Is-
> lamic laws of mutilation for theft and beating for
> wine-drinking were retained, but the use of tobacco
> was punishable with a hundred lashes while the wine-
> bibber escaped with eighty. The two most remarkable
> aspects of the régime were a sort of communism of
> property and an abnormal indulgence of sensual pas-
> sions. The property of all men had to be placed in the
> Bet-ul-Mal, the Community House, to be distributed
> by the Mahdi. To accomplish this the inquisition
> worked barbarously. Of this Colonel Wingate says:
> “The last Khali fate has been under European ob-
> servation, its propaganda has been studied most care-
> fully, and the whole may be summed up in the phrase,
> ‘Your money or your life.’ At Khartum the Mahdi
> changed into a sensuous voluptuary, luxurious and
> uxurious. He ate of all dainties, wore the finest ma-
> terials, was profusely perfumed. Instead of the
> straw mat on which he had hitherto sat and slept, he
> had the finest Persian rugs and an imported bedstead.
> He changed to his former uncouth costume to appear
> 
> in public as the leader of prayers, where seventy thou-
> sand men bowed before him on the grass and even
> stooped to kiss the dust he trod upon, and gathering
> it up kept it as a treasure. His bath water was car-
> ried away as a means of grace. Yet so great was his
> hypocrisy that, as Slatin says (“Fire and Sword in
> the Sudan”), “No man is more irreligious. I have
> never seen him say a prayer in his own house—only
> in public.” Making a show of piety before the peo-
> ple, he was guilty of the wildest excesses in private.
> His haram consisted of four hundred wives and con-
> cubines. By divorce he changed his four legal wives
> as often as his fancy suggested. His concubines were
> booty captured in war, mostly from the tribes which
> at the point of the sword had been forced to acknowl-
> edge him as Mahdi. As the result of his voluptuous
> life, he became debauched and effeminate, and at last
> met the reward of his prodigal excesses. A girl who
> had lost family, property, and all in the siege, “sub-
> mitted to outrage and obtained a terrible revenge.
> She gave the Mahdi a deadly poison, and after linger-
> ing in great agony, he died in 1885, but six months
> after the capture of Khartum. … The people stood
> round as though stunned. He could not die; he was
> immortal” (“Mahdism,” p. 228). Thus perished
> this contemporaneous example of a Mohammedan
> prophet. The Khalifa Abdullah succeeded to power
> and crushed the people beneath a heavier yoke. If
> the Mahdi had beaten them with whips, the Khalifa
> chastised them with scorpions. They were reduced
> to such a degree of ruin that they might well long for
> the oppressions of the Egyptians. Their deliverance
> 
> came by means of the Anglo-Egyptian force under
> Kitchener, at the battle of Omdurman in 1898. The
> bravery of the darvishes won the admiration and pity
> of their foes. Intrepid and undaunted, they charged
> again and again in the face of machine-guns, only to
> fall. Eleven thousand were killed, and 16,000 fell
> wounded out of 40,000 engaged in the battle. Sir
> Garnet Wolseley says: “I am sure our men would
> prefer to fight the best European troops rather than
> the same number of warriors who were under the
> influence of Mohammedan fanaticism.” (Quoted from
> Public Opinion, Vol. VII, p. 210, in Atterbury’s “Is-
> lam in Africa,” p. 101.) In view of the devotion of
> these darvishes, Dr. C. R. Watson exclaims: “What
> magnificent Christians these men might have made!
> Why should they not be given the True Guide who
> will lead them not to death but to life?” The Mahdi’s
> tomb had become a shrine as sacred as that at Mecca.
> It was said to be indestructible—a place of pilgrimage
> to last forever. The body was treasured as that of
> a deity. The tomb was destroyed, the body burnt,
> and the ashes cast into the Nile (Shoemaker: “Islam
> Lands”).
> 
> The result of the Mahdi’s rule was calamitous.
> The aspirations of the people for economic betterment
> were sadly disappointed. War, famine, and disease
> had wrought terrible havoc. Countless towns had
> been devastated, myriads of men and women had
> perished. Of a population of 8,500,000, three and a
> half millions were destroyed by famine and disease
> and three and a quarter millions by the wars. The
> country had diminished seventy-five per cent (“En-
> 
> cyclopedia Britannica,” Article: “Mohammed Ah-
> mad”). The battle of Omdurman is an important
> event in the history of Africa. Great Britain’s defeat
> and withdrawal would have meant the throwing back
> of civilization in a large section of the Dark Con-
> tinent. Gordon’s death has been made fruitful in
> good for humanity in bringing the Sudan under the
> influence of European civilization, and the opening of
> the way sooner or later for the inculcation of Gor-
> don’s faith, even though at present the Memorial Gor-
> don College has been perverted from that holy pur-
> pose.
> 
> CAUSES OF THESE MAHDIIST MOVEMENTS
> 
> What are the reasons for these Mahdiist develop-
> ments in Islam? One reason is the condition of de-
> generacy, corruption, injustice, and weakness. The
> Bab inveighed against the corruptions: the Sudanese
> Mahdi against the injustice. One sign of the Mahdi’s
> coming was decadence in Islam. Decline is not to
> them a proof of its falsehood, for traditions clearly
> state that this is to be expected before the coming of
> the Imam Mahdi. Thus the Bahar-ul-anvar of Maj-
> lisi (quoted in “Crusades of the Twentieth Century,”
> W. A. Rice, p. 424) has a tradition that Mohammed
> said: “A time will come upon my people when noth-
> ing will remain of Islam except its name and naught
> of the Koran except its writing,” and “the mosques
> of Mussulmans will be destitute of knowledge and
> worship and the Ulema will be the worst people under
> the heavens, and contention and strife will issue from
> them and return upon them.” This will precede the
> 
> triumph of the Mahdi and Islam will be revived and
> strengthened. To read “The Bahai Proofs” and its
> description of the mullahs one would suppose that
> such a time had come upon Islam. There is no doubt
> that Islam feels its weakness even more than it ap-
> pears to us, for the decline of political power and
> the prosperity of the Christians weigh on their hearts.
> A writer in the Mo ay ad of Cairo (Missionary Review,
> 1914, p. 163) says: “Where are our Ulema? Where
> are our leaders? Where are those who are able to
> donate funds for us to follow the example of the
> Christians? Things are in a bad condition. Oh God!
> send us some one to collect together our scattered
> forces!” This cry for a Mahdi was noticed by
> Keane, who under the name of Haj Haji Mohammed
> Amin made the pilgrimage to Mecca. He says (“Six
> Months in Mecca,” p. 33): “The old ideas of the
> near approach of the end of the world are very preva-
> lent in the East just now, which all in all is about
> as ready for the reception of some darvish Peter the
> Hermit as it well could be.”
> 
> SIGNIFICANCE OF MAHDIISM
> 
> Some have asked: “What is the dynamic of these
> movements?” It is the belief that these hopes are
> about to be fulfilled and that the glorious results which
> have been promised and long anticipated are now to
> be realized under the present Leader. But they come
> and go—the Mahdi of the Sudan,—the Mahdi-Mes-
> siah of India,—the Bab,—Baha Ullah—and still the
> Moslem world awakes to disappointment and hope
> deferred. These all show the sense of need, the un-
> 
> satisfied longings of heart in the Moslem world. Is
> it not significant that two or three of these latest
> prophets have proclaimed themselves the advent of
> Christ, and preached “peace on earth” and not the
> jihad? These new religions have failed, the hopes
> of reform and world regeneration through them have
> not reached fruition. The high aspirations and en-
> thusiasms of our fellow-men have fed on husks. The
> Church must make known to them Him who is the
> Desire of all nations, the True Guide.
> 
> V
> 
> MODERNISM IN ISLAM
> 
> MODERNISM in Islam is a tendency and a
> movement to bring the thought and life of
> Moslem peoples into harmony with the pres-
> ent age. Its object, in the words of one of its advo-
> cates, is “to dispel the illusory traditions of the past,
> which have hindered our progress, to reconcile Orien-
> tal learning with Western literature and science, to
> preach the gospel of free inquiry, of large-hearted
> toleration, and of pure morality.” The movement
> affects not only the religion but the life and customs
> as well. Though some new influences have undoubt-
> edly originated in Islam itself or been resuscitated
> from its past, yet the chief cause is the impact of the
> West on the East. It is the effect of Western civiliza-
> tion and Christian thought and life on Islam. This
> impact has been continuous and strong during the last
> century. Contact with Europe has been through vari-
> ous channels. Governments, diplomacy, jurispru-
> dence, commerce, travel, education, languages, science,
> arts, industries, literature, missions have each made
> its impression. A chief influence has been education.
> The going of young men to France and the prevalence
> of French language and literature have been large
> factors. Wider and deeper has been the effect of
> 
> British thought because brought to bear more directly
> and on the greater number in India and Egypt. The
> influence of America, through its missionaries and
> their schools and the atmosphere they create, has
> not been small. The “spirit of the age” has affected
> Moslem peoples, and philosophical and scientific prin-
> ciples, social and economic truths have awakened a
> response in their minds and consciences. Modernism
> as an intellectual system or a manifestation of open
> protest or aspiration is not fully in evidence in litera-
> ture and the press. But extensive modification in
> thought and desires is evident to one who has lived
> among Moslems for some years. He recognizes that
> there is a great, a wondrous change in mental atti-
> tudes, in social ideals, in prejudices regarding theo-
> logical conceptions. The reality cannot be set forth
> by statistics, nor by the examination of public or
> printed utterances of Moslems, for on matters per-
> taining to religion and the Sacred Law expediency
> often prevents expression of views, even if there is
> no actual repression. My conviction is that there is
> a marvellous change in the intellectual attitude and
> conceptions of intelligent Moslems. Islam for a
> thousand years has been traditional and under dog-
> matic authority. Reason had its place, which was to
> expound and enforce that which was accepted on
> authority. Logic and metaphysics were highly valued,
> but nothing contrary to the Traditions must be set
> forth. Now thought is being liberalized, moral con-
> ceptions and customs are being modified, and this is
> coming to pass through the infiltration, penetration,
> the direct impact and impress of Western or Chris-
> 
> tian civilization. This trend is toward Christian
> ideals and away from traditional Moslem conceptions.
> Islam is in ferment. I do not believe there are signs
> of religious disintegration, but there is demand for
> large modifications. There is a definite trend, partly
> conscious, largely unconscious, to adapt itself to the
> modern age. The reason is the conviction which has
> sunk into the minds of many that they are behind-
> hand, retrograde, non-progressive. This conscious-
> ness of inferiority has aroused a desire for improve-
> ment, a spirit of emulation. It is accompanied at
> times with a feeling of inability to proceed without
> guidance from those who are known to be in a supe-
> rior status, in spite of a prejudice which wishes to
> deny such superiority. The full effects of the leaven
> of modern ideas in Islam are not yet evident, and only
> the initial stage of the movement can be described.
> I shall present Neo-Islam in relation to religious
> thought, to the intellectual revival, and to social ame-
> lioration,—in other words, to theology, education, and
> the family.
> 
> NEO-ISLAM IN TURKEY
> 
> In regard to theological thought, if I begin at the
> seat of the caliphate, it is evident that new interpreta-
> tions of doctrine could not be made the subject of
> public discussion in Turkey, in the time of Abdul
> Hamid. There was no liberty of the press. There
> was expressed some sympathy with the reactionary
> doctrines of Wahabism; Pan-Islamism was main-
> tained, but liberalism in theology had no opportunity
> to find expression. Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din’s book re-
> 
> garding the caliphate was suppressed. Yet it is plain
> that Western thought was continuing to permeate the
> minds of the educated classes of Constantinople and
> of the port-cities such as Smyrna, Beirut, and Sa-
> lonica. Those who received the modern education,
> whether at home or abroad, became tinged with
> liberalism in theology. They have broken in many
> points with the old creed and ceased the observance
> of the fast of Ramazan and such rites. Secularism
> and scepticism often have taken the place of faith.
> Some of the Young Turks, in exile, even drifted
> away from all religion and became scoffers. Re-
> ligion with many persons is but an outward cloak,
> kept on for the sake of popular opinion. They have
> zeal for Islam traditionally as against any other creed,
> partly from pride, partly from race prejudice, or as
> the embodiment of national aspirations because it is
> a bond of popular unity. These modifications in prac-
> tice and in mental attitude are evident to all. The
> report on the “Preparation of Missionaries to the
> Near East” (p. 14) emphasizes the fact that the
> Mohammedanism of Constantinople differs materially
> from that of other regions, due to Europeanizing in-
> fluences and the “inroads of Western scientific,
> philosophical, and religious teachings.” These in-
> fluences have been felt, though in a less degree, in
> smaller cities and in Anatolia and Irak, but even
> there they have found deep lodgment and borne fruit.
> Even the wilds of Kurdistan have been penetrated by
> the modern ideas.
> 
> Since the establishment of the Constitution, liberty
> has increased and reforms in Islamic social life have
> 
> been advocated, but the stormy years have not in-
> vited men to the discussion of theological themes.
> The Sheikh-ul-Islam, the State Minister of Religion
> in Turkey, has made many decisions which do not
> coincide with traditional views and has expressed
> many liberal and modern opinions. In them he has
> followed the habit of attributing to Mohammed
> traditional sayings or finding in the Koran the basis
> for modern political and social reforms. The Sheikh-
> ul-Islam declared to Sir Edwin Pears that it was in
> accordance with the teaching of Mohammed and his
> example that Christians be treated as the equals of
> Mohammedans (“Turkey, etc.,” p. 330), that Moham-
> med had proclaimed unity and equality and that all
> who accepted the Unity of God were to be treated as
> brothers. Some Turkish Ulema have come to the
> point of admitting the right to examine and investi-
> gate matters of religion and to criticise and investi-
> gate the Koran and the Law. New explanations and
> new expositions are made possible by emphasizing a
> verse or tradition which may have been passed over
> previously but is now seized hold of because it suits
> the new purpose. The further consideration of mod-
> ern influences in Turkey I defer till the discussion of
> political movements, as they are closely associated.
> 
> MODERNISM IN PERSIA
> 
> In Persia liberty of thought and writing has been
> much restricted. The assumption by Babism of a po-
> litical and revolutionary attitude probably increased
> the restrictions. The publication of criticisms of the
> faith has not been permitted. A pamphlet describing
> 
> the mullahs, their faults and opposition to progress,
> was published in Baku, Russia. When copies of it
> were distributed through the book-room of the school
> of Mirza Husain Kamal in Tabriz, the antagonism to
> him was so fierce as to close the school and drive him
> from the city. The illustrated weekly Mullah Nasr-
> ud Din, published at Tiflis, which cleverly criticised,
> often with striking cartoons, the foibles of the clergy
> and state in Persia, was excluded from distribution
> through the mail. Even after Constitutional govern-
> ment was established, Sayid Hasan, editor of the
> Hablul Matin, who with his brother, the editor of the
> prominent paper of the same name in Calcutta, had
> given strong support to the Constitution, was ad-
> judged guilty of a serious offence because he referred
> with pride and regret to the condition of Persia before
> Islam and spoke of the Arabs as “lizard-eaters,” us-
> ing this expression of the poet Fardusi. For this of-
> fence he was brought to trial and sentenced to prison
> (Browne’s “Persian Revolution,” pp. 244, 234). In
> Tabriz, at the same time, Mirza Husain Khan, an
> editor, referred to the tradition of Mohammed in
> which he said that “Woman was made out of a
> crooked rib of Adam. If you try to straighten it, it
> will break; if you leave it alone, it will remain
> crooked.” He semi-humorously advocated freedom
> for woman and the amelioration of her condition,
> even an attempt to straighten the crooked rib. So
> much excitement was caused by the article that the
> editor was in danger, and was called to Teheran os-
> tensibly to answer for his offence, really for his pro-
> tection.
> 
> Modernism among the Shiahs may be said to have
> its rise with Mullah Sadra of Shiraz, Mohammed bin
> Ibrahim, an eminent theologian of the time of Shah
> Abbas the second. He revived the study of philoso-
> phy and science. He maintained liberal principles of
> the interpretation of the Koran and of judging tradi-
> tions rationally. His system strove to reconcile phi-
> losophy, Sufiism, and the Shariat. He and Abdu
> Razzak revived the study of Avicenna and his philoso-
> phy and set in motion currents of liberal thought. He
> no doubt had influence on Sheikh Ahmad of Ahsa, the
> founder of Sheikhism—which is an example of mod-
> ernism among the Shiahs. He was the source of the
> influence which led on to Babism and Bahaism, but
> while the latter both broke with Islam, the Sheikhis
> remained within the fold and strenuously opposed the
> Babis as anti-Islamite. The Sheikhis themselves suf-
> fered from the suspicion and hatred of the more ortho-
> dox Mutasharis. Their views have the virtue or taint
> of Neo-Islam. Sheikh Ahmad explained away the
> miracles of Mohammed. The two mentioned in the
> Koran,—namely, the cleaving of the moon and the
> miraj or ascent to heaven,—he did not deem super-
> natural. The latter he regarded as a dream or vision
> of the night, not a real journey. He denied the resur-
> rection of the body, teaching that man has an astral
> or spiritual body which accompanies the soul into the
> other world, and this is the resurrection. He directed
> his disciples to regard Christians as clean and not as
> a contamination ceremonially. He taught that there
> is always in the world a “perfect Shiah,” the repre-
> sentative of the Imam and his medium of communi-
> 
> cation. Through him is given the opportunity for
> the modification of interpretations. This overcomes
> the chief difficulty to the renovation of the creed in
> accordance with modern ideas and needs. The lib-
> erality of the Sheikhis is noticeable in their relation
> to Christians. The Sheikhi Mujtahids of Azerbaijan
> maintained social relations with the missionaries, and
> even sent their children to Europe and to the schools
> of the mission for education. One of these was the
> Sigat-ul-Islam. He would visit us, drink tea with us,
> discuss questions of science with us. He had a
> library of considerable size, received magazines from
> various countries, and was engaged in preparing an
> historical chronology. He did not express himself
> freely on religious themes and rather avoided discus-
> sion. I remember on one occasion when, seated in
> my parlour, I was discussing certain points with one
> of the mullahs who accompanied him, the Sigat-ul-
> Islam finally said: “Won’t you two stop trying to
> convert one another?” He was an open and sincere
> friend of the Constitution and did much to further
> the cause of popular liberties. He tried to bring about
> peaceful settlement with Mohammed Ali Shah, hold-
> ing telephonic conversations with him at Teheran to
> settle Tabriz troubles. Those were indeed troublous
> times. He fell under the suspicion of instigating and
> abetting the riot in Tabriz against the Russian gar-
> rison, and was hanged on the tenth of Muharram, by
> order of the court-martial, in the mashk-madan—
> the drill grounds. His last words were: “I have
> done my duty. I have tried to serve my country.
> Long live the Constitution.”
> 
> Another modernist Mujtahid of Persia was Haji
> Sheikh Hadi, Nazmabadi (Browne’s “Persian Revo-
> lution,” p. 406). Pie was of first rank among the
> Ulema of Teheran, learned, incorruptible, a counsellor
> and instructor of all. He was somewhat of a recluse
> and ascetic, sat on the ground outside of his house,
> and was visited by high and low. Viziers and princes
> were received by him without ostentation. He rose
> to receive no one save Nasr-ud-Din Shah. Sheikh
> Hadi’s influence was very great. He, a liberal-minded
> thinker, was branded as a heretic, but his influence
> was rather increased by this. He opposed popular
> superstitions, denounced prevailing abuses, led the
> minds of his hearers away from old beliefs. He had
> some of Tolstoi’s conviction of the dignity and neces-
> sity of manual labour and insisted on his sons and
> disciples working at a trade. His influence was very
> great in bringing about what is called the awakening
> of Persia. Men of all classes and creeds were helped
> to break with the traditional past through his criticism
> and instruction.
> 
> Though many mullahs were held in high repute and
> honour both for their learning and their faithfulness
> to their religion, yet it may be said that one character-
> istic of the age in Persia has been the contempt and
> obloquy heaped upon the mullahs. Dissatisfaction
> with the condition of religion has been great and has
> voiced itself in denunciation of the mullahs as the
> cause of the degeneracy of the times and of religious
> life. One cause of this was that many of them op-
> posed progress. Another and greater cause was that
> many of the Mujtahids are large landlords and were
> 
> supposed to look kindly upon if not to assist in cor-
> nering wheat.
> 
> MODERNISM IN EGYPT
> 
> In Egypt, modernism has come in as a result of
> Western education as well as from the influence of cer-
> tain progressive mullahs. Among these was Sheikh
> Jamal-ud-Din, who has been described in the chapter
> on “The Revival in Islam.” He had much influence
> on the Egyptians by applying philosophy to theo-
> logical discussions. From 1871 to 1879 he was lec-
> turer-extraordinary with a salary from the govern-
> ment. He influenced young writers who became emi-
> nent in the presentation of modern thought in new
> literary style. His most conspicuous pupil was Sheikh
> Mohammed Abdu, afterwards Grand Mufti (1875-
> 1905). The latter is called the founder of Neo-Islam
> in Egypt (Browne, ibid., pp. 3, 7, and Cromer’s
> “Modern Egypt,” pp. 174-77). He steered a middle
> course between the Europeanized Egyptians and the
> conservatives. He wrote books such as the “Amud-
> ul-Muslimin,”in which he protested against vari-
> ous laws and usages of Islam. He tried to reform
> divorce laws and the corrupt practices of the courts as
> well as the system of education. His freedom in deal-
> ing with traditional theology and law left him under
> the ban of the orthodox. His opposition to the ex-
> travagances of the Court of the Khedive and his sym-
> pathy with the aspirations of his own people made
> him at times unacceptable to the authorities. Lord
> Cromer describes another of these modern Sheikhs,
> El Bakri, who “boasted of his acquaintance with
> 
> Gladstone and Salisbury, quoted Rousseau on the
> Rights of Man in excellent French; indulged in plati-
> tudes about the blessings of parliamentary govern-
> ment, and borrowed books to study the French Revo-
> lution,—a compound of Mecca and the Paris Boule-
> vard, the latest development of Islam” (“Modern
> Egypt,” Vol. II, p. 177).
> 
> With the Grand Mufti and the reformers who have
> succeeded him the cry is “Back to the Koran.” This
> cry, says Rev. F. Wurz, “is heard in addresses, read
> in books, pamphlets, and daily papers, and has be-
> come rather universal” (“Islam and Missions,” p.
> 58). With some “Back to the Koran” and “Back to
> Mohammed” mean the same thing, namely, a desire
> to get away from the traditional law. S. H. Leeder
> (“Veiled Mysteries of Egypt”), a friend of Islam,
> expresses Sheikh Mohammed Abdu’s position as fol-
> lows: “Back to the Koran and the simple godliness
> of the Prophet; away from the superstitious inven-
> tions and fables of later men; let Islam be true to the
> spirit of its great founder and his friends.” Some
> who are saying “Back to Mohammed” are mean-
> ing rather to an idealized Mohammed, a prophet
> with the incarnated divine Light—not the prophet of
> history. Some there are who make a distinction, re-
> jecting Mohammed as an example and simply accept-
> ing him as the revealer of the Koran. A young re-
> former said to Mr. Gairdner (“Vital Forces,” p.
> 23): “The important thing is to accept the Koran;
> it is no part of the mission of the Prophet to give a
> moral ideal. Accept the Koran and then let Jesus,
> 
> if you like, be better than Mohammed.” These
> quote the Ulema as saying, “The Koran contains all
> that is necessary to salvation.” In this movement the
> Koran is being made more use of for ethical study.
> It is also being examined and commented on as litera-
> ture and its finest selections published separately for
> devotional uses (“Vital Forces,” p. 136).
> 
> This modernist call to go back to primitive Islam
> means a different thing from what it did as the cry
> of the Wahabis. The latter wished a puritanical
> reformation, rejecting all foreign influences. With
> the New Moslems it is a method of discarding anti-
> quated customs and laws and bringing Islam into har-
> mony with Western thought. They feel the necessity
> of appearing to be good Moslems and have a desire
> to maintain such a position with their own people.
> By a loose exegesis they hope to hold what they wish
> and discard what is unacceptable to them. They think
> thus to revitalize Islam and inspire it with a spirit of
> progress. They nominally stand in the orthodox posi-
> tion and cannot be classed as Mutazalites, as the New
> Moslems in India can. Lately some actual reforms
> have been brought about in Egypt, through the ef-
> forts of Sayid Ahmad Al Bakri and the heads of the
> darvish orders. They have regulated and limited the
> zikrs of the darvishes, their extreme gesticulations,
> hypnotic rites, and excitement. The ceremony, called
> Dozeh, at Cairo, in which the Sheikh of the Saadiyah
> on horseback rode over the prostrate bodies of the
> devotees, has been abolished. The attributing of su-
> pernatural powers to the tombs of the Sheikhs is
> being discouraged. (See Dr. J. Giffin: “Islam and
> 
> Missions,” p. 295; Dr. C. R. Watson: “In the Val-
> ley of the Nile,” p. 219; Professor Macdonald: Inter-
> national Review of Missions, 1913, p. 596.)
> 
> IN MALAYSIA
> 
> In Malaysia the influence of New Islam has been
> felt. Moslems in Java, conscious of their backward-
> ness, have inaugurated a movement looking towards
> progress and education. The “Society of Islam,”
> sympathetic with modernism, held a congress in
> Java attended by thirty thousand people. Among the
> questions discussed were the education of women, the
> freedom of the press, and self-government. A resi-
> dent reports that “Within the past year greater
> changes have come into the minds of the Javanese
> than in the past twenty-five years.” (Quoted by Dr.
> Zwemer: Missionary Review, 1914, p. 182.)
> 
> NEW ISLAM IN RUSSIA
> 
> Modernism is represented among the forty-two
> races of Moslems in Russia. This may be noted in
> external things. Men and women, too, are adopting
> Christian modes of dress, living in the Christian quar-
> ters of the cities, and conforming to their customs.
> Some of the women no longer live in seclusion nor
> wear the veil. Mullahs complain that the people are
> lax in their religious duties, even increasing their use
> of alcoholic drinks. Boys and even girls are attend-
> ing Russian government schools. The young Mos-
> lems enter the army and civil service as officers. In
> the Caucasus the movement is advanced. In Tiflis,
> Mullah Nasr-ud-Din, the journal already referred to,
> 
> makes sport of the foibles of the mullahs, holds up
> to ridicule old notions and customs and does ef-
> fective work by its bright cartoons. There is a weekly
> journal for Moslem women, edited by a Moslem
> woman. Besides these there are two dailies, the
> Hakikat and the Shariat, and a monthly called the
> Maktab. In Baku, Tagief, a petroleum millionaire
> has built a large school for girls. A society carries on
> other schools. Tracts and books have been published
> advocating reforms, and especially inveighing against
> the mullahs. Liberal education is progressing in
> Kazan and the interior of Russia. A prominent
> leader in Neo-Islam is Ismiel Bey Gasparinski. His
> organ, the Tarjuman, circulates through Russia and
> Central Asia. At Tomsk in Siberia a Moslem society
> for reform and progress has been organized (Mis-
> sionary Review, 1910, p. 738). In 1904 Mohammed
> Fatah Gilmani published a book in the Tartar lan-
> guage (Professor Vambery: Nineteenth Century,
> February, 1905), called “A Travel to the Crimea,”
> in which he commends to the Tartars the acquisition
> of European science, laments their backwardness,
> blames it on the mullahs and the old education, de-
> mands a vernacular version of the Koran, and that
> polygamy and divorce be discouraged, that women be
> allowed freedom, permitted to attend school, become
> teachers, preachers, and authors, and participate in
> public life. He declares that this desire for awaken-
> ing is a national feeling, born and fostered by their
> societies. Professor Vambery affirms that the move-
> ment has extended its influence to Eastern Turkistan
> and to many of the nomadic tribes of Central Asia,
> 
> and that it has a political and revolutionary side as
> well as literary and religious. It is certainly a notable
> fact that Tartars have developed their language, are
> preparing a modern scientific and general literature,
> and giving a corresponding education. A congress
> of Moslems met at Petrograd in 1914 with forty-two
> delegates, representing all parts of the Russian empire,
> even Tartary and Central Asia. They discussed the
> care of schools, the maintenance of high schools and
> colleges for Moslems, the need of women doctors,
> and general amelioration of moral and economic con-
> ditions of their co-religionists in Russia. They also
> formulated demands for equal rights with Christians.
> Concerning this, the Moslem members of the Duma
> are also alert to seek action.
> 
> NEO-ISLAM IN INDIA
> 
> It remains to consider Moslems in India with refer-
> ence to the influence of modernism among them.
> Here the movement has been more open and more
> widely extended, and from there has influenced other
> lands.
> 
> Neo-Islam in India received its great impulse from
> Sayid Ahmad Khan of Aligarh, 1818-98. He was
> distinguished in the Indian civil service, served the
> Crown well in the mutiny, was received in royal audi-
> ence in 1870 on his visit to England and knighted.
> His aim was to bring his co-religionists into harmony
> in doctrine and life with the modern age. To this
> end he encouraged English education, especially by
> founding Aligarh College, edited a magazine called
> The Reform of Morals, wrote a Commentary on the
> 
> Bible, admitting its truth and authenticity and trying
> to reconcile it with the Koran. He interpreted Islam
> according to rationalism and denied miracles. He
> recognized a human element in the Koran and ad-
> mitted the fallibility of both it and Mohammed. He
> declared that Islam in its traditional and exclusive
> mould had no future and strove to bring it into con-
> formity with the times and so strengthen it. Because
> he wrote much in regard to natural religion his fol-
> lowers were called Naturis. He started conferences
> among Moslems and was the founder of the Moslem
> League, which had for its aim social, economic, edu-
> cational, and religious reforms.
> 
> His influence was increased still further by his
> successors, who developed the same policy. One of
> these is Sayid Amir Ali, a graduate-in-law in London
> and a Justice in the Indian Courts. He is the author
> of “The Life of Mohammed,” “Mohammedan Law,”
> “The Legal Position of Woman in Islam,” “The
> Spirit of Islam,” etc. His attitude is that of a
> special pleader. He would explain away and gloss
> over the defects of Mohammed’s character and by
> strained interpretations show that the Sacred Law is
> in conformity with twentieth-century ideals. His
> teaching in regard to inspiration is evident from his
> saying (“Life of Mohammed,” 1873, p. 25) that
> Mohammed’s knowledge of Jesus was received from
> floating traditions in Arabia, prevalent in his time,
> part of the folklore of the country, and that the law
> regarding spoils in war was promulgated by Moham-
> med and incorporated in the Koran. He knows noth-
> ing of revelation from eternal tablets preserved in
> 
> heaven. The Koran comes by a lower form of in-
> spiration. He suppresses the supernatural and mi-
> raculous in the miraj, in the flight to Medina, or an-
> gelic action at Bedr (p. 83), rejects a personal devil
> and the jinns (p. 86). As to the facts of Moham-
> med’s history, he utterly disregards all that the ancient
> Moslem historians tell against his character, so that
> Dr. W. St. C. Tisdall is led to say: “A great modern
> discovery of the Neo-Mohammedan is that no reliance
> is to be placed on the earliest and most celebrated Mus-
> lim historians, traditionalists, and commentators,
> when they relate anything which a modern apologist
> deems discreditable to Mohammed, but that the very
> same writers are thoroughly reliable when they state
> anything in his favour” (Moslem World, 1913,
> p. 408).
> 
> As to the Shariat, Amir Ali states his far-reaching
> principle in the following words: “Commands and
> prohibitions have invariably been in consonance with
> the progress of humanity, and the law has always
> grown with the growth of the human mind” (“Mo-
> hammedan Law,” p. 13). “The elasticity of laws is
> their great test, and this test is pre-eminently possessed
> by those of Islam. Their compatibility with every
> stage of progress shows their founder’s wisdom. In-
> quiry will evince the temporary character of such
> rules as appear scarcely consonant with the require-
> ments or prejudices of modern times” (“Life of Mo-
> hammed,” pp. 227, 157). Many sumptuary regulations,
> precepts, and prohibitions of Mohammed were called
> forth by temporary circumstances. With the disap-
> pearance of the circumstances, the need for those laws
> 
> has also disappeared. The people, whether Moslem
> or not, who suppose that every Islamic precept is
> necessarily immutable do injustice (p. 194). With
> such views he relegates to a secondary position verses
> and passages of the Koran and Traditions which have
> held the field, and gives emphasis to other verses. He
> claims the right to ignore verses and to change inter-
> pretations, as he says the Christians have done. And
> further, as Bosworth Smith says (“Mohammed
> and Mohammedanism,” p. 257), “There are some
> among the New Moslems who see now, and there will
> be more who will soon see, that there will soon be an
> appeal to the Mohammed of Mecca from the Moham-
> med of Medina.” Amir Ali affirms the right of pri-
> vate judgment and, with special interpretations, re-
> jects from the Koran all that does not accord with
> his own ideas. He shows, to his own satisfaction at
> least, that Mohammedan “law itself may be consid-
> ered a prohibition of the plurality of wives,” and that
> slavery, intolerance, and war for the propagation of
> the Faith are not parts of Islam. It is at least a grati-
> fication to find an expounder of Islam who repudiates
> such practices. He does not accept the decisions of
> the Imams on traditional law as unchangeable nor
> exempt them from criticism. The Imams have in-
> jured Islam by making it fixed, reactionary, and un-
> able to adapt itself. Their decisions must be disre-
> garded. The fatvas of the Ulema, too, are without
> authority. Even the Koran can be criticised. All
> provisions of the Shariat not suited to the present age
> can be discarded. Reason is to be the judge and con-
> temporary sense of fitness the criterion. The Imams
> 
> have rejected five hundred thousand traditions and
> only found eight thousand authentic. Let us throw
> all overboard that do not suit us. Such is the atti-
> tude of this representative reformer.
