Bahá’u’lláh l’exposition faite par Avicenne au sujet de l’existence de Dieu en tant que vájib al-vu- and the God júd ou “le Nécessairement Existant”; que ses déclarations confirment le récit déductif of Avicenna d’Avicenne sur les attributs divins; et qu’Il confirme le propos central des arguments d’Avicenne concernant la nature de l’acte JOSHUA D. T. HALL créateur de Dieu, sa relation au monde, et la durée infinie de sa création, tant dans le Abstract passé que dans l’avenir. L’auteur soutient This article analyzes and compares the en outre que la philosophie d’Avicenne ap- teachings of Bahá’u’lláh on the nature and porte un éclairage unique sur la métaphy- existence of God with the core metaphys- sique et la théologie de Bahá’u’lláh, dans ical positions of Avicenna, the preeminent la mesure où son analyse théologique aide philosopher of Islam. In three parts, it ar- à comprendre la teneur et la signification gues that Bahá’u’lláh validates the meta- philosophiques, ainsi que la logique rigou- physical principles underlying Avicenna’s reuse des déclarations de Bahá’u’lláh sur argument for the existence of God as the l’existence, la nature et l’acte créateur de vájib al-vujúd or “the Necessarily Exis- Dieu. tent”; that His statements affirm Avicenna’s deductive account of the divine attributes; Resumen and that He confirms the central content of Este artículo analiza y compara las en- Avicenna’s arguments regarding the na- señanzas de Baha’u’lláh sobre la naturale- ture of God’s creative act, His relation to za y la existencia de Dios con las princi- the world, and the limitless duration, into pales posiciones metafísicas de Avicena, the past and future, of His creation. It fur- el preeminente filósofo del Islam. En tres thermore submits that Avicenna’s philoso- partes, argumenta que Baha’u’lláh valida phy sheds a uniquely informative light on los principios metafísicos subyacentes en Bahá’u’lláh’s metaphysics and theology, el argumento de Avicena por la existencia insofar as his theological analysis helps de Dios como el vájib al vujúd o “Existente one understand the philosophical content Necesario”; que Sus aseveraciones afirman and significance, and rational rigor, of los razonamientos deductivos de Avicena Bahá’u’lláh’s own statements on God’s ex- sobre los atributos divinos; y que El confir- istence, nature, and creative act. ma el contenido central de los argumentos de Avicena relacionados a la naturaleza del Résumé actuar creativo de Dios, Su relación con L’auteur analyse les enseignements de el mundo, y la duración sin limites en el Bahá’u’lláh sur la nature et l’existence pasado y el futuro de Su creación. Además, de Dieu et les compare avec les positions sostiene que la filosofía de Avicena de métaphysiques fondamentales d’Avicenne, manera única echa luz informativa sobre la philosophe prééminent de l’Islam. Dans metafísica y la teología de Baha’u’lláh, en cette analyse qui se décline en trois parties, la medida en que su analisis teológico le l’auteur soutient que Bahá’u’lláh valide ayuda a uno entender el contenido y sig- les principes métaphysiques sous-tendant nificado filosófico y el rigor racional, de 8 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
las aseveraciones propias de Baha’u’lláh philosophers in Christian Europe, such sobre la existencia, la naturaleza, y el actu- as Thomas Aquinas (McGinnis 244). ar creativo de Dios. Given the importance of Avicenna’s thought in the history of Islam, with- Acknowledgements in the cultural and religious context of which the Bahá’í Faith emerged, I would like first to thank Naeem Nabiliak- this article explores the currents of bar for his continuing and ceaseless love, support, counsel, and encouragement, his Avicenna’s theology that are repre- unique insight into the Bahá’í Writings, sented and affirmed in Bahá’u’lláh’s and his invaluable assistance with and writings, and, secondarily, in the ex- instruction in Persian and Arabic; Adib planations of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. Though Masumian for his unflagging interest, gen- Bahá’u’lláh Himself never composed erous help, enthusiasm, and patient proof- a work of systematized theology reading; Professor Rhett Diessner for his (Schaefer xiii), His many writings in sound, illuminating scholarly perspective Arabic and Persian are nonetheless and constructive comments; and Professor rich in metaphysical content. As a Ardi Kia, for his professional engagement, whole, they present a consistent phil- review, and kindness. osophical worldview expressed in the substantial nomenclature of the Islamic I intellectual tradition. Accordingly, one may approach an understanding of As suggested by the title, it is the Bahá’u’lláh’s theology by considering aim of this article to analyze and how it treats the central questions on compare the core theological posi- the nature of God dealt with by Islamic tions of Bahá’u’lláh and the Islam- philosophers, among whom Avicenna ic philosopher Avicenna. Avicenna, stands out as especially prominent. perhaps most famous in the West as Throughout the course of this article, I the celebrated author of the Qánún fí will thus present two broad arguments. aṭ-Ṭibb or Canon of Medicine, was a First, I propose that Bahá’u’lláh’s Persian Muslim born near the city of theological teachings are substan- Bukhárá in 980 A.D. Propounding a tively affirmative of the metaphysical rationalistic worldview and synthesis principles underlying Avicenna’s ar- of Neoplatonism, Aristotelianism, and gument for God’s existence and his Islamic monotheism, Avicenna indeli- philosophical positions on God’s na- bly shaped the contents and character ture, attributes, and creative act, with of Islamic philosophy from medieval no implication that His teachings are into modern times and became, by derivative from those of Avicenna or far, the most influential philosopher of in any way reducible to them. Second, Islam; going well beyond the borders I suggest that Avicenna’s metaphys- of the Islamic world, his ideas even ics, given Bahá’u’lláh’s affirmation informed the thought of the scholastic of his core philosophical arguments, Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 9
provides a framework that clarifies insights, though he does not explicate and rationally elucidates the essential in detail Avicenna’s original argument. content, logical coherence, and phil- Juan Cole, in his monograph “The osophical integrity of Bahá’u’lláh’s Concept of Manifestation in the Bahá’í teachings on the existence and nature Writings,” significantly states that of God. Thus, examining the aspects of Bahá’u’lláh “affirmed Avicenna’s solu- Avicenna’s theology that Bahá’u’lláh tion to the problem of the co-eternity of affirms, far from being a merely aca- the universe with God,” though it was demic exercise, will all the more reveal beyond the aims of that work to treat the implications, conceptual depth, and Avicenna primarily. Ian Kluge likewise rational nature of Bahá’u’lláh’s meta- has warmly referenced Avicenna in a physical and theological statements. number of his outstanding essays on Because Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá Bahá’í philosophy, stressing the com- so consistently affirm, as will be seen, monality of Avicenna’s rationalist and both Avicenna’s terminology and the broadly Aristotelian worldview with philosophical substance underlying the Bahá’í Faith’s own philosophical that terminology, and reject opposing presuppositions. views in the history of Islamic thought Keven Brown, similarly, has dis- in favor of Avicenna’s, the deep study cussed some of Avicenna’s views, of Avicennian thought is relevant to along with those of other Islamic discerning and articulating the princi- philosophers, in his papers “Abdu’l- ples of Bahá’í theology—a scholarly Bahá’s Response to Darwinism: Its endeavor requiring that we examine the Historical and Philosophical Context” historical frameworks that Bahá’u’lláh and “‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s Response to the and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá employ or forego in Doctrine of the Unity of Existence,” describing Their distinctive theology. even if Avicenna was not the primary This article thus aims to contrib- philosopher under discussion. Vahid ute to a discourse in scholarship on Rafati in “Lawḥ-i-Ḥikmat: The Two the Bahá’í Faith that deals with the Agents and the Two Patients” makes relationship between Bahá’u’lláh’s a useful reference to how Avicenna’s teachings and Avicenna’s theological account of the four elements relate to philosophy. Scholars have gestured Bahá’u’lláh’s Lawḥ-i-Ḥikmat. Nader before at the philosophical common- Saiedi likewise references the cosmol- alities between Bahá’u’lláh’s teach- ogy of Avicenna in his book Gate of the ings and Avicenna’s thought, even if Heart, as does Moojan Momen in his Avicennian metaphysics has not been paper “Relativism: A Basis for Bahá’í their primary subject of concern. Wil- Metaphysics.” Interestingly, however, liam Hatcher, in his admirable book Momen does not mention Avicenna in Minimalism, put forth an argument in his article “The God of Bahá’u’lláh,” formal logic for God’s existence that favoring instead the Sufi Andalusian consciously draws from Avicenna’s thinker Ibn ‘Arabí. 10 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
This article therefore aims to contrib- features of Islamic thought—and that ute to this body of Bahá’í scholarship Avicenna, while certainly not being by investigating the elements of Avi- the only philosopher relevant to un- cenna’s thought affirmed in the Bahá’í derstanding the metaphysics treated Faith, specifically engaging Avicenna’s in the Bahá’í Writings, is particularly and Bahá’u’lláh’s theological positions important to Bahá’í studies because of and analyzing their respective thought his significant place in this history of in three discrete parts. Part One, accord- philosophy and of Islamic thought, as ingly, treats Avicenna’s argument for well as the extensive degree to which the existence of God as the vájib al-vu- his principles and arguments are repre- júd or “the Necessarily Existent,” and sented in the Bahá’í Writings and help seeks to demonstrate that Bahá’u’lláh elucidate their metaphysical content. affirms the basic metaphysical princi- These subjects will be addressed ples underlying Avicenna’s argument through analysis of the primary for God’s existence, validates his log- sources. These include a selection of ical procedure, and corroborates his Bahá’u’lláh’s discrete epistolary works concept of God as an existentially or in Arabic and Persian, called alváḥ ontologically independent and tran- (tablets), such as his Lawḥ-i-Basíṭ al- scendent first cause. Part Two then Ḥaqíqat and Lawḥ-i-Ḥikmat, as well discusses Avicenna’s deductive argu- as the metaphysics (iláhíyyát) sections ments for why such a first cause must within two of Avicenna’s philosophical be divine, successively treats each compendia, the Arabic ash-Shifá and important attribute Avicenna ascribes the Persian Dánishnámiy-i-‘Alá’í, with to God, and argues that Bahá’u’lláh occasional reference to Avicenna’s Ar- confirms Avicenna’s account of re- abic an-Naját. Passages from the writ- spective divine attributes. Lastly, Part ings of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, meanwhile, will Three establishes that Bahá’u’lláh and be analyzed in conjunction with those Avicenna, being in harmony with re- of Bahá’u’lláh as indispensable inter- spect to their views on God’s creative pretative aids.1 Though official trans- act and the eternal nature of the world, have central cosmological positions in 1 ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s interpretations common, and that Bahá’u’lláh conse- of Bahá’u’lláh’s theology are vital when quently affirms characteristically Avi- analyzing Bahá’u’lláh’s own views, in- cennian positions on God’s relation sofar as ‘Abdu’l-Bahá was specifically to the world. The conclusion will sum appointed by Bahá’u’lláh to explicate His up our findings, treat several possible teachings and preserve Bahá’ís from dis- objections, and likewise explain how agreement, as seen in the Kitáb-i-Aqdas, the Avicennian ideas demonstrated to Kitáb-i-‘Ahd, Súriy-i-Ghuṣn, and Lawḥ- have been affirmed by Bahá’u’lláh are i-‘Arḍ-i-Bá. Even from a secular point of indeed meaningfully characteristic of view, therefore, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s interpre- Avicenna, and are not purely general tations represent authoritative explana- tions of Bahá’u’lláh’s theology, and must Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 11
lations of the Bahá’í Writings will be it. The atheist, conversely, believes that used when available, extensive atten- there is no supernatural reality, and as- tion will be given, either in footnotes serts that nature is simply the whole or the body of the text, to the precise of existence, and that any legitimate wording of the Arabic or Persian origi- explanation of a thing must necessarily nal and the exact philosophical signifi- be a natural and not supernatural one. cance of particular words. All passages It follows on atheism, then, that the from Avicenna, however, are my own existence of nature itself can have no renderings, though they have bene- cause, grounds, or explanation. This is fited from reference to the pioneering because one cannot explain the whole translations published by Parviz More- of nature and its existence through wedge and Michael Marmura of the something that is itself part of nature Dánishnámih and ash-Shifá, respec- and a natural phenomenon, bounded tively. Marmura’s bilingual publication by space, time, and the limitations of of ash-Shifá’s “Metaphysics” has been matter. One can only explain, via an- especially useful as an edited source of tecedent physical causes, subsequent Avicenna’s original Arabic. physical conditions, but not why the In what follows, we shall begin by whole of nature should exist at all or, considering how Bahá’u’lláh and Avi- ultimately, anything whatsoever for cenna each argue for God’s existence, which nonexistence is logically and a necessary point of departure before metaphysically possible. Therefore, if establishing the other areas of concep- nature is all there is, nature itself must tual convergence. be inexplicable, even if individual phe- nomena within it allow for proximate, G N E but of course never ultimate, causes and explanations. A ’ A Bahá’u’lláh and Avicenna both ex- N E plicitly reject such naturalism, and insist that there is a transcendent and The primary difference between theism supernatural reality—God—which and atheism lies perhaps in differing grounds the existence of the world. views of nature. According to the the- Bahá’u’lláh, in the Lawḥ-i Ḥikmat, ist, there is a reality beyond and tran- writes on this theme: scendent above the material universe and its phenomena—a supernatural Those who have rejected God and and absolute reality that ultimately firmly cling to Nature as it is in grounds the existence of the world, itself are, verily, bereft of knowl- while remaining utterly sanctified from edge and wisdom. They are truly of them that are far astray. They have failed to attain the lofty sum- be considered in any thorough analysis of mit and have fallen short of the Bahá’u’lláh’s writings. 12 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
ultimate purpose; therefore their his part, proposes an argument for eyes were shut and their thoughts the existence of God as just this sort differed, while the leaders among of transcendental reality in the meta- them have believed in God and in physics section of his comprehensive His invincible sovereignty . . . When philosophical compendium, ash-Shifá, the eyes of the people of the East specifically in the first chapter of Book were captivated by the arts and Eight of the “Metaphysics.” Some of wonders of the West, they roved the premises of the argument, howev- distraught in the wilderness of ma- er, find their grounding in other parts of terial causes, oblivious of the One the “Metaphysics,” which will thus be Who is the Causer of Causes, and referenced in giving a whole account the Sustainer thereof . . . . (Tablets of his argument. 143–44; Maj’mú’iy-i-Alváḥ ba’d Avicenna begins his reasoning by az Kitáb-i-Aqdas 85) noting that there are some concepts which are “impressed in the soul in a And Avicenna, for his part in ash- primary way” (ash-Shifá 22). That is Shifá, distinguishes between the natu- to say, there are certain ideas which are ral and supernatural or divine orders of themselves so basic and self-evident that causality: they cannot be proven or demonstrat- ed, insofar as they are the fundamen- The theistic philosophers do not tal ideas by which all other concepts mean by the term “efficient cause” might be demonstrated or defined. An what is merely the source and example is the idea of existence. Avi- principle of a physical change, as cenna points out that everyone, no mat- the naturalists assert. Rather, they ter the language spoken, understands regard the efficient cause as that in a basic way the meaning of the term which is the source of a thing’s existence. But any attempt to define existence and what imparts exis- existence itself or to demonstrate that tence to it, even as God imparts there is such a thing as existence would existence absolutely to the world fail, because one would have to assume (and does not merely fashion it the existence of something beforehand from pre-existing matter). (195) in order to use it subsequently to define or demonstrate the idea of existence. Both Bahá’u’lláh and Avicenna assert, Any definition or demonstration would therefore, the existence of some real- accordingly be circular and therefore ity that is not contained in the natural invalid. We thus understand existence order, and they will thus argue that in itself as a primary idea, and not as nature itself is not a metaphysical ul- something apprehended secondarily timate. But why do they suppose that from other things. there is anything beyond the phenom- Avicenna then states that the terms enal world of nature? Avicenna, for necessary, possible, and impossible Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 13
are likewise understood by the mind proceed to analyze the different modes in a primary way—as basic concepts in which things exist, as he does in known intuitively and comprehended chapter six of Book One in ash-Shifá. immediately. This is because any at- Conceptually, existence can be divid- tempt to define the necessary, possible, ed into what is possible or contingent and impossible falls prey to circularity (mumkin) and what is necessary (vá- just like trying to define existence does, jib). What is inherently impossible2 for the definition of any one of these clearly does not and never shall exist, terms is inescapably made in reference and thus existence can only be said of to one or both of the other two. In de- what is either necessary or possible. fining what is possible, for instance, If the existence of a thing is possible, one might say that it is something that it may just as well exist as not exist, is neither necessary, such that it must when considered in itself.3 If it does be and cannot not be, while at the same exist, however, then its existence is, in time it is not something that is impossi- some way, made actual or necessary by ble in itself, such that it could never be, virtue of something else, that is through just as a four-sided triangle could never a cause. To use a favored example of be. To define what is necessary, how- Avicenna, a house, considered in itself, ever, one must either say that “it is not might just as well exist as not exist, and possible to suppose its nonexistence, or its existence is thus only possible in it- that it is impossible to suppose it being self. But if a carpenter should assemble any other way than it already is” (ash- the proper materials and construct it, Shifá 28). the house that was merely possibly or In this way, Avicenna shows that potentially existent would become nec- the concepts of existence, necessity, essarily existent and actual. possibility, and impossibility have Avicenna makes an important point self-evident and fundamental mean- here. The house, once it exists in ings that must be apprehended directly by the mind, for the only definitions 2 As, for example, something that they can accommodate are mutually involves an essential contradiction or mis- referential. It is important for Avicen- use of terms, such as an unmarried bache- na to give an account of these terms at lor or a round square. this juncture, since they will be central 3 That is, considering something to his argument for God’s existence, merely in terms of what it is. For exam- and also since his very subject here is ple, the existence of a bachelor is not im- metaphysics, which he defines as that possible, nor is it strictly necessary; there branch of philosophy which studies be- could be no bachelors. Simply given what ing insofar as it is being. Accordingly, a bachelor is, considered in itself, it is he must give an account of the basic equally possible for there to be one or not terms he uses to describe existence. to be one. For either of these two states of Having done so, Avicenna can then affairs to obtain, therefore, external causes are necessary. 14 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
actuality, is still only possibly or con- At this point in the trajectory of his tingently existent in itself, insofar as it thought, Avicenna is confident that requires a cause for its existence. Thus, there are things that exist, and that according to Avicenna, it is necessarily there are things whose existence is pos- existent through another (vájib al-vu- sible or contingent in itself and which júd bi-ghayrihi) but only possibly or may be made necessary and actual contingently existent in itself (mumkin through a cause. Another theoretical al-vujúd). This is because the house, division of being remains, however. If as a particular arrangement of matter, there are things that are contingently does not merely depend on its materi- existent in themselves, could there be als having been assembled by an agent something that is necessarily existent at some point of time in the past; it also not through another but in itself? Avi- depends on the cohesion of its respec- cenna does not attempt to prove that tive elements in the here and now—for there is something necessarily existent without the cohesion of these parts, it in itself (vájib al-vujúd bi nafsihi) until could not exist. A water molecule may Book Eight of the “Metaphysics” in be presented as a contemporary exam- ash-Shifá. However, because the idea ple. Before any two hydrogen atoms of the Necessarily Existent in Itself is and single oxygen atom cohere in a co- central to Avicenna’s theological vi- valent bond, the existence of a certain sion, he thoroughly teases out the basic water molecule is merely possible, its implications of such a reality early in existence being contingent on the junc- ash-Shifá and also in the Dánishnámih, tion and cohesion of those atoms. But even before he formally attempts to once the bond is established, the exis- demonstrate that the Necessarily Exis- tence of that water molecule becomes tent does in fact exist. actual and necessary—though its exis- First, Avicenna makes it clear that tence remains only possible or contin- the existence of what is contingently gent in itself—insofar as the molecule existent in itself, (mumkin al-vujúd), is was originated by a cause, depends in not in itself necessary or impossible— the present on the covalent bond, and it is thus possible. But it is clear that for may well cease to exist as a water mol- the contingently existent actually to ex- ecule should the bond be broken. Con- ist, and for its existence to be rendered sequently, the inevitable and intrinsic necessary, it requires a cause. Avicenna features of a contingently existent being justifies this claim in the Dánishnámih, are, first, its being originated, and sec- chapter nineteen of the “Metaphysics,” ond, its continuing dependence in the when he writes: present on composition of some kind. Thus the water molecule does not, in As to whatever is contingent and itself, exist necessarily, but only contin- only possible, its existence, con- gently, though its existence is rendered sidered in itself, has no prepon- necessary once its causes are present. derance over its non-existence. Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 15
Its existence is therefore due to actuality, it is clear that what is nec- the existence of its cause, and its essarily existent in itself would not non-existence would be due to the require a cause to exist. This is because non-existence of the cause. If it its existence would not be logically existed of itself without a cause, equivalent to its non-existence, insofar its existence would be necessary— as the necessarily existent in itself is not possible—in itself. Therefore, not merely possible. If there is some- whatever is contingent and possi- thing that is truly necessary in itself, ble in itself requires a cause for its its actual existence would be necessary existence, and that cause is prior to and essential to it and its non-existence it essentially (that is, not necessar- impossible, in contrast to the contin- ily prior in time). (369) gently existent being whose existence and non-existence are both similarly Avicenna’s point here is that the ex- possible. This, of course, does not yet istence of something possible is logi- show that there is such a thing as exists cally equivalent to its non-existence: in necessarily in itself; it merely shows itself, it could just as well exist as not that what is necessarily existent in it- exist. If it exists in actuality, therefore, self would require no cause. its existence logically must have pro- Yet the relevance of the concept ceeded to it from another, something of the Necessarily Existent, the vá- that acts as the determinative of its ex- jib al-vujúd, might now be becoming istence: a cause.4 clear in regard to its theological im- If, then, what is possibly existent plications: if God exists, and if He is in itself requires a cause to exist in the creator of all things—a reality on which all other beings depend—it is clear that He Himself could not require 4 Avicenna’s premise here should a cause for His existence. If He did, He not be misconstrued as being an example would not be God, but simply anoth- of inductive reasoning, and criticized on er creature, or created thing, among that ground. He is not drawing a general many. What Avicenna must now do rule by observing that contingent things in his experience do in fact have causes, is show that there is a first cause that and then concluding that this stands for all does not itself have a cause, for such contingent beings. He is rather concluding a thing would be identical to the Nec- deductively that if the innate possibility essarily Existent. His formal argument of a thing’s existence is equal to the pos- for the existence of a first cause can be sibility of its non-existence, there must be found in several places throughout his something external to that thing to account works, but significantly in Book Eight, for its existence, should it actually exist: a chapters one to three of ash-Shifá, even cause or sequence of causes. For Avicenna, as Daniel De Haan has noted, with a the presence of the cause is a matter of log- variation in an-Naját. The sketch of ical necessity and is not, by any means, a the argument below thus draws from generalized observation. 16 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
ash-Shifá as well as the Dánishnámih. the first thing has its existence ei- One important point before ex- ther in itself or from a third thing, plaining Avicenna’s argument for whereas the existence of the sec- the Necessarily Existent as the first ond derives from the first. More- cause, however, is to clarify the ways over, the existence of the second in which, according to him, a cause thing, in this scenario, is necessi- may be said to be prior to an effect. tated by the first, the second not A cause, of course, can be prior to an being necessary in its essence, in- effect in time, even as the father must sofar as in itself it is only possible. exist prior to his son in time. But in Furthermore, this is allowing that Avicenna’s terminology, the father is the first thing, so long as it exists, not prior to his son as a cause essen- necessitates the existence of the tially, (muqaddam bi dhátihi) but only second thing. (ash-Shifá 126) temporally (bi zamán). This is because the son, whether as a child or a man, Avicenna then clarifies this rather tech- does not depend on the father for his nical explanation through an illustra- continued existence, or his subsistence. tion. If Zayd is holding a key and his The son, therefore, does not depend hand moves, the motion of the hand essentially on his father, for causal de- is clearly the cause of the motion of pendence on his father is not an essen- the key, while the motion of the key tial or necessary property of the son. If is clearly not the cause of the hand’s the father dies, the son will continue motion. The motion of the hand is thus to exist. This is because, according to prior to that of the key essentially, Avicenna, the father is not actually the even though the motion of each one is cause of the son’s subsistence, but rath- simultaneous with the other. The mo- er only of a certain aspect of the son’s tion of the key is necessitated by, and temporal origination, “the motion of essentially dependent on, the motion the seed” (ash-Shifá 201). Thus, for of the hand, while the hand’s motion is Avicenna, the activity of a true cause is neither necessitated by nor dependent always concurrent with its effect (201). on the key’s motion. What is more, so A cause is essentially prior to its ef- long as the motion of the hand exists, fect when they are concurrent, and the so will that of the key. effect could not possibly exist without In the Dánishnámih, Avicenna ex- the sustaining activity of the cause. plains this idea of essential causal pri- Avicenna states: ority through the example of a house, which I used as an illustration earlier: When there are two things and the existence of the first does not de- The generality of people suppose rive from the second, then the first that the cause of a thing is that thing is prior in existence to the which brings about its existence second thing. This holds true when and once it has done so, the thing Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 17
