# Iran since the Revolution *Exported from [Holy-Writings.com](https://www.holy-writings.com/) on 2026-06-19 — 1 clipping.* --- > Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Nikki R. Keddie, Iran since the Revolution, bahai-library.com. > ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── > > b37á5.c.9S. 12 > > IRAN > SINCE THE REVOLUTION > Internal Dynamics, > Regional Conflict, > and the Superpowers > > Edited by > Barry M. Rosen > > SOCIAL SCIENCE MONOGRAPHS, BOULDER > DISTRIBUTED BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, NEW YORK > 1985 > Copyright © 1985 by Program on Society in Change > Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 84-52082 > ISBN 0-88033-075-9 > Printed in the United States of America > Brooklyn College Studies on Society in Change > No. 47 > Editor-in-Chief > Bela K. Kiraly > 12 Nikki R. Keddie Islamic Revivalism Past and Present, with Emphasis on Iran 13 > > in government, but with the giving of greater weight to right-wingers in-chief did not increase his long-term power and was taken from him > and to those who once favored the radicals but now act conservatively. in 1981. > The radicals are, as of January 1984, still in government, and some are The third phase began in the spring and early summer of 1981, when > still fighting for greater influence. In social terms the recent development participants in a Bani-Sadr rally, attacked by the Hezbollahis, fought > has been away from workers and peasants and toward the middle, back, and Bani-Sadr was stripped of his presidency and went into > landed, and professional classes-including bazaaris, landlords and hiding. He escaped abroad with Mas'ud Rajavi, leader of the Islamic > wealthy peasants, and professionals and technocrats, as well as those leftist Mojahedin-e Khalq, which declared its militant opposition to the > in these classes and among students outside Iran whom the government regime. A large number of assassinations of high- and middle-level > would like to attract back to Iran. Revolutionary utopianism has, at governmental figures, mostly by the Mojahedin, failed to weaken the > least for now, partly given way to "bourgeois" practicality, including a government but did give it both a reason and an excuse to crack down > stress on oil income, foreign trade, and technology, though continued on all opposition, which was tainted with abetting the Iraqi enemy. > war, jailings, executions, and anti-American rhetoric have kept most Executions, torture, and jailings occurred on a massive scale. > Americans from noticing the change. During these three phases the government tried to meet some of the > Both Iranian revolutionaries and some foreign analysts have divided needs of the poor, despite the economic problems created by revolution > the revolution in power into three phases, and the Thermidor beginning and war, and the volunteer Construction Crusade carried out important > sometime in 1982 may be added as a fourth. public works while organizations like the Foundation for the Oppressed > The first phase began with the seizure of power by guerrilla forces aided the urban poor. New land distribution measures were proposed > in the name of the revolution in February 1979 and ended with the from 1980 on but never implemented, although some confiscations > taking of the American hostages in November 1979. At first there was effected by peasants were not reversed. > a true united-front government, including not only nonulama supporters The fourth phase began with conservative measures early in 1982, > of Khomeini, notably Prime Minister Mahdi Bazargan and the younger and by the end of that year, this tendency was clear, even though there > Abu 'I-Hasan Bani-Sadr, Sadeq Qotbzada, and Ibrahim Yazdi, but also, were few major personnel changes after those necessitated by the > for a time, more conservative, secularist members of the National Front assassinations. One aspect of this phase has been the veto by the Council > such as Karim Sanjabi. For a time there was considerable freedom of of Guardians as un-Islamic of economic measures that were deemed to > the press and association, but by the summer of 1979 numerous news- interfere with private property (in contrast to the numerous nationalpapers and journals had been suppressed, and the clerically backed izations that had taken place earlier). The two main measures so vetoed > thugs called the Hezbollahis were breaking up