# The Baha'i Question: Cultural Cleansing in Iran

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> Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Bahá'í International Community, The Baha'i Question: Cultural Cleansing in Iran, bahai-library.com.
> ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
> 
> THE BAH Á’Í QUE STION
> Cultural Cleansing in Iran
> THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> Cultural Cleansing in Iran
> 
> Bahá’í International Community
> THE BAH Á’Í QUESTION
> Cultural Cleansing in Iran
> Web site: http://question.bahai.org
> 
> Copyright 2005 Bahá’í International Community
> Bahá’í International Community
> 866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 120
> New York, NY 10017, USA
> Contents
> 
> 5 CHAPTER I: Introduction
> 10 The Bahá’í Faith: A global community
> 
> 13 CHAPTER II: A Campaign of Cultural Cleansing
> 18 The ISRCC document
> 
> 23   CHAPTER III: The Current Situation
> 26   The Bahá’í Institute for Higher Education
> 30   The Bahá’í community of Iran speaks for itself
> 44   The ongoing threat of execution
> 
> 49 CHAPTER IV: “To kill a Bahá’í is a good deed…”
> 54 Hanged for teaching “Sunday school”
> 60 How Iran has justified the persecution
> 
> 65 CHAPTER V: The Historical Background
> 72 The international response
> 
> 76 CHAPTER VI: Conclusion and Summary
> 79 APPENDIX I: Bahá’ís killed since 1978
> 84 APPENDIX II: The United Nations’ Response
> 4 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> Chapter I
> IN TRODUCTION
> 
> B
> Y ALL ACCOUNTS, the house of Mirza Abbas
> Nuri was a masterpiece of Islamic architec-       That the Iranian
> ture. Mirza Abbas Nuri was a renowned 18th       government would
> century Iranian calligrapher, and his home          destroy part of
> in Tehran — marked by a verdant veranda,
> flowered courtyard, and tasteful tile-work — was considits country’s own
> ered among the most beautiful houses of that period.          heritage tells much
> In the summer of 2004, however, Iranian authorities        about the current
> demolished the house. The reason was all too clear: the
> state of Iran’s 25-
> home was considered by Iran’s Bahá’ís as a sacred and
> historic site, inasmuch as Mirza Abbas Nuri was the             year-campaign
> father of Bahá’u’lláh, the Founder of the Bahá’í Faith.         to eradicate the
> That the Iranian government would destroy part             300,000-member
> of its country’s own heritage tells much about the current state of Iran’s 25-year-campaign to eradicate the
> Iranian Bahá’í
> 300,000-member Iranian Bahá’í community. Since                    community.
> coming to power in 1979, Iran’s cleric-led Islamic
> government has systematically persecuted Bahá’ís in
> 
> The demolition in June 2004 of the house of Mirza Abbas
> Nuri, a renowned 18th century Iranian calligrapher, reflects
> the Iranian government’s willingness to destroy its own
> cultural heritage to eradicate the Bahá’í Faith from Iran.
> 
> CHAPTER I: Introduction | 5
> Iran, using execution, imprisonment, torture, and a
> wide range of measures designed to impoverish and
> drive out the country’s largest religious minority.
> Between 1978 and 1998, more than 200 Bahá’ís were
> executed by the Iranian government. Hundreds more
> Bahá’ís were imprisoned and tortured, and tens of
> thousands were deprived of jobs, pensions, businesses,
> and educational opportunities.
> In the face of intense international pressure, most
> significantly through a series of United Nations human
> rights resolutions, the Iranian government has essen-
> Farhang Mavaddat       tially halted the executions and greatly reduced the
> was executed in June   number of Bahá’ís held in prison.
> 1981, and his wife         Yet while the government has seemingly halted the
> Mehri Mavaddat was     most egregious forms of direct violence against individimprisoned in 1980.    ual members of the Bahá’í community, the government
> has nevertheless continued its campaign of persecution, albeit in a manner that clearly seeks to avoid the
> scrutiny of international human rights monitors.
> Bahá’ís in every part of Iran continue to face the
> threat of short-term detention and harassment. In the
> spring of 2005, for example, more than 35 Bahá’ís in
> various areas were imprisoned without charge. While
> most were held less than a week, others were jailed for
> up to three months in a kind of “revolving door” detention apparently aimed principally at creating terror and
> repression. Some of the prisoners, for example, were
> held incommunicado, in unknown locations, while
> their families desperately searched for them. In addition, government agents conducted prolonged searches
> of many of their homes, confiscating documents, books,
> computers, copiers and other belongings.
> Moreover, the government has sought overall to
> suffocate the Bahá’í community through extensive
> social and economic restrictions. In addition to incidents such as the razing of Mirza Abbas Nuri’s home,
> which was preceded by the destruction of another
> 
> 6 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> important Bahá’í holy site in April 2004, this effort
> at slow strangulation — which must be considered as             Beyond the
> nothing less than cultural cleansing — can be most        destruction of Bahá’í
> clearly observed in the government’s efforts to prevent    holy places and the
> Bahá’í youth from obtaining higher education.
> In the early 1980s, the government banned Bahá’í       denial of education
> youth from Iranian universities and colleges. In early       to Bahá’í youth,
> 2004, however, apparently in response to international       the government
> condemnation of the ban, the government publicly
> has in recent years
> promised to change its policies, indicating that it
> would allow Bahá’í students to enroll in university in      adopted a regimen
> the autumn of that year. On that basis, about 1,000             of arbitrary
> Bahá’í youth took university entrance examinations.         arrests, short term
> In August 2004, the government released the results
> of those exams, on which Bahá’í students scored well.      imprisonment, and
> However, the government also falsely recorded the            the confiscation
> religious affiliation of each Bahá’í student, printing         of homes and
> the word “Islam” in the field listing each Bahá’í stuproperties, designed
> dent’s religion. Because their religious principle prevents them from even “pretending” to deny their faith,         to harass and
> Bahá’ís were effectively precluded from matriculating.        intimidate the
> Some 800 Bahá’ís — those who had otherwise passed          Bahá’í community.
> their examinations — were denied the right to education for the 2004-2005 school year in this manner.
> Beyond the destruction of Bahá’í holy places and
> the denial of education to Bahá’í youth, the government has in recent years adopted a regime of arbitrary
> arrests, short term imprisonment, and the confiscation of homes and properties, designed to harass and
> intimidate the Bahá’í community. The community as
> a whole remains under numerous restrictions, with
> its administrative institutions dismantled, its worship
> practices restricted, and its right to equal protection
> under the law utterly refused.
> The government’s long term strategy to destroy the
> Bahá’í community without bringing undue international attention was cruelly outlined in a secret 1991
> 
> CHAPTER I: Introduction | 7
> Many Bahá’ís have been tortured. The body of Dr. Nasir Vafai, a 49-year-old physician
> who was executed on 14 June 1981, was found to have a deep gash below his abdomen
> which ran all the way around his leg, severing the joint.
> 
> memorandum that aimed at establishing policy regarding “the Bahá’í question.” Drafted by the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council and signed by Supreme
> Leader Ali Khamenei, the document calls for a series
> of restrictions on the access of Bahá’ís to education
> 
> 8 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> and livelihood that is nothing less than a blueprint for
> the strangulation of the Bahá’í community. Most sig-              The Bahá’í
> nificantly, it lays out unequivocally the government’s        community in Iran
> overall objective — to ensure that the “progress and        poses no threat to the
> development” of the Bahá’í community “shall be
> blocked.” [See page 18 for full text of document.]           Iranian authorities.
> The recent destruction of holy sites and denial of      The principles of the
> education to Bahá’í youth, as well as the continuing        Bahá’í Faith require
> measures aimed at harassing Bahá’ís and depriving
> its followers to avoid
> them of their rightful property and livelihood, indicate
> that the government’s secret plan is still very much in       partisan political
> effect. All of the evidence flatly contradicts the govern-        involvement,
> ment’s oft-repeated contention that it has no campaign       subversive activity,
> of persecution against the Bahá’ís.
> The fact is that the Bahá’ís of Iran remain in a           and all forms of
> precarious state. They are denied the right to prac-                violence.
> tice their faith freely, guaranteed under international
> human rights instruments such as the International
> Bill of Human Rights, to which Iran is a party. The
> administrative institutions of their Faith have been dismantled in accordance with a government edict. They
> live each day knowing that their government seeks to
> block their development as a community, and that even
> slight infractions can result in the deprivation of their
> livelihood, imprisonment or worse.
> The Bahá’í community in Iran poses no threat to
> the Iranian authorities. The principles of the Bahá’í
> Faith require its followers to avoid partisan political involvement, subversive activity, and all forms of
> violence. The community has painstakingly avoided
> aligning itself in any fashion with any of the country’s
> governments, ideologies or opposition movements.
> While defending their right to worship and practice their religion freely, as promised by international
> law, Bahá’ís seek only to be peaceful, law abiding and
> productive contributors to the advancement of Iranian
> society.
> 
> CHAPTER I: Introduction | 9
> The Bahá’í Faith: A global community
> 
> F
> OUNDED A CENTURY and a half ago in Iran, the
> Bahá’í Faith is today among the fastest-growing of
> the world’s religions. With more than five million
> followers, who reside in virtually every nation on earth,
> it is the second-most widespread independent world
> religion, surpassing every faith but Christianity in its
> geographic reach. Bahá’ís reside in more than 100,000
> localities around the world, an expansion that reflects
> their dedication to the ideal of world citizenship.
> The Bahá’í Faith’s global scope is mirrored in the
> People of every              composition of its membership. Representing a cross
> nationality, race, ethnic    section of humanity, Bahá’ís come from virtually every
> group, and religious         nation, ethnic group, culture, profession, and social or
> background around the        economic class. More than 2,100 different ethnic and
> world have declared          tribal groups are represented.
> their belief in the Bahá’í       The Faith’s Founder is Bahá’u’lláh, a Persian noble-
> Faith. Shown here is         man from Tehran who, in the mid-nineteenth century,
> a group of people from       left a life of princely comfort and security and, in the
> around the world who         face of intense persecution and deprivation, brought to
> have volunteered to serve    humanity a stirring new message of peace and unity.
> at the Bahá’í World              Bahá’u’lláh claimed to be nothing less than a new
> Centre in Haifa, Israel.     and independent Messenger from God. His life, work,
> 
> 10 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> Entrance to the Shrine
> of Bahá’u’lláh, near
> Acre, Israel.
> 
> and influence parallel that of Abraham, Krishna,
> Moses, Zoroaster, Buddha, Christ, and Muhammad.
> Bahá’ís view Bahá’u’lláh as the most recent in this succession of divine Messengers.
> The essential message of Bahá’u’lláh is that of
> The essential
> unity. He taught that there is only one God, that there
> is only one human race, and that all the world’s reli-            message of
> gions represent stages in the revelation of God’s will       Bahá’u’lláh is that
> and purpose for humanity. In this day, Bahá’u’lláh said,    of unity. He taught
> humanity has collectively come of age. As foretold in
> all of the world’s scriptures, the time has arrived for       that there is only
> the uniting of all peoples into a peaceful and integrated    one God, that there
> global society. “The earth is but one country, and man-      is only one human
> kind its citizens,” He wrote.
> race, and that all
> For a global society to flourish, Bahá’u’lláh said, it
> must be based on certain fundamental principles. They       the world’s religions
> include the elimination of all forms of prejudice; full        represent stages
> equality between the sexes; recognition of the essential      in the revelation
> oneness of the world’s great religions; the elimination
> of extremes of poverty and wealth; universal education;          of God’s will
> the harmony of science and religion; a sustainable bal-        and purpose for
> ance between nature and technology; and the estab-                humanity.
> lishment of a world federal system, based on collective
> security and the oneness of humanity.
> 
> CHAPTER I: Introduction | 11
> Chapter II
> A CA MPAIGN OF
> CULTUR AL CLEANSING
> 
> I
> N THE WORLD today, Iran seeks to portray itself as a deserving partner in international trade,
> inter-governmental affairs, and other cooperative activities. Understanding that its international reputation on human rights is critical,
> Iran has embarked on a multi-pronged effort to convince the world at large that it has largely abandoned
> the practices of execution, torture, imprisonments, and
> repression that marked the early days of the Islamic
> revolution. Since 2002, for example, Iran has engaged
> in a series of “dialogues” with the European Union and
> others on human rights and trade.
> The story of its ongoing persecution of the Bahá’í
> community of Iran offers a singular litmus test of the
> Iranian government’s degree of sincerity in meeting
> 
> The House of the Báb in Shiraz, Iran, one of the
> most holy sites in the Bahá’í world, was destroyed by
> Revolutionary Guardsmen in 1979 and later razed by
> the government. The photo at top was taken before the
> demolition took place, shown at bottom.
> 
> CHAPTER II: A Campaign of Cultural Cleansing | 13
> globally accepted human rights standards. Bahá’ís hold
> no political ambitions, are committed to non-violence,
> and seek only to help in the redevelopment of their
> native land. Yet, for more than 25 years, they have been
> persecuted wholly for their religious beliefs.
> Consider the following images:
> • After executing Bahá’ís by firing squad, Iranian
> officials in the 1980s would frequently demand payment for the price of the bullets from the families
> of the victims.
> • Ten Bahá’í women, arrested and charged with the
> “crime” of teaching religious classes for children
> and youth, were hanged, one by one, from the oldest to the youngest, as the others stood by. Prisoners
> who watched the 1983 hangings said that the executioners had hoped to force the younger women to
> recant their Faith, or even simply to say they were
> not Bahá’ís. None did, all preferring to die rather
> Muna Mahmudnizhad,             than to renounce their beliefs.
> 17, was one of 10 Bahá’í     • Bahá’ís, seeking simply to educate young people
> women executed in              who had been excluded by government decree from
> Shiraz on 18 June 1983.        higher education in Iran, set up their own college
> The primary charge             classes in private homes around the country in the
> against her: teaching          late 1980s. In 1998, Iranian officials raided some
> Bahá’í children’s classes.     500 private homes where such classes were held,
> arresting 30 teachers and confiscating hundreds of
> thousands of dollars worth of books, furniture and
> educational equipment.
> • Bahá’í holy sites, including those associated with
> the Iranian-born Founders of the Faith, have been
> systematically destroyed throughout the country,
> by officials using everything from pickaxes to bulldozers.
> • When Bahá’ís in Yazd approached government
> officials in late 2004 to call attention to their
> 
> 14 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> persecutions, they were warned that any public complaints might cause the Iranian public to
> rise up against them, invade and burn down their
> homes, assault them, and possibly even kill them.
> Within weeks, indeed, Bahá’í homes were invaded,
> Bahá’ís were beaten, the Bahá’í graveyard was desecrated, and at least one Bahá’í-owned business was
> set ablaze. Evidence emerged that the police chief,
> who in theory should have protected the Bahá’ís,
> ordered the attacks.                                         Although the
> persecution of the
> These and other images and events add up to noth-
> Bahá’í Faith in
> ing less than a systematic campaign aimed at the complete eradication of an entire minority community. It is,   Iran has its roots in
> in short, a government-led effort at cultural cleansing.    Iranian history, the
> Although the persecution of the Bahá’í Faith in          current campaign
> Iran has its roots in Iranian history [See “The Historical Background,” page 65], the current campaign of
> of systematic
> systematic persecution began with the 1979 Islamic           persecution began
> Revolution. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, virtually        with the 1979
> the entire leadership of the Iranian Bahá’í community
> Islamic Revolution.
> was arrested and executed or disappeared. In all, more
> than 200 Bahá’ís have been killed or executed since the
> Islamic Republic’s founding, and nearly 1,000 Bahá’ís
> have been imprisoned.
> The campaign at that time openly sought the
> wholesale destruction of the Bahá’í community. Thousands of Bahá’ís also were fired from jobs, deprived
> of pensions, and excluded from education (including
> primary and secondary education). Bahá’í properties, sacred sites, and cemeteries were confiscated and
> destroyed. All manner of rights to religious freedom,
> worship and assembly were abrogated.
> All of this has been well documented. Governments,
> non-governmental organizations, and the news media
> have widely reported on the persecution of Bahá’ís
> in Iran. In the 1980s and 1990s, the international
> 
> CHAPTER II: A Campaign of Cultural Cleansing | 15
> community rose up and condemned this oppression
> through a series of resolutions at the United Nations
> and in other venues.
> For a time, conditions seemed to improve. In the
> late 1990s, the killings all but stopped. Most of those
> Bahá’ís held in prison were released. Bahá’í children
> were allowed to re-enroll in primary and secondary
> Iran’s anti-Bahá’í    schools in most parts of the country. Some Bahá’ís were
> allowed to obtain new business licenses, and restricactions are not
> tions on other forms of economic activity appeared to
> random acts,      lessen.
> but deliberate         At the same time, however, those who followed
> government policy.    events in Iran closely could see that the government
> never gave up its plans of eliminating the Bahá’í com-
> In 1993, concrete   munity as a viable entity in Iranian society. Indeed,
> evidence emerged     continuing through today, the Bahá’í community has
> that the government    been kept off guard through the constant threat of
> arbitrary arrest and harassment. Restrictions on ownhad in fact adopted
> ing businesses and property have remained in force.
> a secret blueprint   And Bahá’í youth have been prevented from entering
> for the quiet     institutions of higher education.
> strangulation of the
> Bahá’í community.     The Bahá’í Question
> Iran’s anti-Bahá’í actions are not random acts, but
> deliberate government policy. In 1993, concrete evidence emerged that the government had in fact
> adopted a secret blueprint for the quiet strangulation
> of the Bahá’í community.
> That evidence came in the form of a secret memorandum, which had been drawn up by the Iranian
> Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council (ISRCC) in
> 1991. [See page 18 for complete text of the ISRCC document.]
> Stamped “confidential,” the document was prepared
> at the request of the Leader of the Islamic Republic
> of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the then President of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
> 
> 16 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> The memorandum was signed by
> Hujjatu’l Islam Seyyed Mohammad Golpaygani, Secretary of the
> Council, and approved by Mr.
> Khamenei, who added his signature to the document.
> The memorandum came to
> light in the 1993 report by UN
> Special Representative Reynaldo
> Galindo Pohl. According to Mr.
> Galindo Pohl, the document came
> as “reliable information” just as the
> annual report on Iran to the UN
> Commission on Human Rights
> was being completed.
> The memorandum specifically calls for Iran’s Bahá’ís to be
> treated in such a way “that their
> progress and development shall
> be blocked,” providing for the first
> time conclusive evidence that the
> campaign against the Bahá’ís is centrally directed by       A photocopy of the 1991
> the government.                                             memorandum from
> The document indicates, for example, that the gov-      the Iranian Supreme
> ernment aims to keep the Bahá’ís illiterate and uned-       Revolutionary
> ucated, living only at a subsistence level, and fearful     Cultural Council on
> at every moment that even the tiniest infraction will       “the Bahá’í question.”
> bring the threat of imprisonment or worse.
> Although some of its provisions appear to grant a
> measure of protection to Bahá’ís, its overall impact is
> to create an environment where the Bahá’í community
> of Iran will be quietly eliminated.
> The memorandum says, for example, that all
> Bahá’ís should be expelled from universities; that they
> shall be denied “positions of influence,” and instead
> only be allowed to “lead a modest life similar to that of
> the population in general”; and even that “employment
> 
> CHAPTER II: A Campaign of Cultural Cleansing | 17
> The ISRCC document
> 
> [Translation from Persian]
> [Text in square brackets added by translator]
> In the Name of God!
> The Islamic Republic of Iran
> The Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council
> Number: 1327/....
> Date: 6/12/69 [25 February 1991]
> Enclosure: None
> CONFIDENTIAL
> Dr. Seyyed Mohammad Golpaygani
> Head of the Office of the Esteemed Leader [Khamenei]
> Greetings!
> After greetings, with reference to the letter #1/783 dated 10/10/69 [31 December
> 1990], concerning the instructions of the Esteemed Leader which had been conveyed to the Respected President regarding the Bahá’í question, we inform you that,
> since the respected President and the Head of the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural
> Council had referred this question to this Council for consideration and study, it was
> placed on the Council’s agenda of session #128 on 16/11/69 [5 February 1991] and
> session #119 of 2/11/69 [22 January 1991]. In addition to the above, and further to
> the [results of the] discussions held in this regard in session #112 of 2/5/66 [24 July
> 1987] presided over by the Esteemed Leader (head and member of the Supreme
> Council), the recent views and directives given by the Esteemed Leader regarding
> the Bahá’í question were conveyed to the Supreme Council. In consideration of the
> contents of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the religious
> and civil laws and general policies of the country, these matters were carefully studied and decisions pronounced.
> In arriving at the decisions and proposing reasonable ways to counter the above
> question, due consideration was given to the wishes of the Esteemed Leadership
> of the Islamic Republic of Iran [Khamenei], namely, that “in this regard a specific
> policy should be devised in such a way that everyone will understand what should or
> should not be done.” Consequently, the following proposals and recommendations
> resulted from these discussions.
> The respected President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the Head of the
> Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council, while approving these recommendations,
> instructed us to convey them to the Esteemed Leader [Khamenei] so that appropriate action may be taken according to his guidance.
> 
> 18 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS
> AND RECOMMENDATION
> A. General status of the Bahá’ís within the country’s system
> 1. They will not be expelled from the country without reason.
> 2. They will not be arrested, imprisoned, or penalized without reason.
> 3. The government’s dealings with them must be in such a way that their progress
> and development are blocked.
> B. Educational and cultural status
> 1. They can be enrolled in schools provided they have not identified themselves as
> Bahá’ís.
> 2. Preferably, they should be enrolled in schools which have a strong and imposing religious ideology.
> 3. They must be expelled from universities, either in the admission process or during the course of their studies, once it becomes known that they are Bahá’ís.
> 4. Their political (espionage) activities must be dealt with according to appropriate government laws and policies, and their religious and propaganda activities
> should be answered by giving them religious and cultural responses, as well as
> propaganda.
> 5. Propaganda institutions (such as the Islamic Propaganda Organization) must
> establish an independent section to counter the propaganda and religious
> activities of the Bahá’ís.
> 6. A plan must be devised to confront and destroy their cultural roots outside the
> country.
> C. Legal and social status
> 1. Permit them a modest livelihood as is available to the general population.
> 2. To the extent that it does not encourage them to be Bahá’ís, it is permissible
> to provide them the means for ordinary living in accordance with the general
> rights given to every Iranian citizen, such as ration booklets, passports, burial
> certificates, work permits, etc.
> 3. Deny them employment if they identify themselves as Bahá’ís.
> 4. Deny them any position of influence, such as in the educational sector, etc.
> Wishing you divine confirmations,
> Secretary of the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council
> Dr. Seyyed Mohammad Golpaygani
> [Signature]
> [Note in the handwriting of Mr. Khamenei]
> In the Name of God!
