# Iran: The Illusion of Power *Exported from [Holy-Writings.com](https://www.holy-writings.com/) on 2026-06-20 — 1 clipping.* --- > Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, bahai-library.com. > ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── > > G.3'1 á l+.5 .c:.. i~. SS > > IRAN > The Illusion of Povver > ROBERT GRAHAM > > Revised Edition > > CROOM HELM LONDON > CONTENTS > > © 1978 Robert Graham > Croom Helm Ltd, 2-10 St John's Road, London SWll Acknowledgements > Revised edition 1979 > > British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data > Introduction to Revised Edition 11 > > Graham, Robert > Iran, the illusion of power. > Part I: The Creation of Modern Iran > 1. Iran - Economic conditions - 1945 - 1. The Coming of the Boom 15 > I. Title > 330.9'55'05 HC475 2. The Growth of Urban Iran 22 > ISBN 0-7099-0201-8 3. Oil and the Iranian Economy 32 > ISBN 0-7099-0187-9 Pbk > 4. Monarchy and the Pahlavi Dynasty 53 > > Part II: Cycle of the Boom > 5. The Big Opportunity 77 > 6. Limits to Oil Wealth 93 > 7. Successes an~ Failures 105 > > Part III: The System of Power > 8. Use and Abuse of Power 131 > 9. Control Through Money 154 > 10. Influence of the Military 170 > 11. Problems of Culture 192 > 12. Opposition and Revolution 208 > > 13. Conclusion 245 > > Appendices 255 > > Index 268 > > Printed in Great Britain by > Lowe & Brydone Printers Limited, Thetford, Norfolk > <1< 1 Umits to Oil Wealth Limits to Oil Wealth 97 > > ,á11lprit of higher prices. Among those arrested were two of Iran's more accept the fixed price, many importers preferred to just leave their > Slh\'cssful businessmen, Habib Elghanian and Mohammed Wahabzadeh. goods unclaimed. As much as 40 per cent of all goods lying on the > 1-'l~~ll:lllian had built up a large plastics business with extensive retail quays at Khorramshahr was unclaimed in 1975. By the time the customs > i)11tkts; while Wahabzadeh was mainly concerned with cars, being came to auction them the goods were frequently too badly damaged to > s 11 lt• agent for BMW. A summons was also served in absentia on Habib be worth buying, so continuing to clutter the port. 13 > S:iht•t. More importantly, an important opportunity to overhaul the coun- > I ligh profits were being made and some unscrupulous merchants try's distribution network was wasted. Reducing the middle man's > \\t'rt' taking advantage. Yet profiteering was a symptom, not a cause. profits did not solve the key question of getting goods quickly and > l'l1t• ~ause lay in the inability of production, or imports, to meet efficiently into the market. The technocrats in the Ministry of Co~­ > dt•111and. The campaign was also highly selective, and it was significant merce would have liked to have seen this happen but the political will > that the most vigorous action was taken in those areas where the was lacking. > ;\sl'iring middle class had been most affected - for instance the rising The obstructive tactics of the merchants, mainly the traditional > 1..' 1'sls of buying and maintaining a car. Vahabzadeh was accused of merchants of the Bazaar, proved too strong; and the Shah was neither > sdli11g BMW cars for Rsl .08 million instead of Rs800,000. 12 ready nor willing to risk a confrontation. Indeed to mollify the merch- > I 11\posing draconian price controls in a severely overheated economy ants, Commerce Minister Fereidoun Mahdavi was removed on 7 February > W;\s inevitably disruptive and ultimately counter-productive. Matters 1976. He had been the main champion of reorganising distribution - > \Wrc not helped by the bands of ill-informed inspectors, frequently including the creation of a model market like London's Covent Garden > St\hlt'nts, sent out to check prices and decide sometimes with complete (a scheme which was shelved with his demise). 14 Some considered it > ;\rhit rariness the correct price for a product. The price war was the first significant that the bigger names prosecuted in the anti-profiteering or > i' 1 'litkal test of the newly formed single party, Rastakhiz; and on at prices campaigns were often outsiders - members of the Bahai sect, like > l1.';\st 1Hle occasion youths in the name of the party and the municipality Sabet, or Jews, like Elghanian - who were resented by the Bazaaris. > "-h'kl'd a Tehran supermarket, said to be overcharging, in a manner > Oil as a Variable > ~-...'miniscent of the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution in China. > l'ht' party subsequently admitted that its involvement in the prices The dampener on the boom came not from inside Iran but outside. Oil > ,';\mpaign was a mistake - or rather that it would not be repeated. sales failed to meet expectation and revenues fell. By December 1975 > ,-\s a whole the price campaign was a failure. Official indices went oil production was running 20 per cent below the same period the > '"'" n for six months but black-market prices for essential commodities previous year. For the year as a whole the average daily production was > ~\\.