> 
> Another writer of Neo-Islam is Maulvie Chiragh
> Ali, an officer of the Nizam’s government. He has
> published “Reform Under Moslem Rule” and
> “Critical Exposition of the Jihad.” Another of the
> group, Ali Hasan, has published a life of Mohammed,
> “The Last Prophet,” in which he discards the miracu-
> lous. The Light of Mohammed is simply the light of
> conscience with inspiration; the miraj or midnight
> journey was in vision only, jinns are but bad men,
> jihad is only to be in self-defence. Mohammed’s in-
> tercession, sinlessness, and miracle-working are not
> mentioned. The example of the Prophet has not the
> binding force of law on his followers.
> 
> Controversy has occurred among the Hanifites over
> the use of the vernacular in prayer and of translations
> of the Koran. The modern party take the ground
> that worship should be in a language understood by
> the participants. Besides the arguments of reason,
> they appeal to the tradition that Mohammed allowed
> his Persian converts to make their prayers in their
> own tongue (“Spirit of Islam,” p. 522).
> 
> Another New Moslem is S. Khuda Bakhsh. In his
> “Essays Indian and Islamic” he quotes with approval
> the teachings of Von Kremer and Goldziher regard-
> ing the relation of Roman law to the Shariat. He
> cites Nawaur as saying: “By far the greatest por-
> tion of the Muslim law is the outcome of true inquiry,
> for the actual passages of the Koran and Sunna
> 
> have not contributed a hundredth part of it. The
> Board of Nazar-ul-Mazalim had to decide not ac-
> cording to the letter of the law, but according to the
> principles of equity.” “Islam, stripped of its
> theology, is a perfectly simple religion. The Koran
> is a spiritual guide, not a body of civil laws. It was
> never the intention of the Prophet to lay down immu-
> table rules or to set up a system of laws which was to
> be binding apart from changed conditions.” He laid
> down rules of marriage, etc., intended to meet the
> then existing conditions. Muslim jurisprudence grew
> by the adoption of foreign rules (“Essays Indian
> and Islamic,” pp. 284-86). These principles give
> scope for a complete modernizing of Islam.
> 
> Another Indian reformer is Mulvi Abdullah of
> Chakrel, somewhat of an ascetic and a voluminous
> writer. His teachings are described by Canon Sell
> as a wide departure from orthodox Islam. He would
> return to the Koran, rejecting all traditions. Polyg-
> amy and the jihad are declared to be against the
> Koran, the azan or call to prayer and the rosary are
> rejected, as well as all pilgrimages except the one to
> Mecca, which must be limited to simple ceremonies
> and be without the kissing of the black stone. Neither
> Mohammed nor any other man can be mediator at
> the Day of Judgment. The intermediate state is one
> of unconsciousness.
> 
> Another new sect is the Ahli Koran, the People
> of the Koran, who have some following in the Pun-
> jab. They reject traditions entirely, denounce polyg-
> amy, and affirm that neither Mohammed nor any
> other of the prophets had more than one wife
> 
> (“Vital Forces,” p. 173).1 In general it may be said
> of these Indian Moslem reformers, in the pertinent
> words of Mr. Gairdner (“Reproach of Islam,” p.
> 206;: “They read into the Koran almost everything
> they have come to like, and out of it almost every-
> thing they have come to dislike.”
> 
> Such are the principles of Neo-Islam. Have its
> expounders forsaken the Faith? By no means.
> They are strenuous Moslems. They proclaim the
> greatness and glory of Mohammed, whitewash his
> record, expurgate from Islam all blemishes, and make
> it the possessor of every excellency demanded by
> public opinion of the twentieth century. Justice Amir
> Ali2 is bitterly and scornfully anti-Christian and
> scours the history of Christendom from age to age
> to find crimes to set against those of Mohammed and
> 
> 1 It is curious how the reformers of Islam cling to some of the
> old Oriental ideas. This is noticeable in regard to assassination.
> Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din said in an interview with Professor Browne
> (“Persian Revol.,” p. 45): “No reform can be hoped for until
> six or seven heads are cut off,” and specified Nasr-ud-Din and
> Amin-i-Sultan. Both these were afterwards assassinated. Jamal-
> ud-Din also proposed that Khedive Ismiel should be assassinated
> and Sheikh Mohammed Abdu says (quoted by Lord Cromer, Vol.
> Ill, p. 181, from W. S. Blunt’s “Secret History,” p. 489): “I
> strongly approved of it, but we lacked a person capable of tak-
> ing lead in the affair.” We are reminded of the assassination of
> the Azali Babis by the Bahais. The attempts to assassinate the
> new Sultan of Egypt are also instigated and applauded by high
> religious authorities of Constantinople. See Chapter V.
> 
> 2 The historical attitude of this learned representative of New
> Islam may be seen in his lament over three things (p. 342):
> 1. The failure of the Persians to conquer Greece. 2. The failure
> of the Arabs to conquer Constantinople in the eighth century.
> 3. The unfortunate results of the battle of Tours. “Each of
> these has prevented the growth and progress of civilization.”
> 
> primitive Islam. (See “Life of Mohammed,” last
> chapter.) Principal Morrison of Aligarh College
> says: “They believe that in their Faith are enshrined
> the great truths of religion and morality; but that in
> the past they have misread the word of God, and
> that the narrow-minded mullahs have expounded it
> amiss.” (Quoted in “Crusaders of the Twentieth
> Century,” p. 49.)
> 
> It must be borne in mind that this rationalistic
> method of interpreting Islam is not new. This In-
> dian school of thought is a revival of the Mutazalis,
> who existed under the Abbaside caliphate of Bagdad.
> Then Persian thought and influence were prevalent
> and exercised a strong tendency to free Islam from
> the fetters which were fast being bound upon it. Vic-
> tory was apparently with this party of free thought.
> Orthodoxy seemed to have lost the adhesion of the
> learned. But Al Askari, using as his weapon the dia-
> lectics of Aristotle and teaching Greek logic to the
> orthodox, gave them the victory and established rigid
> legalism and traditionalism in Islam (Stanley Lane-
> Poole: “Studies in a Mosque,” pp. 171-74; Geden’s
> “Studies in the Religions of the East,” p. 831).
> Again the disciples of free thought take the same
> name. Amir Ali says (preface to “Mohammedan
> Law,” p. x): “Belonging myself to the little known
> but not unimportant philosophical and legal school
> of the Mutazalis, and thus occupying a vantage ground
> of observation, I cannot but observe the movement
> that has been going on for some time among them.
> The advancement of culture and the growth of new
> ideas have begun to exercise the same influence on
> 
> them as on other races and peoples. The young gen-
> eration is tending unconsciously to Mutazalite doc-
> trines. It must not be supposed, however, that this
> movement results from a weakening of the Islamic
> faith. It originates more from the desire to revert to
> the pristine purity of Islam and to cast off the excres-
> cences which have marred its glory in later times.
> To me it appears that great changes are imminent in
> the social institutions and personal laws of Indian
> Mussulmans.” But we need not expect much to re-
> sult in the way of uplift to Islam from rationalizing
> and intellectual defence and pruning. No Erasmus
> can set on fire a genuine reform. Still as Persian in-
> fluence had great results in the old time, the foreign
> civilization in India will show effects on Islamic
> thought and conscience.
> 
> VI
> 
> THE NEW EDUCATION IN ISLAM
> 
> MOSLEMS, especially in the Near East, have
> had considerable intellectual life. But educa-
> tion long ago became stereotyped. For cen-
> turies it has been clerical. Its centre was the mosque,
> its teacher the mullah or mudarris. Generally there
> is a mullah in each village and a mud-walled, adobe
> mosque, unceiled and unfloored, without furniture
> save the membar or pulpit and a bastinado in the
> corner for refractory boys. The father on bringing
> his boy into view of this instrument of torture, would
> say to the mullah, “The bones are mine, the skin and
> flesh are yours, only teach him letters.” The pupils
> gave fees and presents to the mullah. These were not
> large nor abundant, as is evidenced by the story of
> a father who brought his boy to the mullah and said:
> “Ay, mullah, what will you take to teach my boy to
> read?” “I want ten tomans,” answered the mullah.
> “That’s too much,” exclaimed the father; “I can buy
> a donkey for that sum.” “Buy,” retorted the mullah,
> “and then you will have two.” (See author’s “Per-
> sia; Western Missions.”) The income of the mullah
> was supplemented by writing deeds, contracts, letters,
> and charms for the people. The pupils sit on reed
> matting without desks. They are unclassified, and
> 
> when one recites alone the rest of the pupils learn
> their lessons aloud in a singsong tone. In cities these
> schools are in different wards, and some of them in
> the bazaars, separate from the mosques.
> 
> The basis of the curriculum is learning to read the
> Koran. In countries in which Arabic is not the ver-
> nacular, this is injurious to the pupils. Many of
> them spend all of the few years which it is their lot
> to attend school learning to read Arabic by rote and
> often very imperfectly. This schooling is of no prac-
> tical use to them. Many who read fluently do not
> understand its meaning, yet they have their reward
> in the great merit of simply reading the holy words.
> This has been a great hindrance to popular education
> even in Persia and Turkey. In less civilized lands it
> has been nothing short of a calamity. In Sierra
> Leone and Central Africa, Moslem education is de-
> scribed as an unintelligible learning by rote of the
> Koran and committing to memory of a few prayers,
> to which is added a course in witchcraft, making
> charms and fetishes. In Malaysia the instruction has
> a stupefying rather than an enlightening effect. It
> is mechanical and parrot-like. They learn neither the
> tribal language nor the Malay. Mr. Simon says:
> “They acquire a number of Arabic formulae and
> facility in rattling off a few Malay phrases of which
> they practically do not understand a word.” For-
> tunately common sense and race pride asserted them-
> selves in Persia. So after some time spent in reading
> Arabic, the pupil is permitted to learn his vernacular,
> and a course in Saadi, Hafiz, and other poets has
> developed many Persians of good literary ability.
> 
> Private instruction at home has been a sub-
> stitute for good schooling for the nobles and the
> scribes. Even in Arabic-speaking lands the old sys-
> tem hampers education by confining education to
> the dialect of the Koran and not using the modern
> dialect.
> 
> Higher education, under the old system, was con-
> fined to training for the Ulema. The course of in-
> struction included theology and law, the Koran and
> the Traditions and their exposition, with grammar,
> rhetoric, and logic, and possibly some mathematics.
> It excludes modern sciences and languages. These
> madressas are supported by tithes and vakf, endow-
> ments. They develop acute and well-trained faculties,
> and have served their purpose through the medieval
> period of Islam. But a spirit of narrowness and big-
> otry rules in them. Many of them are hotbeds of
> fanaticism. They train up their talabas or softas to
> be reactionary, not only hard-bound to traditionalism
> in the sphere of religion, but adverse to the progress
> which modern science brings to mankind.
> 
> THEOLOGICAL SCHOOLS
> 
> The theological-law schools of Islam have continued
> on the ancient basis. Shiah madressas at Kerbala and
> Najef, Sunni ones at Mecca and chief cities of Turkey
> and Central Asia, have changed but little. One of
> the most celebrated of these is Al Azhar at Cairo.
> Time was when a Christian was not even permitted
> to enter its precincts, but fortunately for the members
> of the Cairo Missionary Conference that rule no
> longer holds. I was greatly interested in walking
> 
> through its crowded cloisters, and seeing its multitude
> of students, sitting on the floor, in circles around their
> Sheikhs and Muftis. As we passed from group to
> group I kept imagining what ones might be from
> Kazan or Bukhara, what ones from Morocco or Java,
> from Cape Town or Peking, and where they will be
> scattered after years of training in the lore of Islam.
> This famous theological school was founded by the
> Fatimide Jowhar, vizier of Sultan Muiz, A.D. 969,
> at the time Cairo was laid out. It has as high
> as 325 professors and 11,095 students from many
> lands. Each nation has its section or dormitory. The
> Italian Government lately established a hostel with
> 150 students from Erithrea and Tripoli “to train
> students to teach the coming generation in Tripoli the
> Islamic doctrine, the Arabic tongue, and love of
> Italy.” Al Azhar has large endowment from which
> a daily dole of bread is given to the students. It is
> noted specially for instruction in theology and Arabic.
> Rev. F. Wurz points out that it is a mistake to refer
> to Al Azhar as a great foreign missionary centre, for
> it does not send out missionaries to non-Moslem lands.
> It is rather an international theological seminary. It
> is intensely conservative. The Grand Mufti, Moham-
> med Abdu, tried to modernize its curriculum by intro-
> ducing some secular learning into the preparation—for
> example, geography and history. The necessity for
> this may be seen from an incident related by Dr. Wat-
> son (“Egypt and the Christian Crusade,” p. 48). A
> graduate of Al Azhar was teaching Arabic to a mis-
> sionary and came upon the word Asia. He asked,
> “Where is Asia? Is it a part of Europe?” The
> 
> Mufti’s plan was not accepted by the professors,
> caused difficulty, and the Khedive secured his resig-
> nation. Al Azhar continued to illustrate the stagna-
> tion of Moslem conservatism. The Khedive tried his
> hand at reforming it, and as an inducement increased
> its revenues from forty to two hundred thousand
> pounds. But owing to dissatisfaction with its spirit
> and management, he ceased to patronize it. A ninth
> attempt to modernize it failed in 1910. A new regula-
> tion was that all students who had been in the uni-
> versity more than seventeen years should leave if they
> failed in the coming examinations. I believe that it
> still teaches the Copernican system. A similar school
> in Constantinople, used, until a few years ago, a text-
> book for physical science which was a thousand years
> old. There is much dissatisfaction with such institu-
> tions. This is voiced by a Moslem, Mushir Husain
> Kidwal, who wrote in the Hindustan Review: “Even
> the educational institutions stink of the old decaying
> smell.”
> 
> The old system of education reached only a small
> proportion even of the boys. Illiteracy prevailed in all
> Moslem lands. For example, take the Persians—a
> people with a literary classic tongue and masterpieces
> which have merited the admiration of the world.
> Travellers who report about the proportion of the
> population who can read fail to consider the village
> and nomad people. In many villages scarcely one in
> a hundred can read. Probably the estimate made
> about Moslem lands for the Cairo Conference is ap-
> proximately correct,—namely, that ten to fifteen per
> cent are literate, though in India, where the census
> 
> gives the correct figure, not more than five in a hun-
> dred of the men can read and only four in a thousand
> of the women.
> 
> Discontent with these conditions has led to a move-
> ment for modern education. The desire is to do away
> with this antiquated system, and to substitute modern
> methods and curricula. This is one of the significant
> movements—one that is having large influence on
> their lives and religious conceptions. The new educa-
> tion is Western and carries with it a large element of
> Christian truth.
> 
> In the Near East the modern ferment of ideas
> began at the time of Napoleon. After his invasion of
> Egypt and Syria, those lands continued in closer and
> more constant contact with Europe. After that time
> European influence is continually evident. It was at
> the same time that ambassadors from France, Britain,
> and Russia began special efforts to influence the Shah
> of Persia; and the people of Persia began to know
> something definite about Christian civilization. A
> powerful influence was exerted by Europe on the Near
> East during the nineteenth century by the coming of
> young men in considerable number from Turkey,
> Syria, Egypt, and Persia for education. They re-
> turned much changed in religious belief and practice
> and with ideas and purposes out of harmony with the
> old conditions. They especially felt the need for their
> own people of the literary and scientific culture which
> they had seen in Europe. This need was made more
> prominent and a general impulse was given to new
> education among Moslems by the mission schools and
> by those of the Oriental churches among their own
> 
> people as well as in some countries, as India, by the
> government schools.
> 
> NEW EDUCATION IN PERSIA
> 
> I shall begin a review of this educational movement
> with Persia. The first Persian students who returned
> from Europe to Persia about the middle of the nine-
> teenth century were not well received and were viewed
> with suspicion (Markham’s “History,” p. 19). But
> in the subsequent period, many of the most enlight-
> ened men have had the benefit of European training.
> Such was Hasan Ali Khan, Amir-i-Nizam, the able
> though unscrupulous governor of Azerbaijan, who did
> so much to overthrow the tobacco monopoly. The
> late regent Abul Kasim Khan, Nasir-ul-Mulk, a grad-
> uate of Oxford, and different members of the family
> of Riza Kuli Khan, Lala Bashi, were prepared by it
> to take a prominent part in organizing the Constitu-
> tional government. Many members of the medical
> profession were of the modern school, and not a few
> of them received the foreign training. What is true
> of Persia is more the case with reference to other
> countries of the Near East. The visit of the Shah
> Nasr-ud-Din to Europe led him to encourage Western
> learning. He founded the Shah’s College, with a cur-
> riculum on European models. When I visited it in
> 1881 it was doing fairly good work, but it did not
> develop rapidly in standard and efficiency. A few
> other schools were established in the chief cities of
> the country. The teachers and graduates of these
> schools were, for the most part, liberal-minded and
> progressive, with a lighter sense of the obligation of
> 
> the Shariat and a less bigoted attitude towards Chris-
> tians. There was a tendency towards secularism and
> scepticism which seemed to endanger religious char-
> acter, and threatened to bring about a condition where
> young men of culture would be freed from the re-
> straints of Islam and have no faith in Christ to take
> its place. A term, Frangi mahab, was applied to a class
> of men who were imitators of foreign ways and often
> without substantial character back of it. Spasmodic
> but for the most part unsuccessful efforts were made
> to establish schools. The Constitutional movement
> gave a vigorous impetus to new effort, but no systems
> could be organized owing to disturbed conditions.
> Within a year twenty schools were opened in Tabriz
> and a correspondingly larger number in Teheran,
> where the education of girls took a good start. But
> all these schools only accommodated a few hundreds
> in the smaller cities and a few thousands in the larger
> places. The reactionaries under Mohammed Ali Shah
> showed their attitude towards the new education by
> looting and burning the schools, the libraries, and
> breaking in pieces the printing-presses. A remarka-
> ble opportunity came to the Missions to educate the
> Moslem youth. They came by the hundreds to their
> schools, taking the religious lessons because of their
> desire for the science and languages. Impetus was
> given to plans for higher education and projects were
> initiated to develop colleges for Moslem students in
> Teheran, Tabriz, and Ispahan.
> 
> EDUCATION IN TURKEY
> 
> On Turkey the influence of Western education has
> been marvellous. Many young men have gone to
> France and some to England and Germany. French
> to a great extent became in the nineteenth century the
> language of diplomacy and business. It became also
> a means of literary culture. A European movement
> set in strongly, especially from 1850 to 1870. Lit-
> erature took on new life and developed under the
> stimulus. The literary style and taste of Osmanli
> scholars were transformed. Of Turkish poetry previ-
> ous to that time Gibbs says (“Turkish Poetry,” Vol.
> V, pp. 1-21): “It was Persian in its inception, Per-
> sian in substance it remained.” Thereafter the litera-
> ture of Turkey no longer followed the Persian models
> but those of France. The intellectual life of the edu-
> cated was changed as were their political ideals. Re-
> markable modifications are noticeable in their ideals
> and forms. The language itself was remodelled and a
> new prose created by Shanasi Effendi, Namik Kamal
> Bey, and Ziya Effendi. Abd ul Hak Hamid Bey
> acquired fame as a vernacular poet, though the Sultan
> prohibited his works from circulation. Literature
> ceased to be an adjunct of the work of the clergy.
> The drama was introduced. French drama and
> Shakespeare were translated. Ideas of patriotism and
> liberty permeated literature.
> 
> The reforming Sultans favoured popular education
> as a means of bringing Turkey into accord with Eu-
> ropean life. About the middle of the nineteenth cen-
> tury schools were established in which children of all
> 
> races were to be educated without distinction. These
> were elementary, middle or rushdiya, and lyceums or
> colleges, including normal, agricultural, technical,
> medical, law, military, and naval schools. The pri-
> mary schools were fairly numerous in the provinces,
> and high schools in the cities. Some few were for
> girls. The School of Commerce did not prosper, be-
> cause the Turks do not take to business life. After
> a score of years it has only a handful of stu-
> dents.
> 
> The Christian population did not take kindly to these
> mixed schools, preferring to have schools distinctive
> for their own language, literature, and religion. Nor
> were they acceptable to the Moslems. They were
> changed in 1870 to schools for Moslems only, in which
> their religion was specially taught and foreign lan-
> guages abandoned. Of this period Charles Dudley
> Warner wrote: “Signs enough are visible in the
> Levant of a transition period, extraordinary but hope-
> ful; with the existence of poverty, oppression, super-
> stition, and ignorance, are mingled Occidental and
> Christian influences, the faint beginnings of a revival
> of learning and the strong pulsations of awaking com-
> mercial and industrial life.” Later Abdul Hamid re-
> stricted the schools, for he would have kept the people
> in ignorance, and especially would have prevented the
> spread of liberal ideas. But he knew the necessity
> of education for officers, so he supported some good
> military and medical schools. He even let some
> students go to Europe to learn military science, but
> prevented all others even from travel, as much as he
> could. He allowed more freedom for the education
> 
> of girls, not apparently dreading their influence on
> politics or perhaps despising it as of no account. Yet
> many young men escaped to Europe, and were edu-
> cated there and the Young Turks are largely men of
> this class. Since the Constitution was established,
> Turkey has talked much about promoting education.
> Indeed, some of them attributed their defeat by the
> Balkan states to their lack of education. The Ikdam
> (quoted in The Orient) says: “Why have we been
> beaten? Because our adversaries have even in their
> villages primary schools.” They have given liberty
> to scientific, and philosophic study. They have
> planned much, but accomplished little. One reason is
> that the prosecution of or preparation for war has
> exhausted their funds. The appropriation for public
> instruction is 65,000,000 piastres, about $3,000,000,
> while that for war, navy, and pensions is 1,400,-
> 000,000 piastres (more than $60,000,000) in time of
> peace. Even the schools with a religious endowment,
> or avkaf, are in a pitiable condition and have been
> decreased from 325 to 250. Another difficulty has
> arisen from mixing politics with the educational plans,
> and pursuing the policy of Turkifying the subject
> races, and compelling the Albanians, Arabs, and others
> to learn the Turkish. In spite of all, some progress is
> being made. Female education is being encouraged.
> Girls are being prepared as teachers; some have been
> placed by the government in the normal course of the
> (American) Constantinople College and others sent
> to Europe. A significant incident occurred at Nico-
> media in February, 1914. Moslem boys and girls took
> part in school exercises together. Girls of twelve and
> 
> thirteen made recitations and addresses before an
> audience of two thousand people. The governor made
> a stirring appeal for general education and especially
> for the culture of the future mothers. Another sig-
> nificant event was the inception by the Sheikh-ul-
> Islam, Hairi Bey, of a new “Theological Madressa of
> the Great Khali fate,” at Constantinople,—to be a
> training-place for the Ulema of the whole Islamic
> world, to rival and eclipse Al Azhar. Its distinctive
> feature is that it will give instruction in all modern
> science and philosophy, and turn out Ulema who shall
> be progressive leaders in intellectual life (The Orient,
> October 7, 1914). A Moslem university has been
> started at Medina. The cornerstone was laid No-
> vember 29, 1913. An address was made by Sheikh
> Abdul Aziz Shawish. The irade of the Sultan de-
> clares that its object is the teaching and spread of the
> eminent truths of Islam; all Christian influence is to
> be excluded. It will also teach agriculture and en-
> gineering. Its central committee will be in Constan-
> tinople, but superintendence in the hands of a com-
> mittee at Medina.
> 
> At Jerusalem, the Madressa-i-Kulliyah has been
> founded to prepare religious leaders in theology, with
> scientific and sociological training. It is under the
> direction of Sheikh Shawish, who says it is a restora-
> tion of an institution founded by Salah-ud-Din, but
> which became a Roman Catholic school, but now re-
> verts to the Turkish Government. Its programme is
> broad. It starts with one hundred boarders, free in-
> struction, and government endowment. Secular uni-
> versities are announced for Bagdad and Damascus.
> 
> The Committee of Union and Progress is at least in
> some respects true to its name.
> 
> Since the increase of liberty, Moslems showed a
> desire to attend the mission colleges. The largest
> representation has been at the Syrian Protestant Col-
> lege at Beirut, but there has been a disposition to shirk
> the religious instruction.
> 
> A curious development has been the organization of
> Turkish Boy Scouts. It was initiated at the War
> Office, with Enver Pasha as Chief Scout. It has a
> definite military object, to draw the wealthy Turks into
> military life, and secondly to promote a Neo-Turanian
> spirit,—to develop Turkish nationalism, to use the
> Turkish language by discarding Persian and Arabic
> words. For example, in the oath Allah is not used,
> but Tengri, not Sultan or Padishah, but Khakan. It
> is an attempt to link themselves with the great Turk-
> ish race which extends to the border of China.
> Maybe it is prophetic of the fact that Byzantine and
> Arabian connections are about to cease.
> 
> IN EGYPT
> 
> In Egypt the influence of Europeanized Moslems
> has been specially felt. Even Khedives and the present
> Sultan of Egypt were educated in Europe. The Khe-
> dives opened schools, normal, polytechnic, medical
> and military, and for girls. They had in 1880, before
> British occupation, 5,000 schools with 111,800 pupils.
> Under British superintendence the system has been
> enlarged on European methods. The traditional re-
> ligious teaching is given to the classes. Some Mos-
> lems are held firm by it, others tend to scepticism.
> 
> Some Coptic pupils under the influence of the lessons
> have accepted Islam (Gairdner: “Methods, etc.,” pp.
> 62-63). To crown the system the National Uni-
> versity has been founded on Western models. It has
> considerable grants of land and endowments from
> Princess Fatima Khanum. The cornerstone was laid
> April 10, 1914. It is without a religious foundation.
> Schools of engineering and agriculture have been
> opened at Giza. At Tanta success seems to have been
> attained in modernizing the Sheikh’s Mosque School.
> There 3,400 students have the benefit of a course of
> study including geography, history, physics, drawing,
> and hygiene (S. A. Leeder, in “Veiled Mysteries of
> Egypt”). Young men seem to care little for higher
> education except as a means to official appointment.
> Six hundred youths are in Europe for education at
> their own expense, the majority of them in England.
> They do not seem to attend to study, and a committee
> has been appointed to have oversight of them.
> 
> Striking progress has been made in female educa-
> tion. Lord Kitchener wrote in 1912: “There is noth-
> ing more remarkable than the growth of public opinion
> among all classes of Egyptians in favour of the edu-
> cation of their daughters. The girls’ schools are
> crowded, and fresh schools are to be constructed. In
> 1900 there were 1,640 girls in Kutabs (common
> schools); in 1910, 22,000.” (Quoted by Dr. Sailer
> in Woman’s Work.) In 1899 no girl presented her-
> self for the primary certificate, in 1911 there were 43.
> A Woman’s Educational Union was founded under
> the patronage of the Khedive’s mother and with the co-
> operation of the ladies of Cairo, with the aim of
> 
> developing education among married women. Special
> lectures for them were given in the University. In
> 1907, in order to start a certain school, the govern-
> ment enjoined its employees to send their daughters.
> Now the attendance is over three hundred, and six
> women teach unveiled in the presence of the male
> principal (Sailer: ibid.). But all this is only a begin-
> ning, for as yet only three Moslem women in a thou-
> sand can read in Egypt.
> 
> NORTH AFRICA
> 
> In the French possessions in Africa primary schools
> have been opened in which French and Arabic are
> taught, with the usual course of European schools. A
> Frenchwoman conducts a school largely attended by
> wealthy Moslem girls, in which nothing is said of
> religion. A significant incident was a strike of the
> students of the Mosque of the Olive Tree at Tunis
> against lazy professors and a demand for a scientific
> course with geography, physics, chemistry, and like
> studies. Regarding the education of Moslems in
> Russia I have spoken in a former section.
> 
> IN INDIA
> 
> Moslems under these Christian governments have
> come more directly and without their own initiative
> under the influence of the new education. This is
> especially so in India. But there the Moslems for a
> long period failed to take advantage of government
> schools and consequently fell behind in culture and
> preparation for life. They clung to the Arabic and
> 
> Persian learning and were distanced by the Hindus.
> Now they have awakened and acknowledge the value
> of Western science and learning, but they are trying
> to obtain the benefits without departing from Islam.
> They would separate the civilization of the Christians
> from their religion, take the former and repudiate
> the latter. They are entering into the educational
> competition with some eagerness with regard to boys,
> but with luke warmness with regard to girls. Female
> education is advocated by them in conferences, but no
> efficient system has been organized by them, while
> they still hesitate to patronize government or mission-
> ary schools “as not fit places for the training of Mos-
> lem girls” (The Comrade, quoted in the Moslem
> World, 1914, p. 310). Among the schools opened for
> girls is one at Lucknow in charge of a Canadian
> woman, a convert to Islam. The Anjuman at Lahore
> has nine girls’ schools and shows some zeal for female
> education. The Moslem Educational Conference for
> Southern India passed a resolution requesting the gov-
> ernment to start schools “with purdah or curtained
> conveyances for pupils.” In India but four women
> in a thousand can read. Ninety-five per cent of In-
> dian Mohammedans are illiterate. What a commen-
> tary on a “Religion of a Book” that sixty million
> Indian believers cannot read the Koran!
> 
> ANGLO-MOHAMMEDAN COLLEGE
> 
> I have already referred to the one notable attempt
> of Moslems in India to promote modern learning,
> the Anglo-Mohammedan College at Aligarh. It was
> founded by Sayid Ahmad Khan, the promoter of
> 
> Neo-Islam, with the avowed object of “reconciling
> Oriental with Western literature and science and to
> make the Mussulmans of India worthy and useful
> subjects of the British Crown.” Lord Lytton, viceroy,
> laid the foundation in 1877 and the government aided
> it. Its principal and some of its teachers are English-
> men, its courses in Western sciences and languages
> are standard. It gives instruction in both Sunni and
> Shiah law and theology. The attendance is eight hun-
> dred. Its influence on the students is liberalizing.
> Dr. Murray Mitchell says (“The Great Religions of
> India,” p. 240): “Under the instructions they receive,
> the pupils cannot long retain their intense bigotry and
> narrowness. If the college continues to prosper an
> immense change must gradually take place in the Mo-
> hammedans of India.” The college has been success-
> ful in having a succession of intelligent and forceful
> men who have elevated its position. With headquar-
> ters here, there has been organized the All-India Mos-
> lem Students’ Brotherhood. A project was set on
> foot to develop the college into a great Moslem uni-
> versity with affiliated colleges in other provinces.
> Much enthusiasm was manifested. Generous sub-
> scriptions were made towards the fifty lakhs of rupees
> desired, of which Agha Khan of Bombay gave one
> lakh. Some dissensions arose as to the place religious
> instruction should have. Some claimed that “the
> function of a Mohammedan university should be to
> make a Mohammedan a genuine one, well grounded
> in the doctrine and principles of Islam.” Others
> claimed that “the comparative study of other reli-
> gions could be safely introduced into the university.”
> 
> While they disputed and planned, the British Govern-
> ment vetoed the scheme as likely to aid Pan-Islamism
> without benefiting education. Subscriptions were in
> part sent to the Turkish war fund. Among other
> advances made by Moslems is a scientific college at
> Karachi, to give technical and industrial training.
> The attempt has also been made to modernize the-
> ological education. A Mohammedan Educational
> Conference aims to promote the cause of learning.
> Of Indian Mohammedans, Professor Siraj-ud-Din
> says (“Vital Forces,” p. 160) that “through their
> political and educational condition, they have been
> more thoroughly leavened by Western civilization
> than the Mohammedans of any other community in
> the world, not excepting even Turkey in Europe.”