demonstrations by leftist in 1982 were a land reform bill, which would have divided still-existing > and left-center groups, notably the Mojahedin-e Khalq, the Feda'iyyin- large holdings among poor peasants, and one nationalizing most foreign > e Khalq, and the National Democratic Front led by Hedayatollah Matin- trade. Iranian eyewitness reports indicate that pressure from landowners > and bazaar elements whose economic interests would be hurt by these > Daftari, a grandson of Mosaddeq. > measures help account for these vetoes; both laws had been passed by > With the taking of the U.S. embassy and hostages, the movement > the Majlis, which still represents more broad-based popular opinion. > toward control by radical clerics received a big impetus that the growing > In late 1982 Khomeini issued a decree that, among other things, > radical clerical leadership used for its own ends; this inaugurated the > protected people's homes, jobs, and telephones against scrutiny or > second phase of the revolution. Bazargan and his foreign minister Yazdi > invasion by officials, and this was followed by the creation of investigative > resigned when they were unable to resolve the crisis, and their power > bodies that traveled throughout Iran and the forced resignation of some > passed to radical clerics. In the light of later trends, the January 1980 officials charged with crimes against people. Khomeini spoke of the > election of Bani-Sadr as president appears in part as an anomaly that revolutionary phase's being over and the need for stabilization. Middleoccurred largely because the Islamic Republican Party candidate was class and upper-class pressures were at work here too, as was the > forbidden to run because of a technicality. Iraq's attack on Iran later in growing economic pragmatism also seen in Iran's striving for high oil > 1980 further radicalized the situation and made opponents of the regime, production and prices and numerous trade and industrial agreements > such as the Kurds, who had been fighting for autonomy since negotiations with a variety of countries that could not meet Iran's ideological standards. > broke down in 1979, look like traitors. Bani-Sadr's position as commander- The establishment of some new legal norms, as long as the persons > 14 Nikki R. Keddie Islamic Revivalism Past and Present. with Emphasis on Iran 15 > > involved were not Baha'is, women, or associated with organizations ease with which many of Iran's clerical leaders can change their interconsidered hostile, was aimed in large part at the middle classes and pretations > . . of Islam from > . . revolutionary-populist > . to conservat 1áve -b ourgeo1s, > á > at halting the continued emigration of trained persons and attracting mdJCate that > . IslamJC ideology 1s malleable accordiáng to c1árcums t ances. > back such persons who had gone abroad. The conservatism has often Both r~d'.cal and conservative camps still exist among the ulama, with > not, however, been directed toward legal norms. The increasing arms Khome1m bowing to trends more than is admitted, and future trends > sales by the USSR to Iraq after Iran refused to negotiate with the latter . behdivined by any. study. of .Shi'ism, which is consta n ti y m > cannot á fl ux. > were probably the main reason for the arrest early in 1983 of the Smce t e 196 0 s, .Islamic revival m Iran, while appealing to some of > leadership of the Tuda party and the effective banning of that party the s~me mass. sentiments, has represented a wide variety of trends in > despite its support of the government. Jailings and/or executions of pra.chce. Even 1f one starts an analysis only in 1978, one finds a variety > people for their associations-whether Mojahedin, Tuda, or Baha'i- of 1de~s bound together at first more by a common enemy-the shah > continue and often involve the flouting of legal norms. and his foreign s.upporters-than by a really common interpretation of > The 1982 veto of the land reform bill was both an element and a Islam. Interpretations ranged from the de facto socialism of the Mojahedindirectional signal in the treatment of peasants. The increasing references e Khalq through the more ambiguous radicalism associated with the > to the sanctity of private property in Islam have found their most name of 'Ali Shari'ati (d. 1977), the reformism of Mortaza Motahhari > extreme expression to date in a labor act proposed in 1983, which would and the > ., ratherd