> The decision of the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council seems sufficient.
> I thank you gentlemen for your attention and efforts.
> [signed:] Ali Khamenei
> 
> CHAPTER II: A Campaign of Cultural Cleansing | 19
> shall be refused to persons identifying themselves as
> Bahá’ís.”
> The provisions regarding arrest, imprisonment and
> punishment can be read in two ways. The document
> says:
> (a) With regard to the general condition of Bahá’ís,
> Although some of its       the following guidelines are hereby adopted: (i) they
> provisions appear         are not to be expelled from the country without
> to grant a measure         reason; (ii) they are not to be detained, imprisoned
> or punished without reason; (iii) the government’s
> of protection to        treatment of them shall be such that their progress
> Bahá’ís, its overall       and development shall be blocked.
> impact is to create       At first glance, it might seem that the term “without reason” is a move towards greater justice, inasmuch
> an environment
> as virtually all of the detentions, arrests and imprisonwhere the Bahá’í     ments of Bahá’ís in the past have been without cause.
> community of Iran      However, when the entire memo is understood in the
> will be quietly     context of what to do about “the Bahá’í question,” it is
> clear that the directive is merely instructing officials to
> eliminated.       be sure that they justify their actions before they make
> any moves against a Bahá’í. It in no way promises any
> sort of protection.
> The memorandum also belies its underlying intentions when it says that Bahá’ís will be allowed to go
> to school only if they do not identify themselves as
> Bahá’ís, and that they should be sent to schools “with
> a strong religious ideology.” The aim here, obviously, is
> to wrest Bahá’í children from their faith.
> Ominously, the memorandum says that “A plan
> must be devised to confront and destroy their cultural
> roots outside the country.” That Iran would like to
> reach outside its borders to stamp out the Bahá’í Faith
> makes clear the degree of blind animosity felt by the
> government towards Bahá’ís.
> In the years since the memorandum was written,
> the Bahá’í community has experienced persecution
> in all of the areas outlined by it: Bahá’ís have been
> 
> 20 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> detained, imprisoned, and falsely charged with “spy-       Iran’s Bahá’ís have
> ing”; they have been denied access to education and        experienced persecution
> sources of livelihood; they have been stripped of all      in every region of the
> influence in Iranian society and deprived of their right    country.
> to religious freedom.
> Indeed, as the next chapter indicates, the Iranian
> government has focused on social, economic and cultural repression aimed quite clearly at carrying out the
> plan endorsed by the “Bahá’í question” memorandum.
> 
> CHAPTER II: A Campaign of Cultural Cleansing | 21
> 22 | The Bahá’í Question
> Chapter III
> THE CURREN T
> SITUATION
> 
> I
> N CONTRAST TO its campaign of outright killing, imprisonment, and torture of Bahá’ís during       The government’s
> the 1980s, the Iranian government has in recent           efforts to deny
> years focused largely on economic and social ef-      Bahá’í youth access
> forts to drive Bahá’ís from Iran and destroy their
> cultural and community life.                                 to higher education
> Such measures include ongoing efforts to prevent        perhaps most clearly
> Bahá’ís from receiving higher education, to deny them          demonstrate the
> the means of economic livelihood, and to deprive them
> lengths to which the
> of the inspiration provided by their sacred and historic
> sites.                                                      Iranian government
> The government has also used arbitrary arrests and        is willing to go in
> detentions, coupled with the confiscation of personal            its campaign of
> property, to terrorize, oppress and otherwise keep the
> community off balance — a stratagem that appears to be        cultural cleansing.
> on the rise. Behind these techniques remains the implicit
> threat of long term imprisonment and execution.
> Above all else, the Bahá’í community remains
> 
> Interior of the house of Mirza Abbas Nuri, an
> architectural landmark in Tehran, during its demolition
> in June 2004.
> 
> CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 23
> without fundamental religious freedoms accorded to
> it in international human rights documents that Iran
> has signed. These include the right of Bahá’ís to freely
> assemble, to choose their leadership, and to openly
> manifest their religion “in worship, observance, practice and teaching.”
> 
> Denial of Access to Education
> The government’s efforts to deny Bahá’í youth access
> to higher education perhaps most clearly demonstrate
> the lengths to which the Iranian government is willing
> to go in its campaign of cultural cleansing.
> As previously stated, the Iranian government
> banned Bahá’í youth from education shortly after the
> 1979 Islamic revolution. At first, all Bahá’í children were
> excluded from schooling, but in the 1990s, primary and
> secondary school children were allowed to re-enroll.
> But the ban on the entry of Bahá’í youth into public and private institutions of higher education has
> remained. The Bahá’í Faith places a high value on education, and Bahá’ís have always been among the besteducated groups in Iran. Being denied access to higher
> education for years has had a demoralizing effect on
> Bahá’í youth, and the erosion of the educational level
> of the community is clearly aimed at hastening its
> impoverishment.
> In late 2003, early 2004, however, the government
> indicated that it would allow Bahá’í youth to enroll
> in university in the autumn of 2004. (It’s worth noting that the government was at the time engaged in a
> human rights dialogue with the European Union, and
> one demand of the Europeans was improved access to
> education for Bahá’ís.)
> The key to this change was the publication of news
> articles stating that the question of religious affiliation
> would be removed from university entrance examina-
> 
> 24 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> tions and other university enrollment documents.
> The removal of the data field asking for religious
> affiliation was critical to Bahá’í youth who sought to
> enter university. The government had always said that
> if Bahá’ís simply declare themselves as Muslims, they
> would be allowed to enroll. But for Bahá’ís, such a false
> declaration would not only be against the principles of
> their faith, which precludes lying or dissimulation, it          The Iranian
> would also tacitly play into the hands of government        government banned
> efforts to get them to deny their faith.                     Bahá’í youth from
> education shortly
> False Promises
> after the 1979
> With the promise that religious affiliation would not         Islamic revolution.
> matter, about 1,000 Bahá’ís accordingly signed up            At first, all Bahá’í
> for and took university entrance examinations. And,
> indeed, no field declaring religion was on the papers.           children were
> Students were asked to take a religious subject             excluded from
> examination, however. It came as part of the whole            schooling, but in
> range of subject tests relating to mathematics, lanthe 1990s, primary
> guage, history, and so on. The religion tests were
> offered in four subjects, Islam, Christianity, Judaism          and secondary
> and Zoroastrianism, corresponding to the four recog-        school children were
> nized religions in Iran.                                    allowed to re-enroll.
> Most Bahá’í students opted for the Islamic subject
> test since, as the majority religion, Islam is taught in
> all schools and most Bahá’ís in Iran accordingly have a
> solid familiarity with its teachings.
> In August, however, when the examination results
> were mailed out, government authorities had printed
> the word “Islam” in a data field listing a prospective
> student’s religion. Officials cynically explained they did
> that on the assumption that choosing to take the subject test on Islam amounts to a de facto declaration of
> faith in Islam.
> Upon learning of the forced religious declaration,
> (continued on page 28)
> 
> CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 25
> The Bahá’í Institute for Higher Education
> 
> I
> N WHAT THE New York Times called “an elaborate act of communal
> self-preservation,” the Bahá’í community in 1987 established its own
> higher education program to meet the educational needs of as many
> of its young people as resources would allow. That program evolved over
> the years into a full-fledged university, known as the Bahá’í Institute for
> Higher Education (BIHE), which, until mid-1998, had an enrollment of
> some 900 students, a faculty of more than 150 first-rate academics and
> instructors, and complete course offerings in ten subject areas.
> Because of the continual threat of persecution, the BIHE was forced
> to operate in a highly circumspect and decentralized manner. Most of
> its classes were held in private homes throughout Iran and what little
> permanent infrastructure it had was composed of a handful of rented
> classrooms and laboratories scattered throughout the capital.
> Then, in an act that speaks volumes about the government’s real
> attitude towards Bahá’ís, hundreds of government agents fanned out
> across the country in September 1998, arresting some 36 BIHE faculty
> and staff, raiding some 500 homes, and confiscating hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of books, equipment and records in a blatant
> effort to shut the university down.
> “The materials confiscated were neither political nor religious, and
> the people arrested were not fighters or organizers,” said the New York
> Times, in a 29 October 1998 article about the raids. “They were lecturers in subjects like accounting and dentistry; the materials seized were
> textbooks and laboratory equipment.”
> Teaching was done principally via correspondence, or, for specialized scientific and technical courses and in other special cases, in smallgroup classes that were usually held in private homes.
> “At the beginning, the students did not even know the names of
> their professors,” said one BIHE professor, who, like most others quoted
> in this article, wanted to remain anonymous out of fear for his safety
> and that of his relatives in Iran. “Even after three or four years, the students did not know the names of their professors. They had never seen
> them. Because it was very dangerous. If somebody knows the name of
> them, maybe they would tell their friends. So it was all correspondence
> at the beginning of this plan.”
> 
> 26 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> Over time, however, the Institute
> was able to establish a few laboratories, operated in privately owned
> commercial buildings in and around
> Tehran, for computer science, physics,
> dental science, pharmacology, applied
> chemistry and language study. The
> operations of these laboratories were
> kept prudently quiet, with students
> cautioned not to come and go in large
> groups that might give the authorities
> a reason to object.                         Most of the classes offered by the Bahá’í
> Among its faculty were approxi- Institute for Higher Education have been
> mately 25 or 30 professors who had held in private homes, like this one, which
> been fired from government-run uni- shows a professor with his back to the easel
> versities after the 1979 Islamic Revolu- and several students on living room couches.
> tion. Other faculty members included
> doctors, dentists, lawyers and engineers. The majority were educated
> in Iran, but a good number have degrees from universities in the West,
> including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Columbia University, the University of California at Berkeley and the Sorbonne.
> None of the Bahá’í faculty members were paid for their time; all
> worked as volunteers.
> “These youth are very precious people,” said a faculty member,
> explaining why they were willing to take such risks, without monetary
> remuneration, to establish the Institute. “We all care about them. They
> have been through tests and trials and they had no hope. They have
> been deprived of many things so if there was any chance for us to get
> something better for them, we did it.”
> While most of those arrested were ultimately released, and the
> holding of classes in private homes has resumed on a small scale, the
> effort by the government to shut down the BIHE clearly demonstrates
> the degree of hatred and prejudice against the Bahá’ís that remains in
> certain circles of the government — and shows unambiguously why
> the Bahá’í community will not be safe until legal protections are firmly
> institutionalized, regardless of talk of reform.
> 
> CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 27
> a group of Bahá’í students complained to officials at
> the Educational Measurement and Evaluation Organization (EMEO), asking if they could return the exam
> results with corrected information. A footnote in the
> The Bahá’í Faith      letter conveying examination results said that incorrect
> places a high value    names and addresses could and should be corrected
> on education,       and returned.
> However, no mention was made about correcting
> and Bahá’ís have      religious information. Indeed, Bahá’ís were told by
> always been among      EMEO officials that “incorrect religion would not be
> the best educated     corrected” on the forms since the Bahá’í Faith is not
> among the officially recognized religions in Iran.
> groups in Iran.
> Shortly after that meeting, Bahá’í students wrote a
> Being denied access    letter of protest to the EMEO. The students expressed,
> to higher education    clearly, their objection to having been designated as
> for years has had a    Muslims after having been promised that they would
> not have to disclose their religion in order to take the
> demoralizing effect    entrance examination.
> on Bahá’í youth,          At first, officials of the EMEO seemed to sympaand the erosion of    thize with their problem, even allowing Bahá’ís to fill
> out revised registration forms with no religious affiliathe educational level
> tion. However, even though some 800 Bahá’í students
> of the community      who had passed their examinations also met the new
> is clearly aimed     deadline for submission of the revised forms, only
> at hastening its     ten names were published in an EMEO bulletin on 12
> September 2004 announcing which students had been
> impoverishment.       admitted to university.
> It’s worth noting also that many Bahá’ís received
> high scores on the examinations, and, in fact, many of
> them were passed over in the admission process, while
> many lower-scoring Muslim students were accepted.
> In the end, out of solidarity with the rest of the 800
> students who had been unfairly discriminated against,
> those ten Bahá’ís declined to register in the universities to which they had been accepted. And so, for the
> school year 2004-2005, Bahá’í young people were once
> again utterly deprived of access to higher education.
> 
> 28 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> For Bahá’ís, the entire episode seems calculated to
> accomplish a number of government objectives. First, it
> apparently seeks to demoralize Iranian Bahá’í youth in
> an effort to induce them to leave the country. Second,
> it allowed Iranian authorities to identify by name those
> Bahá’ís with outstanding academic ability, who might
> at some point play a role in helping to revive the Bahá’í
> community’s fortunes. And, third, it allowed the Iranian government to say to international human rights
> monitors that they had given the Bahá’ís a chance to
> enroll — and that it was the Bahá’ís themselves who
> refused the opportunity.
> Yet the government, of course, has long been aware
> that Bahá’ís cannot and will not as a matter of religious
> principle falsify or misrepresent their beliefs. And so it
> is clear from the whole affair that the 1991 policy aiming at blocking the development and progress of the
> Bahá’í community remains in effect.
> 
> Destruction of Holy Places
> In the destruction of Bahá’í holy places, the government also demonstrates the lengths to which it will
> go to suffocate the Bahá’í community in Iran and to
> cleanse Bahá’í culture from modern memory — even
> though it may mean destroying monuments and buildings of historic importance to the society at large.
> In June 2004, authorities demolished an historic
> house in Tehran that had been designed and owned
> by the father of the Faith’s founder. The house was not
> only significant to Bahá’ís but was also considered to
> be a sterling example of period architecture of historic
> importance to Iranians.
> The house that was destroyed in June was owned by
> Mirza Abbas Nuri, the father of Bahá’u’lláh. Its destruction prompted an outcry by Bahá’ís around the world.
> (continued on page 34)
> 
> CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 29
> The Bahá’í community of Iran speaks for itself
> 
> I
> N NOVEMBER 2004, the Iranian Bahá’í community addressed a letter
> to Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, outlining the scope of
> the persecution they have faced for 25 years. The letter examines the
> persecution in light of those verses of the Qur’an and Islamic law that
> proscribe violence and uphold freedom of religion. It also notes that Iran
> signed and ratified the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and associated covenants that protect freedom of religion. It then recounts
> the government’s recent duplicity in offering university enrollment to
> Bahá’í youth but then falsely recording them as Muslims. It ends with
> a call for the full emancipation of the Bahá’í community. Here follow
> excerpts from the letter:
> 15 November 2004
> The Esteemed Presidency of the
> Islamic Republic of Iran Mr. Khatami
> 
> For more than 161 years, the Bahá’ís have been exposed, in the sacred
> land of Iran—the native soil of their forefathers in whose name they
> take pride—to a series of abuses, tortures, murders and massacres and
> have tolerated numerous forms of persecution, tragedy and deprivation, for no other reason than believing in God and following their
> Faith, the largest religious minority in Iran. Contrary to all religious,
> legal and moral standards, and supported by existing official documentation, they have been, individually and collectively, the subject of
> unwarranted discrimination and various injustices. Every time a political and social turmoil has occurred in this country, new machinations
> have been devised against this religious minority, and, in one way or
> another, their inalienable rights have been violated.
> 
> Day after day, the pressure against this wronged community became
> more intense and the scope of the injustice and infringement of their
> rights in various aspects of their lives more overt, such that their possessions, their homes, their jobs and their very existence were the target of attacks.
> 
> 30 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> Bahá’ís would never commit any act contrary to the law of the land;
> they are well-wishers of the people and the state; they do not involve
> themselves with any political party; and they tenaciously uphold their
> Faith’s principles, which call on them to love and serve the entire
> human race and to bring about peace, amity and unity of religion.
> 
> From the perspective of the holy religion of Islam, people are free
> to choose and follow their own religion, and no one has the right to
> impose his religion on another. The following noble verses “Let there
> be no compulsion in religion…” and “To you be your Way, and to me
> mine” confirm this point. From the perspective of the holy religion
> of Islam, no one has the right to attack and violate the properties,
> the life and the dignity of those who live under the banner of this
> religion, which is to be secure and protected: “…if anyone slew a person—unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land—it
> would be as if he slew the whole people…”
> 
> The equality, the freedom and the inalienable rights of all members
> of the human family, without discrimination as to race, gender, language
> and religion, have been unequivocally specified in all international covenants, especially in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
> 
> Notwithstanding the Divine Standards and social and legal norms,
> to which brief reference has been made, certain decisions which have
> baffled humanity were made at the beginning of the [Islamic] Revolution, under authority of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Under the rubric
> of Cultural Revolution, the authorities of the [Ministry of ] Culture
> and Education decided to expel Bahá’í students, some of whom were
> completing their last term, from universities and other institutions of
> higher learning in which they were studying. Others were barred from
> entering these institutions solely because of their adherence to the
> Bahá’í Faith. Then in 1369 [1990/91], the Council of Cultural Revolution, with reference to a well-planned agenda, openly deprived Bahá’í
> youth from higher education, thereby denying a number of the youth
> of this land the opportunity to realize their potential. This situation
> continued for some 20 years until in Ádhar of 1382 [December of 2003]
> 
> CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 31
> “Peykesanjesh” (the publication of the Ministry of Science) officially
> announced that for the first time the religious affiliation of applicants
> would not be included in the application for the [university] national
> examination, and, instead, applicants would be asked to choose the
> subject of religious studies in which they would wish to be examined.
> Owing to the limitation cited in Article 13 of the Constitution, Bahá’í
> applicants necessarily chose Islamic studies for this examination.
> 
> Having received their entrance identification cards and subsequently taking this national examination, the success of Bahá’í youth,
> based on the government announcement of results in the first phase,
> was significant in that some 800 students were qualified to choose
> their fields of study, of whom hundreds ranked in the one to four digit
> range [a ranking scale extending to 200,000]. After receiving their
> test result forms, however, the Bahá’í applicants were surprised to see
> that their religion was specified as Islam. This duplicity astounded the
> Bahá’í community. Alas, the joyful news that the question about the
> religion of the applicants had been omitted from the national university entrance examination, which was a reflection of freedom of belief
> and a sign that the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran was
> moving toward establishing the foundation of human rights and eliminating discrimination in education, was quite short-lived.
> 
> Questions continue to preoccupy the minds of the members of
> the Bahá’í community in Iran and throughout the world as well as
> free thinkers and advocates of human rights: Does such unfair decision-making, such resorting to strategies whose direction is obvious
> and whose aim is to create prejudice and to violate the indisputable
> rights of a community, conform to standards of justice and equity?
> Should those who seek progress be barred from acquiring knowledge
> and deprived of actualizing their God-given potentialities because of
> their religious belief?
> 
> By now, a quarter of a century has elapsed in the reign of the
> Islamic government. To every act of injustice, Bahá’ís have responded
> 
> 32 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> with magnanimity. Faced with widespread and intense persecutions
> and multi-faceted iniquities, the Bahá’ís have never deviated, even by
> a hair’s breadth, from the straight divine path, and they continue to
> hold fast onto the cord of patience and tolerance as dictated by their
> Faith and belief.
> 
> They fain would expect that, over such a long period of time, which
> should have been sufficient to remove suspicions and misunderstandings, the esteemed authorities would have realized that the Bahá’ís
> firmly believe in the oneness of God and the divine nature of all religions and prophets, as well as the realm beyond as confirmed in all the
> divine scriptures; they obey the laws and regulations of their country in
> accordance with the principles of their religion; they strive to preserve
> the interests of their homeland by offering cultural, social, economic
> and developmental assistance; and they would never refuse any service
> to establish human virtues and perfections which fulfil such universal
> visions as world peace and the oneness of humanity.
> 
> It is now hoped that [that respected authority], based on the Constitution, will take immediate action to ensure the emancipation of the
> Iranian Bahá’í community, reinstating their human rights and restoring the privileges of which they have been deprived.
> 
> Respectfully,
> 
> The Iranian Bahá’í community
> 
> CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 33
> In six nations, Bahá’í communities coordinated the
> publication of a statement in major newspapers that
> decried the house’s destruction as part of a campaign
> of “cultural cleansing” against the minority Bahá’í
> community in Iran.
> Noting that the house was an “historical monument, a precious example of Islamic-Iranian architecture, ‘a matchless model of art, spirituality, and
> architecture,’” the statement compared this action by
> Iran’s extremist Muslim leadership to those of the Taliban of Afghanistan.
> “The hatred of the extremist mullahs for the Bahá’ís
> is such that they, like the Taliban
> of Afghanistan who destroyed
> the towering Buddhist sculptures
> at Bamian, intend not only to
> eradicate the religion, but even to
> erase all traces of its existence in
> the country of its birth,” said the
> statement.
> “In their determination to rid
> Iran of the Bahá’í community and
> obliterate its very memory, the
> fundamentalists in power are prepared even to destroy the cultural
> heritage of their own country,
> which they appear not to realize
> they hold in trust for humankind,”
> Destruction of cultural        the statement continued.
> heritage. Another image            Mirza Abbas Nuri himself was widely regarded
> of the interior of the house   as one of Iran’s greatest calligraphers and statesmen.
> of Mirza Abbas Nuri            In July, the Iranian newspaper Hamshahri published
> in Tehran during its           a lengthy article about his life and the architecture of
> demolition in June 2004.       his house.
> “As he had good taste for the arts and for beauty, he
> designed his own house in such a style that it became
> known as one of the most beautiful houses of that
> 
> 34 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> period,” wrote Iman Mihdizadih on 13 July 2004. “The
> plasterwork and the tile-work in the rooms as well
> as the verdant veranda, the courtyard with its central
> pool, and the trees planted in the flowerbeds, all created a tranquil atmosphere in this house.”
> The house was destroyed over the period of about
> one week in June. The demolition order was issued in
> April by Ayatollah Kani, director of the Marvi School
> In the destruction of
> and the Endowments Office of the government, ostensibly for the purpose of creating an Islamic cemetery.         Bahá’í holy places,
> When the demolition started on 20 June, officials from           the government
> the Ministry of Information were present, and by 29            also demonstrates
> June more than 70 percent of the structure had been
> destroyed.                                                       the lengths to
> The destruction of the house of Mirza Abbas Nuri           which it will go to
> followed the razing in April 2004 of another historic         suffocate the Bahá’í
> Bahá’í property, the gravesite of Quddus, an early
> community in Iran
> disciple of the Bahá’í Faith. The action came after
> demolition work started in February and then halted          and to cleanse Bahá’í
> temporarily in the face of protest at the local, national,   culture from modern
> and international levels.                                      memory — even
> Indeed, Bahá’ís had approached national authorities after the demolition work had been started, and             though it may
> for a time that work was halted. Then, in April, it was         mean destroying
> discovered that the dismantling of the gravesite had            monuments and
> continued surreptitiously over a period of days until
> buildings of historic
> the structure was entirely demolished.