> 
> Of Afghanistan it may be noticed that the Habibiya
> or Chiefs’ College has been established in spite of
> the opposition of the mullahs, and a modern hospital
> opened, following the introduction of the telegraph
> and telephone.
> 
> MODERN MOSLEM PRESS
> 
> Islam had and continues to have considerable intel-
> lectual life of its own kind. Its old presses issue many
> books by the lithographic process. Bookstores are in
> all large cities, with general literature, but with a
> special output of theological books. The Mujtahids
> have good-sized libraries and considerable general in-
> telligence. All over the Moslem world the press is
> taking on new life. In Persia after the Constitution
> was established, newspapers sprang up like mush-
> rooms. A similar manifestation occurred in Turkey,
> 
> where 747 newspapers were started after the new ré-
> gime. In Constantinople there still exist eleven dailies.
> The circulation of the chief ones is the Sabah (Morn-
> ing), 20,000; the Tanin (Echo), 15,000; the Ikdam
> (Progress), 13,000; the Yani (New Gazette),
> 10,000. In India Moslem newspapers abound and
> many of them have a strong reform tendency.
> Monthly magazines, literary and religious reviews,
> and even novels are widely circulated. Egypt has 39
> dailies in Arabic, 17 literary reviews, 3 law magazines,
> 3 of medicine, 2 for women, 11 for religion specially.
> Yearly 2,500,000 Moslem newspapers were posted
> from Egypt to other Moslem lands (Zwemer). In
> Russia, Moslems have journals in their various dia-
> lects as they have in Algeria. Even Tunis has its
> daily and an organ for the Young Tunis or National-
> ist party. In South Africa and in South America like-
> wise they have their journals. The press of Islam has
> a powerful influence,—anti-Christian of course, often
> anti-government, so that even India and Egypt have
> their regulative press laws. But on the whole the
> papers are instrumental in spreading new modern ideas
> of life, of civilization, of science, of social and po-
> litical reform. They have a great deal of fanaticism,
> but they carry to all Islam convincing news of Mos-
> lem defeats and increasing weakness; their accusa-
> tions against their enemies and their laments telling
> the tale.
> 
> TRANSLATIONS OF THE KORAN
> 
> Of some significance is the desire of the New Mos-
> lems to have the Koran in the language of the people.
> 
> Mr. Farquhar says (“Modern Religious Movements
> in India,” p. 439): “The Christian contention that
> sacred books can be of no value unless understood
> by the people has led all the movements, Jain, Sikh,
> Parsee, and Moslem, as well as Hindu, to produce
> translations of the sacred books they use and to write
> all fresh books in the vernacular.” It is true that the
> Koran has been translated in the past by Moslems
> into their own tongues, though objected to by the
> Hanafi School. These are interlinear translations of
> a literal, non-idiomatic kind, in Persian, Urdu,
> Pushto, Javanese, Malayan, Turkish, and other
> tongues. Now the effort is being made to have freer
> popular vernacular translations. One of these has
> been made in Urdu by a well-known novelist, Mulvi
> Nazir Ahmad (Canon Weitbrecht: “Moslem World
> of To-day,” p. 197). A new version in Turkish was
> in part published in Constantinople lately, but it was
> quickly suppressed, as likely to lead to unbelief. A
> similar fate overtook the Turkish translation forty
> years ago.
> 
> Regarding this educational and literary movement,
> several things are worthy of attention. It is caused
> by the example of the Christian world. The stimulus
> is the knowledge of the benefits accruing to Christian
> lands and even to the Christian subjects of Moslem
> rulers. Not a little of the latter is due to missionary
> institutions. Another fact is that the new education
> is out of the hands of the mullahs and ignores their
> dicta. As to method, it grounds primary training
> on the plain vernacular,—on the modern Persian, not
> on that of Saadi and Hafiz, on the Turkish of the
> 
> people, Osmanli, Azerbaijani, Tekki as the region may
> require. It teaches the colloquial Arabic, using even
> the readers of the Beirut Mission Press. It strives to
> reform the chirography and make correspondence and
> business easy. It teaches European languages, disre-
> garding the old saying of the mullahs that “he who
> learns the language of the Frank is an infidel.” It
> gives the enlightening benefit of physical science. It
> quotes approvingly a tradition attributed to Moham-
> med: “Go forth in search of learning, even if you
> have to go as far as China.” It is founded on the
> belief that knowledge is power and that they should
> share with the Christians the secret of this power.
> Their eagerness makes them apt pupils. The effect on
> their condition and religious attitude is marked. It
> results in discontent with their social and political en-
> vironment and almost as certainly in a modification in
> their religious thought. Young Moslems are liberal-
> ized. The bonds of religious tradition are loosened.
> Yet some Moslems scorn the possibility of any injuri-
> ous effect as far as their faith is concerned. M. T.
> Kadirbhoy writes: “It is possible that religious en-
> thusiasts may cry that science, and especially Western
> science, may exercise a sceptic influence on the Moslem
> mind. The possibility is too remote to cause any ap-
> prehension. So fast does the Moslem hold to the word
> of the Prophet and the Koran that no amount of
> sceptical influence will ever serve to lessen his devo-
> tion to his religion and to his God. Youths may
> put the new wine of the West into the old bottles of
> the East, keeping the colour and quality of the bottle
> unimpaired” (Moslem World, 1912, p. 304). Of
> 
> more weight is the opinion of Lord Cromer (“Mod-
> ern Egypt,” Vol. II, p. 230), who declares that the
> Europeanized Moslem loses his Islamism, cuts adrift
> from his creed while retaining its lax morality, does
> not approach Christianity, is intolerant, hates Chris-
> tians as rivals and because those who are in contact
> with him deserve to be hated. “European civilization
> destroys one religion without substituting another.”
> What a strong argument this is that the Church should
> give them the truth of Christ along with our civiliza-
> tion. Dr. J. A. Oldham, in a review of the condition
> of the Islamic world (International Review of Mis-
> sions, 1914, p. 46), says: “The disintegration of Is-
> lam and the growth of unbelief among the educated
> classes are proceeding at an accelerated rate and
> are likely to increase with the growth of foreign
> influence.”
> 
> VII
> 
> NEO-ISLAM AND SOCIETY
> 
> BY general agreement Islam is a failure as a
> social system. Those familiar with the con-
> ditions it has brought about, and especially
> with the low position of woman and the estimate put
> upon her, are frankly hopeless of any true reform
> unless these conditions are changed. Stanley Lane-
> Poole says (“Studies in a Mosque,” p. 101): “As a
> social system Islam is a complete failure. The degra-
> dation of woman is a canker which has eaten into the
> whole system; it has misunderstood the relation of the
> sexes, and by degrading woman has degraded each
> successive generation of their children down an in-
> creasing scale of infamy and corruption.” Lord
> Cromer asks: “Can any one conceive of the existence
> of true European civilization, on the assumption that
> the position which woman occupies in Europe be de-
> ducted from the general plan? As well can a man
> blind from his birth be made to conceive the exist-
> ence of colour. The position of woman in Moham-
> medan countries is therefore a fatal obstacle to the
> attainment of that elevation of thought and charac-
> ter.” Intelligent Moslems have arrived at the same
> judgment. An educated Turk said to Sir Edwin
> Pears (“Turkey and Its People,” p. 57): “No re-
> form is possible, because we have no family life. You
> 
> may believe in the possibility of Turkish reforms
> when you see Turkish husbands and wives, arm in
> arm, on Galata bridge,—that is, when we Turks re-
> spect and trust our women.”
> 
> The hopelessness of the case lies in this, that this
> dark blot has been indelibly stamped on Islam by the
> Koran and the example of the Prophet. He has
> fixed the standard. It is a man-made religion for
> man.
> 
> WOMAN’S POSITION BEFORE ISLAM
> 
> There is much to show that Islam brought woman
> into a more degraded and debased condition. Her
> social status under the Arabs in the “time of igno-
> rance” was higher than after Mohammed. Prof.
> Robertson Smith says (“Kinship and Marriage
> in Ancient Arabia,” p. 100): “It is very remarkable
> that the place of woman in the family and in society
> has steadily declined under his [Mohammed’s] law.
> … The Arabs themselves recognize that the posi-
> tion of woman has fallen.” Similarly Stanley Lane-
> Poole testifies (“Studies in a Mosque,” p. 23): “In
> the desert woman was regarded as she has never since
> been viewed by Moslems. The modern haram sys-
> tem was undreamt of; the maid of the desert was un-
> fettered by the ruinous restrictions of modern life
> in the East. She was free to choose her husband and
> to bind him to have no other wife than herself. She
> might receive male visitors, even strangers, without
> suspicion.” Dr. Zwemer corroborates this, saying
> (“Islam, etc.,” p. 6): “The use of the veil was almost
> unknown in Arabia before Islam, nor did the haram
> 
> system prevail.” At the present time the same fact
> is seen. In the East Indies and some parts of Africa
> the advent of Islam brings further degradation to
> woman. Professor Westermann says: “The posi-
> tion of woman among the Shilluks [heathen of the
> Sudan] is no doubt a higher one than with most
> Mohammedan people of the Sudan. She is shown re-
> markable respect. Women sometimes take part in
> public assemblies with the men, discuss affairs, share
> in the dances and religious ceremonies.” In these the
> young men and girls meet each other face to face
> and eye to eye, dancing in harmony. Dr. C. R. Wat-
> son testifies that the position of woman seems in-
> variably to be lowered (“The Sorrow and Hope of
> the Sudan,” p. 189): “In pagan communities a
> woman, especially an unmarried woman, may go about
> and be quite safe from all molestation. Not so after
> the introduction of Islam … her person is safer
> under paganism than under Islam.” In the Dutch East
> Indies woman was held in higher esteem in pre-
> Islamic days. This is evident among the recent con-
> verts. It has lowered the privileges of women and
> disintegrated family life. Where tribal customs
> punished adultery, frowned on divorce, and confined
> polygamy to the higher classes, Islam has relaxed
> these beneficial customs. Especially loose divorce
> has injured the position of woman. “Contempt for
> woman has fallen to a point even below the zero of
> moral esteem for woman in heathenism” (Simon,
> p. 184). Another witness is Sir William Ramsay.
> He says (“Impressions of Turkey, etc.,” p. 49):
> “The Turkish tribes originally did not practise the
> 
> seclusion of women. They learned the custom from
> the Arabs and the Koran.”
> 
> POLYGAMY AND DIVORCE UNDER ISLAM
> 
> What is the position of woman under orthodox
> Islam? What is the attitude of the New Moslems?
> The orthodox claim superiority for their law in this
> as in all matters. The Muslim Review asserts that
> Islam “sets a purer and more divine standard of do-
> mestic life” than any other. Specifically it is claimed
> that Mohammed limited polygamy, prohibited mar-
> riages within certain degrees, made women heirs, pro-
> hibited widows from being regarded as part of the
> estate to be disposed of as chattels, gave them power
> over their own property brought at the time of mar-
> riage, provided for the maintenance of children and
> abolished infanticide.1 Allowing due credit for what-
> ever good it wrought, the facts are that Islam per-
> petuated and sanctioned the degradation of women
> and increased it. It allows a man four wives and as
> many concubines and slave women as he can obtain.
> The wives can be divorced at the whim or caprice of
> the man on condition of paying over a dowry, usually
> small. According to his desire he may take the di-
> vorced wife back twice without condition, but after
> the third divorce he cannot take her back until she
> has been married and divorced by another man.
> Loose divorce works more evil than polygamy. In
> the street near me in Tabriz lived two men, one rich,
> 
> 1 Stanley Lane-Poole (“Studies in a Mosque,” p. 24) says,
> “Infanticide, which is commonly attributed to the whole Arab
> race, before Islam was exceedingly rare in the desert.”
> 
> the other poor. The former, a sayid, was in the habit
> of marrying pretty young girls and sending them
> away with their dowry, when his fancy tired of them.
> He had reached the thirtieth when I left Persia. The
> poor young man astonished us more by the facility
> with which he yearly took and divorced a new wife.
> He only kept one at a time and apparently most of
> the time had to go in debt to pay the dowry. Of
> this feature of Islam, Lane in his “Modern Egyp-
> tians” says (chap, vi): “While no more than one hus-
> band in twenty has two wives at the same time, there
> are many men who in the course of ten years have
> married as many as twenty, thirty, or more wives;
> and women not far advanced in age who have been
> wives of a dozen or more men successively.” A Mos-
> lem of prominence has affirmed that ninety-five per
> cent, of Mohammedan wives in Egypt are sooner or
> later divorced; in other words, only five women in a
> hundred remain with their first husband. In that
> same country there is one divorce to three marriages,
> even though a man may keep the wife and take three
> others. There is a Moslem saying that “a woman is
> like an old pair of shoes; a man throws her away
> and buys another as long as his money lasts.” One
> youth divorced his twenty-eighth wife. He justified
> himself by saying, “Why not? My father divorced
> thirty-eight.”
> 
> A disgrace of Shiahism is the temporary marriage,
> mutaa. Under the sanction of religion and with the
> blessing of the mullah the contract wife is taken for
> a day or for a year. (See author’s “Persian Life and
> Customs,” p. 263.) Mrs. Major Sykes, who lived at
> 
> Meshed, brings new testimony to the prevalence of
> this abomination at the Holy Shrine of the Imam
> Reza, where many temporary wives are kept for the
> pilgrims. She adds: “This is common throughout
> the country and is a potent factor in the degradation
> of the womanhood of Persia.”
> 
> This disgrace of Shiahism is surpassed by the black
> stain of forcible concubinage which lies against the
> Sunnis.1 Hear these vigorous words of Lane-Poole
> (“Studies in a Mosque,” p. 105): “One cannot for-
> get the unutterable brutalities inflicted on the con-
> quered nations in the taking of slaves. The Moslem
> soldier was allowed to do as he pleased with any ‘in-
> fidel’ woman he might meet in his victorious march.
> When one thinks of the thousands of women,
> mothers, and daughters who must have suffered un-
> told shame and dishonour by this license, he cannot
> find words to express his horror.” Such, sanctioned
> by the example of Mohammed, has been the record
> since the conquest of Persia, when slave girls were a
> drug in the markets of Arabia, till the days of the
> Armenian Massacres and the Holy War of 1915.
> 
> THE SECLUSION OF WOMEN
> 
> Another element in the degraded condition of the
> Moslem woman is her seclusion. She is confined in
> the haram, behind walls and lattices, and, if means
> permit, in a separate court-yard. She is veiled when
> she appears on the street. This veiling is in varying
> 
> 1 The disgraceful conduct of Persian Shiahs in Urumia in ab-
> ducting Christian women in January, 1915, makes it necessary to
> include them in this condemnation also.
> 
> degrees, reaching its extreme in Persia, where the
> whole person is absolutely covered, and neither the
> hands, head, nor even the flash of the eye can be
> seen. The jealousy of Mohammed caused the com-
> mand of the Koran which requires the seclusion of
> women and his example enforced it (Surah XXXIII,
> 55). Dr. Watson writes: “Where faith in chastity
> ended, the seclusion of women began.” Mohammed’s
> order for veiling is sometimes attributed to the Zaid-
> Zainab incident. Persians say that one day Moham-
> med was seated with Ayesha, when a passing Arab,
> admiring her beauty, offered Mohammed a camel
> in exchange for her, and this produced the order for
> veiling. He formed into law customs which pertained
> previously to kings and grandees, so that they became
> as the will of God. Only Kurds, Beduins, and wild
> tribes among Moslems have disregarded the law. In
> India many women never leaves their harams. One
> caliph in Egypt even prohibited the making of shoes
> for women, that they might not be able to go out of
> doors. A man does not allude to his wife in conver-
> sation nor inquire for yours. If under some neces-
> sity to mention her, he uses a euphemism as “the
> mother of Zaid” or “the children.” The effect of
> this seclusion is to limit the mental development of
> women, to cramp and crush their lives. The inviola-
> bility of the haram is even made a plea to prevent
> proper sanitation and quarantine in case of cholera
> and plague. It has an injurious effect on the children
> and is answerable for the lower intelligence and slow
> progress of the men. The mothers are incapable of
> the best training of the children. Sir William Ram-
> 
> say (“Impressions, etc., p. 41) says: “In the condi-
> tion of the Turkish women lies the reason for the
> steady degeneration of the Turkish people. They are
> poorer both in physique and mind than the Christians,
> —a stunted and impoverished motherhood produces a
> poor and diminishing people.”
> 
> Some Moslems maintain that the seclusion of their
> women is an advantage—that it conduces to their hap-
> piness, the continuance of the marriage union, re-
> moves causes of jealousy, and protects females from
> insult. One of them said in jocose vein, “No Mos-
> lem sees any woman save his own wife, so he thinks
> her the prettiest one that lives.”
> 
> NEO-ISLAM ON WOMAN
> 
> What is the attitude of New Moslems to woman
> and her position in the family and in society? It is
> truly remarkable and is a radical departure from
> traditional Islam. The movement advocates freedom
> for women. I will first notice modern interpreta-
> tions and opinions with reference to woman and then
> some changes which are evident in her condition in
> Moslem lands.
> 
> The position of Neo-Islam in India is strongly
> stated by Sayid Amir Ali in his books, “Mohamme-
> dan Law” (Preface, and pp. 21, 159, 226) and the
> “Legal Position of Woman in Islam.” He declares
> that polygamy is not a part of Islam, that “the law
> forbids a second union during the subsistence of the
> former contract.” He argues that since the Koran
> requires that the husband should deal justly and
> equally with his several wives, and since fulfilment of
> 
> this requirement is an impossibility, it amounts to a
> prohibition. He pronounces polygamy an unendur-
> able and unmitigated evil, which must necessarily
> cease to exist. He says (“Spirit of Islam,” p. 365):
> “I look upon polygamy in the present day as an adul-
> terous connection and contrary to the spirit of Islam
> —an opinion which is shared by a large number of
> Moslems.” He and other modernists deny the law of
> divorce or repudiation as held and practised by Mos-
> lems, and argue that Mohammed meant that divorce
> should be founded on the charge of adultery and
> should be carried out only by granting a regular bill
> of divorcement and also that the seclusion of women
> was a recommendation, not a law obligatory and per-
> petual. A modified view is taken by Sheikh Abdul
> Kadir, who says: “The Koran recommends the man
> to restrict himself to one wife and imposes on the
> polygamous the obligation of treating his alike and
> equitably. By these difficulties which the law
> throws in his way very rarely can a man venture to
> do it, unless he is drawn to it by extreme necessity
> such as barrenness or sickness of his wife, or his ab-
> sence from home or unless he is a voluptuary or, like
> the holy patriarch, through a desire to multiply the
> human species. Another learned Mohammedan
> leader put on the title-page of his book the words,
> “Listen to me, if your ears are not deaf; on no ac-
> count marry two wives, for a man has not two hearts
> in his breast” (“Vital Forces,” p. 173).
> 
> A Moslem writer in the Journal of Reformed
> Islam strenuously combats the use of the veil and pre-
> sents many reasons for its abolition (Margoliouth’s
> 
> “Mohammedanism,” p. 136). In the female educa-
> tional section of the Moslem League in India, Maulvi
> Shibli maintained from an Islamic point of view
> equality of rights and opportunity for woman; and
> others agreed with him. Some held that seclusion in
> the haram is a custom, not a command of religion;
> that the Koran commanded the Prophet’s wives only
> should be veiled and secluded. Though the Koran
> says (Surah IV, 8): “Men are superior to women
> on account of the qualities with which God has gifted
> the one above the other,” yet Justice Abdur Rahim
> of India says: “God has endowed women with intel-
> lectual gifts as much as men. Islamic laws accord
> the same status to women as men,” and that Moslems
> “are proud of the liberal spirit of their religion and
> laws.”
> 
> These modernist interpretations do not change our
> conception of what real Islamic law is. Their casuis-
> try does not alter the historic Shariat nor convince us
> contrary to facts. But it is deeply significant that this
> effort is made to reconcile the Shariat with modern
> ideas. It indicates progress of thought in Islam.
> 
> MOSLEM WOMEN’S POSITION IMPROVING
> 
> Significant also is the modification in practice with
> regard to woman. Her day of emancipation is per-
> ceptibly nearer. Regarding polygamy, testimony is
> practically unanimous that it is declining. Combined
> with the growing feeling that it is unlawful or inex-
> pedient, many extraneous circumstances are tending
> to root it out from among Moslems. “Large num-
> bers place in the marriage contract a formal renuncia-
> 
> tion on the part of the husband of any right to con-
> tract a second contemporaneous marriage.”
> 
> In India not more than three per cent of the Mos-
> lems are polygamous. In Egypt monogamy has been
> gaining ground (Cromer: “Modern Egypt;” Gif-
> fen: “Islam and Missions,” p. 297). Ismiel Khedive
> had many wives and concubines. His successor Tew-
> fik had but one. The last Khedive had but one for
> many years, but later took a second, a Christian
> woman whom he turned into a Moslem. The Khe-
> dive Tewfik said to De Guerville: “The custom of
> having several wives is rapidly disappearing. The
> principal reasons are the abolition of slavery and the
> increased cost of living.” Of Turkey Sir Edwin
> Pears declares (p. 68): “The habit of having more
> wives than one is decreasing. The influence of the
> West is having its effect.” The Young Turks are
> almost all monogamists. In Persia no doubt the same
> tendency is at work, though I can hardly endorse the
> opinion of Mrs. Major Sykes (“Persia and Its Peo-
> ple,” p. 75), that “polygamy is becoming rare in
> Iran. Persians speak of it as unfashionable.” This
> is to be attributed partly to poverty and partly to the
> worry of rival wives; according to the proverb, “Two
> tigresses in a house are better than two mistresses.”
> 
> Woman is also being released from her seclusion,
> slowly but surely. Fortunately in certain outlying
> countries of Islam, it has not yet succeeded in shutting
> up woman in the haram. This is true in Malaysia.
> There primitive customs continue and woman is per-
> mitted to go about freely and unveiled, and to con-
> verse with men who are not relatives. In China, too,
> 
> women do not live in seclusion nor wear the veil.
> Yet they do not go to the mosque. They bind their
> feet like the Chinese heathen women. In Russia Mos-
> lem women have greater freedom than under their
> own rulers. Some have adopted certain Christian so-
> cial customs, like receiving men visitors, riding about
> and travelling with their husbands. They are trained
> in the Russian gymnasia and normal schools and
> universities, teach school, practise medicine, are ad-
> mitted to the bar, hold conventions, and have the te-
> merity to request the ballot in the Communes. This
> movement is widely extended, on the Volga, in the
> Crimea and Caucasus, and even among the Kirghiz
> (International Review of Missions, 1915, p. 39; Mos-
> lem World, 1914, p. 264). In India a society of
> young men has been organized with the object of do-
> ing away with the veil. They are making a propa-
> ganda to this end. A bride and groom lately drove
> off in a vehicle together, the bride with her face un-
> covered. Freedom, which has become common
> among Hindu and Parsee women, is scarcely allowed
> among Moslems, who have been largely responsible
> for much of the seclusion which has existed among
> the others. Yet a Conference of Moslem ladies has
> met at the same time and place as the men’s Educa-
> tional Conference, to promote the education of girls.
> 
> In Egypt agitation for the freedom of woman is
> active. A leader in this movement was the late
> Kasim Bey Amin, whose books, “The Emancipation
> of Woman,” “The New Woman,” and “The Veil,”
> have been eagerly read by men and women alike. In
> these writings twentieth-century ideas of woman are
> 
> advocated and the evil effects of Moslem customs are
> set forth. A society for the abolition of the veil is
> working. The debate in the press, pro and con, is
> active and full of vim. The old and the new are clash-
> ing in discussion. But as yet even those women who
> have been educated in Europe must conform to cus-
> tom and live in seclusion. An exception was the Prin-
> cess Nazli Fazil Khanum, a descendant of Moham-
> med Ali Pasha, who refused to be bound by the re-
> strictions of the haram and mixed freely in the so-
> ciety of men and women, yet retained the respect of
> the devotees of Islam. She was very proficient in
> Arabic, Turkish, English, and French. She resided
> in Paris and other European capitals as wife of the
> Turkish Ambassador Khallil Pasha Sherif. After
> his death her house in Cairo became a celebrated
> salon, where many great men and ladies were received
> with honour. Her conversational powers were of a
> high order and her influence on politics elevating.
> She was an ardent advocate of freedom and her words
> had power in Turkey as well as in Egypt.
> 
> In Persia discussion prevails, but with little change
> as yet. A woman who, some years ago in Tabriz,
> ventured in the street with the semi-veil of Constanti-
> nople, was promptly warned by the Mujtahid that if
> she did so again, she would be beaten. The girls’
> schools, either native or mission, are scarcely securely
> established outside of the Capital. Girls do not at-
> tend with boys as in Turkey. For a girl to appear on
> the platform of the Mission School, even thickly
> veiled, to receive her diploma, was a great innovation
> in Teheran. The contrast with the Christian girls
> 
> caused some comment in the Persian newspapers
> showing that they had aspirations for freedom for
> their girls. During the Revolution, Persian women
> organized patriotic clubs and secret societies, a dozen
> or more of them, in the Capital, and watched keenly,
> even with veiled eyes, the course of events. They
> were ardent supporters of liberty, acting as inform-
> ants for Mr. Morgan Shuster, intriguing for the Con-
> stitutional party. At the final crisis the veiled women
> invaded the House of Parliament, daggers in hand,
> and threatened the deputies if they yielded the liber-
> ties of their country.
> 
> In Turkey the movement for the emancipation of
> woman has made definite progress. Sultan Abdul
> Hamid did not repress female education, evidently
> thinking woman a negligible factor. In Constanti-
> nople and the coast cities, the education of girls made
> considerable progress. Until they are eight or ten
> years of age they are allowed to go with the boys.
> Some families have had European governesses from
> whom the girls learned European languages and im-
> bibed European ideals. For some this was a means
> of excellent culture, for others the result was a mim-
> icry of French styles in dress and a taste for reading
> of romances. One of these governesses afterwards
> opened up a private school for Moslem girls in Beirut.
> It was patronized by the well-to-do of the city. The
> result of the Christian spirit in the school was so
> great upon the girls and their training so effective in
> character, that during the period of several score
> years, in which many of the girls became wives of
> Moslems, not one of them was divorced and not one
> 
> of them had the humiliation of having a companion
> wife brought to vex her. Constantinople (American)
> College was not permitted to receive Moslem girls in
> Abdul Hamid’s time. One, however, Halidah Salih,
> daughter of the Sultan’s treasurer, finished her course
> of study. She is proficient in French and English,
> and has become a writer of distinction and the “lead-
> ing woman in Turkey in popularity and influence.”
> For her first book, a translation of “The Mother in
> the Home,” she was decorated by the Sultan. Her
> articles frequently appear in the press. She wears a
> veil in public, but is unveiled before men in her own
> house. She is a member of the Young Turk Com-
> mittee of Union and Progress, and was marked as a
> victim in the counter-revolution, but was not found
> by the assassins. Another advanced Turkish woman
> is Balkis Shevket Khanum, up-to-date editor of the
> Kadinlar Dunyasi (The Woman’s World) of Con-
> stantinople. To be up with man in everything, she
> took a flight in an aeroplane with Fathi Bey. The
> paper had in one issue a front-page illustration of a
> group of unveiled Moslem women. Later the paper
> was suppressed. The educated Turkish women took
> a special part in the Revolution. Their reading had
> led them to deep sympathy with liberty and progress.
> Being largely exempted from the espionage from
> which men suffered so much, they were able to aid
> the cause greatly. After the downfall of despotism,
> the women had a taste of freedom. Some appeared
> unveiled, rode with open face in carriages and walked
> about at the watering places and parks, made speeches
> in the hall of the University, formed clubs and circles
> 
> for discussion and enlightenment, corresponded with
> the newspapers, and even organized two feminist
> journals. Yet, according to the best testimony (Sir
> Edwin Pears, p. 66), they acted with modesty and
> discretion and their speech showed remarkable cul-
> ture and wisdom. Yet the shock to the conservatism
> of Islam was too great, and a handle was given the
> reactionaries to work against Constitutionalism. An
> order was therefore issued by the Commandant of
> the city: “Whereas women are forbidden to go in
> public places in costumes unbecoming with reference
> to national customs and Moslem morals, those who
> infringe this regulation will be arrested by detective
> agents and severely punished, according to the laws.”
> So restraint was put upon the women but not success-
> fully, as appears from the journal Tasfiri Efkiar
> (Orient), September 6, 1914. It says: “Certain
> of our women, not appreciating the situation, and in
> spite of reiterated orders from the military authori-
> ties, dress themselves in an unsuitable way and one
> calculated to seriously offend the religious sentiments
> and national customs. In the name of the well-being
> of the country we call upon the military authorities
> to make a few exemplary punishments.” Professor
> Cheyne (“Reconciliation of Races and Religions,” p.
> 116) mentions that forty of the boldest women were
> arrested and exiled to Acca. I have seen no confir-
> mation of this report. When telephones were intro-
> duced, of one hundred or more operators, seven
> were Moslem girls. It is said they became clerks, not
> because of necessity, for they were daughters of of-
> ficials, but to open the way for Moslem women to en-
> 
> gage in honest labour. They do not wear the char-
> shab. During the Balkan war the women held and
> addressed large mass-meetings, and acted as nurses
> of the Red Crescent. The establishment of homes on
> Christian or Western models is set before them as a
> desideratum. The old haram life is no longer con-
> sidered praiseworthy nor commendable. In Syria,
> too, much the same condition prevails. Men are no
> longer willing to marry a bride unseen. It has be-
> come the habit to advocate the elevation of women
> and to strive for the amelioration of social life. The
> injunction of the Koran to scourge refractory wives,
> interpreted by the Shariat to mean that he shall not
> give her less than three nor more than thirty lashes,
> is one of which the modern Moslem is somewhat
> ashamed. Already the switch has replaced the bas-
> tinado—the switch itself has dry rot. Effort is also
> being made in Turkey to put down the white-slave
> traffic. A Turkish newspaper says (The Moslem
> World, 1914, p. 268): “The East will not be elevated
> until woman is elevated and restored to the position
> she once occupied. The fall of Moslem womanhood
> has been the great reason for the fall of the whole na-
> tion, and her education and uplift are necessary if the
> nation is to regain its lost position.”
> 
> THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY AMONG MOSLEMS
> 
> The Koran and the Shariat definitely ordain and
> regulate slavery, yet the abolition of slavery and the
> slave trade is going steadily forward in Islam. This
> is largely due to the influence of Christian govern-
> ments. But the effort commends itself to the con-
> 
> science of modern Moslems. In those lands directly
> under Christian rule the abolition has been accom-
> plished. An act of the Indian Legislature abolished
> slavery in 1843. In 1877 Lord Vivian entered into
> a convention with the Egyptian Government forbid-
> ding the slave trade or the sale of slaves from family
> to family, providing for the gradual manumission
> of slaves and for the right of the slave to claim his
> liberty through the government. Slave-trade in the
> Egyptian Sudan was suppressed after many years of
> effort; slavery is being superseded by paid service. It
> was ended in Zanzibar in 1897 and nominally in Af-
> ghanistan in 1895 by treaty. Persia has entered into
> treaty for its abolition. Russia has accomplished the
> same among her Moslem subjects and, by treaty, in
> Khiva and Bukhara. The Osmanlis enslaved many
> from the Christian races of the Balkans, of the Greeks
> and Armenians. Less than two hundred years ago
> they carried off one hundred thousand German and
> Magyar woman in a single campaign. By the Consti-
> tution of 1876 slavery was abolished in Turkey. In
> 1890 the Sultan signed the declaration of the Anti-
> slavery Conference, held at Brussels, by seventeen na-
> tions, “of a firm intention to put an end to the crimes
> and devastation engendered by traffic in African
> slaves.” Renewal of the Constitution in 1908
> brought the abolition again into effect. Though slav-
> ery still exists, both of concubines and eunuchs, it is
> gradually being brought to an end. The auction of
> slaves still continues in the public square of Mecca
> and existed in Morocco till French occupation. To
> supply these marts and the secret traffic the trade still
> 
> goes on in Central Africa (Professor Westermann,
> International Review of Missions, 1913, p. 481).
> In 1909, pilgrim caravans via Molfi, Western Sudan,
> carried through nearly three thousand women and
> children to be sold as slaves. It appears, however,
> that slavery will be brought to a close in Islam. There
> will be no modification of the Shariat, but the expense,
> the cessation of war captives, the force of moral sen-
> timent are all working with the influence of Christian
> governments to accomplish its complete abolition.