á conservative bazaar-oriented constitutionalism of Kazem' > do away with both the gains made before the revolution and those Shan a'.ma an, to the populist .fu.ndamentalism of Khomeini. Younger > ,1dded in some areas since then. Islam is said in this bill to sanction nonclencal > d. followers of Khomem1 such as Bani-Sadr, Qotb za d a, an d > what amounts to the view enforced in parts of the West at the beginning Yaz 1 seem t~ have believe.d that their influence on Khomeini's prol)f the nineteenth century, namely, no interference of any sort with nouncements m France, which Khomeini accepted out of pragmatism, > private contracts between owner and worker. Group gains, including wo~ld extend ~o a real moderating influence after the revolution, but > 1t did not. Barn-Sadr has subsequently claimed to have been bet a ed > unions, insurance, and a minimum wage, would be outlawed, as would > existing limits on child labor. In a period of mass unemployment like by Khome.ini, but he seems rather to have believed in that part > prerevolut1onary Khomeini that pleased him.1J > :f ~he > the present, workers would surely bid each other downward. Whether > > l > or not the measure passes in its current form, it is a good indication Af'.er the. revolution there continued to be ideological differences, not > of the way some of those now leading the government look at socio- only. m~lud1~g all the above groups, but centering more and more on > economic issues. 12 The dismissal in the summer of 1983 of the Minister contmumg differences between radical and conservative ruling clergy, > of Labor who sponsored the bill put the bill in limbo, but its ideas were among whom there were often shifting alliances and subfactions. As > not repudiated by its supporters. > •l noted above, policies have changed significantly from one phase of the > i > As I have said, it is a special feature of the Iranian Thermidor that :ev~lutio.n to the next, and for each phase and policy an Islamic > it is being carried out largely by the same persons who were identified 1ustification has been found. The few constants that might be noted > with the radical Phase 3 and, in some cases, with even earlier phases. ~ave bee~ in enforcing "Islamic" laws and some "Islamic" punishments > It is common both in the Muslim world and elsewhere for someone (m.,~uotahon marks because there is no complete agreement, even among > who begins with a radical and populist appeal to adjust to the old Sh11s, about what laws and punishments are Islamic). These are mostly > ruling classes and conservative ways once in power, but here there has as else~here, in the sphere of what we would call morality and in th~ > t-een, in addition, a postrevolutionary phase of increasing radicalism segregat10n .of wom~n and a return to many Quranic or early Islamic > reminiscent of revolutions like the French, in which personnel did laws regarding marnage and the family. Bad treatment of the Baha'is > change. It appears that revolutions do have a momentum and force that has also been present in all phases. Essentially, then, a considerable > pushes them, once in power, toward fulfillment of some of their promises ~umber of Baha'is, active oppositionists, and women have borne a burden > to the masses and suppression of less revolutionary views. In the English, m all phases of the revolutionary movement from at least Phase 2 on.14 > French, and Russian revolutions, foreign war was another force leading Another c.onsta~t ~f the Islamic Revolution in power, which ties it > to greater radicalism and to both voluntary and forced unification of to .the I~la~1c re~1:ahst movements discussed in the first part of this > the nation behind the embattled revolution, and this has also happened article, 1s its ant1-1mperialist appeal. The "Great Satan," the United > in Iran. These parallels with non-Islamic movements, as well as the States, remains the great symbolic enemy, responsible for most of Iran's > 22 Mango/ Bayat Shi'a Islam as a Functioning Ideology in Iran 23 > > but more progressive, more challenging and innovative view of knowl~dge served as vali al-amr (Holder of Supreme Authority) in the absence of > as an alternative to the official teachings of the conservative theologians. the Imam. 3 > The foqaha', on the other hand, viewed the Imam as the sole The first decade of the twentieth century marked the end of theological > authoritative source of knowledge and