> The house-like structure marked the resting place of       importance to the
> Mullah Muhammad-Ali Barfurushi, known as Quddus                 society at large.
> (The Most Holy). Quddus was the foremost disciple of
> the Báb, the Prophet-Herald of the Bahá’í Faith.
> The destruction of two such important holy sites
> in 2004 was not without precedent. In March 1979, the
> House of the Báb, the holiest Bahá’í shrine in Iran,
> was turned over by the government to a Muslim cleric
> known for his anti-Bahá’í activities. In September that
> year, that house was destroyed by a mob led by mullahs
> 
> CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 35
> and officials of the Department of Religious Affairs.
> Likewise, in the early years of the Islamic Republic,
> the House of Bahá’u’lláh in Takur, where the Founder
> of the Bahá’í Faith spent His childhood, met a similar
> fate: it was demolished and the site was offered for sale
> to the public.
> Over the years, as well, in Tehran and other cit-
> ...in April, it was    ies throughout Iran, Bahá’í buildings have been looted
> discovered that      and burned, Bahá’í cemeteries have been bulldozed
> the dismantling       and Bahá’í graves have been broken open. In the Tehran area, the Bahá’ís were forced to bury their dead
> of the gravesite
> in a barren stretch of land reserved by the authorities
> had continued       for “infidels.” Having access to their own cemeteries is
> surreptitiously over    especially important to Bahá’ís because, as might be
> a period of days until   expected, they are not allowed to bury their dead in
> Muslim cemeteries.
> the structure was
> entirely demolished.    Arbitrary Arrests and Harassment
> Beyond such specific efforts at cultural cleansing, the
> government has in recent years continued its policy
> of keeping the Bahá’í community off balance through
> various measures, including arbitrary arrests, short
> term detention, persistent harassment, and other forms
> of intimidation and discrimination.
> As noted, hundreds of Bahá’ís were imprisoned
> during the early 1980s. Then, in response to international pressure, the government gradually released
> nearly all long-term Bahá’í prisoners. As of July 2005,
> for example, only two Bahá’ís, Dhabihu’llah Mahrami
> and Mehran Kawsari, were being held under longterm prison sentences.
> Yet the use of arbitrary arrest and short-term imprisonment as methods of harassment, terror and oppression against Bahá’ís not only continues but appears to
> be on the rise. In late July-early August 2005, as this
> publication was going to press, some 16 Bahá’ís in three
> 
> 36 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> Gravesite of Quddus, an historic figure of the Bahá’í
> Faith, during its surreptitious demolition in April 2004.
> The gravesite is located in Babol, Iran.
> 
> CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 37
> Bahá’ís gather outside Tehran in 1982 for the funeral
> of one of their co-religionists who was killed by the
> government.
> 
> locations were arrested and imprisoned.
> In March, April, and May of 2005 some 35 Bahá’ís
> across Iran were arrested and held for short periods,
> ranging from a week to nearly three months. Those
> arrested included not only prominent members of the
> community in Tehran, but also six Bahá’ís in Shiraz,
> nine in the city of Semnan, and nine Bahá’í farmers
> whose homes and land had previously been confiscated
> in the village of Kata.
> Most were arbitrarily detained without any charge
> being filed against them. Some of the prisoners were
> 
> 38 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> held incommunicado, in unknown locations, while
> their families desperately searched for them. Most were
> released only after having posted significant amounts
> of money, property deeds or business licenses as bail.
> Moreover, government agents conducted prolonged
> searches of many of the homes of those who were                    The Iranian
> arrested, confiscating documents, books, computers,
> copiers and other belongings.                                    government has
> Among those arrested in the spring of 2005, only              in recent years
> Mr. Kawsari remains in prison at the time this booklet         continued its policy
> was published in August 2005. Mr. Kawsari was arrested
> of keeping the
> on 8 March 2005 for distributing the open letter sent to
> President Khatami [see page 30]. He received a one-year         Bahá’í community
> sentence and has been incarcerated in Evin prison.             off balance through
> Also recently in the city of Yazd, long a center of         various measures,
> anti-Bahá’í activities, it appears that the police chief
> orchestrated a series of incidents against Bahá’ís. In         including arbitrary
> late 2004 and early 2005, a number of Bahá’ís were              arrests, short term
> arrested, detained, and interrogated; several were beaten      detention, persistent
> in their homes; at least one Bahá’í-owned business was
> harassment, and
> set afire; and the Bahá’í graveyard was desecrated.
> Such incidents are hardly isolated. In 2003, for exam-        other forms of
> ple, some 23 Bahá’ís in 18 different localities in Iran were    intimidation and
> subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention for short peri-      discrimination.
> ods of time. In all cases, Iranian authorities summoned
> these people because they were Bahá’ís, questioned them
> about their beliefs, and then released them.
> In 2002, 17 Bahá’í youth who were participating in
> a camp were arrested and detained for questioning.
> Reports about this incident in the Iranian press carried a negative slant, referring to the young Bahá’ís in
> a derogatory and vulgar manner.
> 
> Discrimination in the courts
> The story of Mr. Mahrami, also in prison at the time
> of the publication of this booklet, is instructive in that
> 
> CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 39
> it likewise reflects the very real and continuing threat
> of imprisonment for the Bahá’ís in Iran — and the
> degree to which the legal system is prejudiced against
> Bahá’ís. Mr. Mahrami was first called before the
> In 2003, some       Islamic Revolutionary Court in Yazd in 1995 and questioned about his adherence to the Bahá’í Faith. Several
> 23 Bahá’ís in 18      meetings were held in an effort to persuade him to
> different localities in   renounce his beliefs; he refused and was charged with
> Iran were subjected       apostasy. In 1996 he was sentenced to death. Since his
> heirs are not Muslims but Bahá’ís, his properties and
> to arbitrary arrest
> assets were confiscated. After his lawyer had appealed
> and detention for      to the Supreme Court, Iranian officials announced
> short periods of     that the Court had rejected the verdict of the Revotime. In all cases,    lutionary Court and referred the case to a civil court.
> However, in 1997, the Supreme Court confirmed the
> Iranian authorities      death sentence (communicated orally to his relatives).
> summoned these        Finally, in 1999, the Bahá’í International Community
> people because      was unofficially informed that a Presidential amnesty
> had commuted Mr. Mahrami’s death sentence to life
> they were Bahá’ís,
> imprisonment.
> questioned them           The government has also used the courts to reinabout their beliefs,     force a general sense of second-class citizenship for
> and then released      Bahá’ís. Over the years, there have been numerous discriminatory decisions rendered against Bahá’ís.
> them.               In a recent court case, for example, 12 plaintiffs filed
> a petition against a man accused of murdering their
> relative, who was a Bahá’í. The court’s verdict recognized the crime as a “quasi-intentional” murder and
> convicted the man as charged. But he was sentenced,
> without payment of blood money, to only four months
> imprisonment, and that was suspended as time already
> served. Calling Bahá’ís a “perverse sect” and “infidels,”
> the court concluded that they should receive neither
> requital nor blood money in cases of murder. This verdict is alarming, as it could incite Muslims to believe
> that they are free to take the lives of Bahá’ís in Iran
> with impunity.
> 
> 40 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> Economic Measures
> In the 1980s, over 10,000 Bahá’ís were dismissed from
> positions in government and educational institutions.
> Many remain unemployed and receive no unemploy-                 In the 1980s, over
> ment benefits. The pensions of Bahá’ís dismissed on
> religious grounds were terminated, and some were
> 10,000 Bahá’ís
> even required to return salaries paid to them before              were dismissed
> they were dismissed.                                              from positions
> Efforts to impoverish the Bahá’í community and to
> in government
> deprive its members of their economic livelihood have
> continued through a variety of means. In particular,             and educational
> government authorities have in many places around              institutions. Many
> the country continued to block Bahá’ís from receiving          remain unemployed
> pensions, conducting business, or finding employment.
> Authorities have also continued in the arbitrary confisand receive no
> cation of homes and properties owned by Bahá’ís.                  unemployment
> benefits. The
> Employment                                                     pensions of Bahá’ís
> Limitations on employment opportunities continue                   dismissed on
> to be imposed on Bahá’ís in various sectors of the              religious grounds
> economy. Even when Bahá’ís find employment in the                were terminated,
> private sector, government officials often intervene and
> force the owners of the companies to fire them. And
> and some were even
> when Bahá’ís start a private business, the authorities          required to return
> attempt to block their activities.                            salaries paid to them
> Two recent court cases, for example, demonstrate
> before they were
> the efforts of the authorities to impede Bahá’ís from
> conducting private business activities.                             dismissed.
> In September 2003, Branch 13 of the Tribunal of
> Administrative Justice rejected an appeal by a Bahá’í
> businessman against an injunction that required him to
> cease his business operations. The court also rejected
> his petition to obtain a business license. The tribunal
> held that his appeal was “disqualified as irrelevant, as [it
> was] outside the scope of the applicable regulations,”
> 
> CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 41
> citing the information the court had “about the plaintiff ’s being associated with the perverse Baha’i sect.”
> In 2003, in a second, similar case, an administrative
> injunction was issued to impede a Bahá’í-owned company in Isfahan from doing business. The company is
> owned and directed by a Bahá’í engineer and employs
> some 120 staff — most of whom are Bahá’ís — manufacturing electrical and communication cables. In the
> The government        injunction, the Director-General of the Central Office
> continues to deny     of Protection, which is under the Iranian Ministry of
> Post, Telegraph and Telephone, informed the company
> many Bahá’ís        of an official memorandum issued in April 2003. The
> rightfully earned     document concluded that “the link between the…
> pension funds.      company… and the perverse Baha’i sect is established
> to be true; therefore it is advisable to adopt measures
> Documents prove
> to prevent any collaboration with the above-mentioned
> that this policy is   company.”
> intentional — and          The intergovernmental body most concerned with
> solely related to    the right to employment, the International Labour
> Organization (ILO), made a number of references to
> the pensioner’s     the ongoing discrimination against the Bahá’ís in Iran
> membership in the      at its annual Conference on Conventions and Recom-
> Bahá’í Faith.      mendations in June 2003. The “situation of members
> of the Bahá’í Faith, an unrecognized religious minority,
> continues to be a source of concern,” said the report.
> “The barriers that these people face in access to higher
> education and to employment in public institutions are
> still high.”
> 
> Deprivation of Pensions
> In the first years of its campaign of persecution, the
> Iranian government stopped pension payments to
> thousands of Bahá’ís who had been employed in
> government service. Bahá’ís have, over the years, sought
> to have their pensions restored. The government, however, continues to deny many Bahá’ís rightfully earned
> 
> 42 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> pension funds. Documents prove that this policy is
> intentional — and solely related to the pensioner’s
> membership in the Bahá’í Faith.
> In a letter dated 30 May 2003, for example, the
> Office of Beneficiary Affairs of the Keshavarzi Bank
> instructed its General Office to discontinue the disbursement of a Bahá’í’s pension to his heirs because he
> was a member of the Bahá’í “sect.” The decision was
> later confirmed by the head of the Office of Legal and            In virtually
> Parliament Affairs, who cited a judicial decree of Imam      every case, court
> Khomeini and said a letter of the National Retirement
> Bureau number 6/18448 (dated 3 November 2003) must             judgments or
> be implemented in such cases.                                 documents have
> Likewise, in a letter dated 17 December 2003, the       emerged that prove
> General Office of Finance transmitted a letter to the
> the properties were
> director of the Retirement Bureau of the Province
> of Azerbaijan-e-Sharqi, stating that since a Bahá’í’s       confiscated because
> employment had been terminated due to his belief in          the owners were
> “the perverse Baha’i sect,” there was no authorization            Bahá’ís.
> to return or transfer his retirement deductions.
> Earlier documented evidence involved decisions in
> four more cases, dating from July 2001 to November
> 2002, where Iranian Bahá’ís have been denied access to
> their own, rightfully earned pensions. The documents
> prove that this action was taken solely on the basis of
> religious belief, as they explicitly state: “payment of
> pension to those individuals connected with the Baha’i
> sect is illegal.”
> 
> The Confiscation of Property
> During the past few years, there has been an increase
> in confiscation of Bahá’í properties, in particular in the
> cities of Rafsanjan, Kerman, Marv-Dasht, and Yazd.
> Property owned by Bahá’ís has also been confiscated
> in Tehran, in the village of Kata and in the village of
> Matneq. In October 2004, for example, the homes of
> 
> CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 43
> six Bahá’í families in Kata (in the Buyir-Ahmad region
> of Iran) were confiscated on the order of the prosecutor of the city of Shiraz, with the assistance of the local
> police.
> In virtually every case, court judgments or documents have emerged that prove the properties were
> confiscated because the owners were Bahá’ís.
> For example, one house confiscated in Tehran in
> 1998 belonged to a Muslim landlord, who was leasing
> the property to a Bahá’í. The landlord lodged an appeal,
> and an extract from the court documents (dated 15 Sep-
> 
> The ongoing threat of execution
> 
> S
> INCE 1978, MORE than 200 Bahá’ís have been killed or executed in
> the Islamic Republic of Iran. Most were killed in the early 1980s,
> before international attention was focused on the crisis. A full list
> of those killed or executed can be found in Appendix I.
> Although in recent years the government has sharply reduced its
> killing rate, it continued occasionally to execute Bahá’ís through the
> late 1990s. The most recent execution of a Bahá’í in Iran was in July
> 1998, when Ruhu’llah Rawhani was hanged in Mashhad.
> Nevertheless, the threat of execution or killing still looms large for
> Iranian Bahá’ís, who remain without recognized legal status in Iran.
> A number of Bahá’ís in recent years have been held in prison under
> the sentence of death, for example. Fortunately, international pressure
> has helped to convince Iranian authorities to commute or reduce those
> sentences.
> One such case surrounded the sentence given to Musa Talibi, a Bahá’í
> from Vilashahr, who was arrested in 1994 and then sentenced to death in
> 1996 on the charge of apostasy. He was 63 years old at the time.
> After appeal and initial confirmation of this sentence by the
> Supreme Court, the Bahá’í International Community was unofficially
> 
> 44 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> tember 2001) reveals the underlying judicial issues:
> “In principle, the foundation for the Ministry of
> Intelligence taking legal and serious action against the
> cultural activities of the misguided sect of Baha’ism
> has been on the order of His Excellency the Supreme
> Leader.… The action taken by Court 49 regarding the
> seizure and confiscation of the properties belonging to
> the misguided sect of Baha’ism is legally and religiously
> justifiable.… Such opposition [however] must be carried out in a manner and within a framework through
> which the rights of the righteous [literally, ‘those to
> 
> informed in 1999 that his death sentence
> had been commuted to life imprisonment. Finally, in May 2003, after being
> visited by members of the UN Working
> Group on Arbitary Detention that February, Mr. Talibi was freed.
> Likewise, two men, Bihnam Mithaqi
> and Kayvan Khalajabadi were released in
> February 2004, after having been imprisoned since 1989 on charges arising solely
> from membership in the Bahá’í Faith.
> They had been sentenced to death in
> 1991, and their sentences reconfirmed on Ruhu’llah Rawhani, who
> appeal by the Supreme Court in 1996. was hanged in Mashad by
> In 2001, however, the chief of the judi- government authorities on 21
> cial branch reduced their sentences to July 1998.
> 15 years in prison for “association with
> Bahá’í institutions.” Both men were released on 7 February 2004, having served out their full sentences.
> The stories behind the two most recent executions — in 1998 and
> 1992 — reflect the arbitrary and terrifying nature of the threat.
> Ruhu’llah Rawhani, a father of four and an active Bahá’í during
> his entire life, suffered through the indignities of religious persecution
> 
> CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 45
> whom rights are due’] would be safeguarded and protected.”
> In yet another recent case, a Bahá’í appealed for the
> return of his home, confiscated because of its alleged
> use as a venue for teaching about the Bahá’í Faith, and
> for holding classes of the Bahá’í Institute for Higher
> Education. In rejecting the appeal, the Islamic Revolutionary Court upheld the decision of a lower court on
> the grounds that the owner had held Bahá’í classes in
> this home and that over 900 volumes of Bahá’í books
> 
> throughout much of Iran’s recent history. In 1984, Mr. Rawhani was
> arrested and imprisoned for more than a year, during which he was
> tortured, according to relatives. He was subsequently released but then
> was arrested a second time in the mid-1990s. The charge was apparently related to his volunteer work at purely religious activities, such as
> prayer meetings and children’s classes. He was released after 24 hours.
> In September 1997, however, the medical supplies salesman was
> arrested for a third time, and placed in solitary confinement in Mashhad. Mr. Rawhani had been accused of “converting” a woman from
> Islam to the Bahá’í Faith. The woman, however, denied that she had
> converted; she explained that her mother was a Bahá’í and that she
> herself had been raised as a Bahá’í. She was not arrested.
> Mr. Rawhani was kept incommunicado for the duration of his
> imprisonment and no information is available regarding his treatment
> in prison. There is no evidence that he was accorded any legal process,
> and no sentence was announced. It appears certain that he was not
> allowed access to a lawyer.
> On 20 July 1998, someone from the Iranian Intelligence Department telephoned a Bahá’í in Mashhad stating that Mr. Rawhani was
> to be executed the next day. Initially, this statement was not believed,
> as Bahá’ís in Iran have received similar calls previously in apparent
> attempts to frighten them.
> The next morning, the family was called, told to come to the prison
> 
> 46 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> had been found there. A further attempt to obtain
> redress was also denied, as Branch 23 of the Appeals
> Court in Tehran declared the verdict final and ended
> all legal recourse in this case.
> Such verdicts demonstrate that the Iranian authorities continue to consider the Bahá’í Faith as an illegal
> movement and legitimize, through the courts, violations against the rights of Iranian citizens who are
> members of the Bahá’í community.
> 
> to collect Mr. Rawhani’s body, and given an hour to bury him. Rope
> marks on his neck indicated he had been hanged.
> Bahman Samandari, a Tehran businessman, was executed in March
> 1992. Mr. Samandari, who ran a well-known Tehran travel agency, was
> summoned without explanation to Evin
> prison by authorities on 17 March 1992.
> The next day, he was secretly executed.
> No official charge or verdict was
> announced, and inquiries by family
> members produced vague indications
> that Mr. Samandari’s execution was
> related to his previous detention more
> than four years before, when he and four
> other Bahá’ís were arrested for having a
> prayer meeting in his home.
> In addition to these governmentsponsored executions, Bahá’ís have also
> recently been killed under circumstances Mr. Bahman Samandari,
> that indicate continuing disregard for who was summarily executed
> Bahá’ís as individuals who deserve pro- by the Government in
> tection under the law.                   March 1992.
> 
> CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 47
> 48 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> Chapter IV
> “TO KILL A BAH Á’Í IS A G O OD DEED…”
> 
> How the contemporary
> persecutions started
> 
> L
> ONG BEFORE THE targeting of innocents
> by suicide bombers and the gruesome webcast of “infidel” executions on the Internet
> became commonplace, the Bahá’í community of Iran faced and survived a horrific
> campaign of killing, torture and imprisonment that had       “He was a Bahá’í,
> been inspired by religious fanaticism.                      and to kill a Bahá’í
> In 1982, in the village of Rahimkhani, armed assail-       is a good deed for
> ants broke into the home of Askar Muhammadi and
> devout Muslims.”
> shot him in the back. Confronted by Mr. Muhammadi’s
> brother as they were leaving the scene of the crime, the
> murderers stated simply: “He was a Bahá’í, and to kill a
> Bahá’í is a good deed for devout Muslims.”
> While many Iranians hailed the establishment of
> the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 as the dawn of a
> long awaited era of political liberty and national reconstruction, it was clear from the start that the Bahá’ís
> would be unjustly reviled for their beliefs.
> 
> Funeral of Hashin Farnush, arrested 5 November 1980,
> executed 23 June 1981. His wife is shown kneeling down
> at his graveside in Tehran.
> 
> CHAPTER IV: “To kill a Bahá’í is a good deed...” | 49
> Even before Ayatollah Khomeini returned from
> exile to assume power in February of that year, an
> increase in attacks on Bahá’ís presaged the wholesale
> persecution that was to come. In 1978 at least seven
> Bahá’ís were killed, most as a result of mob violence.
> When the Republic’s new constitution was drawn
> up in April 1979, certain rights of the Christian, Jew-
> Courts in the Islamic
> ish and Zoroastrian minorities in Iran were specifi-
> Republic have       cally mentioned and protected. However, no mention
> denied Bahá’ís the     whatsoever was made of the rights of the Bahá’í comright of redress or   munity, Iran’s largest religious minority.
> Under Iran’s concept of an Islamic government,
> protection against     this exclusion has come to mean that Bahá’ís enjoy
> assault, killings    no rights of any sort, and that they can be attacked
> or other forms of     and persecuted with impunity. Courts in the Republic
> have denied Bahá’ís the right of redress or protection
> persecution — and
> against assault, killings or other forms of persecution
> have ruled that      — and have ruled that Iranian citizens who kill or
> Iranian citizens     injure Bahá’ís are not liable for damages because their
> who kill or injure    victims are “unprotected infidels.”
> Without any claim to civil rights, the Bahá’í com-
> Bahá’ís are not     munity saw rapid deterioration of its position within
> liable for damages     Iranian society. In March 1979, the House of the Báb,
> because their victims   the holiest Bahá’í shrine in Iran, was turned over by
> the government to a Muslim cleric known for his
> are “unprotected
> anti-Bahá’í activities. In September, the house was
> infidels.”        destroyed by a mob led by mullahs and officials of the
> Department of Religious Affairs.
> A November 1979 edict from the Ministry of Education required not only the dismissal of all Bahá’í
> teachers, but also held them responsible for the repayment of all salaries they had previously received.
> 
> 50 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> The nine members of
> the National Spiritual
> Assembly who were
> kidnapped in 1980.
> 
> At least seven Bahá’ís were killed in 1979. Two were
> executed by the government and one was hanged in
> prison. Others were beaten to death or killed in local
> incidents.
> 
> “To cut off the head...”
> Buoyed by their growing influence over all aspects of
> Iranian life, in 1980 the clergy moved “to cut off the
> head” of the “heretical” Bahá’í movement by destroying
> its leadership, believing that the majority of the Bahá’ís
> would then succumb to social pressures to recant their
> Faith.
> This policy is reflected in the fact that nearly half the
> Bahá’ís executed in Iran since 1979 have been members
> of national and local governing councils of the Bahá’í
> community, known as Spiritual Assemblies.
