Mishnah Keritot
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Mishnah Keritot / משנה כריתות

1:1	There are thirty-six cases in the Torah with regard to which one who performs a prohibited action intentionally is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet]. They are: One who engages in sexual intercourse with his mother; or with the wife of his father, even if she is not his mother; or with his daughter-in-law. The same punishment is imposed on a man who engages in intercourse with another male [hazekhur], or who copulates with an animal; and a woman who brings an animal upon her to engage in bestiality. The same punishment is imposed on one who engages in intercourse with a woman and her daughter, or with a married woman. The same punishment is imposed on one who engages in intercourse with his sister, or with his father’s sister, or with his mother’s sister, or with his wife’s sister, or with his brother’s wife, or with the wife of his father’s brother, or with the wife of his mother’s brother, or with a menstruating woman. And these too are liable to receive karet: One who blasphemes the name of Heaven, and one who worships an idol, and one who gives of his children to Molekh (see Leviticus 20:1–5), and a necromancer, and one who desecrates Shabbat. And the same is the punishment of one who is ritually impure who ate sacrificial food; and one who enters the Temple while ritually impure; and one who eats forbidden fat, or consumes blood, or eats meat left over from an offering after the time allotted for its consumption [notar], or eats meat of an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time [piggul]; and one who slaughters offerings and offers them up outside the Temple. And these too are liable to receive karet: One who eats leavened bread on Passover, and one who eats or performs prohibited labor on Yom Kippur. And the same is the punishment of one who blends the anointing oil according to the specifications of the oil prepared by Moses in the wilderness (see Exodus 30:22–33); and one who blends the incense according to the specifications of the incense used in the Temple service for purposes other than use in the Temple; and one who applies the anointing oil to his skin. And one is liable to receive karet for failure to fulfill the mitzva of bringing the Paschal offering and the mitzva of circumcision, which unlike the cases of prohibitions enumerated in the mishna, are positive mitzvot.
1:2	For any of these prohibitions, one is liable to receive karet for its intentional violation and to bring a sin offering for its unwitting violation. And for their violation in a case where it is unknown to him whether or not he transgressed, he is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, which provides provisional atonement until he discovers whether or not he transgressed. This is the halakha for all of the transgressions listed above except for one who defiles the Temple, i.e., he enters the Temple while ritually impure, or partakes of its consecrated items while ritually impure. In these cases he does not bring a provisional guilt offering because he is obligated to bring a sliding-scale offering for a definite transgression. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The halakha is the same even with regard to the one who blasphemes, as it is stated with regard to the sin offering: “You shall have one law for him who performs the action unwittingly” (Numbers 15:29), excluding one who blasphemes, as he does not perform an action but sins with speech.
1:3	There are some women who bring a sin offering of a woman after childbirth and the offering is eaten by the priests. And there are some women who bring a sin offering but it is not eaten. And there are some women who do not bring a sin offering at all. The mishna elaborates: The following women bring a sin offering and it is eaten by the priests: One who miscarries a fetus with a form similar to a domesticated animal, one who miscarries a fetus with a form similar to an undomesticated animal, or one who miscarries a fetus with a form similar to a bird; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: She does not bring a sin offering unless the fetus has the form of a person. With regard to a woman who miscarries a sandal fetus, i.e., one that has the form of a flat fish; or if she miscarries the placenta; or an amniotic sac in which tissue developed; or a fetus that emerged cut, i.e., in pieces; and likewise a Canaanite maidservant, owned by a Jew, who miscarried; in all these cases she brings a sin offering and it is eaten by the priests.
1:4	And these women bring sin offerings but their sin offerings are not eaten: One who miscarries and does not know the nature of what she miscarried; and two women who miscarried, in a case where one miscarried a fetus of a type for which a woman is exempt from bringing an offering and the other one miscarried a fetus of a type for which a woman is liable to bring an offering, and they do not know which miscarried which type. Rabbi Yosei said: When is their sin offering not eaten? It is when both women went to different places within the Temple to bring their offerings, e.g., this woman went to the east and that woman went to the west. But if both of them were standing together, both of them together bring one sin offering, and it is eaten.
1:5	These women do not bring a sin offering: A woman who miscarries an amniotic sac full of water, or one full of blood, or one full of different colors; and likewise a woman who miscarries a fetus with a form similar to fish, or grasshoppers, or repugnant creatures, or creeping animals; and a woman who miscarries on the fortieth day of her pregnancy; and a woman who gives birth by caesarean section. Rabbi Shimon deems a woman liable to bring a sin offering in the case where she gives birth by caesarean section.
1:6	A woman who gives birth to a daughter counts fourteen days during which she is ritually impure. That is followed by sixty-six days during which she remains ritually pure even if she experiences a flow of blood. The Torah obligates a woman to bring her offering on the eighty-first day (see Leviticus 12:1–6). If the woman miscarries another fetus before that day, she is not required to bring an additional offering. In the case of a woman who miscarries a fetus on the night of, i.e., preceding, the eighty-first day, Beit Shammai deem her exempt from bringing a second offering and Beit Hillel deem her liable to bring a second offering. Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: What is different between the night of the eighty-first and the day of the eighty-first? If they are equal with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity, i.e., the blood flow of this woman on the eighty-first night renders her ritually impure and all the standard strictures of ritual impurity apply to her, will the two time periods not be equal with regard to liability to bring an additional offering as well? Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: No, there is a difference between that night and the following day. If you said with regard to a woman who miscarries on the eighty-first day that she is obligated to bring an additional offering, this is logical, as she emerged into a period that is fit for her to bring her offering. Would you say the same with regard to a woman who miscarries on the night of the eighty-first day, where she did not emerge into a period that is fit for her to bring her offering, as offerings are not sacrificed at night? Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: But let the case of a woman who miscarries on the eighty-first day that occurs on Shabbat prove that this distinction is incorrect, as she did not emerge into a period that is fit for her to bring her offering because individual offerings are not sacrificed on Shabbat, and nevertheless she is obligated to bring an additional offering. Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: No, there is a difference between these cases. If you said this ruling with regard to a woman who miscarries on the eighty-first day that occurs on Shabbat, the reason is that although Shabbat is unfit for the sacrifice of an individual offering, it is fit for the sacrifice of a communal offering whose time is fixed, e.g., the daily offering. Would you say the same with regard to a woman who miscarries on the night of the eighty-first day, as the night is completely unfit, since neither an individual offering nor a communal offering is sacrificed at night? Beit Shammai add: And as for the ritual impurity status of the blood, i.e., Beit Hillel’s opinion that the two time periods are equal with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity, this does not prove what the halakha should be with regard to offerings, as with regard to a woman who miscarries before the completion of the term of eighty days, her blood is impure like the blood of a woman after childbirth, and nevertheless she is exempt from bringing the offering.