has no need of a cause. But they and the emission of light, fire and the have put forth an empty proof and emanation of heat, a sequence of mov- have been pleased with a mis- ers and things moved (such as a series leading analogy. They argue that of gears), and the force that coheres “whatever had begun to exist sub- the parts of a thing and the thing com- sequently does not depend upon posed. Now, in these cases, the cause its cause, insofar as one does not or source of the effect is in its essence make again what is already made.” independent of the effect, while the ef- Their analogy is this: should some- fect is essentially dependent on such a one make a house, it is not in need cause. of another maker once it has been This is not merely a technical point constructed. But this is their mis- that lacks wider relevance. This un- take: no one suggested that what derstanding of what the efficient cause is made needs to be made again. consists in is vital to Avicenna’s argu- Rather, we say that what is made ment for a first cause that is necessar- requires something to support and ily existent, an argument in which the sustain it. But their analogy of the question of time is completely irrele- house betrays an evident error, vant. For when Avicenna then argues for the carpenter is not the cause that there is indeed a first cause, he will of the existence of the house, but be speaking solely in terms of efficient is rather the cause of the motion causes that are concurrent with their of the wood and clay to a certain effects, and are ordered (murattab) in location, and that is precisely the a sequence such that the causes are meaning of carpenter and con- essentially—not temporally—prior to structor. But the cause of the form their effects, and the effects are essen- of the house is the cohesion of its tially—not temporally—posterior to elements, and the nature of those their causes. It is thus that he stresses, elements that necessitates the per- as Book Eight of the “Metaphysics” of sistence of the house in the form it ash-Shifá opens, that “the cause of a has. (370) thing’s existence is concurrent with it.” What, then, is Avicenna’s argument If the true cause is always concurrent for a first cause, itself independent of with its actual effect, then, any contin- any cause and necessarily existent in gent being—anything that is only pos- itself? As we have seen, Avicenna first sibly existent in itself—depends upon establishes that everything is either a cause or causes in the here and now, necessary or contingent in itself, and and not merely upon a certain cause in shows that all contingent beings— the past that was part of its temporal since they are merely possibly existent origination. Thus, examples of causes in themselves—require concurrent that are essentially prior and effects causes to exist in actuality. Avicenna essentially posterior include the Sun then concludes that there must be a 18 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
necessarily existent being, since there how many more intermediate causes cannot be an infinite series of con- are added to the sequence. If there were current contingent causes; any causal no absolute cause, the sum of interme- chain must therefore terminate in a diate causes would lack the concurrent necessarily existent being, on which cause that it, due its contingency, re- the entire causal sequence depends, quires. This absolute cause, however, and which itself depends on no cause. cannot itself be contingent; if it were, He thus writes that if one “supposes an it would itself have a cause, and would effect and its cause, and for that cause therefore be yet another intermediate a cause, there cannot be for every cause cause added to the sum, and not the yet another cause ad infinitum” (ash- absolute cause that the sum requires. Shifá 258). One consequently must conclude, as Avicenna justifies this claim, in ash- Avicenna writes, that “[t]here cannot Shifá, by having the reader meditate on be a sum of causes without there being a theoretical sequence of essentially a causeless cause, a first cause” (ash- ordered causes simultaneous in time Shifá 258). This first cause is therefore (258). If, for example, a is the cause of not contingent, but necessarily existent b, and b is the cause of c, then a is the of itself, and there thus exists a neces- absolute cause of the effects b and c, sarily existent being. while b acts as an intermediate cause In an-Naját, meanwhile, Avicenna between the extreme cause a and the defends the need for a necessarily ex- extreme effect c. Each member in this istent cause in slightly simpler terms sequence would have a special charac- (300). There, Avicenna points out that teristic, a as absolute cause of the suc- the causal sequence of concurrent ceeding members of the sequence, b as contingent causes is a composite, and intermediate cause, and c as ultimate since composites are contingent, any effect. Now, no matter how many more sum of concurrent contingent caus- members are added between the abso- es itself requires a cause in order to lute cause and the ultimate effect, the exist. It depends on its parts to exist, characteristic of intermediacy is still a and those parts are themselves contin- feature of the causes succeeding a and gently existent; the sum is therefore preceding c. Thus, if the ultimate effect contingent—an argument mirrored in is not c but z, such that the sequence is ash-Shifá when he writes, “whatever now a, b, c, d, . . . z, the mere addition is dependent on what is caused is also of more causes does not exempt them, caused” (ash-Shifá 258). The cause of as a sum, from the characteristic of in- the sum of concurrent contingent caus- termediacy. The important point here is es cannot itself be contingent, howev- that all intermediate contingent causes, er. If it were, it would just be part of the precisely because they are intermedi- sum itself and the cause of its own ex- ate, will essentially depend and be con- istence—an impossibility. There must tingent on an absolute cause, no matter be a cause, therefore, that is external Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 19
to the sum of contingent causes, and 1. Whatever exists is either nec- which is therefore not contingent at all, essary or contingent. but necessarily existent in itself. “Con- 2. Whatever is contingent has a tingent beings thus terminate,” so Avi- concurrent cause of its exis- cenna writes, “in a cause that is neces- tence. sarily existent. There is not, therefore, 3. Whatever is necessary exists for every contingent being a contingent independent of any cause. cause ad infinitum” (an-Naját 301). It 4. A causal sum of concurrent is this reality, then—the Necessarily contingent causes is itself con- Existent—that causes, and bestows tingent. existence on, the whole of contingent 5. Therefore, such a causal sum being at every moment. Importantly, if has a concurrent cause of its one were to counter that, given infinite existence (from 2, 4). time, an infinite sequence of contin- 6. The concurrent cause of such gent causes is possible, the objection a causal sum is either neces- would have no bearing on Avicenna’s sary or contingent (from 1). argument. This is because Avicenna is 7. If a causal sum has no nec- discussing concurrent causes, as we essary cause, it will have have seen, and is thus answering the contingent concurrent causes question of how any contingent being ad infinitum. or the whole of contingent being can 8. A causal sum cannot have exist in the here and now, given its contingent concurrent causes intrinsically dependent and non-neces- ad infinitum. sary reality. To this question, Avicenna 9. Consequently, the causal sum answers that such contingent being ex- does have a necessary cause ists because it is ceaselessly caused and (from 7, 8). sustained by a necessarily existent and 10. Therefore, there is something independent reality. necessary and independent of Though this argument, in either any cause (from 3, 9). of the two forms, may seem complex from the foregoing pages, this is mere- T N E ly because Avicenna’s basic premises B ’ ’ ’ W required a thorough explanation. In summary, the argument may be pre- Avicenna thus demonstrates the exis- sented as follows with nine premises, tence of something necessarily existent themselves supported by the arguments in itself. His proposition that a sum of above, leading to a final conclusion. concurrent members subsists by virtue (For brevity, “necessary” and “contin- of those members and thus only contin- gent” will be used in place of the more gently is almost self-evident. It appears, technical “necessary” or “contingent in therefore, that his strongest claim is itself”). found in premise two: “whatever is 20 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
contingent requires a concurrent cause to creation as consisting of mumkinát, for its existence.” We have previously contingent beings, only possibly ex- seen the logical problems in suppos- istent in themselves. This tablet is ing otherwise, and as such Avicenna’s partially translated in Gleanings by argument represents a remarkably ele- Shoghi Effendi, and since he various- gant and powerful logical argument— ly translated the term mumkinát, I will proceeding from an analysis of exis- indicate it below with parentheses. tence itself into model categories—for Bahá’u’lláh states in the beginning of something necessarily existent. I will the tablet: not address here, however, all possible objections to Avicenna’s argument, in- All praise to the unity of God, sofar as my larger purpose is to show and all honor to Him, the sover- that Bahá’u’lláh affirms his concept of eign Lord, the incomparable and the divine.5 all-glorious Ruler of the universe, The question before us now con- Who, out of utter nothingness, cerns the theological implications of hath created the reality of all Avicenna’s proof and how it relates things (mumkinát) . . . and Who, to Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings about God. rescuing His creatures from the First of all, essential to the idea of God abasement of remoteness and the is that He is the creator of all things, perils of ultimate extinction, hath something metaphysically ultimate on received them into His kingdom of which the existence of all other things incorruptible glory. Nothing short depends, and who Himself depends of His all-encompassing grace, on nothing for His existence—God is His all-pervading mercy, could something beyond and independent of have possibly achieved it. How the phenomenal and contingent order could it, otherwise, have been of nature. The central idea of God, as possible for sheer nothingness to Avicenna’s analysis shows, is that He is have acquired by itself the worthi- something necessarily existent in Him- ness and capacity to emerge from self. This—as will be demonstrated its state of non-existence into the through quoted passages—is precisely realm of being? what Bahá’u’lláh says regarding God. Having created the world and In this vein, Bahá’u’lláh explicitly all that liveth and moveth therein terms God vájib, necessarily existent, (kull-i-mumkinát) . . . . (64–65) in a short but comprehensive Persian tablet (Majmúʻiy-i-Alváḥ-i-Mubárakih Here Bahá’u’lláh identifies creation 338–42), in which He likewise refers with what is contingently existent, using precisely the same Arabic-Per- 5 For a similar, though distinct, sian term—mumkinát or contingent appraisal of which of Avicenna’s premises beings—as Avicenna. Bahá’u’lláh lit- are the most ontologically robust, see Mc- erally states that it is by God that all Ginnis, 166. Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 21
contingent beings (kull-i-mumkinát) the transient (ḥádith) and the Eternal have their existence, even as it is the (qadím), the contingent (mumkin) and Necessarily Existent, for Avicenna, the Absolute (vájib)” (Gleanings 66; that sustains the existence of any con- Majmúʻiy-i-Alváḥ-i-Mubárakih 28). tingent being in the here and now. Bahá’u’lláh thus confirms the same Bahá’u’lláh implies here that God metaphysical principles, the distinc- must exist, insofar as contingent real- tion between contingent and necessary ity could only derive from something existence, and the need to appeal to the that is ontologically superior to it; there latter to explain the former, that Avi- must be something existentially superi- cenna employed to demonstrate God’s or to the world of contingent beings to reality as the Necessarily Existent. ground it and to cause its existence— This language distinguishing be- something that is, by implication, nec- tween the necessary and the contin- essarily existent. gent in reference respectively to God For Bahá’u’lláh, it is evident that and His creation is central to this work contingent beings could not precede of Bahá’u’lláh, and its centrality to from “sheer nothingness,” and in Bahá’u’lláh’s theological vision in themselves do not even have “the ca- general is clearly realized as soon as pacity to exist.” They must depend, one notes that the term imkán, literally therefore, on what is not contingent but signifying the realm of contingent ex- necessary. In itself, contingent being is istence, is used in reference to creation characterized only by “the abasement ubiquitously in Bahá’u’lláh’s writ- of remoteness and the perils of ultimate ings, even as mention of mumkinát— extinction,” and accordingly must be contingent beings—is unavoidable “rescued” by a transcendent reality in in most any prayer, tablet, or epistle order to subsist at all. Here we see, im- from Him. As such, the Lawḥ-i Ḥik- plicit in Bahá’u’lláh’s account, the vital mat opens with: “This is an Epistle distinction between what is necessarily which the All-Merciful hath sent down and what is only contingently existent, from the Kingdom of Utterance. It is for it is by the former that the latter has truly a breath of life unto those who its being, while the former in itself is dwell in the realm of creation (imkán). independent of all else. Accordingly Glorified be the Lord of all worlds!” and significantly, in this same Tablet (Tablets 137; Majmúʻiy-i-Alváḥ ba’d Bahá’u’lláh soon identifies God explic- az Kitáb-i-Aqdas 80). Likewise, the itly with what is necessarily existent, Long Obligatory Prayer enjoined by using the term vájib, technically mean- Bahá’u’lláh states: “Thou seest me ing “necessary,” just as Avicenna did. turning toward Thee, and rid of all Bahá’u’lláh states that “there can be no attachment to anyone save Thee, and tie of direct intercourse to bind the one clinging to Thy cord, through whose true God with His creation, and no re- movement the whole creation (mum- semblance whatever can exist between kinát) hath been stirred up” (Prayers 22 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
and Meditations 317; Ad‘íyyiy-i- such limitations” (Gleanings 150–51; Ḥaḍrat-i-Maḥbúb 65). Iqtidárát 72–73). Here, “whatsoever in These are but two examples among the contingent world can either be ex- myriad of Bahá’u’lláh’s identification pressed or apprehended” translates the of creation with contingent being, with Persian ánchih dar maqám-i-mumkin, its implied attribution of necessity literally “whatsoever is in the station to God. We may further consider, for of the contingent (mumkin)”; such a instance, Bahá’u’lláh’s statement in thing, Bahá’u’lláh says, is maḥdúd, or the Kitáb-i-Íqán in which He stresses limited, by ḥudúdát-i-imkáníyyih, the God’s ontological distinction from limitations pertaining to the contingent mumkinát or contingent beings, insofar realm, or the constraints of contin- as they have an intrinsic dependence gency. According to Bahá’u’lláh, God upon Him: “No tie of direct intercourse alone transcends such limitations. As can possibly bind Him to His creatures such, Bahá’u’lláh here explicates the (mumkinát) . . . inasmuch as by a word ontological gulf between God and His of His command all that are in heav- creation in the Persian text by explicit- en and on earth have come to exist, ly characterizing creation as being “in and by His wish, which is the Primal the station of the contingent,” while Will itself, all have stepped out of utter He implicitly affirms the necessary nothingness into the realm of being, existence of God by saying that He the world of the visible” (63). alone transcends such constraints of In yet another work, Bahá’u’lláh contingency. again stresses, using precise meta- This language of necessity and physical language, that God utterly contingency with its accompanying transcends contingent existence. He logic continues through the writings thus explicitly validates, beyond any of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Who even repeats a mere coincidence of terminology, the kind of argument from contingency in content of Avicenna’s central distinc- which reasoning similar to Avicenna’s tion between that which is necessar- appears in the eloquent brevity of a sin- ily existent in itself, being God, and gle sentence: “So long as the contingent what exists within the constraint of world is characterized by dependency, contingent being, namely, the cre- and so long as this dependency is one ation. Bahá’u’lláh thus asserts: “the of its essential requirements, there habitation wherein the Divine Being must be One Who in His own Essence dwelleth is far above the reach and ken is independent of all things” (Some of anyone besides Him. Whatsoever Answered Questions 6; Mufávaḍát 4). in the contingent world can either be That ‘Abdu’l-Bahá appeals to the con- expressed or apprehended, can nev- tingent nature of the world to argue for er transgress the limits which, by its God’s existence, as an ontologically in- inherent nature, have been imposed dependent reality, shows that He vali- upon it. God, alone, transcendeth dates the basic metaphysical principles Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 23
underlying Avicenna’s argument for beings,” of referring to God as “neces- God, and that His use of a term like sary” and “One Who in His own Es- “contingent” is likewise no mere co- sence is independent of all things”— incidence of terminology, but rather a the significance of such expressions is substantive affirmation of the concept utterly lost without an understanding of creation’s inherent contingency and of that metaphysical world-picture God’s ontological necessity. rationally argued for by Avicenna and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá furthermore uses the an appreciation of its attendant terms very term necessarily existent (vujúb) of contingency and necessity. This fact in explicit reference to God, such as illustrates the relevance of analyzing when He says that God is absolutely the Avicennian positions affirmed in one and indivisible insofar as the di- the Bahá’í Writings to understand the vine reality “admits of no division, for theological teachings contained in division and multiplicity are among the them. characteristics of created and hence Another example of this point can contingent things, and not accidents be seen when, right next to the terms impinging upon the Necessary Being necessary and contingent, Bahá’u’lláh (vujúb)” (Some Answered Questions calls God qadím and creation ḥádith: 127; Mufávaḍát 27). Similarly, “there can be no tie of direct inter- ‘Abdu’l-Bahá states that such things as course to bind the one true God with “we affirm for creation to be among the His creation, and no resemblance what- requirements of origination we deny in ever can exist between the transient God; for to be sanctified and exalted (ḥádith) and the Eternal (qadím), the above all imperfections is one of the contingent (mumkin) and the Absolute characteristics of the Necessary Being (vájib)” (Gleanings 66; Majmúʻiy-i-Al- (vujúb)” (Some Answered Questions váḥ-i-Mubárakih 340).Though qadím 339; Mufávaḍát 204). He asserts, more- is generally and rightly translated as over, that “whatever is originated, in eternal, it alludes to those philosophi- respect to its existence and conditions, cal points about causation that we con- requires the effluence of being that em- sidered in the first section of this paper. anates from the Necessarily Existent” In this connection, qadím comes from (Khitábát 2:6, provisional translation).6 the same root as muqaddam, which Clearly, Avicenna’s modal meta- signifies “being prior,” whether in time physics is not merely incidental to or in essential independence, from the these passages from Bahá’u’lláh and ḥádith, an effect or phenomenon (trans- ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. The significance of call- lated as “transient” above). It is ac- ing creation “the contingent world,” cordingly in the full sense of a cause’s of calling created things “contingent essential priority to its effect, as Avi- cenna explains, that Bahá’u’lláh here employs the term qadím in reference to 6 All provisional translations in this God and ḥádith with respect to created article are by the author. 24 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
things, insofar as according to both Avicenna, but also affirms the meaning Avicenna and Bahá’u’lláh creation is underlying it. “That primal Essence,” co-eternal with God but essentially and Bahá’u’lláh assures us in the Lawḥ- ceaselessly dependent on Him—as will i-Tawḥíd, “subsists (qá’im) by virtue be explored in Part Three of this arti- of its own self” (Majmúʻiy-i-Alváḥ-i- cle. Thus, Bahá’u’lláh not only stresses Mubárakih 313, provisional transla- the necessary existence of God and the tion). Similarly, in the Short Obligato- contingency of His creatures, but also ry prayer enjoined by Bahá’u’lláh, one alludes to His being essentially prior reads: “I testify, at this moment, to my to them, as the ultimate and uncondi- powerlessness and to Thy might, to my tioned cause of all other things at all poverty and to Thy wealth. There is times, as Avicenna argued. none other God but Thee, the Help in Moreover, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, in chapter Peril, the Self-Subsisting (al-qayyúm)” eighty of Mufávaḍát or Some Answered (Prayers and Meditations 314; Ad’íyy- Questions, Himself provides a detailed iy-i-Ḥaḍrat-i-Maḥbúb 74). In addition, presentation of essential and temporal when explaining the immortality of the priority, as well as the dependent and human soul, Bahá’u’lláh distinguishes originated nature of an effect (ḥudúth), between the everlasting existence of that precisely mirrors Avicenna’s own the soul, which is nonetheless contin- explanations; this again indicates His gent, temporal and thus dependent on support for the metaphysical account of a cause, and the eternal existence of causation underlying Avicenna’s argu- God, which is necessary, absolute, un- ment for God. In this light, Bahá’u’lláh conditioned and essential to Him, and likewise uses the term ḥudúth to refer thus in need of no cause. He states: to created things’ essential contingency and their fundamental insignificance When the soul attaineth the Pres- when compared with God’s necessary ence of God, it will assume the and unconditioned existence: “how form that best befitteth its immor- utterly contemptible must every con- tality and is worthy of its celestial tingent (ḥudúth) and perishable thing habitation. Such an existence is appear when brought face to face with a contingent and not an absolute the uncreated, the unspeakable glory of existence, inasmuch as the for- the Eternal” (Gleanings 187–88; qtd. mer is preceded by a cause, whilst in Dávúdí 131). the latter is independent there- Even when Bahá’u’lláh uses terms of. Absolute existence is strictly other than vájib in reference to the confined to God, exalted be His nature of God’s existence, the evident glory. (Gleanings 157; Majmúʻiy- meaning remains that God is neces- i-Alváḥ-i-Mubárakih 164–65) sarily existent in Himself and essen- tially independent—an indication that The term translated as “absolute He not only uses the terminology of existence” is baqáy-i-dhátí, which Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 25
literally signifies essential existence. in being causally dependent and con- Because God exists necessarily of Him- ditioned (Muntakhabátí 1:58–59). self without need of anything external From the above points, therefore, we to Him, His existence is essential to His may safely conclude that Bahá’u’lláh, nature, and is accordingly absolute, as along with ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, recognizes Shoghi Effendi perceptively translated, and affirms the Avicennian distinction insofar as it is not contingent on, or between contingent and necessary ex- conditioned by, anything whatsoever. istence, and identifies God with the Since this “essential existence” is not Necessarily Existent. The above points preceded by or dependent on a cause— also showcase how an understanding whereas non-essential existence is— of the metaphysical principles Avi- Bahá’u’lláh is clearly distinguishing cenna uses in his argument for God’s between existence which is essential existence illuminate the meaning of to something and thus necessary, and Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s state- existence which is incidental, derived ments—Their own arguments in favor from a cause, and thus contingent to a of God’s existence and clarifications of thing. As such, it is this necessary exis- His nature. tence, not dependent on a cause, which Nevertheless, the concept of the Nec- He says is “strictly confined to God.” essarily Existent that Avicenna propos- In this passage, therefore, es may initially seem too conceptually Bahá’u’lláh carefully explicates the bare to be easily identified with God, metaphysical notions of contingent and particularly the full and lively God of necessary being, and what they entail Bahá’u’lláh. Though the concept of for the nature of God and His creatures, God presented by Bahá’u’lláh clearly and consequently affirms the concep- entails that He exists necessarily and tual core of Avicenna’s argument for not merely contingently, we have yet God and subsequent conception of the to see the full rational justification Divine in its essential form. Similarly, for why, in Avicenna’s metaphysics, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá makes a precise distinc- something necessarily existent in itself tion, like Avicenna, between the condi- should be recognized as divine and as tional and hence contingent existence the single reality worthy of the term di- of creatures and the necessary exis- vinity. The object of the following part tence of God, when He explicitly states of this paper, therefore, is to explore in one place that existence is “of two how a rich theological picture emerg- kinds,” that of God and that of khalq or es from the idea of absolute necessi- creation. While the existence of God, ty, and how the attributes of divinity He explains, is preceded by and depen- can be logically deduced therefrom in dent on no cause whatsoever, being ab- Avicenna’s system. We will see, mean- solute and eternally and independent- while, an even greater convergence ly subsistent, the kind of existence between Avicenna’s arguments and creatures possess is radically different Bahá’u’lláh’s statements, as well as 26 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
the explanations of the latter’s son and contingent beings. The prime method successor, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. of establishing God’s attributes, there- fore, in both the Bahá’í Writings and T D A Avicenna’s work, is the apophatic ap- proach of negative theology, by which In the foregoing pages, we reviewed properties that are characteristic of cre- Avicenna’s argument for God as the ated and contingent beings as such are Necessarily Existent, and demonstrat- negated from God. In this light, God ed that in Bahá’u’lláh’s view God, as is the one reality that transcends the Avicenna stresses, is indeed charac- conditioned, contingent, caused, and terized by necessary existence. What mutable order of nature, and is thus remains to be shown, therefore, is absolute and sanctified from the multi- twofold. First, we must elucidate the plicity of attributes that are distinctive rationale behind Avicenna’s assertion of contingent beings. By this method that the Necessarily Existent is indeed of negation, a fuller understanding God by explaining how he deduces emerges of what necessary existence further divine attributes from the idea logically entails, and what it must pre- of necessary existence. We will do this clude, with the result that one comes by considering the divine attributes to know God by virtue of what He is of simplicity, singleness, immutabil- not, such as when one asserts that He ity, eternality, perfection, goodness, is eternal (not in time), necessary (not intellect, will, and infinitude, each of contingent), one (not multiple), and so which is significant in Bahá’u’lláh’s on. revelation and Avicenna’s thought. A related principle to bear in Second, we must ascertain whether mind—one whose justification will Bahá’u’lláh accepts Avicenna’s ac- become evident once the concept of count of the divine attributes, in order simplicity has been discussed—is to determine further how Bahá’u’lláh that for Bahá’u’lláh and Avicenna the affirms Avicennian principles and how divine attributes treated in this part understanding those Avicennian princi- are not discrete and separate proper- ples illuminates the nature, and rational ties that characterize God. Each one, character, of Bahá’u’lláh’s own teach- rather, is a different construal of His ings on the nature of God. Such, then, necessary existence. We saw, for in- is the object of the second part of this stance, in this article’s first part that paper. the Necessarily Existent has no cause. In order to contextualize the dis- If it needed a cause to exist, it would cussion of divine attributes that fol- not be necessarily existent in itself. lows, we can note at the outset that a Insofar as we conclude that there is conceptual analysis of the Necessarily a first causeless cause, we can deter- Existent shows the stark disparity and mine that it is identical to the Neces- categorical distinction between it and sarily Existent, for it would require Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 27