> The execution on 27 June 1980 of Yusuf Sobhani, a
> highly regarded member of the Tehran Bahá’í community, was among the first of such killings that targeted
> Bahá’í leadership. This was followed by the executions
> of the chairman and another member of the local Spiritual Assembly of Tabriz on 14 July 1980, a member of
> the Spiritual Assembly of Rasht on 16 July 1980, and
> two prominent Bahá’í spokesmen in Tehran on 30 July
> and 15 August 1980.
> On 21 August 1980, all nine members of the
> national Bahá’í governing council, the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of Iran, were abducted
> and disappeared without a trace. It seems certain that
> they were executed.
> During 1980 at least 24 Bahá’ís were killed in Iran;
> 
> CHAPTER IV: “To kill a Bahá’í is a good deed...” | 51
> 20 were executed by the government and the rest were
> “The Qur’an              stoned, assassinated or burned to death.
> recognized only               Despite a growing international outcry, the rate of
> the People of the          executions continued to grow through 1981. By late
> summer that year, revolutionary courts were openly
> Book as religious          sentencing Bahá’ís to death purely on religious grounds
> communities. Others          and announcing the fact in Iranian media. The Attorare pagans. Pagans          ney General, Siyyid Moussavi-Tabrizi, stated explicitly:
> “The Qur’an recognized only the People of the Book as
> must be eliminated.”
> religious communities. Others are pagans. Pagans must
> — Iranian Attorney         be eliminated.” Under Islamic law in Iran, “People of
> General Siyyid            the Book” include only Muslims, Jews, Christians and,
> Moussavi-Tabrizi           by special dispensation, Zoroastrians.
> The National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of
> Iran was reconstituted through new elections but was
> again ravaged by the execution of eight of its members
> on 27 December 1981. In all at least 48 Bahá’ís were
> killed in Iran during 1981; of those, all but two were
> executed by the government.
> Executions continued apace through 1982, 1983 and
> 1984. At least 32 Bahá’ís were executed or killed in
> 1982, 29 were executed or killed in 1983, and 30 were
> executed or killed in 1984. And, again, the targets of
> 
> Faramarz Samandari,
> with his wife Anita,
> and children. He was a
> physician and professor at
> the University of Tabriz.
> He was excuted in Tabriz
> on 13 July 1980.
> 
> 52 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> these executions were often members of Bahá’í governing councils. Four members of the National Spiritual             The torture of
> Assembly, which had once again been courageously              Bahá’ís in Iranian
> re-established through fresh elections, were executed           prisons — and
> in 1984, although by then the institution had been disbanded in accordance with a government decree and                particularly of
> the individuals held no official position in the Bahá’í       those who had been
> community. [See Appendix I for a complete list of those       members of Bahá’í
> who have been killed or executed.]
> governing councils
> One of the most dramatic groups of executions came
> in June 1983, when ten Iranian Bahá’í women, including       — was routine and
> two teen-age girls, were hanged. The primary charge           systematic. Again,
> against them: teaching Bahá’í children’s classes. [See       according to Bahá’ís
> page 54.]
> The women were subjected to intense physical and             who survived,
> mental abuse in an effort to coerce them to recant their       the purpose of the
> Faith — an option that was almost always pressed                 torture almost
> upon Bahá’í prisoners. Yet, like most Bahá’ís who have
> invariably was to
> been arrested in Iran, they refused to deny their beliefs.
> Nevertheless, the fact that so many Bahá’ís were given         make the Bahá’ís
> the option of recanting, with the promise of release          recant their Faith
> if they did so, is among the strongest proofs that the         or confess to some
> persecutions were based solely on religious beliefs.
> treasonous activity.
> Imprisonment and Torture
> Since 1979, nearly 1,000 Bahá’ís have been arrested and
> imprisoned. At one point in 1986, some 747 Bahá’ís
> were being held in prisons throughout Iran. In most
> cases, they had no trials.
> The torture of Bahá’ís in Iranian prisons — and
> particularly of those who had been members of Bahá’í
> governing councils — was routine and systematic.
> Again, according to Bahá’ís who survived, the purpose of the torture almost invariably was to make the
> Bahá’ís recant their Faith or confess to some treasonous activity.
> 
> CHAPTER IV: “To kill a Bahá’í is a good deed...” | 53
> Hanged for teaching “Sunday school”
> 
> F
> EW INCIDENTS ARE more shocking — or revealing of the religious basis of the persecution against Bahá’ís and the courage
> with which they faced it — than the group hanging of ten Bahá’í
> women in Shiraz on 18 June 1983.
> Their crime: teaching religious classes to Bahá’í youth — the equivalent of being “Sunday school” teachers in the West.
> Ranging in age from 17 to 57, the ten Bahá’í women were led to
> the gallows in succession. Authorities apparently hoped that as each
> saw the others slowly strangle to death, they would renounce their
> own faith.
> But according to eyewitness reports, the women went to their fate
> singing and chanting, as though they were enjoying a pleasant outing.
> One of the men attending the gallows confided to a Bahá’í: “We
> tried saving their lives up to the last moment, but one by one, first the
> older ladies, then the young girls, were hanged while the others were
> forced to watch, it being hoped that this might induce them to recant
> their belief. We even urged them to say they were not Bahá’ís, but not
> one of them agreed; they preferred the execution.”
> All of the women had been interrogated and tortured in the months
> leading up to their execution. Indeed, some had wounds still visible on
> their bodies as they lay in the morgue after their execution.
> The youngest of these martyrs was Muna Mahmudnizhad, a
> 17-year-old schoolgirl who because of her youth and conspicuous
> 
> Muna            Mahshid          Simin Sabiri     Zarrin Muqimi-      Akhtar Thabit
> Mahmudnizhad       Nirumand                             Abyánih
> 
> 54 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> innocence became, in a sense, a symbol of the group. In prison, she
> was lashed on the soles of her feet with a cable and forced to walk on
> bleeding feet.
> Yet she never waivered in her faith, even to the point of kissing the
> hands of her executioner, and then the rope, before putting it around
> her own throat.
> Another young woman, Zarrin Muqimi-Abyanih, 28, told the interrogators whose chief goal was to have her disavow her faith: “Whether
> you accept it or not, I am a Bahá’í. You cannot take it away from me. I
> am a Bahá’í with my whole being and my whole heart.”
> During the trial of another of the women, Ruya Ishraqi, a 23-yearold veterinary student, the judge said: “You put yourselves through
> this agony only for one word: just say you are not a Bahá’í and I’ll see
> that...you are released...” Ms. Ishraqi responded: “I will not exchange
> my faith for the whole world.”
> The names of the other women hanged on 18 June 1983 were: Shahin Dalvand, 25, a sociologist; Izzat Janami Ishraqi, 57, a homemaker;
> Mahshid Nirumand, 28, who had qualified for a degree in physics but
> had it denied her because she was a Bahá’í; Simin Sabiri, 25; Tahirih
> Arjumandi Siyavushi, 30, a nurse; Akhtar Thabit, 25, also a nurse; Nusrat Ghufrani Yalda’i, 47, a mother and member of the local Bahá’í
> Spiritual Assembly.
> All had seen it as their duty to teach Bahá’í religious classes — especially since the government had barred Bahá’í children from attending
> even regular school.
> 
> Shahin (Shirin)      Ruya Ishraqi       Izzat Ishraqi     Tahirih Siyavushi    Nusrat Yalda’i
> Dalvand                                (Janami)
> 
> CHAPTER IV: “To kill a Bahá’í is a good deed...” | 55
> Torture included sustained beating and flogging,
> Bahá’ís were      the bastinado (whipping the soles of the feet), the pullalso subjected     ing out of fingernails and teeth, and the deprivation of
> to psychological    food and water for days at a time.
> Bahá’ís were also subjected to psychological torture,
> torture, including
> including mock executions and being forced to witness
> mock executions     the torture of family members and friends.
> and being forced to       Thus an elderly Bahá’í woman, who was a member
> witness the torture   of a local Bahá’í council, was tortured in front of a
> dozen other Bahá’ís in an effort to persuade her and
> of family members     them to deny their Faith. The woman’s jailer took her
> and friends.      by her hair and continually banged her head against
> the wall. She was beaten about the head for a long
> time, until her body was covered with blood. After two
> years of imprisonment, she was summarily released,
> with no recourse against the abuse she had received.
> At least 13 Bahá’ís who died in prison are believed
> to have been tortured to death. In these cases, the bodies were buried by the authorities before the families
> could view them.
> Two of the most recent cases involving torture and
> intimidation took place in July 1997.
> Masha’llah Enayati, a 63-year-old Bahá’í resident of
> Tehran, died on 4 July 1997, after being severely beaten
> while in custody. During a visit to his native village of
> Ardistan to attend a Bahá’í meeting, Mr. Enayati was
> arrested under circumstances which are not clear. He
> was taken to prison in Isfahan, where he was severely
> beaten on all parts of the body. It appears that he was
> held in prison for about a week before being taken to a
> hospital, where he eventually died. Mr. Enayati’s death
> certificate is worded in a most unusual way, suggesting
> that the doctor himself may have been under threat.
> Under “cause of death” the doctor entered in his own
> handwriting, “will be known later.”
> Shahram Reza’i, a young Bahá’í serving as a conscript in the Iranian army on a military base near the
> 
> 56 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> A woman from Kata, murdered by a mob in 1979, shown
> with her two younger sisters.
> 
> city of Rasht, was shot in the head by his superior
> officer on 6 July 1997 and died the following day. The
> officer concerned, who was responsible for weapons
> training, maintained that the bullets were fired in error.
> He was released after a few days, once it was determined that the dead soldier was a Bahá’í. The court
> excused the officer from paying the blood money normally required in such instances, ordering him to pay
> just the cost of the three bullets used to kill Mr. Reza’i.
> Mr. Reza’i was the seventh Bahá’í in Iran engaged in
> compulsory military service to have been slain by offi-
> cers or other soldiers.
> 
> Social and Economic Intimidation
> As noted earlier, the authorities have also conducted a
> campaign of economic, social and cultural intimidation
> against the Bahá’í community of Iran. The objective, it
> is clear, has been to deprive Bahá’ís of their rights to
> education, to jobs and to homes of their own — once
> again with the intention of forcing them to recant.
> 
> CHAPTER IV: “To kill a Bahá’í is a good deed...” | 57
> Since the 1930s, the Bahá’ís in Iran have been forbidden to run their own educational establishments,
> and have therefore educated their children at state-run
> schools and universities where they have often suffered
> discrimination and persecution.
> The level of discrimination and persecution in
> schools rose sharply following the Islamic revolution
> in 1979. In 1981, an official decree was issued barring
> Bahá’í students and professors from admission to or
> employment at any university in Iran. Universities
> published new prospectuses in 1981 requiring that
> applicants belong to one of the four religions recognized in the constitution, namely the Muslim, Jewish,
> Christian or Zoroastrian religions.
> Admission to primary and secondary schools was
> refused to those who identified themselves as Bahá’ís,
> and hundreds of students were expelled.
> 
> Deprivation of Employment
> The Iranian government has also sought to intimidate
> and stifle Bahá’ís by making it impossible for them to
> earn a living.
> In 1979 the government started dismissing all Bahá’í
> Government document      civil servants without compensation. By July 1982, all
> of permanent dismissal   Bahá’í public servants had been dismissed and the
> from employment for      pensions of all retired Bahá’í civil servants had been
> being a Bahá’í.          terminated.
> In late 1984, the Attorney General started issuing
> summonses demanding that all those Bahá’í civil servants who had been dismissed repay salaries they had
> received during their employment. They were threatened with imprisonment if they did not comply. Obviously, repayment of a lifetime’s wages was beyond the
> means of most victims. Many were imprisoned as a
> result of failure to meet this absurd demand.
> The government has also systematically sought to
> 
> 58 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> drive Bahá’ís in the private sector to economic ruin.
> In the early 1980s, the trading licenses of most Bahá’í    In the early 1980s,
> businessmen were revoked, the assets of businesses         the trading licenses
> run by Bahá’ís were confiscated, and bank accounts of          of most Bahá’í
> most Bahá’í businessmen were frozen. In addition, the
> authorities intimidated private employers into dismissbusinessmen were
> ing many Bahá’í employees.                                  revoked, the assets
> Almost every dismissal notice served on a Bahá’í         of businesses run
> employee, whether in the public or the private sector,
> by Bahá’ís were
> stated that the reason for dismissal was membership in
> the Bahá’í Faith and that the individual’s job would be      confiscated, and
> restored if he or she would recant his or her faith.          bank accounts
> In addition to depriving Bahá’ís of a livelihood,         of most Bahá’í
> the government in the early 1980s sought to deprive
> arrested Bahá’ís of many of their possessions, including
> businessmen were
> their homes.                                                      frozen.
> Through its takeover of the major Bahá’í savings
> company, Nawnahalan — literally meaning “new
> plant,” a reference to the fact that the savings institution was started by Bahá’í children at the turn of
> the century — the government in one move swept
> away the life savings of 15,000 Bahá’í shareholders and
> investors. In addition, thousands of Bahá’ís, rich and
> poor alike, have had their homes and personal possessions confiscated by the government, and thousands
> more have had their homes destroyed by arson and
> looting. In rural areas, the authorities have encouraged
> the plunder and destruction of the livestock and crops
> of Bahá’í farmers.
> 
> Confiscation of Community Assets
> The Bahá’í community in Iran has never been allowed to
> hold community property in its own name. As a result,
> all community property has been held in the name of a
> non-profit company created for this purpose. This body,
> the Umana — meaning “Trustee” — Company, was
> 
> CHAPTER IV: “To kill a Bahá’í is a good deed...” | 59
> How Iran has justified the persecution
> 
> I
> NEVITABLY, IRAN’S RESPONSES to the world outcry on behalf of the
> Bahá’ís have proven entirely unsatisfactory. The reaction has ranged
> from simple silence to attempts to justify the persecutions by charging the Bahá’ís with a wide variety of offenses.
> An examination of the charges that have been made against the
> Bahá’ís illuminates the depth of animosity and prejudice directed
> towards them — as well as the degree of ignorance regarding the basic
> principles and history of the Bahá’í Faith.
> Despite the overwhelming proof that the Bahá’í community in Iran
> is being persecuted solely because of its religious beliefs, the Iranian
> government continues — in both public and private forums — to justify its behavior with unsubstantiated accusations.
> Here follow some of the principal accusations advanced by the government:
> THE ACCUSAT ION: That Bahá’ís were supporters of the Pahlavi
> regime and the late Shah of Iran; that they collaborated with SAVAK,
> the secret police; and that the Bahá’í Faith is a political organization
> opposed to the present Iranian government.
> THE REALIT Y: Bahá’ís are required by the basic principles of their
> Faith to show loyalty and obedience to the government of the country
> in which they live. The Bahá’í community in Iran thus did not oppose
> the Pahlavi regime, just as it does not oppose the present government
> of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Indeed, members of the community
> 
> allowed to administer such properties without undue
> interference until the change of government in 1979.
> One of the first acts of the new government was
> to confiscate the Umana Company and all its holdings. This meant that in one stroke all Bahá’í community properties were arbitrarily transferred to the
> state without compensation. The government also
> 
> 60 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> have obeyed every law and instruction of the present government,
> including the instruction to disband all Bahá’í administrative institutions in Iran.
> Bahá’í principles also require the avoidance of any form of involvement in partisan politics. Accordingly, Iranian Bahá’ís were precluded
> by membership in their faith from accepting cabinet posts or similar
> political positions under the Pahlavi regime. They did not collaborate
> with SAVAK. On the contrary, the Pahlavi regime consistently persecuted the Bahá’í Faith, and SAVAK was one of the main agencies of
> this persecution.
> The Iranian government has alleged that certain SAVAK officials
> were Bahá’ís. These allegations are completely untrue, fabricated to
> mask the religious nature of the persecutions.
> Indeed, the non-political nature of the Bahá’í case was significantly bolstered by the 1996 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on
> Religious Intolerance. Professor Abdelfattah Amor of Tunisia wrote:
> “With regard to the Bahá’ís, the Special Rapporteur hopes that a clear
> distinction will be drawn between questions of belief or other questions of a political nature. In that connection, it should not be presumed that the entire community has been politicized or is engaged
> in political or espionage activities. Considering the religious principles
> of the Bahá’í community, the Special Rapporteur believes that there
> should not be any controls that might, through prohibition, restrictions or discrimination, jeopardize the right to freedom of belief or the
> right to manifest one’s belief.”
> 
> (continued on page 62)
> 
> confiscated the assets of all Bahá’í welfare agencies,
> which provided services to people of all religions on
> an equal basis.
> Among the government’s next steps were to desecrate and in many cases destroy Bahá’í holy places
> throughout Iran. As noted, these properties include
> the holiest Bahá’í shrine in Iran, the House of the Báb
> 
> CHAPTER IV: “To kill a Bahá’í is a good deed...” | 61
> THE ACCUSATION: That Bahá’ís are heretics or enemies of Islam.
> 
> THE REALIT Y: Such charges are false. The Bahá’í Faith is widely recognized as an independent world religion — even by Islamic scholars.
> As long ago as 1924, a Sunni appellate court in Egypt recognized that
> the Bahá’í Faith was an independent world religion, stating that, in its
> judgment, “The Bahá’í Faith is a new religion entirely independent....
> No Bahá’í therefore can be regarded as Muslim or vice versa, even
> as no Buddhist, Brahmin or Christian can be regarded as Muslim.”
> Accordingly, no charge of heresy can be made.
> Bahá’ís revere Muhammad and His Book, the Qur’an, as they do
> Jesus, Buddha, and the founders of the other great religions. Indeed,
> alone among the followers of the world’s other major independent religions, only Bahá’ís recognize the station of Muhammad as a Prophet
> of God.
> THE ACCUSATION: That Bahá’ís are agents of Zionism.
> 
> THE REALIT Y: This charge is based on the fact that the Bahá’í World
> Centre is in Israel. The Bahá’í World Centre was, however, established
> on Mt. Carmel in the 19th century, long before the State of Israel
> came into existence, in accordance with the explicit instructions of
> Bahá’u’lláh, who was exiled there from Iran.
> THE ACCUSAT ION: That Bahá’ís are involved with prostitution,
> adultery and immorality.
> 
> in Shiraz, which was confiscated and then destroyed.
> The House of Bahá’u’lláh in Takur, where the Founder
> of the Bahá’í Faith spent His childhood, met a similar
> fate: it was demolished and the site was offered for sale
> to the public.
> In Tehran and other cities throughout Iran, Bahá’í
> buildings were looted and burned, Bahá’í cemeteries
> were bulldozed and Bahá’í graves were broken open.
> 
> 62 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> THE REALIT Y: This charge, like the others, is without foundation.
> Bahá’ís have a strict moral code and attach great importance to chastity and to the institution of marriage.
> The Bahá’í marriage ceremony is not recognized in Iran and no
> civil marriage ceremony exists. Consequently, Bahá’ís have been faced
> with the choice of denying their faith in order to be married according
> to the rites of one of the religions recognized in Iran, or of marrying
> in accordance with the rites of their own faith. They have consistently
> chosen to be married in accordance with Bahá’í law. The government
> does not recognize these marriages and denounces Bahá’í wives as
> prostitutes.
> The other charges of adultery and immorality against Bahá’ís are
> based on the fact that, in accordance with the Bahá’í principle of the
> equality of men and women, there is no segregation of the sexes at
> Bahá’í gatherings.
> THE ACCUSAT ION: That the Bahá’í Faith is not a religion but a
> political movement, devised by colonial powers in the 1800s to influence and control the Persian government.
> THE REALIT Y: The Bahá’í Faith has been widely recognized by Western historians, religious leaders, and others as an independent world
> religion. Its founding had nothing to do with the work of British or
> other colonial powers. Moreover, as noted, the teachings of the Faith
> explicitly prohibit Bahá’ís from involvement in partisan politics.
> 
> In Tehran, as noted earlier, the Bahá’ís have long
> been forced to bury their dead in a barren stretch of
> land reserved by the authorities for “infidels.” Having
> access to their own cemeteries is especially important
> to Bahá’ís because, as might be expected, they are not
> allowed to bury their dead in Muslim cemeteries.
> 
> CHAPTER IV: “To kill a Bahá’í is a good deed...” | 63
> 64 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> Chapter V
> THE HISTORICAL
> BACKGROUND
> 
> T
> HE PRESENT DAY status of human rights
> and social reform in the Islamic Republic
> Early followers faced
> of Iran cannot be adequately understood            violent opposition
> without taking into account the histori-              from both the
> cal background of persecution against
> Islamic religious
> the Bahá’í community — a history that does much to
> explain the cultural crisis gripping Iranian society to-           authorities and
> day as its leadership struggles to face the challenge of        succeeding dynasties.
> modernity.
> The Bahá’í Faith has been persecuted in Iran since
> its founding there in the mid-1800s. Early followers
> faced violent opposition from both the Islamic religious authorities and succeeding dynasties. It has been
> estimated that some 20,000 persons perished in these
> pogroms during the nineteenth century.
> 
> The illustration at top left, depicting the death of an early
> Bahá’í, appeared in the Persian magazine, Ima’mat,
> circa 1911. The photo bottom left, a Bahá’í father and son
> (left) in chains after being arrested with fellow Bahá’ís
> shown in a photograph taken around 1896. Both were
> subsequently executed.
> 
> CHAPTER V: The Historical Background | 65
> The takeover of the National Bahá’í Centre in Tehran
> during the Khomeini regime, 1979.
> 
> The persecutions have continued intermittently
> in the twentieth century, coinciding most often with
> the need of various governments to shore up support
> with certain elements of Iran’s Islamic leadership.
> And they have come regardless of the leaders’ political orientation.
> Some of the outbreaks against Bahá’ís were directed
> by local or regional authorities. In 1903, for example,
> 101 Bahá’ís were killed in the city of Yazd after the
> populace was incited by hostile mullahs. At other
> times the oppression of Bahá’ís was made a part of
> official national policy. During the early years of the
> Pahlavi regime (1927 to 1979), the government formalized a policy of discrimination against the Bahá’ís as
> a concession to the clergy. Beginning in 1933, Bahá’í
> literature was banned, Bahá’í marriages were not recognized, and Bahá’ís in public service were demoted or
> fired. Bahá’í schools — of which there were some 50 in
> 
> 66 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> Mullah Falsafi supervising workmen in the act of
> destroying the dome of the National Bahá’í Center
> in 1955, Tehran.
> 
> the country — were forced to close.
> Another round of persecutions commenced in
> 1955, when the Pahlavi regime allowed the nationwide
> broadcast of a series of incendiary sermons against the
> Bahá’ís by a leading Shia preacher in Tehran — apparently hoping to make the Bahá’ís a scapegoat to deflect
> attention from unpopular government policies. Both
> the national and army radio stations were put at the
> disposal of the responsible cleric, Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Falsafi, who joined the Shah’s Minister of
> Defense, General Batmangelich, in demolishing the
> dome of Bahá’í national headquarters with pickaxes.
