# Land Reform and Social Change in Iran *Exported from [Holy-Writings.com](https://www.holy-writings.com/) on 2026-06-20 — 1 clipping.* --- > Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Afsaneh Najmabadi, Land Reform and Social Change in Iran, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1987, bahai-library.com. > ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── > > Land Reform and Social > Change in Iran > > Afsaneh Najmabadi > > University of Utah Press > Salt Lake City > 1987 > > Copyright © 1987 by the University of Utah Press Contents > Pn.nted in the United States of Amen.ca > All Rights Reserved > > List of Tables . . . . Vl > List of Figures . . . 1x > Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Acknowledgments . x > Najmabadi, Afsaneh, 1946- 1. Introduction: Why Land Reform? . 3 > Land reform and social change in Iran. 2. The Postwar Outlook on Development . . 15 > Bibliography: p. 3. Land Reform and Primitive Accumulation. . 33 > Includes index. 4. Pre-Land Reform Agrarian Relations. . . . . 43 > 1. Land reform-Iran. 2. Peasantry-Iran. > 5. The 1962 Land Reform: History and Legislation . 59 > 3. Iran-Rural conditions. 4. Agriculture-Economic > aspects-Iran. I. Title. 6. Results of the Land Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 > HD1333.l7N34 1987 333.3'1'55 87-31630 7. Cooperatives and Corporations . . . . . . . . . . 169 > ISBN 0-87480-285-7 8. The Changing Sociology and Politics of the Peasantry . 19 3 > Appendix A: Contribution of Land Payments to > () ) , , - ' j Capital Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 > Appendix B: The Position of the Clergy in the > 1962 Land Reform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 > Appendix C: Consumption Expenditure of Rural > Households. . 209 > Notes . . . . 211 > References. . 225 > Index . . . . 235 > > v > 206 I Land Reform and Social Change in Iran Appendixes I 207 > > At a much earlier time, when the original land reform bill was being up there .... Go and investigate if a penny from a big or feudal land- > lord has reached Qum. (Davani n.d. :vol. 4, p. 139) > discussed by the parliament in February 1960, Ayatollah Borujerdi > had written a letter to Ja'far Behbehani, his nephew and a member There was no ambiguity, however, about the clerical opposition > of parliament, complaining that the bill was ill-advised and contrary to the local election bill, which they opposed on three grounds: first, > to the shaná'a (religious law) (Akhavi 1980:91). Several ulama (mem- it removed being a Muslim as a requirement for electors and candi- > bers of the clergy) agitated against the 1962 land reform on the dates in these elections; second, in the swearing-in ceremony the > grounds that the government should have solicited their opinion on Qur'an was replaced by any "holy book"; third, it allowed women > such an important matter. Once the Additional Articles of January both to vote and stand as candidates in these elections. 2 The first two > 17, 196 3, were announced, requiring charitable waqf lands to be of these changes would allow the followers of minority religions to > leased on ninety-nine-year terms to the peasants cultivating them, hold elected offices. In some of the clergy's earlier statements, the > certain members of the clergy posed strong opposition (Lambton issue of the women's vote was considered to be less important. The > 1969: 105-108). Nonetheless, the majority of the clergy, and partic- first protest telegrams sent to 'Alam by Ayatollahs Zanjani, Damad, > ularly the more political and activist circles around Khomeini, did Amoli, Ha'iri, and Khomeini did not even mention the women's > not oppose land reform as such. vote (Davani n.d.:vol. 3, pp. 31-32, 40, 96). Davani, himself a cler- > Indeed, just these elements of the clergy were wary of the possi- ical participant, recalls the clerical perception of the issue in this > ble success of the government's contention that the opposition was way: > instigated by the landlords, and so they went out of their way to > deny any such connections. In a statement issued a day after The issue of women's vote was but an excuse. The main aim [of the > government) was to eliminate the condition of Islam from the require- > Khomeini's arrest on June 5, 1963, Shari'atmadari reiterated this > ments of the electors and the candidates so that the road would be > theme: opened up for other sects, for Jews, Christians, Zoroasterians, and espe- > The shi'i ulama have no connections with big landlords and they do cially for the astray sect of the Baha'is, those dangerous agents of for- > not oppose peasants' ownership of land. Contrary to deceitful govern- eigners in Iran. To facilitate this, they removed the Quran from the > ment propaganda, the interests of the ulama will not be threaten~d by swearing-in ceremony and replaced it with "holy book," so that such > such ownership; they will be better served. The ulama are more lmked sects and even members of the Baha'i political party, who call their > to the peasants than to landlords. Our protest against the governme?t forged creed a "religion" and consider their book of superstitions a > concerns the application and implementation of the [reform] law rn "holy book," could be elected to the provincial councils of the Islamic > which, we say, legal and religious conditions must be observed. In any country of Irari, and could take the fate of Muslims into their hands, > case, our struggles do not principally relate to this [land reform] issue. by intervening in all public affairs and thus gaining vast prerogatives > (Davani n.d. :vol. 4, p. 105) over the affairs of Iranian people. (Davani n.d. :vol. 3, p. 29) > > Even on the issue of waqf land, the clerics rejected the govern- It is indicative of the outlook of many of the clergy that the > ment accusations: election bill, more than the land reform, should have been the cat- > alyst for the emergence of their organized opposition to the shah. > The present ruling elite ... says that the clergy is against land distri- > bution, because of their hold on awqaf [endowment land]. This is From the clerical viewpoint, the changes that the shah had embarked > ridiculous. All the awqaf is held by the government .... The awqaf of on constituted the final stage in the undermining of the traditional > Qa'inat, with its enormous revenues, is held by Mr. 