a cause if it were merely possible in S itself. And yet, although being neces- sarily existent and being independent The above point—that in God there of any cause are distinct propositions, is no multiplicity—is especially ap- the reality they point to is the same, as parent from an understanding of the each predication is fully identical to, attribute of simplicity. It is discussed or convertible into, the other. Similar- first because it is arguably the most vi- ly, each of the attributes spoken of will tal to comprehend in order for one to not constitute a discrete entity in God, understand the God of Avicenna and, but will serve as a way of deducing likewise, the God of Bahá’u’lláh. In the logical consequences of necessary sum, simplicity means that the Nec- existence. This is by way of negating essarily Existent is incomposite and from the Necessarily Existent the at- absolutely one in its essence—it has tributes peculiar to contingent beings, no component parts. Simplicity stands as described above, rather than affirm- in contrast to complexity, which en- ing of it a plurality of discrete proper- tails the composition of multiple parts ties, as Avicenna stresses: as well as a variety of real ontological disjunctions and various internal as- God has attributes whose meaning pects cohering within an entity. But, is negative, such that when we as Avicenna explains (Dánishnámih say that God is “one,” for exam- 368–69 and 374–75), the Necessarily ple, we mean that His reality is Existent must be simple because it has such that He has no peer, or that no cause for its existence, nor for its He is not composed of parts. Sim- being the way that it is. For if the Nec- ilarly, when we say He is eternal, essarily Existent were composed of we mean that His existence has different parts, then it would depend no beginning, but these two attri- on those parts, and on some principle butes—oneness and eternity—do by which they would cohere, in order not bring about any multiplicity in to exist. In such a case, its existence His essence. (Dánishnámih 381) would be contingent and not neces- sary—contingent, that is, on a range It is in this light that ‘Abdu’l-Bahá of parts and on something to cause says, as seen earlier, that such things as them to come together so as to sustain “we affirm for creation to be among the the subsistence of the complex enti- requirements of origination we deny in ty. If this were so, then it would only God; for to be sanctified and exalted be possibly existent in itself and not above all imperfections is one of the necessary. It would not be something characteristics of the Necessary Being metaphysically ultimate, for anything (vujúb)” (Some Answered Questions that depends on composition is defi- 339; Mufávaḍát 204). nitionally not the absolute terminus of causal explanation, insofar as it 28 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
depends on ontologically more funda- Thus, the Necessarily Existent can- mental elements. not have any parts, nor can it entail Another way to reason out the sim- any composition. Consequently, there plicity of the Necessarily Existent is could be no discrete physical parts in this: if the Necessarily Existent did the Necessarily Existent, and it could have parts, would those parts be nec- not be something extended in three essarily existent in themselves? If they dimensions. For Avicenna, however, were not necessarily existent in them- there are deeper, metaphysical ways in selves, then what they would compose which something could be a compos- clearly could not be necessarily exis- ite in contrast to being a simple entity. tent, for “what is dependent on what is Namely, something could be a compos- caused is also caused” (ash-Shifá 258). ite of actuality and potentiality, matter But if we did conceive these parts each and form, essence and existence. We as necessarily existent, there would will thus successively explore the sig- still have to be a cause or principle by nificance of each of these pairs in Avi- means of which they would join to- cenna’s thought. gether and form the Necessarily Exis- First, with regard to actuality and tent being whose existence we initially potentiality, Avicenna accepts Aristot- deduced. But such a complex being le’s fundamental postulate, articulated would not be necessarily existent, for in Book Nine of his Metaphysics, that it would still be dependent for its ex- something is either actual or potential, istence on the composition of separate and that causation, change or origi- elements as well as some external prin- nation involves the actualization of a ciple to unite those elements; it thus potential. In fact, Avicenna assimilates would not be fundamental and neces- this Aristotelian insight into his divi- sary in itself. Consequently, something sion of existence into the modalities of cannot be composed of necessary enti- necessity and possibility. For Avicen- ties and remain necessarily existent in na, whatever can possibly exist must itself.8 be said to exist in some way or other, whether in actuality or in potentiality, 7 This same logic, as we discussed even as he expresses in the Dánish- earlier, showed us that composition is a námih: “When it is possible for some- feature strictly confined to contingent be- thing to exist but it still does not exist, ings. Composition entails the existence of the possibility of its existence while it something prior to the composed thing, is nonexistent is called potentiality” something more basic which supports, (363). When a possibly existent thing causes, and sustains its existence. The comes into existence, it passes from Necessarily Existent, then, must be entire- potentiality into actuality. However, ly void of such composition. such a thing does not have actuality in 8 Avicenna’s demonstration that in principle there could only be one nec- essarily existent reality is discussed in the section “Singleness.” Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 29
itself but must be actualized by a cause; a cause to become actually existent. insofar, then, as a contingent being can If that potential in it were actualized change or revert to nonexistence, it is by a cause, then the being of the Nec- not pure, self-subsistent actuality, but essarily Existent would not be fully rather is partly actual (as actualized by necessary in itself but necessitated by its cause or causes) and partly potential a cause. This, of course, is a contra- due to its inherent contingency. diction. Alternatively, if one part of its Consequently, things that are caused existence were actual in itself, and an- or mutable are composites of actuality other part potential, the former would and potentiality, actual and potential have no need of the latter to exist. That existence. That is, a contingent being, former would then be the true Neces- say a tree, is actually one way and sarily Existent, in which case it could potentially another. Part of a tree’s not be subject to an external cause to contingency entails that it has poten- join it to something only potentially tiality—it can potentially exist or not existent, nor would it make sense to exist; it can potentially be fertile green say that what is necessary in itself de- or withered brown; it can potentially pends on a part that is only possibly grow or diminish. Conversely, it actu- existent in itself.9 ally is one way or another at any par- Hence, the Necessarily Existent is ticular time, and that current actuality no composite of actuality and poten- is made actual, or necessary, by some tiality, but fully actual and necessarily cause or other. The tree, accordingly, is so—not upon the condition of anything not purely actual or necessary in itself, else; it is thus wholly unconditioned, but is subject to causes and has poten- absolute, and free of any metaphysical tials that may or may not become ac- composition. The simplicity of its ex- tualized. Metaphysically, therefore, the istence inevitably entails that it is one tree is a composite of actual and poten- thing and one thing only, in complete tial existence: existence as necessitated actuality and necessity—pure actuality by its causes and existence as merely with no potentiality. In classical terms, possible in itself. it is pure act with no potency. But Avicenna writes in ash-Shifá, Similarly, Avicenna explains that “Whatever is necessarily existent by the Necessarily Existent could not be a its own essence is necessarily existent composite of matter and form: in every aspect” (30). This is because if the Necessarily Existent had any po- tentiality, if any part of its existence 9 Likewise, and stated more simply, were not already fully actual and nec- the Necessarily Existent can have no po- essary but potential and contingent, it tentiality, for then it would have an actual would not be necessarily existent in part and a potential part, and then it would itself. In itself, that part would only not be fundamentally irreducible and inde- be possibly existent and would require pendent of the composition of more basic elements. 30 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
There cannot be any multiplicity that receives the form and is actualized in the Necessarily Existent, such by it, as wax receives the impression that its existence becomes actual- of the seal. Lastly, the final cause is the ized due to a multiplicity of things, purpose of a thing, or its end, the state even as the body of man is. Nor that it is directed towards by virtue of can things be divisions within it, its particular nature, the realization of each part subsisting in its own which constitutes its good.10 right, like the wood and clay of a The Necessarily Existent, in not house. Nor can there be divisions depending upon causes, clearly does within it that are conceptually sep- not have an existence that is realized arate though not in essence, even by virtue of any one of these four caus- as matter and form are conceptu- es. As such, the Necessarily Existent ally separate in natural bodies, for could have neither a material nor for- in that case the essence of the Nec- mal cause: it could not be comprised of essarily Existent would be a com- matter, some basic stuff with the poten- posite and admit of association tiality of being actualized in a particu- with causes, as has been shown. lar form. If this were the case, it would (Dánishnámih 374) not be necessarily, but only possibly, existent. Accordingly, even as it is not a The full significance of the Necessar- composite of discernible discrete parts, ily Existent’s not being a composite or of actuality and potentiality, the Nec- of matter and form similarly depends essarily Existent cannot be a composite on some understanding of Aristotelian of matter and form. It follows logical- metaphysics and its view of causation, ly, then, that it must be immaterial, for, the basic structure of which Avicenna otherwise, it would be a contingent adopts and defends. In brief, the Ar- entity composed of two metaphysical istotelian account presents four kinds parts: matter and form. Matter would of cause: the efficient, the formal, the represent its potentiality, form its actu- material, and the final. The efficient ality, and it, as a being whose existence cause is already familiar from the dis- has been realized, would be dependent cussions in Part One; it is the agent, the on those causes, the material cause source of a change in a thing (such as and the formal cause, as well as some when a stove imparts heat to water) or agent, the efficient cause, to actualize the existence of a thing (as when the the substrate of matter into some con- motion of the hand creates the motion crete form. This, of course, is impossi- of the key being held). The formal ble for the Necessarily Existent, for it cause, however, is the essential form is dependent on no cause whatsoever. and nature or functional organization of a thing, which makes it actually the 10 Significantly, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá thing that it is. Conversely, the material likewise validates the Aristotelian theo- cause is the matter, the raw potentiality, ry of the four causes; see chapter eighty of Mufávaḍát. Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 31
Given, therefore, that the Neces- attributes peculiar to water: its inherent sarily Existent is immaterial, it cannot nature. Water, as H2O, has properties even be conceived as a uniform and that neither of its elements, hydrogen homogeneous substance existing in and oxygen, has alone, and its attri- three-dimensional space; rather, it is butes are not a mere sum of hydrogen’s something that altogether transcends and oxygen’s discrete properties. Water space and the material world. Conse- has a unique set of properties, such as quently, it is void of all the incidental being capable of existing in gas, liquid, attributes particular to material enti- and solid states in a narrow range of ties, which include subsisting in space; temperatures. Water is thus essential- being situated in three dimensions; ly or intrinsically different from other exhibiting weight, mass, position, and elements. locomotion; and so forth. Immaterial- The important point is that Avicen- ity is thus a logical consequence both na recognizes that, for any contingent of necessary existence and simplicity. being, whether it exists must be a dis- There remains, however, yet anoth- tinct consideration from what defini- er and even more fundamental level tionally constitutes what it is. This is at which the Necessarily Existent is because there is nothing entailed by properly understood as absolutely sim- the essence of any contingent being ple. This involves Avicenna’s famous that will demonstrate to someone that distinction between essence and exis- it exists in actuality. The essence of tence. For Avicenna, contingent beings a human being, for example, may be are composed of essence and existence, defined, as it was classically at least and their essence is conceptually and since Aristotle, as a rational animal. If metaphysically distinct from their ex- the essence of the human being, then, istence. In other words, for Avicenna, is to be a rational animal, it is clear that the fact that something is distinct from this remains a fact even if all human what something is. The essence of a beings become extinct. Likewise, even thing is its quiddity, its máhíyyat, the if humans had never emerged, that whatness that defines it. An essence is would not have changed the fact that what makes an entity the thing it is and the human essence is to be a rational not some other thing. For example, the animal. One cannot know whether any essence of a triangle—triangularity— human exists simply by investigating determines that any triangle has three what constitutes the human essence; sides and three sides only, internal instead, one must empirically deter- angles whose sum is 180 degrees, and mine whether humans exist in the so forth. A triangle is not a square; the present, or deduce their existence in- two shapes are essentially different. To directly from their effects, insofar as use a more concrete example, the es- their existence is not logically neces- sence of water could be construed as sary but contingent and incidental to that reality by which it manifests the their essence. 32 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
Avicenna, in addition, has a briefer essence. It is thus that saying “the es- proof of the distinction between es- sence is an existent” differs from say- sence and existence in ash-Shifá. His ing “the essence is an essence.” proof rests on the idea that, if essence This distinction between essence and existence were not distinct, then and existence moreover clarifies why even some of the simplest propositions a contingent being is only possibly ex- would revert to bare tautologies. He istent in itself. Because of the distinc- explains: tion between essence and existence, a contingent being cannot derive exis- It is evident that for everything tence from its own essence; it there- there is a reality particular to it, fore does not have existence in and of and this is what constitutes its itself, that is, from its own nature and essence. Likewise, it is clear that essence. It must therefore receive ex- the reality particular to each thing istence from something other than its is distinct from its existence. This essence, from something beyond itself: is because it is intelligible to say an external cause. As a case in point, that the reality of something does although triangularity is the essence exist in a concrete way, or as ap- of a triangle, and although no triangle prehended in the mind, or abso- can exist without that essence, what lutely as common to both. But it Avicenna would call the formal cause, is vain and useless to say that the no concrete triangle can exist without reality of something is the reality an efficient cause, some external factor of something, or that the reality of imparting existence to it, say, the geo- something is a reality. (24) metrician who draws it and creates it as a particular triangle. Because contin- Though Avicenna continues with his gent beings evince, in this way, a real explanation, his main point is that, distinction between essence and exis- while a statement such as “the essence tence, they are only possibly and not of man exists (either concretely or as necessarily existent, insofar as they do conceived by a mind)” is meaningful not exist simply given what they are. in that the predicate reveals something Accordingly, every existent contingent more about the subject, to say “the es- being evinces a fundamental composi- sence of man is the essence of man” or tion, a composition that immediately “the essence of man is an essence” is points to the conditional, dependent, a mere restatement. The predicate, in and derivative nature of its being: the that case, reveals nothing more about composition of essence and existence. the subject. This shows, for Avicenna, A composite of essence and existence that there is a distinction between es- is not metaphysically fundamental sence and existence. Otherwise, to say and self-sufficient, but rather relies that a particular essence exists would on something else for its being and not convey anything more about that origination. Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 33
It then follows that, unlike each here is simply identical to the predicate member of the totality of contingently in a way that would not hold for any existent beings, the Necessarily Exis- contingent being. tent could not be such a composite of In this connection, one may recall, essence and existence. As Avicenna as discussed earlier, how Bahá’u’lláh deftly argues in the Dánishnámih: implicitly confirms this Avicennian “Whatever has an essence other than its proposition by restricting “essential own existence is not necessarily exis- existence” to God; because God’s es- tent. For if the essence of a thing is not sence is His existence, His existence its own existence, its existence would is essential to Him. Contingent beings, have the characteristic of being an in- in contrast, have a merely accidental cidental, and not essential, feature to it. or incidental existence, as Avicenna Any incidental feature, moreover, has a explains: “Whatever is necessarily ex- cause” (377). The Necessarily Existent istent of itself has no essence except is thus nothing other than necessary existence, and . . . whatever is not nec- existence, nothing other than absolute essarily existent of itself has existence, being. Therefore, it has no essence therefore, only incidentally” (Dánish- distinct from its existence, and in this námih 409). ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, in valida- sense one may say that the Necessarily tion of this point, thus states that “[t] Existent has no essence, insofar as it his common existence (of contingent does not have an essence distinct from beings) . . . is only one accident among its act of existence. In this connection others that enter upon the realities of Avicenna writes: “The Necessarily created things” (Some Answered Ques- Existent has no essence; it is rather tions 337–38; Mufávaḍát 203). In this from Him that existence emanates onto sense, the essential is associated with those things that have essences. It is the necessary, and the contingent with pure being from which all privation the accidental, which here refers to that and description is negated” (ash-Shifá which is incidental, and not essential 276). Yet Avicenna also writes that, or inherent, to a thing. Such contingent in another sense, the Necessarily Ex- beings do not have existence of them- istent’s essence is its existence: “The selves or essentially, their existence Necessarily Existent has no essence is “accidental” or incidental to them, apart from its existence” (ash-Shifá as ‘Abdu’l-Bahá and Avicenna both 274). In the Necessarily Existent, then, explain. there is no distinction between what it Since the essence of the Necessar- is and the fact that it is; what it is is its ily Existent is its very incomposite existence. It is therefore absolute and existence, it follows that it could not unconditioned Being. Thus, to say “the have a plurality of essential attributes. Necessarily Existent exists” is equiv- Contrary to contingent things such as alent to saying “the Necessarily Exis- a human being—which is a composite tent is necessarily existent”; the subject of the essential attributes of rationality 34 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
and animality by virtue of the intellect can be nothing in it that is actualized by and the body, respectively—the es- any external cause. sence of the Necessarily Existent could The essential simplicity of the Nec- not be a composite of different meta- essarily Existent thus entails that it physical parts or attributes, for then is nothing else than the absolute act that essence would be something other of being. In it there is no junction of than the single and incomposite reality physical parts, no admixture of actu- of necessary existence. As Avicenna ality and potentiality, no combination explains (Dánishnámih 374), if the of discrete attributes, no cohesion of Necessarily Existent did have multiple form and matter, no union of essence discrete attributes, its essence would be and existence. It is instead something actualized by virtue of those attributes, absolutely one and indivisible, simple and that essence would thus be depen- and uncomposed. Accordingly, there is dent on those parts, and a cause to unite nothing more fundamental, more basic, those parts. And this, as we have seen, more ultimate to reality than the simple is impossible for the Necessarily Exis- reality that the Necessarily Existent is. tent. Its essence, therefore, is simply or It is categorically and essentially un- non-compositely necessary existence, like any contingent being by virtue of and whatever attribute is properly as- its inherent necessity, simplicity, and cribed to it is in fact identical to that absolute oneness, and it is due to its necessary existence and does not indi- utterly simple essence that it is some- cate an actual multiplicity within it. thing truly ultimate. Consequently, the It follows, then, that in the Neces- Necessarily Existent is not just one sarily Existent there is no distinction or being among beings, for in that case it composition of essence and attributes. would merely be a limited and contin- Its attributes are either identical to gent instantiation of existence, superior its essence, or it transcends attributes only in relative degree to other beings. altogether, at least in the sense that Rather, its simplicity entails that the contingent beings have attributes. Con- Necessarily Existent is not something sequently, given that the Necessarily that has or instantiates existence as be- Existent is “necessary in all aspects,” it ings do, but instead is Being itself, sub- likewise cannot admit of any incidental sisting of itself, dependent on no other. or non-essential attributes or features. It is thus wholly unlike all other things As Avicenna asserts, any incidental and unique—an attribute that will have feature would require that an external its full discussion under the coming cause had actualized something contin- subsection, “Singleness.” gent in the Necessarily Existent, since This, then, is how Avicenna deduces no incidental feature is essential to the the simplicity of the Necessarily Exis- being of its possessor. But we have tent, and hence of God. But how does seen that it is “necessary in every as- Bahá’u’lláh affirm God’s simplicity in pect” and fully actual, and thus there addition to His necessity? There are, Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 35
indeed, many instances in His writings insofar as His existence, as seen above, and those of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá in which di- is essential to Him. Bahá’u’lláh fur- vine simplicity is either implicitly—as thermore suggests, in affirming that mentioned above—or explicitly con- God is “one in his works” (váḥidan fí firmed. In one of His tablets, for exam- af‘álihi) that God does not engage in ple, Bahá’u’lláh firmly asserts that God a multiplicity of actions or works, as “in truth, hath, throughout eternity, contingent beings do, and thus does not been one in His Essence, one in His at- admit of the multiplicity of potentially tributes, one in His works” (Gleanings enacting one thing and then actually 193; Muntakhbátí 77). More tellingly, enacting it, of potentially being one Bahá’u’lláh writes the following in the way and actually another. This in ac- Lawḥ-i-Madíniy-i-Tawḥíd or the Tablet cord with Avicenna’s position that God of the City of Divine Unity: “Thou art enacts, and is identical to, His single then witness that God is one in His at- and absolute act of existence, and that tributes, and that [multiple] attributes He is thus exempt from a multiplicity are debarred from entry into the court of contingent actions, which would in- of His sanctity . . . Recognize, more- volve the actualization of potentiality over, that the multiplicity of various in Him.11 Bahá’u’lláh therefore clearly designations and attributes shall never affirms that God does not have various be joined unto His essence, for His at- parts or composition, discrete proper- tributes are verily His essence itself” ties or separate qualities, and confirms (Má’idiy-i-Ásmání 4: 329–13, provi- that He is one absolutely and categor- sional translation). ically. In this way, Bahá’u’lláh affirms In these passages, Bahá’u’lláh as- the notion of God’s simplicity in addi- serts that God is one and does not have tion to His necessity. plurality of attributes, for whatever Furthermore, if each of God’s attri- attribute may be properly ascribed to butes is identical with His essence, as Him is identical to His single essence. Bahá’u’lláh states, then logically each Consequently, it seems His intent in one of them is identical with, or con- these passages is not merely to stress vertible to, any of the others. It follows, that there is only one God. As we saw then, that for Bahá’u’lláh God has no with Avicenna, the intent behind em- attributes distinct from His essential phatically stating that God is one in es- and utterly indivisible being, just as sence, attributes, and acts seems rather for Avicenna. Moreover, Bahá’u’lláh’s to disallow any notion that there is any statement that God is “one in His acts” multiplicity in God at all. His essence is fully intelligible from the notion of is one; His attributes are one; His acts are one. Therefore, in God there are not 11 The section “Creation and Cos- multiple attributes and discrete proper- mology” will explore the question of how ties; there is only His essential being, the Necessarily Existent performs the which for Bahá’u’lláh is His existence, creative act according to Bahá’u’lláh and Avicenna. 36 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