> A wave of anti-Bahá’í violence swept the country.
> Murders, rapes and robberies were reported in many
> areas, while the government assured the Majlis that
> it had ordered the suppression of all activities of “the
> Bahá’í sect.”
> 
> CHAPTER V: The Historical Background | 67
> Successive stages of the demolition of the House
> of the Báb. The first image is an interior room in
> early 1979; the second photo shows Revolutionary
> Guards in the process of destruction; the third the
> collapse of the roof.
> 
> Bahá’ís understand that this pattern of
> persecution is a manifestation of the misunderstanding and fear that often occur when a
> new religion emerges from the matrix of a wellestablished orthodoxy. The pattern has been
> repeated through the ages; virtually all of the
> world’s great religions have faced intense persecution at their birth.
> In the case of the Bahá’í Faith, the teachings
> of its two Founders, especially when viewed
> through the lens of traditional Islam, are as
> challenging as those of any Prophet in ancient
> times.
> The initial wave of persecution came in
> response to the claims of a young Iranian
> merchant, known to history as the Báb, who
> announced in Shiraz in May 1844 that He was
> the bearer of a new revelation from God. His
> primary mission, the Báb said, was to prepare
> humanity for the advent of “Him Whom God
> Shall Make Manifest,” the universal divine
> Messenger anticipated in the scriptures of all the major
> religions.
> The teachings of the Báb called for the spiritual
> and moral reformation of Persian society, and for the
> upliftment of the station of women and the poor. His
> promotion of education and the useful sciences was
> also revolutionary. Such progressive and idealistic
> teachings, which made a clear break with the Islamic
> frame of reference, were rapidly embraced by thousands of followers and were seen by both secular and
> 
> 68 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> The area is completely razed in preparation for
> the later construction of the Mosque of Mihdi.
> The white circles on the images below indicate the
> location of the House of the Báb. The last photo
> shows the Mosque in 1994.
> 
> religious authorities as a threat to their power.
> Widespread persecutions ensued, and, as noted
> above, some 20,000 believers, who were known
> as Bábís, paid with their lives. The Báb Himself
> was executed by the government in 1850.
> Among the followers of the Báb was an
> Iranian nobleman named Bahá’u’lláh. In 1863
> He announced that He was the Messenger the
> Báb had heralded, founding the Bahá’í Faith,
> which develops and extends many of the teachings and principles introduced by the Báb. The
> central theme of Bahá’u’lláh’s message is that
> humanity is a single race and that the day has
> come for unification into one global society.
> “The earth is but one country and mankind its
> citizens,” wrote Bahá’u’lláh.
> Bahá’u’lláh taught that there is only one
> God, and that all of the world’s religions are
> expressions of a single, unfolding divine plan,
> “the changeless Faith of God, eternal in the
> past, eternal in the future.”
> Bahá’ís believe that God progressively reveals religious truth to humanity through a series of divine Messengers, each of Whom has founded a great religion.
> These Messengers have included Abraham, Krishna,
> Zoroaster, Moses, Buddha, Jesus and Muhammad; the
> most recent are the Báb and Bahá’u’lláh. Others will
> follow in ages to come.
> The idea that there should be new Messengers of
> God after Muhammad is viewed by many Muslims as
> heresy. In the Qur’an, Muhammad referred to Himself
> 
> CHAPTER V: The Historical Background | 69
> as the “Seal of the Prophets,” and most Muslim scholars interpret this to mean that He would be the last
> Messenger of God.
> Bahá’ís, however, believe that the coming of the
> Báb and Bahá’u’lláh poses no contradiction to Islamic
> Bahá’u’lláh taught      teachings or those of any of the other revealed religions. Bahá’ís understand that Muhammad ended or
> that there is only one   “sealed” the prophetic cycle. Then, with the advent of
> God, and that all of    the Báb and Bahá’u’lláh, a new era of religious fulfillthe world’s religions    ment began. Bahá’u’lláh referred to this new period
> in human history as the “stage of maturity.” Bahá’ís
> are expressions of
> believe that this is all in accordance with the prophea single, unfolding     cies of Islam and the world’s other major religions.
> divine plan.            Other aspects of the Bahá’í teachings also arouse
> opposition among some followers of Islam. In outlining His vision for a new world civilization, Bahá’u’lláh
> advocated a series of highly progressive social principles. These include the elimination of all forms of
> prejudice; equality between the sexes; the elimination
> of extremes of poverty and wealth; universal education;
> the harmony of science and religion; a sustainable balance between human society and the natural world;
> and the establishment of a world federal system, based
> on collective security and the oneness of humanity.
> Some fundamentalist Muslims view the progressive nature of these teachings, such as the equality of women and the absence of religious clergy, as
> particularly antithetical to the traditions of Islam. To
> Iran’s Shia establishment, especially — and also to
> many among their Sunni Muslim counterparts — the
> emergence of an independent religion that postdates
> the Qur’an by almost thirteen centuries is not only
> theologically abhorrent but threatens the system of
> patronage, endowments, political influence, and social
> perquisites to which they lay claim. The effect has been
> to arouse in the Shia establishment a determination to
> extinguish the new faith and suppress its followers.
> 
> 70 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> The words, “Enemy
> of Islam,” were found
> written on the leg of
> Dr. Masih Farhangi, a
> Bahá’í who was executed
> in Tehran on 24 June 1981.
> 
> The persecution of the Bahá’ís in Iran is not related
> to any underlying issue of ethnicity or political agenda.
> The overwhelming majority of Iranian Bahá’ís come
> from the same Persian and Azerbaijani ethnic stock as
> the rest of the population, and they represent a cross
> section of Iran’s social classes.
> Only their religious beliefs distinguish them from
> their fellow countrymen — beliefs which the Bahá’í
> teachings forbid them from imposing on others.
> Paradoxically, because of the control exercised by the
> Islamic clergy over the media of communication, the
> nature of Bahá’í beliefs remains virtually unknown to
> a public that has been systematically taught to fear and
> hate them.
> The Iranian Bahá’í community has itself consistently
> been denied the use of any means of mass communication, including radio, television, newspapers, films, the
> distribution of literature and public lectures. The result
> has been widespread, unreasoning prejudice.
> 
> CHAPTER V: The Historical Background | 71
> The international response
> 
> T
> HE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY has responded to the persecution of the Bahá’í community in Iran with overwhelming
> sympathy, expressing concern for the Bahá’ís and condemnation
> of the Iranian government. The Bahá’í community believes that this
> outpouring has been a strong restraining force against the government,
> preventing a pogrom on a much greater scale.
> The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has passed
> more than 20 resolutions expressing concern about reports of human
> rights violations in Iran, and each has made specific mention of the
> situation of the Bahá’í community there. [See Appendix II]. The specific
> reference to a religious community is quite unusual for the Commission, which normally confines itself to expressions of diplomatic concern and general references to charges of human rights violations and
> discrimination.
> Following the lead of the Commission on Human Rights, the
> United Nations General Assembly itself has since 1985 approved some
> 17 resolutions that have specifically mentioned the situation of the
> Bahá’ís in Iran and expressed concern over reports of human rights
> violations there.
> Virtually all of these resolutions have called on Iran to stop violating the rights of Bahá’ís and to abide by the various international
> covenants on human rights that the government has freely signed. UN
> resolutions have also called explicitly for the “emancipation” of the
> Bahá’ís of Iran.
> Among the most salient features of the United Nations’ attention
> to the Bahá’í case has been the continuing investigations conducted
> by a succession of highly regarded human rights specialists. Each
> was appointed by the Commission on Human Rights and given the
> mandate to probe into the human rights situation in Iran. And each
> has reported extensively on the real and serious nature of the persecution of the Bahá’ís of Iran, lending unimpeachable credibility to the
> Bahá’í case.
> The first Special Representative of the Commission on Human
> Rights, as these investigators are called, was Andres Aguilar of
> 
> 72 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> Venezuela, who was appointed in 1984. After his
> resignation in 1986, Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, a law
> professor and human rights expert from El Salvador, was appointed to the position. Following Mr.
> Galindo Pohl’s departure in 1994, the Commission
> appointed Maurice Copithorne, a noted Canadian jurist, as its Special Representative for Iran. Diane Ala’i, a Bahá’í
> Unfortunately, as part of an effort to engage Iran International Community
> in a “human rights dialogue,” the Commission on representative to the United
> Human Rights stopped appointing Special Repre- Nations, addresses the UN
> sentatives in 2002. And in many respects, the situa- Commission on Human
> tion has grown worse since that time.                   Rights in Geneva.
> Nevertheless, the Commission’s Special Representatives have produced over the years a series of extremely important and influential reports to the United Nations on the situation in
> Iran. Gathering their information from a variety of sources and — in
> at least four cases — making visits to Iran, Special Representatives
> have managed to catalogue the whole range of abuses and persecutions which the Bahá’í community in Iran has experienced.
> For example, Mr. Galindo Pohl’s 1990 report to the General Assembly noted that he had received extensive documentation that provides
> “evidence of discrimination, confiscation, rejection by universities, suspension of pensions, demands for the return of pensions earned and
> paid, denial of passports and other irregularities.”
> The report added that “it would seem that the attitude towards the
> Bahá’ís and their situation depends on the temperament and personal
> convictions of individual officials. This keeps the Bahá’ís in a perpetual
> state of uncertainty about their activities.”
> In Mr. Copithorne’s 1998 report to the General Assembly, he
> wrote that continuing reports of violations of human rights against
> the Bahá’ís force him “to conclude that the pattern of persecution of
> members of this community has not abated.”
> And in his last report, released in 2002, Mr. Copithorne said that
> while there had been “some hopeful signs” concerning the “commutation of death sentences” and “the release of prisoners,” the Bahá’í
> community “continues to be subject to harassment and discrimination
> in the areas of, inter alia, education, employment, travel, housing and
> 
> CHAPTER V: The Historical Background | 73
> the enjoyment of cultural activities.” Seven Bahá’ís were in prison at
> that time, he said, and “Bahá’í property continues to be subject to
> confiscation.”
> Of interest, Mr. Copithorne also expressed a conviction that the
> “Bahá’í Question” policy is still operative.
> Also of concern is the sentence issued by a judge of the Supreme
> Office of Control and Review, Hamzih Khalili, on 15 September 2001,
> in the context of an appeal by the Muslim owners of property rented
> to the Baha’is that was confiscated in 1998. According to an unofficial
> translation to which the Special Representative has had access, the
> verdict declares that the “seizure and confiscation of the properties
> belonging to the misguided sect of Baha’ism is legally and religiously
> justifiable” and states that “the cultural activities of the misguided
> sect of Baha’ism — as prescribed by the order of His Excellency the
> Supreme Leader — do need to be seriously opposed”. This would
> seem to indicate that the 1991 memorandum on “The Baha’i Question”, issued by the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council and
> approved by the Supreme Leader, is still in force and therefore that
> discrimination against Baha’is continues to be official practice, a
> situation the Special Representative deeply deplores.
> As well, in 1996, United Nations support for the Bahá’í case was
> further strengthened by the release of a report by the UN’s Special
> Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, which called on Iran to end its
> ban on Bahá’í institutions and other oppressive measures. Authored by
> Professor Abdelfattah Amor, a noted Tunisian legal expert, the report
> explicitly stated that the persecution of the Bahá’ís was based on religious intolerance.
> More recently, in 2003, the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance took note of the continuing confiscations, imprisonments, and
> efforts to block Bahá’í youth from receiving higher education, and
> concluded:
> While noting some promised improvements in treatment of the
> Baha’i minority, the Special Rapporteur is of the view that the
> measures taken by the Iranian authorities to end the persecution
> of Baha’is, including by non-State entities, and to guarantee them
> the same rights as any other Iranian citizen are still inadequate. He
> 
> 74 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> again reminds the Iranian authorities of the need to ensure respect
> for the relevant provisions of international law, including article 18
> of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
> the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
> and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. In addition, as a
> religious minority, Baha’is are entitled to the respect due to all other
> religious minorities.
> 
> In addition to efforts by the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies and agencies, numerous national legislatures and regional bodies
> have spoken out against Iran’s treatment of the Bahá’í community over
> the last twenty years. Expressions of concern for Iran’s Bahá’ís have
> come from the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and from
> the legislatures of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands,
> Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America,
> among others. Many heads of state and government leaders have also
> voiced their dismay over Iran’s treatment of the Bahá’ís.
> International and national non-governmental organizations have
> also risen to the defense of Iran’s Bahá’ís. Amnesty International, the
> Minority Rights Group, and Middle East Watch, among others, have
> closely monitored the situation of the Bahá’ís in Iran and published
> extensive reports that confirm the persecutions there.
> The world’s news media, as well, have reported extensively on the
> persecution of Iran’s Bahá’í community. Major articles and editorials
> which detail, confirm and condemn the persecutions have appeared in
> Le Monde, the Times of London, the New York Times, the Washington
> Post, the Economist, the Times of India, and the Sydney Morning Herald
> — as well as smaller and lesser known newspapers such as the Uganda
> Times, the Papua New Guinea Post Courier, the Straits Times of Singapore, and La Republica in Panama City. The Associated Press, Reuters,
> and the Agence France-Presse have also carried numerous dispatches
> on the persecution of Bahá’ís in Iran and the response of international
> organizations and agencies.
> In many respects the Bahá’í case has been a model for how international human rights machinery can be used to protect an oppressed
> minority. Thanks to international support for the Bahá’ís, the wholesale
> genocide of the Bahá’í community in Iran has so far been prevented.
> 
> CHAPTER V: The Historical Background | 75
> Chapter VI
> CONCLUSION AND
> SUMM ARY
> 
> T
> HE WORLDWIDE BAHÁ’Í community is
> today one of the most diverse and widespread organizations on earth. Comprising individuals from virtually every nation, ethnic group, trade, profession, and
> social or economic class, more than five million followers of the Bahá’í Faith reside in at least 235 countries
> and territories. They represent some 2,100 different
> tribes, racial and ethnic groups, and come from every
> religious background: Christian, Muslim, Hindu,
> Buddhist, Jewish, Zoroastrian, Sikh, Jain, and animist,
> as well as from non-religious backgrounds.
> Yet in the land where their religion originated,
> Bahá’ís continue to face a campaign of systematic,
> centrally directed persecution. At best, by denying
> them basic rights and freedoms, the government hopes
> merely to block the growth and development of the
> Bahá’í community, while keeping it as a ready scapegoat for its own failures. At worst, the government
> harbors the goal of exterminating the Bahá’í community as a viable entity in Iran and erasing all traces of
> its culture.
> 
> 76 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> During the 1980s Bahá’ís were executed, tortured,
> imprisoned, deprived of jobs, pensions and educa-               On the Bahá’í
> tional opportunities — solely because of their religious         question, the
> beliefs. In the 1990s some aspects of this persecution     Iranian government
> subsided as a result of international pressure. However,
> in 1993 came the exposure of a secret governmental
> has been utterly
> plan to suffocate the Bahá’í community.                       silent. There has
> Subsequent actions — ranging from random kill-           been no admission
> ings, revolving door imprisonment, arbitrary arrest
> of the government’s
> and harassment, denial of access to higher education,
> the destruction of important Bahá’í holy sites, and the      campaign against
> continued efforts to deprive Bahá’ís of their livelihood         Iran’s Bahá’í
> — reveal the Iranian government’s intention of con-           community and
> tinuing its efforts to destroy the Bahá’í community
> without attracting international attention.
> the need for reform
> Indeed, as of the time of publication of this book-      that it represents,
> let, the signs point only towards increasing problems          let alone public
> for Iran’s innocent Bahá’ís. The arbitrary arrests and
> statements that
> detentions of some 35 Bahá’ís around the country in
> March, April and May 2005 exemplify the worsening             might somehow
> situation. Held incommunicado for periods ranging             pave the way for
> from one week to three months, these prisoners were          recognition of the
> held without any formal charges while personal possessions were seized by government agents from their
> Bahá’í community’s
> homes in wanton searches. Other incidents in Yazd in       fundamental rights.
> January and February, involving the beating of several
> Bahá’ís and the burning of a Bahá’í-owned business,
> along with other short term arrests and detentions,
> point to ominous signs for the future.
> For most people, whatever their religious background, the continued campaign against the Bahá’ís
> defies rational explanation. The Bahá’í community in
> Iran poses no threat to the Iranian authorities. The
> fundamental principles of the Bahá’í Faith require its
> followers to be obedient to their government and to
> avoid partisan political involvement, subversive activity, and all forms of violence.
> 
> CHAPTER VI: Conclusion and Summary | 77
> In recent years, Iran has sought to portray itself as
> Continued           ready to rejoin the world community as a respected
> international        partner in international affairs, projecting an image of
> tolerance and civility. President Khatami, for exammonitoring remains
> ple, spoke of humanity’s entry into a “new century of
> the only form of      humanity, understanding, and durable peace.”
> protection for Iran’s       Yet on the Bahá’í question, the Iranian government
> Bahá’ís.          has been utterly silent. There has been no admission of
> the government’s campaign against Iran’s Bahá’í community and the need for reform that it represents, let
> alone public statements that might somehow pave the
> way for recognition of the Bahá’í community’s fundamental rights.
> In this regard, continued international monitoring
> remains the only form of protection for Iran’s Bahá’ís.
> Any lessening of international support for the Bahá’í
> community will be perceived by the Iranian authorities as condoning the persecution of the Bahá’ís at the
> least, and therefore as a license to continue their campaign with impunity.
> The Bahá’ís in Iran seek no special privileges. They
> seek only their rights under the Universal Declaration
> of Human Rights, including the right to life, the right
> to liberty and security of person, the right to education
> and work, and the right to profess and practice their
> religion.
> What is needed are legal and entirely public steps
> that will firmly establish the complete emancipation of
> the Bahá’ís of Iran. Only then can it be said that Iran
> has truly complied with its oft-stated commitment to
> universal human rights.
> 
> 78 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> Appendix I:
> BAH Á’ÍS KILLED SINCE 1978
> 
> NO. NAME                                             ROLE*      DATE                  PLACE                   METHOD
> 19 7 8
> 1.   Mr. Ahmad Ismá’ílí                                      1978                  Ahram                   Killed
> 2.   Mr. Díyá’u’lláh Haqíqat                                 Aug 13                Jahrum                  Killed
> 3.   Mr. Shír-Muhammad Dastpísh                              December              Buyr-Ahmad              Mobbed
> 4.   Mrs. ‘Avad-Gul Fahandizh                                Dec 14                Shíráz                  Mobbed
> 5.   Mr. Sifatu’lláh Fahandizh                               Dec 14                Shíráz                  Mobbed
> 6.   Mr. Khusraw Afnání                                      Dec 22                Míyán-Duáb              Mobbed
> 7.   Mr. Parvíz Afnání                                       Dec 22                Míyán-Duáb              Mobbed
> 19 7 9
> 8.   Mr. Ibráhím Ma’navi                                     early 1979            Hisár                   Killed
> 9.   Mr. Hájí-Muhmmad ‘Azizi                                 Jan 9                 Khurmúj                 Beaten
> 10.   Mr. Husayn Shakúrí                                      Apr 2                 Ushnavíyyíh             Killed
> 11.   Mr. ‘Alí-Akbar Khursandí                     LSA        Apr 12                Tehran                  Hanged
> 12.   Mr. Bahár Vujdání                                       Sep 27                Mahábád                 Executed
> 13.   Mr. ‘Alí Sattárzádíh                                    Oct 28                Búkán                   Killed
> 14.   Mr. ‘Azamatu’lláh Fahandizh                             Dec 14                Shíráz                  Executed
> 19 8 0
> 15.   Mr. Habíbu’lláh Panáhí                                  Feb 4                 Urúmíyyih               Assassinated
> 16.   Mr. Ghulám-Husayn A’zamí                                May 6                 Tehran                  Executed
> 17.   Mr. ‘Alí-Akbar Mu’íní                                   May 6                 Tehran                  Executed
> 18.   Mr. Badi’u’lláh Yazdání                                 May 6                 Tehran                  Executed
> 19.   Mr. Parviz Bayáni                                       May 11                Píránshahr              Executed
> 20.   Mr. Mir-Asadu’lláh Mukhtárí                             May 18                Andrún                  Stoned
> 21.   Mr. Hasan Ismá’ílzádíh                                  June                  Sanandaj                Killed
> 22.   Mr. Yúsuf Subhání                                       Jun 27                Tehran                  Executed
> 23.   Mr. Yadu’lláh Astání                         LSA        Jul 14                Tabríz                  Executed
> 24.   Dr. Farámarz Samandari                       LSA        Jul 14                Tabríz                  Executed
> 25.   Mr. Muhammad Akbarí                                     Jul 16                Rasht                   Executed
> 
> * Many of those killed or executed played a leadership role in the Iranian Bahá’í community. The acronym “LSA” in this column
> indicates that the person was a member of a local Spiritual Assembly, the community-elected local Bahá’í governing council. “NSA”
> identifies a member of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of Iran, the national-level governing council. “ABM” identi-
> fies an “auxiliary board member,” an appointed leadership position within the Bahá’í administrative framework. “CBC” identifies a
> member of the Continental Board of Counsellors, an appointed leadership position which oversees the auxiliary board members.