1:7	With regard to a woman who has in her case uncertainty concerning five births, and likewise a woman with regard to whom there is uncertainty concerning five irregular discharges of blood from the uterus [ziva], she brings one offering, and then she may partake of the meat of offerings. And the remaining offerings are not an obligation for her. If she experienced five definite discharges of a zava or five definite births, she brings one offering, and then she may partake of the meat of offerings. And the remaining offerings are an obligation for her. There was an incident where the price of nests, i.e., pairs of birds, stood in Jerusalem at one gold dinar, as the great demand for birds for the offerings of a woman after childbirth and a zava led to an increase in the price. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: I swear by this abode of the Divine Presence that I will not lie down tonight until the price of nests will be in silver dinars. Ultimately, he entered the court and taught: A woman who has in her case five definite discharges of a zava or five definite births brings one offering, and then she may partake of the meat of offerings. And the remaining offerings are not an obligation for her. And as a result, the price of the nests stood that day at one-quarter of a silver dinar, as the demand for nests decreased.
2:1	There are four individuals whose halakhic status is defined as: Lacking atonement [khappara], which means they had been in a state of ritual impurity and underwent rituals to purify themselves, but since they have not yet brought the requisite atonement offering to complete the purification process, they may not partake of sacrificial meat. And there are also four individuals who bring an offering for an intentional transgression in the same manner as they do for an unwitting transgression. And these are the four individuals who lack atonement: The man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [zav], the woman who experiences a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period [zava], the woman after childbirth, and the leper. In all four of these cases, although the individual has completed all of the other steps of the purification process, the process is not complete until the atonement offering has been brought. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: A convert also lacks atonement, even after he has been circumcised and has immersed in a ritual bath, until the priest sprinkles the blood of his offering on the altar on his behalf. A nazirite also lacks atonement with regard to his permission for drinking wine, and cutting his hair, and his exposure to ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, until his offerings are sacrificed.
2:2	These individuals bring an offering for an intentional transgression in the same manner as they do for an unwitting transgression: One who engages in intercourse with an espoused maidservant, who is liable to bring a guilt offering (see Leviticus 19:20–22); and a nazirite who became ritually impure, who is required to bring a sheep as a guilt offering and two doves or two pigeons, one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering (see Numbers 6:9–12); and one who falsely takes the oath of testimony, asserting that he does not have any testimony to provide on a given issue (see Leviticus 5:1); and one who falsely takes the oath on a deposit, asserting that an item belonging to another is not in his possession (see Leviticus 5:21–26).
2:3	There are five individuals who bring one offering for several transgressions, i.e., for violating the same transgression several times; and there are five individuals who bring a sliding-scale offering, which is determined based on the financial status of the sinner. These are the five individuals who bring one offering for several transgressions: First, one who engages in several acts of intercourse with an espoused maidservant, and second, a nazirite who became ritually impure due to several instances of contact with ritual impurity. The mishna continues to list the five situations in which one offering is brought to atone for several transgressions: Third, one who issues a warning to his wife declaring himself jealous with regard to several different men with whom he suspects her of committing adultery, and forbidding her to be alone with them. If the wife was then found separately in seclusion with each of the men, he brings her to the Temple with one single meal offering of jealousy. And fourth, a leper who was afflicted with several instances of leprosy, meaning that he was purified from his leprosy, and before he brought his offerings, he suffered a relapse of the leprosy. When he is finally purified, he brings only one set of offerings. If a leper brought the two requisite birds on the first day of his purification (see Leviticus 14:4–7), and prior to bringing his offerings on the eighth day of his purification he was afflicted with a relapse of leprosy, those birds do not satisfy his obligation until he brings his sin offering. Rabbi Yehuda says: Until he brings his guilt offering.