~' sharply. The shortages were not relieved, and if anything became almost 12 per cent down. 15 > :~h,r1.' pronounced. Importers decided in many instances that if controls Throughout the summer sales had been slack. A surge of buying just > ''•'n.' to be placed on profit margins of products it was more economic prior to the biannual OPEC meeting in Vienna in September 1975 > :~,,t t1) import at all: the same applied to local manufacture. Elghanian's proved a temporary phenomenon. Continued world recession and a > :'~•\St ks operation, arguably the most efficient in Iran and marketing the mild European winter kept international demand sluggish. Iran was > :~~'"-"t sophisticated range of products, closed down, never to reopen. especially affected because of the nature of its crude oil: a 'light' crude > ~~~1.'t. aged 72, stayed in Paris, refusing to return to run his empire and of high quality with a low sulphur content; and a 'heavy' crude with a > s,,u~ht to put his capital elsewhere. higher sulphur content suitable for fuel oil. 16 The heavy crude was most > l'hc anti-profiteering campaign and price controls also had a damaging similar to that of Kuwait, while the light competed with the high-volume > -.'t~~t on the ports. Because goods had been 'under-invoiced' the govern- crude of Saudi Arabia. Normally Iran exported a ratio of 52/48 light/ > n~-t\t tlxed the price and profit margin on the price declared. This heavy. However, the mild winter severely affected demand for fuel > l'\~\t that importers were being made to sell at below cost price. oil, and through the complex OPEC pricing system that differentiated > Although a clever ruse by the government to encourage the importers various types of crude, Iranian heavy oil became uncompetitive, especi- > t\. h~ more honest, it backfired. Rather than declare the real price or ally when both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia reduced the price of their > 220 Opposition and Revolution Opposition and Revolution 221 > had been prominent religious figures, while his elder brother became Grievances of the Clergy > an ayatollah (see Appendix C). He first studied under the latter, then > Inside Iran the basic bone of contention with the regime of the moderate > moved to Isfahan, then to Arak before settling in the holy city of Qom. > clergy led by Ayatollah Shariat-Maderi was the increasingly ambivalent > Here he quickly earned a reputation so that even before he was 30 his > role of religion. The Shah exploited religion when it suited him and > philosophical teachings attracted a keen following among seminary > ignored it when it contradicted development needs. To this were added > students. He refused to see Islam in a narrow religious context but re- > a host of major and minor irritants. The loss of land owned by the > garded it as an all-em bracing moral force. In 1941 he wrote a book > mosques as a result of Land Reform remained a nagging sore - though > strongly attacking Reza Shah - the beginning of a sustained attack on > not as great as some would contend since compensation had been paid > the monarchy and Pahlavis. His writings appeared to be strongly influ- > and important religious endowments at Meshed and Qom had been > enced by nationalistic and moral considerations. Seeing Iran increasingly > retained. A greater complaint was the Shah's scheme to redevelop > dominated by Britain and Russia and witnessing the changes wrought > the Holy Shrine at Meshed which involved the destruction of large > on society during the Second World War, he determined to free Iran > segments of the old city. It was a classic instance of something being > from all foreign influence. His views have been remarkably consistent, > imposed from on high, wholly unaware of local opinion. The scheme, > his sole solution for Iran being an Islamic republic. 37 > and the Shah's close identification with it, was so unpopular that bull- > Like several other of the clergy, suspicious of Mossadegh's ties with > dozers and construction equipment was frequently bombed or sabo- > the Tudeh Party, Khomeini took his distance from the National Front > taged .38 A more significant, and gratuitous, affront to the religious > during the 1953 oil nationalisation. The overthrow of Mossadegh left > community was the imposition of the monarchy calendar in 1976. This > Khomeini as one of the leading opposition figures and by 1962 he had > helped convince some of the moderate clergy that the Shah was bent on > established himself as a formidable presence, as well as one of Iran's destroying the Islamic roots of Iran. > leading ayatollahs. He opposed the Shah's proposals for land reform > There was also a groundswell of discontent over the Shah's efforts to > and the emancipation of women - the two pillars of the White Revolu- cow the clergy. Dissident voices inside Iran like Ayatollah Taleghani and > tion - at two levels (see Chapter 4). At one level he contested the Ayatollah Rouhani were jailed for alleged subversive