> 
> APPENDIX I: Bahá’ís killed since 1978 | 79
> NO. NAME                               ROLE*     DATE          PLACE          METHOD
> 19 8 0 (continued)
> 26.   Mr. Yadu’lláh Mahbubíyán                        Jul 30   Tehran         Executed
> 27.   Mr. Dhabíhu’lláh Mu’miní                        Aug 15   Tehran         Executed
> 28.   Mr. Núru’lláh Akhtar-Khávarí     ABM            Sep 8    Yazd           Executed
> 29.   Mr. ‘Azizu’lláh Dhabíhíyán       ABM            Sep 8    Yazd           Executed
> 30.   Mr. Firaydún Faridání            ABM            Sep 8    Yazd           Executed
> 31.   Mr. Mahmúd Hasanzádíh                           Sep 8    Yazd           Executed
> 32.   Mr. ‘Abdu’l-Vahháb                              Sep 8    Yazd           Executed
> Kázimi-Manshádí
> 33.   Mr. Jalál Mustaqím               LSA            Sep 8    Yazd           Executed
> 34.   Mr. ‘Ali Mutahari                LSA            Sep 8    Yazd           Executed
> 35.   Mr. Rídá Firúzí                                 Nov 9    Tabríz         Executed
> 36.   Mr. Muhammad-Husayn Ma’súmí                     Nov 23   Núk, Birjand   Burned
> 37.   Mrs. Shikkar-Nisá Ma’súmí                       Nov 23   Núk, Birjand   Burned
> 38.   Mr. Bihrúz Saná’í                               Dec 17   Tehran         Executed
> 19 8 1
> 39.   Dr. Manúchihr Hakim              NSA            Jan 12   Tehran         Assassinated
> 40.   Mr. Mihdi Anvari                                Mar 17   Shíráz         Executed
> 41.   Mr. Hidáyatu’lláh Dihqání                       Mar 17   Shíráz         Executed
> 42.   Mrs. Núráníyyih Yárshátir                       Apr      Shíráz         Assassinated
> 43.   Mr. Sattár Khushkhú                             Apr 30   Shíráz         Executed
> 44.   Mr. Ihsánu’lláh Mihdí-Zádih                     Apr 30   Shíráz         Executed
> 45.   Mr. Yadu’lláh Vahdat             ABM            Apr 30   Shíráz         Executed
> 46.   Mr. Muhmmad (Suhráb) Habibí      LSA            Jun 14   Hamadán        Executed
> 47.   Mr. Muhammad-Baqir (Suhayl)      LSA            Jun 14   Hamadán        Executed
> Habíbí
> 48.   Mr. Husayn Khándil               LSA      Jun 14         Hamadán        Executed
> 49.   Mr. Tarázu’lláh Khuzayn          LSA      Jun 14         Hamadán        Executed
> 50.   Mr. Husayn Mutlaq                LSA      Jun 14         Hamadán        Executed
> 51.   Dr. Fírúz Na’ími                 LSA      Jun 14         Hamadán        Executed
> 52.   Dr. Nasir Vafá’í                 LSA      Jun 14         Hamadán        Executed
> 53.   Mr. Buzurg ‘Alaviyán             LSA      Jun 23         Tehran         Executed
> 54.   Mr. Háshím Farnúsh               ABM LSA Jun 23          Tehran         Executed
> 55.   Mr. Farhang Mavaddat             LSA      Jun 23         Tehran         Executed
> 56.   Dr. Masíh Farhangí               CBC ASIA Jun 24         Tehran         Executed
> 57.   Mr. Badí’ulláh Farid                      Jun 24         Tehran         Executed
> 58.   Mr. Yadu’lláh Pústchí                     Jun 24         Tehran         Executed
> 59.   Mr. Varqá Tibyániyán (Tibyání)            Jun 24         Tehran         Executed
> 60.   Mr. Kamálu’d-Din Bakhtávar                Jul 26         Mashhad        Executed
> 61.   Mr. Ni’matu’llah Kátibpúr                 Jul 26         Mashhad        Executed
> Shahidi
> 62.   Mr. ‘Abdu’l-‘Alí Asadyárí        LSA            Jul 29   Tabríz         Executed
> 63.   Mr. Husayn Asadu’lláh-Zadeh      LSA            Jul 29   Tabríz         Executed
> 64.   Mr. Mihdí Báhiri                 LSA            Jul 29   Tabríz         Executed
> 65.   Dr. Masrúr Dakhílí               LSA            Jul 29   Tabríz         Executed
> 66.   Dr. Parvíz Fírúzí                LSA            Jul 29   Tabríz         Executed
> 67.   Mr. Manúchihr Khádí’í            LSA            Jul 29   Tabríz         Executed
> 68.   Mr. Alláh-Vírdí Mítháqi                         Jul 29   Tabríz         Executed
> 69.   Mr. Habíbu’lláh Tahqíqí          LSA            Jul 29   Tabríz         Executed
> 70.   Mr. Ismá’íl Zihtáb               LSA            Jul 29   Tabríz         Executed
> 71.   Mr. Husayn Rastigar-Námdár                      Aug 5    Tehran         Executed
> 72.   Mr. Habíbu’llah ‘Azizí           LSA            Aug 29   Tehran         Executed
> 73.   Mr. Bahman ‘Atifi                                Sep 11   Dáryún, Isf.   Executed
> 74.   Mr. ‘Izzat Atifi                                 Sep 11   Dáryún, Isf.   Executed
> 75.   Mr. Ahmad Ridvání                               Sep 11   Dáryún, Isf.   Executed
> 
> 80 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> NO. NAME                               ROLE*     DATE          PLACE             METHOD
> 19 8 1 (continued)
> 76.   Mr. Atá’u’lláh Rawhání                     Sep 11       Dáryún, Isf.      Executed
> 77.   Mr. Gushtásb Thábit-Rásikh                 Sep 11       Dáryún, Isf.      Executed
> 78.   Mr. Yadu’lláh Sipihr-Arfa                  Oct 23       Tehran            Executed
> 79.   Mr. Mihdí Amin Amin             NSA        Dec 27       Tehran            Executed
> 80.   Mr. Jalál ‘Azizi                NSA        Dec 27       Tehran            Executed
> 81.   Dr. ‘Izzatu’lláh Furúhi         ABM NSA Dec 27          Tehran            Executed
> 82.   Mrs. Zhínús Ni’mat Mahmúdi      ABM NSA Dec 27          Tehran            Executed
> 83.   Dr. Mahmúd Majdhúb              NSA        Dec 27       Tehran            Executed
> 84.   Mr. Qudratu’lláh Rawhání        NSA        Dec 27       Tehran            Executed
> 85.   Dr. Sírús Rawshani              NSA        Dec 27       Tehran            Executed
> 86.   Mr. Kámrán Samimi               NSA        Dec 27       Tehran            Executed
> 19 8 2
> 87. Mrs. Shiva Mahmudi                LSA        Jan 4        Tehran            Executed
> Asadu’llah-Zadeh
> 88. Mr. Iskandar ‘Azizi               LSA         Jan 4       Tehran            Executed
> 89. Mrs. Shidrukh Amir-Kiyá Baqa                  Jan 4       Tehran            Executed
> 90. Mr. Fathu’llah Firdawsi           LSA         Jan 4       Tehran            Executed
> 91. Mr. Khusraw Muhandisi             LSA         Jan 4       Tehran            Executed
> 92. Mr. Kúrush Talá’í                 LSA         Jan 4       Tehran            Executed
> 93. Mr. Atá’u’lláh Yávari             LSA         Jan 4       Tehran            Executed
> 94. Mr. Ibráhím Khayrkháh                         Feb 22      Tehran            Executed
> 95. Mr. Husayn Vahdat-i-Haq                       Feb 28      Tehran            Executed
> 96. Mr. ‘Askar Muhammadi                          Apr 2       Rahímkhán,        Assassinated
> Kírmán
> 97.   Mr. Ihsánu’lláh Khayyámi                    Apr 12      Urúmíyyih         Executed
> 98.   Mr. ‘Azizu’llah Gulshani                    Apr 29      Mashhad           Executed
> 99.   Mrs. Ishraqiyyih Faruhar        LSA         May 8       Karaj             Executed
> 100.   Mr. Mahmud Faruhar              LSA         May 8       Karaj             Executed
> 101.   Mr. Badí’u’lláh Haqpaykar       LSA         May 8       Karaj             Executed
> 102.   Mr. Agahu’lláh Tizfahm                      May 10      Urúmíyyih         Executed
> 103.   Miss Jaláliyyih Mushta                      May 10      Urúmíyyih         Executed
> il Uskú’í
> 104.   Mrs. Irán Rahímpúr (Khurmá’í)               May 12      Dizfúl            Executed
> 105.   Mr. Nasru’lláh Amini            LSA         May 16      Kháníábad,Tehe.   Executed
> 106.   Mr. Sa’du’lláh Bábázádeh        LSA         May 16      Kháníábad,Tehe.   Executed
> 107.   Mr. Atá’u’lláh Haqqání                      Jun 1       Tehran            Killed
> 108.   Mr. Muhammad Abbásí             LSA         Jul 9       Qazvín            Executed
> 109.   Mr. Jadidu’lláh Ashraf          LSA         Jul 9       Qazvín            Executed
> 110.   Manúchihr Farzánih              LSA         Jul 9       Qazvín            Executed
> Mu’ayyad
> 111.   Mr. Muhammad Mansúrí            LSA         Jul 9       Qazvín            Executed
> 112.   Mr. Manúchíhr Vafá’i                        Jul 9       Tehran            Assassinated
> 113.   Mr. ‘Abbás-Ali Sadiqipur                    Jul 15      Shíráz            Executed
> 114.   Mr. ‘Ali Na’imíyán                          Aug 11      Urúmíyyih         Executed
> 115.   Mr. Habibu’lláh Awji                        Nov 16      Shíráz            Executed
> 116.   Mr. Dhíyá’u’lláh Ahrári         LSA         Nov 21      Shíráz            Executed
> 117.   Mr. Husayn Nayyiri-Isfahani                 Nov 29      Isfahán           Died in Prison
> 118.   Mrs. Guldánih ‘Alipúr                       Dec 24      Sári              Mobbed
> 19 8 3
> 119.   Mr. Hidáyatu’lláh Síyávushí     LSA        Jan 1        Shíráz            Executed
> 120.   Mr. Yadu’lláh Mahmúdnizhad      LSA ABM Mar 12          Shíráz            Executed
> 121.   Mr. Rahmatu’lláh Vafá’í         LSA        Mar 12       Shíráz            Executed
> 122.   Mrs. Túbá Zá’irpúr                         Mar 12       Shíráz            Executed
> 123.   Mr. Adadu’llah (Aziz) Zaydí                Apr 1        Míyán-Duáb        Killed
> 
> APPENDIX I: Bahá’ís killed since 1978 | 81
> NO. NAME                                  ROLE*     DATE          PLACE            METHOD
> 19 8 3 (continued)
> 124.   Mr. Jalál Hakímán                                 May 1    Tehran           Executed
> 125.   Mr. Suhayl Safá’í                                 May 1    Tehran           Executed
> 126.   Dr. Bahrám Afnán                   LSA            Jun 16   Shíráz           Executed
> 127.   Mr. ‘Abdu’l-Husayn Azádí           LSA            Jun 16   Shíráz           Executed
> 128.   Mr. Kúrush Haqbín                  LSA            Jun 16   Shíráz           Executed
> 129.   Mr. ‘Ináyatu’lláh Ishráqí                         Jun 16   Shíráz           Executed
> 130.   Mr. Jamshíd Siyávushí              LSA            Jun 16   Shíráz           Executed
> 131.   Mr. Bahrám Yaldá’í                                Jun 16   Shíráz           Executed
> 132.   Miss Shahín(Shírín) Dálvand                       Jun 18   Shíráz           Executed
> 133.   Mrs. ‘Izzat Jánamí Ishráqí                        Jun 18   Shíráz           Executed
> 134.   Miss Ru’yá Ishráqí                                Jun 18   Shíráz           Executed
> 135.   Miss Muná Mahmúdnizhád                            Jun 18   Shíráz           Executed
> 136.   Miss Zarrín Muqímí-Abyáníh                        Jun 18   Shíráz           Executed
> 137.   Miss Mahshíd Nírúmand                             Jun 18   Shíráz           Executed
> 138.   Miss Símín Sábírí                                 Jun 18   Shíráz           Executed
> 139.   Mrs. Táhirih Arjumandí Síyávushi                  Jun 18   Shíráz           Executed
> 140.   Miss Akhtar Thábit                                Jun 18   Shíráz           Executed
> 141.   Mrs. Nusrat Ghufrání Yaldá’í       LSA            Jun 18   Shíráz           Executed
> 142.   Mr. Suhayl Húshmand                               Jun 28   Shíráz           Executed
> 143.   Mr. Ahmad-‘Alí Thábít-                            Jun 30   Shíráz           Died in Prison
> Sarvístání
> 144.   Mr. Muhammad Ishráqí               ABM            Aug 31   Tehran           Died in Prison
> 145.   Mr. Akbar Haqíqí                                  Sep 19   Khuy             Mobbed
> 146.   Mr. Bahman Díhqání                                Nov 19   Muhammadíyyíh    Mobbed
> 147.   Mr. ‘Abdu’l-Majíd Mutahhar                        Dec 15   Isfahán          Died in Prison
> 19 8 4
> 148. Mr. Rahmatu’lláh Hakímán                            Jan 11   Kírmán           Died in Prison
> 149. Mr. Ghulám-Husayn Hasanzádih-                       Mar 10   Tehran           Executed
> Shákíri
> 150. Mr. Muhsin Radaví                            Mar 13          Tehran           Died in Prison
> 151. Mr. Nusrat’ulláh Díyá’í                      Mar 19          Báft, Kírmán     Died in Prison
> 152. Mr. Kámrán Lutfí                             Apr 9           Tehran           Executed
> 153. Mr. Rahím Rahímíyán                          Apr 9           Tehran           Executed
> 154. Mr. Yadu’lláh Sábíríyán                      Apr 9           Tehran           Executed
> 155. Mr. Asadu’lláh Kámíl-Muqaddam                May 2           Tehran           Died in Prison
> 156. Mr. Maqsúd ‘Alízádih                         May 5           Tabríz           Executed
> 157. Mr. Jalál Payraví                    ABM     May 5           Tabríz           Executed
> 158. Mr. Jahángír Hidáyati                NSA     May 15          Tehran           Executed
> 159. Mr. ‘Ali-Muhammad Zamání                     May 15          Tehran           Executed
> 160. Mr. Nusratu’lláh Vahdat                      Jun 17          Mashhad          Executed
> 161. Mr. Ihsánu’lláh Kathírí                      Jun 27          Tehran           Executed
> 162. Dr. Manúchíhr Rúhí                           Aug 16          Bujnúrd          Executed
> 163. Mr. Aminu’lláh Qurbánpúr                     Aug 25          near Tehran      Died in Prison
> 164. Mr. Rustam Varjávandí                        Sep 15          Tehran           Died in Prison
> 165. Mr. Shápúr (Húshang) Markazi         NSA ABM Sep 23          Tehran           Executed
> 166. Mr. Fírúz Purdil                             Oct 30          Mashhad          Executed
> 167. Mr. Ahmad Bashiri                    NSA     Nov 1           Tehran           Executed
> 168. Mr. Yúnis Nawrúzi-Iránzád            LSA     Nov 1           Karaj
> 169. Mr. ‘Alíridá Níyákán                         Nov 11          Tabríz           Died in Prison
> 170. Mr. Díyá’u’lláh Maí’í-Uskú’í                 Nov 13          Tabríz           Died in Prison
> 171. Dr. Farhád Asdaqí                    NSA     Nov 19          Tehran           Executed
> 172. Mr. Fírúz Atharí                     LSA     Dec 9           Tehran (Karaj)   Executed
> 173. Mr. Ghulám-Husayn Farhand            LSA     Dec 9           Tehran (Karaj)   Executed
> 174. Mr. ‘Ináyatu’lláh Haqíqí             LSA     Dec 9           Tehran (Karaj)   Executed
> 
> 82 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> NO. NAME                               ROLE*     DATE          PLACE             METHOD
> 19 8 4 (continued)
> 175. Mr. Jamál Káshání                 LSA            Dec 9    Tehran (Karaj)    Executed
> 176. Mr. Jamshíd Púr-Ustádkár          LSA            Dec 9    Tehran (Karaj)    Executed
> 177. Dr. Rúhu’lláh Ta’lím              LSA            Dec 9    Tehran            Executed
> (Kirmánsháh)
> 19 8 5
> 178.   Mr. Rúhu’lláh Hasúrí                           Jan 21   Yazd              Executed
> 179.   Mr. Rúhu’lláh Bahrámsháhi       LSA            Feb 25   Yazd              Executed
> 180.   Mr. Nusratu’lláh Subháni                       Mar 5    Tehran            Executed
> 181.   Mr. ‘Abbás Idilkhání                           Aug 1    Tehran            Executed
> 182.   Mr. Rahmatu’lláh Vujdání        LSA            Aug 31   Bandar-‘Abbás     Executed
> 183.   Mr. Núr’ud-Din Tá’ifí                          Oct 12   Gurgán            Died in Prison
> (Kirmánsháh)
> 184. Mr. ‘Azízu’lláh Ashjárí                          Nov 19   Tabríz            Executed
> 19 8 6
> 185.   Mr. Paymán Subháni (reported)                  Apr 28   Saráván           Mobbed
> 186.   Mr. Sirru’lláh Vahdat-Nizámí                   May 4    Tehran            Executed
> 187.   Mr. Fidrus Shabrukh                            May 9    Záhidán           Executed
> 188.   Mr. Farid Bihmardí              NSA            Jun 10   Tehran            Executed
> 189.   Mr. Habíbu’lláh Muhtadí                        Aug 27   Tehran            Killed
> 190.   Mr. Bábak Tálibí                               Sep 2    Karaj             Beaten
> 191.   Mr. Iraj Mihdi-Nizhád                          Sep 4    Bandar-‘Abbás     Mobbed
> 19 8 7
> 192.   Mr. Ahmad Kávih                                Jan 26   Isfahán           Killed
> 193.   Mr. Surúsh Jabbári                             Mar 3    Tehran            Killed
> 194.   Mr. Abu’l-Qásim Sháyiq                         Mar 3    Tehran            Killed
> 195.   Mr. Ardishír Akhtarí                           Sep 28   Tehran            Executed
> 196.   Mr. Amír-Husayn Nádiri                         Sep 28   Tehran            Executed
> 19 8 8
> 197. Mr. Bihnám Páshá’í                        presumably Nov Tehran          Executed
> 198. Mr. Iradj Afshín                          presumably Nov Tehran          Executed
> 199. Mr. Mihrdad Maqsudi                            Feb 16     Urúmíyyih      Killed
> 19 9 2
> 200. Mr. Bahman Samandari                           Mar 18     Tehran         Executed
> 201. Mr. Ruhu’lláh Ghedami                          Jun 17     on Qum Highway Killed
> 19 9 5
> 202. Mr. Shirvin Falláh                             Approx Dec Arak           Killed
> 19 9 7
> 203. Mr. Mansúr Dawlat                              Apr 4      Kírmán         Killed
> 204. Mr. Shahrám Reza’i                             Jul 7      Rasht          Killed
> 205. Mr. Mashá’lláh Enáyatí                         Jul 4      Isfahán        Beaten in prison
> 19 9 8
> 206. Mr. Rúhu’lláh Rawhání                          Jul 21     Isfahán        Executed
> 
> APPENDIX I: Bahá’ís killed since 1978 | 83
> Appendix II
> THE UNITED NATIONS’ RESPONSE
> 
> Since 1980, human rights organs of the United Na-                Grave concern for the Bahá’í minority is expressed
> tions have been expressing concern about the tragic           by members of the Human Rights Committee at its
> situation of the Bahá’í religious minority in Iran. This      16th session, when the Committee discusses with repdemonstration of international concern has played a           resentatives of the Iranian Government the preliminary
> critical role in moderating the actions of the Iranian        report submitted by the Government of the Islamic
> authorities and providing a measure of security to the        Republic of Iran in accordance with its reporting obli-
> Bahá’í community.                                             gations under the International Covenant on Civil and
> A summary history of this issue at the United Na-          Political Rights.
> tions is outlined below:                                         Resolution 1982/25 (8.9.1982) of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
> 1980
> Minorities recalls its earlier resolutions on the plight
> Resolution 10 (XXXIII) (10.9.1980) of the Sub-             of the Bahá’ís and expresses its continuing concern at
> Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and                human rights violations in Iran.
> Protection of Minorities expresses profound concern
> for the Bahá’ís both individually and collectively, and                               1983
> invites the Government of Iran to protect their funda-           Resolution 1983/34 (8.3.1983) of the Commission
> mental human rights and freedoms.                             on Human Rights expresses its profound concern at
> the religious persecution of the Bahá’ís and requests
> 1981
> the Secretary-General to continue his direct contacts
> Resolution 8 (XXXIV ) (9.9.1981) of the Sub-               with the Government of Iran on the human rights
> Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and                situation in that country, “including the situation of
> Protection of Minorities draws the attention of the           the Bahá’ís.”
> Commission on Human Rights to the perilous situ-                 Resolution 1983/14 (5.9.1983) of the Sub-Comation facing the Bahá’ís and requests the Secretary-          mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-
> General to report on their plight to the next session of      tion of Minorities expresses its grave concern at the
> the Commission.                                               continuing religious persecution of the Bahá’ís and
> 1982                                  suggests that the Commission on Human Rights appoint a Special Rapporteur to study the human rights
> Resolution 1982/27 (11.3.1982) of the Commission           situation in Iran.
> on Human Rights notes the Secretary-General’s report
> on the Bahá’ís and requests him to establish direct                                   1984
> contacts with the Government of Iran and to continue             Resolution 1984/54 (14.3.1984) of the Commishis efforts to ensure the Bahá’ís full enjoyment of their     sion on Human Rights expresses its concern for the
> human rights and fundamental freedoms.                        Bahá’í minority and requests its Chairman to appoint
> 
> 84 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> a Special Representative to establish contacts with the        religion” (operative paragraph 2);
> Government of Iran and to make a thorough study of                 “Decides to continue its examination of the situahuman rights in Iran.                                          tion of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
> Decision 1984/138 of the Economic and Social               including the situation of minority groups such as
> Council endorses the Commission’s decision to appoint          the Bahá’ís, during its forty-first session in order to
> a Special Representative.                                      examine this situation anew in the light of additional
> Resolution 1984/14 (29.8.1984) of the Sub-Com-             elements provided by the Commission on Human
> mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-            Rights and the Economic and Social Council” (operation of Minorities expresses alarm at the continuing           tive paragraph 8).
> gross violations of human rights in Iran, including the
> 1986
> religious persecution of the Bahá’ís, and welcomes the
> Commission’s decision to appoint a Special Represen-               Resolution 1985/41 (12.3.1986) of the Commission
> tative.                                                        on Human Rights “expresses its deep concern over the
> specific and detailed allegations of grave human rights
> 1985                                 violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran to which the
> Preliminary Report of the Special Representative           Special Representative refers in his report”; endorses
> to the Commission on Human Rights expresses great              his conclusion that “specific and detailed allegations
> concern at the number and gravity of alleged violations        concerning grave human rights violations” in Iran canof human rights in Iran, including denial of the right to      not be dismissed; decides to extend the mandate of the
> freedom of thought, conscience and religion.                   Commission’s Special Representative and requests him
> Resolution 1985/39 (13.3.1985) of the Commission           to present an interim report on the situation, “including
> on Human Rights endorses the general observations of           the situation of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís” to
> its Special Representative, expresses its deep concern at      the General Assembly at its forty-first session and a
> the number and gravity of alleged violations of human          final report to the Commission at its forty-third sesrights to which his preliminary report bears witness,          sion in 1987.