2:4	The mishna continues with the last of the five situations in which one offering is brought to atone for several transgressions: A woman who gave birth to several offspring. This is a case where a woman gave birth to a daughter, after which she is ritually impure for fourteen days and then enters a period of sixty-six days of ritual purity, even if she experiences uterine bleeding. Nevertheless, during this interim period, she is still somewhat impure, and it is therefore prohibited for her to enter the Temple or to partake of consecrated food, and at the end of the period she must bring an offering. And during those days of ritual purity, she became pregnant again and then miscarried a female fetus within the eighty days, and then became pregnant again and miscarried another female fetus within eighty days of the first miscarriage. In this situation, when she ultimately completes her process of purification, she brings one single offering for all the births and miscarriages. And a similar halakha applies to a woman who miscarries multiple fetuses from a single pregnancy at different points in time, miscarrying each fetus before completing the purification period of forty days for a male or eighty days for a female for the previous fetus. When she finally completes her process of purification, she brings one single offering for all of the miscarriages. Rabbi Yehuda says: In these cases, a single offering does not suffice for all the births or miscarriages. Rather, she brings an offering for the first birth or miscarriage and does not bring an offering for the second miscarriage, as it took place before the completion of the purification period for the first. She then brings an offering for the third miscarriage and does not bring an offering for the fourth fetus, as it was miscarried before the completion of the purification period for the third fetus.These are the five situations mentioned in the mishna (9a) in which one brings a sliding-scale offering: For hearing the voice of an oath, i.e., where one took a false oath that he does not have any testimony to provide on a given issue; and for the utterance of the lips, which is a case where one took a false oath about a different matter; and for the defiling of the Temple, by entering it while ritually impure, or defiling its sacrificial foods, by partaking of them while ritually impure; and a woman after childbirth; and a leper at the end of his purification process.What are the differences between an espoused maidservant and all those others with whom relations are forbidden? The difference is that the status of the maidservant is not equal to their status, neither with regard to punishment nor with regard to an offering, as one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden is liable to bring a sin offering, and by contrast, one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an espoused maidservant is liable to bring a guilt offering. One who unwittingly engages in intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden brings a female animal, and one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an espoused maidservant brings a male animal, as a sin offering is a female and a guilt offering is a male. Furthermore, with regard to engaging in intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden, both the man and the woman are equal with regard to liability to receive lashes if they were forewarned, and with regard to liability to bring an offering if they did so unwittingly. And in the case of one who engages in intercourse with a maidservant, the Torah did not equate the man with the woman with regard to lashes, as she alone is flogged, as will be explained, and the Torah did not equate the woman with the man with regard to bringing an offering, as she does not bring an offering. With regard to intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden, the Torah rendered the halakhic status of one who engages in the initial stage of intercourse [hame’areh] to be like that of one who completes the act, and one is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every act of intercourse that he performs unwittingly. By contrast, in the case of relations with an espoused maidservant, one is liable only for completing the act of intercourse, and the man brings a single offering for several transgressions. This is a stringency that the Torah imposed with regard to the maidservant relative to other individuals with whom relations are forbidden: That the Torah established her status so that the one who engages in intercourse with her intentionally is like the one who does so unwittingly, as both are liable to bring a guilt offering, whereas one who engages in intercourse with those with whom relations are forbidden is liable to bring a sin offering only when he does so unwittingly.
2:5	Who is the espoused maidservant in question? It is any woman who is half-maidservant half-free woman, i.e., a maidservant who belonged to two masters, one of whom liberated her, as it is stated: “And she was redeemed and not redeemed” (Leviticus 19:20), which means that she was partially but not completely redeemed. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yishmael says: An espoused maidservant is a full-fledged maidservant whose status is certain, as the language of the verse does not mean redeemed and not redeemed; it is simply a way of stating that she was not redeemed. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: All those with whom relations are forbidden are enumerated in the Torah, and we have no exception other than one who is half-maidservant half-free woman.
2:6	This mishna cites an additional difference between the status of an espoused maidservant and the status of forbidden relatives. In all cases of intercourse with those with whom relations are forbidden, if one is an adult and one is a minor, the minor is exempt; if one is awake and one is sleeping, the sleeping one is exempt; if one commits the act unwittingly and one does so intentionally, the one who did so unwittingly is liable to bring a sin offering and the one who did so intentionally is liable to be punished with karet. By contrast, in a case of intercourse with an espoused maidservant, the man is liable to bring a guilt offering only if the woman is flogged, and that is the case only if she was an adult, awake, and committed the sin intentionally.
3:1	If witnesses said to a person: We saw that you ate forbidden fat, he is liable to bring a sin offering if he did so unwittingly. If a witness says: He ate forbidden fat, and a witness says: He did not eat forbidden fat, or if a woman says: He ate forbidden fat, and a woman says: He did not eat forbidden fat, he is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering. If a witness says: He ate forbidden fat, and the person himself says: I did not eat forbidden fat, he is exempt. If two witnesses say: He ate forbidden fat, and the person himself says: I did not eat forbidden fat, Rabbi Meir deems him liable to bring a sin offering. Rabbi Meir said: This conclusion can be derived a fortiori: If two witnesses could have brought him liability to receive the severe punishment of death, can they not bring him liability to sacrifice an offering, which is relatively lenient? The Rabbis said to him: Witnesses are unable to render another person liable to bring an offering contrary to his statement, as what if he wishes to say: I did so intentionally, in which case he would be exempt from bringing an offering?
3:2	If one unwittingly ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat and then ate another olive-bulk of forbidden fat during one lapse of awareness, i.e., in a case where he did not discover in the interim that fat is forbidden, or that the food he is eating is forbidden fat, he is liable to bring only one sin offering. If one ate forbidden fat, and blood, and piggul, and notar in one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every one of them. This is a stringency that applies to one who eats several types of forbidden food and does not apply to one who eats one type of forbidden food. And a stringency that applies to one who eats one type of forbidden food and not to one who eats several types of forbidden food is that if one ate half an olive-bulk and then ate another half an olive-bulk during one lapse of awareness, in a case where they were both from one type of forbidden food, he is liable to bring a sin offering. If they were from two types, he is exempt, because he did not eat an olive-bulk of any specific forbidden food.
3:3	How much time can one expend while eating an olive-bulk of forbidden food and still be liable for violating the prohibition? The duration is calculated as though he were eating toasted grain, which one eats one kernel at a time. If he eats the olive-bulk of forbidden food within the amount of time it would take to eat an olive-bulk of toasted grain, he is liable. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Unless the amount of time he expends from beginning to end is more than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf [peras] of bread, he is liable. Likewise, one who ate a quarter-loaf of ritually impure foods or drank a quarter-log of ritually impure liquids within the amount of time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread is rendered unfit to partake of teruma, the portion of the produce designated for priests, until he becomes pure. Similarly, if one drank a quarter-log of wine and entered the Temple, and he remained there for the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, he is liable. Rabbi Elazar says: If he interrupted his drinking of the quarter-log of wine or if he placed any amount of water into the wine, he is exempt.