maintained that the renewed speculative ferment. It was also the beginning of a political era in which > understanding of the revelation had to be postponed until the return the crucial issues were no longer those of doctrine or of man's relation > of the Hidden Imam. As guardians of the law that regulates the everyday to the ultimate conditions of his existence. The dispute that came to > life of the believer in this world and prepares him for the next, they divide the ranks of the religious establishment was over aspects of the > resisted and condemned the development of an individual leadership new law. Both the opponents and the proponents of the new constitution > that laid claim to absolute authority in the name of the Imam. Never- favored the continued existence of the state, with its executive power > theless, despite the traditional stand of the jurists, occasional deviati~n,s delegated to a cabinet of ministers directly responsible to the Majlis. > from the norm may be observed. For instance, the concept of the mar7a - Nuri and fellow opponents of the constitution came to champion the > e taqlid-e motlaq as the supreme authority in religious affairs, .w~ic~ cause of the reactionary Mohammad 'Ali Shah Qajar mainly as a result > gained ascendancy in the nineteenth centu?, ~e?1onstrates th~ iunsts of their objection to the inclusion of certain articles. These articles, > own temptation to recognize the need for md1v1dual leadership. That guaranteeing sovereignty of the people, freedom of opinion, equality of > this concept did not find firm roots in Imami Shi'ism is evidence of the all citizens, including the religious minorities, before the law, and > sect's strong juridical preference for a collective leadership that ~Hows compulsory education for all men and women, were declared contrary > a degree of ekhtelaf, divergence of opinion i.n. legal mat.ters not directly to Islamic principles and directives. In fact, Nuri accused the Majlis of > concerned with the basic principles of religion or with fundamental seeking to establish the "heretical" Babism and eradicate Islam in Iran. > aspects of the dogma. Yet members of the religious establishment occupied one-fourth of the > At the tum of the century, socioeconomic forces and new ideas shifted seats of the Majlis that had drafted and unanimously adopted the new > the emphasis in religious disputes from doctrinal considerations to politics. constitution. Moreover, a leading mojtahed of the time, Mohammad > The lay modernists found "converts" to their political cause within the Hosain Na'ini, wrote in favor of the constitutional government. His > ranks of the dissident ulama and through them gained the valuable often-quoted work 4 is nowadays hailed as an authentic Shi'i attempt at > support of some high-ranking members. of the r~li~ous establish.n:ent. defining the form of government that would best fit the conditions of > A new conception of the law then split the opm1on of the religious ghaiba. While Nuri's view was obviously influenced by his concern > community. The state and the religious establishment had periodically with the immediate threat of the Babi heresy (the ulama's main enemy > clashed over their respective rights to administer the law. While the at the time), Na'ini was undoubtedly inspired by Western concepts of > ulama had a monopoly over matters pertaining to personal and com- constitutional rights. 5 The concerns of both men reflected the social > mercial law, the state enjoyed the right to administer public law, or 'orf. tensions and clashing rhetorics of their time. > The distinction between 'orf and shari'a and their application to particular In the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution, the poet, the lay > cases was not always clear. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth man of letters, came to displace the mojtahed in influencing public > century, government officials often clashed with the ulama, who a~cus~d opinion. The traditional centers of Islamic culture rapidly lost influence > the state of encroaching upon their legal domain and enlarging its and prestige among progressive-minded thinkers. Change in intellectual > jurisdiction at their expense. To a number of high-ranking ulama, including outlook, traditionally initiated by speculative theologians and philoso- > Ayatollah Fazlollah Nuri, who had initially supported the movement, phers from within the ranks of the ulama, was undertaken by g.r~ups > the promulgation of the Constitution of 1906 and the sub~equ~nt outside the religious establishment. However, the system of relig10us > establishment of the Majlis as a consultative assembly for legislat10n beliefs enforced by the ayatollahs was not openly rejected. Secularization, > offered a unique means to institutionalize and control the '~rf system. I or the institutional change inaugurated by the first Majlis, was not > > I > The idea of collective leadership taking over from a despotIC monarch accompanied by change in doctrine. Nor was secularism in its Western > the power to enact laws pertaining to the pu~lic life of the believe~,~ form adopted officially. The constitution specifically declared Twelver > thus gained official recognition. It also constituted yet anothe: Sh1.1 Shi'a Islam the state religion and granted a council of five mojtaheds > attempt at accommodating the state, a more up-to-date ~odus v1venádá1. I the right to supervise Majlis legislation. Moreover, religious studies were > In the words of the revolutionary preacher Jamal ad-Dm, the Mailis made compulsory in public schools. The official anticlerical and mod- > 84 Farhad Kazemi Iran, Israel, and the Arab-Israeli Balance 85 > > reflected in the story of Esther and Haman. The Jews were also subject of these regulations was "to degrade the Jew in the eyes of the Muslim."7 > to the intermittent hostility of Zoroastrian priests, the severity of which The only respite for the Jews came after the downfall of the Safavids, > depended to a large extent on the personality of the reigning Sasanian under Nader Shah Afshar (1736-47) and Karim Khan Zand (1750-79). > monarch and the relative power of the priestly caste. With the establishment of the Qajar dynasty in late eighteenth century, > The Islamic conquest of Iran in A.O. 642 was not necessarily viewed however, many of the Safavids' restrictive codes, mass conversion presas a calamity by the Jews. They were granted the status of protected sures, and other forms of persecution were revived. The relative asminority (dhemmi) and partook of the cultural expansion and development cendancy of the Shi'i clerics in the Qajar era contributed to this rise > of early Islamic civilization. They were, however, subjected to heavy in anti-Jewish sentiment. The Jews of Mashhad and Tabriz in particular > taxation and probably also some of the prejudice directed against other suffered enormously during this period. 8 The general worsening of the > non-Muslim and non-Arab elements of the population. Jewish settlements situation was probably a factor in the conversion of many Jews to the > were established throughout the country in both urban and rural areas, 3 new Babi-Baha'i religious movement. 9 > and the Jews engaged in a variety of occupations in commerce and The Qajar period also heralded a few important positive developments > trade. Isfahan emerged as the primary center of Jewish learning, but for the Iranian Jews. First, communications and contacts with world > Talmudic scholarship was also in evidence in other parts of Iran. 4 Jewry were reestablished. Second, secular education was made available > Messianic movements emerged sporadically in Isfahan and elsewhere. ° > through the creation of the first Alliance school in 1898. 1 Finally, the > The available information on Jewish life in Iran during the centuries adoption of a constitution based on popular representation in 1906 > immediately preceding the Mongol invasion is not extensive, but a Jewish officially and formally recognized the Iranian Jews as a religious minority. > presence persisted in many areas of Iran. There is evidence of extensive The Jews were allowed to elect a representative to the Iranian parliament. > activities by adherents of the Karaite schism in the ninth and tenth Although these changes were slow in coming, they affected the community > centuries. The Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century resulted in in a beneficial way. > the destruction of several major cities and the massacre of their pop- The next notable event for Iranian Jewry was the coming to power > ulations. The Jews, along with other Iranians, suffered heavily at the of Reza Shah and the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925. > hands of the invaders. A few prominent Jews, however, emerged as key Reza Shah's programs of modernization and secular nationalism as well > officials of the administration in the ensuing period. Some of them even as the tight rein he imposed on clerical influence helped the Jewish > reached the rank of grand vizier of the Il-Khanids and provided protection community immensely. He abrogated the Law of Apostasy and abolished > and a brief respite for their Jewish brethren. With the downfall of these the jezya (poll tax). 