# Debacle: The American Failure in Iran *Exported from [Holy-Writings.com](https://www.holy-writings.com/) on 2026-06-19 — 1 clipping.* --- > Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Michael Ledeen, Debacle: The American Failure in Iran, bahai-library.com. > ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── > > Michael Ledeen DEBACLE > & William Láewis .The American > ~ > ALFRED A. KNOPF NEW YORK 1981 > Failure in Iran > > '"'-:,.,_ > -'•II > THIS IS A BORZOI BOOK > PUBLISHED BY ALFRED A. KNOPF, INC. > > Copyright © 1980, 1981 by > Michael Ledeen and William Lewis To Kathleen and Barbara > > All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copy- > right Conventions. Published in the United States by Alfred A. > Knopf, Inc., New York, and simultaneously in Canada by Ran- > dom House of Canada Limited, Toronto. Distributed by Random > House, Inc., New York. > > LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING IN PUBLICATION DATA > Ledeen, Michael Arthur. (Date) > Debacle, the American failure in Iran. > Includes bibliographical references and index. > 1. United States-Foreign relations-Iran. > 2. Iran-Foreign relations-United States. > I. Lewis, William Hubert, joint author. II. Title. > E183.8.155L42 1981 327.73981 327.73055 80-2714 > ISBN 0-394-51657-7 AACRI > > Manufactured in the United States of America > First Edition > DEBACLE The King of Kings 31 > would learn the virtues of moderation in a different environment. of the revolution has observed, "the clergy was the only group in Iran > This was not always a successful operation. In fact, Khomeini's three equipped to engage in oppositional activities. It possessed a function- > closest associates during the revolutionary period all returned to Iran ing system of communication; local facilities in the form of mosques > from foreign universities: Ibrahim Yazdi from Texas, Abo! Hassan and related buildings ... close daily contact with the masses and the > Bani Sadr from Paris, and Sadeq Ghotbzadeh from Georgetown possibility of including political themes in the Friday sermons. With > University in Washington, D.C. Even college graduates--or drop- all this, the high-ranking clergy enjoyed a certain degree of immunity > outs, as in the case of Ghotbzadeh--could retain the intense faith of from the shah's grip." 1' > the Shi'ites. * While the shah challenged the mullahs indirectly-by enactment > of the legislation that made up the White Revolution-he had no > Concentration of strength in the hands of the religious leaders: stomach for the kind of unholy war that would have been necessary > While Khomeini had been exiled in the early 1960s (first to Turkey, to bring the Shi'ites to heel. His father had been far more forceful, > then to the city of Najaf in Iraq), the shah never took decisive action and there were many around him who urged Mohammed Reza to > against the mullahs, who bitterly resented his programs. Like Reza emulate Reza Shah. Yet paradoxically, the greater the shah's author- > Shah, Mohammed Reza provided for civil judges (thus depriving the ity (and authoritarianism) in secular matters, the less he seemed > mullahs of financial and political opportunities) and greatly en- inclined to challenge the mullahs. > hanced civil rights for the populace at large, particularly for women > and minorities. These measures flew in the teeth of the Shi'ite leaders' The hostility of the bazaaris: The bazaar merchants, who made up > convictions that women should be unseen and unheard outside the a traditional merchant class of considerable power, had long resented > home, and that the governance of the country should remain in the shah's modernization program. His introduction of the Western > purely Shi'ite hands. Perhaps the most provocative of the shah's banking system threatened the bazaaris' income from moneylending > actions was to appoint several Baha'is (followers of a nineteenth- (at rates much higher than those permitted by the banks), and his > century religious movement considered heretical by Islamic leaders) plans for the creation of cooperatives also menaced their traditional > to cabinet-level positions. activities. Worse yet, the shah proposed the construction of a new > Beginning in 1976, there were large-scale demonstrations demand- commercial and shopping area precisely on the site of the traditional > ing greater adherence to fundamentalist Islamic practices. Rather bazaar, thus threatening the bazaaris with physical removal from > than meeting the Shi'ite challenge