3:4	There is a case where one can perform a single act of eating an olive-bulk of food and be liable to bring four sin offerings and one guilt offering for it. How so? This halakha applies to one who is ritually impure who ate forbidden fat, and it was left over from a consecrated offering after the time allotted for its consumption [notar], on Yom Kippur. He is liable to bring sin offerings for eating forbidden fat and notar, for eating the meat of an offering while impure, and for eating on Yom Kippur. He is also liable to bring a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property. Rabbi Meir says: If it was Shabbat and he carried it out from a private domain to a public domain while eating it, he would be liable to bring an additional sin offering for performing prohibited labor on Shabbat. The Rabbis said to him: That liability is not from the same type of prohibition, as it is not due to the act of eating, and therefore, it should not be counted.
3:5	There is a case where one can engage in a single act of intercourse and be liable to bring six sin offerings for it. How so? It is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his daughter to be liable due to having violated the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with his daughter, his sister, the wife of his brother, the wife of his father’s brother, a married woman, and a menstruating woman. It is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his daughter’s daughter to be liable to bring sin offerings due to the unwitting violation of the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with his daughter’s daughter, and his daughter-in-law, and the wife of his brother, and the wife of his father’s brother, and his wife’s sister, and a married woman, and a menstruating woman. Rabbi Yosei says: If the elder, i.e., the man’s father, who is the woman’s great-grandfather, transgressed and married her, the man would also be liable for engaging in intercourse with her due to the prohibition of intercourse with the wife of his father. And likewise, it is possible for one who engages in intercourse with the daughter of his wife to be liable to bring six sin offerings, similar to one who engages in intercourse with his own daughter, for violating the prohibitions against engaging in intercourse with his wife’s daughter, his sister, the wife of his brother, the wife of his father’s brother, a married woman, and a menstruating woman. And it is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his wife’s daughter’s daughter to be liable to bring seven sin offerings, similar to one who engages in intercourse with his own daughter’s daughter, for violating the following prohibitions: Engaging in intercourse with his wife’s daughter’s daughter, his daughter-in-law, the wife of his brother, the wife of his father’s brother, his wife’s sister, a married woman, and a menstruating woman.
3:6	It is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his mother-in-law to be liable to bring seven sin offerings for doing so, due to the unwitting violation of the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with his mother-in-law, and his daughter-in-law, and the wife of his brother, and the wife of his father’s brother, and his wife’s sister, and a married woman, and a menstruating woman. And likewise, the same applies with regard to one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his father-in-law or with the mother of his mother-in-law. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: It is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his mother-in-law to be liable due to the unwitting violation of the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with his mother-in-law, and the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law. The Rabbis said to him: Those three prohibitions are all one category of prohibition, derived from the same verse: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you shall not take her son’s daughter, or her daughter’s daughter” (Leviticus 18:17). Consequently, one is not liable to bring separate sin offerings for violating these prohibitions.
3:7	Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in the meat market [itlis] in Emmaus, where they went to purchase an animal for the wedding feast of the son of Rabban Gamliel: In the case of one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with his sister, and the sister of his father, and the sister of his mother, during one lapse of awareness, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring one sin offering for all three prohibitions, or is he liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one of the prohibitions? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We did not hear a ruling from our teachers about that case, but we heard the following ruling: One who engages in intercourse with each of his five wives while they are menstruating, during one lapse of awareness, we heard that he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for having engaged in intercourse with each and every one of them. And it appears to me that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference: If he is liable to bring separate sin offerings for having engaged in intercourse with five menstruating women, who are forbidden by one prohibition, he should certainly be liable to bring separate sin offerings for having engaged in intercourse with his sister, the sister of his father, and the sister of his mother, who are forbidden by three separate prohibitions.
3:8	And furthermore, Rabbi Akiva asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in the meat market of Emmaus: What is the status of a dangling limb of an animal? Does it impart ritual impurity like a severed limb? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We have not heard a ruling from our teachers in that specific case, but we have heard with regard to a dangling limb of a person that it is ritually pure. And in this manner would the people afflicted with boils, whose limbs were dangling due to their affliction, act in Jerusalem: Each of them would go on Passover eve to the doctor, who would cut the affected limb almost completely until he would leave it connected by a hairbreadth of flesh, so that neither the doctor nor the afflicted would be rendered ritually impure by a severed limb. Then, the doctor would impale the limb on a thorn attached to the floor or the wall, and the afflicted would pull away from the thorn, thereby completely severing the limb. And that person afflicted with boils would perform the rite of his Paschal offering, and the doctor would perform the rite of his Paschal offering, as neither had come into contact with the limb once it was severed. In any case, as long as it was dangling, the limb did not impart impurity. And I consider that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference. If a person’s limb, the impurity of which when amputated is severe, does not impart impurity when it is dangling, it is all the more so logical that an animal’s limb, the impurity of which when amputated is lenient, does not impart impurity when it is dangling.