11 Jews entered a variety of occupations, including > officials, Jewish life once again suffered. government service. The only discontinuity in this period was Reza > The coming to power of the Safavid dynasty in 1501 created a new Shah's sympathy for the Axis powers, which eventually resulted in his > situation for Iranian Jewry. The Safavids made Shi'ism the state religion forced abdication in favor of his son in 1941. > and showed overwhelming zeal in transforming Iran into a Shi'i land. The succession of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to the Peacock Throne > A new and more acute intolerance was directed against non-Shi'is and greatly improved the status of the Jews in Iran. Despite sporadic antiexpressed with some regularity in persecutions of the Jews. Codes of Jewish incidents and the anti-Baha'i campaign of 1955, his reign can > conduct and rules designed to restrict Jewish social and economic life probably be considered a "Golden Age" for minorities in modern Iran. > were promulgated. 5 Pressures for conversion were particularly strong The Jews prospered economically, socially, and culturally, especially in > and resulted in a decrease of the Jewish population and severe intra- the last two decades of the shah's rule. A new and vigorous Jewish > communal strife. Special identifying clothing, their "badge of shame," bourgeoisie emerged in the capital city, which in turn attracted Jewish > was required of the Jews, further segregating them from the dominant migrants from provincial towns and rural areas. By the early 1970s, > Shi'i community. The Law of Apostasy allowed a Jewish convert to Tehran was the center of Jewish economic and social activities. Iran's > Islam to "inherit all of the property of his relatives, even those of distant Jewish population surpassed eighty thousand, with perhaps over half > degree." 6 residing in Tehran. > The restrictive codes of the Safavids, among the most severe in the During this period the Iranian Jews also benefited from the generally > Muslim world, had detrimental consequences for Jewish economic, social, friendly and multifaceted relationship of Iran with Israel. This relationship > legal, and political rights. As Sorour Soroudi remarks, the main purpose went through different phases in the course of the shah's regime but > 94 Farhad Kazemi > Iran, Israel, and the Arab-Israeli Balance 95 > 2. Laurence Loeb, Outcaste: Jewish Life in Southern Iran (New York: Gordon > and Breach, 1977), p. 274. See also J. Neusner, "Jews in Iran," in Cambridge 21. Segev, Iranian Triangle, p. 108; Weinbaum, "Iran and Israel," p. 1076. > History of Iran, vol. 3, pt. 2, Seleucid, Parthian, and Sasanian Periods, ed. Ehsan 22. Davar, April 20, 1980, pp. 3-4. Segev points out that the Iranian foreign > Yarshater (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 909-23; Shaul minister, 'Abbasqoli Khal'atbari, visited Israel in 1977 (Iranian Triangle, p. 153). > Shaked, ed., lrano-Judaica: Studies relating to Jewish Contacts with Persian Culture 23. Discussion of the Iran-Israel oil link can be found in Robert Reppa, Sr., > throughout the Ages (Leiden: Brill, 1982). Israel and Iran (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 73-86; Segev, Iranian Triangle, > 3. Loeb, Outcaste, p. 279. p. 75; Weinbaum, "Iran and Israel," pp. 1078-80; Marvin Zonis, "Israel and > 4. Ibid., p. 280, citing Walter Fischel, "Isfahan: The Story of a Jewish Iran: From Intimacy to Alienation," Moment 4 (March 1979):13. > Community in Persia," in Joshua Starr Memorial Volume (New York: Jewish Social 24. For details see Reppa, Israel and Iran, pp. 98-99. > Studies Publication, 1953), p. 116. On the contribution of Iranian Jews to Persian 25. Rabi'i's defense is (to my knowledge) part of the only published report > literature of both pre- and post-Islamic periods, see Jalal Matini, "Ahamiyyat- of the proceedings of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts. Most of the minutes of > e Athar-e Adabi-ye Farsi-ye Yahudian," Iran Nameh 1 (1983):424-46. the