God’s being complete actuality, sheer both He and Avicenna are in perfect necessary being without any addition concord, as shall be shown. of potentiality or contingency or any The context of this Tablet indicates composition therewith. God is, in other that Bahá’u’lláh was asked about words, pure act insofar as He is neces- the meaning of the following saying, sary existence, the very act of absolute originating with Plotinus in the En- being. If God is truly one, His essence neads (5.2.1): “The Simple Reality is could be no more distinct from His ex- all things,” which was affirmed by the istence than His action could be distinct prominent early modern Persian phi- from either His essence or existence. losopher Mullá Ṣadrá. That the Simple He is at once necessary existence and Reality (Basíṭ al-Ḥaqíqat) is clearly the act of being, insofar as His reali- understood to refer to God is assumed ty as the Necessarily Existent means throughout the Tablet, and Bahá’u’lláh, that His essence is to be. Bahá’u’lláh’s incidentally, even refers to God quite statements are therefore manifest ex- explicitly as the Necessarily Existent in pressions of the idea of divine sim- this work. Bahá’u’lláh’s aim, however, plicity, as is clear after considering an is to explicate Plotinus’ original state- account of Avicenna’s explanations ment and Mullá Ṣadrá’s views in a way for why the Necessarily Existent must that precludes any pantheistic reading. be simple. Understanding Avicenna’s In His interpretation, Bahá’u’lláh ex- logical analysis of necessary existence plicitly affirms God’s simplicity and and simplicity thus illuminates the denies that He has any parts or partic- philosophical context and content of ipates in the multiplicity of contingent Bahá’u’lláh’s own statements. things. Rather, God is the fullness of Even if the logical consequenc- existence itself with all its perfection, es of these passages failed to prove from Whom the existence of His crea- definitively that Bahá’u’lláh affirms tures proceeds, while He Himself re- God’s simplicity, His remarks on this mains one and undivided among other theme in His Lawḥ-i-Basíṭ al-Ḥaqíqat things or in Himself. Bahá’u’lláh thus or Tablet on the Simple Reality would states: be sufficient to show that He in fact so strongly supports the doctrine of di- Thou hast written that an inquirer vine simplicity as to take it as a given. hath asked for an explanation of Moreover, Bahá’u’lláh stresses in that the statement of the philosophers, Tablet that divine simplicity should not “the Simple Reality is all things.” be construed as entailing any kind of Say: Know that the meaning of pantheism or monism, a view in which “things” in this connection is the distinction between the necessary nothing else but existence and and the contingent collapses, and God the perfections of existence qua becomes identical with the creation existence, while the meaning of that proceeds from Him. In this too, “all” is the possessor thereof. This Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 37
“all” admits of no division and of vision of the seer. Insightful eyes no parts. Thus, the Simple Reality, behold, in all things, the signs of because it is simple in all aspects, the One, for in all things are the is the possessor and totality of all divine names manifest, while limitless perfections, as it hath God Himself hath ever been, and been said, “there is no limit to His shall forever be, sanctified from handiwork.” ascent, descent, and limitation, as In the Persian tongue,12 it may well as connection and association be said that the intent of the phi- [with any other thing]. All other losopher in the above passage in things, in contrast, abide in the regard to “things” is the perfec- sphere of their specific limitations. tions of existence insofar as it is (Má’idiy-i-Ásmání 7:140–41, pro- existence, and his intent as to “all” visional translation) is a possessor, that is, the One who is the possessor and totality of In Bahá’u’lláh’s interpretation, “the all limitless perfections in a sim- Simple Reality is all things” means that ple manner. They have put forth God, the Simple Reality, is the posses- similar statements on the themes sor of existence and its perfections in- of divine simplicity and on the sofar as it is absolute existence indepen- “potency” and “intensity” of ex- dent of any of the incidental attributes istence.13 Here, the philosopher’s of being found diversely in contingent intent was not that the Necessarily entities (such as place, position, quan- Existent hath permeated or is di- tity, temperature, texture, etc.). For vided among limitless entities. Ex- Bahá’u’lláh, the simple and non-com- alted is He above that! Rather, it posite nature of God is absolute; God is as the philosophers have stated: is not the basic stuff out of which other “The Simple Reality is all things, things are literally made, and His reali- and not any single one of them,” ty is never a part of, or a substratum to, and in another place, “The splen- the contingent order. This would require dors of the Simple Reality can that God’s simplicity become inter- be perceived in all things.” This mixed with limitless complexity, and perception is conditioned by the that He be something basically material and composite which could take part in 12 Here, Bahá’u’lláh switches from the material and composite world. This Arabic to Persian, and largely reiterates the would certainly contradict the absolute same point. reality of God’s necessary existence and 13 This is a reference to Mullá Ṣadrá, thus His simplicity, for we have seen for his philosophy made use of the ideas of how the Necessarily Existent must be the relative intensity (tashdíd), as well as wholly actual being with no potentials the differentiation (tashkík), of existence as and no aspects receptive to being or be- beings proceed from the absolute existence coming contingent on external causes. of God. 38 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
Indeed, for Bahá’u’lláh and Avi- to God as the Necessarily Existent. cenna, God is something fully one and However much simplicity may complete in His necessary being, abso- seem to be a rather abstract attribute lutely simple and non-composite, from of God, it is the most fundamental of Whom the existence of other things the attributes that we shall discuss, for proceeds, while He Himself remains two reasons. The first is that it enables absolute, simple, and indivisible. And one to understand precisely why God so Avicenna writes in this connection: as the Necessarily Existent is the ab- “Everything is from Him, and He is solute terminus of explanation: there is not like anything which proceeds from simply nothing more basic and funda- Him. He is the source of everything, mental than He is Himself, and there and is not any one of the things that are is thus nothing—even theoretically— posterior to Him” (ash-Shifá 283). upon which He could depend. Because ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, too, elucidates there is no distinction whatsoever be- Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings on the simplic- tween His essence and His attributes, ity of God. Reiterating Bahá’u’lláh’s or His essence and His existence, we assertion that in God there is no plu- have no need to ask why He is one rality of attributes, and that each of way and not another, or whether He His attributes is consequently identical could exist or not exist, insofar as He with His essence, He writes that “the is necessarily existent in Himself. The essential names and attributes of God second reason to devote so much atten- are identical with His Essence, and His tion to simplicity is that it enables one Essence is sanctified above all under- to deduce additional attributes of God, standing” (Some Answered Questions and also to understand that these seem- 168; Mufávaḍát 105). Elsewhere, ingly additional attributes are not sep- as we saw earlier, He asserts that the arate properties but merely represent Godhead “admits of no division, for different ways of considering what the division and multiplicity are among same reality, termed the Necessarily the characteristics of created and hence Existent, logically entails. Simplicity, contingent things, and not accidents then, enables one to understand how impinging upon the Necessary Be- God’s attributes could be identical ing” (Some Answered Questions 127; to His essence and to one another, as Mufávaḍát 27). The Bahá’í Writings, Bahá’u’lláh and Avicenna state, and therefore, confirm Avicenna’s notion are not a collection of distinct proper- of the simplicity of God. Logically, ties in actuality. what is necessarily existent of itself But before we proceed to what cannot have parts of any kind, physi- Bahá’u’lláh and Avicenna have to say cal or metaphysical, and Bahá’u’lláh about God’s attribute of singleness, it and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá accordingly affirm should be noted that there are some God’s essential and absolute oneness, statements from Avicenna on God’s in addition to Their explicit references simplicity that may not be explicitly Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 39
mentioned by Bahá’u’lláh or ‘Abdu’l- throughout the Bahá’í Writings. Bahá. These include Avicenna’s deduc- But a question remains. Clearly, tion that in God there can be no dis- there can be no multiplicity within the tinction between His essence and His Necessarily Existent, but has it been existence—that He just is His being. shown there is one thing, and one thing What Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá only, that is necessarily existent of it- do state unequivocally is that God is self? This, of course, is a vital question the Necessarily Existent and absolutely for the monotheism of Avicenna and one and simple, there being in Him no Bahá’u’lláh, and it is hence to the at- multiplicity and division, and that His tribute of singleness that we must now attributes are one with His essence. The turn. potential absence of an explicit state- ment on such matters as the identity of S God’s essence with His existence does not imply, however, that They do not The singleness of the Necessarily Exis- uphold its truth, for it follows logically tent means that there is not, and cannot from what Bahá’u’lláh says of God’s be, more than one necessarily existent necessity, essential existence, and sim- being, and that it is unique and com- plicity, His oneness in essence and at- pletely without like or peer. Avicenna’s tributes. As discussed above, to be nec- demonstration that the Necessarily essarily existent logically implies being Existent is single in this sense follows incomposite and simple at the deepest from its necessity and simplicity. We level, that of having a complete unity have seen that the Necessarily Existent of essence and existence. It is thus that is nothing other than its own neces- Bahá’u’lláh uses the term “essential sary existence, without parts, various permanence or existence” (baqáy-i- discrete attributes, incidental features, dhátí) with reference to God. In sum, or potentiality of any kind. How then if this existence is essential to God and could there be more than one? For Avi- thus an essential attribute, and if God’s cenna reasons in chapter twenty-two of attributes are identical to His simple the Dánishnámih’s “Metaphysics” that essence, it follows that Bahá’u’lláh if there were more than one being with upholds Avicenna’s position that God the attribute of necessary existence— is the Necessarily Existent whose say two—then each one would have essence is His existence. If God’s es- to have some additional characteris- sence were not His existence, His ex- tic that the other did not have. There istence would not be essential to Him would have to be something that dis- and would therefore proceed from an tinguished one from the other, so they external cause—making Him a con- could be considered multiple instanti- tingent being. Avicenna’s argument, ations of the same nature; otherwise, therefore, illuminates the importance they would be identical. For example, of the statements on divine simplicity two human beings are distinguished 40 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
from each other by virtue of the fact the Necessarily Existent, and the Nec- that each one is capable of evincing essarily Existent would thus have to be a plurality of attributes, qualities, and a composite of actual and potential ex- incidental features. One is standing in istence—existence as it is in itself and position a, the other in position b; one existence as caused by another. In this is six feet tall, the other is five feet; case, it would be a composite being, and so on. Although each person has and any composite being is only con- the same human nature, each one rep- tingently existent, in being dependent resents a separate and distinct instanti- on parts, as has been shown. Thus, as ation of that nature. Existence, in other Avicenna points out in chapter sev- words, is imparted to the same human en of Book One in ash-Shifá, there is essence in two discrete instances. simply nothing by virtue of which one But because the Necessarily Exis- necessarily existent being could be dif- tent is absolutely simple and necessary ferent from another—each, being only in all aspects, one necessarily existent simple existence, would be perfectly being would be identical to another in indistinguishable and thus identical. every respect; one would have no es- Therefore, it is simply incoherent to sential attribute the other did not itself say there could be more than one nec- possess. Each would be immaterial, as essarily existent entity. was shown in the previous section, so Moreover, since the essence of the neither could occupy a different posi- Necessarily Existent just is its exis- tion in space. Both would be wholly tence, it follows that same essence actual, so one could not have a poten- could not have more than one instantia- tial feature the other did not have. And tion of existence. Since the essence of a since no necessarily existent being can contingent being is not its existence, it be a composite of multiple attributes, can be made existent in more than one neither could possess an attribute be- instance, just as there are many human sides necessary existence the other did beings, water molecules, trees, and not possess. As a result, there can be so forth. But the Necessarily Existent only one necessarily existent being. does not have an essence distinct from And since, as shown in the previous its own existence, and so the single es- section, the Necessarily Existent is sence could only have one existence, necessary in every aspect and is sheer for it is identical to that existence. On actuality with no potentials, it is im- account of these and other reasons, possible for it to have any incidental there can only be one necessarily ex- or contingent attribute (such as place, istent being. position, quantity, quality, or time) by Therefore, when Avicenna speaks of which it could be distinguished from the sum of contingent causes needing another necessarily existent being. For an external, necessarily existent cause, such an incidental attribute, in order to it could not be objected that there arise, would require a cause external to could, even in principle, be a number Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 41
of necessarily existent beings sustain- He is, and hath from everlasting ing the contingent world. There is but been, one and alone, without peer one absolute reality, then, which con- or equal, eternal in the past, eter- currently sustains the entire contingent nal in the future, detached from all structure of being, and which imparts things, ever-abiding, unchange- existence to it absolutely and inex- able, and self-subsisting. He hath haustibly. It is as though there is but assigned no associate unto Him- one spring from which all the waters self in His Kingdom, no counselor of being flow, or but one root by which to counsel Him, none to compare all the branches of existence are sus- unto Him, none to rival His glory. tained. The oneness and singleness of To this every atom of the universe the Necessarily Existent is accordingly beareth witness, and beyond it the a logical consequence of its necessity, inmates of the realms on high, they its simplicity and the identity of its es- that occupy the most exalted seats, sence and its existence. There is noth- and whose names are remembered ing like it, for all other things are con- before the Throne of Glory. tingently existent and have being only Bear thou witness in thine in- derivatively, and thus are much more most heart unto this testimony like one another than they could ever which God hath Himself and for resemble that absolute source of all Himself pronounced, that there being. Avicenna, through this means, is is none other God but Him, that able not only to infer the existence of all else besides Him have been that divine reality transcendent above created by His behest, have been nature, but also to affirm that such an fashioned by His leave, are subject ultimate reality must be absolutely one to His law, are as a thing forgotten and single, unique and matchless. The when compared to the glorious central claim of all monotheistic faiths evidences of His oneness, and are is thus rigorously upheld by the ratio- as nothing when brought face to nal philosophy of Avicenna—that there face with the mighty revelations is only one God, incomparable, single, of His unity. (Gleanings 192–93; and peerless. Muntakhabátí 75–76) This claim, too, is central to the Faith of Bahá’u’lláh. There is hardly And what Bahá’u’lláh declares in the any work by Him that does not stress, poetic strains of the prophet, Avicen- with the unshakable conviction of na reiterates in the sober tones of the certitude, the oneness of God and the philosopher: incomparable, the transcendent nature of His being. Bahá’u’lláh thus affirms, It has thus been established for in a representative instance, the single- you that there is something nec- ness of God as a natural concomitant of essarily existent. Likewise, it has His divine nature: been shown that the Necessarily 42 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
Existent is one. He is thus sin- the Necessarily Existent is simply nec- gle; nothing shares with Him His essary existence and actual being, with station, and nothing else is nec- no other part existing contingently or essarily existent. He alone, there- potentially, or in any way involving fore, is the principle by which contingency or potentiality, and since the existence of all other things any change involves the actualization is necessitated, whether directly of a potential or the realization of a or through an intermediary cause. contingency through some agent, it And since the existence of all oth- follows that there could be no change er things proceeds from Him, He in the Necessarily Existent. Any such is the First. By “first” we do not change would require an external mean an attribute additional to His cause conditioning some potential as- necessity, such that the necessity pect or part of the Necessarily Existent. of His existence becomes multi- Its complete necessity and simplicity, ple. Rather, we mean that He is the however, make this strictly impossible. First in the sense of how all other Avicenna writes: things stand in relation to Him. (ash-Shifá 274) Whatever admits of change must also admit of having a cause, of I being in one condition by virtue of a certain cause, or lacking that The simplicity and singleness of the condition by virtue of another Necessarily Existent distinguishes it as cause. The being of such a thing utterly unlike any contingent being and is not clear of association with transcendent above the entire order of those two causes, and its being the contingent realm. And among the would therefore make up a com- attributes and inherent conditions of posite conditioned by causes. But contingent beings is change and al- we have previously shown that teration, becoming and perishing. But the Necessarily Existent is not a since the Necessarily Existent has no composite being of any kind in as- likeness to contingent beings and con- sociation with causes. Therefore, tingent attributes, it cannot admit of it is not capable of any change. any alteration, or be receptive to any (Dánishnámih 376) change. Avicenna’s proof for the immutabil- That is, in order for the Necessarily Ex- ity of the Necessarily Existent in the istent to change, there would have to Dánishnámih is remarkably brief, but be some aspect or part of its reality that since he has previously established its was not necessary in itself but rather necessity and simplicity, its immutabil- contingent upon being actualized by ity need only be shown to be logically some external cause. Such a being, entailed by those two notions. Since however, would not be the Necessarily Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 43
Existent, which is absolutely simple and that God whom He has affirmed to not a composite of actual and potential be necessarily existent. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá existence. The Necessarily Existent is thus validates the logical method un- therefore immutable and unchanging. derlying Avicenna’s own conclusion. The immutability of the Neces- Avicenna’s method, in turn, elucidates sarily Existent, and hence of God, is the rational structure of the Bahá’í likewise affirmed by Bahá’u’lláh and theological claim—a trend observed ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá states ex- throughout this paper. plicitly and decisively: Of course, to say that the Neces- sarily Existent is unchanging is not to For the essence of the Godhead imply that it is stagnant, lacking need- there is no ascent or descent, no ed activity or dynamism. Rather, it is entrance or egress. It is sanctified itself the sheer act of being, and thus of from time and place. It is ever in unbounded vitality and life. For there the apex of sanctity, for change to be any alteration in the Necessarily and alteration are impossible Existent, therefore, would mean for it for the reality of the Godhead. to quit its station as the ultimate reality, Change and alteration and motion the ground for all dynamism in the con- from one condition to another are tingent realm. And it is only because it incidents particular to contingent is the unchanging and absolute ground and originated phenomena. (Kh- of being that it can sustain the chang- iṭábát-i-ʻAbdu’l-Bahá 2:131–32, ing realm of contingent becoming. The provisional translation) Necessarily Existent is not stagnant, then, but rather constant, and in that Indeed, change is a fundamental fea- constancy any change would constitute ture of the contingent world, the realm no added virtue, but would rather sig- of becoming, and thus is far removed nify a deficiency commensurate with from the Necessarily Existent, which that of the realm which it sustains and is absolute being without any aspect supports. of becoming. Any change, moreover, Bahá’u’lláh accordingly proclaims: is dependent on what already is, and “Praise be to God, the Eternal that therefore only absolute, immutable be- perisheth not, the Everlasting that de- ing could be the ultimate ground and clineth not, the Self-Subsisting that support of the changing realm of con- altereth not (Al-Báqí bi lá faná’, ad- tingent beings. The vital point here is Dá’im bi lá zavál, al-Qá’im bi lá in- that ‘Abdu’l-Bahá not only asserts the tiqál)” (Epistle 1; Lawḥ-i-ibn-i-Dhi’b immutable nature of God; He argues 1). He is báqí and thus abides forever, for God’s immutability by noting that bi lá faná’, without death. He is dá’im mutability is foreign to God precisely and thus perpetual and constant, bi because it is characteristic of contin- lá zavál, without decline, corruption, gent beings and thus impossible for or extinction. He is qá’im and thus 44 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
subsists dependent on no other, bi lá being, the immutability, the constancy intiqál, without change or alteration. of what is truly God. As such, eternal is one of the various senses of the word E qadím that Avicenna applies to the Necessarily Existent. In the Dánish- The Necessarily Existent is thus im- námih he explains that the Necessarily mutable. However, it is also common- Existent alone has the full possession ly understood that God is eternal, and of qidam, eternality; for anything that this is asserted by Bahá’u’lláh without exists through the sustaining power reservation. Indeed, when we consider of something beyond itself, even if it the Necessarily Existent, we see that had always contingently existed in this eternality is entailed in the very con- manner, is in the realm of origination, cept of necessary existence. For what- of ḥudúth (382–83). Accordingly, the ever exists necessarily of itself, and Necessarily Existent, dependent on no is immutable, must also exist without other, alone has what the sixth-centu- beginning or end, and is not subject ry philosopher Boethius eloquently to the passage of time, being beyond defined eternality as: “the possession any measure of motion and change. of endless life whole and perfect at a The Necessarily Existent never began single moment” (Book 5, ch. 6). to exist, and it can never fail to exist. As to Bahá’u’lláh, He repeatedly Moreover, there can be no change in affirms the eternality of God, in one the condition of its existence, and time place writing: “One and indivisible, thus has no hold or power over its He hath ever subsisted within His sta- unchangeable reality. There is no mo- tion sanctified from all time and place” tion for the Necessarily Existent, and (Má’idiy-i-Ásmání 7:8, provisional so within it there can be no difference translation). To say that the Necessar- between the past, the present, and the ily Existent is sanctified from place, it future. No alteration or finality awaits being immaterial and thus not extended it, just as no origination or beginning in three dimensions (since that would precedes it. require it to be composite), likewise In it there is rather an everlasting affirms one of Avicenna’s theological present of the fullness of its existence. arguments, but what is important here The present that belongs to it is one is Bahá’u’lláh’s affirmation that God is of constancy, permanence, unceasing sanctified from zamán, or time. He is actuality, and absolute being; it is a thus eternal, entirely unbound by the present that consists in a timeless and temporal-spatial conditions of con- immutable act of existence, a present tingent beings. Though Bahá’u’lláh’s that has no likeness to the temporal references to God’s eternality are too order of the contingent realm. Eter- numerous to quote adequately here, we nality, then, in a word sums up the may again consider His statement that necessary existence, the transcendent “there can be no tie of direct intercourse Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 45
to bind the one true God with His cre- A human being, to use Avicenna’s ation, and no resemblance whatever example, admits of imperfection, “for can exist between the transient (ḥádith) many things,” he writes, “among the and the Eternal (qadím), the contingent perfections of his existence are defi- (mumkin) and the Absolute (vájib)” cient in him” (ash-Shifá 283). That (Gleanings 66; Majmúʻiy-i-Alváḥ-i- is, there are many things requisite for Mubárakih 340). the complete flourishing of a human being that exist only potentially and P not actually or necessarily, and their actualization not only requires some- In the foregoing pages, we have seen thing outside that person but also may that the Necessarily Existent must be simply fail to occur, in which case he simple, single, immutable, and eter- or she would suffer sheer imperfection nal. By logical extension, then, it is and deficiency. Such things as sound- ultimate, incomparable, absolute, un- ness of health, prosperity, education, changeable, everlasting, and the source virtue, and love are needed for human of all other reality. Such attributes alone life and existence to be complete, or and in themselves distinguish it above perfect in the relevant sense. But a hu- all other things. Through an under- man being depends on external causes standing of what necessary existence for these things or may altogether fail logically entails, therefore, we see that to achieve them, and furthermore may divinity may well be rightly ascribed to lose them in time. No human being, the Necessarily Existent. But its divine nor any other contingent being, can be character will be much more evident perfect in any essential sense, for in once its subsequent attributes, starting and of themselves human beings do not with perfection, are established. even have existence, this having been Avicenna states, in chapter six of acquired through external causes, and Book Eight of ash-Shifá’s “Metaphys- thus they are deficient and imperfect in ics,” that the Necessarily Existent is themselves. perfect, and that perfection follows But the Necessarily Existent, being from its necessary being. Not only is in itself pure existence and fully actual it perfect; its perfection transcends the without any potential remaining to be kind achievable by any contingent be- actualized, is támm al-vujúd, “com- ing. For Avicenna, perfection (kamál plete and perfect in its existence.” It or tamám) refers to completeness and needs nothing and depends on nothing actuality, as opposed to deficiency and in order to enjoy that fullness of being, unrealized potentiality. For something and there is no higher state of actuali- to be perfect, then, means that it is ty which it might attain. Therefore, in complete and free from deficiency in it there can be no lack or deficiency, respect to what it is and what is proper no unrealized potential or possibility, to its existence. for that would assume that there is 46 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
