# Falsafi, Kashani, and the Baha'is

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> Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: A. W. Samii, Falsafi, Kashani, and the Baha'is, bahai-library.com.
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> 
> Falsafi, Kashani, and the Bahá'ís
> 
> A. W. Samii
> 
> 1996-01-15
> 
> Subject: RE; FALSAFI, KASHANI, AND THE BAHA'IS
> 
> From: abbas65@aol.com (A.W. Samii)
> 
> Date: 1996/01/15
> 
> Message-ID:
> 
> Sender: root@newsbf02.news.aol.com
> 
> Newsgroups: soc.culture.iranian
> 
> Subject: FALSAFI & THE BAHA'IS OF IRAN
> 
> On 11 Jan 1996, some information about Falsafi was posted. So I did some
> research and came up with this stuff:
> 
> The clergy had played a significant role in the Oil Crisis and the Shah's
> subsequent return to power. Aya. Kashani's role bears elaboration.
> Kashani was a vocal proponent of nationalization and the elimination of
> foreign influence in Iranian affairs. While he advocated a return to
> Islamic government for Iran, it is generally agreed that this stemmed more
> from his political motives than any real religious motivation.1 During
> the 30 Tir (18 July 1952) incident Kashani helped organize crowds in
> Musaddiq's favor, prompting the Shah to ask Musaddiq to resume the role of
> Prime Minister, which he had symbolically resigned.
> 
> Later, however, both Kashani and Aya. Sayyid Mohammad Behbehani were
> approached by CIA contract officers to encourage them to split with the
> National Front.2 It was later stated that they did take the money,
> leading to stories of 'Behbehani dollars' in the bazaar, and a report of a
> post-coup meeting between the Shah, Zahedi, and Kashani, in which Kashani
> was thanked for his efforts.3 Musaddiq's extra-legal efforts to
> concentrate power in his own hands had a greater effect in losing him his
> early supporters, despite what some apologists may say, than did foreign
> money.4
> 
> After the coup Kashani gradually slipped from public life, because many
> came to believe that he was a British agent, and Tehran's press and radio
> ignored his efforts to attract attention.5 This did not signify a
> diminution in the importance of the clergy in Iranian affairs, and it has
> been suggested that the clergy's importance increased after August 1953.6
> The government's position towards the religious community did not involve
> the use of repression and coercion, in contrast to its dealings with
> Communists and Nationalists. In fact, the ulama were generally quiet
> after the coup, following the example of the Marja al-Taqlid (source of
> imitation) Aya. Mohammad Hossein Borujerdi in Qum.
> 
> There was one major exception to this general quiet. During the Ramadan
> period in 1955 the popular preacher Falsafi spoke out against the rising
> power of the Bahais in Iran and accused them of being traitors and foreign
> agents.7 The military government called on the Bahais to stop spreading
> propaganda that would provoke the public, and the government radio station
> replayed Falsafi's sermons. Borujerdi then praised Falsafi publicly, and
> the Majlis voted to outlaw the Bahai faith.8
> 
> On 9 May 1955 the press carried reports of the destruction of the dome of
> the Bahai Center in Tehran (Hazhir'e al-Qods) and its occupation by
> troops, and on 17 May it was announced that the Bahai Center in Shiraz had
> been closed and occupied by the military.9 The Chief of Staff
> (Batmanghelidj) and the Military Governor of Tehran (Bakhtiar) led the
> attackers.10 Behbehani congratulated the Shah for these acts. At the
> same time, the Shah's personal physician, Abdol Karim Ayadi, a Bahai, was
> told to leave the country for a while. For this reason he went to Italy
> for about nine months. The Bahais fought back by withdrawing their cash
> from the bazaar, a move which led to the collapse of several businesses.11
> 
> In purely religious terms, Bahai refusal to accept Mohammad as the final
> prophet was the ulama's major concern. More practical reasons, such as an
> attempt to counter the Bahais' increasing political and economic influence
> and reform-orientation, and an effort by the ulama to regain its
> influence, probably carried more weight. More conservative elements
> resented the Bahai pressure for reforms, too.12 Also, the ulama felt
> threatened by the number of conversions of Moslems to the Bahai faith.13
> 
> In 1955, 70 military officers were retired on the grounds of being
> Bahais, yet among this group were some of the very officers who were most
> helpful in terms of remodeling the armed forces. So, while the Shah had
> to permit these moves to appease the religious establishment, to which he
> undoubtedly felt an obligation for its support and a need for its
> continued support, he also recognized that he could not allow the campaign
> to go too far.14 Minister of the Interior Assadollah Alam had Falsafi
> muzzled until order was restored.15
> 
> Over time, Bahais regained their influence, and although the ones
> mentioned below exceeded the limits of mutual help, it is important to
> cite them as examples of people's irritants. Ayadi was given exclusive
> rights for Persian Gulf shrimp fishing, was a shareholder in numerous
> companies, and used his position to help other Bahais.16 Another example
> is that of Hojabr Yazdani, who had started out as little more than a
> shepherd in Sangsar. Allegedly through the use of coercion and protection
> from high in the government, he achieved immense wealth and power.