3:9	And furthermore, Rabbi Akiva asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua: With regard to one who unwittingly slaughters five offerings outside the Temple during one lapse of awareness, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring five sin offerings, one for each and every act of slaughter, or is he liable to bring one sin offering for all the acts of slaughter? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We have not heard a ruling from our teachers in that specific case. Rabbi Yehoshua said: I have heard with regard to one who eats meat from one offering from five different pots in which they were prepared, during one lapse of awareness, that he is liable to bring five guilt offerings, which are for the meat prepared in each and every pot, due to misuse of consecrated property. And I consider that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference: If one is liable to bring five guilt offerings for one offering prepared in five pots, all the more so is he liable to bring five sin offerings for slaughtering five offerings outside the Temple. Rabbi Shimon said: It was not that question that Rabbi Akiva asked them. Rather, it was with regard to one who eats notar from five offerings during one lapse of awareness. What is the halakha? Is he liable to bring one sin offering for all the offerings from which he ate notar, or is he liable to bring five sin offerings, one for each and every one of the offerings from which he ate notar? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We have not heard a ruling from our teachers in that specific case. Rabbi Yehoshua said: I have heard with regard to one who eats meat from one offering that was prepared in five different pots, during one lapse of awareness, that he is liable to bring separate guilt offerings for the meat prepared in each and every pot, due to misuse of consecrated property. And I consider that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference: If one is liable to bring five guilt offerings for one offering prepared in five pots, all the more so is he liable to bring five sin offerings for eating the notar of five separate offerings. Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Yehoshua: If you are reporting a halakha that you received from your teachers with regard to one who eats notar from five offerings, we will accept it, but if it is based merely on the a fortiori inference from misuse of consecrated property, there is a response that refutes the inference. Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Akiva: Respond. Rabbi Akiva said: And no; one cannot derive the halakha of notar through an a fortiori inference from misuse of consecrated property: If you said with regard to misuse of consecrated property that one is liable to bring five guilt offerings, perhaps that is because there are additional stringent elements unique to misuse. As, with regard to misuse, the Torah established that the status of one who feeds another person sacrificial meat is like that of one who eats sacrificial meat, and the status of one who gives benefit to another from consecrated property that is not food is like that of one who derives benefit himself, in that each is liable to bring a guilt offering for misuse. In addition, the Torah joined the misuse of consecrated property that was performed over an extended period, i.e., if one derived benefit worth half a peruta one day and half a peruta the next, he is liable to bring a guilt offering for misuse. Would you say the same with regard to notar, which has none of these halakhot?
3:10	Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer with regard to one who performs multiple prohibited labors on several Shabbatot, and all those labors were subsumed as subcategories of one primary category of prohibited labor, and he performed them during one lapse of awareness. What is the halakha? Is he liable to bring one sin offering for unwitting performance of all these labors or is he liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors? Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva: He is liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors, and this is derived from an a fortiori inference: Just as in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple actions that result in transgression and that result in multiple sin offerings, but rather only the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with her, and nevertheless one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one of his acts of unwitting intercourse; in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple primary categories and subcategories of labor that result in transgression and that result in multiple death penalties or sin offerings, is it not right that he will be liable to bring a sin offering for performance of each and every one of the prohibited labors? Rabbi Akiva continues: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that the inference is not valid: If you said one is liable to bring multiple sin offerings in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are two prohibitions, as the man is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with the menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with him, would you say the same in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there is only one prohibition? Rabbi Eliezer said to me: The halakha of one who engages in intercourse with minor menstruating girls will prove this refutation is not valid, as in that case there is only one prohibition, because the minor is exempt from the mitzvot, and nevertheless the man is liable to bring a separate sin offering for intercourse for each and every one of the acts of intercourse. Rabbi Akiva said: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that the cases of Shabbat and minor menstruating girls are not comparable. If you said in the case of minor girls that although it is not prohibited for them at present it is prohibited for them after the passage of time, when they reach majority, would you say the same in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are neither two prohibitions at present, nor will there be after the passage of time? Rabbi Eliezer said to me: The halakha of one who copulates with an animal will prove this refutation is not valid, as there are never two prohibitions in that case, and nevertheless the person is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every act. Rabbi Akiva said: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that no proof can be cited from the case of an animal, as in my opinion the case of the animal is like that of Shabbat; there is uncertainty with regard to both cases.
4:1	If there is uncertainty whether one ate forbidden fat and uncertainty whether one did not eat forbidden fat, or even if one ate forbidden fat and there is uncertainty whether there is the measure that determines liability in the piece he ate and uncertainty whether there is not the measure that determines liability in the piece he ate, he must bring a provisional guilt offering. If one has a piece of permitted fat and a piece of forbidden fat before him and he ate one of them and he does not know which of them he ate; or if his wife and his sister were with him in the house and he unwittingly engaged in intercourse with one of them and he does not know with which of them he unwittingly engaged in intercourse; or if he confused Shabbat and a weekday and he performed labor prohibited on Shabbat on one of the days and he does not know on which of them he performed the labor, in all of those cases he is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering.
4:2	Just as in a case where one unknowingly ate a piece of forbidden fat and then another piece of forbidden fat in a single lapse of awareness he is liable to bring only one sin offering, so too, in a case where their status is unknown to him and he ate them both unwittingly during a single lapse in awareness, he is liable to bring only one provisional guilt offering. But if he had gained knowledge between the first and second instance of eating that there is a possibility the fat might be prohibited, then the halakha is different: Just as he would be liable to bring a sin offering for each and every piece when he gained knowledge of their prohibited status in between each act of consumption, so too, he must bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every instance in which he consumed food that might be forbidden after learning of their uncertain status in between each unwitting act of consumption. Just as in a case where one ate forbidden fat, and blood, and piggul, and notar in one lapse of awareness he is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every one, so too, with regard to a case where their status is unknown to him and he ate them unwittingly during one lapse of awareness, he must bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every item. If one has pieces of forbidden fat and notar before him and he ate one of them and he does not know which of them he ate; or if his menstruating wife and his sister were with him in the house and he unwittingly engaged in intercourse with one of them and he does not know with which of them he unwittingly engaged in intercourse; or if Shabbat and Yom Kippur occurred adjacent to one another and he performed prohibited labor during the intervening twilight period and he does not know on which of the days he performed the labor, in all of these cases, Rabbi Eliezer deems the transgressor liable to bring a sin offering, as he certainly sinned, and Rabbi Yehoshua deems the transgressor exempt, as he does not know the nature of his sin. Rabbi Yosei said: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree with regard to one who performs prohibited labor during the intervening twilight period because they concur that he is exempt, as I say: He performed part of the labor today, and he performed part of the labor the following day. With regard to what case did they disagree? With regard to the case of one who performs prohibited labor in the midst of the day, and he does not know whether it was on Shabbat that he performed the labor or whether it was on Yom Kippur that he performed the labor; or with regard to one who performs a prohibited labor and he does not know which labor he performed. As, in those cases Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin offering and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt. Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Yehoshua would deem him exempt even from bringing a provisional guilt offering.