something proper to it and needed by and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. We may recall, in it that it does not already have by itself this connection, Bahá’u’lláh’s state- and necessarily of itself. Such cannot ments in the Lawḥ-i-Basíṭ al-Ḥaqíqat, be said of the Necessarily Existent, which was discussed in the section on which is itself independent, subsistent “Simplicity.” In that work, Bahá’u’lláh being, single and without parts. But mirrors Avicenna’s own phrases, such not only is it perfect in itself; it is, in a as “the perfections of being,” when the certain sense, fawq at-tamám, “above latter writes that the Necessarily Ex- perfection.” “For not only does He pos- istent is “complete and perfect in His sess His own being,” writes Avicenna, existence, for there is nothing deficient “but the existence of every being itself in Him in respect to His being and the flows from the abundance of His being, perfections of His being.” Bahá’u’lláh belongs to Him, and emanates from states: Him” (ash-Shifá 283). The Necessarily Existent, therefore, Thou hast written that an inquir- has a transcendental perfection, for by er hath asked for an explanation it is the being of all other things created of the statement of the philoso- and sustained, and their own contingent phers, “the Simple Reality is all perfection realized and made manifest. things.” Say: Know that the mean- There can be no limit or deficiency to ing of ‘things’ in this connection its being, and thus it is perfect and the is nothing else but existence and source of all perfections in the realm of the perfections of existence qua contingent existence. In addition, inso- existence, while the meaning of far as it is immutable, the Necessarily ‘all’ is the possessor thereof. This Existent could never become some- ‘all’ admits of no division and of thing less than it is, and could thus no parts. Thus, the Simple Reality, never suffer, even theoretically, any because it is simple in all aspects, deficiency or lack. Its perfection, there- is the possessor and totality of all fore, is inviolable, supreme, and truly limitless perfections, as it hath necessary, while that of a contingent been said, “there is no limit to His being is quite naturally only possibly handiwork.” (Má’idiy-i-Ásmání existent, corruptible, and conditioned. 7:140) Perfection in the full sense of the word, then, not only applies to the Necessar- Here we see how Bahá’u’lláh uses the ily Existent but is also more truly said phrase “perfections of being,” as Avi- of it than anything else, for it is, in a cenna himself does. This shared usage meaningful sense, perfection itself. points to the fact that both Bahá’u’lláh Such, at least, is the basic sense in and Avicenna are explaining a congru- which Avicenna regards the Necessari- ent concept of God, a God of absolute ly Existent as perfect, and this concept and necessary being, who is transcen- is explicitly affirmed by Bahá’u’lláh dental perfection, and the indivisible Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 47
source of all perfections in His cre- with the theology of Bahá’u’lláh, is ation. His perfection is His being, and not possible here. Nonetheless, we can His being His perfection. analyze the basic reasoning behind ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, too, affirms the per- Avicenna’s ascription of goodness to fection of God and even God’s identity the Necessarily Existent, and consider with his perfection. In chapter twen- how this further aligns his theological ty-seven of Mufávaḍát or Some An- vision with that of the Bahá’í Writings. swered Questions, He states definitive- Since Avicenna works within the ly that “God is pure perfection and the Aristotelian philosophical tradition creation is absolute imperfection,” God and accepts its basic postulates (such being, in other words, kamál-i-maḥḍ or as the role of actuality and potential- absolute perfection, and the contingent ity, form and matter, the four causes, world nuqṣán-i-ṣirf or sheer deficien- etc.), Aristotle’s account of the good is cy. Moreover, He remarks there that indispensable in illuminating Avicen- “the contingent world is the source of na’s own position. In the Nicomachean deficiencies and God is the source of Ethics, Aristotle, after having rejected perfection. The very deficiencies of the Platonic account, considers how the contingent world testify to God’s the good is said of many things, and perfections.” that it thus does not have a single, or From these passages, it is evident univocal, meaning. A man is good, a that the Bahá’í Writings affirm the horse is good, a meal is good, and so rational basis of Avicenna’s insistence on, but the respective goodness of each that God, since He is unconditioned is not identical in meaning, but of a being, must also be absolute perfection. different character. Nonetheless, there The Necessarily Existent is perfect, is an analogous relationship among and it is, in a sense, perfection itself by these respective goods. The good, in virtue of its absolute and incorruptible every case, is what is sought. How- being. ever, among goods there are those that are desirable in themselves, and G those sought rather as a means to oth- er things. So the goodness of a meal Goodness is no less a divine attribute is as a means to nourishment and also than perfection, however, and so we by virtue of the pleasure it affords. But must consider whether the Necessarily Aristotle singles out eudaimonia— Existent is good, insofar as the good is happiness, flourishing, or living well— linked with the monotheistic concep- as that which is desirable in itself for tion of God. Yet since the good is such human beings; it is sought as an end an equivocal term, applied in different and not as a means to other goods, and ways to different things, an exhaustive is thus the highest good of human life. treatment of the good in Avicenna’s From this point, Aristotle proceeds to philosophy, and its correspondence analyze what constitutes eudaimonia, 48 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
and settles on a life lived in accord being. Thus, being, in fact, is what with reason that evinces fundamental is sought. Being, therefore, is pure virtues. The human good, therefore, is good and absolute perfection. To a manner of life that actualizes or per- wit, the good, in general, is that fects the inherent potentials of human which everything seeks within its existence. own limit, and that by which its This is not the place to explicate Ar- existence is made complete. Evil, istotle’s ethical theory. What is vital for conversely, has no definite es- our purposes is his notion that some- sence. It is rather the privation of thing that is sought may be termed a substance, or the privation of a good, especially that which is sought substance’s wholeness and integri- for its own sake, for every living thing ty. Being, accordingly, is goodness, has its fundamental end in the flourish- and the perfection of being is the ing condition of its own being. In addi- goodness of being. And that Being tion to this notion, in Avicenna’s writ- which is untouched by privation, ing we find affirmed the Neoplatonic neither the privation of substance idea that evil does not in itself have any nor that of something belonging to positive existence but, rather, it is lack substance, but which is rather per- and deficiency—the privation of being petually in actuality—that Being and of its perfections, even as blindness is pure good. A contingent being is a privation in the eye, as Plotinus ex- in its essence is not pure good, be- plains in the Enneads (1.8.9). The good cause its essence, simply by virtue is thus the eminent presence of some- of itself, does not have existence. thing, of being and perfection, insofar Its essence, therefore, is subject to as the latter are desired for their own privation, and that which is sub- sake. With these two notions in mind, ject to privation in a certain sense we can consider what Avicenna writes is not clear in every aspect from in ash-Shifá regarding the goodness of evil and deficiency. Therefore, ab- the Necessarily Existent: solute good is nothing other than the Necessarily Existent in its es- The Necessarily Existent, in its es- sence. (283–84) sence, is pure good. For the good, in general, is that which all things Thus, for Avicenna, the Necessarily desire, and that which all things Existent is pure good in itself, insofar desire is being, or that perfection as it is pure being and absolute perfec- of being which accords with the tion, which is precisely what is sought manner of a thing’s existence. as the good by every being, insofar as Nothing desires privation as such, every being seeks its own flourishing, but only insofar as the nonexis- and for its potentials of life to be ac- tence of a certain thing is condu- tualized in ever greater stages of per- cive to being and the perfection of fection. Furthermore, the Necessarily Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 49
Existent is pure good insofar as in it an inevitable feature of anything that there is no privation or deficiency, and exists contingently, for such a being thus in it there can be no evil, which is does not, in itself, have existence, and the privation of the good. thus is necessarily subject to the priva- But the Necessarily Existent is also tion of being and imperfection.14 good in the sense that all other good Regrettably, it is outside the scope proceeds from it. It is good, therefore, of this essay to give the full Avicennian not only when considered in itself, but answer to the so-called problem of also in its effects. Avicenna writes: evil. It is sufficient to describe, in sum, how Avicenna affirms the goodness of Good is also said of that which God: first, by identifying the good with bestows the perfections of things being and perfection; second, by show- and their virtues. Now, it is evi- ing that the Necessarily Existent is ab- dent that the Necessarily Existent solute being and perfection, and hence must be, by its very essence, that pure good; and third, by demonstrating which bestows existence onto all that it is the cause and source of all oth- things, and that by which the per- er being and perfection, and hence only fection of anything is realized. It the cause of good, insofar as evil is not is good, therefore, in this aspect as a created thing but merely the inevita- well, even as within it there is no ble privation of existence inherent to deficiency or lack. (ash-Shifá 284) any contingently existent being. Significantly, these notions of In Avicenna’s view, if good is properly the good are readily affirmed by said of being and its perfection, then Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. In the Necessarily Existent is supremely Mufávaḍát (184) or Some Answered good insofar as it, in its essence, is pure Questions (304), ‘Abdu’l-Bahá gives being and sheer perfection. Further- His full support to the Neoplatonic more, it is by the Necessarily Existent account of evil as privation and, after that any other thing has existence, and giving a summation and defense of its it is by it that the existence of any thing central premise, concludes: is made complete, such as when an acorn grows into an oak tree, or an in- Whatsoever God has created, He fant into an adult. In it there is no evil, has created good. Evil consists no deficiency, no lack, no imperfection. Evil, similarly, does not proceed from 14 In this connection, moral as op- it. Evil, instead, is something without posed to natural evil may be analyzed as a any positive existence or essence. It corruption or imperfection of the will con- operates as the privation of being and trary to the objective good and flourishing imperfection in a thing, such as when of human nature. Though there are evil decomposition results in the death of actions, they spring from corruptions or im- an organic being. But this evil is merely perfections of human nature and result from having a damaged or disordered character. 50 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
merely in non-existence. For ex- In any case, it is implicit in ample, death is the absence of life: Bahá’u’lláh’s presentation of God that When man is no longer sustained God is wholly good. The goodness by the power of life, he dies. Dark- of God, consisting in His perfect and ness is the absence of light: When inexhaustible being, is expressed in light is no more, darkness reigns. personal terms, even as Bahá’u’lláh re- Light is a positively existing thing, peatedly emphasizes the utter transcen- but darkness has no positive ex- dence of God. On this latter theme, He istence; it is merely its absence. writes: Likewise, wealth is a positively existing thing but poverty is mere- In truth, no praise or mention of ly its absence. God—how exalted is His majesty, It is thus evident that all evil is how universal is His grace—can mere non-existence. Good has a ever befit Him. For the way is positive existence; evil is merely barred that leadeth to His unap- its absence. proachable sanctuary; the path is obstructed that endeth in that in- ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, here and in the sur- accessible Secret, that Mystery of rounding context of the passage, affirms mysteries. What is the concourse of the Avicennian account of goodness as the visible set against the sanctum convertible with being and perfection, of that invisible Essence? What and agrees that evil consists merely in way can reach Him or road attain its privation. Since evil is an ‘adam, an to Him? If ever the infinitesimal absence or privation of good, it has no ant could make mention of Him positive ontological reality in itself; it who is the Aim and Desire of all consequently is present in the world things, perhaps then the pen could only as an instance of non-being, de- mark down some word relating of ficiency, imperfection, corruption, or the Eternal. And if ever the mote decline. It follows, then, that God as of dust could impart any notion of the ultimate positive ontological reality the blinding splendor of the Sun, if and as perfect being is pure good, from ever the meanest drop could even Whom only good proceeds: “Whatso- suggest the full immensity of the ever God has created, He has created ocean, perhaps then human tongue good.”15 could advance some praise of the Best Beloved of the worlds . . . 15 Incidentally, neither Avicenna’s but thou knowest full well that the nor ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s statements on evil invisible Essence is sanctified of, entail that there is “no such thing” as evil. transcendent above, and removed Although metaphysically evil is non-be- ing and imperfection, it is a feature in the world in the same sense that there are such on. Though these things are not substances, things as blindness, darkness, death, as so they can be meaningfully referred to. Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 51
from all in the realm of the visible. mindless principle, devoid of con- (qtd. in Dávúdí 85, provisional sciousness. Avicenna, like Bahá’u’lláh, translation) describes the Necessarily Existent as having munificence and supreme But even as God, according to generosity; for Avicenna, He is indeed Bahá’u’lláh, ultimately transcends the javvád, all-bountiful and munificent. knowledge and descriptions of His This characterizes the goodness of the creation, He nonetheless is the “Aim Necessarily Existent, which consists and Desire of all things” and the “Best in how it bestows existence onto all Beloved of the worlds,” and thus the things, as an intelligent and voluntary ultimate object of desire and love— act, done not for the sake of itself but the highest good. For as pure being for the good of created things. It is, fur- itself, He is Himself that paradigm of thermore, difficult to conceive some- perfection for which all things long, thing as God that itself is devoid of any and as the source of all existence, He knowledge. Therefore, if the Necessar- is that inexhaustible wellspring from ily Existent is to be regarded as divine, which all conceivable good proceeds. it must have intellect and volition, Since God is the source of all being and a goodness consonant therewith. and therefore of all good, Bahá’u’lláh We will thus consider how Avicenna stresses His loving kindness, His mer- deduces the intellectual nature of the cy, and His providence, and it is in Necessarily Existent, and further cor- these personal terms that He expresses relate his views with the teachings of the supreme goodness that is God. He Bahá’u’lláh. writes, as quoted earlier, that God “res- cuing” all things “from the abasement I of remoteness and the perils of ultimate extinction . . . hath received them into Though the attribute of simplicity was His kingdom of incorruptible glory. paramount in showing the ultimate Nothing short of His all-encompassing and incomparable nature of the God of grace, His all-pervading mercy, could Bahá’u’lláh and Avicenna, it is in the have possibly achieved it. How could attribute of intellect and knowledge it, otherwise, have been possible for that the fullness of His divine nature is sheer nothingness to have acquired by revealed. For without such a thing as in- itself the worthiness and capacity to tellect, the Necessarily Existent, how- emerge from its state of non-existence ever supreme, would seem to amount into the realm of being?” (Gleanings to some kind of force requisite for the 64; Majmúʻiy-i-Alváḥ-i-Mubárakih existence of all things, but which itself 338). could not be meaningfully regarded as But if God’s goodness is spoken of God. If Avicenna’s God were such as in terms of generosity, munificence, this, however, it could not be identical mercy and love, then He cannot be a to the omniscient God of Bahá’u’lláh. 52 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
To consider Avicenna’s Necessarily Necessarily Existent, however, is rath- Existent as void of consciousness, er the transcendent cause of all physi- however, would be a grave mistake. cal systems and contingent entities and The attributes of necessity, simplicity, thus cannot be construed as something singleness, immutability, eternality, existent within such systems or as de- perfection, and goodness all together scriptive of them. point to a reality that is not unknow- The Necessarily Existent, therefore, ing and uncomprehending, but which is not a body or any corporeal reality; in its very nature is all-knowing and it has no mass or dimension, location all-encompassing in its comprehen- or position, shape or delimitation, nor sion, which is itself pure consciousness is it the activity and operation of things and intellect, and which consequently exhibiting such attributes. Its being al- is eminently worthy of the term divine. together transcends material realities, Avicenna’s demonstration of the while being their ultimate cause. If, intellective nature of the Necessarily then, the Necessarily Existent is not Existent is brief, but he bases his argu- matter, could it be mind? According ment from prior principles in his theory to Avicenna, simply by virtue of tran- of the faculties of the mind. In chapter scending matter and all material attri- six of Book Eight of ash-Shifá’s “Meta- butes, it could be nothing else except physics,” he points out that the Neces- ‘aql-i-maḥḍ, pure intellect. Although sarily Existent is wholly immaterial, this might not seem immediately intu- and that its existence is disassociated itive, to recognize the Necessarily Ex- from matter in every respect. We saw istent’s nature as intellect is inevitable the reasons for this in the discussion once its radical immateriality is con- of the earlier attributes, especially sim- sidered in juxtaposition with its other plicity, for if the Necessarily Existent essential attributes. Incidentally, that were a corporeal entity, it would be a the Necessarily Existent is immaterial substance extended in three dimen- in itself has profound implications for sions. It consequently would be com- one’s worldview, for if the Necessarily posed of matter and some form to actu- Existent does exist, then materialism alize the potentiality of that matter into is false; if materialism is false, then a realized kind and arrangement. This explanations of reality, and especially would characterize it as a contingent mind, need not, and should not, be con- entity, however, which is impossible fined to what exists in matter. for the Necessarily Existent. A modern If, then, the Necessarily Existent person, moreover, could not construe is immaterial, how should it be de- the Necessarily Existent as energy of scribed? Among immaterial things, some kind, for the concept of energy there are indeed concepts and abstrac- simply refers to the work or activity tions that the human mind conceives exhibited in and by physical systems, after considering the universal essence which are contingent entities. The of a thing, such as humanity, as distinct Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 53
from its instantiation in particular house; the intelligible form of a horse physical manifestations, such as indi- cannot win a race. The Necessarily Ex- vidual human beings. Such concepts, istent, however, is a cause in actuality for Avicenna, would constitute form and supremely so. It, therefore, cannot that is not joined with matter, form be some inert, immaterial idea. It must, which exists not concretely as a partic- then, be pure intellect, unbounded ular but in an intellect as a universal. by the realm of contingent, material But the Necessarily Existent cannot existence.16 be a mere intelligible form conceived In addition, the reader may recall by a contingent mind, for then it could from the section on “Simplicity” that not be the ultimate cause of all exis- the Necessarily Existent is not distinct tence. What is more, Avicenna rejects from its act of being; it is pure actuali- the Platonist notion that abstractions, ty. Therefore, this act of the Necessari- such as “the Beautiful,” “the True,” ly Existent is one of immaterial being. and “the Equal,” exist independently What, then, is the actuality, the act and of concrete reality or any intellects to action, the mode of existence proper to conceive of them, and any such thing, a wholly immaterial reality? The only consequently, could not be the Neces- immaterial action conceivable is intel- sarily Existent. It follows for Avicenna, lection, knowing and understanding then, that the Necessarily Existent, in as opposed to sensing and physically being wholly immaterial, must be pure perceiving. If intellection is the only intellect. This follows because it could act proper to something immaterial, not be a mere ma‘qúl, an intelligible the Necessarily Existent must be pure reality, dependent on or subsisting intellect, insofar as there is nothing within an intellect. The Necessarily material in its being. Existent, therefore, must be a fully in- Furthermore, the Necessarily Ex- dependent ‘áqil or agent of intellection istent is the creator and source of all and knowledge. It is, in the perfection things, which possesses all the “per- of its immaterial being, a comprehend- fections of being” unitedly in a simple ing reality rather than a comprehended way. The infinite creative power that object. originates and sustains all contingent Avicenna’s conclusion may be existence cannot be reduced to any one further defended by pointing out that immaterial form that does not itself immaterial realities could conceivably possess, in a higher way of pure unity, include either intelligible forms—uni- all the perfections present in the exis- versals and abstract objects—or minds tence of the fathomlessly vast cosmos. and intellects. But things within the But Divine Intellect conceivably could former category of immaterial reality comprehend all the perfections of being seem causally inert: the number 100 does not put a hundred dollars in one’s pocket; the idea of blue cannot paint a 16 A point familiar to some contem- porary theistic philosophers; see Craig. 54 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
immaterially, through an act of perfect God immediately knows Himself, and intellection, and thus be the source of is thus conscious of Himself in the full- their realization in the contingent order ness of His being. As Avicenna states of existence. The Necessarily Existent, in chapter twenty-nine of the Dánish- therefore, could not be an immaterial námih’s “Metaphysics,” what makes reality, like a mathematical abstraction, something intelligible, as opposed to which in itself is bereft of knowledge sensible, is that it be abstracted from and consciousness, but must be pure matter and its concomitants. When intellect enacting perfect knowledge form actualizes matter, the resulting be- and comprehension. ing exists materially and is perceivable Thus, by virtue of its absolute im- by the senses; it is extended in three di- materiality, Avicenna regards the Nec- mensions, and can be seen, felt, tasted, essarily Existent as ‘aql-i-maḥḍ, pure smelled, and heard. But when some- intellect. At this stage, the justification thing is apprehended by the intellect, for Avicenna’s characterizing the Nec- the form is considered separate from a essarily Existent as divine, as truly material instantiation, and thus is intel- God, stands ever more revealed. For ligible, but not sensible. The concept, what, other than God, could the Neces- say, of food is not sensible; it can be sarily Existent be—that supreme intel- thought of as an abstract concept, but lect which is the self-subsistent cause it cannot be smelled or tasted. In order, and creator of all things, that source then, for something to be grasped by which is absolutely one, incomparable, the intellect, it must be removed from unique, eternal, immutable, perfect, matter and considered as an abstracted and wholly good? One may question form. An intellect, therefore, in being the actual existence of this reality, but immaterial and removed from matter is one cannot question that it deserves the immediately known to itself, for there name God. For the Necessarily Exis- is no impediment, no matter, that could tent, in being pure intellect, cannot be obstruct direct self-apprehension. a mere what, but is properly a who in Hence, God knows Himself. He the fullest significance of that word. As is at once knower, ‘áqil, and the ob- such, for the sake of brevity, the Neces- ject of His knowledge, ma‘qúl. Of sarily Existent will henceforth be called course, God is absolutely simple, so God interchangeably and referred to as God as the knower and as the known He. Being immaterial, God, of course, is identical; there is not one aspect of is not a body and thus free of sex and Him that knows and another that is gender; nonetheless, in being intellect, known. In knowing Himself, the in- God cannot properly be referred to as tellect that knows is identical to the an it, for that would imply He is void intellect that is known. Furthermore, of mind. since God has no parts, His essential But if God is pure intellect, what does being cannot be distinct from His act He intellect? According to Avicenna, of knowledge, so He is also the very Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 55
act of self-apprehending intellection; to attribute imperfection to Him, it He is knower, known, and knowing all is likewise improper to ascribe to at once and in perfect unity—intellect, Him multiple acts of intellection. intellection, and intelligible. So God, Rather, the Necessarily Existent as pure and absolutely simple intellect, intellects all things in a universal is His knowledge just as much as He is fashion. And yet no particular es- His necessary existence, His simplic- capes Him: “Not even the weight ity, His singleness, His immutability, of an atom, in the heavens or on His perfection, and so forth. earth, escapes him”17 . . . In regard The nature of God’s knowledge is to how this can be, when He ap- explored to great depth in chapter six prehends His essence and appre- of ash-Shifá’s “Metaphysics,” in which hends Himself as the source of ev- Avicenna analyzes the implications of ery existent thing, He apprehends God’s knowledge. Since in God there the principles of all beings and is perfect unity, He must be identical what proceeds from them; nothing to His act of intellection; He is His whatsoever exists except insofar knowledge. His knowledge, therefore, as its existence is necessitated by must be as absolute, as necessary, as Him through a cause—as we have uncaused, and as immutable as He is shown. The confluence of these in Himself. God, then, cannot come causes results in the origination of to know something, for that would particular things. The First knows necessitate a change in His essence, these causes and their interrela- which is impossible. Nor could God tions; He thus knows the necessi- contemplate a number of separate ty of what results from them, the things in changing sequence, as human intervals of time between events, beings do, for that would degrade His and their recurrences. For it is im- simplicity. His knowledge, therefore, possible that He should know the cannot be like human knowledge inso- cause and not the necessary effect. far as it utterly transcends contingen- He thus comprehends particular cy, mutability, and multiplicity. How, things insofar as they are univer- then, could God know anything other sal. (ash-Shifá 288) than Himself? In one sense, God only knows Himself, but in knowing Him- Thus, God knows things not by sense self He knows Himself as the cause of perception, but through His perfect in- all things, and He thus knows them in tellectual knowledge of Himself as the an eternal, universal way. In describing ultimate cause of all particular things God’s knowledge and omniscience, and their necessary interactions, in be- Avicenna writes: ing the eternal source of their existence. His knowledge of all things, then, is Even as affirming a plurality of acts to the Necessarily Existent is 17 A reference to the Qur’án, 34:3. 56 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