> extends his mandate, and requests him “...to present an            Decision 1986/137 of the Economic and Social
> interim report to the General Assembly at its fortieth         Council approves the Commission’s decision to extend
> session on the human rights situation in the Islamic           the Special Representative’s mandate and its request
> Republic of Iran, including the situation of minority          to the Special Representative to submit reports to the
> groups such as the Bahá’ís...”                                 forty-first session of the General Assembly and the
> Decision 1985/148 of the Economic and Social               forty-third session of the Commission.
> Council endorses the Commission’s decision.                        It is announced on 14 July 1986 that, in response
> Resolution 1985/17 (29.8.1985) of the Sub-Com-             to this request, the Chairman of the Commission apmission on Prevention of Discrimination and Pro-               pointed Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl to serve as the
> tection of Minorities welcomes the Commission’s                Special Representative of the Commission.
> decision, expresses its alarm at the continuing reports            Resolution 41/159 (4.12.1986) of the General Asof gross violations of human rights and fundamental            sembly “Expresses its deep concern over the specific
> freedoms in Iran, “in particular at the evidence of per-       and detailed allegations of violations of human rights
> secution of the Bahá’í religious minority...,” endorses        in the Islamic Republic of Iran and in particular over
> the general observations of the Special Representative         those related to the right to life, such as summary and
> in his preliminary report, and expresses the hope that         arbitrary executions, the right to freedom from torture
> the initial contacts of the Government of Iran with            or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishthe Special Representative will develop into a positive        ment, the right to liberty and security of person and to
> cooperation.                                                   freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention, the right to
> Resolution 40/141 (13.12.1985) of the General              a fair trial, the right to freedom of thought, conscience
> Assembly “Expresses its deep concern over the specific          and religion and to freedom of expression and the right
> and detailed allegations of violations of human rights in      of religious minorities to profess and practice their own
> the Islamic Republic of Iran to which the Special Rep-         religion”;
> resentative refers in his interim report, and in particular,       “Requests the Commission on Human Rights to
> those related to the right to life, such as summary and        study carefully the final report of the Special Reprearbitrary executions; the right to freedom from torture        sentative, as well as other information pertaining to the
> or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-            situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of
> ment; the right to liberty and security of person and to       Iran, and to consider further steps for securing effective
> freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention; the right to       “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
> a fair trial; the right to freedom of thought, conscience      for all in that country”;
> and religion and to freedom of expression; and the right           Decides to continue its examination of the situation
> of religious minorities to profess and practice their own      of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran includ-
> 
> APPENDIX II: The United Nations’ Response | 85
> ing the situation of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís,         Resolution 42/136 (7.12.1987) of the General
> during its forty-second session....”                           Assembly takes note of the Commission’s resolution
> 1987/55 requesting the Special Representative “to
> 1987
> submit an interim report to the General Assembly
> Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1987/55 (11.3.1987)                   at its forty-second session on the situation of human
> of the Commission on Human Rights recalling its                rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the
> resolution 1986/41, extends the mandate of the Special         situation of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís...”;
> Representative for one year; requests him to present an        again expresses “its deep concern about the numerinterim report on the human rights situation including         ous and detailed allegations of grave human rights
> the situation of minority groups, such as the Bahá’ís;         violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran to which
> regrets “that the Government of the Islamic Republic           the Special Representative had referred in his report,
> of Iran has so far provided no comment or information          namely, those related to the right to life, the right to
> to the Special Representative and has not allowed him          freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
> to visit the country”; again expresses “its deep concern       treatment or punishment, the right to liberty and secuover the numerous and detailed allegations of grave and        rity of person, and to freedom from arbitrary arrest or
> extensive human rights violations to which the Special         detention, the right to a fair trial, the right to freedom
> Representative refers in his report (E/CN.4/1987/23)           of thought, conscience and religion and to freedom
> and in particular, those related to the right to life, the     of expression, and the right of religious minorities to
> right to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or             profess and practice their own religion”; expresses “its
> degrading treatment or punishment, the right to liberty        grave concern, in particular, that although the Special
> and security of person and to freedom from arbitrary           Representative indicates that the number of alleged
> arrest or detention, the right to a fair trial, the right      violations of the right to life has diminished over the
> to freedom of thought; conscience and religion and             past two years, according to information made available
> to freedom of expression, and the right of religious           to him, some one hundred persons were alleged to have
> minorities to profess and practice their own religion”;        been executed in the period October 1986-September
> requests “the Special Representative to present an             1987 because of their political and religious convicinterim report to the General Assembly, at its forty-          tions”; expresses “its deep concern at allegations that
> second session on human rights in the Islamic Republic         maltreatment and torture, both physical and psychoof Iran, including the situation of minority groups such       logical, are common practice in Iranian prisons during
> as the Bahá’ís....”                                            interrogation and before and after the final verdict, and
> Decision 1987/150 of ECOSOC approves the                    at the existence of extremely summary and informal
> Commission’s decision to extend the Special Represen-          proceedings, unawareness on the part of the prisontative’s mandate.                                              ers of specific accusations, lack of legal counsel and
> Resolution E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/1987/12 (1.9.1987)              other irregularities with respect to fair trial”; endorses
> of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-             “the conclusion of the Special Representative that acts
> tion and Protection of Minorities refers to “various           continue to occur in the Islamic Republic of Iran that
> resolutions and documents published by other interna-          are inconsistent with the provisions of international
> tional bodies and organizations including resolutions          instruments....”; decides “to keep under consideration
> ratified by the European Parliament and Council of              the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic
> Europe ... all of which have expressed great concern           of Iran, including the situation of minority groups such
> over the violations of human rights and violation of the       as the Bahá’ís, during its forty-third session...”
> most basic rights of the ethnic and religious minorities..”; learns “with renewed concern that the number                                   1988
> of those allegedly executed by the ruling Government,              Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1988/69 (10.3.1988) of
> including Bahá’ís and others, now exceeds 70,000...”;          the Commission on Human Rights recalls its deciexpresses “strong concern over the grave violations of         sion to request the Special Representative to present
> human rights and basic freedom such as...the right to          an interim report to the General Assembly on human
> freedom of belief and religion...”; urges “determined          rights situation including the situation of minority
> protest by the Commission to the Islamic Republic of           groups, such as the Bahá’ís; expresses “again its deep
> Iran concerning continuing disrespect for the Charter          concern about the numerous detailed allegations of
> of the United Nations in relation to human rights”; and        grave human rights violations... in particular those
> “requests the Secretary-General to inform the General          related to the right to life,... the right to freedom of
> Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights and its               thought, conscience and religion and to freedom of
> Special Representative of the information obtained             expression...”; requests “the Special Representative to
> from the Sub-Commission on the grave violation of              present an interim report to the General Assembly at
> human rights and the most basic freedoms in the Is-            its forty-third session on the human rights situation,
> lamic Republic of Iran.”                                       including the situation of minority groups, such as the
> 
> 86 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> Bahá’ís, and a final report to the Commission at its           has referred in his reports, namely, those related to the
> forty-fifth session.”                                          right to life, the right to freedom from torture or cruel,
> Decision 1988/137 of ECOSOC approves the                  inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the
> Commission’s decision to extend the Special Represen-         right to liberty and security of person, the right to a fair
> tative’s mandate. This decision refers also to Commis-        trial and to freedom of thought, conscience, religion
> sion resolution 1984/54.                                      and expression,”; requests “the Special Representative
> Resolution 43/137 (8.12.1988) of the General              to present an interim report to the General Assembly
> Assembly takes note of the Commission’s resolution            at its forty-fourth session on human rights situation in
> 1988/69 requesting the Special Representative “to             Iran, including the situation of minority groups, such as
> submit an interim report to the General Assembly at           the Bahá’ís and a final report to the forty-sixth session
> its forty-third session on the situation of human rights      of the Commission.”
> in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation          R e s o l u t i on E / C N . 4 / S u b. 2 / RES / 1 9 8 9 / 1 0
> of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís....”; notes “the       (31.8.1989) of the Sub-Commission on Prevention
> recent contacts between the Special Representative            of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities takes
> and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,           note “of numerous reports by United Nations special
> which it is hoped will lead to a state of full co-operation   rapporteurs and by NGOs,...”; concerned “also at
> between the Special Representative and that Govern-           reports of denial of rights of minorities to enjoy their
> ment, including a visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran,      own culture, to profess and practice their own beliefs”;
> so that he can fulfil his mandate”; notes “that the           is “further concerned at reports about persecution and
> Bahá’ís in the Islamic Republic of Iran continue to be        detention of members of the Bahá’í community in the
> subjected to various forms of harassment and discrimi-        Islamic Republic of Iran.”
> nation, although there are indications that the intensity         Resolution 44/163 (15.12.1989) of the General
> of the campaign of persecution against the Bahá’ís has        Assembly takes note “with appreciation of the interim
> diminished somewhat in recent months, and that                report of the Special Representative of the Commisa number of them have been released from prison”;             sion on Human Rights”; takes note “of the view of the
> expresses once more “its deep concern about the nu-           Special Representative that, in order to achieve full
> merous and detailed allegations of grave human rights         co-operation between the Government of the Islamic
> violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran to which           Republic of Iran and the Special Representative, there
> the Special Representative had referred in his report,        is a need to proceed to another stage in the discharge of
> namely, those related to the right to life, the right to      his mandate”; welcomes “the invitation by the Islamic
> freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading           Republic of Iran to the Special Representative for him
> treatment or punishment, the right to liberty and secu-       to visit that country”; decides “to continue its examinarity of person, the right to a fair trial and the right to    tion... during its forty-fifth session.”
> freedom of thought, conscience and religion”; expresses
> 1990
> “its deep concern also at the existence of extremely
> summary, informal and irregular proceedings, failure              Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1990/79 (7.3.1990) of
> to inform defendants of specific accusations against           the Commission on Human Rights notes “the findthem, lack of legal counsel, absence of an appropriate        ings of the Special Representative on the situation of
> instance for appeal and other irregularities that con-        the Bahá’ís in the Islamic Republic of Iran”; expresses
> travene international standards on fair trial”; endorses      “its concern that testimony gathered by the Special
> “the conclusion of the Special Representative that acts       Representative reiterated complaints about unlawful
> continue to occur in the Islamic Republic of Iran that        executions, torture, substitute prisoners, imprisonment
> are inconsistent with the provisions of international         beyond the period specified in the sentence, spontaneinstruments...”; decides “to keep under consideration         ous decisions by low-ranking officials and the absence
> the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic         of council for defence as well as restrictions on the right
> of Iran, including the situation of minority groups such      to assemble...”; requests “the Special Representative to
> as the Bahá’ís, during its forty-fourth session....”          submit an interim report to the General Assembly at
> its forty-fifth session on the human rights situation in
> 1989                                 the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation of
> Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1989/66 (7.3.1989) of                minority groups, such as the Bahá’ís, and a final report
> the Commission on Human Rights recalling “...the              to the Commission at its forty-seventh session.”
> situation of minority groups, such as the Bahá’ís...”;            Decision 1990/243 of ECOSOC approves the
> notes “that the situation of the Bahá’ís in the Islamic       Commission’s decision to extend the Special Represen-
> Republic of Iran continues to be uncertain”; expresses        tative’s mandate.
> once more “its deep concern over the numerous and                 Resolution E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/1990/9 (30.8.1990)
> detailed allegations of grave and extensive human             of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discriminarights violations to which the Special Representative         tion and Protection of Minorities notes “that the
> 
> APPENDIX II: The United Nations’ Response | 87
> situation of the Bahá’ís in the Islamic Republic of Iran         ernment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and to report
> continues to be uncertain”; expresses “its deep concern          on further progress.
> about the grave violations of human rights namely                   Resolution E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/1991/9 (23.8.1991)
> those related to the right to life, the right to freedom         of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discriminafrom torture and from cruel, inhuman and degrad-                 tion and Protection of Minorities notes “that the situing treatment or punishment, the right to liberty and            ation of the Bahá’í community in the Islamic Republic
> security of person, the right to a fair trial, and the right     of Iran continues to be a matter of great concern”;
> to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and expres-          expresses “its deep concern at the escalating grave
> sion...”; decides “to consider the situation of human            violations of human rights in the Islamic Republic
> rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the            of Iran, in particular of the right to life, the right to
> situation of minority groups such as the Bahá’í, at its          freedom from torture and from cruel, inhuman and
> forty-third session.”                                            degrading treatment or punishment, the right to liberty
> Resolution 45/173 (18.12.1990) of the General                 and security of person, the right to a fair trial and the
> Assembly noting “the findings of the Special Represen-            right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and
> tative on the situation of the Bahá’ís in the Islamic Re-        expression, and calls upon the Commission on Human
> public of Iran”; calls upon “the Islamic Republic of Iran        Rights at its forty-eight session, to extend the mandate
> to intensify its efforts to investigate and rectify the hu-      of the Special Representative and the monitoring of
> man rights issues raised by the Special Representative,          the situation of human rights”; decides “to consider the
> in particular as regards the administration of justice           situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of
> and due process of law in order to comply with inter-            Iran, including the situation of minority groups such as
> national instruments on human rights, including the              the Bahá’í community, at its forty-fourth session.”
> International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
> 1992
> to which the Islamic Republic of Iran is a party, and
> to ensure that all individuals within its territory and              Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1992/67 (4.3.1992) of
> subject to its jurisdiction, including religious groups,         the Commission on Human Rights takes note “with
> enjoy the rights recognized in these instruments”; notes         appreciation of the report of the Special Representative
> “that the co-operation of the Islamic Republic of Iran           of the Commission (E/CN.4/1992/34) and the obserwith the Special Representative has improved and has             vations contained therein”; expresses “its deep concern
> included replies by the Government to allegations that           at the continuing reports of violations of human rights
> have been transmitted to it, and urges the Government            in the Islamic Republic of Iran”; expresses “its concern
> to reply in detail to all allegations referred to by the         more specifically at the main weaknesses, according to
> Special Representative in his reports.”                          the Special Representative, of the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, namely, the lack of
> 1991                                   guarantees of due process of law, discriminatory treat-
> Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1991/82 (7.3.1991) of                  ment of certain groups of citizens for reason of their
> the Commission on Human Rights noting further                    religious beliefs, notably the Bahá’ís....”; welcomes “the
> “the findings of the Special Representative on the situ-          fact that the Government of the Islamic Republic of
> ation of the Bahá’ís in the Islamic Republic of Iran”;           Iran has permitted the Special Representative to visit
> welcomes “the full cooperation extended by the Gov-              the country and has continued to reply to allegations
> ernment of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Special           of human rights violations transmitted to it by the
> Representative, which has reached its highest level, as          Special Representative”; calls upon the Government
> well as the intention of the Government to continue              “to ensure that all individuals within its territory and
> its full cooperation with the Special Representative”;           subject to its jurisdiction, including religious groups,
> requests “the Special Representative to maintain his             enjoy the rights recognized in the international instrucontact and cooperation with the Government...and                ments”; decides “to extend the mandate of the Special
> to report on further progress with regard to the recom-          Representative requesting him to submit an interim
> mendations contained in his report, on the basis of his          report to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh
> mandate pursuant to Commission on Human Rights                   session”; decides “to continue its consideration of the
> resolution 1984/54 of 14 March 1984”; also requests              situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms
> the Special Representative “to submit a report to be             in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a matter of priority,
> considered by the Commission which will consider the             at its forty-ninth session.”
> report with the view to its discontinuing the mandate if             Decision 1992/239 of ECOSOC approves the
> there is further progress achieved regarding his recom-          Commission’s decision to extend the Special Repmendations.”                                                     resentative’s mandate and its request to the Special
> Decision 1991/261 of ECOSOC approves the                     Representative to submit an interim report to the forty-
> Commission’s request to the Special Representative to            seventh session of the General Assembly and a final
> maintain his contacts and cooperation with the Gov-              report to the forty-ninth session of the Commission.
> 
> 88 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> R e s o l u t i on E / C N . 4 / S u b. 2 / RES / 1 9 9 2 / 1 5   sentative … for a further year,” requesting “the Special
> (27.8.1992) of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of                    Representative to submit an interim report to the
> Discrimination and Protection of Minorities notes “in                 General Assembly … on the human rights situation
> particular that the situation of the Bahá’í community in              in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation
> the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to be a matter                 of minority groups, such as the Bahá’ís,” continuing
> of concern”; condemns “the continuing grave violations                its consideration of Iran’s human rights situation “as a
> of human rights by the Government of the Islamic                      matter of priority, at its fiftieth session.”
> Republic of Iran, especially: (d) renewed persecution of                  Decision 1993/273 of ECOSOC approves the
> religious minorities and summary killings of Bahá’ís.”                Commission’s decision to extend the mandate of the
> Resolution 47/146 (18.12.1992) of the General                     Special Representative for one year, to request him to
> Assembly expresses “its concern at continuing reports                 submit an interim report to the General Assembly at its
> of violations of human rights in the Islamic Republic                 forty-eighth session on the situation of human rights
> of Iran”; expresses “its concern more specifically at the              in the Islamic Republic of Iran and to report to the
> main criticisms according to the Special Representative               Commission at its fiftieth session and to request to the
> of the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of              Secretary-General to give all necessary assistance to the
> Iran, namely, the high number of executions, the prac-                Special Representative.
> tice of torture, the standard of the administration of                    R e s o l u t i on E / C N . 4 / S u b. 2 / RES / 1 9 9 3 / 1 4
> justice, the absence of guarantees of due legal process,              (20.4.1993) of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
> the treatment of the Bahá’í community and restriction                 Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, gravely
> of freedoms of expression, thought, opinion and press”;               concerned at “the systematic repression of the Bahá’í
> regrets “that the Government of the Islamic Republic                  community and at the plight of the Iranian Kurds,”
> of Iran has not permitted the Special Representative                  strongly condemns “the continuing and flagrant huto visit the country and failed to reply to allegations               man rights violations of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
> of human rights violations” and regrets also “that, as                including: (d) The continued persecution of the Bahá’ís
> the Special Representative concluded, the Islamic                     and other religious minorities,” and decides to “consid-
> Republic of Iran has not given adequate follow-up to                  er further the situation of human rights in the Islamic
> many of the recommendations contained in the previ-                   Republic of Iran, including the situation of women and
> ous reports”; decides “to continue the examination of                 minority groups such as the Bahá’ís and the Kurds, at
> the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic                 its forty-sixth session.”
> of Iran during its forty-eighth session under the item                    Resolution 48/145 (20.12.1993) of the General As-
> ‘Human rights questions’ in the light of additional ele-              sembly expresses its concern “at the main criticisms of
> ments provided by the Commission on Human Rights                      the Special Representative with regard to the human
> and the ECOSOC.”                                                      rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, namely,
> … discriminatory treatment of certain groups of
> 1993
> citizens by reason of their religious beliefs, notably the
> Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1992/62 (10.3.1993) of                       Bahá’ís, whose existence as a viable religious commuthe Commission on Human Rights, noting “the Spe-                      nity is threatened…,” also calls upon “the Government
> cial Representative’s … view that during 1992 there was               of the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply with interno appreciable progress in the Islamic Republic of Iran               national instruments on human rights, in particular the
> towards improved compliance with human rights stan-                   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
> dards in conformity with international instruments,”                  to which the Islamic Republic of Iran is a party, and to
> “expresses its deep concern at continuing reports of                  ensure that all individuals within its territory and subviolations of human rights in the Islamic Republic of                 ject to its jurisdiction, including religious groups, enjoy
> Iran; expresses “its concern more specifically at the                  the rights recognized in those instruments” and decides
> main criticisms of the Special Representative of the …                to “continue the examination of the situation of human
> discriminatory treatment of certain groups of citizens                rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the
> for reason of their religious beliefs, notably the Bahá’ís,”          situation of minority groups, such as the Bahá’ís…”
> while conveying “its regret that the Government of the                    Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1994/73 (9.3.1994) of the
> Islamic Republic of Iran has not granted the request of               Commission on Human Rights expresses its concern
> the Special Representative to visit the country for more              “at the main criticisms of the Special Representative
> than a year,” “calls upon the Government … to comply                  with regard to the human rights situation in the Islamic
> with international instruments on human rights …                      Republic of Iran, namely, … discriminatory treatment
> to which the Islamic Republic of Iran is a party, and                 of certain groups of citizens for reason of their relito ensure that all individuals within its territory and               gious beliefs, notably the Bahá’ís, whose existence as
> subject to its jurisdiction, including religious groups,              a viable religious community in the Islamic Republic
> enjoy the rights recognised in these instruments,” and                of Iran is threatened, as well as the ill-treatment of
> “decides to extend the mandate of the Special Repre-                  certain Christians and restrictions on the freedoms of
> 
> APPENDIX II: The United Nations’ Response | 89
> expression, thought, opinion and the press, and that, as                Republic of Iran to comply with international instrunoted by the Special Representative, there is continued                 ments on human rights, in particular the International
> discrimination against women,” also calls upon “the                     Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the
> Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply                    Islamic Republic of Iran is a party, and to ensure that
> with international instruments on human rights, in                      all individuals within its territory and subject to its juparticular the International Covenant on Civil and                      risdiction, including religious groups and other persons
> Political Rights, to which the Islamic Republic of Iran                 belonging to minorities, enjoy the rights recognized
> is a party, and to ensure that all individuals within                   in those instruments”; and decides “to continue the
> its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, including                examination of the situation of human rights in the
> religious groups, enjoy the rights recognized in these                  Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation of
> instruments” and requests the Special Representative to                 minority groups, such as the Bahá’ís, during its fiftieth
> submit an interim report to the General Assembly at its                 session under the item entitled ‘Human rights quesforty-ninth session on the situation of human rights in                 tions’ in the light of additional elements provided by
> the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation of                the Commission on Human Rights and the Economic
> minority groups, such as the Bahá’ís, and to report to                  and Social Council.”
> the Commission at its fifty-first session.