head on, the shah alternated be- their business places. Along with these hated steps, he periodically > tween harsh measures and attempts at appeasement (as, for example, called for crackdowns on price-gouging. It was thus not surprising > his return to the use of the Arab calendar in the autumn of 1978). that many bazaaris supported the revolution, both for their own > This was only understandable, for the struggle with the Shi'ites self-interest (often of a highly avaricious sort) and to a certain extent > would have been enormously difficult even under the most favorable out of religious conviction. Lastly, there was an unpleasant "ethnic" > circumstances, and in the second half of the 1970s the shah found component to the bazaaris' anti-shah activities: they hoped to re- > himself on the defensive in many areas. As one of the best analysts move their Jewish and Armenian competitors by supporting > Khomeini-hopes that were to be fully realized after the revolution. > •Shi'ism has its roots in the disputes that erupted after the death of the Prophet Mohammed > as to who should wear his mantle as leader of the religious community (Umma). The Shi'ites The physical presence of a foreign community: If any Iranian > are those who remained loyal to Ali in the line of succession. Widely distributed throughout needed a physical symbol of the changes the shah had wrought upon > Iraq and Iran, as well as the Persian Gulf and Pakistan, the Shi'ites proclaimed the legitimacy > of the Caliphate within the family of Ali. In time, however, various schools of interpretation > the country, it was readily at hand in the large foreign ghettos in > evolved, reducing the homogeneity of the Shi'ite religious community. The various schools Tehran, and to some extent other cities as well. The most obvious > include the Qarmats, the Ismai'ilians, the Nusayris, and so on. of these groups was the American community, composed of business > !02 DEBACLE > > (they had in fact urged that publication be postponed, or that it be > printed in an unobtrusive corner of the paper), and they had to deal > with the rage of the ayatollahs and mullahs. Even the most moderate > ' The Crisis, I > which had religious significance or stood for secular influence or a > > Western life-style in the eyes of the demonstrators. Others were chosen > because they were seen as symbols of capitalism and social inequality, > of the ayatollahs, Kazem Shariatmadari, condemned the article for or of the power of the regime. Many targets fell into more than one > "besmirching the faith," and suggested that the publication of the of these categories. Recurrent attacks were made on cinemas and > attack had "shocked all Muslims in Iran." Under the circumstances, theatres, liquor stores, television sale rooms, shops for luxury goods, > expensive cars, banks, the headquarters of women's organizations, > no one could defend the article in Ettela 'at, and the alliance of > police stations, and the offices of the Rastakhiz party. A different > convenience between religious and more secular religious leaders > religious element came to the fore in the attacks on businesses owned > opposed to the shah became even stronger. > or headed by members of the Bahai sect. ... Yet another indication > The publication came at a time when violence was once again was that riots usually started at centers of religious life .... Sermons > erupting in the streets. New demonstrations took place in the holy and religious lectures were the principal means for spreading opposi- > city of Qum on January 7 and 9. Religious leaders claimed that the tion propaganda. . . .1 > actions were in response to the Ettela 'at article, while the govern- > ment maintained that they were timed to coincide with two of the In addition to all these targets, the demonstrations increasingly > most important dates in the history of the westernization of Iran: centered upon the person of the shah himself, and upon his deviation > January 7, when women had been formally emancipated in 1935; and from Islamic standards of behavior and belief. In particular, there > January 9, when the shah's agrarian program had been formally was a growing demand that the shah abandon the Imperial calendar > launched in 1962. Whatever the actual explanation, the demonstra- (dated from the accession of Cyrus the Great) and reinstate the > tions were serious, with the second leading to violent clashes with Islamic one (starting with the hejira of Mohammed in 622). > police. At least six people were