activities which > legality of the Pahlavi dynasty and its prerogative to introduce such far amounted to no more than challenging the Shah's use of torture and > reaching reforms. At another he was challenging the regime which he political repression (see Chapter 8). The imprisonment of well-known > felt was using populist reform to weaken the traditional power and figures like Ayatollah Taleghani alienated ordinary people far more > authority of the clergy. The other clergy did not really share his per- than tough police handling of the former politicians or the guerillas. > sonalised crusade against the Pahlavis and the monarchy, but they Attempts to brand religious persons as political subversives rarely suc- > supported his concern that traditional areas of authority were being > ceeded, even if official propaganda tried to insinuate that these persons > eroded as the modem state assumed responsibility for education, birth were being manipulated by Marxists. 39 > control, marriage and family laws. > At least three other factors were a source of friction with the clergy. > This was why the Ayatollah's arrest in June 1963 provoked such > (I) Corrnption. This has already been mentioned but it should be > riots. The clergy were fully behind him. Yet once Khomeini had taken > stressed that corruption even extended to the management of religious > up his forced residence in Najaf, Iraq in late 1964, the more moderate > affairs. For instance the chief officials concerned with organising the > clergy were relieved that such an uncompromising figure should be out > pilgrimage to Mecca were found guilty in 1976 of taking bribes from > of the way. Khomeini retained, however, a following in Iran, especially 40 > pilgrims. (2) The uncertain nature of state financial support. The > at Qom where seminary students continued to commemorate the riots. > clergy were constantly concerned that the authorities would use state > From his Iraqi exile he refused to drop his crusade, denouncing the > support for endowments and religious institutions as a means of con- > lavish Persepolis celebrations organised by the Shah in 1971 and calling > trol. Increased financial costs as a result of the inflation since 1973 had > for a boycott of the Rastakhiz Party when it was established in 197 5. > weakened their financial independence.41 (3) The rise of Bahaiism. > But it was not until 1977 that the same forces that helped form a > Bahaiism is not officially recognised in Iran as it is considered an here- > broadly united front of religious protest in 1963 began to coalesce again. > tical Moslem sect whose founder was executed in Tabriz in 1851. This > 222 Opposition and Revolution Opposition and Revolution 223 > > doctrine was based on the idea that certain holy men could be used as a disturbances at least 70 persons were killed - the bloodiest incident > means of communication between the people and the awaited, but since 1963. > hidden, Twelfth Imam. 42 Despite tremendous persecution Bahaiism The spontaneous response to this anti-Khomeini smear campaign, > prospered, earning itself the reputation of a freemasonry that in turn and the government's heavy-handed reaction, transformed the situation. > produced much slanderous gossip about Bahai ritual. The traditional The secular constitutional protest movement lost the initiative to the > clergy feared the growing presence of such 'heretics' in positions of religious inspired opposition, and the moderate clergy, still in the > power - whether close to the Shah (like his personal physician) or in majority, found themselves being outmanouevred by the more radical > business, like the banking magnate, Hozbar Yazdani. It was also held pro-Khomeini supporters. It is also probably correct to trace the begin- > against Hoveida that his father was a Bahai. (One explanation for nings of the clergy's awareness of their power to this incident at Qom. > Khomeini's strong anti-Israeli feeling has been the presence of the M~over that it should come from Qom itself was no accident. This > Bahai international headquarters in Haifa.) city had refused to allow the attributes of modern Iran to permeate: > there are no bars, cinemas, alcohol stores or luxury shops. It is a city > The Power of the Mosque > whose life revolves round the mosques and the seminaries so that it > All these elements combined to make the religious community inside could claim to have been 'unpolluted' by the Iran of the Pahlavis. > Iran deeply concerned when they too detected that the Shah's Great The clergy had a genuine constituency - the conservative mass of > Civilisation was fading into the distance and being replaced by popular the population who were puzzled, confused and bitter about the > discontent with no apparent change in the system of government. How- contradictory policies and broken promises of the Shah. These were > ever, first they were neither militant nor organised, and indeed seemed people who did not read newspapes and inherently mistrusted govern- > to