4:3	Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri say: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree with regard to a case involving a matter where his lack of knowledge involves items from one category, e.g., he picked a grape from a vine on Shabbat and does not know which vine it was, as in that case they both agree that he is liable, since he knows the nature of his sin. With regard to what case did they disagree? With regard to a case involving a matter where his lack of knowledge involves items from two categories, e.g., he picked fruit from a tree on Shabbat and does not know whether it was from a vine or from a fig tree. As, in that case Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin offering, since he certainly sinned, and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt, as he does not know the nature of his sin. Rabbi Yehuda said: Even if one intended to pick figs and he picked grapes, or to pick grapes and he picked figs, or to pick black figs and he picked white figs, or to pick white figs and he picked black figs, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin offering and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt. Rabbi Yehuda added: I wonder if Rabbi Yehoshua deemed him exempt in that case, as even in his opinion the person intended to perform a prohibited labor. The mishna asks: If it is so, that he is not exempt according to Rabbi Yehuda, why is it stated: “If his sin, wherein he has sinned” (Leviticus 4:23), from which it is derived that one is liable only if the object of the sin was the one that he intended? The mishna answers: This serves to exclude one who acts unawares and does not intend to perform a prohibited action at all.
5:1	If one consumed an olive-bulk of blood that spurted during the slaughter of a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird, whether it is a kosher or non-kosher species; or if one consumed blood that flowed after stabbing an animal or killing it in a manner other than by ritual slaughter, or blood that spurted after ripping the animal’s windpipe or gullet, or blood that spurted during bloodletting with which the soul departs, one is liable to receive karet for consuming it intentionally or to bring a sin offering for consuming it unwittingly. But with regard to blood of the spleen, blood of the heart, blood of eggs, blood of grasshoppers, or blood of exudate [tamtzit], i.e., that oozes from the neck of the animal after the initial spurt of its slaughter concludes, one is not liable for consuming it. Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable in the case of blood of exudate.
5:2	This mishna resumes discussion of the provisional guilt offering addressed in the previous chapter. Rabbi Akiva deems one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for a case where he is uncertain whether he is guilty of misuse of consecrated property, a transgression that renders one liable to bring a definite guilt offering (see Leviticus 5:15). And the Rabbis deem him exempt, as one brings a provisional guilt offering only in a case of uncertainty as to whether he is liable to bring a sin offering, not a guilt offering. And Rabbi Akiva concedes that one does not bring payment for his misuse until it becomes definitely known to him that he is guilty of misuse, as then he will bring a definite guilt offering with his payment. Rabbi Tarfon said: For what purpose does that person bring two guilt offerings, one provisional and one definite? Rather, at the outset one brings the payment for misuse of consecrated property and its additional payment of one-fifth, as mandated by Torah law, and he will then bring a guilt offering worth two sela and say: If it is certain that I misused consecrated property, this is payment for my misuse and this is my definite guilt offering. And if it is uncertain whether I misused consecrated property, the money is a contribution to the Temple fund for the purchase of communal offerings and the guilt offering is provisional, as from the same type of animal that one brings a guilt offering for a case where it is known to him that he is guilty of misuse, he likewise brings a guilt offering for a case where it is unknown to him.
5:3	Rabbi Akiva says: The statement of Rabbi Tarfon appears correct in the case of minimal misuse, but in a case where he is confronted with a case of uncertainty with regard to misuse valued at ten thousand dinars, would it not be preferable for him that he will now bring a provisional guilt offering valued at two sela and he will not bring payment now for uncertain misuse valued at ten thousand dinars? The mishna concludes: Apparently, Rabbi Akiva concedes to Rabbi Tarfon in the case of minimal misuse. He agrees that at the outset one brings payment for misuse and its additional payment of one-fifth, and conditionally brings a guilt offering. Apropos the previous case in which one brings the same type of animal when liability is certain as when liability is uncertain, this mishna teaches: With regard to a woman who brought a bird sin offering in a case of uncertainty whether she miscarried a fetus that would have rendered her liable to bring a sin offering or whether what she expelled would not render her liable to bring an offering, in which case this sin offering may not be eaten by priests, the halakha is as follows: If before the nape of the neck of the bird was pinched it became known to her that she certainly gave birth, i.e., miscarried, in a manner that obligates her to bring a sin offering, she should render the offering a definite sin offering, as from the same type of animal that she brings a sin offering for a case where it is known to her that she miscarried, she brings a sin offering for a case where it is unknown to her.
5:4	The mishna resumes discussion of the provisional guilt offering. If one had a piece of non-sacred meat and a piece of sacrificial meat, and he ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate, he is exempt from the obligation to bring a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property. Rabbi Akiva deems him liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, in accordance with his opinion in the previous mishna that one brings a provisional guilt offering even in a case of uncertainty with regard to misuse. If he then ate the second piece, he brings a definite guilt offering, as it is certain that he ate the sacrificial meat. If one person ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second piece, this first person brings a provisional guilt offering and that second person brings a provisional guilt offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Shimon says: Both of them bring one definite guilt offering as partners, and they stipulate that the one who ate the non-sacred meat grants his share of the animal to the one who ate the sacrificial meat, and the guilt offering is sacrificed on his behalf. Rabbi Yosei says: Two people do not bring one guilt offering, as one may not sacrifice atonement offerings conditionally.
5:5	If one had a piece of forbidden fat and a piece of non-sacred meat, and he ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate, he brings a provisional guilt offering, as perhaps he ate the forbidden fat. If he then ate the second piece, he brings a sin offering, as it is certain that he ate the fat. If one person ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second piece, this person brings a provisional guilt offering and that person brings a provisional guilt offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Shimon says: Both of them bring one sin offering as partners, and they stipulate that the sin offering should be credited to the one who ate the fat. Rabbi Yosei says: Two people do not bring one sin offering.