> 
> MODERNISM AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
> 
> Neo-Islam professes to stand for religious liberty
> and it is no doubt more liberal than the orthodox
> party. But the words of its expounders are far from
> the ideal. Justice Amir Ali, after a long defence of
> Mohammedanism in an historical view, concludes:
> “We deny altogether that Islam ever grasped the
> sword for the purpose of proselyting. Islam never
> persecuted” (“Life of Mohammed,” pp. 212-15).
> If such is the decision of an enlightened, anglicized
> High Justice of British India—a reformer—we may
> well despair of any appeal to history in reasoning with
> a Moslem. Yet notwithstanding this, there is un-
> doubtedly among the New Moslems a modification
> of the fanatical spirit. Practically they do have a
> more friendly feeling to Christians. Not only in In-
> dia, but in Teheran, in Beirut, in Constantinople, in
> Cairo, there are tens of thousands who do not believe
> in injuring the Moslem converted to Christianity, who
> would not lift a finger to execute the law which de-
> crees death to the apostate. There is a wide preva-
> 
> lence of the spirit of toleration. There has been a
> marked change, a change encouraging to Christian
> missions. The mental attitude of intelligent Mos-
> lems has been modified. This change may be due
> partly to indifference, partly to the relaxing of his
> own faith, partly to his enlightenment and a real ap-
> preciation of the right of the individual conscience
> to decide its belief. Many Young Turks and Persian
> Nationalists have personally clear conceptions of and
> belief in liberty of conscience, did not questions of
> politics and national aspirations get inextricably
> mixed up with religion. Persian Sufis are natural
> friends of religious liberty. There are many forces
> working in Islam bringing about freedom of con-
> science. Even the Ulema of Turkey, says Sir Edwin
> Pears (p. 395), “are beginning to be under the in-
> fluence of Western ideas, and the day is coming when
> even the ignorant Moslem will not consider it meri-
> torious to kill a Christian. … There is promise of
> continued though slow improvement.”
> 
> THE FUTURE OF NEO-ISLAM
> 
> I have considered Neo-Islam in detail,—a move-
> ment which aims to adopt Western science and educa-
> tion, change the status of woman, and bring Moslem
> law into conformity to Western civilization. What
> will be the effect of this movement? Will Islam be
> changed? Will it be freed from the shackles of tra-
> dition and brought into conformity to modern
> thought? It is impossible to reach an absolute con-
> clusion. Undoubtedly there is a trend towards trans-
> formation. Regarding many Islamic peoples, this
> 
> opinion rests upon impressions made upon observers.
> Even in India, where there is much more public dis-
> cussion and publication of views, competent witnesses
> differ as to the conditions. Rev. W. A. Wilson de-
> clares (“Islam and Missions,” p. 149), that the
> New Islam largely moulds Mohammedan thought.
> On the other hand, Canon Sell thinks that the in-
> fluence of the movement is waning and conservatism
> is reviving.
> 
> Lord Cromer expresses strong doubts of the pos-
> sibility of Islam reforming. The difficulty of bring-
> ing Islam and its ways into harmony with modern
> society is comparable to squaring the circle, in his
> judgment. He says (“Modern Egypt,” Vol. II, p.
> 184): “Let no practical politician think that he has
> a plan capable of resuscitating a body which is not in-
> deed dead, and which may yet linger on for centuries,
> but which is nevertheless politically and socially mori-
> bund, and whose decay cannot be arrested by any
> modern palliatives however skilfully they may be ap-
> plied.” “One could not make the Egyptian horse
> drink of the waters of civilization, albeit the most
> limpid streams of reform were turned into the trough
> before him. It has yet to be proved that Islam can
> assimilate civilization without succumbing in the
> process. It is not improbable that in its passage
> through the European crucible, many of the distinc-
> tive features of Islam, the good and the bad alike,
> may be volatilized, and that it will eventually issue
> forth in a form scarcely capable of recognition.”
> Thus after wavering, he reaches the conclusion that
> Islam will probably change, but he adds: “It should
> 
> never be forgotten that Islam cannot be reformed,
> that is to say, that Islam reformed is Islam no longer.
> It is something else, and we cannot tell yet what it
> eventually will be” (pp. 175, 161). Professor Mac-
> Donald expects modifications in Islam, and says (In-
> ternational Review of Missions, 1913, p. 597): “It
> is never well to underestimate the strange power that
> a religion has of transforming itself in adaptation to
> new situations.” Similarly Professor Margoliouth
> says (“Mohammedanism,” p. 224): “What is to be
> expected is not the supersession nor the abolition of
> Islam, but its accommodation to the conditions im-
> posed upon the world by European science.” May
> we not suppose that a reformed Islam will bear such
> a relation to the Koran and the Traditions as Re-
> formed Judaism bears to the Torah and the Talmud?
> It will bear the name and heritage of Islam, acknowl-
> edge its creed and book, and have an anti-Christian
> spirit, whatever may be its change of methods and
> weapons. Christianity can expect no spiritual vic-
> tory by the forces of civilization. As Islam opened
> its doors to take in and take on Greco-Syrian and
> Persian civilizations and showed itself capable of
> adapting itself to the higher condition in Bagdad and
> Spain and bearing fruit by this grafted culture, so it
> may do again. Whether Islam is being changed or
> not, it is certain that Moslems are changing. Num-
> bers of them have broken away from the old tradi-
> tions and practices. They stoutly maintain that they
> are Moslems, and will likely continue to do so. But
> their old adherence to Islam as a body of laws for the
> state, as a hard-and-fast rule for social life, is pass-
> 
> ing. The universal sway of fanaticism, the belief in
> the obligation to persecute, is going. There are few
> signs of the rejection of Islam as an outward profes-
> sion. But more and more a condition is being reached
> in which the community will divide into religious, in-
> different, and irreligious—a condition in which those
> who wish to, can openly neglect the rites of religion
> and be unmolested, when those who allegorize or ra-
> tionalize the Koran and its system shall be held ac-
> countable to no court or judge and physical penalties
> shall not be inflicted for unbelief nor a new belief.
> There will be open toleration within Islam, to be fol-
> lowed by open acquiescence in apostasy from Islam.
> Popular opinion has accepted this in many places un-
> der Christian rule, and is not far from accepting it
> in some communities under Moslem rule. New Islam
> in practice has wider acceptance than as a system of
> doctrines. Dr. Young of Aden takes a most hope-
> ful view (“Islam and Missions,” p. 126): “The
> time has come,” he says, “for a general advance, and
> when that advance begins, the cleavage in Islam will
> widen and a new form of Islam will arise with subtler
> doctrines and purer life,” but, he adds with mission-
> ary vision, “even that must finally give way before
> the higher life of true Christianity.” Expecting this
> consummation, we must sow the seed of Christian
> truth. It is a critical time for Islamic peoples. The
> call is for strenuous effort to direct the thought and
> conscience of Moslems to the Source of true reform.
> 
> VIII
> 
> POLITICAL MOVEMENTS AMONG
> MOSLEMS
> 
> IN the political world of Islam the most striking
> fact is the subjection of Moslem lands to Chris-
> tian rule. The phrase “the disintegration of
> Islam” is sometimes used, but whether Islam is dis-
> integrating may be questioned, yet of the disintegra-
> tion of the empire of Islam there is no doubt. This
> movement had begun before the last century in the
> freeing of Spain, Hungary, and Russia from Moslem
> dominion, yet this was rather an escape of Christian
> countries from subjection. This latter period has
> been characterized not only by further liberation of
> Christian peoples, but by the conquest and subjection
> of Moslem peoples (see table on p. 219) by Christian
> governments. Moslem lands in Africa have passed
> under Christian sway; its vast territory is divided.
> Its European empire has decreased to a small strip,
> and the present war will likely result in pulling down
> the Star and the Crescent from the last stronghold of
> Islam in Europe—the beautiful, the unique city of
> Constantinople. Even Persia is but semi-independent,
> being divided into spheres of influence between
> Russia and Great Britain. The rapidity of this de-
> cline may be seen in the striking contrast between the
> present condition and that existing when I went to
> 
> Persia. At that time Rev. Dr. H. H. Jessup stated
> before the General Assembly that 50 millions out of
> the 175 millions of Moslems, or twenty-nine per cent,
> were under Christian rule. Now there are 170 mil-
> lions, or eighty-five per cent, under Christian rule,
> and only seventeen per cent under Moslem rule. Rus-
> sia, France, and Holland each rule over many more
> Moslems than does the Sultan of Turkey, and Great
> Britain over five times as many. Islamic rulers hold
> sway over but one twenty-second part of the earth’s
> surface, while Christian Powers rule over nineteen
> twenty-seconds. The sword-arm of Islam is withered,
> its mighty empire has faded away. Pan-Islamism
> cannot save it; the jihad cannot save it; the old battle-
> cry, “Allah Akbar” (“God is Great”), cannot save
> it, for God wills that its intolerant, despotic sway
> should cease.
> 
> ADJUSTMENT OF MOSLEMS TO CHRISTIAN RULE
> 
> How has this condition been brought about? By
> fierce and bloody wars of conquest. In this we cannot
> see the spirit of Christ. Moslems have made heroic
> resistance under such leaders as Sheikh Abdul Kadir
> in Algeria and Schamyl in Daghestan, or of mad mul-
> lahs and Mahdis. But they meet in vain the modern
> armour of the European Powers. Everywhere ma-
> chine-guns have been victorious against the poorly
> equipped troops of Islam. Their courageous leaders,
> undaunted by defeat, have either fallen in vain attack
> or languished in exile as pensioners of the conquerors.
> Sometimes these conquests have been made in ruth-
> less disregard of the rights of humanity and with too
> 
> TABLE OF TERRITORY FREED FROM ISLAMIC RULE
> SINCE 1800
> DATE      COUNTRY OR PROVINCE                           To WHOM CEDED
> I. Caucasus and Transcaucasus
> 
> 1800       Georgia from Persia                           Russia
> 1813       Darband, Shirwan, Baku, Karadagh from Persia
> Russia
> 1813       Sovereignty of Caspian Sea from Persia        Russia
> 1828       Erivan, Nakhejevan, etc., from Persia         Russia
> 1829       Poti, Anapa, and Circassian coast from Turkey Russia
> 1878       Batum, Kars, Ardahan from Turkey              Russia
> II. Central Asia
> 
> 1844       Kirghiz                                      Russia
> 1864       Samarcand                                    Russia
> 1868       Khohand and Bukhara                          Russia
> 1873       Khiva                                        Russia
> 1881       Merv                                         Russia
> 1891       Part of Khorassan from Persia                Russia
> III. Southern Asia
> 
> 1799       Nizam's Dominions, India                     Great Britain
> 1803       Mogul Empire, India                          Great Britain
> 1824       Straits Settlements                          Great Britain
> 1830       Dutch Rule consolidated
> Holland
> 1839       Aden and Arabian Coast                       Great Britain
> 1843       Sinde, India                                 Great Britain
> 1849       Punjab and Kashmere                          Great Britain
> 1856       Oudh                                         Great Britain
> 1876       Baluchistan Protectorate                     Great Britain
> IV. Europe
> 
> 1829       Greece and Servia granted independence
> 1858       Wallachia and Moldavia from Turkey          Rumania
> 1878       Bessarabia from Turkey                      Russia
> 1878       Cyprus                                      Great Britain
> 1878       Bosnia and Herzegovina (annexed 1908)       Austria
> 1878       Greece, Servia, Montenegro, and Rumania en-
> larged.
> 1878       Bulgaria formed from Turkey                 Bulgaria
> 1885       East Rumelia from Turkey                    Bulgaria
> 1898       Crete autonomous from Turkey
> 1912       Crete annexed                               Greece
> 1912       Ægean Islands from Turkey                   Italy
> 1913       Parts of Macedonia, Albania, and Islands    Greece
> 1913       Parts of Macedonia, and Albania             Servia
> 1913       Parts of Macedonia, Albania, and Thrace     Bulgaria
> 1913       Part of Albania                             Montenegro
> 1913       Albania made independent
> V. Africa
> 1830       Algeria                                      France
> 1882       Tunis                                        France
> 1882       Egypt (annexed 1914)                         Great Britain
> 1884-89    British East Africa                          Great Britain
> 1884-89    German East Africa                           Germany
> 1880-90    Eritrea, Somali coast                        Italy
> 1884-98    Sahara and Western Sudan                     France
> 1898       Eastern Sudan                                Great Britain
> 1909       Zanzibar                                     Great Britain
> 
> 1910   Wadai                         France
> 1912   Morocco                       France
> 1912   Morocco part to               Spain
> 1912   Tripoli and Cyrenaica         Italy
> 
> much imitation of the barbarous warfare of the Mos-
> lems themselves. Neither the motives nor the meth-
> ods of the conquests nor the morals of the diplomacy
> which preceded, nor the frequent disregard of plighted
> word given at the time of occupation or annexation,
> have commended the religion of the Christians. Some
> of the wars, as those against the Turks for the libera-
> tion of the oppressed Christian races; of Italy in
> Tripoli, blessed by the Pope; of the Balkan allies pro-
> claimed by King Ferdinand as one of the Cross
> against the Crescent; or when accompanied by the
> destruction of a Mahdi’s tomb or the bombardment
> of the shrine of an Imam, have seemed like religious
> crusades, and the results have made the impression
> of a triumph of Christianity over Islam rather than
> that of Bulgaria or Italy or other European Power
> over the Osmanlis. The result has been the increase
> of century-long hatred and bitterness and of zeal and
> fanaticism among Moslem races. It is a significant
> fact that under Moslem rulers, Sultan and Shah, Khe-
> dive and Amir, large sections of the population are
> dissatisfied with the government and hostile to the
> mullahs, who are oftentimes bribe-taking and un-
> scrupulous administrators of the Shariat. The people
> denounce them and are apparently ready to renounce
> them. But when political power passes into the hands
> of the Christian, taxation and policing become the
> function of the foreign infidels, the powers of judging,
> bastinadoing, and fleecing pass from the hands of the
> mullahs; then people and priest are soon reconciled,
> there is a drawing together in the common dislike of
> the Frangis, religion becomes a bond of union, and,
> 
> reinforced by a nascent patriotism, issues in a strong
> and zealous Islamic spirit. This was strikingly seen
> in the contrast between the Caucasus and Persia be-
> fore the late change. Under the rule of the Shah
> and the Shari, the people were cursing king and
> mullahs alike; whereas in the Caucasus the relation
> between the mullahs and the Moslem people was
> cordial.
> 
> Dislike to living under Christian rule has led to
> the expatriation of large populations who, forsaking
> land and property even in the winter’s cold, have
> voluntarily exiled themselves rather than continue to
> live comfortably under the rule of the Christian.
> Thousands of Circassians, Abkhasians, Bosnians, and
> Macedonians have thus followed the trail to Turkey.
> Not a few Say ids have abandoned their North African
> homes for Syria and Arabia.
> 
> The adjustment of Moslems to Christian rule has
> legal difficulties. For Islam never anticipated such
> a condition. It was to be a triumphant empire, always
> to rule, and extending its sway further and further
> till it became universal. All lands which had not
> submitted to its law were Dar-ul-Harb, lands of war-
> fare, against which the jihad was not only lawful but
> obligatory. Its attitude towards Christian govern-
> ments ought always to be one of hostility. But the
> laws of Islam have yielded to major force. Moslems
> have learned to live under Christian rule, either se-
> cretly biding their time, though still rebellious in heart
> or satisfying their consciences by bringing in new legal
> definitions to justify their loyalty to infidel govern-
> ments. With this purpose, explanation is made that
> 
> India is still a “land of Islam” because the rites and
> laws of Islam can still be fulfilled with liberty; and that
> the jihad is unlawful because there is not a reasonable
> assurance of success. Even where part of the law
> cannot be obeyed, necessity becomes a higher law, as
> under the Austrian regulations for Bosnia and Herze-
> govina, which forbid polygamy and slavery. But un-
> doubtedly the spirit and law of Islam demand that the
> sole allegiance of the Moslem should be to a ruler of
> his own faith, and only expediency or necessity makes
> him submissive to any other rule. To him race is
> secondary; the Cretan who has become a Moslem is
> no longer a Greek, the Pomak Bulgar is not a lover
> of Bulgaria.
> 
> PARTIALITY OF COLONIAL GOVERNMENTS TO ISLAM
> 
> The utmost care is taken by the governments not
> to offend the religious sensibilities nor to contravene
> the customs and laws of Moslems—in vain as far as
> winning their loyalty. Indeed, the steps of the colonial
> governors have been so carefully ordered that they
> have assisted Islam both in Asia and in Africa. Ka-
> firistan (Abode of Infidels) resisted all the efforts of
> the Afghans to bring them to Islam, till a political
> agreement with Great Britain consigned them to the
> tender mercies of their old enemies and they were
> forced to accept the yoke of Mohammed. Similarly
> in Russia, Father Macary went to Altai to begin a
> mission among the Kirghiz. He was turned away
> by Russian officials on the plea that they were too
> wild and savage to be accessible to the Gospel. Mos-
> lem mullahs were not forbidden to approach them and
> 
> were able to convert them to Islam. The care taken
> not to offend Moslem susceptibilities has been inter-
> preted by Africans and Malays as a sign of fear on
> the part of Europeans and led them to believe in the
> great power of Islam. This partiality was made the
> subject of a special report and remonstrance in the
> Edinburgh Conference. The attitude of colonial of-
> ficials may be shown by some examples. Lord Curzon
> voiced the mind of some in his advice to the students
> of Aligarh College: “Adhere to your own religion.”
> A British resident officer in the Sudan said: “My
> influence is exerted to make the region Mohamme-
> dan” (Dr. A. P. Sterritt, of Sudan Interior Mission).
> Pagan chiefs are installed by putting on a turban, a
> part of the Moslem dress, and this gives the impression
> that the government wishes the pagans to become
> Moslems. At times the heathen soldiers are circum-
> cised, contrary to their desires, to make them accepta-
> ble to their Moslem comrades. Assistants and sub-
> alterns are allowed free privilege of converting the
> people to Islam, while the commander or governor
> from a Christian land preserves neutrality supposedly.
> At Lagos, at the dedication of an expensive mosque,
> the headmaster of the government school expressed
> the satisfaction of the Moslems in these words: “The
> British is the star in the heavens which guided Islam
> to the shores of liberty. … By British protection
> Islam has increased in numbers by thousands and
> thousands with miraculous rapidity” (International
> Review of Missions, 1914, p. 54). Another Mos-
> lem has said: “God raised up the British Government
> for the progress of Islam.” Heathen tribes which
> 
> withstood Islam and refused to admit its propaganda
> have been overcome by European Powers and so
> opened up to Moslem inroads. In Egypt government
> offices and schools are open on Sunday and closed on
> Friday. In Turkey, at Constantinople and Smyrna,
> Christians are excused from work on Sunday; they
> are kept at work in Egypt. More Moslems are heads
> of villages under British rule than were under Turk-
> ish rule and more Christians were in the civil service
> under the old régime (C. R. Watson, “Egypt, etc.,”
> pp. 92-93). A Moslem magazine, Arafate, says (C.
> R. Watson, “The Valley of the Nile,” p. 208):
> “Moslems will not wish to be under other than this
> government which has shown itself determined to put
> the law of the Koran into force. Who knows? It
> will perhaps be the glory of Lord Cromer … to
> resurrect the Moslem Law, which the majority of our
> leaders declare without blinking to be utterly out of
> date.” A journal in Constantinople notes the fact
> that the “French have established nine hundred Koran
> schools in which reading and recitation of passages
> from the Koran are the only occupation of the pupils,
> and negro fetish worshippers are being converted in
> great numbers.” Islam is bolstered up and its intoler-
> ance in Egypt and its pride throughout Africa is in-
> creased by the partiality shown by the European con-
> querors to Moslems over heathen and Christians.
> Let me quote the finding of the great Edinburgh Mis-
> sionary Conference (Vol. I, p. 209): “The lamentable
> fact is that the tendency in the local representatives
> of these foreign governments, not excepting the Brit-
> ish Government (all of them professedly Christian),
> 
> is to facilitate and encourage the acceptance of the
> Mohammedan religion, and to restrict and in some
> cases to prevent the propagation of Christianity.”
> 
> In the Dutch East Indies there has been a change
> of policy in late years. Formerly the spread of Islam
> was aided greatly by the officials, whose clerks, inter-
> preters, policemen, and other assistants were Malay
> Moslems. Through the influence of this corps, and
> the government schools, and the exclusive use of the
> Malay language, Islam made great strides and most of
> the forty millions who were heathen when the Dutch
> took possession are now Moslems. A report says
> (Missionary Review of the World, 1898, p. 360):
> “The Mohammedans of Sumatra themselves believe
> that Allah has given the rule to the Dutch in order
> that all heathen tribes may become Mohammedan.”
> No government official in Java was allowed to become
> a Christian. The government built magnificent
> mosques in Sumatra and Borneo, and allows rest-day
> for Moslems on Friday but refuses it for Christians
> on Sunday. Now, however, fair opportunity is being
> given to the Christian propaganda. Graf von
> Lunberg-Sturm told the Dutch officials that “for
> years the policy of the Dutch Government had been
> influenced by the fear that the spread of Christianity
> might arouse the fanaticism of the Mohammedans,
> but that short-sighted fear is gradually vanishing in
> influential circles and is being more and more replaced
> by the very opposite opinion, that for purely political
> reasons no obstacle should be placed in the path of
> missions” (Simon: “Progress, etc.,” p. 286).
> There seems, moreover, to be an awakening among
> 
> governments to the danger of the Moslem advance in
> Africa. The German Colonial Conference warned
> of the danger and Emperor William spoke strongly
> of the necessity of promoting Christianity and of
> hindering the spread of Islam in Africa. It is to be
> hoped that after this war and the humbling of Turkey
> and the death of political Pan-Islamism, the fear of
> Moslems will pass away, the attitude of truckling to
> them disappear, and an open door and real neutrality
> to Christian missions prevail.
> 
> DISLOYALTY OF MOSLEM SUBJECTS
> 
> Notwithstanding the care exercised not to give of-
> fence, it is impossible for European governments to
> win the Moslems, their confidence, and their heart
> loyalty. I do not mean that individuals may not be
> sincerely loyal and devoted. The ignorant populace
> still believes that Islam is invincible and irresistible.
> God in His own good time will put to naught the
> power of its enemies. The fellahs of Turkey and
> Persia are not convinced to the contrary. The
> Javanese believe that the Sultan is all-powerful and
> that the Christian rulers are under his sovereignty.
> This accounts in the eyes of the negro heathen for
> the way the European honours the Moslem. Edu-
> cated Moslems are opposed to Christian governments,
> for their education has brought in its train other as-
> pirations. Even though weaned from their bigotry,
> they have ideas of independence and self-government,
> with an increased jealousy of the rulers both as for-
> eigners and as anti-Moslem. There is a tendency
> among Africans and Malays to look upon Islam as
> 
> the religion of the black and the brown men, and to
> put hope in it as the power which in its future develop-
> ment may free them from the dominion of the white
> men. The Moslems in Africa are fellow-subjects with
> the heathen, and both are now drawing near each
> other in sympathy. The old-time enmities are passing
> away. They intermarry and are bound together so-
> cially. Mr. Simon says (“Progress, etc.,” pp. 39,
> 44-45): “There is an idea of far-reaching signifi-
> cance in the modern Moslem movement. It means
> the organization in the face of the European nations
> —the rallying of the oppressed proletariat among the
> nations in the face of the ruling Christian Powers.
> … Islam parades before the people as the power
> that can turn against the Europeans: it embodies the
> hope of the brown race for freedom from European
> supremacy.” He says that anti-European feeling is
> so strong that the Malay fears to become a Christian
> lest he be a Dutchman in the next world.
> 
> NATIONALISM AMONG MOSLEMS
> 
> Among the more cultured Moslem races there has
> developed recently a spirit of Nationalism. The
> genius of Islam, maybe, would merge all races in one
> great people under one caliph, but that dream has
> long since passed. It was natural that the spirit of
> Nationalism which has shown itself so markedly in
> Europe and has led to the renaissance of the Italians,
> Greeks, and Balkan peoples should communicate itself
> to Asiatics. The national aspirations of these subject
> Christian races have deserved our sympathy and en-
> couragement. We can sympathize with the aspira-
> 
> tions of subject Moslem races as soon as they learn
> to treat other religions on an equality. The Christian
> can sincerely wish well to all rightly directed efforts
> for liberty. Patriotism, too, the love of country and
> people as distinct from love of Islam, is a growing
> feeling fostered by the new education and the per-
> meation of Western ideas. The awakening of Asia
> is a marked characteristic of the age. The movement
> which has so marvellously affected Japan and which
> has aroused China is evident among Moslem peoples.
> The victory of Japan over Russia had a far-reaching
> and marked effect on Asiatic peoples. Its demonstra-
> tion of the fact that the Orient could face the Occi-
> dent and win, sank deep into their consciousness, in-
> spired them with hope, and roused them with deter-
> mination to throw off the domination of Europe. The
> impression on Moslem peoples was specially marked,
> for they have regarded Russia as their inveterate and
> irresistible enemy. The press and pulpits of Islam
> took up an anti-Christian, anti-foreign propaganda
> with new hopefulness. The modernists emphasized
> the fact that Western science, military skill, and po-
> litical institutions could be acquired and utilized en-
> tirely apart from the Christian religion. “What
> heathen Japan had done, could they not do with the
> help of Allah?” This interest was universal. Battak
> Moslems discussed how they could now expel the
> Dutch. Those of India addressed the Emperor of
> Japan and asked him to take the headship of Asia and
> expel the Europeans. It may be remembered in this
> connection that Japan, when it began to seek modern
> civilization, sent a commission of investigation around
> 
> the world. They travelled through Persia and Tur-
> key, but saw nothing in the Moslem capitals of
> Teheran and Constantinople which they need tarry to
> learn. On the other hand, Japan has given a startling
> lesson to the Moslem world.
> 
> MOSLEM NATIONALISM IN INDIA
> 
> In passing in review political movements among
> Moslems in the present day I will begin with the people
> under the rule of Christian governments. In India
> Moslems continued for a long while in sullen and
> inactive subjection to the British crown. They re-
> fused, as I have already indicated, to take advantage
> of the modern education, by means of which the
> Hindus forged ahead. Jealousy of the Hindus and
> their predominance led the Moslems to give steady
> support to the British Government, that by its aid they
> might be able to hold their own against the encroach-
> ments of the Hindus. The first Mohammedan leaders
> adhered to a programme of loyalty to the British and
> development under their ægis. The leaders following
> Sayid Ahmad Khan were Justice Amir Ali, president
> of the London-All India Moslem League; Ali Khan,
> president of the Central League; His Highness Aga
> Khan, chief of the Bohrah sect of Ismieliyahs of
> Bombay; and the Prince of Arcot in Southern India.
> This All-India Moslem League, intended to include
> all sects, has provincial leagues and a council in Lon-
> don designed to act upon the Imperial Government.
> It has developed ardour and enthusiasm and mani-
> fested considerable activity. It wishes to make a
> common language for all Indian Moslems, possibly the
> 
> Urdu. The government, in a reform scheme, gave
> representation to the people in the Legislative Council
> and in other official bodies. Moslems took advantage
> of these privileges and became members of the High
> Councils. In order to be prepared for their new
> status, they are seriously seeking modern education
> and making progress. Of late many influences have
> combined to arouse the political aspirations of the
> Moslem people. The Pan-Islamic influences of the
> Sultan, hajis and darvishes, the active press, the
> critical condition of the Moslem world, and the rapid
> influx of new political ideas have caused a sudden
> change. A new party has been formed which is
> strongly nationalistic. It is composed, for the most
> part, of lawyers, editors, and teachers of the younger
> generation. They have forced the adoption by the
> Moslem Leagues of a programme calling for “po-
> litical and religious unity with Turkey and the outer
> Islamic world,” and for the freedom of Islamic races
> and countries from the rule of alien and Christian
> governments. This thesis is one upon which theo-
> retically modernists and Pan-Islamists, politicians and
> darvishes, editors and Ulema can agree. But later
> the Nationalists, undeterred by the resignation of
> their old leaders, and by the anarchistic tendencies and
> outbreaks of the Hindus, reached an understanding
> with the Hindu National Congress, sinking their re-
> ligious differences and giving adhesion to the motto,
> 4 India for the Indians” (International Review of
> Missions, 1914, p. 34). The newly organized League
> passed resolutions severely disapproving of the course
> of the British Government concerning Turkey and
> 
> Persia in 1910. The state of feeling was becoming
> more embittered. Everything was critically regarded.
> An example of this was seen just before the war. In
> order to open a new street, a fountain which was used
> for ablutions was removed. This was declared to be
> an insult to Islam and was made the occasion of riot
> and loss of life. The fountain was rebuilt by the gov-
> ernment on a new level. The rapprochement of Mos-
> lems and Hindus and adjustment of their programmes
> does not indicate any widening of religious outlook,
> but simply a temporary sinking of them for political
> purposes. Indeed, the attitude of both races is reac-
> tionary, rejecting the idea of the superiority of Chris-
> tian civilization, except in physical science and its ap-
> plications, and exalting the worth of all things Indian.
> It opposes the movement of Neo-Islam to graft Euro-
> pean law and ideas on Islam, but rather would renew
> confidence in the old religion as in all things of their
> own. At present all expression of criticism is under
> the ban of the censor and the police, and what amounts
> to martial law.
> 
> NATIONALISM IN EGYPT
> 
> Among those who withstood Napoleon in Egypt
> was Mehemet Ali Bey, an Albanian. He became
> Pasha of Egypt, subdued and massacred the Mame-
> lukes, and established a hereditary vice-royalty, called
> the Khedivate. His fourth successor, Ismiel, 1863,
> followed his example in favouring the introduction of
> European civilization. He established public utilities,
> railways, telegraphs, manufactories, developed re-
> sources, adorned the capital with parks and palaces,
> 
> and inaugurated a new system of education, including
> medical institutions. His was the good fortune to
> open the Suez Canal. With these externals of civ-
> ilization, there was no real reform. All the splendour
> caused enormous debts, so that he was not a real
> blessing to his country. For the bondholders a com-
> mission of investigation was ordered. Finances fell
> under the control of French and British adminis-
> trators. Economies were enforced. The notables
> were restrained. Jealousy and dissatisfaction became
> prevalent. A nationalist party began to form to op-
> pose foreign control. The Khedive dismissed the
> Controllers, and was himself deposed. Tewfik Khe-
> dive, his successor, was unable to maintain political
> equilibrium. The Nationalist movement increased in
> power, taking in various classes. Its cry was “Egypt
> for the Egyptians,” directed against Turkish officers
> as well as against Europeans, for the army was under
> Circassian or Osmanli officers who were as distasteful
> as the European tax-collectors, who represented for-
> eign bondholders. The movement culminated in a
> revolt led by Ahmad Arabi Pasha, who stirred up
> popular fanaticism to make demonstrations against the
> British and French. He became a popular hero and
> Minister of War. Riots took place in Alexandria.
> The French and English fleets were fired on, and in
> return bombarded the forts. Mob violence massacred
> two thousand people, including Europeans. Great
> Britain retaliated by bombarding the city, and quelled
> the revolt at Tel-el-Kebir, July, 1882. Arabi Pasha
> was exiled to Ceylon. Great Britain occupied Egypt
> as temporary administrator. The British Government
> 
> strove, as Lord Cromer, its able representative, says
> (“Modern Egypt,” Vol. II, p. 197), “to let the rays
> of true civilization lighten with their sunshine even the
> mud hut of the Egyptian fellah; to deliver them from
> the thraldom of their oppressors; teach them that they
> might be treated like human beings and have opened
> to them the path that leads to moral progress and ele-
> vation of thought.” British officials succeeded in free-
> ing the Egyptians from the three C-s, courbash,
> corvée, and corruption, which may be paraphrased
> as the three F-s, flogging, forcing, and fleecing.
> Great material prosperity and vast internal improve-
> ments followed the Occupation. Egypt was fortunate
> to have justice, security, and light taxation. I no-
> ticed when I visited Cairo after leaving Constanti-
> nople the difference between the conditions of the
> people. Constantinople, under the repression of Abdul
> Hamid, was gloomy in spirit, silent, fearful, requiring
> a caution of speech which made it difficult for one
> accustomed to the freedom of speech of Persia.