trial were published in Iranian newspapers. Three issues of Ettela'at give > reasonable verbatim accounts of the trial: Farvardin 21, 22, and 23, 1358/1979. > 5. Soroudi, "Jews in Islamic Iran," p. 103. > See also Segev, Iranian Triangle, pp. 72-74. > 6. Loeb, Outcaste, pp. 286, 292; Soroudi, "Jews in Islamic Iran," pp. > 26. Zonis, "Israel and Iran," p. 12. > 104-6; Fischel, "Israel in Iran," pp. 1167-71. > 27. Ibid., p. 15. > 7. Soroudi, "Jews in Islamic Iran," p. 104. > 28. Weinbaum, "Iran and Israel," p. 1081; Segev, Iranian Triangle, pp. 119, > 8. Ibid., p. 106; Marvin Weinbaum, "Iran and Israel: The Discreet Entente," > 176, 187. > Orbis 18 (1975):1071. > 29. John Cooley, "Iran, the Palestinians, and the Gulf," Foreign Affairs, summer > 9. See Walter Fischel, "The Bahai Movement and Persian Jewry," Jewish > 1979, p. 1017. > Review, March 1934, pp. 47-55; Hayyim Cohen, The Jews of the Middle East: 30. Ibid. > 1860-1972 (New York: Wiley, 1973), pp. 162-63. > 31. For a firsthand account of the Jewish community's distress at this time, > 10. Cohen, Jews of the Middle East, pp. 53-54, 141-46; S. Landshut, Jewish see Barbara and Barry Rosen (with George Feifer), The Destined Hour: The > Communities in the Muslim Countries of the Middle East (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Hostage Crisis and One Family's Ordeal (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982), > Press, 1950), p. 65. pp. 78-80. > 11. Loeb, Outcaste, p. 289; Soroudi, "Jews in Islamic Iran," p. 107. 32. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Velayat-e Faqih: Hokumat-e Eslami (Tehran, > 12. Farhad Kazemi, "The Fada'iyan-i Islam: Fanaticism, Politics, and Terror," 1977), p. 38; also p. 6. > in From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam: Essays on Social Movements in the 33. Ibid., p. 175. > Contemporary Near and Middle East, ed. Said Amir Atjomand (Albany: State 34. During the first presidential elections held in the Islamic Republic, in > University of New York Press, 1983), p. 162. January 1981, a radio reporter was dispatched to a Jewish activities center to > 13. Weinbaum, "Iran and Israel," p. 1073. interview the Jews and broadcast their views on the election. The reporter asked > 14. Ibid., p. 1074, n. 10. those present about the primary qualifications for the office of the president. > 15. Jerusalem Post, December 31, 1961, quoted in Weinbaum, "Iran and Israel," Every respondent began with the statement that he must be a believing and > p. 1070. true Muslim who respects, fulfills, and enforces Islamic injunctions. > 16. New York Times, July 27, 1960, p. 5. 35. A letter of protest was sent to members of Parliament by a group of > 17. New York Times, July 25, p. 2; July 27, p. 5; July 29, p. 1; August l, p. Iranian Jewish intellectuals in April 1981. > 7; and August 30, p. 2, all 1960. 36. Many of these recent Jewish immigrants to Israel are of modest socio- > 18. New York Times, July 28, 1960, p. 5. economic background and have practically no knowledge of Hebrew. For a > 19. Weinbaum, "Iran and Israel," p. 1077. Detailed analysis of Iran-Israel variety of reasons, their adjustment to Israeli society has been difficult. There > relations can be found in Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle: The Secret Relations is, however, an organization of Iranian Jews in Israel. The organization was > between Israel-Iran-U.S.A. (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1981). According to Segev (p. 94), founded in 1979 and is led by the Iranian-born Likud member of the Knesset > El Al was permitted to operate in Iran in 1958 but only discreetly. After Nasser's Moshe Katsav. The group arranges social and cultural activities and publishes > death in 1970, El Al was allowed to function openly and advertise its flights. Payam, a monthly Persian-language magazine that includes general articles on > See also pp. 77-78, 80. I am indebted to David Menashri for sending me a world events and Iranian Jewry, short stories, and other features. See, for > copy of this book. I am also grateful to Shaul Bar for the time he took to read example, Payam for August and November 1980. > and translate the Hebrew text for me. 37. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security > 20. Davar, April 20, 1980, pp. 3-4. Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), p. 504. > > — *Iran since the Revolution (Used by permission of the curator)*