have little sense of their own potential power. ment and who saw the mullah and the mosque as the repository of > Since 1976 when the first group of Iranian pilgrims was allowed to traditional values. At first the clergy's power was used to organise > visit Shiia shrines in Iraq, Ayatollah Khomeini had been able to keep in protest funeral processions for those killed in clashes with the security > closer touch with his supporters inside Iran.43 Tapes of his sermons forces. These drew on the Iranian tradition of large, highly emotional > attacking the regime were smuggled in with increasing frequency and mourning processions. At 40-day intervals these continued from Janu- > he was well able to exploit the regime's more tolerant attitude towards ary until August 1978. In the meantime, Khomeini, still in Iraq, was > mosque pronouncements in mid-1977. His tough rhetoric from outside transformed into a mythical symbol of the hidden Imam, who one day > raised the pitch of religious protest. By the autumn of 1977 the tenor would return to the Shila faithful. 47 But if the growing surge of protest > of sermons had changed and in many instances was becoming openly to the Shah's regime took an increasingly religious aspect, it was not > hostile to the Shah, while others called for observance of the Constitu- entirely attributable to the power of the clergy. The Bazaar and the > tion .44 With Khomeini once again in the public eye, the tempo of rootless urban proletariat played an important role. > protest quickened. The Ayatollah's own determination was hardened > The Bazaar > by the mysterious death of his son, Mostafa, in Iraq on 23 October, > apparently the work of SAVAK.45 Whether or not this belief was true The Bazaar is the hub of urban life in Iran. It serves not merely as a > the authorities certainly began to blame Khomeini for the emerging ' commercial centre but also as a unique type of community centre. It > religious unrest. On 7 January 1978 the leading Persian language daily, includes one, or several, mosques, public baths, the old religious schools > Etelaat, published an article attacking and slandering Khomeini. 46 It a?d nymerous tea houses. With so much activity condensed in a rela- > quickly filtered through that the article had been ordered by the t1vel)f small area, communication within the Bazaar is quick and easy, > Information Minister, Darioush Homayoun, an ambitious apparatchik and as a result the Bazaar has traditionally been the main source of > who had gained the post for his zealous activities in Rastakhiz. The P<;>litical mobilisation. This was true of the constitutional movement at > next day in Qom theological students staged a sit-in. This was broken J the turn of the century and it was true of the pro-Shah counter demon- > up by security forces, an action which quickly provoked violence strations that ensured his return in 19 53. > with the security forces shooting at the demonstrators. In two days of 1jhe independent financial strength of the Bazaar has been a vital > 224 Opposition and Revolution Opposition and Revolution 225 > > element in its power. Despite the modernisation of the economy, the tion whose new wealth permitted them to buy property outside the > Bazaar still controls over two-thirds of domestic wholesale trade and Bazaar a\ea yet whose tradition made them work in, and continue to > accounts for at least 30 per cent of all imports. 44 At the same time identify With, the Bazaar. The merchants themselves were resentful of > through its control of the carpet trade and other export items like nuts the government's challenge to their privileges. The more so when they > and dried fruits, the Bazaar has access to foreign exchange which has saw business taken from them in the name of the state now being con- > not been channelled through the official system. Likewise its traditional ducted for the benefit of friends and associates of the Royal Family. 5t > money lending and money changing have continued. One unofficial An indication of the residual Bazaari attitude towards the Royal > estimate put Bazaari lending in 1976 at 15 per cent of private sector Family was the virtual absence of royal portraits in the Bazaar area. 52 > credit.49 Yet such resentment was insufficient to turn the Bazaar merhcants into > Precisely because the Bazaar possessed such political power, the the organisers and financiers of the nationwide anti-Shah protests that > Shah sought over the years to diminish it. This was done firstly by emerged in 1978. > building new state schools, new housing and new shopping centres out- Politically; the Bazaar has had to be opportunist to survive. However, > side the Bazaar, while within the Bazaar streets were 'widened' - a the bul-k, of kazaaris could be classified as conservative, devout Moslems > euphemism for imposing a modern grid-iron pattern of roads on the and providers of important funds to subsidise religious activity. When, > old narrow alleyways (which also made security easier to