> Cairo, in contrast with the Sultan’s capital, was light,
> gay, and free. The people moved about, spoke, and
> acted without restraint or fear. Popular amusements,
> assemblies, literary activities, political theorizings were
> freely indulged in. During the threatened invasion
> of the Mahdi and the efforts for the reconquest of
> the Sudan, agitation was in abeyance. But Britain’s
> sincere efforts to be fair, even to the point of partiality
> to the Moslem, did not succeed in winning their loy-
> alty. The Nationalist movement broke out again after
> a time. For the Moslem prefers oppression from one
> of his own faith and race to justice and progress under
> 
> the infidel foreigner. Pan-Islamic agitation from
> Turkey helped to revive Nationalism in Egypt and the
> new spirit moving upon Asiatic peoples was felt there
> also. Discontent and dissatisfaction grew apace;
> partly from the agitation of those shut out from
> former emoluments; partly from the exclusion of
> Egyptians from high civil and military offices; partly
> from the injustice of the capitulations which favoured
> foreigners even when criminals; partly from hostility
> to Christianity itself. This hostility was kept alive
> not only by the Ulema, but by the Europeanized Egyp-
> tians, who, often sceptical themselves, regarded Islam
> as the rallying cry for nationalism. The demand was,
> “Cessation of British occupation and Home-Rule.”
> Khedive Abbas Hilmi was anti-English and the Coun-
> cil was manipulated by the Nationalists. The Sardar,
> Sir Eldon Gorst, tried a policy of accommodation and
> conciliation.
> 
> Two parties, at least, existed among the National-
> ists. The first and oldest was led by Ali Pasha Yusuf.
> They advocated reforms and the gradual withdrawal
> of Great Britain. Their newspaper was Al Moayad.
> The other party was led by Kamil Pasha. He had
> been educated in France, loudly denounced everything
> British, and strenuously advocated immediate with-
> drawal, saying, “Rather an unreformed Egypt than
> one reformed by the British; rather the Turks, for
> they at least are Moslems.” He was supported by the
> Sultan of Turkey. Their organ was the Lcwa. The
> newspapers had great influence in exciting patriotic
> feeling, for while few of the people can read, story-
> tellers in the villages read and re-read the papers to
> 
> groups. The movement was directly encouraged by
> the Minister of Education. Anglophobia was ram-
> pant in the schools, especially the School of Law.
> The Club of High Schools, founded for educational
> purposes, was turned into an organization of the Na-
> tionalist party. Students were continually involved in
> criminal investigations. Of the graduate Nationalist,
> W. N. Willis gives the following description (quoted
> in The Near East, from “Anti-Christ in Egypt”):
> “He is half-educated and wholly superficial. He is
> a nuisance to himself and a worry to everybody else.
> Many of the foreign consuls play upon his vanity by
> sympathizing with him—with their tongues well
> planted in their cheeks. They simply make a tool of
> him in order to breed trouble and discontent.”
> 
> Nationalist agitation reached a climax when, in
> February, 1910, Boudros Pasha, the Prime Minister
> and a Copt, an able supporter of British administra-
> tion, was assassinated by Wardani. The power of
> Moslem fanaticism appears in the fatva or decree of
> the Grand Mufti, that Wardani should not be ex-
> ecuted—(1) because he killed with a revolver, and
> Moslem law has said nothing about such a murder,
> (2) because the government entered process, and by
> Moslem law it should have been done by the rela-
> tives, (3) because it is not a capital crime for a
> Moslem to kill a Christian. Wide sympathy for the
> assassin existed among the Egyptians. It was at this
> time that Former President Roosevelt passed through
> Egypt on returning from Central Africa. In an ad-
> dress at the University in Cairo he strongly con-
> demned the murder. The Nationalists were greatly
> 
> enraged, and hundreds of them made a demonstration
> against him, shouting, “Down with Roosevelt!”
> “Down with the Occupation!” The Copts have
> been alienated from the Nationalist party, whose cry,
> “Egypt for the Egyptians,” is more truly, Egypt for
> the Moslems. The Nationalism attaches itself to Islam
> and does not include in its scope the real Egyptians,
> the Copts, who are six hundred thousand, or one-
> tenth of the people, and proportionately the more in-
> telligent. Indeed, it is said that a large proportion of
> the Nationalists were of Turkish, Kurdish, Circassian,
> and Syrian extraction. Moslem fanaticism has even
> awakened in the Christians a fear for their personal
> safety. The British Government awoke to the neces-
> sity of action and sent Lord Kitchener to be Sardar
> with an iron policy. A press law was enforced with
> severe penalties. Offending editors were dealt with.
> Among these was Sheikh Abdul Aziz Shawish. He
> was a graduate of Al Azhar, lecturer on Arabic at
> Oxford, Inspector in the Egyptian Ministry of Edu-
> cation, an able writer and editor and a contributor to
> Nationalist journals. He was fiercely anti-English,
> and was for a while imprisoned for libel and sedition.
> Some editors fled to Geneva and Paris. There they
> published a paper called El Kisas (“The Punish-
> ment”). Its spirit is shown in its exalting the as-
> sassin of Boudros Pasha to the rank of hero and
> patriot.
> 
> The Turkish Revolution of 1908 strengthened Na-
> tionalism in Egypt. The Young Turks actively pro-
> moted it, and the Ottoman High Commissioner, who
> represented the Sultan, had no occupation but to carry
> 
> on intrigues and to try to inflame the spirit. Though
> Egypt was neutral in the war in Tripoli, yet Egyptians
> helped the Turks. A significance incident showed that
> Nationalism is not love for the Turks. Among those
> who assisted Turkey in Cyrenaica was the Egyptian
> Aziz Ali Bey. After the war he was court-martialled
> in Constantinople through the jealousy of Enver
> Pasha and Sheikh Shawish and condemned to death.
> The unjust sentence was protested against by the united
> voice of the Egyptian press and people, seconding the
> efforts of the two governments, and was accompanied
> by a vehement outburst of anger against the Turks
> until he was freed. Lord Kitchener, with severity,
> combined efforts to satisfy the people. He specially
> strove to relieve the condition of the fellahs by just
> laws, by supervision and restraint of the landlords,
> and by postal savings banks freeing them from
> usurers. A delegation of Egyptians presented in Lon-
> don a petition for increase of rights. Shortly after-
> wards the powers of self-government were enlarged.
> In lieu of the Legislative Council, established in 1883,
> a Legislative Assembly was inaugurated in 1914. It
> consisted of 66 members elected by the people and 23
> nominated by the government, including 6 ministers
> and representatives of the Beduins, Copts, Jews, and
> special classes. It has power of initiating legislation.
> When the present war began, opinion was divided.
> Some feared that they might fall into the hands of
> Germany if England were defeated. When Turkey
> proclaimed a Holy War a wave of sympathy passed
> over the people. The Khedive Abbas Hilmi was in
> Constantinople. He had been anti-British. He had
> 
> even refused to preside at cabinet meetings, and
> through his intrigues had involved many princes, so
> that they exiled themselves. His attempt to sell the
> Mariut Railway to foreigners had almost brought
> about his deposition. He remained in Constantinople
> and accepted appointment to go with the Turkish army
> against the British. In consequence of all this, Great
> Britain, on December 18, 1914, declared Egypt a
> British protectorate, repudiating Turkish sovereignty.
> Prince Husain Kamil, second son of Ismiel Pasha,
> was proclaimed ruler of Egypt, with the title of
> Sultan. Martial law was declared, and the arrival
> of British armies made further Nationalist manifesta-
> tions inopportune. Only the students of the High
> School have dared to show their spirit by “cutting”
> attendance when Sultan Husain visited their institu-
> tion, and some anarchists by twice attempting his as-
> sassination.
> 
> ARABS AND ALBANIANS
> 
> Concerning the spirit of Nationalism in other coun-
> tries of North Africa or in Russia and Central Asia,
> all that is necessary has been said under the Pan-
> Islamic movement. Political agitation has not been
> permitted to show itself so openly in those countries.
> Even Moslem countries under Moslem rulers of a dif-
> ferent race have strongly manifested Nationalism.
> The Arabs have been in a continual ferment against
> Turkish domination and have made many revolts.
> The Kurds, under Sheikh Obeidullah, in 1880, formu-
> lated a programme of independence. The Albanians
> have shown a strenuous resistance to Ottomanization,
> 
> even the Moslem Albanians (1,500,000) appearing to
> put race before religion. It is possible some of them
> are secret Christians, both men and women, and that
> they maintain Christian practices secretly (Pears:
> “Turkey and Its People,” p. 173). They say that
> they were made Mohammedans by compulsion and
> have no loyalty to Mohammed. Rev. C. T. Erickson
> says (Missionary Review, 1913, p. 322): “I am con-
> vinced, having it from the people themselves, that
> once they are free from the Turkish yoke, off goes the
> Moslem yoke also.” Dr. J. L. Barton testifies to the
> same effect: “When an Albanian chief was asked if
> he was not a Mohammedan, he denied the fact with
> great emphasis. He said Albanians had no love for
> the Turks nor for Mohammedanism, and that no rea-
> son exists why they should not accept Christianity.”
> But it seems doubtful whether the national spirit will
> unite the Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Moslem
> Albanians in political solidarity.
> 
> HOW CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATION AFFECTS MOSLEM
> LANDS
> 
> I turn now to consider Moslem lands which are po-
> litically independent. It is remarkable how they are
> under the influence of Christian civilization. Their
> economic dependence has been a prelude to their ab-
> sorption of social and political ideas. Just a para-
> graph about this economic relation. Turkey and
> Persia look to Europe for public utilities, as railways,
> tramways, telephones, telegraphs; for internal devel-
> opment, as mining, irrigation, and engineering; for
> weapons for the jihads—cannon, muskets, cruisers,
> 
> and aeroplanes; for gold and silver for their money,
> for machines to mint it, safes to hold it,
> purses to carry it, loans to replenish it; for
> window glass, lamps and matches to light their
> mosques, compasses to show the kibla of prayer, and
> watches to tell their times of worship, and for paper
> on which their Korans and prayers and charms are
> written, and for stamps to send their letters; for their
> spectacles and teeth and drugs and hardware and
> dishes and knives and forks and an indefinite supply
> of their needs. For much the Islamic world is
> indebted to the Christian. It is even adopting the
> style of dress, the shoes, the brushes, the kaloshes,
> the umbrellas of the Christian, and the Sherif of
> Mecca rides on the day of pilgrimage on a saddle,
> made in Europe, of pig-skin (Keane: “Six Months
> in Mecca”).
> 
> In all departments of science the Moslems are bor-
> rowers from the Christian world, and very profitably
> in medicine. But more remarkable is their readiness
> to learn in politics, law, and statecraft, in which they
> have a Koran, a Shariat, and a Khalifa to guide them.
> Nothing has more surprised the world than the Con-
> stitutional movements in Persia and Turkey. Even
> Afghanistan is undergoing remarkable changes in
> thought and “Young Afghans” are ambitious for a
> liberal government. Amir Habib Ullah is inclined to
> reforms in the administration. His visit to India in-
> creased his desire for progress.
> 
> POLITICAL REFORMS IN PERSIA
> 
> Political reforms in modern Persia were first at-
> tempted by Mirza Taki Khan, the celebrated vizier of
> Nasr-ud-Din Shah (1848-52). This man, sprung
> from the common people, was of sterling integrity,
> scorning bribes and flattery. He succeeded for a time
> in bringing about a reform of abuses and of the cor-
> ruption of official life. The sale of offices was abol-
> ished, the absurd civil pension roll cut down, oppres-
> sion of the peasants restrained, the use of bombastic
> titles discountenanced, the sea slave trade prohibited,
> the interference of foreign legations in the internal
> affairs of Persia was discountenanced. The power of
> the mullahs in political affairs was restrained, the right
> of asylum was taken away from the Mujtahids, pop-
> ular fanaticism was frowned upon, especially as ex-
> hibited and incited by the Muharram ceremonies. But
> the jealousy and opposition of the reactionaries was
> too much for him. He was dismissed and executed.
> Yet the indignation caused by his death brought about
> at least this reform that the custom of executing ex-
> viziers ceased. Though he had no thought of con-
> sulting the people and continued the old method of
> autocratic rule, yet “the short period of his adminis-
> tration is now looked back upon as having been the
> golden age of modern Persia” and he is regarded as
> the “only man who possessed the ability, the patri-
> otism, the energy, and the integrity” to regenerate the
> country (Watson’s “History of Persia,” pp. 366-
> 404).
> 
> Next in time comes the advocacy of reform by
> 
> Prince Malcom Khan, Minister to Great Britain. I
> had the pleasure of calling on this intelligent and pro-
> gressive man in Tabriz. When Minister and after-
> wards when under the ban of the Shah, he set forth
> a programme of reforms and Constitutional govern-
> ment for Persia. He established a magazine, called
> Kanun (Rule), which, published in London, circu-
> lated in Persia, and set forth liberal ideas of govern-
> ment and discoursed on the faults of the administra-
> tion, especially of the Vizier Ali Askar Khan, Amin-i-
> Sultan. He organized a society called the “World of
> Humanity” and also, from its secrecy, “Faramush
> Khana,” through which liberalism was propagated.
> 
> Other preachers of reform in Persia were Sheikh
> Hadi of Teheran and Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din, of whom
> I have spoken. The latter, before his work for Pan-
> Islamism, associated himself with Malcom Khan in
> advocating a Constitution for Persia. He expressed
> regret that he had spent so much of his effort in trying
> to influence sovereigns. “Would that I had sown all
> the seeds of my ideas in the receptive ground of the
> people’s thoughts. The sword of unrighteousness has
> not suffered me to see awakening of the peoples of the
> East and the hand of ignorance has not granted me
> the opportunity to hear the call of freedom. The
> stream of renovation flows quickly towards the East.
> The edifice of despotic government totters to its fall.
> Strive as far as you can to destroy the foundations of
> despotism, not to pluck up and cast out its individual
> members” (Browne’s “Persian Revolution,” p. 29).
> 
> These agitations were a preparation for the crisis
> which came in 1891, on the occasion of the Shah
> 
> granting a monopoly of the tobacco trade to a British
> company. Abetted by Russia, the liberals, the mul-
> lahs, and the governors who had been overlooked in
> the distribution of bribes combined to overthrow this
> concession. (See writer’s “Persian Life and Cus-
> toms,” pp. 290-96.) The Akhtar, the Persian journal
> at Constantinople, denounced it and was suppressed.
> Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din, who had been acting as a Min-
> ister, was arrested and expelled. Malcom Khan tele-
> graphed his disapproval. He was dismissed and re-
> mained in exile. Thus he escaped the fate of his
> friend, M. Yusuf Khan, Mustashar-ud-Doulah, For-
> eign Agent—my next-door neighbour at Tabriz. His
> correspondence was inspected. He was called to Te-
> heran, but at Kasvin was met by a royal cup of coffee
> which terminated his journey. Tracts were circu-
> lated through the country demanding the suppression
> of the monopoly, reform of the finances, religious free-
> dom, and a representative government. Finally a
> fatva of the chief Mujtahids of Kerbala and Najef
> interdicted the use of tobacco. The people ceased to
> use the weed. Strikes and riots threatened; the
> monopoly was rescinded. The royal power by this
> defeat received a great check. Priests and people had
> learned their power when united. Of those who took
> an active part in these riots was one Mirza Riza, a
> disciple of Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din. He was imprisoned
> and maltreated. He wreaked his vengeance by assassi-
> nating the Shah in 1896, no doubt instigated thereto
> by the Sheikh,1 and possibly by the Babis (Azalis).
> 
> 1 See chapter on Neo-Islam. The assassin in his examination
> said: “Those who share my view are many, but no one, save
> 
> Agitation was kept up during the reign of Muzaffar-
> ud-Din Shah. In 1901 pamphlets, placards, and pro-
> tests were distributed and even delivered on the table
> of the Shah himself, directed against him and the
> Amin-i-Sultan and the new loans and mortgages which
> were being made for the Shah’s journeys to Europe.
> Some of these agitators were arrested, imprisoned, and
> exiled. Discontent grew apace during the following
> years. The people felt that their situation was des-
> perate. They were suffering grievously from injustice
> and oppression. Their ancient country was weak, its
> government corrupt, its independence threatened. The
> people, rich and poor alike, were groaning on account
> of their pitiable lot. Their Kismat was ill-fortune.
> Bribes weighed down the scales of justice. Security
> of property was at the caprice of venal judges, both
> civil and religious. Men cursed their rulers with a
> 
> myself and Sayid Jamal-ud-Din, was aware of the idea of mine
> to kill the Shah” (Browne’s “Persian Revolution,” p. 67). He
> also said: “A tree,—meaning the Shah,—whereof the fruits
> after all these years are such low-down rogues and scoun-
> drels … who are the plagues of the lives of the Moslem
> community, such a tree, bearing such fruits, ought to be cut
> down.” Some suspected that the Babis had part in the crime,
> for the two men who visited Mirza Riza at Shah Abdul Azim,
> the scene of the murder, were Babis, i.e. Azalis, and the two
> men whom he visited in the prison at Trebizond, en route for
> Teheran, were of the same sect. These two were extradited and
> executed at Tabriz on the charge of complicity. One of them,
> M. Hasan Khan, Mukhbir-ul-Mulk, I had conversed with at the
> Mustashar-ud-Doulah’s in Tabriz. Another of these Babis was
> an editor of the Akhtar and a son-in-law of Subh-i-Azal (ibid.,
> pp. 78, 92-95, 405, 415). The reform movement was not, how-
> ever, a Babi movement. Those who took part did so with other
> Persians of all sects desiring the good of the country.
> 
> vim and a vindictiveness which were startling. For
> several decades the city people had lived on the verge
> of famine, though the crops were fairly good. They
> exclaimed: “Allah gives us our daily bread, but
> greedy men starve us.” Princes and nobles, mullahs
> and other capitalists, had their hands on the throat of
> the people as effectively as if they had been a land-
> lords’ trust. They doubled and trebled the price of
> bread in the cities. The labourer was obliged to work
> ten days for a bushel of wheat. This high price
> scarcely benefited the farmer, for he had little wheat
> or barley to sell after feeding his family. The rent
> and taxes he paid in kind, by measure not by value.
> The Crown Prince, Mohammed Ali Mirza, was the
> most avaricious grain merchant. The people bitterly
> resented it, saying: “Our Prince should be our Pro-
> tector and Shepherd; he devours us like a hungry
> wolf.” It cost him his crown. The officials, the
> farmers of taxes, and the mullahs whose stipends
> were collected by them from the villages in produce,
> were waxing richer and the mass of the people grew
> poorer and poorer. The Mujtahids are among the
> greatest landlords, and wealthy because recipients of
> the tithes and because in their capacity as judges they
> have been corrupt. Bitterness against them was in-
> tensified because, while as representatives of religion
> they were expected to manifest justice and mercy, they
> have so often shown avarice and hardheartedness.
> Men with fair earnings were under the necessity of
> pawning their household goods. Bread riots of men
> and even of women failed to bring relief. With heart
> and lip they cursed both priest and prince.
> 
> The corruption of the government was causing in-
> tense dissatisfaction. Ministers were quarrelling, pos-
> sibly poisoning one another. Loans had been con-
> tracted from Russia, making possible royal jaunts in
> Europe and lining the pockets of viziers and court
> favourites, but with no result in public utilities. For
> these loans the customs duties were hypothecated.
> Foreign (Belgian) controllers were put in charge of
> customs, post, and passports. Road concessions gave
> control of highways into the hand of foreigners.
> Bridges which from time immemorial had been public
> property became toll-bridges through the connivance
> of bribe-taking officials. Patriotic anger was aroused
> by these circumstances and by the threatened danger
> to the independent regulation of religion should for-
> eign control increase. The conviction that the coun-
> try, and with it the religion, was endangered by con-
> cessions, loans, and the foreigners, had the deepest
> influence. Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din wrote to the prin-
> cipal Ulema, “By God’s life, folly and greed are
> allied to destroy religion, abrogate the Holy Law,
> and to hand over the home of Islam to foreigners!”
> 
> Under these conditions the outcome of the Russo-
> Japanese war made a profound impression. The in-
> vincible Russians were humbled. Persians began to
> hope. The Constitutional struggle in Russia had a
> great influence, especially in its effect on the Persians
> and Shiahs of the Caucasus, who imbibed Constitu-
> tional and socialistic ideas and were initiated into revo-
> lutionary methods. Other Persians were influenced in
> Turkey. In Persia secret agitators were working and
> planning. The relation between the mullahs and the
> 
> government became more and more strained. Pru-
> dence seemed to have forsaken the officials. Sayids,
> mullahs, and even Mujtahids were bastinadoed. The
> killing of a Sayid finally inflamed the embers of dis-
> content. A great popular demonstration occurred.
> People to the number of twelve thousand took refuge
> at the British Legation. There the demand for a
> Constitution was formulated as the panacea for their
> ills. Muzaffar-ud-Din bowed to the will of the people
> and granted a Constitution August 5, 1906. His suc-
> cessor Mohammed Ali Shah abrogated it and dispersed
> parliament at the cannon’s mouth, hanging the editors,
> June, 1908. Civil war ensued, and he was forced to
> abdicate, by the Nationalists, July, 1909. Ahmad
> Sultan Shah succeeded him at the age of thirteen.
> Mr. Morgan Shuster was called in to regulate the
> finances as Treasurer-General, but his plans were in-
> compatible with the purposes of Russia, which forced
> his retirement and continued to hold parts of Northern
> Persia with the army of occupation. The Constitu-
> tion continues nominally in force; the new Shah was
> crowned before the reassembled second parliament,
> and the third one assembled in December, 1914.1
> 
> 1 OUTLINE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT IN PERSIA.
> (1) Merchants and mullahs protest against oppression, take
> refuge at Shah Abdul Azim, force Ayn-ud-Doulah’s resignation,
> 1905.
> (2) Petition for reforms, leaders exiled, April, 1906.
> (3) Killing of Sayid and fifteen others by soldiers. Mullahs
> and people take refuge at Kum, June 21, 1906.
> (4) Great political demonstration. Twelve thousand people
> take refuge at British Legation, July 19-August 5.
> (5) Constitution granted by Muzaffar-ud-Din Shah August 5,
> 1906.
> 
> PERSIAN CONSTITUTION AND RELIGION
> 
> The adoption of a Constitution did not put much
> of a strain on the relation of Persians to their reli-
> gion because they had long been under the urfi or
> civil law, which was largely the decisions of the Shah
> and his Ministers. This urfi had often crossed the
> will of the mullahs. Between them and the civil
> authorities there had been much rivalry and jealousy.
> This accounts in a measure for the fact that the mul-
> lahs had such a conspicuous part in the Persian revo-
> lution. Whereas in Turkey the movement was carried
> on largely by young scholars, educated in Europe,
> 
> (6) First National Assembly inaugurated, Teheran, October
> 7, 19o6.
> (7) Shah died, Mohammed Ali crowned, January 19, 1907.
> (8) Vizier Amin-i-Sultan (Atabeg) assassinated August 13.
> (9) Russian-British agreement, dividing Persia into spheres of
> influence, published September, 1907.
> (10) Coup-d’état June 23, 1908.
> (11) Civil war. First siege of Tabriz, June-October. Royal
> troops withdrew, vanquished.
> (12) Second siege of Tabriz, January-April, 1909. Relieved by
> Russian troops.
> (13) Nationalist troops occupy Teheran, July 6th. Shah ab-
> dicated. Ahmad Sultan made Shah.
> (14) Second National Assembly convened November, 1909.
> (15) Mr. Morgan Shuster made Treasurer-General May 12,
> 1911.
> (16) Ex-Shah’s raid and defeat, summer of 1911.
> (17) Dissolution of Parliament. Shuster dismissed on demand
> of Russia.
> (18) Third siege of Tabriz ends, December 25, 1911. Shuja-
> ud-Doulah begins reign of terror in Tabriz.
> (19) Ahmad Shah crowned, 1914. Third parliament
> assembles, December, 1914. Neutrality of Persia proclaimed in
> the Great War.
> 
> often irreligious and with reliance on the army, in
> Persia the mullahs were the force that broke the gov-
> ernment in the first place, though they were influ-
> enced more than they knew by men who had drunk
> from the streams of liberal and revolutionary
> thought. Another class which was strong and influ-
> ential were the Sayids, the descendants of Mohammed,
> who are supposed to be a fanatical class. From first
> to last they were prominent in the liberal ranks and
> many of them suffered death for the cause of lib-
> erty and progress. They demonstrated that the reli-
> gious class of Islam contains a good proportion of
> liberal-minded men. Because of this, the Nationalists
> were constrained to allow the mullahs large influence
> in drafting the written Constitution, especially as
> without their aid the Shah could not be forced to
> accept and sign it. Some provisions favour clerical
> domination and provide for the continuance of their
> power. Article I establishes Islam according to the
> Shiah sect of the twelve Imams as the religion of
> Persia, to which the Shah must belong and to the
> spread of which he must contribute. Article II de-
> clares that the National Assembly has been founded
> by the help of the Twelfth Imam, and it must never
> to all ages pass laws contrary to the Shariat; and a
> commission of five Mujtahids shall have power to
> reject all bills which their judgment decides to be
> contrary to the Law. Articles LXXI and LXXXVI
> seem to limit the power of the Mujtahids’ courts by
> giving the final decision to a tribunal established by
> the government. There is no doubt that the prin-
> ciples of the Nationalist party really tended to under-
> 
> mine the Islamic courts and the traditions. It was
> not long before most of their strict religionists turned
> to the reactionary side. When the contest of arms
> came on, mullahs and Mujtahids were generally
> against the Nationalists. In Tabriz they organized a
> society called the Islamia, which used all the weapons
> of bigotry and religious hate in their efforts to over-
> throw the cause of freedom. They branded the sup-
> porters of the Constitution as Babis or heretics, dis-
> loyal to Islam and worthy of extermination in a jihad.
> To convince the royal army of besiegers that they
> were good Shiahs, a unique demonstration was made
> —one that will never fade from memory. Mounting
> the flat roofs of Tabriz, the people repeated with the
> mighty sound of ten thousand voices the creed, call-
> ing out: “Allah akbar! Allah akbar! God is great!
> There is no God but God; Mohammed is the Apostle
> of God; Ali is the vicegerent of God.” Times with-
> out number this creed rang out, testifying to the be-
> sieging army that the city were true Shiahs. There
> arose an intense feeling of bitterness against the mul-
> lahs, who were denounced with hatred and contempt.
> Among the few houses looted and destroyed by the
> Nationalist mob were those of the Mujtahids, and
> they did not venture to return to Tabriz even when
> it was under guard of the Russian troops. For the
> time the power of the mullahs was broken and free-
> dom of speech and action regarding religion was
> increased.
> 
> PERSIAN REFORMS AND LIBERTY
> 
> The provisions of the new law are a series of com-
> promises. People shall enjoy equal rights except
> where it contravenes the Shari. The study and teach-
> ing of arts, letters, and science are free except as for-
> bidden by the Shari. Publications are permitted ex-
> cept when harmful to the religion of Islam. Other
> articles disqualify from voting or being a candidate
> any apostates from the Shiah faith and those living
> in open sin, and declare that only a Mohammedan
> Persian can be a Minister of State. While the banner
> “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, and Justice” was
> widely displayed, the question of giving real equality
> to Christians and Jews was scarcely mooted. The
> smallness of their number precludes the question be-
> coming one of active politics, but for this reason the
> Moslems could without endangering their supremacy
> in any particular have applied the principles of liberty.
> Non-Moslems were not regarded as regular citizens.
> As exceptional populations, the Armenians, Nes-
> torians, Zoroastrians, and Jews were each allowed
> one representative in parliament, and these must be
> sound in their respective faiths.
> 
> Civil rights were guaranteed, reforms projected,
> popular education advocated, the adoption of Western
> civilization decided upon, under a Constitutional
> régime. But many difficulties hindered the carrying
> out of these purposes. First there were the schemes
> of the reactionaries, including several insurrections
> by the ex-Shah and Kajar Princes. These were sue-
> 
> cessfully put down. Two difficulties proved insur-
> mountable, one internal, the other external.
> 
> CAUSES OF FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT
> 
> What was the internal cause of the failure of the
> new régime? An Oriental story seems apropos. The
> wise man said that three things were necessary for
> the progress of the kingdom: an army, money, and
> the trust of the people. He was asked which could
> be most easily dispensed with. “The army,” he said,
> “for with the other two, prosperity could still exist.”
> “Which of these two?” “Money,” he replied, “for
> the trust and confidence of the people would give
> success.” But what shall we say of a country where
> the army is untrained and divided under tribal leaders
> and factional chiefs, united by no common patriotic
> purpose nor aspiration; where money is lacking and
> financial administration inadequate; in which distrust
> of the leaders is keenly felt and that righteousness
> which exalteth a nation is absent? Why did the
> Constitutional movement fail? It failed for lack of
> men, men of character and integrity. The old royalist
> officials were corrupt and venal; the new men, the
> would-be reformers, for the most part proved deficient
> in the same way. Let me call some independent wit-
> nesses. Mr. Arthur Moore came to Persia as a
> representative of the Persian Committee of the British
> Parliament. He sympathized with and aided the Con-
> stitutionalists, even drilling their troops, and joined in
> the sortie in which the devoted Mr. Baskerville was
> sacrificed. After much experience, Mr. Moore said
> to me: “This movement must fail. The men lack
> 
> moral stamina.” Take, for example, the hero of Ta-
> briz, Sattar Khan. When Mohammed Ali Shah abol-
> ished the Constitution, he sent an army of freebooters
> against Tabriz to punish it for its stubborn advocacy
> of liberty. These mountaineers began to loot, burn,
> and destroy the homes and bazaars of the defenceless
> inhabitants. Then up rose an unknown man, mounted
> his horse, gathered some comrades, and rode through
> the streets calling on the citizens to arm and resist.
> They seized the armoury, organized the butchers and
> bakers and candlestick-makers, endured two sieges,
> and caused the final triumph of the Constitution.
> Sattar Khan was the hero of this fight for freedom.
> Shall we honour his name as a Washington or a
> Garibaldi? No! He was conquered by greed and
> graft, wine and women. His name became a by-word
> and a reproach.
> 
> How was it when Mr. Shuster tried to put Persia’s
> finances to rights? He dealt with the cabinet ministers
> of the Constitutional government. What kind of men
> did he find them to be? He describes them as selfish,
> self-seeking, greedy, looking out for their own inter-
> ests and not for those of their country (Shuster’s
> “Strangling of Persia,” pp. 239, 200). A member
> of the British Boundary Commission voiced the same
> verdict: “We have lost hope of Persia on account of
> the lack of men of character and ability to lead it.”
> 
> The external factor which controls the situation in
> Persia is Russia. For many years its influence has
> been gradually on the increase. It received legal
> sanction when the Shah solicited loans and hypothe-
> cated the custom duties as security. Its position was
> 
> rendered impregnable when the agreement with Great
> Britain acknowledged its sphere of influence as ex-
> tending over the largest and best part of Persia, as
> far south as Ispahan and Yezd inclusive. The British
> sphere extends over a much smaller section, including
> Kerman and Bandar Abbas. Between these spheres
> a considerable area is left as a buffer. By this ar-
> rangement the Lion and the Bear lay down together,
> and the Persian lamb within them. Later Russia’s
> position was strengthened by stationing troops and
> consular guards at various points. In the present war
> the invasion of Azerbaijan by Turks and Kurds has
> brought dire calamity upon the Christian population,
> adding another full chapter of untold horrors to the
> story of Moslem cruelty, savagery, and lust. Russia
> later drove them from Persian soil, which, though
> neutral territory, has suffered terribly.
> 
> IX
> 
> POLITICAL REFORMS IN THE TURKISH
> EMPIRE
> 
> I HAVE already referred to the gradual weaken-
> ing and dismemberment of the Turkish empire.
> This disintegration impressed upon the govern-
> ment and people the necessity of finding a remedy.
> European civilization had gone forward by leaps and
> bounds; the Turks were distanced in the race. The
> consciousness of this condition aroused the Sultans,
> who began to act partly on their own initiative, and
> partly at the instigation of Europeans like the British
> Ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and not
> at all in response to any popular demand or agitation.
> Mahmud II, Abdul Mejid, and Abdul Aziz are called
> the Reforming Sultans. Mahmud II paved the way
> for reforms by abolishing the Janissaries, who, on
> mutinying, were destroyed at the cannon’s mouth.
> He strove to placate European States by bringing
> Turkey into the line of progress. Some of his
> projects were external and did not touch the root of
> the matter. He discarded long robes and the turban,
> donned the European dress, and adopted the fez as a
> national headdress—an article which had previously
> been used by some Greeks in Turkey. His assistant in
> organizing the new administration was Raif Mahmud
> Effendi, who as secretary to the Ottoman Embassy in
> 
> England had imbibed some principles of free govern-
> ment. Some of the changes affected in this and the
> following reigns were as follows: A new Sultan
> should not on his accession, openly at least, slaughter
> all his brothers, nor cut off the head of a Grand
> Vizier on his deposition, nor imprison ambassadors
> in case of war. The Vizier thereafter deigned to
> rise to a foreign ambassador; even the Sultan might
> grasp the hand of such an infidel or become his guest.