> Allegedly, when he was investigated by the Imperial Inspectorate
> Organization (IIO), its head, Gen. Hossein Fardust, was told by Ayadi that
> he had intervened with the Shah and Fardust should drop the issue.17
> 
> Resenting the end of the anti-Bahai campaign, the ulama rose up when
> efforts to enforce women's Constitutional rights arose. By mid-1959,
> however, the clergy fully supported the Shah, even making anti-Soviet
> speeches during the Muharram processions, and in general, the ulama was
> supportive of the Shah during the post-coup period. The Fada'iyan-i Islam
> is an exception to this view, but as stated earlier, the group's
> importance was exaggerated. Clergy-government relations became strained
> with the introduction of the Shah's Land Reforms in the 1960s.18
> 
> Notes
> 
> See M. Yazdi, 'Patterns of Clerical Political Behavior in Postwar
> Iran, 1941-53,' Middle Eastern Studies v. 26, n. 3 (July 1990). On
> Kashani's early career, see 'Transmitting Biographic Data on Ayatollah
> Kashani,' Foreign Service Despatch, 788.521/9JUN50.
> 
> Based on interviews with seven former CIA officials in Iran at the
> time, in M.J. Gasiorowski, 'The 1953 Coup D'Etat in Iran,' IJMES 19 (1987)
> pp. 268-69. This financial approach was part of an operation, codenamed
> BEDAMN, intended to thwart Tudeh and Soviet influence. Funded at $1
> million a year, BEDAMN utilized propaganda, 'black operations' (such as
> infiltration of the Tudeh, 'paying religious figures to denounce the Tudeh
> as anti-Islamic, and organizing attacks on mosques and public figures in
> the name of the Tudeh'), and 'direct attacks on Soviet allies.'
> 
> 1983 and 1984 interviews with the CIA officials who delivered $10,000
> to a Kashani representative, Ahmad Aramesh; in Gasiorowski, 'The 1953 Coup
> D'Etat in Iran,' p. 274; and 'Account of Conversation,' 1SEP53,
> FO/371/104571, in ibid., p. 285.
> 
> This apologetic tendency has been noted in a review of J.A. Bill and
> W.R. Louis, ed.'s, Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil, by C. Arjani,
> British Society for Middle Eastern Studies Bulletin, v. 16, n. 2 (1989),
> pp. 207-12.
> 
> 'National Front Leaders: Whereabouts and Potentialities,' Foreign
> Service Despatch, 788.521/17APR54, RG-59, Box 4119; and 'The Government
> and Kashani's Publicity Campaign,' Foreign Service Despatch
> 788.00/26FEB54, RG-59, Box 4112.
> 
> A. Tabari, 'The Role of the Clergy in Modern Iranian Politics,' in N.R.
> Keddie, ed., Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ism from Quietism to
> Revolution, (New Haven, 1983).
> 
> Falsafi had a history of rabble-rousing. In June 1951 he was
> identified as 'one of Iran's most influential younger mullahs' whose
> lectures against the UK, US, and USSR led to riots. In May 1952, he was
> involved in disorders in the Tehran bazaar. Also, he was sponsored by a
> CIA operation called BEDAMN as an alternative to Kashani during the oil
> crisis. (State Department telegram 3453, 788.00/27JUN51, RG-59, Box 4107;
> Mashad Consulate telegrams 2 & 4, 788.00/2AUG51, ibid.; S. Akhavi,
> Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran Clergy-State Relations in the
> Pahlavi Period, [Albany, 1980], p. 64; Gasiorowski, US Foreign Policy and
> the Shah, p. 70). On Falsafi's relations with the government, see W.M.
> Floor, "The Revolutionary Character of the Ulama: Wishful Thinking or
> Reality?", in Keddie, Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ism from
> Quietism to Revolution, p. 76.
> 
> State Department telegram 2225, 788.00/8MAY55. Falsafi was a member
> of an anti-Bahai group which eventually became the Hojjatieh Society, and
> the leading ulama approved of the group's work; see 'The Hojjatieh
> Society - Its History, Advocates, and Opponents,' Iran Press Digest,
> (28SEP82), p. 20, and ibid., (5OCT82), p. 15.
> 
> Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, p. 77, 80.
> 
> Oney, CIA Research Study; in Asnad, v. 7, p. 33.
> 
> State Department Office of Intelligence Research, 'Political
> Significance of the Campaign Against the Bahai Sect in Iran,' Intelligence
> Report 6964, (16JUN55), p. 5.
> 
> Ibid., pp. 1-2, 6.
> 
> 'Murderers of Bahais Convicted - Analysis of Present Position of
> Bahai Community,' Foreign Service Despatch 27, 788.00/12JUL56, RG-59, Box
> 3810.
> 
> 'Political Significance of the Campaign Against the Bahai Sect in
> Iran,' p. 7. Tragically, Islamic aggression against the Bahais was
> revived during the Revolution.
> 
> In 1963, Falsafi spoke out against the Shah's Reforms, so Alam, who
> had become Prime Minister, had him imprisoned; see A. Alam, (A. Alikhani,
> ed.), The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court,
> 1969-1977, [London, 1991], p. 48) .
> 
> Alam, The Shah and I, p. 386; Asnad, v. 17, p. 66.
> 
> Fardust, Khatirat, p. 375. Yazdani was jailed by the Shah in August
> 1978 for fraud and illegal use of government land; see Department of State
> telegram, ( 28NOV78); in Asnad, v. 37, pp. 4-5.
> 
> 'Women's Rights Become Current Political Issue,' Foreign Service
> Despatch 479, 788.00/15JAN59, RG-59, Box 3812; US Army WEEKA (weekly
> update), 788.00 (W)/23JUL59, RG-59, Box 3814.
> 
> METADATA
> 
> Views15736 views since posted 1997; last edit 2025-04-03 01:35 UTC;
> 
> previous at archive.org.../samii_kashani_bahais;
> URLs changed in 2010, see archive.org.../bahai-library.org
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> — *Falsafi, Kashani, and the Baha'is (Used by permission of the curator)*