universal and eternal, identical to His God’s attributes are identical to one an- unchanging knowledge of Himself other and to His essence—that He is ab- as the source of all things. He knows solute unity. Among the attributes that things by virtue of being their creator, Bahá’u’lláh repeatedly affirms of God, even if through secondary causes, in a of course, is His unbounded and all-en- manner very roughly analogous to how compassing knowledge, His complete a novelist knows, in a universal way, and universal wisdom. He writes of all the particulars of her novel, the ac- God in the Lawḥ-i-Madíniy-i-Tawḥíd, tions of the characters, and the neces- saying: “He is the Ever-Abiding who sary effects of those actions in the plot, perisheth not, from Whose knowledge by virtue of being the ultimate creator nothing can escape, Whose grace en- of the novel. It is in this way that Avi- compasseth all contingent being, Who cenna affirms the omniscience of God. knoweth all the secrets of men’s hearts This is not the place, however, to and everything that proceeds from explore the many implications of Avi- them” (Má’idiy-i-Ásmání 4:314, provi- cenna’s account of divine knowledge sional translation). If knowledge is an and omniscience, especially as God’s attribute of God, and if God’s attributes knowledge relates to particular things. are, as we have seen, identical to His My purpose is rather to show that Avi- Essence, then His essence is not onto- cenna demonstrates that the Necessar- logically distinct from His knowledge ily Existent is God in the full sense of or intellection any more than it is dif- divinity, by establishing that the Nec- ferent from His perfection, goodness, essarily Existent is pure intellect and or immutability. Therefore, if God es- omniscient intelligence. Had Avicenna sentially is His knowledge, it follows rejected God’s personal18 and omni- under Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings that He scient nature, the Necessarily Existent is immaterial intellect, who alone fully of his philosophy would not correlate comprehends His own being. with the God of Bahá’u’lláh. That Avi- On this theme Bahá’u’lláh states in cenna instead affirms this personal and the same Tablet: omniscient nature of God yet again indicates the theological harmony that He is the Eternal from Whom exists between Avicenna’s thought and nothing can depart, unto Whom Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings. nothing can be joined, Who is, in We saw earlier that Bahá’u’lláh val- truth, the Exalted, the Omnipotent, idates the Avicennian position that God the Supreme. Nothing but His own is simple and non-composite. As such, Essence can acknowledge His Bahá’u’lláh explicitly affirms that oneness, and nothing but His own Being can in truth recognize Him. 18 In the sense of having conscious- All that hath been originated and ness, knowledge, and intellect, not in the called into existence in this world sense of being like a contingent human hath been created only at the word person. Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 57
of His behest. None other God is within Him, His essential attribute of there but Him, the Almighty, the knowledge, would be contingent on, Munificent. (Má’idiy-i-Ásmání and in need of, other things, which is 4:314, provisional translation) impossible. But if God knows, as Avi- cenna argues, not through a contingent If, according to Bahá’u’lláh, God perception of any particular thing, but knows, is known to Himself, and is rather through a direct self-apprehen- identical to that attribute of knowl- sion of Himself as absolute existence edge in perfect oneness and simplici- and as the universal cause and source ty, it follows that Avicenna’s analysis of any kind of contingent being what- of God is correct, namely, that God is soever, who encompasses within Him- intellect, intelligible, and act of intel- self and in utter unity all perfections, lection, in absolute unity. Here we see then ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s statement is not that Bahá’u’lláh not only confirms the only intelligible but theologically nec- accuracy of Avicenna’s view; Avicen- essary, given Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings na’s analysis provides a framework by on the independent and indivisible na- which one can understand the philo- ture of God. sophical significance of Bahá’u’lláh’s Reflecting back on the attribute of own statements, insofar as Bahá’u’lláh goodness examined in the previous explicitly states that God’s attributes section, we now see how one can in- are one and identical to His essence. deed construe God’s goodness in per- This proposition from Bahá’u’lláh is sonal terms, as Bahá’u’lláh and Avi- intelligible if one accepts Avicenna’s cenna both do. This is because God’s argument that to be necessarily existent unchanging and absolute creation of all is to be immaterial, that to be immate- things, His bestowal of existence onto rial is to be intellect, and that to be in- all things, is effected by Him insofar as tellect is to have knowledge. God thus He is intellect and self-apprehending remains one, His attributes being iden- consciousness—and thus in knowledge tical to His essence and to one another. and not unwitting compulsion. Insofar, Furthermore, Avicenna’s account then, as God is pure good and sheer of God’s knowledge is in accord with, perfection, the source of all good and and even makes philosophical sense of, all perfections—and insofar as He is ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s explanation in chapter intellect—He may well be described eighty-two of Some Answered Ques- as all-bountiful and munificent. These tions that God’s knowledge is not de- terms, of course, can only be applied pendent on objects of knowledge. That to Him by analogy, for His bounty in- is, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá insists that, although finitely transcends the limitations of God has knowledge, He is not depen- human generosity. A further discussion dent on anything external to Himself of this point, however, leads us neces- in order to have that knowledge. If He sarily to the attribute of will. were thus dependent, then something 58 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
W not to will; and yet it is not incidental, for it is necessitated by its essential na- Throughout Bahá’u’lláh’s writings, ture. As to incidental acts, these occur and indeed in each of the Abrahamic when there is neither intent, nor strict religions, there is much mention of necessity, but some element of chance God’s will. It is indeed by virtue of or an incidental confluence of causes God’s having will that His creative act and potentialities, or when persons are can be construed as generous, and it is compelled to act by an external pow- by virtue of will that personal terms er or agent, and not according to their of devotion can be applied to Him. own nature or will. How, then, does Avicenna deduce the When one acts knowingly, how- attribute of will, of volition, from the ever—when one acts with an under- nature of the Necessarily Existent? In standing of the act and oneself as the this connection, it must first be noted author of that act, non-accidentally and that for neither Bahá’u’lláh nor Avi- without compulsion—then such an act, cenna can God’s will be an attribute says Avicenna, “is not devoid of will.” actually distinct from the others, on Avicenna subsequently divides willful account of His simplicity. Therefore, or voluntary actions into those done even as God’s necessity is His simplic- due to reason and knowledge, those ity, which is His immateriality, which done due to supposition (gumán), and is His intellect and knowledge, so is those due to imagination (takhayyul), God’s will, for Avicenna, identical to and it is the first that he will ascribe to His knowledge. God. A voluntary act done in accord To understand this, one may con- with knowledge, Avicenna states, is sider how Avicenna makes clear in like that of the physician or geometri- the Dánishnámih, specifically chapter cian, who applies a treatment or draws thirty-three of its “Metaphysics,” that a figure according to what they know will concerns the manner by which intellectively. an agent acts. Avicenna immediate- In regard to God, His act cannot be ly distinguishes between acts that are incidental to Him, for He has no inci- due to nature, due to will, or due to dental attributes, as we saw in the sec- “accident,” i.e. incidentally. Regarding tions “Simplicity” and “Singleness.” acts due merely to nature, one could He is purely His own essential being, present the example of the Sun, which and cannot be affected by anything illumines the earth by the necessity of whatsoever, for what He is is necessary its inherent nature; we may well pre- and immutable. Therefore, His act can- sume that the Sun does not choose to not be incidental to Him or compelled do so, nor does it understand what it or conditioned by another. Similarly, is doing, nor does it understand itself His act cannot mechanically be mere- as the agent of that effect. The Sun’s ly due to His nature, for that would action is therefore due to nature, and imply that His act could be separate Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 59
or independent from His knowledge, hand, has no needs or desires whatso- which is impossible because of His ever. Avicenna writes: simplicity. The act of God as the Nec- essarily Existent, therefore, must be We find that the Necessarily Ex- done in knowledge, for He is Himself istent, Who is perfect being, or pure intellect and comprehends Him- Who rather transcends perfection, self in the fullness of His being. He has no goal in His action, and it is thus knows that He creates all other likewise unbefitting of Him that realities, and that He ultimately causes He should know something as and sustains their existence. Likewise, being of utility to Him, such that He knows His creative act, and Himself He should desire it. (Dánishnámih as the author of that act, and moreover 394) acts without external compulsion. He therefore acts willfully and voluntari- In other words, God is complete and ly. Consequently, since God perfectly perfect self-sufficient existence. He knows and fully wills what Avicenna thus desires nothing, and has no goal or calls the “order of the good” (niẓám- aim—in human terms—which He de- i-khayr) that proceeds from Him, the sires to be realized through the creative profound and fundamentally unmerited act. His will, therefore, is not equiva- share of existence that all things receive lent to desire, for that would imply that of Him, He is the author of a voluntary there is something in God that could action of boundless generosity and be actuated by a final cause, a purpose bounty. Since He understands this, the external to Him. bestowal of being from God is a mani- Avicenna further writes in the festation of His goodness, His bounty, Dánishnámih: and His providence. To state the matter again, God, in the supremacy of His The Divine will is nothing oth- being, is not compelled by anything er than God’s knowledge of how outside of Him. The creation of the the order of the existence of all world, therefore, proceeds according to things must be, and His knowl- His volition from the superabundance edge that their existence is good, of His self-subsistent existence. though not for His sake, but rather Nonetheless, Avicenna is explicit in for themselves, for the meaning His affirmation that God’s will should of “goodness” is the existence of not be likened to human volition. Hu- everything as it must be, and the man beings have needs and entertain providence of God consists in His ends because they are not complete knowledge of how things must be, and perfect in their existence. They such as the best ordering of the will something because they desire that limbs of man and the motion of thing, and the realization of an end is the heavens. (394–95) for their own sake. God, on the other 60 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
The purpose of this passage is to state His works; that is, Avicenna’s account that, while in human beings intellect is of God’s will is in accordance with something distinct from their will for Bahá’u’lláh’s commitment to divine the things they desire, in God there is a simplicity. Avicenna is able to show complete unity of attributes. Thus, His how God’s attribute of will is really nature as pure intellect is identical with identical to His knowledge, how God’s His being a voluntary agent of His ac- knowledge consists in His intellectual tion, which is nothing else but the per- being, which in turn is His very es- fect knowledge He has in His essence sence as the Necessarily Existent. Con- of the eternal procession of existence sequently, God is one in His attributes from Him according to the “order of and essence. But if God must also be the good.” His will is His knowledge, “one in His acts,” He cannot will a and His knowing act is necessarily vol- number of particular things at particu- untary, even as there is nothing outside lar times, as conditioned by changing of Him that could compel Him, just circumstances. Therefore, as Avicenna as He has no desire or end He needs says, He wills one primary act eter- to realize that could somehow influ- nally—the very act of His self-sub- ence His action. His will, therefore, is sistent and necessary existence—and as absolute and unconditioned as His from this voluntary and intellective knowledge and essential being. act there proceeds, in a universal way Avicenna’s account of Divine will— as governed by His providence, a sin- while persuasive, coherent, and consis- gle effect: the cascading sequence of tent with his account of God’s other beings in the contingent world.19 This attributes, especially His simplicity—is universal and eternal creative act is subtle, even abstruse, and no doubt de- thus one, and is identical to God’s will serves a more comprehensive treatment and His knowledge. We see once again, of its own. The brief discussion above, therefore, how Avicenna’s analysis il- however, should suffice to ground an luminates the rational basis and philo- exploration of the theological harmony sophical content of Bahá’u’lláh’s own between Bahá’u’lláh’s and Avicenna’s statements. accounts of divine will. Third, Bahá’u’lláh moreover affirms First, both Avicenna and Bahá’u’lláh Avicenna’s notion that God has no need posit that it is proper to speak of God or desire for things outside Himself, as having will, as demonstrated by and thus He does not create the world Bahá’u’lláh’s oft-repeated statement for His own sake, out of desire. He cre- regarding God, “yaf‘alu má yashá’” ates for the good of the creature, and (He doeth whatsoever He willeth). Sec- ond, Avicenna’s account conforms to 19 How the multiple entities of the Bahá’u’lláh’s statement, discussed in world proceed from the simple being and the section on “Simplicity,” that God is unitary act of God shall be examined in the one in His essence, His attributes, and third and last part of this paper, “Creation and Cosmology.” Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 61
out of His knowledge of the order of the ment, however, of Bahá’u’lláh’s and good in the contingent realm. For God, Avicenna’s account of creation is to as we have seen, is in Himself perfect be found in the final part of this paper. being, and thus stands in need of noth- Until then, we must consider the divine ing whatsoever. In the Kitáb-i-Aqdas, attribute that will close and complete Bahá’u’lláh appeals to this fact when our discussion of God’s attributes. He says that people ought to accept the religion of God for their own benefit, I and not because He has any need of worship. “This is the changeless Faith That which is infinite must be, by defi- of God,” Bahá’u’lláh says in reference nition, not finite; it has no limitations. to His own revelation, “eternal in the The classical monotheistic conception past, eternal in the future. Let him that of God often stresses His infinity, His seeketh, attain it; and as to him that lack of any limit, whether imposed on hath refused to seek it—verily, God is His being, His knowledge, His power, Self-Sufficient, above any need of His or His goodness. The idea of each of creatures” (85–86, 173). Similarly, in the omni- attributes, whether omni- the Kitáb-i-Íqán Bahá’u’lláh states: science, omnipotence, omnipresence, “that ideal King hath, throughout eter- or omnibenevolence, thus follows nity, been in His Essence independent from divine infinity. It is thus proper of the comprehension of all beings, and to speak of how the Necessarily Exis- will continue, forever, in His own Be- tent, according to Avicenna’s positions, ing to be exalted above the adoration of must be infinite, and how Bahá’u’lláh every soul” (52–53, 34). likewise supports God’s infinitude. Thus for Bahá’u’lláh, as for Avicen- But here we should also consider how na, God could not have willed the exis- the infinite is, by extension, identical tence of the world through any need on His part, or any desire for something to know and love God. Does this contradict that would have made His existence Bahá’u’lláh’s other statements and imply more sound or complete. God already that God wanted or needed recognition is perfection, or even above perfection, or worship? That the human purpose lies fawq at-tamám. God’s creating is thus in the knowledge and recognition of God done not for Himself but for the sake does not entail, in fact, that this recognition of His creation and His knowledge of benefits Him in any way whatsoever. Rath- the order of the good that creation con- er, the duty of recognizing God is solely stitutes; hence, He is all-bountiful and for the good of the human being. Since a supremely generous.20 A fuller treat- human being is a rational animal, the high- est good of the intellect is to recognize God 20 A reader may here wonder about as the source of all being and as goodness those instances in Bahá’u’lláh’s writings, itself. Though God is above worship, the such as the Short Obligatory Prayer, in knowledge of Him is the highest good of which He says that humanity was created the beings that He created to be rational. 62 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
with the supremely transcendent, for and dimension.21 Bahá’u’lláh routinely emphasizes By the same argument, we realize the incomprehensible transcendence there is no limit to God’s power, for all of God, how He surpasses every cat- power proceeds from Him, and He de- egory of contingent existence, and rives His power from no other. Indeed, eludes any direct apprehension of His a thing has power, or the ability to act essence. in a certain way, by virtue first of ex- First, we should reflect on the in- isting and then of existing as the kind evitable conclusion that God, as the of thing it is. Both these facts, how- Necessarily Existent, submits to no ever, are contingent upon the creative physical limit. This is because He is act of God, His ceaseless bestowal of not material and has no extension in existence. God therefore has a power three dimensions. As such, God can- in Himself that knows no limitation, not have any spatial delimitation. He whereas the power of contingent be- cannot have a certain form, shape, or ings is limited by their essential con- figure, imposing on Him the limitation tingency and ontological poverty. We of being materially present in a partic- should not understand omnipotence, ular location in space. Nor could God, however, as meaning “the ability to do as discussed earlier, be physically ex- anything whatsoever,” for that, taken tended throughout all material reality, literally, is not an attribute that could enveloping and penetrating discrete be ascribed to the Necessarily Existent. objects. This would imply taking on He cannot, for instance, cease to exist the accidental qualities and limita- or choose to do so, since He just is tions of mutable, contingent realities, necessary being, nor could He in any changing with them and taking on way descend into the conditions of their multiplicity. As the immaterial, the created order; as Bahá’u’lláh says, simple, single, and necessarily exis- “the Unseen can in no wise incarnate tent cause of all contingent realities, His Essence and reveal it unto men” God cannot be conceived of in this (Gleanings 49; Muntakhabátí 19). Nor way. God accordingly is omnipresent only if “presence” does not signify 21 I must here admit that Avicenna, occupying or filling a point in space as far as I can tell, does not specifically as a body does. Rather, since what- treat the idea of God’s omnipresence in ever exists has its being from God, ash-Shifá or the Dánishnámih. But as it there is no place where the supremely was illustrative of the idea of infinitude creative, ceaselessly sustaining, and and immateriality, I here adapted one of boundless ontological power of God Thomas Aquinas’ arguments for God’s is not evident and intimately oper- omnipresence found in the Summa Theo- ative. He thus is everywhere in this logica (1:8:1–2), an argument that is fully sense, but not in the manner of occu- compatible with (perhaps even influenced pying material space and having mass by) Avicenna’s account of the Necessarily Existent’s attributes. Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 63
should we expect that God can bring omnipotent, omniscient, and so forth. logical impossibilities into being, for The Necessarily Existent has, or rather an impossibility, in its proper sense, is is, the superabundance of perfect be- merely semantic incoherence. As such, ing. This is because, unlike contingent God cannot create four-sided trian- beings, He has no essence distinct from gles or married bachelors. Impossible His existence. A contingent being, in things simply cannot exist; power is contrast, has a particular essence, that set over the possible, not the impos- which makes it what it is—that which sible, as Avicenna himself notes (Mc- necessarily defines, distinguishes, and Ginnis 187). God, therefore, is infinite limits it. in power, when power is understood For example, the powers and func- coherently. He is thus omnipotent, as tions of a rose bush, stemming from Bahá’u’lláh repeatedly proclaims. the irreducible fact of its essence, are God likewise is infinite in His necessarily limited—they are not those knowledge. He knows all things by of a dog, a dolphin, or a human being. virtue of being their eternal and univer- The rose bush’s existence is limited sal cause as pure intellect; His knowl- due to the kind of thing it is; it can only edge is therefore perfect and complete. exist according to the limitations, and There consequently is no limit to His inherent potentials, of what it is. It can knowledge, and He may well be called only act in conformity with the limita- omniscient. Nor is there any limit to tions of what it is. Consequently, its ex- His goodness. For if evil is privation istence as a rose bush cannot transcend of being, He is absolute good in that the limitation of its “rose” essence. And He is absolute being. And insofar as since a rose’s essence is distinct from all possible good proceeds from Him, its existence, it is astoundingly limited and insofar as creation is a supremely in its being, for it has no existence of bountiful act on His part, there is no itself; its essence requires an external limit to His goodness, and He is thus bestowal of existence, and even when omnibenevolent. that essence is made existent, it is in- But God’s infinity can be expressed herently limited in the operations it can on an even deeper level, beyond omni- perform. presence, omnipotence, omniscience, But God has no essence distinct and omnibenevolence; it can be ex- from His necessary existence. Hence, pressed at the level of being itself. A there is in Him no essence that only little reflection will show that there contingently exists; He therefore, as can be no limitation to the being of we have seen, exists of Himself. But the Necessarily Existent. Perhaps we more profoundly, His being is not lim- then should resurrect an admittedly ob- ited, is not circumscribed or delimited, scure word, and term Him omniëssent, by any essence distinct from His exis- “all-being” or “all-existing,” under the tence. His being then has no limit, no same paradigm by which one calls Him limitation, no condition, no restriction. 64 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
Whereas every contingent being is a transcends kind and type entirely. Avi- finite being, the Necessarily Existent cenna accordingly writes: “It has thus is Himself infinite being. As infinite been made clear that the First has no being, He naturally can act as the in- genus, no quiddity, no quality, no quan- exhaustible, the all-bountiful source of tity, no spatial or temporal location, no the existence of all that is brought forth equal, no partner, and no contrary—ex- into being, and all that is sustained in alted and glorified is He—nor does He being. have any definition” (ash-Shifá 282). By virtue of the identity of God’s That is, the Necessarily Existent has essence with His existence, He tran- no essence distinct from His existence scends all categories to which con- that could be subject to a definition. tingent beings belong. This follows This is yet another indication of God’s because a contingent being, in having infinitude—His being cannot be con- an essence that can be considered in tained by kind and species, genus and isolation from its existence, has an es- differentia, nor can it be subject to any sence that can be defined by the logical reductive analysis. terms of genus and differentia—that But insofar as the intellect com- is, what general category something prehends a thing by considering its belongs to and what distinguishes it essence abstracted from a particular within that category. For instance, a instance—the concept, say, of animal triangle belongs to the genus of “plane in contrast to any seen or imagined par- figure,” and has the differentia of hav- ticular animal—the intellect compre- ing three closed sides; a triangle is hends a thing by separating that thing thus defined as a closed plane figure conceptually from its own particular having three sides. The existence of existence. Likewise, the intellect com- any particular triangle is limited to and prehends an essence by defining it; by circumscribed by that definition. Being regarding it as belonging to a general itself, however, does not have a logi- type, a genus; and by recognizing it cal genus-differentia definition.22 Now, as distinguished within that genus by even if only one triangle existed in all a differentia. But since God has no es- concrete reality, it could still be defined sence distinct from His particular exis- as belonging to a general kind, and as tence, and accordingly does not belong distinguished by a specific differentia. to any genus or have any differentia, But since God has no essence distinct it follows from Avicenna’s reasoning from His existence, He has no limit in that He must uniquely transcend the the sense of a standard definition. He power of the human intellect to com- is not even “one of a kind,” but rather prehend His reality. Significantly, this is a central aspect of Bahá’u’lláh’s the- ology—that God transcends all other 22 Avicenna’s idea that existence is things not only in the order of being, an irreducible or basic concept is discussed but also in the order of thought and in the first section of this article. Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 65
intellective apprehension. One can God defies comprehension because come to the recognition of God’s exis- He transcends the limitations of finite tence only indirectly, and not through reality. In this spirit, Avicenna writes actual perception or comprehension of that “when you recognize Him, He is His essence. This is well expressed by described, after His individual exis- ‘Abdu’l-Bahá when He writes in His tence, by the negation of similarities to address to Auguste Forel: Him” (ash-Shifá 283). That is to say, one can form a conception of God, not Now concerning the Essence of by direct comprehension of His tran- Divinity: in truth it is on no ac- scendent essence, but by affirming that count determined by anything essence in its transcendent nature, by apart from its own nature, and negating from it all the attributes of can in no wise be comprehended. contingent things, and by recognizing For whatsoever can be conceived that positive assertions about God are by man is a reality that hath lim- on the order of analogy. On this theme, itations and is not unlimited; it is ‘Abdu’l-Bahá writes that circumscribed, not all-embracing. It can be comprehended by man, no soul has ever fathomed the and is controlled by him . . . How reality of the Essence of the Di- then can the contingent conceive vinity so as to be able to intimate, the Reality of the absolute? describe, praise, or glorify it . . . . Thus man cannot grasp the . . Yet we ascribe certain names Essence of Divinity, but can, by and attributes to the reality of the his reasoning power, by observa- Divinity and praise Him for His tion, by his intuitive faculties and sight, His hearing, His power, the revealing power of his faith, His life and knowledge. We af- believe in God, discover the boun- firm these names and attributes ties of His Grace. He becometh not to affirm the perfections of certain that though the Divine Es- sence is unseen of the eye, and the logical (manṭiqíyyih) principles.” This existence of the Deity is intangi- statement indicates ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s sup- ble, yet conclusive spiritual proofs port, as likewise evidenced by chapter two assert the existence of that un- of Mufávaḍát or Some Answered Questions, seen Reality. (Tablet 15–16; Min for philosophical arguments for the exis- Makátíb Ḥaḍrat ‘Abdu’l-Bahá tence of God, such as Avicenna’s. Rational 259)23 recognition of God is, however, fully com- plimentary with an experiential and inward 23 Here, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá states in Per- apprehension of the presence of the Di- sian that one can believe in God through vine, as indicated by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s men- qavá‘id-i-‘aqlíyyih va naẓaríyyih va tion here of “intuitive faculties” (ṭulú‘át-i- manṭiqíyyih, literally through “rational fikríyyih) and the “revealing power of his (‘aqlíyyih), theoretical (naẓaríyyih), and faith” (inkisháfát-i-vijdáníyyih). 66 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
