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At a much earlier time, when the original land reform bill was being  
up there .... Go and investigate if a penny from a big or feudal land-  
lord has reached Qum. (Davani n.d. :vol. 4, p. 139)

discussed by the parliament in February 1960, Ayatollah Borujerdi  
had written a letter to Ja'far Behbehani, his nephew and a member

There was no ambiguity, however, about the clerical opposition  
of parliament, complaining that the bill was ill-advised and contrary  
to the local election bill, which they opposed on three grounds: first,  
to the shaná'a (religious law) (Akhavi 1980:91). Several ulama (mem-  
it removed being a Muslim as a requirement for electors and candi-  
bers of the clergy) agitated against the 1962 land reform on the

dates in these elections; second, in the swearing-in ceremony the  
grounds that the government should have solicited their opinion on  
Qur'an was replaced by any "holy book"; third, it allowed women  
such an important matter. Once the Additional Articles of January  
both to vote and stand as candidates in these elections. 2 The first two

17, 196 3, were announced, requiring charitable waqf lands to be  
of these changes would allow the followers of minority religions to  
leased on ninety-nine-year terms to the peasants cultivating them,

hold elected offices. In some of the clergy's earlier statements, the  
certain members of the clergy posed strong opposition (Lambton  
issue of the women's vote was considered to be less important. The  
1969: 105-108). Nonetheless, the majority of the clergy, and partic-

first protest telegrams sent to 'Alam by Ayatollahs Zanjani, Damad,  
ularly the more political and activist circles around Khomeini, did

Amoli, Ha'iri, and Khomeini did not even mention the women's  
not oppose land reform as such.

vote (Davani n.d.:vol. 3, pp. 31-32, 40, 96). Davani, himself a cler-  
Indeed, just these elements of the clergy were wary of the possi-  
ical participant, recalls the clerical perception of the issue in this  
ble success of the government's contention that the opposition was  
way:

instigated by the landlords, and so they went out of their way to  
deny any such connections. In a statement issued a day after

The issue of women's vote was but an excuse. The main aim [of the

government) was to eliminate the condition of Islam from the requirements of the electors and the candidates so that the road would be theme:

opened up for other sects, for Jews, Christians, Zoroasterians, and espe-

The shi'i ulama have no connections with big landlords and they do not oppose peasants' ownership of land. Contrary to deceitful government propagandists, they removed the Quran from the swearing-in ceremony and replaced it with "holy book," so that such ownership; they will be better served. The ulama are more linked to the peasants than to landlords. Our protest against the government forged a "religion" and consider their book of superstitions a concern for the application and implementation of the [reform] law in "holy book," could be elected to the provincial councils of the Islamic which, we say, legal and religious conditions must be observed. In any country of Irani, and could take the fate of Muslims into their hands, case, our struggles do not principally relate to this [land reform] issue. by intervening in all public affairs and thus gaining vast prerogatives (Davani n.d. :vol. 4, p. 105)

over the affairs of Iranian people. (Davani n.d. :vol. 3, p. 29)

Even on the issue of waqf land, the clerics rejected the govern-

ment accusations:

election bill, more than the land reform, should have been the catalyst for the emergence of their organized opposition to the shah.

The present ruling elite ... says that the clergy is against land distribution, because of their hold on awqaf [endowment land]. This is

From the clerical viewpoint, the changes that the shah had embarked on ridiculous. All the awqaf is held by the government .... The awqaf of

constituted the final stage in the undermining of the traditional

Qa'inat, with its enormous revenues, is held by Mr. 'Alam [then the

Islamic society first initiated in the mid-nineteenth century by reform- prime minister]. The big awqaf dedicated to Imam Reza's shrine [in

ist ministers such as Amir Kabir, continued by the constitutionalist

Khorasan province) is all in the hands of the government. Go and con-

movement, and greatly accelerated by the explicitly anticlerical pol-

tact any of the theological students in Qum and inspect all the books

of revenues for the seminaries and see if a penny from the awqaf shows

icies of Reza Shah. The links between the controversy over the elec-

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tion law, the defense of Islam per se, and the overall historical pro-  
the same danger to Islam, the Qur'an, and the country when the gov-  
cess of social change were explained by the oppositionists at Qum.

ernment took measures to change the local elections. Now it seems that  
For example, in one of his telegrams to the prime minister, Khomeini  
~he enemies of Islam are trying to achieve the same thing through  
fool-

vividly sketched out what were to become his familiar motifs of for-  
mg a bunch of naive people. (Davani n.d. :vol. 3, pp. 205-206)  
eign conspiracy and internal decadence:

The postrevolutionary practice of the clergy in power, since Feb-  
It is incumbent upon me, according to my religious duties, to warn the  
ruary of 1979, vindicates this evaluation: the clergy has done much  
Iranian people and the Muslims of the world that Islam and the Qur'an  
to Islamicize both Iranian society and the state, including the place  
are in danger; that the independence of the country and its economy  
of women in society and politics. The clergy has not reversed the  
are about to be taken over by Zionists, who in Iran appear as the party  
land reform. On the contrary, the politically dominant faction within  
of Baha'is, and if this deadly silence of Muslims continues, these ele-  
the ruling bloc has been trying to pass a land reform legislation  
ments will soon take over the entire economy of the country and drive  
it to complete bankruptcy. Iranian television is a Jewish spy base, the  
t?rough the Majlis that would sanction land takeovers by peasants  
government sees this and approves of it (Ruhani 1977:177-178) 3  
smce 1979 and would deal with lands exempted from the shah's ear-  
lier reform measures. Only on the issue of the waqf lands, for obvi-  
When the shah put his six-point program to a vote on January  
ous religious reasons and not because of financial considerations, has  
26, 1963, it included land reform, the women's vote, nationalization  
there been discussion of declaring any previous land reform transac-  
of forests and pastures, and a workers' profit-sharing scheme. The  
tions void.

clergy interpreted this program as a rejection of their demand for  
greater influence in the government and as a further attempt to curb

#### APPENDIX C

the clergy's social influence and political role. They called for a boy-  
CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE OF RURAL HOUSEHOLDS  
cott of the referendum. It must be emphasized, however, that no

~able C-1 has been constructed on the basis of annual surveys pub-  
single plank in the program was the sole cause of the clerical boy-  
lished by the Plan Organization on consumptive expenditure of rural  
cott. Rather, the clergy voiced their fears of the project as a whole.

households. The data for all selected years have been reduced to six  
In their eyes, the shah's program was a final assault on Islam. The  
expenditure categories, because for the period 1966-1970 the six cat-  
clergy saw it as the rejection of the clerical demand to reverse the

egories comprised the extent of the published data. Other years course of the previous decades and to move in an Islamic direction.

included a wider classification, ranging from nine to twelve groups. The existential tone of the declarations of the time make this evi-

The expenditure groups are defined differently from year to year, dent, as this statement by Khomeini demonstrates:

and in the absence of accurate information on rural consumer price indexes, it is not possible to make accurate comparisons. The reduction of other years to six expenditure groups is, therefore, partly for the good of the people, why do they not turn to the program of arbitrary, although a general measure of changing expenditure patterns has been taken into account.

life, and so that all will be happy in this and the other world? Why are they instituting cooperative funds that, are robbing the fruits of the peasants' labor? With the establishment of these cooperatives, the Iranian home market will be lost, and both merchants and farmers ruined, while other classes will suffer a similar fate .... The clergy registers the danger for the Qur'an and our religion. It seems that this compulsory referendum aims to lay the basis for the removal of the clauses [in the constitution] linked to religion. The Islamic ulama had previously felt

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