> One Sultan, Abdul Aziz, even visited European capi-
> tals, 1875. Politeness to foreigners became the cus-
> tom. Torture of criminals was prohibited, slavery-
> was mitigated, the slave-trade and public slave-mar-
> kets were abolished, the poll-tax on zimmis or Chris-
> tian rayats was for a time removed and the evidence
> of Christians was to be admitted in court. Though
> done, for the most part, under the pressure of Chris-
> tian governments, yet all this was encouraging. Re-
> forms were summed up in two celebrated decrees is-
> sued by Abdul Mejid. One in 1839 was the Hatti
> Sherif of Gulkhana, called the Magna Charta of
> Turkey, which systematized taxation and military
> service, and guaranteed security of life, honour, and
> property to all subjects, irrespective of race or religion.
> The other, in 1856, called the Hatti Humayun, guar-
> anteed religious freedom and abolished the death pen-
> alty for apostasy from Islam. This was issued at the
> demand of the Christian ambassadors, following the
> public and shameful execution of an Armenian youth
> who through fear and in intoxication had professed
> Islam and had afterwards recanted. The decree
> caused great rejoicing in Christian lands, but this in-
> 
> terpretation was subsequently repudiated by the
> Porte (William Goodell: “Forty Years in the Turk-
> ish Empire,” pp. 240, 292, 385, 481, 48C). It stated
> that “every distinction and designation tending to
> make any class whatever of the subjects of my empire
> inferior to another class on account of their religion,
> language, and race shall be forever effaced. … No
> subject shall be hindered in the exercise of the religion
> he professes, nor shall be in any way annoyed on that
> account. No one shall be compelled to change his
> religion.”
> 
> About the same time, following the Crimean War
> (1855), the Turkish army was reorganized and the
> Sultan was able to confirm his rule in the borders of
> Kurdistan, Syria and Arak Arabi, and to a certain
> extent over Nejd and the Persian Gulf littoral. Euro-
> pean codes of law were introduced. The laws of
> landed property were changed. At the conquest one-
> third of the land had been assigned to the Ulema.
> Donations and endowments, vakf, had increased these
> properties greatly. The darvish orders also held large
> endowments. The State took over the administra-
> tion of these vakfs. The privileges of the nobles and
> beys as landlords were revoked. These measures
> caused great discontent. These powerful elements
> were alienated and the salaries assigned in lieu of the
> former incomes did not satisfy them. Their spirit
> is seen in the act of a darvish who came before Rashid
> Pasha at a public audience, reviled him, called him
> dog and infidel, and invoked the vengeance of heaven
> and the dagger of the Moslem upon him for introduc-
> ing reforms. Because of such a spirit, an eminent
> 
> Turk remarked: “Our Ministers labour in vain, for
> civilization will never enter Turkey so long as the
> turbeh, shrines, of the darvishes are in existence.”
> Mr. Ubicini (quoted in Browne’s “Dervishes,” p.
> 349) says: “The two bodies of which religious so-
> ciety is composed, the Ulema and the darvishes, are
> the enemies of all reform. There is conservatism in
> the Ulema, who speaks in the name of Law, saying,
> ‘Touch nothing that is established, borrow nothing
> from the infidels, because the Law forbids it.’ The
> darvish Sheikh says: ‘I am the Law; all is good that
> I commend, all is evil that I forbid. My sentence is
> the sentence of God.’ The government may hope
> from the Ulema, but not from the darvishes.”
> 
> Towards the end of his reign, Abdul Aziz became
> reactionary, and persecuted, and exiled the reform-
> ers. The Palace and the Porte contended. The
> reformers, led by Midhat Pasha, prevailed. Abdul
> Aziz was deposed and murdered. Murad V became
> insane. Abdul Hamid was made Sultan, 1876.
> Shortly afterwards he proclaimed a Constitution and
> assembled a Parliament. Maybe he did this with no
> serious purpose, but to throw dust in the eyes of
> Europe. At any rate, in the midst of the war with
> Russia, 1878, he suspended the Constitution.
> Crushed and humiliated as the result of the war, by
> the loss of large territories in the Balkans, Abdul
> Hamid entered upon a career of autocratic oppres-
> sion and tyrannic repression, with firm purpose to
> thwart reforms among Moslems and with a fierce
> fanaticism against Christians. He threw himself
> heart and soul in with the reactionaries, ruled as a
> 
> despot through the Palace junta, suppressing the
> Viziers at the Sublime Porte. By means of the tele-
> graph he kept in personal touch with every corner of
> his empire. His system of espionage was most ter-
> rible; forty thousand spies, maintained at an expense
> of ten million dollars a year, made life a horror for
> his subjects. No one was safe. Private conversa-
> tion became a dangerous pastime. In passing through
> Constantinople, I was struck with the hushed serious-
> ness of the whole community. Laughter and gaiety
> were absent. The residents would warn me at every
> turn not to talk in public. They had learned to live
> in an atmosphere where free speech was denied every
> one. The contrast to Persia was striking. I at-
> tended the celebrated salaamlukh to see the Sultan
> come in state to Friday prayers. It is a function
> which can only be attended by special permission, and
> tickets and places were reserved for us in the pavilion.
> How near we came to falling under the suspicion of
> the ever-present spies, I can never know. But just
> as the Sultan passed in his carriage, our three-year-
> old child piped up in a clear voice: “Papa, the
> king is a great killer.” When I said “Hush,” she re-
> peated the words: “Papa, the king is a great killer.”
> I quickly whispered to her: “The king loves his own
> little boys and girls.” This satisfied and quieted her.
> She was evidently applying her knowledge of King
> Herod to the first king she saw. And out of the
> mouth of a babe the truth was spoken as truly as by
> Gladstone when he pronounced Abdul Hamid “the
> Great Assassin.” At another time, when leaving
> Constantinople, our baggage was taken out and most
> 
> minutely examined. When we had come down to
> breakfast in the hotel that morning we had noticed
> that all the waiters were missing. We now under-
> stood that they had been imprisoned on suspicion of
> a plot. The police thought maybe bombs had been
> concealed in our baggage to escape their inspection.
> Through the reports of these spies, twenty-five
> thousand of the flower of Turkish manhood suffered
> death or exile, or fled, leaving their property to be
> confiscated. Many were exiled to distant parts of
> the empire. Many were dropped into the Bosphorus.
> Apropos of this a story goes that some foreign sailors
> had need to dive down near a vessel at Seraglio Point.
> They found themselves among a multitude of human
> corpses, whose heads were weighted down and their
> legs were moving to and fro by the force of the cur-
> rents (McCallagh: “Abdul Hamid,” p. 119). The
> press was strictly censored. Public discussion was
> prohibited. Liberal ideas were crushed. Schools for
> Moslems were repressed, except primary education of
> a poor quality. Foreign governesses were spied upon
> as well as their pupils and their fathers. Higher edu-
> cation was grudgingly allowed to officers because it
> was essential and medicine was carefully taught. It
> and sanitation were two things Abdul Hamid cher-
> ished. But electric lights and telephones were ex-
> cluded. When Dr. Jessup wrote “The Mohammedan
> Missionary Problem,” just after the Treaty of Berlin
> was signed, he thanked God for the bright prospects
> for Turkey, because Christian England had under-
> taken to see that reforms were carried out—having
> taken Cyprus as a vantage ground. Alas that it was
> 
> otherwise ordered by Abdul Hamid. He became the
> enemy of England, and the Armenians became the
> victims of unspeakable and terrible massacres. It
> seemed as if the plan was to exterminate the Chris-
> tians. The liberal Turks suffered much, but there
> was no general massacre of them. The number of
> them killed was as hundreds to tens of thousands of
> Christians.
> 
> THE YOUNG TURKS
> 
> The political reformers who had fled to Europe,
> and especially to London and Paris, and had agitated
> for reforms in the time of Abdul Aziz had been
> dubbed “The Young Turks.” They published a
> paper, called “Hurriat” (Liberty). When Abdul
> Hamid abolished the Constitution of 1876, thousands
> of them again fled into exile. There their eager souls
> grew in longing for the freedom of their country.
> Among them was Hairedin Pasha, a Circassian. He
> had been governor of Tunis and Grand Vizier in the
> first year of Abdul Hamid. He believed that under
> Islam they could attain to the high standard of
> European civilization. He dismissed the corrupt of-
> ficials and started out to do justice to Moslems and
> Christians alike. Unable to carry out his project he
> went again into exile and became one of the reorgan-
> izers of the Young Turk party. This was a secret
> organization, formed to work for liberty and reform.
> They published literature in Europe which they
> smuggled into and distributed in Turkey. In spite of
> repression many minds were permeated with modern
> ideas. They became impressed with their inferiority
> 
> to Western nations and even to their subject Chris-
> tian races in education and science. For years
> the ferment worked actively, especially among the
> younger men. Students abroad and in the govern-
> ment schools imbibed liberal ideas. The officers and
> surgeons in the military college were inspired with
> the spirit of reform. Many of the bolder propagan-
> dists suffered death, betrayed. Exiling to distant
> provinces spread the reform movement in those out-
> posts. The espionage system was disgusting to the
> officers of the army, and the rank and file, too, be-
> came disaffected by continual neglect, poor pay, and
> hard service in Arabia and the fortresses.
> 
> In 1891 a committee of reformers was organized
> in Geneva. Later they perfected organization in
> Paris and other capitals and took the name of “The
> Committee of Union and Progress.” Their policy
> was to liberalize and reform Turkey by (1) preserv-
> ing its integrity, (2) avoiding European or any out-
> side interference in its affairs, (3) giving equality to
> all races, (4) introducing parliamentary government
> and if necessary deposing the Sultan.
> 
> The movement was distinctly secular in its nature.
> It was a reflection of European political life. Its
> moving influences, its modes of thought came from
> Christian civilization. Islam was not paramount in
> its aims, but the nation, the people, independence, self-
> defence. The Young Turks explained away the tra-
> ditions of Islam; discouraged fanaticism. They
> wished to bring religion into conformity with modern
> progress. They repudiated Pan-Islamism, which
> even the Egyptian Nationalists encouraged. One of
> 
> their leaders said: “We Ottomans understand that
> the pursuit of Pan-Islamic designs of the visionaries
> would be contrary to our dearest interests” (Knight’s
> “Turkey,” p. 658). Therefore membership included
> Christians and Jews, who were to join Moslems in
> political action as friends and brothers. The Arme-
> nian and Jewish committees were persuaded to unite
> with them, and later unity of action was negotiated
> with the Macedonian committees of the Bulgarians,
> Greeks, and Serbs. Salonica was made headquarters
> of the Committee. This city had not been controlled
> by the spy-system as much as some others. Besides,
> according to Knight (“Turkey,” p. 101), Free-
> masonry flourished there, though the name and
> nature of their meeting were always secret, for to be
> found to be a Mason was to incur the penalty of death.
> The Committee of Union and Progress was, he tells
> us, “to a large extent modelled on Freemasonry and
> a considerable portion of the early associates, Mos-
> lems, and some Jews, were of Masonic lodges of
> Salonica.” In Macedonia the army corps and officers
> were won over. There were altogether fifteen thou-
> sand members enrolled in Macedonia. The soldiers
> of Asia Minor were brought into harmony with the
> movement. Propagandists were successful every-
> where throughout the empire. The leaders were men
> of education, in professional and official life, averag-
> ing but thirty-two years of age.
> 
> THE REVOLUTION
> 
> The time was ripe. The plot was perfected, though
> European diplomacy knew it not. On July 23, 1908,
> 
> the leaders, among whom were Niazi Bey, Enver
> Bey, and Mahmud Shevket Pasha, openly revolted
> and proclaimed a Constitution. From Salonica the
> demands of the revolutionists were presented by tele-
> gram straight to the Palace. The Sultan awoke to
> find himself without resource or subterfuge. In
> solemn conclave, where all the viziers knew and none
> dared to say the word, the astrologer Abul Huda was
> put forward and pronounced the talisman, “A Con-
> stitution.” The next day Abdul Hamid issued a de-
> cree re-establishing the Constitution of 1876. The
> Young Turks became the rulers of Turkey. The
> Macedonian Corps became the royal guard. The
> Palace camarilla disappeared, the spies were dismissed,
> the prisoners of liberty were released, the exiles re-
> turned, separated families were united, a whole peo-
> ple breathed the first free breath in thirty years. The
> jubilee of liberty was sounded. Enthusiasm knew
> no bounds. The entire populace went wild with a
> delirium and frenzy of rejoicing. Transports of joy
> thrilled all hearts. Paeans of praise and gratitude
> burst spontaneously from all lips. Barriers of race
> and religion were broken down. Moslems and Chris-
> tians and Jews sincerely fraternized, in an ecstasy of
> delight. Mullahs and priests embraced and kissed
> each other in the streets; they met in mass-meetings,
> speaking on a common platform and electrifying a
> united people with approval and exemplification of the
> motto, “Hurriyat, Musavat, Agviyat, Adalat”
> (Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, Justice). Demonstra-
> tions of various kinds were held. Conspicuous among
> 
> them was the memorial service of the Armenians,
> killed in the massacres. The exiled Armenian Patri-
> arch had returned. Ulema and Moslem people ac-
> companied Greek, Bulgarian, and Armenian priests
> and bishops to the Armenian cemetery and prayed
> and held services for the victims of fanaticism and
> hate which seemed to have passed away. At the City
> Hall a mullah offered prayer for brotherhood,
> and Christians and Moslems joined together in the
> “Amin.” At the time of the parliamentary election
> the ballot box was treated as a symbol of liberty. It
> was adorned with the flag, borne on camel-back in
> procession, surrounded by little girls dressed in white.
> Carriages followed, in which were seated Turkish
> mullahs, Greek and Armenian priests, and Jewish
> rabbis sitting side by side. At the voting table a mul-
> lah sat with a Greek priest on one side and an Arme-
> nian on the other. All over the empire, in Asia
> Minor, Syria, and Armenia, the people received the
> news of freedom with boundless joy and enthusiasm.
> The world read the reports with gratitude and some-
> thing akin to awe.
> 
> Most wonderful of all, the veiled women of the
> harams issued forth from behind the pardas and the
> latticed windows, threw aside the veils, appeared in
> carriages with men, attended the theatre and the
> parks, wrote for the press, held public meetings and
> receptions, made addresses, demanded new rights,
> talked politics with men, stood in the street awaiting
> election returns—open-faced and without shame.
> It was decided by the government to admit women
> 
> into the University, and to have special courses in
> hygiene and domestic economy. It seemed the day
> of woman’s emancipation.
> 
> THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SHARIAT
> 
> The provisions of the Constitution were, in brief:
> the participation of the people in their government
> through representatives in parliament, thus limiting
> the autocratic power of the Sultan; the right of se-
> cure domicile and personal liberty; Islam to be the
> established religion, but all religions and races to have
> equality before the civil law; all subjects to be con-
> sidered Ottomans and to serve in the army; popular
> education to be promoted. Adhered to and put into
> practice these principles would have made a really
> new political system in Moslem lands.
> 
> There were supreme difficulties in the way of ac-
> complishing all this, even after the army had been
> won over and the despotic caliph cowed. On the re-
> ligious side there were two great difficulties: (1) To
> show the Ulema and their party that the Constitution
> in general was in accordance with the Shariat; (2)
> To justify the provision that non-Moslems were to
> be on an equality with Moslems. The general ques-
> tion was settled in a way by the decrees of the Caliph
> and of the Sheikh-ul-Islam. The Sheikh proclaimed
> the legality of Constitutional government, holding
> that Islam was essentially democratic, that the first
> four “rightly guided” caliphs had been elected by the
> people, that the principles of liberty, equality, frater-
> nity, and justice were compatible with the Koran and
> Islam. It was shown from the traditions that it is
> 
> in accord with the Law to limit the power of the ruler
> by that of the people. For example, the Prophet has
> said: “Consult with them [the people] on every af-
> fair”; “Take counsel”; “Any obnoxious measure
> taken after consultation is preferable to a salutary
> measure taken arbitrarily”; “If any one should give
> you a good commandment in my name, even though
> I have not given it, do it”; “I am only a man. When
> I order you anything respecting religion, receive it;
> when I order you anything regarding the affairs of
> the world, I am only a man.” It was cited also that
> the “rightly guided caliphs” and their commanders
> mentioned important events in the assemblies of the
> people on Fridays; that the Imam Ali even appeared
> before a tribunal, like any ordinary man, in a suit
> against a Christian. In an interview with some promi-
> nent Englishmen (C. R. Buxton: “Turkey in Revo-
> lution,” pp. 172-74), the Sheikh-ul-Islam was asked:
> “Is a real Constitutional government permitted by
> the law of Islam?” He replied: “Permitted! It is
> more than permitted; the law of Islam is more liberal
> than the Constitution itself. … Our law, rightly in-
> terpreted, is in accordance with the principles of
> representative government. The wisest men, chosen
> by the people, are to direct the ruler, and if he rules
> without their consent he is going beyond his power.
> Now that this principle has been embodied in the
> law of the Constitution, that law itself is included in
> the law of Islam (!). Our Ulema are bound to help
> actively in carrying out the Constitution. … The
> law of Islam enjoins equality—not that the people
> can regard a Moslem as in every way the same as a
> 
> Christian; but political equality, equality before the
> law, they are bound to grant.”
> 
> The crux of the matter lies in this provision—the
> equality of civil rights of Christians and Jews with
> Moslems. Is this possible under Islam? As an ideal
> this had been propounded in the Ottoman empire as
> early as the seventeenth century by the Koprulu fam-
> ily of viziers. The Christian governments had
> laboured to this end in the nineteenth century, espe-
> cially for equal taxation, military service, and the
> right to testify. This equality of rights had been pro-
> claimed in the Hatti Sherif: adopted in the Constitu-
> tion of 1876, and now readopted. It said: “All sub-
> jects of the Ottoman empire are called Ottomans,
> whatever religion they profess.” “All Ottomans are
> equal before the law. They have the same rights and
> the same duties in reference to the State.” Of this
> provision Jurist says (Moslem World, 1913, p. 360):
> “The signing of the Constitution of 1876 was the
> death-warrant of Moslem law. … The two basic
> principles are essentially Christian—responsibility and
> equality.” To bring the Moslem people into recon-
> ciliation with this provision the Committee sent
> Ulema through the land to instruct in the mosques
> and harmonize constitutional equality with Moslem
> ideas. After hearing the doctrine propounded, two
> old mullahs rose up in a mosque and protested; and
> one in Bagdad said: “Then this is the end of Islam.”
> He was right as regards one of the working postulates
> of Islam, that the Moslems are the ruling class, and
> Christians and Jews subject races, suffered to live
> only so long as they continue in subjection. The Mos-
> 
> lem regards himself as superior—not because of
> wealth, intellect, education, morals, or even conquest,
> but because of his religion. It is a revolutionary
> change of Moslem conceptions and of the customs of
> thirteen hundred years to put the Christian on an
> equality. To count the Christian’s life and honour
> as equal to those of a true believer, to grant him
> equality before the courts in giving testimony and
> receiving punishment, in taxation, in the army as pri-
> vates and as officers, in the elections, and in official
> life—this is a condition which the Moslem cannot
> contemplate with equanimity. The Young Turks
> might idealize, in the environs of Geneva or Paris,
> such a consummation, and the Sheikh-ul-Islam theo-
> rize about it in interviews with liberal statesmen, but
> to bring it into practical working was a superhuman
> task. Yet the Young Turks were sincere in their pur-
> pose and the Constitution was re-established on this
> ideal. They would have grafted on the Moslem state
> the best results of Christian civilization. They would
> have substituted patriotism for religious fanaticism.
> Yet this new fundamental law guards the law of Is-
> lam and leaves an opening for persecution and pun-
> ishment of the apostate. For after declaring that
> Islam is the religion of the State, it is further de-
> clared in Article X that “individual liberty is invio-
> lable. Except according to the forms and for the
> causes determined by the Canon Law of Islam (Shar-
> iat) and the civil code, no one can be arrested or suf-
> fer penalties.”
> 
> The parliament assembled December 17, 1908. It
> was a striking assemblage, with deputies from Turks
> 
> and Albanians, Kurds and Arabs, Greeks and Arme-
> nians, Syrians and Jews. It met in the historic St.
> Sophia. The Ulema of Islam, the Christian Patri-
> archs, the Ottoman princes, the ambassadors of Mos-
> lem and Christian States all gave dignity to the scene,
> while Sultan Abdul Hamid in person inaugurated the
> National Assembly. It was an occasion of supreme
> interest.
> 
> THE REACTION
> 
> Kaimal Pasha was made Grand Vizier. Around
> him was organized a party called the Ahrar, the Lib-
> eral Union. With them was Prince Sabah-ud-Din, a
> son of the Sultan, who had lived in exile. These
> favoured decentralization, giving to the Arabs and
> Albanians and such races large powers of local self-
> government. They were backed by the Sultan and
> the reactionaries for their own purpose. And with
> this party were British diplomacy and press, sowing
> the seeds they are now reaping. All were working
> against the Committee of Union and Progress.
> 
> The reactionaries organized an association called
> the Moslem League. Its organ was the Volcan, whose
> editor was a darvish. The League had more than
> five hundred agitators, of whom seventeen were jour-
> nalists and a number were connected with the Palace,
> with Nadir Aga, one of the Sultan’s eunuchs, as
> leader. The Sultan and his treasure-chest was back
> of it all. The cry of the League was, “The Sacred
> Law is in jeopardy! The Shariat! The Shariat is in
> danger! The Faith is fallen!” They were not lack-
> ing in pretexts for this party-cry. It was not difficult
> 
> to find cause against the Young Turks. Mahmud
> Mukhtar Pasha had issued an order that military drill
> and discipline should not be interrupted by prayer
> times. Some of the officers had refused to join in
> the prayers and had mocked the soldiers for beliefs
> which they said were exploded. They had shown
> contempt for the ceremonial rites. The sentiment of
> one was quoted as: “Now, glory to God, every one is
> free to believe as he likes.” When the League was
> discovered to be working among the soldiers the lat-
> ter were forbidden to associate with the Hodjas and
> the Hodjas from entering the barracks. Officers even
> directed the soldiers to be ready to bayonet the Hod-
> jas. They retorted by calling the Young Turks in-
> fidels, Freemasons, Jews, wine-bibbers, seducers of
> Moslem wives and destroyers of harams, who de-
> lighted to decorate their lodgings with pictures of
> naked infidel women. By such influences, aided by
> powerful bribes, the soldiers were weaned from their
> allegiance, even the Salonica regiment, which, as sup-
> porters of the Constitution, had been placed as guards
> of the Sultan’s palace. On April 14, 1909, the sol-
> diers rose in mutiny; in the Palace, the barracks, in
> the cavalry, the marines and the regulars, all officers
> who did not manage to escape were slain. The offi-
> cers of the Committee and their journal, the Tanin,
> were wrecked. The night following Constantinople
> was terrorized and shuddered in wakeful, fearful an-
> ticipation, while the soldiers shot off more than a mil-
> lion cartridges. The next day in front of St. Sophia,
> the mutineers and the Ulema celebrated the restora-
> tion of the Shariat. Cries rent the air,—“Yashasun
> 
> Shariat-i-Paghambar!” (“Long live the Law of the
> Prophet!”). With sounding of trumpets and chant-
> ing of hymns, they rejoiced. On all sides and from
> every lip went up the shout, “Shariat!” “Shariat!”
> In the name of religion they had dared and won. The
> next Friday the Sultan held his salaamlukh, with a
> strange sight of soldiers on guard and officers con-
> spicuous by their absence. The Sultan seemed again
> triumphant and absolute.
> 
> DEPOSITION OF ABDUL HAMID
> 
> But that was the Red Sultan’s last salaamlukh.
> Like an avenging fury, the Constitutional army swept
> down from Macedonia upon the Capital, General
> Husain Husni Pasha sending a proclamation that
> “There exists not and cannot exist any law or power
> above our Constitution.” Swift and sure was their
> victory. Parliament reassembled. It put to the
> Sheikh-ul-Islam this momentous question (April 22,
> 1909):
> 
> “What becomes of an Imam who has destroyed
> certain holy writings; who has seized property in con-
> travention of the Shariat; who has committed cruel-
> ties in ordering the assassination and imprisonment of
> exiles without any justification under the Shariat;
> who has squandered the public money; who having
> sworn to govern according to the Shariat has violated
> his oath; who by gifts of money has provoked blood-
> shed and civil war and who is no longer recognized in
> the provinces?” The judgment of the Sheikh-ul-Is-
> lam, the highest tribunal in Turkey, was in few
> words: “He must abdicate or be deposed.”
> 
> A Committee of Parliament—chosen by lot—
> waited on the Sultan, and by the mouth of a Salonica
> Jew this mighty despot, this Caliph-Sultan, heard the
> decree of deposition. His haram of several hundred
> concubines were scattered to the homes of their child-
> hood, in the mountains of Albania, the huts of the Cir-
> cassians, or the palaces of favourites. The Sultan,
> still well supplied with a retinue of three Sultanas,
> four inferior concubines, five female slaves, four
> eunuchs, and nine domestics, was exiled and confined
> in a Salonica palace. The last picture we have of
> the great assassin is, gathering his womenfolks about
> him and casting the lot, which proves unfortunate,
> for he exclaims “Bosh sheh!” (“Vanity, Vanity!”)
> and breaks out into an oath—“Laanat Olsun!”
> (“Cursed be it!”) (Francis McCallagh: “Fall of
> Abdul Hamid”).
> 
> CONSTITUTIONAL RÉGIME; SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
> 
> Mahmud V Rashad was chosen Sultan and Caliph
> and bound on the sword of Othman as a Constitu-
> tional monarch. The Young Turks took up the task
> of government with considerable hopefulness. The
> press was active, newspapers multiplied; new books
> were issued; modern text-books were adopted; schools
> were established; a reformed writing and spelling was
> introduced to facilitate the study of Turkish; recruits
> were ordered to be taught to read, as well as to use
> knives and forks; men of age began attending night
> school, and could be seen reading on the street cor-
> ners. Several hundred youths were sent to Europe
> to study law, finance, politics, and industry; a ma-
> 
> ternity hospital was opened; lectures were delivered
> on religious liberty; much freedom of speech and
> travel was allowed. The white-slave traffic with
> Egypt was abolished, encouragement was given to the
> liberation of slaves, ladies-in-waiting were substituted
> as far as possible for eunuchs in the palace. Tram-
> ways were increased; telephones came into use; elec-
> tric lights were no longer prohibited, but appeared
> in the mosques and on their domes. The dogs were
> cleaned out of the streets of Constantinople in spite
> of the prophecy that their leaving would be a sign
> that the city would be no longer Mohammedan.
> 
> In carrying out the provisions of the Constitution,
> the Young Turks found circumstances too much
> for them. Neither equality of the religions nor Otto-
> manization of the races was possible practically.
> Equality was violated in the arrangements for the new
> parliament, for the representation was so manipulated
> that out of 240 deputies, the Christians had only 37.
> The enlistment of Christian soldiers met with diffi-
> culties. The Turks were utterly unwilling to treat
> them as themselves. They limited the number in each
> regiment to twenty per cent. They did not ac-
> cept them as officers; they did not desire that they
> should receive military training, but rather that they
> should be hewers of wood and drawers of water and
> makers of roads. The Christians began to flee the
> country to avoid the conscription. The Christian
> soldiers were in danger of demoralization and of los-
> ing their faith. The Patriarch of the Greeks and the
> Exarch of the Bulgarians tried to arrange that Chris-
> tian soldiers should have their own worship and chap-
> 
> lains, should keep Sunday, and should not be per-
> mitted to become Moslems during their term of serv-
> ice. They insisted that they should be received into
> the military schools to be trained as officers. Civil
> offices, too, were not given to the Christians in pro-
> portion to their numbers, though they are very capa-
> ble. In some places fifteen per cent of the police were
> allowed to be Christians.
> 
> Unwillingness of the Moslems to allow Christians
> to assume equality was one cause of the Adana mas-
> sacres, though these were no doubt instigated by Ab-
> dul Hamid and the reactionaries. The peasantry were
> wrought upon by tales of how the Armenians were go-
> ing to rise and rule over them. This massacre, 1909,
> in which twenty-five thousand Christians lost their
> lives, was more dastardly, cruel, and lustful than those
> that preceded it. However inadequate the punishment
> meted out may be considered, it was at least a sign
> of progress and a new thing in history that a Moslem
> government hanged for the murder of Christians
> more than a score of Moslems, some of whom were
> wealthy and some religious leaders. The Young
> Turks in their sane moments have tried to teach Mos-
> lems that they cannot kill Christians with impunity in
> times of peace. A Moslem was executed at Jerusa-
> lem for murdering an Armenian abbot. An Arab,
> looking on, said: “It is a black day for us, for a Mos-
> lem has been killed for killing a Christian.” But
> these punishments were exceptional. The truth is that
> neither in the army, in the courts, in the government,
> nor in ordinary life, did the Christians receive lib-
> erty, equality, fraternity, or justice. Islam and the
> 
> Constitution did not work together. It is doubtful
> whether even a long period of peaceful progress would
> have accomplished it. Rather it was demonstrated
> that only power exerted from without can make the
> life and property of Christians safe under Moslem
> rule.
> 
> ATTEMPTS AT OTTOMANIZATION
> 
> Attempts were made in Arabia and Syria to bring
> the Arabs nearer to Turkish methods. These were
> met by hostility. The project was initiated of impos-
> ing on the Albanians the language, alphabet, customs,
> and military discipline of the Turks. A census was
> ordered and new taxes imposed. The Albanians re-
> sisted and rose in insurrection. Harassed by inter-
> nal troubles and before it had time to put its house in
> order, Turkey became a prey to its neighbours. Aus-
> tria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bulgaria de-
> clared her independence. Italy proclaimed war and
> annexed Tripoli and some islands. The Balkan States,
> Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece, formed an
> alliance, conquered their ancient foe and rent from her
> Macedonia, much of Thrace, Albania, Crete, and
> other islands. The seizure of Morocco by France
> added to the feeling of dismay and hatred. With
> thousands of Macedonian refugees to provide for,
> tension with Greece through boycotts and oppressions
> of her Greek subjects, with danger of Kurdish raids
> and Arab plots, with factional fights within and its
> revenues diminished and its expenditures for war
> preparations enormous, Turkey’s plight was sorry in-
> deed. Its one consolation was the deep sympathy
> 
> which the Moslem world showed it in its misfortunes,
> sympathy shown in lamentations and tears, in curses
> on the Christians and in generous contributions.
> These attacks of the Christian governments had by
> this time driven from the minds of the Young Turks
> all thought of treating the Christians of the empire
> as equals; indeed, little remained that they should
> treat them all as enemies. They found it necessary
> to show a loyalty to Islam which they did not possess,
> and to foster and strengthen the fanaticism of the
> Moslems in order to utilize it.
> 
> Though bent on carrying out the policy of Otto-
> manization of everything, yet necessity made the
> Young Turks dependent on the brain and experience
> of Christians. So after the Balkan War foreign ad-
> visers were called in. German officers took charge of
> the army and Gen. Liman von Sanders became com-
> mander of the corps at Constantinople. To the Brit-
> ish was signed the navy; to the French, finance and the
> gendarmerie. Others were to assist in reforms in
> Armenia and Kurdistan. With all this it appears that
> Pan-Islamic agitation was taken up from Constan-
> tinople. Agents and tracts were sent out. The Near
> East says (April, 1914): “The publication of Pan-
> Islamic, anti-Christian, anti-European literature has
> increased markedly of late.” The European name for
> the capital, Constantinia, was erased from the coinage
> and Dar-ul-Khalifate ul Aliyah (the abode of the High
> Caliph) substituted, corresponding to the official title
> of the city, Dar-i-Saadat, the Seat of Prosperity. The
> change has one advantage, in that the coins can be
> used in the new capital without recoining. Stamps
> 
> were ordered to be printed in Turkish alone, the French
> being deleted. Signboards, which were often in three
> languages, must be only in Turkish. Turkish names
> must be given to the schools and other institutions of
> the non-Moslems. The street-sweepers of Pera had
> badges with number and title in both French and
> Turkish. They went on strike, complaining that the
> Frangi letters on their necks interfered with their
> prayers. Their petition was granted. Efforts were
> begun to curtail and even abolish the privileges of the
> Christian races and to annul the status granted to them
> by Mohammed the Conqueror, and even to change the
> privileges conferred by the Caliph Omar. These privi-
> leges were granted to regulate the condition of those
> subjects who were denied the rights of full citizenship
> enjoyed only by Moslems under their law. Each race
> or religion has had an organization (millat) with a
> large measure of self-government. The Patriarch was
> considered the head of the race as well as of the re-
> ligion and administered many matters ordinarily in
> charge of the civil magistrate. The abrogation of these
> privileges must depend upon the establishment of real
> equality in law and practice which has not yet been
> attained.