enforce). therefore, the mosque sermons became more anti-Shah and open criti- > Secondly it was done by the modernisation of the banking system and cism was voiced of the tremendous waste of national assets and the > the entry of the state into the distribution system. State corporations corruption of national character by foreigners, the Bazaar and its > were set up to import and distribute basic foodstuffs like wheat, sugar leaders were an audience that needed little conversion. > and meat, or to import essential raw materials like cement or steel. The first concrete indication of a new militant link between the > These corporations appeared in the wake of the 1973 boom when the mosque and the merchants was a curious struggle to prevent the Bank > subsidies on foodstuffs were increased and the need to manage raw Saderat - known as the Bazaaris' friend - falling under the control of > material supplies was paramount. To cut out the Bazaari middlemen in a Bahai. At the end of 1977, Hozbar Yazdani, the Bahai and self-made > 1976 the government sought to improve the nationwide distribution millionaire, had acquired a 51 per cent stake in the medium sized > of foodstuffs, and conceived of building a new market in Tehran, based Iranians Bank. He was manoeuvering to take over Shahriar Bank (in > on London's new Convent Garden. 50 A third move to break the Bazaaris' which several w~althy Iranian families were important shareholders) > hold was the price freeze and anti-profiteering campaign initiated in and had just raised his stake in Saderat, Iran's largest private com- > August 1976 (see Chapter 6). mercial bank, to 26 per cent. On the orders from the Shila clergy, > In one sense these moves were an essential part of modernising the the Bazaar merchants organised a campaign of sustained withdrawals. > economy. For instance the Bazaar merchants had a ruthless strangle- The campaign was so effective that the central bank, Bank Markazi, was > hold on the distribution of foodstuffs which was mercilessly exploited obliged to intervene and Yazdani - reportedly on the Shah's orders - > at the expense of the poor farmers. However, the Bazaaris interpreted sold out his interest in Saderat. 53 > these actions as a calculated attack on the Bazaar as an institution; an Once demonstrators began getting killed by the armed forces, the > impression which the government did nothing to alter. At another level Bazaar offered financial support to the victims' families. More impor- > there was no urban renewal in the Bazaar area and no effort to preserve tant, the Bazaar was willing to finance strikes. At first in May 1978 it > what was valid in Bazaar life - or for that matter to provide an accept- was the university students and teachers. Then in the autumn, from > able substitute other than moving into the ranks of the middle class. In September onwards, they helped support large sections of the striking > many instances the cost of new housing for those anxious to move workforce, whether civil servants or oil-workers. There was no precise > outside the Bazaar became prohibitive in the wake of the 1973 boom. point when this support transformed from protest into backing for > The net effect was to establish a fairly clear-cut division between revolutionary change and the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty. The > those who could afford to leave and those who were obliged to stay in most important Bazaar, that of Tehran, was occupied for the first > the Bazaar area. A link, however, was maintained by the older genera- time by tanks on 11 May 1978, but as early as January there had been > 226 Opposition and Revolution Opposition and Revolution 227 > > shutdown protests. Certainly this was the beginning of increasingly With passions running high this transformed the demonstration into a > frequent shutdown protest strikes. These protests were made in a riot, spearheaded by such youths, attacking the symbols of Iran's new > different frame of mind from the constitutionalists' and intellectuals'. wealth (the banks), its political bankruptcy (the headquarters of the > Theirs was more a gut greivance and openly Islamic, despite the fact Rastakhiz Party), its cultural corruption (the cinemas) and its moral > that the leading merchants had family with university education that decadence (liquor stores). Mixed in with this was some unashamed loot- > were also part of the constitutionalist movement. ing and a strong element of Azarbaijani resentment at being neglected > The Tehran Bazaar leadership was provided by a five man Bazaar by the central government. (Since 1946 the Shah had visited Tabriz > Merchants Association which existed in defiance of attempts to impose only once.) Radical students from Tabriz University had also played a > officially sponsored guilds controlled through the Rastakhiz Party. part in transforming this demonstration. The toll was some I 00 killed > These five men operated through a network of assistants who in turn and over 600 arrested. ss This