God, but to deny that He has any single is to deny Him multiplicity; to imperfections. say He is immutable is to negate from When we observe the contin- Him any change or motion; to say He gent world, we see that ignorance is eternal is to assert that He does not is imperfection and knowledge is exist in time and is not subject to alter- perfection, and thus we say that ation or decay; to say He is good is to the sanctified Essence of the Di- understand that in Him there can be no vinity is all-knowing. Weakness privation of being such as contingent is imperfection and power is per- entities undergo; to say He is pure in- fection, and thus we say that that tellect is to clarify the implications of sanctified and divine Essence is His immaterial being; lastly, to say He all-powerful. It is not that we can is infinite is the logical conclusion of understand His knowledge, His negating from Him the deficiencies of sight, His hearing, His power, or contingent being, for whatever exists His life as they are in themselves: contingently is limited and finite—God This is assuredly beyond our must therefore be infinite. Even when comprehension, for the essential one ascribes necessity to Him, one names and attributes of God are comes to this through the recognition identical with His Essence, and that there must be a reality that is not His Essence is sanctified above all contingent. understanding. (Some Answered Expressing this theme, Bahá’u’lláh Questions 168; Mufávaḍát 105) Himself writes in the Lawḥ-i-Basíṭ al- Ḥaqíqat, with respect to God: “Exalted We see here that ‘Abdu’l-Bahá is do- is He, and again exalted is He, above ing precisely what Avicenna has de- being incarnate in anything whatso- scribed: employing the via negativa ever, or bound by any limitation, or of apophatic theology—recognizing joined to anything in creation! He God through negating of Him what He hath ever been sanctified from, and is not, denying that He is at all simi- transcendent above, all else besides lar to contingent reality. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá Himself” (Iqtidárát 108, provisional first recognizes implicitly that God, as translation). No human conception, absolute being, is necessarily existent therefore, could be identical to God’s and not contingent and dependent. infinite being, however much all From that premise, He deduces divine things, in having received existence attributes through a two-fold process from Him, are signs of that transcen- of negation and analogy. He specifical- dent reality, as Bahá’u’lláh explains in ly negates from Him those deficiencies the Kalimát-i-Firdawsíyyih: “God is of contingent reality, and thus asserts immeasurably exalted above all things. God’s perfection. Accordingly, to say Every created being however revealeth God is simple is to assert that He is His signs which are but emanations non-composite; to say He is one and from Him and not His Own Self. All Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 67
these signs are reflected and can be All-Glorious. Thus, for Bahá’u’lláh, seen in the book of existence, and the God’s majesty, His jalál, and His beau- scrolls that depict the shape and pattern ty, His jamál, are at once contained and of the universe are indeed a most great exemplified precisely in God’s glory— book” (Tablets 60; Ishráqát 116). And His bahá—which Stephen Lambden in this connection Bahá’u’lláh fur- has perceptively glossed as “radiant ther relates, again in the Lawḥ-i-Basíṭ ‘glory’, ‘splendour’, ‘light’, ‘brillian- al-Ḥaqíqat: “God Himself hath ever cy’, ‘beauty’, ‘excellence’, ‘goodli- been, and shall forever be, sanctified ness’, ‘divine majesty’” (13). from ascent, descent, and limitation, On God’s majesty, Bahá’u’lláh ex- as well as connection and association claims in a supplication: “Thou art [with any other thing]. All other things, He to Whose power and to Whose in contrast, abide in the sphere of their dominion every tongue hath testified, specific limitations” (Iqtidárát 106, and Whose majesty and Whose sov- provisional translation). ereignty every understanding heart In both Bahá’u’lláh and Avicenna, hath acknowledged.” And as to God’s consequently, there is a wonder and an beauty, He implores: “Let the object of awe expressed before the impenetrable mine ardent quest be Thy most resplen- being of the Divine, the unfathom- dent, Thine adorable, and ever-blessed able infinitude of God, who is at once Beauty.” But it is alone God’s glory, recognized as the illimitable source His bahá, from which the very title of all things, and as the ultimate, the Bahá’u’lláh—the Glory of God—pro- unconditioned and transcendent reali- ceeds, and the name of the Bahá’í Faith ty. This wonder and awe experienced originates. “Lauded be Thy name” thus before the Infinite is further expressed proclaims Bahá’u’lláh, “O my God and in what could be termed the epithets the God of all things, my Glory and the of praise, those titles that particular- Glory of all things” (Prayers and Med- ly extol God’s exaltation above all itations 248; 178; 59; Munáját 166; praise, His sublimity, His majesty, and 121; 45). His glory, as well as His all-arresting Even here, in the epithets of splendor and all-entrancing beauty. praise, Avicenna is in harmony with And here too is light often the chosen Bahá’u’lláh, as the clear-eyed philos- metaphor for expressing the fullness of opher takes up the pen to compose an God’s perfect being, as set against the almost hymn-like conclusion to his darkness of privation and deficiency. analysis of the Divine. The heart is as For Bahá’u’lláh, God’s sublime maj- moved, it seems, as the mind is awed, esty on the one hand—as the supreme when it contemplates the Infinite. reality—and His splendorous beauty “There can be,” he says, “no higher on the other—as the object of all de- beauty or glory (bahá) than this, that sire and perfect goodness and boun- the Divine Essence is sheer intellectual ty—combine in His name al-Abhá, the being, absolute good, free from every 68 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
manner of deficiency, and one in every T A A aspect. Beauty and absolute glory be- C long to the Necessarily Existent, who is the source of the beauty of all things To understand Avicenna’s view on and their glory. And His glory consists God’s creative act we must first re- in this, that He is precisely as He ought call the substance of his argument for to be” (ash-Shifá 297). God’s existence in Part One of this article. Nowhere in his reasoning did C C Avicenna claim that there had to be a definite point in the past at which the In the preceding parts, we have seen the universe came into being and that, significant extent to which Bahá’u’lláh consequently, God’s existence must be affirms Avicenna’s theological posi- invoked as a first cause in a temporal tions, and likewise how much Avi- sense. Rather, in Avicenna’s view, for cenna’s account of divine attributes anything whatsoever to exist, even in accords with the explicit and implicit this moment, requires that existence content of Bahá’u’lláh’s statements. emanate or proceed to it from the Nec- For Avicenna as well as Bahá’u’lláh, essarily Existent. In other words, any God is the Necessarily Existent, ab- contingent being, in the here and now, solutely one in His attributes and es- is in need of an ultimate cause for its sence, transcendent and metaphysical- existence, and thus in need of the Nec- ly ultimate. In this part, we will treat essarily Existent, because the totality yet another aspect of Avicenna’s phil- of any causal structure, visualized as osophical theology that Bahá’u’lláh a chain, depends on a first cause, but affirms—namely, Avicenna’s account in a purely atemporal sense. Even as of how God creates the universe, and the first gear of a series of gears im- his assertion that God’s creation has parts motion simultaneously with the no temporal beginning and is thus, in movement of the subsequent gears, or a sense, co-eternal with Him. We will even as light proceeds simultaneously therefore proceed by first considering with the inherent incandescence of the Avicenna’s notion of a creation that Sun, so does God impart being to the eternally emanates from God. Then, in entire contingent order of reality. God the following section, we will explore thus creates everything, that is, gives how the writings of both Bahá’u’lláh existence to all things, as profoundly and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá affirm the core now as He ever did in the past or will metaphysical elements of Avicenna’s continue to do in the future. position, and how Avicennian thought, Accordingly, for Avicenna, at any in turn, helps one understand the phil- moment in the contingent world, God osophical content of Bahá’u’lláh and is imparting existence to it. He Himself, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s statements on God’s in being pure existence, is alone pos- creative act. sessed of that infinite creative power Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 69
to bestow existence. This universe, in rays exist simultaneously with the Sun, contrast, is only contingently existent though they are dependent on it. and depends on God to have any exis- Simply stated, if God at one point tence whatsoever. In this sense, there- were not creating, and then His cre- fore, God’s creative act does not refer ative act had a beginning, He Him- exclusively, or even primarily, to any self would have undergone a change, past state of the universe. He creates which is impossible. It follows, then, all things and sustains their being, as that He has always created and that an ultimate cause, even in the present. the existence of things has always pro- The question that remains, therefore, ceeded from Him. Avicenna thus states is whether the universe has a begin- that, since God is immutable, if He at ning—whether, in other words, God’s one point were not creating, even now creation had a beginning, or if it, like there would be no creation. Avicenna Him, is everlasting into the past and fu- concludes, therefore, that there could ture. Avicenna’s position, as mentioned not have been any point during which several times before, is that there can God was not creating, nor could there be no beginning to God’s creative act. be a moment when He commenced The core to one of Avicenna’s sever- creation. Accordingly, Avicenna writes al arguments on this theme, as found in in ash-Shifá: Book Nine, chapter one of ash-Shifá’s “Metaphysics,” is that God himself A sound intellect, which has not is unchanging and eternal. Since He been prejudiced, will admit that Himself is immutable, and since His if the Divine essence has never creative act cannot be conditioned by changed in any respect, then even any external stimuli, it follows that now nothing would proceed from God would neither change His will to it, if formally nothing had done so. create nor could something affect His If nothing was proceeding from it, will. Here we may recall that God’s and subsequently something were will and creative act are no different to do so, then there would have had from His knowledge or intellection; to have been some new occurrence His intellection of things from eternity in the Divine essence, whether an is the cause of their origination, even intention, a volition, a disposition, as the knowledge and apprehension an ability, a potency, or the like, of a book in the author’s mind is its which had not existed before. (303) cause. But since God knows and wills immutably and eternally, it follows, for Naturally, it is precisely Avicenna’s Avicenna, that God likewise creates point that no new occurrence, of any the world immutably and eternally. kind whatsoever, is possible within Consequently, His creative act has no God. He thus has always created. beginning, and the world is accord- Avicenna argues further that given ingly co-eternal with him, even as the the presence of the cause, there must 70 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
issue forth a concurrent effect. If, then, does abstruse discussions of time. Sim- the cause is present without that effect, ilarly, it is beyond the aim of this pa- but then later does produce that effect, per to defend Avicenna’s view against there would have to be some change any possible objections. What is vital either in the cause itself or something here is that Avicenna’s basic logic in external to it which affected its op- the argument above, as we will see in eration. Since, regarding God, there the next section, is routinely validated is nothing internal to Him that could in Bahá’u’lláh’s and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s change, nor is there some external inci- writings. In the meantime, then, we dent which could affect Him, Avicenna will consider another important aspect concludes that God’s creation can have of Avicenna’s views on creation in ad- no beginning—nor, we may add, can dressing the question of just how the it have an end. In other words, given world emanates from God. the fact of God’s eternal, unchanging To frame this question, we may first will, such an eternally existent cause consider something of a dilemma. It will necessarily result in an eternally has been stressed throughout this paper present, concurrent effect that proceeds that God, as understood by Avicen- from it. The term that Avicenna uses na and Bahá’u’lláh, is fundamentally for this kind of creation, which entails different from the contingent world the absolute imparting of existence, is which depends on Him. Whereas He fayaḍán or emanation, insofar as he is necessarily existent, immutable, im- conceives of contingent beings as eter- material, single, and simple, the world nally emanating from their ultimate is contingent, mutable, material, and source in God, which process might be is, furthermore, subject both to multi- compared, analogously, to how certain plicity and to composition. How, then, effects emanate from their concurrent do the many created things proceed causes in the world, such as heat from from the absolute oneness of God? fire or illumination from the Sun. Avicenna’s answer to this question, as The above two arguments for an a development of a core idea in Neo- eternal creation, though carefully put platonic philosophy, is that “from the forth in ash-Shifá, do not at all exhaust one, insofar as it is one, only one can Avicenna’s reasoning behind his belief proceed” (ash-Shifá 330). That is to in the eternity of God’s creation and, say, since God is one and simple, mul- hence, the world. Avicenna puts forth tiple things cannot directly emanate several distinctly premised arguments from Him. Avicenna argues that if dif- in defense of the eternity of the cosmos ferent things, such as form and matter, and they are explained in detail by Mc- were to proceed from God, insofar as Ginnis (182–202). It is not the object of they differ in kind, they would have to this article, however, to provide a de- proceed from different aspects in Him; tailed analysis of all of Avicenna’s ar- there are, however, no different aspects guments on this theme, involving as it existing in God, Who is absolute unity Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 71
and simplicity. It thus follows that only Whatever is necessarily existent one thing can directly proceed from of itself has no essence except Him, a single effect of the absolute existence, and . . . whatever is not act of His existence, something that is necessarily existent of itself has not a physical composite of form and existence, therefore, only inci- matter (ash-Shifá 328). For Avicenna, dentally. But since this existence therefore, what immediately proceeds is incidental to something, there from God is only one being, a fayḍ, must be an essence to which this an effluence or emanation which is existence is incidental, such that immaterial like Him and accordingly an entity is contingently existent an intellect, for the same reasons out- in respect to its essence, necessar- lined in the earlier section on this very ily existent in respect to its cause, subject. This intellect, then, is the first and unable to exist without that being or created entity to emanate from cause. Therefore, since the contin- God, first not in the sense of time but gently existent receives existence of ontological rank. Given that it is an from the Necessarily Existent, it intellect and the first created entity, it is is one thing insofar as it has exis- naturally known as the First Intellect, tence from its cause, another thing or ‘aql-i-avval in Persian. in respect to itself . . . if this thing Though the First Intellect is one should be an intellect, it possesses and immaterial, it is nonetheless not one aspect insofar as it knows God absolute unity, as God is Himself. As as the First Cause, another aspect Avicenna explains in the thirty-eighth insofar as it knows itself. (Dánish- chapter of the “Metaphysics” in the námih 409–10) Dánishnámih, the First Intellect has two aspects. In one aspect, it under- In other words, an intellect can com- stands itself as a contingent entity, in- prehend its own essence and therefore sofar as, in itself, it need not exist and its contingency, but it can also contem- is thus only contingently existent. In plate its existence and thus its deriva- another aspect, however, it is neces- tive or conferred necessity as caused sarily existent insofar as it is directly by another. Such an intellect, therefore, caused by or emanated from God. As has some multiplicity; even though it is a result, there is a kind of multiplicity not a composite of matter and form, it is in the First Intellect, for it is admittedly a composite of essence and existence. a composite of essence and existence, As Avicenna explains in the rest of the which God, as the Necessarily Existent chapter, it is true that only one thing in Himself, is not, as we saw in the proceeds from God, who is absolute section on “Simplicity.” On this theme, oneness: the First Intellect. It is subse- and of the concomitant distinction be- quently from the First Intellect, howev- tween essence and existence, Avicenna er, that the rest of creation proceeds, in writes: increasing orders of contingency and 72 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
multiplicity, insofar as the contingen- eternal creation: God, Himself pure cy and multiplicity begins in the one unity and absolute being, enjoys such entity of the First Intellect, and then a superfluity of existence that it ema- compounds in the beings that emanate nates or “overflows” from Him as an consecutively therefrom. eternal, constant act of creative grace The multiplicity of the contingent and providence; this fayḍ or emana- world, in this case, does not emanate tion then proceeds through the First directly from the unity and simplicity Intellect ultimately to create the lower of God. Instead, Avicenna envisions a realms in their multiplicity, diversity, hierarchy of being, in which different and materiality.24 levels of being are established as the Before we consider the harmonies procession of existence descends from between his cosmology and that of God. Consequently, material creation, Bahá’u’lláh, however, I will note that which is subject to multiplicity, ema- Avicenna’s view, in its metaphysical nates from God only through a series aspects, should be of interest for any of intermediaries, of which the First theist, insofar as he elegantly recon- Intellect is the prime member. God is ciles the dilemma of how a realm of thus the ultimate ontological cause of temporal existence and multiplicity the world but not its proximate, or im- could ever be created by or proceed mediate, efficient cause. Finally termi- from an ultimate reality that is eter- nating in the material world, the levels nal and absolutely one: through an of existence that descend further from intermediary principle that reflects the First Intellect become progres- something of the nature of both real- sively more contingent, deficient, and ties. Nevertheless, Avicenna did cor- imperfect, insofar as they have more relate the considerations above with privation of existence and being, while since-outdated theories on the scheme those closer in existential rank to the of the physical universe. Namely, Avi- First Intellect and thus to God are more cenna, not having the benefit of early perfect and enduring, even immaterial. modern telescope technology, upheld In this connection, one could sug- the geocentric theory of Aristotle, who gest an analogy in which God Himself thought that the Sun, Moon, and plan- is thought of as a pure white, single, ets revolved around the earth, each in immutable light source, while the First Intellect is the emanated light 24 Accordingly, the single act of that proceeds from Him; the lower God, which is identical to Him, is His act levels of existence with all their mul- of self-subsistent existence, as described in tiplicity, meanwhile, are the refracted, the section “Simplicity.” However, through polychromatic rays produced by the this same act of existence there eternally “prism” of increasing contingency and emanates a voluntary effect: the procession privation. Such, then, is the essence of the First Intellect and then, through it, of Avicenna’s emanative scheme of the sequence of beings in the contingent realm. Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 73
its own “sphere” (falak in Persian and B ’ ’ ’ A Arabic), while an outermost sphere C compassed the cosmic frame. Ac- cordingly, Avicenna thought that nine The two essential elements of Avicen- additional intellects proceeded after na’s view on creation, as seen above, the First Intellect, each one producing are first that God’s creative act is a particular sphere, until the emana- eternal and that therefore the world is tion of the last, sublunar sphere. The co-eternal with Him while being cease- intellect associated with this lowest lessly dependent upon Him, and sec- sphere, the ‘Aql-i-Fá’il or Active ond that God creates via an emanation Intellect, then would produce all the of existence in a hierarchy of being multiplicity of the earthly realm and, through some intermediary principle. most importantly, would actualize the Both of these propositions find explic- many forms or essences of things in it support not only in Bahá’u’lláh’s the potentiality of matter (McGinnis writings but also repeatedly in those 205). of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. First, with regard to Given the explicit rejection of the eternity of the world, Bahá’u’lláh geocentrism in the Bahá’í Writings, explains: (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, 28; Mufávaḍát 18–19) in Know assuredly that God’s cre- agreement with modern astronomy, as ation hath existed from eternity, well as Bahá’u’lláh’s affirmation that and will continue to exist forever. “every fixed star hath its own planets” Its beginning hath had no begin- (Gleanings 163; Muntakhabátí 65), it ning, and its end knoweth no end. is of course apparent that the astro- His name, the Creator, presup- nomical content of Avicenna’s posi- poseth a creation, even as His title, tions is not confirmed by Bahá’u’lláh. the Lord of Men, must involve the Nonetheless, the purely metaphysical existence of a servant. content of Avicenna’s view remains As to those sayings, attributed pertinent—namely, the core proposi- to the Prophets of old, such as, tion that God creates the contingent “In the beginning was God; there world through an eternal emanation was no creature to know Him,” of existence from Himself through and “The Lord was alone; with no the intermediary of the First Intellect. one to adore Him,” the meaning of Accordingly, we will consider in the these and similar sayings is clear last and final section of this paper the and evident, and should at no time Avicennian principles confirmed in be misapprehended. To this same Bahá’u’lláh’s own cosmology. truth bear witness these words which He hath revealed: “God was alone; there was none else besides Him. He will always remain what 74 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
He hath ever been.” Every discern- of its ákhir, its end or extremity. Given ing eye will readily perceive that that Bahá’u’lláh states this immediate- the Lord is now manifest, yet there ly after confirming the limitless dura- is none to recognize His glory. By tion of the world into the past and fu- this is meant that the habitation ture, this sentence may be understood wherein the Divine Being dwelleth as asserting that there is no temporal is far above the reach and ken of beginning to the world’s generation, anyone besides Him. Whatsoever just as there is no temporal end to its in the contingent world can either progression or continuation. Hence, it be expressed or apprehended, can is possible to render that sentence as never transgress the limits which, follows: “There is neither a beginning by its inherent nature, have been to the world’s generation nor any end imposed upon it (ḥudúdát-i-im- to its progression.” káníyyih). God, alone, transcen- The important point, however, is deth such limitations. (Gleanings that creation does have a “start” or 150–51; Iqtidárát 72–73) avval in terms of its being absolutely dependent on God, who remains its In the first sentence of the above para- concurrent cause; God is prior to the graph, Bahá’u’lláh unequivocally as- totality of the world or His creation in serts the perpetual duration of God’s terms of ontological rank, even if not creation, and subsequently connects in time (recall the discussion in the God’s nature as Lord and Creator with first two sections of how a cause can the notion that an everlasting and be- be concurrent with its effect, and thus ginningless creation is a necessary ef- “prior” to it in essence, though not in fect of His own unchanging will and time). In this connection, Bahá’u’lláh causal status; this logic is unmistak- affirms the essential dependence of the ably similar in character to Avicenna’s world on God, and thus its atemporal arguments for the eternity of the world posteriority to Him, when He states from the immutability of God. in another place that “there can be no The second sentence, however, is doubt whatever that if for one mo- paradoxical at first blush: how can the ment the tide of His mercy and grace cosmos have a beginningless begin- (fayḍ) were to be withheld from the ning or an endless end? The apparent world, it would completely perish” ambiguity of Bahá’u’lláh’s statement (Gleanings 68; Majmúʻiy-i-Alváḥ-i- may be resolved if we consider the pre- Mubárakih 342). Here, it is significant cise wording of the original Persian, as that Bahá’u’lláh uses the term fayḍ, or well as the implications of the preced- literally emanation—as we saw with ing sentence. The Persian text literally Avicenna—such that He states that states that there is no bidáyat or be- without the emanation (of grace or ex- ginning to creation’s avval, its start or istence) from God, the world would at firstness, and no niháyat or termination once be rendered ma‘dúm, nonexistent. Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 75
With an appreciation of this point— creates the physical world. First, as to the unceasing dependence of the creat- the world’s co-eternity, Bahá’u’lláh is ed world on God—we can understand careful to note that, though the world Bahá’u’lláh’s statement in the large may be without beginning or end in excerpt quoted above that while God time, it nonetheless is “preceded” by is existent now, His creation is void the causal power of God. He explains: of existence or mafqúd. Bahá’u’lláh immediately qualifies this statement As regards thine assertions about by clarifying that God transcends all the beginning of creation, this is a the ḥudúdát-i-imkáníyyih, literally all matter on which conceptions vary the limitations of contingency. Since by reason of the divergences in the world exists only contingently and men’s thoughts and opinions. Wert dependently, in relation to God, who thou to assert that it hath ever ex- exists necessarily and independently, it isted and shall continue to exist, is as though it were nonexistent; God it would be true; or wert thou to is alone, in the specific sense that He is affirm the same concept as is men- without peer or match in the manner of tioned in the sacred Scriptures, no His being and existence. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá doubt would there be about it, for reiterates this position when He con- it hath been revealed by God, the firms that “although the contingent Lord of the worlds . . . God was, world exists, in relation to the existence and His creation had ever existed of God it is non-existence and nothing- beneath His shelter from the be- ness” (Some Answered Questions 324; ginning that hath no beginning, Mufávaḍát 196). apart from its being preceded by a From the above points, we may Firstness which cannot be regard- conclude that Bahá’u’lláh affirms ed as firstness . . . (Tablets 140; Avicenna’s metaphysical position that Majmú‘iy-i-Alváḥ ba’d az Kitáb- the created world is beginningless and i-Aqdas 82) perpetual, but that it is always depen- dent, for its existence, on God, Who Given the context of Bahá’u’lláh’s is its ultimate, unchanging and eternal other statements, it is clear that in the cause. How, then, does Bahá’u’lláh above passage He affirms that the world additionally confirm the idea of cre- is eternal; He nonetheless endorses the ation as emanation? In this regard, creation account in the scriptures be- the Lawḥ-i-Ḥikmat is relevant, for cause He supports the underlying truth in that work Bahá’u’lláh not only af- they uphold, namely, that the world is firms the co-eternity of the world with created by God and is not eternal in God, Who ceaselessly sustains it, but the sense of transcending the bounds He also establishes the Word of God of mutability and being necessarily or Logos as an intermediary reality existent in itself and immutable, for it that emanates from the Godhead and is fundamentally contingent and could 76 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