> 
> ABOLITION OF THE CAPITULATIONS
> 
> Another step towards Ottomanization was the aboli-
> tion of the Capitulations, which was put into effect
> September 9, 1914. These capitulations are treaties
> which the Sublime Porte has made with reference to
> foreign subjects living within its borders. They are
> named from the capitula or sections into which the
> 
> treaties are divided. In Byzantine times the emperors
> had made such arrangements with regard to resident
> Europeans. These regulations were confirmed by Mo-
> hammed II. They were founded on an ancient prin-
> ciple of law that the State would not extend rights
> and privileges under its laws to foreigners and that
> their own State must take the trouble of governing
> them. Moslem rule made special regulations more
> necessary, for it would not grant the privileges under
> the Sacred Law to any except Moslems and could not
> expect subjects of independent Christian States to take
> the inferior position of the rayats or subjugated Chris-
> tians. Hence a special arrangement, mutually agree-
> able, was entered into which allowed each nationality
> to be judged by its own consul and laws. Each group
> formed a separate colony, enjoying what have been
> called extra-territorial rights. These were extended
> under the favourite nation clause to all who made
> treaties. At first the powerful Sultans entered into
> this arrangement somewhat as a matter of grace and
> accommodation. They were relieved of the trouble of
> governing the Genoese, Venetians, and other colonies,
> and the power of the Sultans was not limited by this
> in any way in which they cared to exercise it. But
> when Turkish power declined, these privileges became
> extended and acted as a restraint on Turkish authority.
> These capitulations granted freedom of religious wor-
> ship, freedom from the jurisdiction of the Turkish
> courts, with right of trial by one’s own consul, pro-
> tection from molestation from natives or from the
> police, exemption from taxes or arrest, inviolability of
> domicile. They arranged the rate of custom-duties,
> 
> which could not be changed without the consent of the
> foreign governments. They permitted foreign post-
> offices in connection with the consulates.
> 
> These privileges were at times greatly abused. By
> selling or granting the right of citizenship or by re-
> ceiving many into nominal service at the embassies,
> the number enjoying these privileges was wrongfully
> increased. One French ambassador received $80,000
> for passport privileges. The Austrians and Russians
> enrolled several hundred thousand subjects in Wal-
> lachia and Moldavia. Governments which charged
> enormous duties at their own ports, limited Turkey
> to an eight- or eleven-per cent duty. There was no
> doubt of the gross injustice of the conditions. Besides
> it was galling to the pride and self-respect of the Turks
> and a sign of their inferiority. Efforts were made to
> annul them in 1856 and 1862, after the adoption of
> the Code Napoléon. Especially since the adoption of
> a Constitution declaring equal rights to all races and
> religions, the Turks felt that the time had come to
> abolish such restrictions. On the face of it their con-
> tention is right. But some considerations make it evi-
> dent that the fulness of time had not come for their
> abolition. For the equality of Christians with Mos-
> lems before the courts is not yet put into practice; the
> judges are all Moslems, and the testimony of a Chris-
> tian does not yet count for much as against that of a
> Moslem; the courts are notoriously corrupt, and have
> not yet been reformed. The Tanin declares that the
> judges continue to oppose the reform of the judiciary
> and that when a European adviser was employed to
> purge and regulate the courts he was stoutly resisted.
> 
> Reform, it says, “is a fight against the whole force of
> the magistrates, their methods, their ignorance, their
> inability, their mental state.” This difficulty is not in-
> superable, for if Greece and Japan can judge all for-
> eigners, and if Great Britain can have Moslem jus-
> tices in India who are worthy of confidence, such may
> be at length developed among the Turks. Indeed,
> there is testimony to assure us that in the Shari courts
> upright judges are not wanting.
> 
> The abolition of the Capitulations was celebrated
> in Turkey as an Independence Day,—as “the dawn
> of a new era.” Flags were flying for three days, amid
> great rejoicings and congratulations. It was regarded
> as a great and glorious event—as a fact accomplished
> —in spite of the unanimous protest of the Legations.
> 
> Following this, new laws have been issued. Duties
> have been raised from fifteen to one hundred per
> cent; an income tax (Temettu) has been fixed on
> foreigners and their occupations, exception being
> made for certain classes as teachers and clergy. Most
> disquieting is the new law regarding schools, which
> directly affects those of the missions. All schools
> must be formally authorized, must state the name of
> their responsible director, of the text-books and cur-
> riculum, must teach Turkish equally with the chief
> language of the school, and the history and geography
> of Turkey in the Turkish language. Think of it!
> The history of Turkey must be taught, and according
> to the Turkish representation of the facts. But fur-
> ther the law declares “that religious knowledge and
> history and the teaching of the creed of the denomina-
> tion to which the school belongs shall not be given to
> 
> pupils who do not profess that religion.” Nor must
> such pupils be made to attend prayers. This strikes
> at the foundation of educational mission work, the
> largest branch of the American work in Turkey.
> This has already been specifically applied, as at
> Beirut College.
> 
> At another point the Ottomanization programme
> shows itself. After the massacre of the Christians
> by the Druses in 1860, the Lebanon district was placed
> under a special administration. Its privileges have
> been declared null. An army of seventeen thousand
> was sent in and all administration was taken over by
> the Turks. The Christian governor’s authority was
> reduced to a shadow. The patriarch of the Maron-
> ites was stripped of his privileges.
> 
> The aim of this movement and of these new laws
> is to reduce the whole empire to a uniform basis
> under Ottoman law, to abolish all special laws and
> privileges. The non-success of the attempt in Al-
> bania does not argue well for its wisdom.
> 
> TURKEY AND THE PRESENT WAR
> 
> On the opening of the present European war Tur-
> key began general mobilization, calling to arms
> Christians and Jews as well as Moslems. Many non-
> Moslems were excused on the payment of fifty pounds.
> After three months, on November 7, 1914, Turkey
> entered the conflict on the side of Germany, and pro-
> claimed the jihad.
> 
> Why did the Turks enter the war? According to
> their own word, they believed that the day of deliv-
> 
> erance for Islam had come, “the day of vengeance
> against the oppressors,” the day of triumph over those
> who had despoiled their heritage. “We are fighting,”
> says the editor of the Turkish Yourdou, “for the
> freedom of the Turkish race and of Islam.” The
> Tarjuman says: “The Turkish expeditionary army
> on the West and on the East carries the message of
> salvation and life to the Moslems living there.” Hali-
> dah Khanum, the famous writer, graduate of the
> American College, says: “This war is an absolute
> necessity; how eagerly our brethren in Russia await
> the army of the caliphate!” (Orient, January 25,
> 1915). Sir Edwin Pears, a high authority, confirms
> this opinion, saying that popular sentiment was with
> the war party because they hoped to get back some
> of the territory they had lost.
> 
> ENGLAND OR GERMANY! WHICH?
> 
> Why did the Turks enter the war on the German
> side? From a conviction of self-interest. It appears
> to them that Russia, Great Britain, and France are
> the countries that are holding Moslems in subjection,
> while Germany has been content with financial ad-
> vantages. It need not be counted strange that they
> believed Germany to be their friend. The German
> emperor had assumed that position, had supported the
> Red Sultan at the time of the Armenian massacres,
> had twice visited him in 1889 and 1898, had stood
> by the grave of Saladin at Damascus and announced
> that, “The three hundred millions of Mohammedans
> that are scattered through the world may rest assured
> 
> that the German emperor will eternally be their
> friend.”1
> 
> When the star of Abdul Hamid was setting, the
> Germans won the friendship of the Young Turks,
> which the British lost by inexplicable diplomacy.
> After the Balkan War, the German ambassador pub-
> licly declared: “The time has come when the Father-
> land may attach to the Asiatic provinces the warning,
> ‘Touch me not!’” So when the present war was
> declared, it is no wonder that the crowds made a
> great demonstration in front of the German embassy.
> The Ambassador spoke to them of the struggle as one
> for the real welfare of Islam before which there was
> victory and a glorious future. In this connection we
> may recall the telegram which a great mass-meeting
> of Persians and their sympathizers sent from Stam-
> boul to the Kaiser, beseeching his help against Eng-
> land and Russia on behalf of Persia. Germany had
> played its game of diplomacy so as to impress the
> Moslems, of Turkey and Persia at least, with her
> friendship. Of small importance, and intended only
> to inspire the populace, were the reports that the
> Kaiser had become a Mohammedan and had adopted
> the name Haji Mohammed Wilhelm, and was wearing
> a fez, as the photograph showed, and that his haram
> was coming to visit the Sultan in the captured dread-
> naughts of the British; that the Germans had become
> true believers and in proof of their anti-Christian
> feelings had sent views of the ruined churches of
> 
> 1 When I saw the glaring metal tablet at Baalbek, placed to
> commemorate the Kaiser’s visit, I thought it exceedingly incon-
> gruous in those sublime ruins.
> 
> Belgium; that they had appointed a Mohammedan
> governor of Belgium, and the Belgians themselves
> were desirous of becoming Moslems. Even a con-
> sular agent of Germany in Persia is said to have pro-
> fessed to be a Mohammedan in order to win the Per-
> sians to the jihad.
> 
> Lest you be too much astonished at these things,
> behold the other great Protestant Power of Europe
> vying with Germany in being the friend and assister
> of Islam. Sardar Wingate of the Sudan said in his
> proclamation on behalf of the British Government
> (Near East, January 1, 1915): “From the religious
> aspect also we [Great Britain] have brought the holy
> places within a few days’ journey of Khartum. We
> have subsidized and assisted the men of religion. We
> have built and given assistance to the building of new
> mosques all over the country. The Kadis and others
> have received free and thorough education in the
> Koran and in the tenets of the Mohammedan religion.
> … Great Britain will continue to improve in every
> possible manner the facilities for the practice of the
> Mohammedan religion.” The High Commissioner in
> Egypt, representing King George, in the formal ad-
> dress to the new Sultan Husain Kamal, declares that
> “The strengthening and progress of Mohammedan
> institutions in Egypt is naturally a matter in which
> his Majesty’s government takes the deepest interest.”
> Lieut.-Col. A. C. Yate, member of Parliament, at a
> session of the Central Asian Society, presided over
> by Sir Mortimer Durand, said: “If ever a great
> Mussulman confederacy was to be formed, it must
> be done with the fullest sympathy and support of the
> 
> British Empire. The day might come when Great
> Britain might stand forth as the champion of Islam,
> of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan in alliance with
> the Mussulmans of India.”
> 
> THE PROCLAMATION OF THE HOLY WAR
> 
> The Jihad, or Holy War, was proclaimed with due
> ceremony, before an immense crowd at the Mosque
> of Mohammed the Conqueror at Constantinople. By
> legal custom, questions were asked and formally an-
> swered by the Fatva-amini, this constituting a lawful
> declaration. In this the call is made to all Moslems,
> “old and young, living in all parts of the world,” in-
> cluding those living under the governments of Russia,
> England, and France, to join battle against the enemy,
> with their persons and their property; otherwise their
> conduct is “a great revolt against the Omnipotent
> and liable to celestial punishment, and if they fight
> against the Sultan they are to be punished with hell-
> fire.” The proclamation was repeated all over the
> country and with special ceremony at Jerusalem.
> The concourse gathered at the Dome of the Rock, the
> rock-top of Mt. Moriah, the altar of Abraham. The
> Kazi of Medina was brought to add impressiveness to
> the occasion. Just as he rose to read, a thunder-
> storm interrupted him. In a lull he began again,
> when a fierce wind tossed the flag from its staff at
> his feet. The Kazi was alarmed at these evil omens
> and tremblingly read the proclamation, after which
> he fell into a fit, and died within three days (Near
> East, 1914, p. 384). Far and wide throughout all
> 
> Islam the proclamation of the Jihad was sent.
> Through the press, through tracts, and travelling
> agents the Holy War was urged upon the faithful.
> Bulletins were scattered by aeroplanes over the armies
> of the Allies in Belgium and France to call the Mos-
> lem soldiers of Algeria, Senegal, and India to al-
> legiance to Islam. Let me give some extracts from
> a proclamation of the Jihad: “To the millions of
> Islam! ‘God will punish them in your hand; ye
> will overcome them!’ (Koran). Oh, ye faithful, what
> do ye wait for? How often have the savage Rus-
> sians, the traitorous English, the Frenchmen born of
> impure parentage, planted their unclean flags upon
> your holy mountains. Oh, ye helpless people of India,
> of the Oxus, of Tunis and of the orphan isles, and
> you wretched tribes of Turkey. Ye have become
> slaves of the people of the Cross. If you desire
> honour and glory, houris and damsels, behold all are
> in the grasp of your sword. Attack your enemies
> from every side. Whenever you meet them, kill them.
> Quicken the failing proclamation of the Unity. Listen
> to the will of God, the desire of your prophet, the
> command of the Caliph that you give no rest to the
> enemy. If you have no arms, tear his throat with your
> teeth. Jihad! Jihad! Oh, Moslems! The Great
> God is ordering you to fight everywhere. God will
> give you the victory. He gives you the houris and
> the damsels of heaven.”
> 
> Turks and Germans expected great things from the
> Jihad. Ali Fahmi Mohammed (in The Near East)
> declared: “Egypt would revolt against England in
> a world-wide conflict or any serious rising in India.”
> 
> Hafiz Bey Ramazan, an Egyptian Nationalist, had
> been assured that the Kaiser expected to plan his at-
> tack in connection with an uprising in India and
> Egypt. Grothe (quoted by Hurgronge: “The Holy
> War,” p. 36) anticipated that on Turkey’s proclaim-
> ing the Holy War, the Moslems would attack their
> masters “here with secrecy and ruse, there with
> fanatical courage,” and especially to the undoing of
> England. Mr. Carl Peters, the African traveller,
> voiced this expectation (quoted from Professor Vam-
> bery in “Islam: A Challenge,” p. 239): “There is
> one factor which might fall on our side of the balance
> and in case of a world-war might be made useful to
> us: That factor is Islam. As Pan-Islamism it could
> be played against Great Britain as well as against the
> French Republic; and if German policy is bold enough,
> it can fashion the dynamite to blow into the air the
> rule of the Western Powers from Cape Nun, Mo-
> rocco, to Calcutta.”
> 
> The ambitious scheme had in some minds this con-
> summation, that there should be in the world two
> great empires; the Caliph should be ruler of all Islam
> and the Kaiser of all Christendom.
> 
> It is not strange that many persons with a knowl-
> edge of the intense disloyalty and hatred that prevails
> among Moslem subjects of Christian Powers and of
> the propaganda that had been carried on through so
> many years, should have anticipated great results from
> the call to the Jihad. They miscalculated indeed, but
> did not misjudge Moslem feelings. The Moslem peo-
> ple did not make a general uprising. We need not,
> however, give too much value to the proclamations
> 
> of loyalty issued in Egypt, India, Zanzibar, Algeria,
> and Central Asia. These might be diplomatic utter-
> ances accompanied even by secret disloyal plottings.
> But two reasons account for the failure of the call
> to the Jihad. The first and greatest was the convic-
> tion that the Jihad did not promise success. The
> Moslem leaders of Asia and Africa could not believe
> that the united force of Great Britain, France, and
> Russia could go down in defeat. These are the great
> and conquering empires whose power they have felt.
> They looked upon Turkey as broken, overcome by
> Italy and by her own late subjects, the Balkan States.
> Besides if the Germanic Alliance should be victorious,
> they felt that they would only be changing one Chris-
> tian master for another, and as one Moslem expressed
> it, quoting Shakespeare:
> 
> “Thus must we from the smoke into the smother.”
> 
> In addition to this the wily head of Pan-Islamism
> was gone and the Islamic world has a suspicion of, if
> not a detestation for, the Young Turks as a set of
> worldly, Europeanized men with little care for the
> faith as such, and of the Committee of Union and
> Progress as a sceptical group of Crypto-Jewish
> Dunmas and wine-bibbing modernists, who are playing
> with the jihad as a political instrument. Besides they
> felt the incongruity of fighting for the faith of Islam
> in union with an army partly composed of and com-
> manded by Christians.
> 
> However, had the Austro-Germans conquered the
> Allies and the campaigns of Turkey in Egypt, the
> Caucasus, and Persia been successful, the Moslem
> 
> world would have been agitated to its depths and its
> widest extent. There is no doubt that Egypt, Tripoli,
> Algeria, Morocco, the Sudan from east to west, in-
> cluding the powerful Sanusiyahs, would welcome an
> opportunity to cast off the hated infidel yoke. Persia
> would rejoice to attack the Russian bear, could it feel
> assured that its teeth were extracted and its paws
> disabled. As to India we hear well-worded expres-
> sions of loyalty from the official class, but we do not
> hear from the great sixty millions of steadfast
> Sunnis who, no doubt, would join the Hindus to throw
> the British into the Indian Ocean, if confident of ulti-
> mate victory. The twenty million Moslems of Russia
> are of the same mind. In all these lands there are
> few Moslems loyal to their Christian rulers. To be
> so is contrary to the law, instinct, and spirit of Islam.
> They would prefer to be as Afghanistan, with a civil-
> ization of the Middle Ages and under the old-time
> absolutism of a Mohammedan ruler, than to have the
> culture and education of Aligarh College, under the
> British Raj. Albeit their progressive men hope for
> twentieth-century civilization with the Mohammedan
> faith and political independence. To obtain the latter
> they would welcome the first favourable opportunity,
> not because the Turks proclaim a jihad, but because
> it is the deep and fervent desire of their hearts. Con-
> vince them of a successful issue, and rebellion will
> follow. In this lies the danger in a repulse of the
> Allies at the Dardanelles. For their retreat might be
> the signal for a tremendous upheaval in other Mos-
> lem lands. It will create a serious problem for the
> Christian colonies and camps in Africa and Asia if
> 
> the Jihad becomes universal, while the forces of
> Christian nations are engaged in Europe.
> 
> The Turk, wherever his hand reaches, is waging his
> Holy War with terrible reality. See it in action with
> all its old-time fanaticism. Tens of thousands of
> Christians in Urumia and Salmas, Persia, have fled
> for their lives, abandoning all. Their villages, homes,
> and churches have been destroyed, and their women
> ravished. The tribal Nestorians of the Kurdish
> mountains have been driven into the Alpine fast-
> nesses to perish of hunger, or to surrender to death
> or Islam. Their patriarch, Mar Shimoon, is a fugi-
> tive in a foreign land. Look over the mountains and
> plains of Asiatic Turkey and see the ruthless Holy
> War waged against the defenceless Armenians.
> Their strong men butchered in cold blood or drafted
> into the army to be slaughtered in the van. The old
> men and children set adrift in the wildernesses to per-
> ish. All the goodly women subjected to unspeakable
> dishonour or carried off to the harams of the Turks
> and Kurds and forced to Islamize. Thousands of
> villages and towns and districts depopulated. Hun-
> dreds of thousands of Christians, Armenians, Nes-
> torians, Jacobites, Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholics,
> and Protestants mercilessly destroyed, with the dia-
> bolical purpose to wipe out Christianity from Turkey.
> This is the ripened fruit of the reform movement of
> the Young Turks.
> 
> We write over that movement and the attempt to
> establish Constitutional government, as over that of
> Persia: “Failure! Mene, mene, tekel! Weighed in
> the balance! Found wanting! To be divided!” A
> 
> righteous issue of the war will be the dismember-
> ment of Turkey, with the remnant deprived of the
> power ever to proclaim a jihad or to persecute its
> non-Moslem peoples.
> 
> A review of present-day movements among Mos-
> lems shows that Islam is neither dead nor moribund.
> It is full of life, action, agitation, of cross-purposes,
> the resultant of contrary religious and intellectual
> forces. Some are striving for the reform of the social,
> intellectual, political, and religious life of Islam; some
> are mighty to conserve and spread the old Faith; not
> a few would strengthen the old fanatical zeal and
> hatred of its people and call into exercise its perse-
> cuting spirit. All these movements in Islam are
> energetic, aggressive, determined, and anti-Christian.
> 
> Upon the Church of Christ, Islam is an urgent call
> to duty, to faith and obedience. Facts and conditions
> voice anew the command of Jesus Christ: “Go, preach
> the Gospel to the Moslems.” The call is for a con-
> trite heart, recognizing the long neglect of the Church;
> for a sincere love which will overcome our crusader
> spirit and quench thought of vengeance in prayer for
> their repentance and forgiveness; for heroic faith
> because of the supreme difficulties of the task; for
> unfailing courage, knowing that the conversion of Is-
> lam is the most arduous work that the Church has
> undertaken. The need of and hope for Moslems is
> a movement Christ-ward.
> 
> INDEX
> 
> A                         136; propaganda, 137; num-
> Abbasides, 24, 63, 67, 113, 170.             bers, 137; compared to Ba-
> Abdul Aziz, Sultan, 58, 59,                  haism, 138; Moslems on, 135;
> 103, 255, 256, 258, 261.                 inclusive, 135; use of press,
> Abdul Baha, 129-131.                         139
> Abdul Hamid, 21, 41, 59, 63,             Ahmad Sultan Shah, 247.
> 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 72, 74,      Al-Akbar Ibn Arabi, 24.
> 85, 88, 104, 151, 181, 207, 208,     Al Askari, 170.
> 233, 258-265, 272-273, 284.          Al Azhar, 31, 98, 106, 175-176,
> Abdul Kadir (Algeria), 87,                   183, 236.
> 219.                                 Al Bakri, Sheikh, 158, 160.
> Abdul Kadir Jilani, 24.                  Al Sarraj, 17.
> Abdul Mejid, 40, 255, 256.               Albanians, 62, 182, 239, 270,
> Abdullah II, 56.                             273, 276.
> Abdullah, Mulvi, 168.                    Alcohol (see Wine).
> Abubekr, 20.                             Algeria, 25, 26, 45, 77, 87, 95,
> Abu Hanifa, 13, 21.                          104, 219, 290.
> Abul Huda, 63, 64, 264.                  Ali Allahis, 61, 125, 126.
> Abyssinia, 109.                          Aligarh, 163, 223, 290 (see
> Acca, 115, 124, 128, 130.                    Schools; India).
> Achmad Abdullah, cited, 99,              Ali, Imam, 20, 72, 73, 112, 117,
> 103, 105.                                267; exalted to divinity, 27,
> Adrianople, 31, 124, 128.                    29, 44, 126.
> Afghans, Afghanistan, 25, 26,            Ali Mohammed (see Bab).
> 42, 69, 70, 93, 134, 189, 222,       Ali Nur-i-Din, Sheikh, 115.
> 240, 286, 290.                       Alivis, 98 (see Ali Allahi).
> Africa, 21, 22, 26, 33, 42, 62, 77,      Allegorical interpretations, 16,
> 87, 0, 99, 145, 173, 196, 212,           21, 127.
> 217, 219, 222, 223, 226, 227,        America, 71, 109, 150; Baha-
> 236, 290; penetration by Is-             ism in, 130, 131.
> lam, 94-105 (see Sudan).             Amir Ali, Justice, 32, 64, 66,
> Africa, South, 96, 102, 109.                 111, 121, 164-167, 169, 170,
> Aga Khan, 229; cited, 89, 92,                201, 212, 229.
> 188.                                 Animism, 45, 46.
> Ahli Koran, 168.                         Annam, 46.
> Ahmad Ahsai, Sheikh, 116, 155.           Anti-Christ, 114.
> Ahmad Khan, Sayid, 163, 187,             Arabi Pasha, 63, 71, 232.
> 229.                                 Arabia, 25, 36, 54, 55, 57, 69,
> Ahmad, Sayid of Oudh, 56.                    85, 101, 164, 221, 262.
> Ahmadiyas, founder, 132;                 Arabic, 97, 106, 173, 175, 186,
> claims, 133: teachings, 134;             192, 199.
> hostile to Christianity, 134;        Arabs, 62, 67, 74, 90, 103, 169,
> proofs, 135; imprecations,               182, 195, 200, 238, 270, 275,
> 276.
> 
> Armenians, 81, 83, 84, 89, 93,             compared to Ahmadiyas, 138-
> 98, 121, 199, 251, 256, 261,            139; 146, 155, 169.
> 263, 265, 270, 275, 277, 283,       Baku, 162.
> 291 (see Christians, massa-         Balkans, 88, 90, 209, 220, 227,
> cres of).                               276, 277, 289.
> Arnold, T. W. (cited, 45, 47,          Batinis, 121, 127.
> 57, 86, 94, 95-                     Battaks, 57, 85, 93, 228.
> Aryans, 22.                            Bayan, 119, 121.
> Asceticism, 19, 20.                    Bayazid, Sultan, 21.
> Asia, Central, 162, 163, 174,          Becker, Prof., cited, 33, 38.
> 175, 218; 289, 290.                 Beduins, 28, 74, 75, 200, 237.
> Assassins, 114, 125.                   Beirut, 152, 192, 207, 212, 282.
> Assassinations by Sultans, 66;         Beluchistan, 25, 26.
> by Bahais, 124; as a prac-          Berbers, 25, 62.
> tice, 169 note.                     Bliss, E. M., cited, 65, 78, 84.
> Astrology, 33, 45, 63.                 Books, censored, 78.
> Atchin, 65, 87, 93-                    Boudros Pasha, 235, 236.
> Azal (see Subh-i-Azal).                Brahmanism (see Hindus).
> Azalis, 124, 169, 243.                 Britain, Great, British, 56, 66,
> 67, 69, 71, 84, 90, 135, 137,
> B                      177, 180, 217, 242, 253, 260,
> Bab, title, 117; history, 116-             277, 283, 286, 289; partiality
> 120; books, 116, 119 (see               to Islam, 222-225; cultivating
> Bayan); claims, 118, 121; at-           favour, 285-286; in Sudan,
> titude of government, 119;              141, 145, 146, 285, 286; in
> imprisonment, 119; execu-               Egypt, 184, 233-238; in In-
> tion, 120; reforms, 121, 122;           dia, 187, 188, 222, 281, 287.
> successor, 123; 146, 153,           Brown, J. P., cited, 16, 24, 258.
> 155.                                Browne, E. G., cited, 15, 71, 72,
> Babis, 62, 74, 169, 243, 250;              73, 89, 116, 123, 154, 158, 242,
> wars of, 119; brutalities, 119;         243.
> attempt on Shah, 120; in-           Bukhara, 65, 76, 175, 211.
> carnations among, 123.              Bulgaria, 220, 222, 263, 265,
> Babism, 116-122; doctrines,                275, 276.
> 121, 123; rites, 122; results,
> 122, 123.                                              C
> Bagdad, 24, 52, 63, 67, 112, 123,      Cairo, 31, 52, 67, 99, 110, 174,
> 124, 170, 183, 215, 268.                175, 185, 212, 233, 236.
> Baha Ullah, history, 123, 124,         Cairo Conference, 174, 176.
> 129; polygamist, 128; claims,       Caliphate, 69, 151; Osmanli,
> 124, 125; as fulfilment, 126;           63-67; by whom acknowl-
> worshipped, 128; doctrines,             edged, 64-65, 103, 104; em-
> 127; writings, 127-128, 133.            phasized, 69; ordered massa-
> Bahaism, its system, 124; rela-            cres, 83.
> tion to Babism, 123, 124;           Caliphs, 13, 43, 52, 56; titles,
> laws, 128; rites, 128; peace-           64; insignia, 64; qualifica-
> advocate, 129; pilgrimage,              tions, 64, 66; may be de-
> 130; its quarrels, 129; propa-          posed, 67; supreme, 76; 105,
> ganda in West, 130-131; con-            113, 117, 200, 266, 277,
> verts in America, 130-131;
> 
> Capitulations, 279-282.                    Clergy, Mohammedan (see
> Caste in Islam, 44.                           Mullahs), development of,
> Caucasus, 76, 87, 205, 221, 246.              29, 30; classes, 31.
> Celibacy, 20.                              Committee of Union and
> Charms, 24, 33.                               Progress (see Young Turks).
> China, 44, 65, 77, 87, 106, 192,           Constantinople, 21, 22, 31, 34,
> 204, 228.                                 41, 52, 56, 64, 69, 71, 81, 82,
> Chiragh Ali, Maulvie, 167.                    84, 98, 104, 105, 152, 169, 190,
> Christ, Lord Jesus, 23 (see                   207, 212, 217, 224, 229,
> Jesus).                                   233, 237, 270, 271, 274, 277,
> Christian converts, 28, 51, 109,              286.
> 136, 239, 256-257.                     Constitution (see Persia, and
> Christians, Christianity (see                 Turkey).
> Missions), 23, 30, 43, 44, 50,         Copts, 185, 236, 237.
> 51, 54, 61, 96, 98, 103, 107, 109,     Crawford, S., 29.
> 147, 166, 169, 174, 187, 191,          Creed (Moslem), 18, 46, 60,
> 192, 201, 210; hatred for, 74,            250.
> 75, 76, 77, 80, 81, 103, 220,          Cromer, Lord, 12, 77, 158,
> 221, 259, 277; of the devil,              169, 192, 194, 204, 214, 224,
> 76; must be subject, 85, 86;              233.
> in Babism, 121; in Bahaism,            Crusades, 43, 60, 91, 220.
> 129, 131; Mirza Ahmed on,
> 133-135; in Turkey, 59, 63,                               D
> 69, 181, 224, 279; efforts to          Damascus, 31, 283.
> cripple, 78; books censored,           Danfodio, Osman, 57, 93.
> 78-79; work repressed, 79;             Dar-ul-Harb, 43, 56, 86, 221.
> enslaved, 211; efforts to Is-          Dar-ul-Islam, 43, 86.
> lamize, 79, 93; contempt for,          Darvishes, 19, 21, 230, 270;
> 81; persecutions of, 81, 82,              their feats, 19; lodges, 20,
> 213; churches taken, 82, 83;              22, 24, 101; for Pan-Islam-
> massacres of, 66, 261, 275,               ism, 68, 77; reforms in, 160,
> 282, 283, 291; cause of, 83;              257; orders of, 19, 21; wide-
> had religious motive, 79; list            spread, 22; influential, 26,
> of, 83, 84; ordered by Sultan,            258; propagandists, 95, 98-
> 83; accepting Islam, 84, 184;             105, 108; Maulavis, 18, 22;
> women outraged, 199, 291;                 Baktashi, 19, 21, 98; Kadiri-
> reforms for, 217, 220, 256-               yah, 20, 98, 99, 102; Ma-
> 260; united with young                    daniyah, 77; Nakshbandi, 20;
> Turks, 263; rejoiced with,                Mahdiist, 139-145; Rufai,
> 265; under Constitution, 268-             21, 63; Sadiyah, 160; Sa-
> 270, 274-276; military ser-               nusiyah, 22, 77, 99-105 (see
> vice, 274, 282; discriminated             Sanusi, Sufiism).
> against, 223, 224, 225, 274,           Dissimulation, 120, 129.
> 275, 277; national aspirations,        Divination, 33.
> 227; rights abrogated, 278             Divorce, 40, 122, 128, 135, 196-
> (see Armenians; Greeks;                   198.
> Copts; Nestorians); in Per-            Dowie, J., 136.
> sia, 155, 156, 179, 251, 291; in       Dreams, 24.
> Albania, 239, 276; Christian           Druses, 82, 114, 125, 282.
> civilization, 239-240, 262.            Dutch East Indies, Islam in,
> Circassians, 45, 273.
> 
> 22, 26, 33, 34, 35, 45, 46, 81                           F
> note, 87, 88 note, 108, 115,          Fanaticism, 55, 56, 59, 69, 74,
> 196, 204, 225 (see Java, Su-             81, 84, 114, 174, 225, 235, 258.
> matra).                               Farquhar, J. N., cited, 108,
> Dwight, H., cited, 31, 32.                 132, 189.
> Fast, 54, 58 (see Ramazan).
> E                    Fatimides, 61, 67, 112, 114,
> Edinburgh Conference, 222,                 125.
> 224.                                 France, 95, 149, 177, 211, 218,
> Education, old style, 172-176;             224, 276, 277, 283, 286, 287,
> in mosques, 172; curriculum,            288, 289.
> 173, 174; illiteracy, 176, 187;      French language, 149, 180, 186,
> traditional, 174 (see Theo-             278, 280.
> logical Schools); modern,            Fulahs, 57, 62.
> 152, 158, 162, 177, 187; non-
> clerical, 191-192; effects, 192-                        G
> 193 (see Schools); of girls,         Gairdner, W. H. T., cited, 42,
> 182, 183; in Egypt, 185-186;            159, 169, 185.