pattern of protest turned riot was to > had their own subgroupings and lesser heads that permeated throughout repeat itself throughout Iran's major cities from now on. > the Bazaar in a pyramidical structure. This system enabled them to con- > The Role of Women > trol quickly large groups of persons through a mixture of personal > contact and money. It was not difficult to mount a demonstration with In the first major outburst of anti-Shah feeling, at Tabriz, women do > hired help .54 The regime itself had been doing this for years. not seem to have played a prominent role. However, one of the remark- > Part of the crowd in the early demonstrations was probably paid to able features of the ensuing demonstrations was the large scale partici- > participate by the Bazaaris. The boom had created a fertile source of pation of women. The chadoor, the traditional cloth with which > rabble. The thousands of persons who had flocked to the towns from women cover themselves, came to symbolise a form of protest: an > poor conservative backgrounds in the hope of jobs were that section of identity with Islamic values and a rejection of the modernising process > the urban proletariat that least benefitted from the boom. Often they instituted by the Pahlavis. > were single males whose families remained in country villages. They The chadoor was first used as a form of political protest inside the > were confronted with an alien culture, often forced to live on building universities in 1977. Students began to wear the chadoor on campus. > sites or at great expense in slum conditions. Their earnings, which at But the presence of women in the demonstrations probably owed little > first seemed high, were frequently illusory, eroded by inflation. From to the example in the universities. The bulk of the women taking part > mid-1977 the economic slowdown, combined with efforts to peg rents in the demonstrations were working class and this was an important > and house prices, provoked a sharp fall off in construction activity. This dynamic in the revolutionary process.s6 Women first appeared in large > meant that quite suddenly the main area of employment open to these numbers in the mourning processions for those killed. Because the > unskilled persons began to contract. Many became unemployed, and mourning processions were transformed into political protests, the > this unemployment further coincided with a bad year for the agri- women became part of this protest. Previously mourning processions > cultural sector. Production of staple products like wheat, barley and had been the sole occasion on which women from conservative back- > rice declined on average 13 per cent in 1977 /8 pushing more men to the grounds had been permitted to demonstrate their feelings in public. > towns in the hope of higher income. It was this confused, bitter new Therefore the political involvement of women was a natural evolution. > urban proletariat which imbibed quickest the protest messages coming Their presence was not discouraged. On the contrary, the demon- > from the mosques. They had nothing to lose and everything to gain. strators realised that this unexpected female presence tended to > The phenomenon of these 'rootless' males, mostly youths, was first unnerve riot police and the army, making demonstrations more difficult > evident in Tabriz in February 1978 - the first place where serious anti- to challenge. It is also possible that the presence of women gave the > Shah riots occurred. The Tabriz riot began as a demonstration of men greater courage to stand up to the police and army. > sympathy and solidarity to. com~emorate ti:ose killed in Qom the / This raises an important psychological question in the evolution of > previous month. However, it rapidly turned into a vehement protest the opposition movement. The Shah's system of government depended > against the Shah. The local Azarbaijani police refused to intervene and for its survival on two basic factors: a generalised acceptance of the > troops were called in who responded violently and with their weapons. status quo and a deeply inculcated fear of sanctions. The small incidence > 242 Opposition and Revolution Opposition and Revolution 243 > > well as being beaten up. 39.Rastakhiz, 11June1975. > 11. See Index Vol. 7 No. 1 'Iranian Protests' pp. 15-24. 40. Tehran Journal, 25 November 1976. The administration also made it > 12. The Tudeh Party was formed in 1941 under the umbrella of the evolving deliberately expensive to visit Mecca. The officially sponsored month long trip > Russian presence in Iran as a result of the Anglo-Russian occupation during the cost'$ 2,000 per head. Some said this was also designed to prevent pilgrims > Second World War. journeying to Iraq. > 13. Plan and Budget Organisation (PBO). Iran's Fifth Development Plan 41. International Herald Tribune, 15 January 1979. > 1973-78, revised version, p. 401. 42. See Roger Stevens, Land of the Grand Sophy (London, Methuen, 1971), > 14. Iran Almanac. Echo of Iran, Tehran, 1977, p. 411. pp. 46-8. > 15. Ibid., p. 403. 