> 1995
> Decision 1994/263 of ECOSOC approves the
> Commission’s decision to extend for a further year the                     Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1995/68 (8.3.1995) of
> mandate of the Special Representative, to request him                   the Commission on Human Rights expresses “its deep
> to submit an interim report to the General Assembly at                  concern at continued violations of human rights in the
> its forty-ninth session on the situation of human rights                Islamic Republic of Iran, including those highlighted
> in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation                by the Special Representative in his report, namely
> of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís, and to report to                … the discriminatory treatment of minorities by
> the Commission at its fifty-first session and to request                  reason of their religious beliefs, notably the Baha’ís,
> the Secretary-General to give all necessary assistance to               whose existence as a viable religious community in
> the Special Representative.                                             the Islamic Republic of Iran is threatened” … also
> R e s o l u t i on E / C N . 4 / S u b. 2 / RES / 1 9 9 4 / 1 6     urges “the Government of the Islamic Republic of
> (25.8.1994) of the Sub-Commission on Prevention                         Iran, as a State party to the International Covenants
> of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities deeply                   on Human Rights, to abide by its freely undertaken
> concerned “at extensive and continuing human rights                     obligations under the Covenants and under other inviolations by the Government of the Islamic Republic                    ternational instruments on human rights, and to ensure
> of Iran, including … freedom of religion,” shocked                      that all individuals within its territory and subject to
> “by the systematic repression of the Bahá’í community                   its jurisdiction, including religious groups, enjoy the
> and at the situation of the Iranian Kurds and the Arab                  rights recognized in these instruments,” further urges
> minority in Iran, and at increasing intolerance towards                 “the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to
> Christians, including recent murders of Christian                       intensify its efforts to investigate and rectify the hureligious ministers,” condemns “the flagrant viola-                     man rights issues raised by the Special Representative
> tions of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran                   in his observations, in particular with regard to the
> which, as noted by the Special Representative of the                    administration of justice and due process of law, and,
> Commission, include: (d) Religious discrimination,                      in fulfilment of its obligations under article 27 of the
> notably against the Bahá’ís and Christian individuals                   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
> and groups,” and requests the Secretary-General to                      to take steps to ensure the recognition and enjoyment
> “continue to keep the Sub-Commission informed of                        of human rights of persons belonging to minorities”
> relevant reports and United Nations measures to pre-                    and requests “the Special Representative to submit an
> vent human rights violations in the Islamic Republic                    interim report to the General Assembly at its fiftieth
> of Iran, including, in particular, those concerning the                 session on the situation of human rights in the Islamic
> situation of the Kurds and the Arab minority and the                    Republic of Iran, including the situation of minority
> religious freedoms of the Bahá’í and Christian com-                     groups such as the Baha’ís, and to report to the Communities in Iran.”                                                      mission at its fifty-second session.”
> Resolution 49/202 (23.12.1994) of the General                          Decision 1995/279 of ECOSOC approves the
> Assembly expresses “its concern more specifically at                     Commission’s decision to extend for a further year the
> the main criticisms of the Special Representative in                    mandate of the Special Representative on the situation
> his recent reports with regard to … the discriminatory                  of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, to
> treatment of minorities by reason of their religious                    request him to submit an interim report to the General
> beliefs, notably the Bahá’ís, whose existence as a viable               Assembly at its fiftieth session on the situation of hureligious minority is threatened …,” urges “the Islamic                 man rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including
> 
> 90 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> the situation of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís,                                        1996
> and to report to the Commission at its fifty-second ses-                  Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1996/84 (24.4.1996)
> sion and to request to the Secretary-General to give all             of the Commission on Human Rights expresses “its
> necessary assistance to the Special Representative.                  concern at the continuation of violations of human
> R e s o l u t i on E / C N . 4 / S u b. 2 / RES / 1 9 9 5 / 1 8   rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in particular
> (24.8.1995) of the Sub-Commission on Prevention                      … the discriminatory treatment of minorities by
> of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities deeply                reason of their religious beliefs, notably the Bahá’ís,
> concerned at “extensive and continuing human rights                  whose existence as a viable religious community in the
> violations by the Government of the Islamic Republic                 Islamic Republic of Iran is threatened…,” calls upon
> of Iran, including arbitrary and summary executions,                 “the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to
> torture and inhuman or degrading treatment and                       implement fully the conclusions and recommendations
> punishment, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, un-                  of the Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance
> explained disappearances, the absence of guarantees                  relating to the Bahá’ís and to other minority religious
> essential for the protection of the right to a fair trial            groups, including Christians,” urges “the Government
> and disregard for freedom of expression and freedom                  of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a State party to the
> of religion,” noting “that relevant international orga-              International Covenants on Human Rights, to abide
> nizations and bodies emphasize the role of the Islamic               by its obligations under the Covenants and under other
> Republic of Iran in intimidating and harassing the reli-             international instruments on human rights to which
> gious minorities in the Islamic Republic of Iran during              it is party, and to ensure that all individuals within
> the past year, in particular in the assassination of three           its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, including
> Christian leaders,” condemns “the flagrant violations                 religious groups, enjoy the rights recognized in these
> of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran which,               instruments” and requests “the Special Representative
> as noted by the Special Representative of the Com-                   to submit an interim report to the General Assembly
> mission, include: (f ) Religious discrimination, notably             at its fifty-first session on the situation of human rights
> against Bahá’ís and Christian individuals and groups,”               in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation
> requests “the Secretary-General to continue to keep                  of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís, and to report to
> the Sub-Commission informed of relevant reports                      the Commission at its fifty-third session.”
> and United Nations measures to prevent human rights                      Decision 1996/287 of ECOSOC endorses the
> violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including, in            Commission’s decision to extend for a further year the
> particular, those concerning the situation of the Kurds              mandate of the Special Representative, and approves
> and the Arab minority and the religious freedoms and                 the Commission’s request to the Special Representative
> the emancipation of the Bahá’í and Christian com-                    to submit an interim report to the General Assembly
> munities in Iran.”                                                   at its fifty-first session on the situation of human rights
> Resolution 50/188 (22.12.95) of the General As-                   in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation
> sembly expresses “its concern at violations of human                 of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís, and to report to
> rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in particular …              the Commission at its fifty-third session.
> the discriminatory treatment of minorities by reason                     Resolution E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/1996/7 (20.8.1996)
> of their religious beliefs, notably the Bahá’ís, whose               of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discriminaexistence as a viable religious community in the Islamic             tion and Protection of Minorities gravely concerned
> Republic of Iran is threatened …,” urges “the Govern-                “at reports of: (a) Extensive and continuing human
> ment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a State party               rights violations by the Government of the Islamic
> to the International Covenants on Human Rights, to                   Republic of Iran, including arbitrary and summary exabide by its obligations freely undertaken under the                 ecutions, torture and inhuman or degrading treatment
> Covenants and under other international instruments                  and punishment, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment,
> on human rights and to ensure that all individuals                   unexplained disappearances, the absence of guarantees
> within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, in-            essential for the protection of the right to a fair trial
> cluding religious groups, enjoy the rights recognized in             and disregard for freedom of expression and freedom
> those instruments,” and decides “to continue the exam-               of religion,” requests “the Government of the Islamic
> ination of the situation of human rights in the Islamic              Republic of Iran to investigate fully in order to end
> Republic of Iran, including the situation of minority                the alleged violations of human rights in the Islamic
> groups such as the Bahá’ís, during its fifty-first session             Republic of Iran which include: (d) Religious discrimiunder the item entitled “Human rights questions,” on                 nation, notably against Bahá’ís and Christians,” urges
> the basis of the report of the Special Representative                “the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to
> and in the light of additional elements provided by the              implement fully the conclusions and the recommenda-
> Commission on Human Rights and the Economic and                      tions of the Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance
> Social Council.”                                                     relating to the Bahá’ís and to other minority religious
> 
> APPENDIX II: The United Nations’ Response | 91
> groups, including Christians, until they are completely        ations of discrimination against the members of this
> emancipated” and requests “the Secretary-General to            religious community, as well as at the discriminatory
> continue to keep the Sub-Commission informed of                treatment of minorities by reason of their religious
> relevant reports and United Nations measures to pre-           beliefs, including certain Christian minorities, some
> vent human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of        members of which have been the targets of intimida-
> Iran, including violations of the religious freedoms of        tion and assassination,” calls upon “the Government
> the Bahá’í and the Christian communities in Iran.”             of the Islamic Republic of Iran: (b) To abide by its
> Resolution 51/107 (12.12.96) of the General As-             freely undertaken obligations under the International
> sembly expresses “its concern at the grave breaches of         Covenants on Human Rights and under other interhuman rights of the Bahá’ís in the Islamic Republic            national instruments on human rights, and to ensure
> of Iran and situations of discrimination against the           that all individuals within its territory and subject
> members of this religious community, as well as at             to its jurisdiction, including members of religious
> the discriminatory treatment of minorities by reason           groups and persons belonging to minorities, enjoy
> of their religious beliefs, including lack of adequate         all the rights enshrined in those instruments; (c) To
> protection for the Christian minorities, some members          implement fully the recommendations of the Special
> of which have been the target of intimidation and              Representative and the relevant recommendations of
> assassination,” urges “the Government of the Islamic           the Special Rapporteurs on religious intolerance and
> Republic of Iran, as a State party to the International        on freedom of opinion and expression, in particular the
> Covenants on Human Rights, to abide by its freely              recommendations relating to the Bahá’ís, Christians,
> undertaken obligations under the Covenants and under           Sunni and other minority religious groups; (g) To
> other international instruments on human rights and to         ensure that capital punishment will not be imposed for
> ensure that all individuals within its territory and sub-      apostasy or non-violent crimes, or in disregard of the
> ject to its jurisdiction, including members of religious       provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
> groups and persons belonging to minorities, enjoy all          Political Rights and the United Nations safeguards”
> the rights enshrined in those instruments,” calls upon         and decides: “… (c) To continue its examination of the
> “the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to             situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of
> implement fully the conclusions and recommendations            Iran, including the situation of minority groups such as
> of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Hu-             the Bahá’ís, at its fifty-fourth session under the agenda
> man Rights on the elimination of all forms of religious        item entitled ‘Question of the violation of human
> intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or         rights and fundamental freedoms in any part of the
> belief relating to the Bahá’ís and to other minority reli-     world, with particular reference to colonial and other
> gious groups, including Christians,” expresses its grave       dependent countries and territories.’ ”
> concern at indications, according to the information               Decision 1997/262 of ECOSOC endorses the
> received by the Special Representative of the Com-             Commission’s decision to extend for a further year the
> mission on Human Rights on the situation of human              mandate of the Special Representative on the situation
> rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, of a significant        of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, aptoughening of criminal legislation and its application         proved the Commission’s request to the Special Repin the Islamic Republic of Iran and in particular at the       resentative to submit an interim report to the General
> incidence of capital punishment imposed for apostasy           Assembly at its fifty-second session on the situation of
> and non-violent crimes, in violation of the relevant           human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran and to reprovisions of the International Covenant on Civil              port to the Commission at its fifty-fourth session, and
> and Political Rights and United Nations safeguards,”           to keep a gender perspective in mind when seeking and
> and decides “on the basis of the report of the Special         analysing information, and to request the Secretary-
> Representative and in the light of additional elements         General to continue to give all necessary assistance to
> provided by the Commission on Human Rights and                 the Special Representative to enable him to discharge
> the Economic and Social Council, to continue the               his mandate fully.
> examination of the situation of human rights in the                Resolution 52/142 of the General Assembly ex-
> Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation of           presses “its concern: (b) At the grave breaches of
> minority groups such as the Bahá’ís, during its fifty-          the human rights of the Bahá’ís, the discrimination
> second session under the item entitled ‘Human rights           against members of other religious minorities, includquestions.’ ”                                                  ing Christians, and the death sentences pronounced
> against Dhabihullah Mahrami, Musa Talibi and
> 1997
> Ramadan-Ali Dhulfaqari, on the charge of apostasy,
> Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1997/54 (15.4.1997)                   and against Bihnam Mithaqi and Kayvan Khalajabadi
> of the Commission on Human Rights expresses “its               because of their beliefs,” calls upon the Government
> concern: (b) At the grave breaches of the human rights         of the Islamic Republic of Iran: “… (b) To abide by its
> of the Bahá’ís in the Islamic Republic of Iran and situ-       freely undertaken obligations under the International
> 
> 92 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> Covenants on Human Rights and under other inter-            its fifty-fifth session under the same agenda item.”
> national instruments on human rights and to ensure              Decision 1998/273 of ECOSOC endorses the
> that all individuals within its territory and subject to    Commission’s decision to extend the mandate of the
> its jurisdiction, including members of religious groups     Special Representative for a further year, to request the
> and persons belonging to minorities, enjoy all the rights   Special Representative to submit an interim report to
> enshrined in those instruments; (c) To implement fully      the General Assembly at its fifty-third session and to
> the conclusions and recommendations of the Special          report to the Commission at its fifty-fifth session, and
> Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on             to keep a gender perspective in mind when seeking and
> the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance and   analysing information, and to request the Secretaryof discrimination based on religion or belief relating      General to continue to give all necessary assistance to
> to the Bahá’ís and to other minority religious groups,      the Special Representative to enable him to discharge
> including Christians, until they are completely eman-       his mandate fully.
> cipated; E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.2. (g) To ensure that               Resolution 53/158 (9.12.1998) of the General Ascapital punishment will not be imposed for apostasy         sembly expresses “its concern at the discrimination
> or non-violent crimes or in disregard of the provisions     against religious minorities and in particular remains
> of the International Covenant on Civil and Political        gravely concerned at the unabated pattern of persecu-
> Rights and United Nations safeguards” and decides           tion against the Bahá’ís, in particular the execution
> “to continue the examination of the situation of hu-        and sentencing to death and arrests of members of the
> man rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including       Bahá’í community, and calls upon the Government of
> the situation of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís, at    the Islamic Republic of Iran to implement the recomits fifty-third session under the item entitled ‘Human       mendations of the Special Rapporteur of the Comrights questions,’ in the light of additional elements      mission on Human Rights on religious intolerance
> provided by the Commission on Human Rights.”                relating to the Bahá’ís and to other religious minorities,
> until they are completely emancipated”; calls upon “the
> 1998
> Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ensure
> Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1998/80 (22.4.1998) of            that capital punishment will not be imposed for other
> the Commission on Human Rights expresses “its con-          than the most serious crimes, for apostasy, or otherwise
> cern: (c) At continuing grave violations of the human       in disregard of the provisions of the International Covrights of the Bahá’ís, as well as at the discrimination     enant on Civil and Political Rights and United Nations
> against members of other religious minorities, includ-      safeguards, and to provide the Special Representative
> ing Christians, despite constitutional guarantees, at       with relevant statistics on this matter”; and decides “to
> the increased pressure on religious communities and         continue the examination of the situation of human
> persons suspected of proselytizing, and at the death        rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the
> sentences pronounced against Mr. Dhabihullah Mah-           situation of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís, at its
> rami and Mr. Musa Talibi on the charge of apostasy,         fifty-fourth session under the item entitled ‘Human
> and against Mr. Bihnam Mithaqi and Mr. Kayvan               rights questions,’ in the light of additional elements
> Khalajabadi because of their beliefs,” calls upon “the      provided by the Commission on Human Rights.”
> Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran: (b) To
> abide by its freely undertaken obligations under the                                 1999
> International Covenants on Human Rights and under              Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1999/13 (23.4.1999) of
> other international instruments on human rights, and        the Commission on Human Rights notes with interto ensure that all individuals within its territory and     est: “… (b) The reported elimination of discrimination
> subject to its jurisdiction, including members of reli-     against Bahá’í youth in enrollment in the pre-university
> gious groups and persons belonging to minorities, en-       year at the high-school level, while remaining conjoy all the rights enshrined in those instruments; … (e)    cerned that their entry to universities continues to be
> To implement fully the conclusions and recommenda-          refused, expresses its concern: (c) At the continued
> tions of the Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance    discrimination against religious minorities, in parrelating to the Bahá’ís, Christians and other minority      ticular the unabated and, in some instances, worsened
> religious groups, until they are completely emancipated     pattern of persecution against the Bahá’ís, including
> … (j) To ensure that capital punishment will not be         death sentences, executions, arrests and the closure of
> imposed for non-violent crimes, for apostasy, or other-     the Bahá’í Institute for Higher Education” and calls
> wise in disregard of the provisions of the International    upon the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran:
> Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United       “… (b) To ensure that capital punishment will not be
> Nations safeguards” and decides: “… (c) To continue         imposed for other than the most serious crimes, not
> its examination of the situation of human rights in the     for apostasy or otherwise in disregard of the provisions
> Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation of mi-    of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
> nority groups such as the Bahá’ís and the Christians, at    Rights and United Nations safeguards, and to provide
> 
> APPENDIX II: The United Nations’ Response | 93
> the Special Representative with relevant statistics on        the sentencing to death of some of them”. Calls upon
> this matter; (c) To implement fully the conclusions           the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran…”to
> and recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on              implement fully the conclusions and recommendations
> religious intolerance relating to the Bahá’ís and other       of the Special Representative with regard to religious
> minority religious groups until they are completely           intolerance relating to the Bahá’ís and other minority
> emancipated”; and decides: “… (c) To continue its             religious groups, Ibid,. para 110. until they are comexamination of the situation of human rights in the           pletely emancipated”; Decides “to continue the exami-
> Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation of the      nation of the situation of human rights in the Islamic
> Bahá’ís and other minority groups, at its fifty-sixth ses-     Republic of Iran, including the situation of minority
> sion under the same agenda item.”                             groups such as the Bahá’ís, at its fifty-sixth session,
> Resolution A/RES754/177 (17.12.1999) of the               under the item ‘Human rights questions’, in the light
> General Assembly expresses its concern… “at the dis-          of additional elements provided by the Commission on
> crimination against religious minorities, in particular       Human Rights”.
> Bahá’ís, and remains gravely concerned at the unabated
> 2001
> pattern of persecution against the Bahá’ís, including
> death sentences, arrests and the closure of the Bahá’í            Resolution E/CN.4/RES/2001/17 (20.4.2001) the
> Institute for Higher Education, and calls upon the            Commission on Human Rights notes:
> Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to imple-              “ recent positive steps regarding the situation of the
> ment fully the conclusions and recommendations of             Bahá’ís, including the report that they will be allowed
> the Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance relating      to re-establish their cemetery in Tehran, but expresses
> to the Bahá’ís and other religious minorities until they      its concern at the still-existing discrimination against
> are completely emancipated”; Decides… “to continue            persons belonging to minorities, in particular against
> the examination of the situation of human rights in           Bahá’ís, and calls upon the Government of the Islamic
> the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation         Republic of Iran to eliminate all forms of discriminaof minority groups, such as the Bahá’ís, at its fifty-fifth     tion based on religious grounds or against persons
> session under the item entitled “Human rights ques-           belonging to minorities and to address this matter
> tions”, in the light of additional elements provided by       in an open manner with the full participation of the
> the Commission on Human Rights”.                              minorities themselves, as well as to implement fully the
> conclusions and recommendations of the Special Rap-
> 2000                                  porteur on religious intolerance relating to the Bahá’ís
> Resolution E/CN.4/2000/L.16 (10.4.2000) the               and other minority groups until they are completely
> Commission on Human Rights expresses its concern:             emancipated”. Decides… “to continue its examina-
> …”At the discrimination against religious minori-             tion of the situation of human rights in the Islamic
> ties, in particular the unabated pattern of persecution       Republic of Iran, paying particular attention to further
> against the Bahá’ís, including death sentences and ar-        developments, including the situation of the Bahá’ís
> rests”; calls upon…”To ensure that capital punishment         and other minority groups, at its fifty-eighth session
> will not be imposed other than for the most serious           under the same agenda item”.
> crimes, not for apostasy or otherwise in disregard of             Resolution A/RES/56/171(19.12.2001) The Genthe provisions of the International Covenant on Civil         eral Assembly expresses its concern: … “At the conand Political Rights and United Nations safeguards,           tinuing discrimination against persons belonging to
> and to provide the Special Representative with rel-           minorities, in particular against Bahá’ís, Christians,
> evant statistics on this matter”; “To implement fully         Jews and Sunnis”. It calls upon the Government of the
> the conclusions and recommendations of the Special            Islamic Republic of Iran: …”To eliminate all forms of
> Rapporteur on religious intolerance relating to the           discrimination based on religious grounds or against
> Bahá’ís and other minority religious groups until they        persons belonging to minorities and to address this
> are completely emancipated; Decides:…” To continue            matter in an open manner, with the full participation
> its examination of the situation of human rights in the       of the minorities themselves, as well as to implement
> Islamic Republic of Iran, paying particular attention to      fully the conclusions and recommendations of the
> further developments, including the situation of the          Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
> Bahá’ís and other minority groups, at its fifty-seventh        Rights on the question of religious intolerances relatsession under the same agenda item”.                          ing to the Bahá’ís and other minority groups until they
> Resolution A/RES/55/114 (4.12.00) The General             are completely emancipated.”. Decides : ..”To continue
> Assembly expresses its concern: “At the discrimina-           the examination of the situation of human rights in the
> tion against persons belonging to religious minorities,       Islamic Republic of Iran, paying particular attention to
> in particular the unabated pattern of persecution of          further developments, including the situation of the
> the Bahá’ís, including the continuing detention and           Bahá’ís and other minority groups, at its fifty-seventh
> 
> 94 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION
> session, under the agenda item entitled “Human rights      tions”, in the light of additional elements provided by
> questions”, in the light of additional elements provided   the Commission on Human Rights”.
> by the Commission on Human Rights”.
> 2004
> 2003                                  Resolution A/RES/59/205 (02.11.04). The General
> Resolution A/RES/58/195 (22.12.03). The Gen-            Assembly expresses its serious concern at:..” The coneral Assembly expresses its serious concern at:..” The     tinuing discrimination against persons belonging to mi-
> Continuing discrimination against persons belonging        norities, including Christians, Jews and Sunnis, and the
> to minorities, including the Bahá’ís, Christians, Jews     increased discrimination against the Bahá’ís, including
> and Sunnis, including cases of arbitrary arrest and        cases of arbitrary arrest and detention, the denial of free
> detention, the denial of free worship or of publicly       worship or of publicly carrying out communal affaires,
> carrying out communal affairs and the disregard of         the disregard of property rights, the destruction of sites
> property rights”. It calls upon the government of the      of religious importance, the suspension of social, educa-
> Islamic Republic of Iran:…” To eliminate all forms of      tional and community-related activities and the denial
> discrimination based on religious grounds or against       of access to higher education, employment, pensions
> persons belonging to minorities, including the Bahá’ís,    and other benefits”. It calls upon the Government of
> Christians, Jews and Sunnis, and to address this matter    the Islamic Republic of Iran: …” To eliminate all forms
> in an open manner, with the full participation of the      of discrimination based on religious grounds or against
> minorities themselves”. It decides:… “to continue its      persons belonging to minorities, including the Bahá’ís,
> examination of the situation of human rights in the        Christians, Jews and Sunnis, and to address this matter
> Islamic Republic of Iran, paying particular attention      in an open manner, with the full participation of the
> to further developments, including the situation of the    minorities themselves, and to ensure respect for the
> Bahá’ís and other minority groups, at its fifty-ninth       freedom of religion or belief of all persons”.
> session, under the item entitled “Human rights ques-
> 
> APPENDIX II: The United Nations’ Response | 95
> THE BAH Á’Í QUESTION
> Cultural Cleansing in Iran
> Copyright 2005 Bahá’í International Community
> Web site : http://question.bahai.org
>
> — *The Baha'i Question: Cultural Cleansing in Iran (Used by permission of the curator)*