'Alam [then the Islamic society first initiated in the mid-nineteenth century by reform- > prime minister]. The big awqaf dedicated to Imam Reza's shrine [in ist ministers such as Amir Kabir, continued by the constitutionalist > Khorasan province) is all in the hands of the government. Go and con- movement, and greatly accelerated by the explicitly anticlerical pol- > tact any of the theological students in Qum and inspect all the books > of revenues for the seminaries and see if a penny from the awqaf shows icies of Reza Shah. The links between the controversy over the elec- > 208 I Land Reform and Social Change in Iran Appendixes I 209 > tion law, the defense of Islam per se, and the overall historical pro- the same danger to Islam, the Qur'an, and the country when the gov- > cess of social change were explained by the oppositionists at Qum. ernment took measures to change the local elections. Now it seems that > For example, in one of his telegrams to the prime minister, Khomeini ~he enemies oflsla.m are trying to achieve the same thing through fool- > vividly sketched out what were to become his familiar motifs of for- mg a bunch of naive people. (Davani n.d. :vol. 3, pp. 205-206) > eign conspiracy and internal decadence: The postrevolutionary practice of the clergy in power, since Feb- > It is incumbent upon me, according to my religious duties, to warn the ruary of 1979, vindicates this evaluation: the clergy has done much > Iranian people and the Muslims of the world that Islam and the Qur'an to Islamicize both Iranian society and the state, including the place > are in danger; that the independence of the country and its economy of women in society and politics. The clergy has not reversed the > are about to be taken over by Zionists, who in Iran appear as the party land reform. On the contrary, the politically dominant faction within > of Baha'is, and if this deadly silence of Muslims continues, these ele- > the ruling bloc has been trying to pass a land reform legislation > ments will soon take over the entire economy of the country and drive > it to complete bankruptcy. Iranian television is a Jewish spy base, the t?rough the Majlis that would sanction land takeovers by peasants > government sees this and approves of it (Ruhani 1977:177-178) 3 smce 1979 and would deal with lands exempted from the shah's ear- > lier reform measures. Only on the issue of the waqf lands, for obvi- > When the shah put his six-point program to a vote on January ous religious reasons and not because of financial considerations, has > 26, 1963, it included land reform, the women's vote, nationalization there been discussion of declaring any previous land reform transac- > of forests and pastures, and a workers' profit-sharing scheme. The tions void. > clergy interpreted this program as a rejection of their demand for > greater influence in the government and as a further attempt to curb APPENDIXC > the clergy's social influence and political role. They called for a boy- CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE OF RURAL HOUSEHOLDS > cott of the referendum. It must be emphasized, however, that no ~able C-1 has been constructed on the basis of annual surveys pub- > single plank in the program was the sole cause of the clerical boy- lished by the Plan Organization on consumptive expenditure of rural > cott. Rather, the clergy voiced their fears of the project as a whole. households. The data for all selected years have been reduced to six > In their eyes, the shah's program was a final assault on Islam. The expenditure categories, because for the period 1966-1970 the six cat- > clergy saw it as the rejection of the clerical demand to reverse the egories comprised the extent of the published data. Other years > course of the previous decades and to move in an Islamic direction. included a wider classification, ranging from nine to twelve groups. > The existential tone of the declarations of the time make this evi- The .expenditure groups are defined differently from year to year, > dent, as this statement by Khomeini demonstrates: and m the absence of accurate information on rural consumer price > People who are responsible to the law and to the nation have fooled > indexes, it is not possible to make accurate comparisons. The reduc- > His Majesty into doing this job for them. If they want to do something tio~ of other years to six expenditure groups is, therefore, partly > for the good of the people, why do they not turn to the program of arbitrary, although a general measure of changing expenditure pat- > Islam and Islamic experts, so that all classes will enjoy a comfortable terns has been taken into account. > life, and so that all will be happy in this and the other world? Why are > they instituting cooperative funds that, are robbing the fruits of the > peasants' labor? With the establishment of these cooperatives, the Ira- > nian home market will be lost, and both merchants and farmers ruined, > while other classes will suffer a similar fate .... The clergy registers the > danger for the Qur'an and our religion. It seems that this compulsory > referendum aims to lay the basis for the removal of the clauses [in the > constitution] linked to religion. The Islamic ulama had previously felt > > — *Land Reform and Social Change in Iran (Used by permission of the curator)*