killed in the fighting. In the face of this heightened violence against him, the shah re- > The deaths in Qum marked the beginning of six months of periodic versed his tactics by attempting to appease his religious enemies. > violence throughout the country. Once the mandatory sixty days of Military commanders were instructed to show maximum restraint in > mourning had passed, demonstrations were launched anew, produc- dealing with religious-led demonstrations, and it was not until an > ing new clashes with government troops, fresh martyrs, and the outburst of unusually destructive violence swept Isfahan in early > beginning of another cycle of forty days. This relentless rhythm August, shortly after the beginning of the holy month of Ramadan, > continued until June, when the pattern was broken and violence that martial law was temporarily declared in that city. The shah had > became almost nonstop. once again gotten the worst of both worlds: having provoked the > The violence was not limited to religious centers, although it al- wrath of the mullahs, he then backed away from their challenge. The > most always had some religious ingredient. For the first time since impression in the eyes of his enemies was of a man who was losing > 1963, there was an antigovernment protest in the Tehran bazaar, his grip on power, unsure of his strategy, and vulnerable to attack > where the shopkeepers staged a strike in the face of official threats -an impression that had been heightened in June when the shah > to revoke the licenses of all participants. And as always, there were announced that the dreaded chief of SA VAK, General Nematollah > periodic explosions on university campuses. Nassiri, had been relieved of his responsibilities. There are many > In June, the crisis took on a new dimension. Both the number of versions of the reasons for Nassiri's removal, and it is impossible to > demonstrations and their clear religious content pointed to a guiding select any one of them with confidence. Some experts, including at > hand with single-minded resolve: least one high-ranking official of the U.S. State Department, believed > that the shah was responding to direct American suggestions that > The dominant role of the religious leader in the events of 1978 was Nassiri should be removed. The general was the symbol of human > emphasized by the nature of the targets attacked by rioters, many of rights violations to many in the American foreign policy establish- > 106 DEBACLE The Crisis, I 107 > Tripoli, providing logistical help, funds, and sanctuary for Iranian of his own son if he steals, and would flog and stone his near relative > exiles and their friends; and a far-flung network of acolytes and if he fornicates." Prior to the revolution, Khomeini's many apolo- > supporters throughout the Arab world and the West, organizing gists in the West suggested that one should not take such words > similar movements for purposes of propaganda and exerting pressure literally, but the course of events has shown that a literal interpreta- > on local governments to weaken the shah. Once in motion, the tion was closer to the truth. The same volume contains a preview of > movement acquired such tremendous gravity that it attracted the actions of some of the leaders of the Khomeini period: > the weaker secular political groups that had long been considered the > only true alternative to the Pahlavi dynasty by most observers; it also If a just mullah is placed in charge of the enforcement of canonical > received support from the Soviet Union, although the full extent of punishments ... would he enforce them otherwise than how they were > enforced in the days of the Prophet? ... Would the Prophet have > this assistance can only be guessed at. > The world view of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini is contained imposed more than a hundred lashes on the fornicator not previously > chaste? Can the mullah reduce the amount of this punishment, thereby > in two volumes: Islamic Government, a collection of his lectures in > creating a divergence between his practice and that of the Prophet? > Najaf published in Arabic in 1970; and Khomeini and His Movement, > Certainly not! The ruler ... is no more than the executor of God's > a collection of his speeches and harangues published in Farsi in 1975á command and decree.' > The central theme is the same in both volumes-the shah must fall, > for he is an enemy of Islam. In the 1975 book, Khomeini put it in Furthermore, Khomeini attacked the