43. The March 1975 Irano-lraq border treaty committed both sides to ease > 16. There were no official figures for students studying abroad but the border crossing restrictions. The Iraqis eventually conceded an annual quota of > unofficial number was thought to be above 40,000. 130,000 pilgrims. Pressure by Shiia pilgrims to visit the Iraqi shrines was said to > 17. The most radical institution in Iran was the Arayamehr Technical have been an element behind the Shah accepting to negotiate a border peace with > Institute, Tehran. Iraq. > 18.IranAlmanac, 1977,p.122. 44. This was especially noted in Tehran and Qom. > 19. See Fred Halliday,!ran, Dictatorship and Development (London, 45. See Faroughy, L 1ran contre le Chah, p. 176. > Pelican Books, 1979), pp. 227-35. 46. The author has not seen the original and translations vary. According to > 20. Tehran Journal, 22 January 1977. one version, the text insinuates Khomeini to have been a homosexual in the pay > 21. Kayhan International, 21, 22, 23 January 1977. These were a series of of the British. > articles on the opposition with clear official inspiration and seeming to be based 4 7. See Stevens, Land of the Great Sophy, pp. 41-5 for a precise account of > on SAV AK interrogations of some important recently captured underground this aspect of Shiism. > figures. 48. Financial Times, 12 September 1978. > 22. These shorthand terms have stuck and became current during their re- 49. Estimate given to the author by a Bank Markazi official in September > emergence in the 9-12 February 1979 convulsion. 1976. > 23. Halliday, Iran, Dictatorship and Development, provides the most detailed 50. The scheme was drawn up with the aid of Britain's National Freight > analysis of their ideologies but is unable to pin down the philosophy of the Corporation. > Mojahidin (seep. 236). 51. The Bazaar campaign against Commerce Minister Mahdavi in 1975 was due > 24. In 1975 a bomb was exploded in the Shah Abbas Hotel, Isfahan, the to this belief. > country's best known tourist hotel. In July 1975 bombs exploded at the British 52. The Bazaar area was the sole public place where the Royal Portrait was not > Council and American Information Centre in Meshed. visible. > 25. See Halliday,Iran, Dictatorship and Development, p. 237. 53.Financial Times, 12 September 1978. > 26. Kayhan International, 23 January 1977. 54.International Herald Tribune, 15 January 1979. > 27. This was the view of Western embassies in Tehran. 55. Based on information supplied to the author by an expatriate Persian > 28. For a digest of the incidents reported in the Iranian press in 1976 see/ran scholar who visited Tabriz as the riots ended. > Almanac, 1977, p. 122. 56. See Iran Almanac, 1977, pp. 422-3. > 29. The number of incidents reported in 1977 dropped. This probably 57. Comment to the author by Dr Bakhtiar, 3 July 1977. > reflected a decline in guerilla activity. 58. See Stevens, Land of the Great Sophy, p. 42. Many Iranians emphasise, > 30. Ahmad Faroughy, L 1ran contre le Chah (Paris, Editions Jean-Claude as a national trait, the tradition of martyrdom. > Simeon, 1979),p. 164. 59. Sunday Times, supplement 19 November 1978. Roger Cooper counted > 31. From June 1975 to November 1976 the author recorded 158 such eight rows of full graves with 14 to 17 plots each and over 20 rows dug and > instances. waiting at the main Tehran cemetery. > 32. While the author was in Iran from 1975-7 there was only one instance 60. Financial Times, 14 December 1978. > of a foreign news organisation being contacted by the underground opposition. 61. Financial Times, 19 December 1978. > This was Agence France Presse in July 1976. 62. International Herald Tribune, 17 January 1978. > 33. The religious community also shunned the international press. The first 63. The Regency Council was approved under Article 42. > serious effort by the clergy to contact the foreign press was in January 1978. 64. The Shah maintained up until before the 31 March 1979 referendum that > 34. Financial Times, 12 December 1978. he had not abdicated. > 35. Denis Wright, The English among the Persians (London, Heineman, 1977), 65. Comment to the author by a prominent figure in frequent contact with > p. 107. the Shah during this period. > 36. The 1907 supplement to the Constitution talks of a committee of at least 66. Financial Times, 12 September 1978. > five persons chosen from the 'ulemas'. 67. Financial Times, 8 November 1978. > 37. This information is largely based on research carried out by Paul Balta of 68. International Herald Tribune, 25 November 1978. On this occasion 267 > Le Monde. For Khomeini's birth date see Faroughy,L 1ran contre le Chah,p.160. political prisoners were released. > 38. Information supplied to the author by an expatriate living in Meshed 69. International Herald Tribune, 28 August 1978. > in 1976. 70. International Herald Tribune, 10 January 1979. > > — *Iran: The Illusion of Power (Used by permission of the curator)*