5:6	If one had a piece of forbidden fat and a piece of sacrificial permitted fat and he ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate, he brings a provisional guilt offering, as perhaps he ate the forbidden fat. If he then ate the second piece, he brings a sin offering, as he certainly ate the fat, and a definite guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property. If one person ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second piece, this person brings a provisional guilt offering and that person brings a provisional guilt offering. Rabbi Shimon says: Both of them bring a sin offering and a guilt offering as partners, and they stipulate that each offering should be credited to the one who is liable to bring it. Rabbi Yosei says: Two people do not bring one sin offering and one guilt offering.
5:7	If one had a piece of forbidden fat and a piece of sacrificial forbidden fat and he ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate, he brings a sin offering as he certainly ate forbidden fat. Rabbi Akiva says: He also brings a provisional guilt offering, as perhaps he ate the sacrificial fat, in accordance with his opinion that one brings a provisional guilt offering even in the case of uncertainty with regard to misuse of consecrated property. If he then ate the second piece, he brings two sin offerings, as he ate two pieces of forbidden fat, and a definite guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property. If one person ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second piece, this person brings a sin offering and that person brings a sin offering. Rabbi Akiva says: This person and that person each bring a provisional guilt offering as well, due to the uncertainty as to which of them ate the sacrificial fat. Rabbi Shimon says: This person brings a sin offering and that person brings a sin offering and both of them bring one guilt offering as partners, and they stipulate that the offering should be credited to the one who ate the sacrificial fat. Rabbi Yosei says: The two of them do not bring one guilt offering.
5:8	If one had a piece of forbidden fat and a piece of forbidden fat that is notar, an offering whose designated time has passed for which one is liable to receive karet if he ate it intentionally and liable to bring a sin offering if he ate it unwittingly, and he ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate, he brings a sin offering, as he certainly ate forbidden fat, and a provisional guilt offering, due to the possibility that he ate the notar. If he then ate the second piece, he brings three sin offerings, two for the forbidden fat and one for the prohibition against eating notar. If one person ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second piece, this person brings a sin offering and a provisional guilt offering, as he certainly ate forbidden fat and it is uncertain whether he ate the notar, and that person brings a sin offering and a provisional guilt offering. Rabbi Shimon says: This person brings a sin offering and that person brings a sin offering and both of them bring one additional sin offering as partners, and they stipulate that the offering should be credited to the one who ate the notar. Rabbi Yosei says: Two people do not bring any sin offering that comes as atonement for a sin.
6:1	In the case of one who brings a provisional guilt offering due to uncertainty as to whether he sinned, and it became known to him that he did not sin, if he made that discovery before the ram was slaughtered, it shall emerge and graze with the flock as a non-sacred animal, since its consecration was in error. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Its status is not that of a non-sacred animal; rather it is that of a guilt offering that was disqualified for sacrifice. Therefore, it shall graze until it becomes blemished; and then it shall be sold, and the money received for it shall be allocated for the purchase of communal gift offerings by the Temple treasury. Rabbi Eliezer says: It shall be sacrificed as a provisional guilt offering, as if it does not come to atone for this sin that he initially thought, it comes to atone for another sin of which he is unaware. If it became known to him that he did not sin after the ram was slaughtered and its blood collected in a container, the blood shall be poured into the canal that flows through the Temple courtyard, and the flesh shall go out to the place of burning, like any disqualified offering. If the blood was sprinkled before he discovered that he did not sin, and the meat is intact, the meat may be eaten by the priests like any other sin offering, as from the moment that its blood was sprinkled the meat is permitted to the priests. Rabbi Yosei says: Even if the blood was still in the cup when he discovered that he did not sin, the blood shall be sprinkled and the meat may be eaten.
6:2	In the case of a definite guilt offering, it is not so, i.e., the halakha is different than with regard to a provisional guilt offering. If he made the discovery that he did not sin before the ram was slaughtered, it shall go out and graze among the flock, as it is not consecrated. If it became known to him that he did not sin after the ram was slaughtered, it shall be buried like a non-sacred animal that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, and its blood is poured. If he discovered that he did not sin after the blood was sprinkled, the flesh shall go out to the place of burning, like any disqualified offering. In the case of an ox that is sentenced to be stoned (see Exodus 21:28–32), e.g., for killing a person, it is not so, i.e., it also does not have the same halakhic status as a provisional guilt offering. If it is discovered that the testimony with regard to the ox was false before it was stoned, it shall go out and graze among the flock as it never had the status of an ox sentenced to be stoned. If this was discovered after the ox was stoned, its halakhic status is as though it had not been sentenced, and therefore deriving benefit from its carcass is permitted. In the case of a heifer whose neck is broken, when a corpse is found between two cities and the identity of the murderer is unknown (see Deuteronomy 21:1–9), it is not so i.e., the halakha is different than with regard to a provisional guilt offering. If the identity of the murderer is discovered before the heifer’s neck was broken, it shall go out and graze among the flock, as it is not consecrated. But if the identity of the murderer was discovered after the heifer’s neck was broken, it shall be buried in its place, like any other heifer whose neck is broken. The reason is that from the outset the heifer whose neck is broken comes to atone for a situation of uncertainty. Once its neck was broken before the identity of the murderer was revealed, its mitzva was fulfilled, as it atoned for its uncertainty and that uncertainty is gone.
6:3	Rabbi Eliezer says: A person may volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day and at any time that he chooses, even if there is no uncertainty as to whether he sinned, and this type of offering was called the guilt offering of the pious, as they brought it due to their constant concern that they might have sinned. They said about Bava ben Buta that he would volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day except for one day after Yom Kippur, when he would not bring the offering. Bava ben Buta said: I take an oath by this abode of the Divine Presence that if they would have allowed me, I would have brought a guilt offering even on that day. But they would say to me: Wait until you enter into a situation of potential uncertainty. And the Rabbis say: One brings a provisional guilt offering only in a case where there is uncertainty as to whether he performed a sin for whose intentional performance one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin offering.