shah for his close working > unmistakable terms: "The rationale of [the shah's) government and relationship with two foreign powers: the United States and Israel. > some of its members is the abolition of the laws of Islam." What The latter is singled out for intense hatred, and the former is linked > precisely were the shah's sins? First and foremost was the effort to to Israeli schemes for the destruction of Islam. Israel, "through its > westernize Iran, thus depriving the country of its moral base and the evil agents ... has dealt a blow to us. It strikes at you, the nation; > mullahs of their rightful place in society. Khomeini condemns the it wishes to seize your economy; it wishes to carry off your commerce > hiring of women in boys' high schools, and of men in girls' high and agriculture; it wishes to make itself the owner of wealth ... the > schools, "the moral wrongness of which is clear to all." Moreover, Koran bars its way-it must be removed .... The Iranian govern- > it is wrong to have women in high places, which the shah had ment [of the shah] in pursuance to the purposes and schemes oflsrael > permitted. has humiliated us and continues to do so." Those not familiar with > But some of the harshest language is reserved for the practice of the relationship between Israel and Iran might well wonder at the > appointing lay persons to high positions in the national courts: "In intensity of Khomeini's rage in 1975á It is not widely known that > order to accomplish its own designs and to abolish manliness and every Israeli prime minister from David Ben-Gurion to Menachem > adherence to Islam as qualities for judges, the government's Ministry Begin visited Tehran during this period, as did other leading Israeli > of Justice has shown its opposition to the established law of Islam. personages. Moshe Dayan and Yitzhak Rabin, for example, went > From this point on, Jews, Christians, and enemies of Islam and of secretly to Iran to discuss matters of joint interest with their Iranian > the Muslims must interfere in the affairs of Muslims .... " The words counterparts. And there was considerable cooperation between the > "enemies of Islam" are a code-phrase for the Baha'is, who were two countries. Iran was Israel's most reliable oil supplier; Israel > targeted by the Khomeini movement as early as the demonstrations responded by assisting Iran on military preparedness, a certain de- > in 1977-78, and later singled out for violent treatment once the gree of intelligence sharing, and even technical assistance. There was > revolution succeeded. no Israeli embassy in Tehran, but the head of the Israeli mission > The shah was criticized not only for his attempts at moderniza- during the last days, Uri Lubrani, was as much an ambassador as any > tion, but also for his leniency toward sinners: "We want," said diplomat bearing the official title. It is doubtful that Khomeini knew > Khomeini in the earlier volume, "a ruler who would cut off the hand the full extent of bilateral relations, but he was not imagining the > > ~á > Notes > > ONE The King of Kings > > 1. Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), p. 53. > 2. Arthur Arnold, Through Persia by Caravan (London: Tinsley Bros., 1877), p. 179. > 3. Shaul Bakhash, "The Iranian Revolution," New York Review of Books, June 26, 1980, > p. 23. > 4. Graham, Iran, p. 57. > 5. Ernest R. Oney, The Revolution in Iran: Religion and Politics in a Traditional Society. > International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1980, pp. <)-II. > 6. This, along with much of the information in this book, comes from diplomatic cables, made > available to us on a confidential basis. > 7. Diplomatic cable. > 8. Official text of John F. Kennedy's toast at a dinner in the State Dining Room at the White > House, April 11, 1962. > 9. Diplomatic cable. > 10. Nikki R. Keddie, "The Iranian Power Structure and Social Change 1800--1969," Interna- > tional Journal for Middle East Studies 2, no. 1 (January 1971): 17. > 11. Manfred Halpern, "The Revolution of Modernization" (draft ms., Princeton University, > > April 24, 1964). > 12. Diplomatic cable. > 13. Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mission for My Country (London: Hutchinson, 1974), > p. 321. > 14. Diplomatic cable. > 15. Yair P. Hirschfeld, "Decline and Fall of the Pahlavis," Jerusalem Quarterly, Summer 1979, > p. 27. > 16. George Lenczowski, "Iran: the Awful Truth," American Spectator, December 1979, p. 2. > > Notes Notes 247 > 12. Joseph Kraft, "Letter from Iran," New Yorker, December 18, 1978, p. 159. > IJ Text of President Carter's press conference, November 13, 1978. > > Two The Washington-Tehran Axis I4. Newsweek, March 5, I979. p. 43á > I5. US. News and World Report, May 7, I979á p. 32. > 1. Graham, Iran, p. 66. > 2. Robert Pranger and Dale Tahtinen, United States Policy in the Persian Gulf (Washington, > D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, I979), p. 7. FIVE The Crisis, II > 3. Roland A. Paul, American Military Commitments Abroad (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers > University Press, I973). pp. 27-28. Robert Moss, "Who Burned the Rex Cinema?" Daily Telegraph (London), November 6, > 4. Pranger and Tahtinen, US Policy, p. 9. I978. > 5. Diplomatic cable. 2. David Menashri, "Iran," in Colin Legum and Haim Shakhed, eds., Middle East Contempo- > 6. Stanley Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order (New York: McGraw-Hill, I978), p. 47. rary Survey, vol. 2 (I977-78), p. 483. > 7. U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, "U.S. Military Sales to Iran," 3. Kraft, "Letter from Iran," p. I62. > July I976, p. xi. 4. Sharif Arani, "Iran from the Shah's Dictatorship to Khomeini's Demagogic Theocracy," > 8. Ibid., p. 32. Dissent, Winter I980, pp. I7-I8. > 9. Ibid., p. 32. 5. Herman Nickel in Fortune, March 12, I979. p. 98. > 6. Cited in Menashri, "Iran," vol. 3. > 7. Arani, "Iran," p. I4. > 8. Robert Shaplen, series on Newsom, New Yorker, June 2, 9, and I6, I979á > THREE Carter and Iran > 9. See George Ball's interview in Politique Internationale, Autumn, I979á > 1. Unpublished ms. by a member of the Human Rights Bureau. IO. Washington Post, November I9, I978. > 2. Richard Sale, "Carter and Iran: From Idealism to Disaster," Washington Quarterly. II. Washington Post, November 20, I978. > Autumn I980, p. 80. 12. Official text of President Carter's press conference, December 7, I978. > > 3. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, November 9, I977á I3. Arani, "Iran," p. I9. > > FOUR The Crisis, I Six The Revolution > > 1. David Menashri, "Iran" in Colin Legum and Haim Shaked, eds., Middle East Contempo- 1. Kraft, "Letter from Iran," p. I68. > rary Survey, vol. 3 (I978-79) (New York and London: Holmes and Meir, I98o). Since we 2. Confidential interviews. > worked from galley proofs of Menashri's article, we cannot cite a printed page number. 3. Confidential interviews. > 2. Confidential interview shortly after the shah's departure from Iran. 4. Washington Post, June I8, I980. > 3. Cf. Michael Ledeen, "Khomeini's Theocratic Vision," Wall Street Journal. January 5, 5. Confidential interviews. > I979á For an example of the reaction from Khomeini's supporters in the United States, see > the letter to the Wall Street Journal from Mahmoud Rashdan, the Secretary General of > the Muslim Students Association of the U.S. and Canada, January 22, I979á SEVEN The Ayatollah's Revenge > 4. Joseph Alpher, "The Khomeini International," Washington Quarterly, Autumn I98o, > p. 6I. 1. See Bazargan's interview with Oriana Fallaci, New York Times Magazine, October 28, > 5. The most careful analysis of the phenomenon is found in Ervand Abrahamman, ''The I979á > Guerrilla Movement in Iran, I963-I977," Merip Reports, no. 86 (March-April I98o). 2. Kayhan International, July IO, I979á > 6. Oney, Revolution in Iran, and Robert Moss, "How Russia Plots Against the Shah," 3. Menashri, "Iran," vol. 3. > Sunday Telegraph (London), November 5, I978. 4. L 'Express, June 2I, I98o. For some excerpts in English, see Michael Ledeen, "Presswatch," > 7. Michael Ledeen, ''The KGB Radio Hour," American Spectator, February I980. American Spectator, August I980. > 8. Stansfield Turner on ABC's "Issues and Answers," February 4, I979á 5. Cited in Congressional Research Service chronology prepared by Clyde R. Mark and by > 9. Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, "How the Americans Overthrew Me," Now!, December members of the Iran Task Force. > 7, I979á p. 33. 6. BBC broadcast September ll, I979• and Ette/a 'at, May 24, I979á > IO. U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Iran: evaluation of 7. Ette/a'at and Kayhan, May I6, I979á > U.S. intelligence performance prior to November I978," staff report, pp. 4 If. 8. Radio Tehran broadcasts, September 6 and 7, I979á See also International Herald Tribune, > II. Washington Post, November 20, I978. October I5, I979. and Menashri, "Iran," vol. 3. > > — *Debacle: The American Failure in Iran (Used by permission of the curator)*