> India, 187, 205; Russia, 205;        Gasparinski, Count, 110, 162.
> Persia, 206; Turkey, 206-            Gazzali, Al, 20, 21.
> 208, 266; of Moslems in Eu-          Germany, 130, 277, 283, 284.
> rope, 104, 178, 180, 181, 182,       Germany, Emperor of, 65, 226,
> 184, 185.                               274, 284, 285, 288.
> Egypt, Egyptians, 22, 41, 42,           God, Sufi doctrine of, 15; as
> 45, 62, 63, 70, 71, 101, 104,           incarnated, 121, 125, 126, 133;
> 112, 131, 150, 177, 198, 200,           hulul, 126; repetition of
> 204, 205, 211, 231, 274, 285,           name, 18, 100 (see Zikr).
> 287; Sultan of, 160, 138, 285;       Goldziher, I., 36, 39, 47, 100,
> modernism in, 158-160; press,           167.
> 190; in Sudan, 140, 141, 144;        Gordon College, 98, 146.
> Nationalists, 70, 90, 231-238,       Gordon, Gen., 98, 140, 141, 142,
> 262, 287; history of, 233-              146.
> 238; causes, 234; legislature,       Great Britain (see Britain).
> 237 (see Schools; Educa-             Greeks, Greece, 22, 39, 49, 81,
> tion).                                  88, 94, 132, 169, 170, 222, 227,
> Enver Pasha, 184, 237, 264.                255, 263, 265, 270, 274, 276,
> European influence, 149, 177.              281; massacred, 82-84.
> European governments (of                Griswold, H. D., 133, 137.
> Moslems), 65, 71, 80, 90,            Gulam Ahmad, Mirza (see Ah-
> 186; hold in subjection, 217-           madiyas).
> 220; aggressions of, 90, 219,
> 220; attitude, 97, 109; par-                            H
> tiality to Islam, 222-225,           Habib Ullah, Amir, 42, 240.
> 226; assist it, 222, 223, 224;       Hadi, Haji Sheikh, 157, 242.
> discriminate against Chris-          Hafiz, 16, 174, 191.
> tians, 223-225; in India, 229-       Hajis, 74, 75, 76; guides of, 34
> 231; Egypt, 232-238; num-               (see Pilgrims).
> bers, 218.
> Europeans in Turkey, 59, 69,
> 255-256, 277, 279-280.
> 
> Hallaj Al, 20.                          Incarnations, 121, 125.
> Haram, 195 (see Woman).                 Innovations (see Islam, modi-
> Hasan Khan, Mukhbir-ul-                     fications of).
> Mulk, 73, 244.                       International Review of Mis-
> Hasheesh, Bhang, 16.                        sions, 29, 80, 95, 161, 193,
> Hatti Humayun, 40, 256.                     205, 212, 215, 224, 230.
> Hatti Sherif, 40, 256, 268.             Irak, 73, 152, 257.
> Hausa, 62, 93.                          Islam (see Neo-Islam; Mod-
> Hejaz, 52; railway, 74.                     ernism; Moslems), 149, 152;
> Herrick, G., 86, 89.                        is it changeable?, 11, 13, 44,
> Hindus, Hinduism, 22, 32, 44,               46-48, 49; reformable, 214-
> 45, 56, 107, 135, 136, 205, 229,         216; signs of decay, 52;
> 230, 231, 290.                           weak, 218; expecting tri-
> Hiyat-ul-Qulub, 27.                         umphs, 89, 91, 221, 283, 292;
> Holy War (see Jihad).                       divisions of, 61-62; parties
> Houris, 88, 89.                             in, 49-51; unifying forces,
> Hughes, T., 22, 112, 114.                   60, 70, 74 (see Sects; Creed;
> Hurgronje, cited, 68, 69, 76,               Superstitions); periodicals
> 288.                                     for, 6 (see Press); priest-
> Husain Ali (see Baha Ullah).                craft in, 32-34; scholasti-
> Husain, Imam, 25, 56, 113, 139.             cism, 21; lowers woman, 195-
> 197 (see Woman); propaga-
> I                        tion by force, 55, 56, 57, 79,
> Ibn Chaldoun, 15.                           85-86, 94, 95; by missions
> Ibn Hanbal, 13.                             (see Islamic missions, mod-
> Ibn Malik, 13.                              ifications of, 14, 21, 35, 46-
> Ibn Saud, 55.                               48, 215; by Sufiism, 14, 20,
> Ibrahim Pasha, 56.                          22-23; by saint-worship, 23-
> Idolatry, 44.                               26; apotheosis of Moham-
> Ijma (consensus), 35, 38, 48.               med, 26-29; uncreated Ko-
> Imams, 12, 23, 35, 50, 51, 54,              ran, 29; development of
> 87, 112, 113, 116, 121, 146,             clergy, 29-35; sheikh medi-
> 166, 249, 272 (see Ali; Hu-              ators, 34; the Canon Law,
> sain; Mahdi).                            35-40; modern codes, 40-43;
> Imperial Gazetteer of India, 45,            accommodation to conditions,
> 137.                                     43; local superstitions and
> India, 28, 43, 45, 49. 56, 69, 70,          customs, 44-46; process of,
> 71, 74, 77, 87, 89, 90, 131,             48-49; shows its insufficiency,
> 132-137, 139, 150, 186, 200,             23; revival in Islam (see
> 204, 205, 211, 214, 218, 228,            Wahabism; Pan-Islamism),
> 286, 290; Moslem awakening               52, 53; reasons for, 53, 57;
> in, 107-108, 110, 171; lead-             influence, 57-58; reactionary,
> ers of, 229; press, 190; na-             58, 59; propagates the faith,
> tionalism in, 229-231; pro-              94, .103, 105, 107.
> gram of, 230 (see Moslem             Islamic missions (see Islam),
> Leagues).                                94; new spirit of, 96; posi-
> Indonesia (see Dutch East In-               tion favourable, 96; means,
> dies).                                   96-97; by darvishes, 98-105;
> Indulgences, sale of, 33,                   by mullahs, 105; societies,
> 35.                                      107, 110; congresses, 110;
> press, 108, 109; aided by
> 
> Christian governments, 97,                              K
> 98; success, 5, 102-103; in        Kaaba, 13, 17, 34, 68.
> Africa, 96-105; in Asia, 105-      Kaffirs, 93, 222.
> 110, 222, 223, 224; Christians     Kamal-ud-Din, 137.
> Islamized, 105, 109, 137, 138;     Kazi (Kadi), 30, 31, 32, 41,
> in Japan, 110 175.                     285, 286.
> Islamic Review, 17, 137.               Kazim Haji Sayid, 116.
> Ismieliyah, 61, 112, 114,              Keane, cited, 75, 147.
> 125.                               Kerbela, 25, 30, 56, 73, 75, 175,
> Italy, 88, 90, 102, 175, 220, 227,         243-
> 276.                               Khairalla, I. G., 130.
> Khalifa (see Caliphs), 72, 240.
> J                   Khalifa of Mahdi, 113, 141,
> Jabulsa, Jabulka, 113.                     144.
> Jalal-ud-Din, 15, 17.                  Khartum, 139-144.
> Jamal-ud-Din, 70-72, 74, 151,          Khavarij, 64.
> 158, 169, 242, 243, 246.           Khedive, 56, 71, 74, 140, 169,
> Jami, 15.                                  175, 176, 184, 204, 231, 232,
> Janissaries, 21, 255.                      234.
> Japan, 89, 106, 228, 229, 246,         Khojas, 68, 271.
> 281.                               Khuda Bakhsh, S., cited, 32,
> Java, 26, 69, 74, 76, 161, 175,            37, 167-168.
> 225.                               Kibla, 14.
> Javanism, 46.                          Kirghiz, 76, 205, 222.
> Jerusalem, 13, 183, 275, 286.          Kitchener, Lord, 144, 185, 236,
> Jessup, H. H., cited, 67, 218,             237.
> 260.                               Kiyas, deduction, 36, 37, 38.
> Jesus Christ, Lord, 114, 132,          Koran, 15, 18, 20, 25, 27, 35,
> 133, 134, 138, 141, 164.               52, 98, 117, 121, 138, 139,
> Jews, 31, 44, 61, 85, 121, 134,            153, 155, 160, 164, 173, 174,
> 237, 251, 263, 264, 268, 269,          195, 201, 240; uncreated, 29;
> 270, 271, 273, 282.                    has little legislation, 36, 40;
> Jihad, Holy War, 5, 43, 49, 61,            modernism on, 164, 166-168;
> 104, 167, 222, 288, 290; used          169; “Back to the Koran,”
> to propagate faith, 55, 56,            50, 54, 159, 160, 168; trans-
> 57, 93; also by Wahabis, 54-           lations, 138, 167, 190-191;
> 56; obligatory, 55, 56; en-            Ahli Koran, 168; cited, 30
> joined by Mohammed, 85;                note, 85-86, 87, 88, 135, 200,
> by Mahdi, 143; till resurrec-          203, 210, 287.
> tion, 86; restrained by fear,      Koreish, 43, 64, 67.
> 87; by expediency, 87; in-         Kuenen, cited, 35.
> voked against sects, 87, 88;       Kufa, 72, 113.
> proclamations of, 88, 106; in      Kurds, 61, 62, 152, 200, 239,
> present war, 286-289; effec-           253, 270, 276, 277, 296.
> tive, 88; condemned by             Kuzil Beshi (see Ali Allahi).
> Baha, 129; by Ahmadi-
> yas, 134; by Neo-Moslems,                            L
> 168.                               Lahore, 25, 107, 108, 187.
> Judgment Day, 33.                      Lane-Poole, Stanley, 12, 36, 47,
> Junaid, Al, 20.                           170, 194, 195, 197, 199.
> 
> Law, Sacred (Shariat), 17, 25,        Malays, 22, 76, 109, 173, 223,
> 30, 53, 54, 66, 73, 153, 224,         225, 227 (see Dutch East
> 235-236, 240, 258, 279; inter-        Indies).
> preter of, 31; origin of, 35,      Malcom Khan, 242, 243.
> 167; small part from Ko-           Mann, Oscar, 47, 53, 89.
> ran, 36, 167; borrowed, 37-        Marabout, 10, 25, 26.
> 39, 47; Goldziher on, 36, 39,      Margoliouth, Prof., 18, 46, 48,
> 47; complex, 38; indebted             202, 215.
> to Christianity, 39; supple-       Marriage, 20, 40, 44, 45, 122,
> mented by urfi in Persia,             168 (see Polygamy).
> 40; by code in Turkey, 40-         Marseya Khan, 25, 34.
> 42, 58, 257; conflict, 41-42;      Masonic order, 98, 263, 271.
> regarding interest, 41-42; ac-     Massacres (see Christians).
> commodated, 43; mixed with         McCallagh, F., cited, 67, 260,
> Hinduism, 44-45; animism,             273.
> 46; process of change, 48-         Mecca, 13, 25, 33, 34, 43, 51,
> 49; on jihad, 85-88; Neo-             52, 55, 56, 57, 60, 64, 67, 68,
> Islam on, 165, 168, 203; re-          70, 72, 74, 75, 99, 106, 110,
> lation to Constitutions, 250,         117, 147, 164, 174, 211, 240
> 266-271.                              (see Sherif).
> Law, Roman, source of Mos-            Mediators, 18, 34 (see Saint-
> lem Law, 37-39, 49, J 67-             worship; Mohammed Ali).
> Lebanon, 82, 282.                     Medina, 52, 54, 55, 64, 74, 113,
> Leeder, S. H., 159, 185.                 183, 286.
> Lucknow, 108, 187.                    Mehemet Ali, Khedive, 56.
> Merrick, J. L., 27.
> M                   Miracles, 23, 155, 165, 167.
> Macdonald, D. B., 19, 22, 26,         Miraj, 155. 165, 167.
> 37, 48, 161, 215.                   Missionary Review of the
> Mahdi, Mahdiism, 51, 62; ex-             World, 32, 35, 57, 77, 87, 88,
> pectation of, 50, 113, 114;            91, 107, 115, 133, 147, 161,
> doctrine of, 112; history,             162, 225, 239.
> 112-116; the hidden Imam,           Missions, Moslem, 51 (see Is-
> 113, 117; Mahdis many, 56,             lamic missions).
> 101, 113, 114, 115, 132, 134,       Missions to Moslems, 5, 14,
> 147, 218 (see Bab; Baha Ul-            97; hindered, 98, 132, 281-
> lah; Ahmadiyas); causes of,            282; imperative, 103; need
> 146-147; significance, 148.            of, 111, 148, 149, 193; oppor-
> Mahdi of Sudan (Mohammed                 tunities, 179, 184, 226; en-
> Ahmad), 62, 63, 87, 98, 233;           couragement, 213; critical
> history of, 139-145; propa-            time, 216, 292; Dutch Gov-
> ganda, 139-140; occasion, 140;         ernment favours, 225; schools
> victories, 141-143; marks of,          of, 156, 183, 184, 187, 206,
> 142; laws, 142-143; degen-             208, 281 (see Christian Con
> eracy, 143; polygamy, 144;             verts).
> tomb destroyed, 145, 220;           Modernism in Islam, 149, 150,
> dire results, 145-146.                 160, 228 (see Neo-Islam).
> Mahkama, 40, 59.                      Modifications in Islam (see Is-
> Mahmud II, Sultan, 40, 58, 66,           lam, modifications of).
> 255.                                Mohammed, 18, 20, 24, 33, 61,
> 62, 64, 78, 100, 110, 117, 133,
> 
> 135, 138, 164, 165; “Life of          pathy with Turkey, 90, 230,
> Mohammed,” 27, 164, 165,              277; under Constitutions,
> 167, 168; made changes, 13;           248-253, 265-272.
> glorification of, 26-29, 44,        Moslem World, cited, 19, 38,
> 100, 169; pre-existence, 26-          107, in, 132, 133, 187, 192,
> 27; Nur-i-Mohammed, 27,               205, 210, 268.
> 167; sinlessness, 27, 28, 167;      Mosques, 106, 146, 172, 186,
> intercessor, 28, 168; birthday,       223, 225.
> 29, 54; made few laws, 36;          Mufti, 31, 43, 99, 175.
> traditions assigned to, 35,         Mufti, Grand, 41, 158, 159, 175,
> 117, 146, 153, 154, 192; on           235.
> sects, 61; enjoined jihad, 85;      Muharram, 25, 34, 73, 156, 241.
> on woman, 197-198, 200; as          Mujtahids, 30, 36, 38, 48, 72,
> example, 86, 167, 195, 199,           73, 87, 123, 156, 157, 241, 243,
> 200; “Back to Mohammed,”              245, 249, 250.
> 50, 159, 166.                       Mullahs, 42, 75, 146, 153, 157,
> Mohammedanism (see Islam;               172, 223, 248, 265; classes of,
> Moslems).                             in Persia, 30; in Turkey, 31;
> Mohammed Abdu, Sheikh, 158,             duties, 30, 32, 105, 106;
> 159, 169, 175-                        power, 32 (see Clergy;
> Mohammed Ahmad (see Mahdi               Ulema).
> of Sudan).                          Muridism, 72.
> Mohammed Ali, Shah, 156,              Music in Islam, 18, 99.
> 179, 245, 252.                      Mustashar-ud-Doulah, 73, 243,
> Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahab                244.
> (see Wahabism).                     Mutasharis, 53, 155.
> Mohammed V Rashad, 22, 273.           Mutavalsul, 64, 67.
> Morocco, 68, 74, 90, 99, 101,         Mutazali, 160, 170.
> 175, 211, 276, 290.                 Muzaffar-ud-Din, Shah, 244,
> Moslems, 121, 150; interest in,         247.
> 5, 6; movements, 6, 11, 13,         Mystics, Mysticism, 14, 17, 21,
> 40, 49-51, 94, 114, 147, 148-         34, 99 (see Sufis).
> 151, 177, 191-193, 228, 292;
> no longer unitarian, 28-29;                           N
> new mode of initiating, 46;         Najef, 30, 73, 174, 243.
> numbers in races, 62, 283;          Nasr-ud-Din Shah, 71, 157, 169,
> intellectual life, 172 (see Ed-        179, 241, 242, 243.
> ucation; Schools; Press);           Nationalism, 5, 62, 220-221,
> reaction, 231; borrowing civ-          227-239; developing, 227; pa-
> ilization, 239-240; expecta-           triotism, 228 (see India;
> tions, 114, 148; adjustment            Egypt; Albanians).
> under Christian rule, 219-          Negroes, 62, 226 (see Africa).
> 222; expatriation, 221; race        Neo-Islam, 51, 149, 150; how
> secondary, 222, 227; not loyal,        brought about, 149-150, 152;
> 222, 226, 227, 228; allied with        how evidenced, 150; repres-
> Christians, 43, 289; hatred of         sion of thought, 151-153; lib-
> Christians (see Christians;            eral thought, 152; among
> Massacres; Nationalism; Eu-            Ulema, 153; leaders in Per-
> ropean Governments; Fanat-             sia, 155-157; relation to
> icism); Moslem Leagues, 90,            Christians, 155-156; religious
> 107, 164, 203, 229, 271; sym-
> 
> dissatisfaction, 157; promot-          ture, 60; object, 60, 61; or-
> ers in Egypt, 158; their cry,          ganized by Caliph, 63-67;
> 159; retain and modernize,             Mecca as a centre, 67, 68;
> 160; reforms, 160; as to as-           agents, 68; use of press, 69,
> sassination, 169; rapid ad-            77; negotiations with Shiahs,
> vance in Malaysia, 161;                70-74; expense of, 68; apos-
> changes of habit in Russia,            tle of, 71; Pan-Islamic So-
> 161; education, 162; progress          ciety, 72; rejected by rulers,
> among Tartars, 162, 163;               74; hajis as propagandists,
> leaders in India, 163-168; ra-         74-75; congenial to Arabs,
> tionalistic, 164, 166, 170; as         74; widespread, 76-77; anti-
> to Mohammed, 165, 167; as              Christian, 78-80; led to mas-
> to law, 165, 166, 168; as to           sacres, 85; relied on jihad,
> Koran, 164, 166, 168; Mutaza-          84-89; estimates of, 89-93;
> lite, 170; anti-Christian, 169;        manifestations of, 91, 96.
> favours religious liberty, 212,     Pantheism, 14, 15, 44, 115.
> 213, 216; prospects of, 214-        Paradise, 88, 135.
> 215; can Islam be reformed?,        Passion-Play, 25, 73.
> 214-216; reaction from, 231;        Pears, Sir Edwin, cited, 65, 66,
> modernism in education, 177-           81, 98, 104, 153, 194, 204, 209,
> 189, 191-193; in society, 194-         213, 283.
> 211 (see Woman; Slavery).           Persecutions, 13, 81-82, 212,
> Nestorians, 82, 251, 291.                 213 (see Christians).
> New Testament, 30, 31.                 Persia, 5, 66, 72, 73, 74, 79, 112,
> Notovich, N., 134.                        117, 121, 131, 139, 198, 199,
> Nusairiyahs, 114, 117, 125 (see           211, 221, 229, 259; home of
> Ali Allahis).                          Sufiism, 14, 21; Shiahs in,
> 70-73 (see Shiahs, Babism,
> O                      Bahaism); influence on Is-
> Oman, 65.                                 lam, 14, 22, 37, 39, 170, 171,
> Omar, 13, 64, 73, 278.                    215; common law, 40; saint-
> Omar-i-Khayyam, 17.                       worship, 25, 29; mullahs, 30,
> Opium, 52, 56, 122.                       32, 248; modernism in, 153-
> “Orient,” cited, 92, 182, 183,            157, 204; new education,
> 209, 283.                              177-179; Shah’s College, 178;
> Ottoman (see Turkey).                     press, 189; freedom of
> Ottomanization, 182, 266, 268,            speech, 233; borrowing civil-
> 276-282; of races, 276, 278,           ization, 239-240; politically,
> 282; abolishing capitulations,         217, 231, 284, 286; reforms,
> 279-281.                               241; leaders of, 241-242; agi-
> tations, 242-244; cause of,
> P                      243, 245-246; tobacco monop-
> Pachpiriyas, 45.                          oly, 273; agrarian conditions,
> Padri sect, 56.                           245; corruption, 246, 252;
> Palestine, 43.                            Constitution in, 114, 131, 154,
> Palgrave, 12, 21, 32, 34, 52, 53,         156, 178, 179, 213, 240, 242;
> 57, 92.                                origin of, 246; outline of,
> Pan-Islamism, 51, 104, 151, 189,          247-248; relation to religion,
> 226, 230, 234, 263, 277, 288,          248-250; aided by mullahs,
> 289; development of, 60; na-           248; relation to liberty, 250-
> 251; to non-Moslems, 251;
> 
> difficulties, 251; Nationalists,                         S
> 213, 249, 250; causes of fail-       Saadi, 16, 174, 191.
> ure, 252-253, 291; character         Sadra, Mullah, 155.
> of reformers, 252-253; Rus-          Saints, intercession of, 23, 26
> sia and Great Britain, 253;              (see Sheikhs; Imams; Pirs;
> in the present war, 93, 284,             Valis).
> 285, 290; Christians in, 291.        Saint-worship, 23-26; preva-
> Persian language, 19, 173, 176,              lence of, 23, 25, 26, 35, 45,
> 180, 186, 191.                           115; denounced, 54, 100.
> Persians, 15, 20, 39, 75, 125,           Salim I, 63, 64, 82.
> 133, 169, 173, 176, 199, 200,        Salonika, 152, 263, 271, 273.
> 204, 226.                            Sanusi, Sheikh, 77, 88; history
> Petrograd, 71, 76, 106, 163.                 of, 99-102; Order, 100-101;
> Philippines, 65.                             Mahdi, 101, 105, 115.
> Pilgrimage, 25, 58, 68, 70, 110,         Sanusiyahs, 100 (see Dar-
> 116, 122, 145, 168.                      vishes); influence of, 102;
> Pilgrims, 24, 31, 56, 75 (see                held slaves, 100, 102; propa-
> Hajis).                                  ganda, 102-104; their army,
> Pirs, 23, 24, 26, 35, 48.                    104, 105; jihad, 104, 105, 290.
> Polygamy, 20, 66, 122, 135, 138,         Sayids (descendants of Mo-
> 144, 166, 168, 196, 197, 201-            hammed), 35, 45, 70, 221, 248.
> 203, 273; decreasing, 204,           Schamyl, Sheikh, 72, 87, 115,
> 222.                                     219.
> Prayer-rite, 26, 54, 58, 122, 143,       Schools (for Moslems) in
> 167, 168.                                Africa, 97, 102, 186, 224;
> Priests, Christian, 30 note.                 China, 106; Egypt, 184-186,
> Priests in Islam, 29, 32-34, 35.             224, 235, 237; India, 107, 162,
> Primal Will, 15, 27, 121.                    178; Aligarh College, 163,
> Punishments, 42, 128, 142, 143.              167, 187-188; project for
> University, 188-189; results,
> Q                        189; Persia, 154, 172, 173,
> Qadian, 132, 137.                            178, 179; Russia, 105, 161,
> 162, 204; Turkey, 59, 173,
> R                         176, 180, 181-184, 260,
> Railways, 74-75.                             262, 281 (see Theological
> Rajputs, 44, 45.                             Schools; Education).
> Ramazan, 34, 41.                         Sects, 35, 44, 45, 56, 106, 125,
> Ramsay, Sir William, cited, 22,              126, 155; Mohammedan, 61;
> 69, 80, 81, 196.                          number, 61-62, 168.
> Review of Religions, 135,                Sell, Canon, 17, 57, 77, 99, 168,
> 137.                                      214.
> Rice, W. A., cited, 146, 170.            Senegambia, 93.
> Russia, 65, 67, 90, 217, 228, 246,       Severance, L. H., 6.
> 258, 280, 283, 286, 287, 289,         Shafi, Imam, 13.
> 290; in Persia, 156, 177, 243,        Shah Abdul Azim (asylum),
> 245, 247, 250, 253, 254.                  71, 244.
> Russia, Islam in, 32, 105, 153,          Shahs of Persia, 62, 73, 74, 113,
> 161-163, 190, 205, 211, 222;              119, 121, 155, 177, 221, 249;
> Pan-Islamism, 76, 77.                     no religious authority, 30;
> conflict with Shariat, 40, 221.
> 
> Shariat (see Law, Sacred).                   14; pantheistic, 15; mystical,
> Shawish, Sheikh, 183, 236, 237.              16; poets of, 16; antinomian,
> Sheikhis, 61, 116, 121, 155, 156.            17; its paths, 17; zikr, 18;
> Sheikhs, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 34,             history, 20-22; prevalence,
> 48, 54, 65, 67, 95, 98, 99, 141,         21-22; origin, 22; an Indian,
> 157, 158, 160, 175.                      44; rejected by Wahabis, 54
> Sheikh-ul-Islam, 31, 71, 153,                (see Darvishes).
> 206, 267, 269, 272.                  Sultan of Egypt, 169, 184.
> Sherif of Mecca, 34, 64, 65, 67,         Sultan, Osmanli, 31, 40, 56, 58,
> 74, 75.                                  62, 64, 65, 67, 73, 77, 89, 102,
> Shiahs, 23, 25, 27, 30, 33, 34,              109, 140, 180, 183, 184, 211,
> 35, 44, 48, 55, 65, 73, 75. 87,          218, 226, 234, 237, 257.
> 112, 114, 117, 121, 139, 154,        Sultans, 65, 279.
> 174, 198, 246, 249, 250: sects       Sulus, 65.
> of, 61, 112 (see Sheikhis);          Sumatra, 56, 69, 76, 93, 225.
> plan to join Sunnis, 69-73.          Sunnis, 21, 23, 25, 27, 35, 44,
> Shiraz, 116, 118.                            48, 54, 56, 64, 67, 72, 87, 112,
> Shrines, 16, 24, 25, 28, 71, 113,            139, 174, 290.
> 128, 130, 160, 199.                  Swan, G., 19.
> Shuster, Morgan, 207, 247, 248,          Sykes, Mrs., 198, 204.
> 252.                                 Syria, 21, 29, 115, 125, 177, 210,
> Siberia, 162.                                221, 257, 265, 270, 276.
> Sigat-ul-Islam, 156.
> Sikhs, 56.                                                   T
> Simon, G., cited, 22, 26, 29, 32,        Tabriz, 25, 73, 117, 120, 154,
> 46, 65, 76, 88, 89, 91, 93, 226,        156, 179, 197, 206, 242, 243,
> 227.                                    244, 248, 250, 252.
> Siraj-ud-Din, cited, 24, 28, 132.        Tagiya (see Dissimulation).
> Slatin Pasha, 142, 144.                  Takia (see Darvish lodges).
> Slavery, 46, 56, 100, 102, 140,          Tartars, 76, 162, 163.
> 166, 204, 256, 273, 274; slave       Tears, in bottle, 34.
> girls, 199, 212; Koran or-           Teheran, 113, 120, 154, 156,
> dains, 210; abolition, 211,             157, 179, 206, 212, 229, 243,
> 222; slave-trade being sup-             244.
> pressed, 211.                        Theological schools, 30, 31, 52,
> Smith, Bosworth, cited, 35, 47,             57, 106; in Mecca, 75; Shiah,
> 86, 166.                                174; Sunni, 174, 176, 183,
> Smyrna, 152, 224.                           185, 186 (see Al Azhar);
> Sohoto, 57, 93.                             condemned, 176.
> Spain, 21, 215, 217.                     Tisdall, W. St. C, 165.
> St. Sophia, 56, 65, 66, 270, 271.        Tobacco, 54, 56, 99, 143,
> Stamboul, 76, 77, 284 (see                  273.
> Constantinople).                     Traditions, 13, 18, 19, 20, 27,
> Strafford de Redcliffe, 40, 255.            50, 88, 117, 132, 146, 154, 167,
> Subh-i-Azal, 123, 124.                      170, 174, 192; for Constitu-
> Sudan, 22, 62, 87, 95, 98, 101,             tion, 267; numerous, 35, 167;
> 104, 139-146, 196, 211, 212,            not of Arabian origin, 36;
> 223, 290.                               invented, 39, 134; abrogated,
> Sufis, Sufiism, 14-18, 20-22, 40,           43; on Caliphate, 64; re-
> 49, 61, 98, 99, 100, 105, 115,          jected, 164-168.
> 128, 132, 155, 213; Persian,
> 
> Tripoli, 77, 88, 90, 104, 175,          V
> 220, 237, 276.                       Valis, 23, 26, 48, 99.
> Tufail, Ibn, 21.                        Vambery, A., 162, 288.
> Turkey, 5, 21, 25, 30, 31, 32,          Veil, 44, 122, 195, 200, 204, 205,
> 40, 44, 52, 58, 68, 69, 70, 71,          206, 207, 265.
> 88, 129, 131, 151-153, 226,          Victoria, Queen, 65, 66.
> 229, 231, 286 (see Abdul
> Hamid); reforms, 152, 180,                             W
> 204, 208-210, 239-240, 255-          Wahabis, 26, 28, 35, 51, 62, 65,
> 257, 261; new codes, 40-42,             87, 96, 99, 100, 151, 160; his-
> 58, 257, 280; counsels, 68,             tory of founder, 54; doc-
> 106; fear of revolution, 79;            trines and reforms, 54; ji-
> reactions, 58, 191; suppres-            had used, 55; victories, 55;
> sion of ideas, 78, 139, 151,            its influence, 56-57; in In-
> 281; atrocities, 82-85, 86;             dia, 56; in Africa, 57.
> spy-system, 259-262; oppres-         War, Holy (see Jihad).
> sions, 260; Boy Scouts, 184;         Washburn, Geo., 77.
> Revolution, 236, 264-265 (see        Watson, C. R., cited, 87, 145,
> Turks, Young); Constitu-                161, 175, 196, 200, 224.
> tion, 5, 41, 59, 152, 182, 211,      Weitbrecht, Canon, 191.
> 240, 258, 261, 264, 272, 274;        Westermann, Prof., 95, 98,
> rejoicings, 264-265; provi-             196, 211.
> sions of, 266; relation to           Western Theological Semi-
> Shariat, 266-272; Parlia-               nary, 6.
> ment, 270, 272; reaction, 270-       Wherry, E. M., cited, 45, 132.
> 272; Sultan deposed, 272;            Wingate, Col., cited, 140, 143.
> reforms under, 273-274 (see          Wine, wine-drinking, 16, 52,
> Ottomanizing); capitulations            54, 58, 122, 143, 271.
> abolished, 278-281; courts           Woking, 109, 137.
> corrupt, 281; failure, 291;          Woman (see Education of
> the present war, 5, 93, 169,            Girls; Marriage; Polygamy;
> 226, 253, 282-291; jihad, 286-          Veil; Divorce), 44, 45, 46,
> 287; atrocities against Chris-          122, 128, 135, 143, 154, 162,
> tians, 291 (see Christians;             163, 176, 186, 187, 273; Is-
> Education; Schools).                    lamic society a failure, 194;
> Turkestan, 76, 162.                        woman’s degradation, 194;
> Turks, 22, 43, 49, 62, 73, 84, 85,         before Islam, 195-196; greater
> 86, 90, 103, 140, 185, 194,             in Islam, 197-201; seclusion,
> 220, 222, 234, 237, 270, 275.           200-201; abductions, 199;
> Turks, Young, 34, 152, 182,                contract wives, 199; haram,
> 184, 204, 213, 236, 260-263,            200; scourging, 210; benefits
> 269, 270, 274, 275, 284, 289.           claimed, 197; Neo-Islam: ad-
> vocates freedom, 201; repu-
> U                        diates polygamy, 201, 202; is
> Ulema, 21, 30, 31, 32, 40, 42,             decreasing, 204; and divorce,
> 43, 58, 64, 68, 74, 87, 99, 146,        202; seclusion, 202-203; les-
> 147, 150, 166, 174, 183, 213,           sening, 204-206; improve-
> 230, 234, 246, 257, 258, 266,           ment, 203-210; examples,
> 268, 270.                               206, 207, 208; under Consti-
> Usury, 42.
> 
> tutions, 207, 208, 265; wom-      Yezidees, Islamized, 80.
> an’s journals, 162, 208; new      Young, Dr., 216.
> liberty, 208-210; restrained,
> 209, 271.                                             Z
> Wurz, F., 159, 175.                 Zanzibar, 65, 74, 102.
> Zikr, 18, 19, 100, 122, 160.
> Y                  Zoroastrians, 44, 126, 205, 251.
> Yahya, Mirza (see Subh-i-           Zwemer, S. M., cited, 28, 87,
> Azal).                           91, 161, 190, 195.
> 
> PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
>
> — *Modern Movements among Moslems (Used by permission of the curator)*