6:4	Those liable to bring sin offerings and definite guilt offerings for whom Yom Kippur has passed are liable to bring them after Yom Kippur. By contrast, those liable to bring provisional guilt offerings are exempt from bringing them after Yom Kippur. With regard to one who encountered uncertainty as to whether he performed a sin on Yom Kippur, even if it was at nightfall at the end of the day, he is exempt, as the entire day atones for uncertain sins.
6:5	A woman upon whom it is incumbent to bring a bird sin offering due to uncertainty, e.g., uncertainty with regard to whether or not her miscarriage obligated her to bring the sin offering of a woman who gave birth, for whom Yom Kippur has passed, is liable to bring it after Yom Kippur. This is because the offering does not come as atonement for a sin; rather, it renders her eligible to partake of the meat of offerings. With regard to this bird sin offering that is brought due to uncertainty, if it became known to her that she was exempt from bringing the offering after the nape of the neck of the bird was pinched, the bird must be buried.
6:6	With regard to one who designates two sela, which is the minimal value of a guilt offering, to purchase a ram for a guilt offering, and he purchased two rams for a guilt offering with the two sela, if one of them is now worth two sela, he shall sacrifice it for his guilt offering. And the second ram that he purchased with the money he designated does not become non-sacred. Rather, it shall graze until it becomes blemished; and then it shall be sold, and the money received for it shall be allocated for communal gift offerings. If he purchased two rams for non-sacred use with those two sela designated for a guilt offering, he has misused consecrated property. He is therefore liable to bring a guilt offering and to compensate the Temple treasury for those two sela and add one-fifth to the sum for a total of ten dinars, as there are four dinars in a sela. If one of the rams is now worth two sela, and the other one is now worth ten dinars, i.e., two and a half sela, the one that is worth two sela shall be sacrificed as his guilt offering for misuse of the two sela, and the second one shall be sacrificed for his initial misuse, as it is worth two sela plus one-fifth. In a case where he purchased two rams with those two sela designated for a guilt offering, one for a guilt offering and one for non-sacred use, if the ram for the guilt offering is now worth two sela, it shall be sacrificed for his initial guilt offering. And with regard to the second ram that he purchased for non-sacred use, if it is now worth two sela, it shall be sacrificed as a guilt offering for his present misuse, and he brings with it the sum of one sela and one-fifth to the Temple treasury as payment for his misuse.
6:7	In the case of one who designates a sin offering for his performance of an unwitting sin and dies, his son shall not bring it in his stead, neither on behalf of his father nor for his own unwitting sin, even if it was the same transgression. Likewise, one may not bring a sin offering by reassigning it from the sin for which it is designated to atone and sacrificing it for atonement of another sin. Even if he designated a sin offering as atonement for forbidden fat that he unwittingly ate yesterday, he may not bring it as atonement for forbidden fat that he unwittingly ate today, as it is stated: “And he shall bring his sin offering, an unblemished female goat, for his sin that he has sinned” (Leviticus 4:28), indicating that he does not satisfy his obligation until his offering is brought for the sake of the sin for which he designated it.
6:8	One may bring a female goat from money consecrated for a sin offering of a female lamb, and a female lamb from money consecrated for a sin offering of a female goat. And likewise, one may bring doves and pigeons from money consecrated for a sin offering of a female lamb and a female goat; and one-tenth of an ephah of fine flour from money consecrated for a sin offering of doves and pigeons. How so? If one unwittingly performed a sin for which he is liable to bring a sliding-scale sin offering, which varies based on economic status (see Leviticus 5:1–13; see also 9a), and he designated money to purchase a female lamb or for a female goat and then became poorer, he may bring a bird, and the remaining money is non-sacred. If he became yet poorer, he may bring one-tenth of an ephah of fine flour. Likewise, if he designated money to purchase one-tenth of an ephah of fine flour and became wealthier, he shall bring a bird. If he became yet wealthier, he shall bring a female lamb or a female goat. If one designated a female lamb or goat as an offering and it developed a blemish, he must redeem the animal and bring another offering with the money. If he became poorer, he may bring a bird with its money. But if one designated a bird as an offering and it developed a blemish, he may not bring one-tenth of an ephah of fine flour with its money, as there is no possibility of redemption for birds.
6:9	Rabbi Shimon says: Lambs precede goats almost everywhere in the Torah that they are both mentioned, as in the verse: “You shall take it from the lambs or from the goats” (Exodus 12:5). One might have thought that it is due to the fact that sheep are more select than goats. Therefore, the verse states: “And he shall bring for his offering a goat” (Leviticus 4:28), after which it is written: “And if he bring a lamb as his offering for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:32), which teaches that both of them are equal. Similarly, doves precede pigeons almost everywhere in the Torah, as in the verse: “And he shall bring his guilt offering…two doves, or two pigeons” (Leviticus 5:7). One might have thought that it is due to the fact that doves are more select than pigeons. Therefore, the verse states: “And a pigeon or a dove for a sin offering” (Leviticus 12:6), with the usual order reversed, which teaches that both of them are equal. Likewise, mention of the father precedes that of the mother almost everywhere in the Torah, as in the verse: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:12). One might have thought that it is due to the fact that the honor of the father takes precedence over the honor of the mother. Therefore, the verse states: “Every man shall fear his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3), with the order reversed, which teaches that both of them are equal. But the Sages said: Honor of the father takes precedence over honor of the mother everywhere, due to the fact that both the son and his mother are obligated in the honor of his father. And likewise with regard to Torah study, if the son was privileged to acquire most of his Torah knowledge from studying before the teacher, honor of the teacher takes precedence over honor of the father, due to the fact that both the son and his father are obligated in the honor of his teacher, as everyone is obligated in the honor of Torah scholars.
-- Mishnah Keritot — (Sefaria merged English versions) (Public Domain or CC-BY (per Sefaria source data))