not exist, even for a moment, without immediate audience, in this case the the sustaining providence of God, as erudite Bahá’í philosopher Nabíl-i-Ak- Avicenna likewise states. Accordingly, bar, who would have been well famil- for Bahá’u’lláh, one can support the iar with Avicenna’s thought. eternity of creation while also affirm- Shortly after this point in the Lawḥ- ing the central content of the Biblical i-Ḥikmat, Bahá’u’lláh describes the and Qur’ánic accounts. Word of God as the instrumental cause With this understanding, the of the cosmos. He states that this previously quoted statement from all-compelling “Word of God” is “the Bahá’u’lláh is altogether intelligible: cause of the entire creation,” while all “God was, and His creation had ever else besides it is a created thing and existed beneath His shelter from the an effect. The Word or “Command of beginning that hath no beginning, apart God,” He states furthermore, has nev- from its being preceded by a Firstness er been severed or munqaṭi’ from the which cannot be regarded as firstness . world, which recalls His statement, . .”. Creation has ever resided “beneath quoted above, that all created things His shelter”—that is, it is has always would perish were the emanation of depended on God—“from the begin- God’s grace to be withheld for even one ning that hath no beginning,” which is moment. The Word of God may thus be to say forever into the past. The world, identified as that emanation, or as the however, is preceded by the essential chief medium of the gracious emana- priority or “firstness” of God as its tion of being from God. Significantly, concurrent cause. This essential prior- Bahá’u’lláh confirms this reading in ity or firstness thus is not recognized the Lawḥ-i-Ḥikmat when He says this as a temporal priority or firstness. In Word is al-fayḍ al-a‘ẓam, literally the other words, Bahá’u’lláh here affirms supreme emanation, and the ‘illat al- Avicenna’s view that God precedes His fuyúḍát, the cause of the [subsequent] creation as its cause but not in terms emanations. of being prior in a sequence of time, as Bahá’u’lláh then concludes this though there was some definite point in section of the tablet by stating that this the past “before” which there was no Word is “the Cause which hath pre- creation proceeding from God. Accord- ceded the contingent world—a world ingly, Bahá’u’lláh may be understood which is adorned with the splendors as saying that the world is “preceded of the Ancient of Days, yet is being by [an essential] firstness which cannot renewed and regenerated at all times” be regarded as [a temporal] firstness.” (Tablets 141; Majmú‘iy-i-Alváḥ ba’d az Avicenna’s metaphysical analysis of Kitáb-i-Aqdas 83). This last statement concurrent causation and essential is particularly pertinent. The world is priority, as discussed in the first sec- literally described as being adorned tion, thus helps make intelligible what or muzayyan with aṭ-ṭiráz al-qadím, Bahá’u’lláh was here expressing to His the vesture of eternity, and yet it is at Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 77
all times regenerated (tajaddud) and when Bahá’u’lláh describes the Primal originated or created (ḥudúth). This is Will as the instrumental or mediating possible because the Word precedes cause of the creation of the world in the world in being its concurrent cause, the Lawḥ-i-Kullu’ṭ-Ṭa‘ám, a function and it is thus that which continuously that belongs to the Word of God in the sustains and generates it, thus allowing Lawḥ-i-Ḥikmat, for in the former He it to be beginningless and perpetual. states that it is by means of the Primal In sum, Bahá’u’lláh represents this Will that God created the heavens and Word as having emanated from God; earth. Similarly, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá uses the it is “the supreme emanation,” and it Word and the Holy Spirit as synonyms is moreover the cause of subsequent in chapter thirty-eight of Mufávaḍát or “emanations,” which can be read as Some Answered Questions. the levels of contingent reality that In this connection, Bahá’u’lláh’s compose the rest of creation. It is thus account of emanation, the intermedi- apparent that Bahá’u’lláh is describing ary principle, and the co-eternity of a creation, even as Avicenna did, that creation—affirming as it does the phil- eternally emanates from God through osophical arguments of Avicenna— an intermediary principle, which He is itself reaffirmed and clarified in calls the Word. The Word, then, is stun- ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s writings and recorded ningly similar to the First Intellect de- statements. In one instance, ‘Abdu’l- scribed by Avicenna and, in any case, Bahá not only speaks of the ema- it is identical in function and operation nation of the world from God, but as the first emanation from God which also explicitly identifies the Word in turn emanates the subsequent levels of God or Primal Will with the First of existence. Intellect, while perhaps even alluding Let it be noted here that there is a gen- to Avicenna himself. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá eral consensus among Bahá’í scholars thus asserts: “The procession (qíyám) that the intermediary principle which of creation from God is a procession Bahá’u’lláh calls the Word of God in through emanation. That is, creation the Lawḥ-i-Ḥikmat is the same reality emanates from God” (Some Answered expressed by various terms through- Questions 234; Mufávaḍát 144), where out the Bahá’í writings, including the qíyám can signify dependence and sub- “Holy Spirit” (Rúḥu’l-Qudus) and sistence, such that the creation depends the “Primal Will” (Mashíyyat-i-Av- upon God by being subsistent through valíyyih), as well as the “Realm of His emanation of existence. ‘Abdu’l- Revelation” or of “Divine Command” Bahá continues by stating: (‘Álam-i-Amr).25 This is apparent It follows that all things have 25 Keven Brown, “Brief Discussion emanated from God; that is, it is of the Primal Will in the Bahá’í Writ- ings”; Riaz Ghadimi, 662; and ‘Ali-Mu- rad Dávúdí, Ulúhíyyat va Maẓharíyyat, “Station of Unity.” 78 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
through God that all things have one defined in reference to time; there been realized, and through Him has always been an originated creation that the contingent world has come and contingent world. The world, then, to exist. The first thing to emanate is contingent upon the ceaseless ema- from God is that universal reality nation of existence from God through which the ancient philosophers the First Intellect or Primal Will. Just termed the “First Intellect” and as Avicenna recognizes that the First which the people of Bahá call the Intellect is in itself a contingent being “Primal Will.” (Some Answered and not equal to the Necessarily Exis- Questions 235; Mufávaḍát 144) tent, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá likewise clarifies that, in itself, the First Intellect does ‘Abdu’l-Bahá then stresses the eter- not share the absolute ontological pri- nal nature of the First Intellect or Pri- ority or precedence of the Godhead: mal Will, as well as the concomitant “Though the First Intellect is without co-eternity, and ceaseless dependence, beginning, this does not mean that of the creation upon that intermediary it shares in the pre-existence of God principle, and ultimately God. (qidam), for in relation to the exis- tence of God the existence of that uni- This emanation, with respect to versal Reality is mere nothingness” its action in the world of God, is (Some Answered Questions 235–36; not limited by either time or place Mufávaḍát 145). Here, the word refer- and has neither beginning nor end, ring to the “pre-existence” of God is for in relation to God the begin- qidam, which, as explored in the two ning and the end are one and the opening sections, refers to the ontolog- same. The pre-existence of God is ical priority of a cause in relation to a both essential and temporal, while concurrent effect to which it bestows the origination of the contingent existence. Although the First Intellect world is essential but not tempo- is eternal, it is eternally dependent on ral. (Some Answered Questions the immediate effusion of being from 235; Mufávaḍát 145) the Godhead, and thus subordinate to it. When ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says that the orig- ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s explicit identifica- ination of the world is not temporal tion of the Primal Will, a core feature but essential, He evidently means to of Bahá’í theology and cosmology, confirm that the world is created by with the First Intellect mentioned and and dependent on God; its dependence argued for by Avicenna, seems to me to and contingency are essential to its na- demonstrate that the intermediary prin- ture. It is therefore, in its very essence, ciple of creation, which Bahá’u’lláh originated and not self-subsistent; in variously calls the Word of God, the other words, it is a contingent entity. Most Exalted Word (Kalimiy-i-‘Ulyá), Nevertheless, this origination is not and the Primal Will, is in essence Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 79
identical to Avicenna’s First Intellect. intellects emanate in succession, the Consequently, Bahá’u’lláh affirms the last of which, the ‘Aql-i-Fá’il or Ac- core metaphysical content of Avicen- tive Intellect, generates and sustains na’s cosmology, which we can break the existence of the material realm. In down into the following seven proposi- the Bahá’í system, there is no mention tions that they share: (1) God, in being of such subsequent intellects. Instead, immutable, eternal, and absolute, eter- Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá clearly nally creates the world; (2) the world, state that the First Intellect or Primal accordingly, has no beginning or end Will is in fact responsible for the cre- in time; (3) the world nonetheless is ation of the physical world. It may fol- ceaselessly dependent on God for its low, then, that for Bahá’u’lláh the First existence, insofar as it is a contingent Intellect additionally assumes the op- entity; (4) God creates through the em- erations performed by the Active Intel- anation of existence from Himself; (5) lect under Avicenna’s view. In this con- the physical world is not an immediate nection, Bahá’u’lláh and Abdu’l-Bahá emanation from God; (6) an interme- have a cosmology that divides existence diary reality, whether called the Word, into three realms. The first is the Realm the Primal Will, or the First Intellect, of God or ‘Álam-i-Ḥaqq, which is the is the first entity to emanate from the level of reality strictly confined to the godhead, first in the atemporal sense of Necessarily Existent, who is perfect, ontological precedence (as the motion immutable, and absolute. There is then of the hand precedes the motion of the the Realm of Command or the Realm key it holds, not in time but in its caus- of the Kingdom, ‘Álam-i-Amr and al operation); and (7) the First Intel- ‘Álam-i-Malakút respectively, which is lect, which is the immediate emanation the station of the First Intellect, Primal from the Godhead, in turn emanates Will, or Holy Spirit. Lastly, there is the the existence of all other things. That Realm of Creation or ‘Álam-i-Khalq, Bahá’u’lláh and Avicenna should share which is the sum of contingent reality the seven propositions listed above is created and sustained by God through no superficial testament to the fact that the intermediary of the First Intellect. Bahá’u’lláh largely validates the cen- ‘Abdu’l-Bahá describes this cosmolog- tral tenets of Avicennian metaphysical ical picture thus: theology, and that Avicennian thought helps elucidate the philosophical con- The Prophets . . . hold that there tent of the Bahá’í Writings. This being are the world of God, the world established, there remains only one of the Kingdom, and the world additional point to address before we of creation: three things. The first conclude this section. emanation is the outpouring grace At the end of the preceding sec- of the Kingdom, which has ema- tion, we saw that Avicenna holds that nated from God and has appeared from the First Intellect nine other in the realities of all things, even 80 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
as the rays emanating from the article to explain the concomitant as- sun are reflected in all things. pects of Avicenna’s theory of psychol- (Some Answered Questions 341; ogy and abstraction, it is sufficient to Mufávaḍát 205–6) note that, for Avicenna, a prophet is one who is naturally disposed, by the For Avicenna, what the Bahá’í Writings particular constitution and character of call the Realm of the Kingdom would his soul, to receive more fully than oth- comprise at least ten intellects along er people the intellectual illumination with the celestial spheres with which of the Active Intellect, and who is thus they are associated, while the Earth, able to understand the nature of things which is the realm beneath the last, in a flash of inspired intuition, and not lunar sphere, is the physical world. merely through unaided sense percep- Since Bahá’u’lláh rejects any geocen- tion and induction (McGinnis 147–48). tric astronomy, He naturally does not Similarly, in the Bahá’í system, a affirm the idea that there are multiple prophet or Manifestation of God is one intellects emanating in succession as whose human soul is uniquely asso- associated with the heavenly spheres. ciated with the First Intellect, Primal I suggest, therefore, that the Realm Will, or Holy Spirit so as to “manifest” of the Kingdom, ‘Álam-i-Malakút or the attributes of Divinity, including ‘Álam-i-Amr, in the Bahá’í system, inherent knowledge of the natures and may well be reduced to one univer- realities of things, in the earthly realm. sal reality, as ‘Abdu’l-Bahá calls it, Although Avicenna’s objective is to the First Intellect and Primal Will. In provide a rational explanation of Is- sum, for Bahá’u’lláh the First Intellect lamic prophethood consonant with his fulfills the direct creative activity that metaphysics and theology, his approach the Active Intellect performs in Avi- has resonances with the Bahá’í concept cenna’s cosmology. Aside from this of the Manifestation of God, insofar minor point of difference, however, the as he stresses the natural superiority metaphysical or theological content of of the prophet to other human beings, Bahá’u’lláh’s and Avicenna’s cosmolo- and his resulting special association gies are markedly similar, as is evident with the Active Intellect; this replaces in the seven shared propositions listed a more conventional idea of popular above. faith, contrary to Bahá’í thought, that This commonality is even more ap- the prophet is no different than other parent when we consider Avicenna’s men, aside from a rather arbitrary im- account of prophethood. For Avicenna, position of God’s directives into his the Active Intellect not only manifests consciousness. This is yet another ev- the forms or essences of things in the idence, therefore, that for Bahá’u’lláh material world, but it also actualizes the First Intellect in fact encompasses universal concepts in human intellects. the range of activity Avicenna divided Though it is beyond the scope of this among the First Intellect or Emanation, Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 81
subsequent intellects, and the Active and wide-ranging, and indicates a Intellect. It remains for later scholar- shared interpretation of reality as a ship to correlate as well as differentiate whole in its basic features. further the more abstruse and minute The sole purpose of this article has correlations of Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings been to highlight this harmony, insofar and Avicenna’s philosophy. as it enriches the academic study of what Bahá’u’lláh means by God, but C also because an understanding of Avi- cenna’s work and intellectual contribu- In the foregoing sections, we have seen tion provides a framework by which how the theology of Bahá’u’lláh val- one might better comprehend the idates core features of the metaphysi- metaphysical significance of many of cal philosophy of Avicenna—that God Bahá’u’lláh’s theological statements, exists as the one ultimate and uncon- such as His affirmation that God is nec- ditioned reality, necessarily existent, essary or simple, that His creatures are simple, single, immutable, eternal, contingent beings, or that His creation perfect, and wholly good; omniscient has neither beginning nor end. Howev- in intellect and free in will; unlimited er, as expressed in the introduction— in His being and thus truly infinite and and I stress this unequivocally—the transcendent, as contrasted with the objective has decidedly not been either constrained nature of contingently exis- to state or to imply that Bahá’u’lláh’s tent beings. Bahá’u’lláh affirms, more- positions are, in any way, merely de- over, as Avicenna argues, that these rivative from Avicenna, or at all reduc- attributes are each indistinguishable ible to his influence as the preeminent in reality from the indivisible essence philosopher in the Islamic tradition. of God, which is necessary existence, Likewise, I have not intended to imply insofar as to be necessarily existent that Bahá’u’lláh’s theological teach- just is to be simple, indivisible, im- ings are, by any means, restricted to mutable, perfect, wholly good, and in- those themes in Avicenna’s philosophy finite. We have seen, furthermore, that which He affirms and validates, how- Bahá’u’lláh confirms Avicenna’s view ever much one may esteem the impor- that the world is eternal, though cease- tance of such metaphysical principles lessly dependent on God, from whom as necessary and contingent existence, the existence of all things emanates concurrent causation, or emanation. through the intermediary of the First Nonetheless, I have endeavored to Intellect or Primal Will. The metaphys- show—through citation and analysis ical harmony between Bahá’u’lláh and of a diverse selection of Bahá’u’lláh’s Avicenna is consequently not restricted and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s works—that af- to certain superficial or incidental fea- firmations of Avicenna’s theological tures of their thought. The agreement ideas in the Bahá’í Writings are not due between them is in fact fundamental merely to an incidental convergence 82 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
of terminology, to the degree that Consequently, why should the Bahá’í Bahá’u’lláh lived in the Islamic world scholar study Avicenna himself, and and inherited a certain intellectual and take Bahá’u’lláh’s theology as partic- literary culture, but to demonstrate ularly vindicative of his theological that Bahá’u’lláh’s clearly stated views philosophy? Even if this objection on God constitute a vindication of the were largely correct—though I think metaphysical principles underlying it slightly misses the mark—it would Avicenna’s argument for God’s exis- still be fruitful to consider these theo- tence, and His nature, attributes, and logical arguments and doctrines at the creative act, in actual content and con- source, so to speak, and to consider cept. Indeed, the Bahá’í Writings’ af- the rational basis, as explicated by firmation of the content of Avicennian Avicenna, of those philosophical-theo- philosophical theology is incredibly logical doctrines that Bahá’u’lláh and rich in implication; it indicates that ‘Abdu’l-Bahá so consistently affirm, they validate the principles of ratio- in order to demonstrate, and to have a nality that underlie Avicenna’s argu- firmer understanding of, their coher- ments, and that the content of Bahá’í ence, rigorous logic, and conceptual metaphysics can be further understood depth. Indeed, if Avicenna’s ideas were through the study of the Islamic phil- so powerful as to have become main- osophical tradition, to discern areas of stream, the need to understand Avicen- affirmation, as in the case of Avicenna, na himself would be commensurately or difference, in the case of other Is- intensified. lamic thinkers. However, the real situation is much Since there are a number of possible more complex. After Avicenna, phi- objections that could be brought to bear losophy or falsafih did indeed become on the general argument of this article, especially associated with his ideas in I will try succinctly to address them, the Islamic world, and more generally with broad historical strokes, and also with the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic to resolve possible misunderstandings tradition Avicenna himself inherit- as to what the arguments of this article ed, refined, and profoundly shaped. actually entail regarding Avicenna’s Nonetheless, subsequent thinkers not relation to the Bahá’í Faith. One could only adopted and developed his ideas, wonder, for example, if it is warranted but also challenged and argued against to associate the relevant metaphysi- them. In the succeeding generation, for cal principles that Bahá’u’lláh affirms example, the widely influential Persian with Avicenna especially, instead of thinker Ghazálí composed a famous seeing this affirmation as one per- polemic against twenty propositions taining to ideas that, by Bahá’u’lláh’s implied by or related to Avicenna’s time, had become mainstream in Islam thought, The Incoherence of the itself due to the prevalence of Avi- Philosophers (Taháfutu’l-Falásifih), cenna’s thought over a millennium. and he especially took issue with Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 83
Avicenna’s ostensibly heretical notions theologians were generally opposed to such as the eternity of the world; his some of those relevant metaphysical characterization of the nature of God’s ideas Avicenna and the Bahá’í Writings knowledge; and his doubt, suggest- affirm, such as the distinction between ed in several places, as to the bodily essence and existence, the presence resurrection, insofar as he defends a of necessary causal connections in purely spiritual view of the afterlife the world, and a robust affirmation of in his metaphysical works—in agree- divine simplicity.27 Moreover, philoso- ment with the Bahá’í perspective.26 phy itself, in succeeding centuries, was Ghazálí, in addition, argued for occa- often looked at askance in the Islamic sionalism—which holds that there are world, or even thought heretical, while no necessary causal relations in nature, jurisprudence became the chief ex- but only direct actions of God’s arbi- pression of religion among Islamic trary will—against the Avicennian no- scholars. Indeed, although philoso- tion that natural entities have causative phy—whether of Avicenna’s essen- powers and necessary relations in their tially Aristotelian approach, broadly own right, even though they ceaseless- Platonist “Illuminationist” thought ly depend on God for their existence. (Ishráqí), or a synthesis of the two— It is the Avicennian notion, however, was indeed practiced in the Shia milieu that the Bahá’í Writings affirm, as ev- of Early Modern Iran by the School idenced by the passages on causation of Isfahan, its practitioners were of- considered throughout this paper, and ten persecuted or condemned by the the following statement from ‘Abdu’l- ‘ulamá, even while the philosophical Bahá: “By nature is meant those inher- tradition itself, so beautifully embod- ent properties and necessary relations ied by Avicenna, was “by and large derived from the realities of things” abandoned in the rest of the Islamic (Tablet 13). world,” as expressed by the historian Furthermore, the generally fideis- Abbas Amanat (114). Accordingly, it is tic school of Ash‘arite theology, from not reasonable to diminish the degree which Ghazálí more or less operated, to which Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l- became far more mainstream in Sunni Bahá actually vindicate and vali- Islam, the dominant branch of the faith, date the arguments and conclusions, than Avicenna’s rationalist philoso- phy. And indeed, Ash‘arite-influenced 27 As Marmura notes: “For the Ash‘arites, the divine attributes . . . are 26 Fazlur Rahman expresses this co-eternal with the divine essence . . . but more starkly, when he writes that “in gen- are not identical with it. They are attributes eral” Avicenna “taught that the resurrection ‘additional’ (zā’ida) to the divine essence. of the body was an imaginative myth with This point is quite basic, particularly for which the minds of the Prophets were in- understanding al-Ghazálí’s rejection and spired in order to influence the moral char- condemnation of the philosophical doc- acter of the unthinking masses” (119). trine of an eternal world” (141). 84 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
characteristic of Avicenna himself and forms by Avicenna, such as the dis- not Islamic theologians considered tinction between essence and existence generally, regarding causation, con- and contingent and necessary being, tingent and necessary existence, the they are doing so as influenced directly distinction between essence and exis- or indirectly by him, and arguably none tence, and God’s nature, attributes, and of them enjoys the degree of eminence, creative act. influence, historical relevance, and Another objection, however, may synthetic genius Avicenna is general- contend that this article has exagger- ly recognized as possessing, with the ated the Avicennian character of the possible exception, outside Islam, of principles discussed, insofar as certain Thomas Aquinas among medieval phi- Islamic philosophers and thinkers after losophers. Therefore, not to recognize Avicenna—such as Ibn ‘Arabí, Mullá the Avicennian character of the princi- Ṣadrá, Mír Dámád, Sabzivárí, and ples here discussed is no more reason- even Shaykh Aḥmad Aḥsá’í—have able than to deny that the doctrine of variously and to differing degrees the four causes,28 for example, is Aris- discussed some of the ideas treated in totelian, despite the fact that countless this paper. It should be kept in mind, subsequent philosophers, including however, that this article does not Avicenna, have adopted, defended, and make any exclusive claim in demon- clarified the concept. strating Bahá’u’lláh’s affirmation of Moreover, certain other philoso- Avicenna’s ideas, as though Avicenna phers in Islam, such as Suhravardí, is the only philosopher who has argu- are notable for starkly rejecting the ments validated in the Bahá’í Faith, Aristotelian heart of Avicenna’s nor does it suggest that the whole of thought, even while the Bahá’í Faith, Avicenna’s philosophy, beyond the as convincingly argued by Ian Kluge matters explicitly treated here, has the in “The Aristotelian Substratum of the imprimatur of Bahá’u’lláh. Indeed, Bahá’í Writings,” reaffirms the basic Ian Kluge has done impressive work metaphysics of Aristotle’s thought, demonstrating the Aristotelian and especially, I would add, as developed Neoplatonic principles affirmed by by Avicenna. In addition, in certain Bahá’u’lláh, and this article is fully respects it is the particularly Avicen- complementary to and supportive of nian stance that the Bahá’í Writings such scholarship, insofar as Avicenna affirm, in contrast to those of later himself inherited and further refined thinkers: the Avicennian distinction those traditions, and works within clas- between essence and existence, for sical theism more broadly, as shall be example, came to be undermined either discussed below. by an emphasis solely on essence (as Nonetheless, when later philoso- phers in Islam argue for or develop ideas first articulated in their mature 28 Discussed in the section “Simplicity.” Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 85
in Suhravardí’s radical essentialism) transcends all things in His essence or on existence (as in Mullá Ṣadrá’s and yet imparts to them their very ex- Heraclitan existentialism).29 Likewise, istence ceaselessly, and is thus “closer some subsequent thinkers, influenced to a man than his life vein,” as it is said by Sufi mysticism, tended toward cer- in the Qur’án (50:16). Since the Bahá’í tain monistic or pantheistic ideas, at Faith evidently contributes to this tra- variance with Bahá’u’lláh’s teaching, dition of classical theism, one could in contrast to Avicenna’s chaste insis- find points of substantive commonal- tence on God’s transcendence. Conse- ity between Bahá’u’lláh and philoso- quently, Avicenna is well-deserving of phers such as Aristotle, Plotinus, and explicit attention in Bahá’í studies, and Augustine—before Avicenna—and it is with this aim that this article has Maimonides, Averroës, and Aquinas, focused exclusively on Avicenna, and after him. Nonetheless, in the sheer only alluded to or briefly mentioned abundance of Avicennian propositions other philosophers. Again, it should that Bahá’u’lláh validates, the affinities be stated that the purport of this arti- between Avicennian philosophy and cle is not that Bahá’u’lláh’s theology the Bahá’í Faith should prove to be a is reducible to Avicenna’s thought as rich field for future work and of spe- an historical antecedent. It has argued cial interest to Bahá’í scholars. In this solely that Bahá’u’lláh’s theology is af- connection, Avicenna may be taken firmative of, not derivative from, those to be one remarkably impressive and Avicennian ideas we have discussed. influential member of a broad, multi- I will note in closing, however, that faith philosophical-theological tradi- the theological agreement between tion whose relation to the Bahá’í Faith Bahá’u’lláh and Avicenna is no histor- should be a matter of intensive study ical coincidence. Though Avicenna’s and consideration. thought has a particular affinity with Despite the above points, how- the Bahá’í Faith, he is admittedly one ever, one may still wonder whether in a long line of thinkers who sup- recognizing the Avicennian themes in port what is called classical theism, Bahá’u’lláh’s metaphysics is anything a view of God which recognizes Him more than a mere academic exercise. as the one metaphysically ultimate On the contrary, Avicenna’s philosophy and absolute reality, who completely invests one with a powerful tool in un- derstanding the conceptual, philosoph- 29 As discussed by Wisnovsky ical, metaphysical, and logical content (111). ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s position is decided- and implications of Bahá’u’lláh’s writ- ly Avicennian when He confirms that for ings themselves. The Bahá’í Writings’ contingent beings existence “is only one affirmation of the distinction between accident (‘araḍ) among others that enter essence and existence; of the two mo- upon the realities of created things” (Some dalities of necessary and contingent Answered Questions 337–38; Mufávaḍát being; of the necessary existence of 203). 86 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
God; of a robust account of divine sim- revealed to be non-negotiable tenets of plicity holding that God’s attributes are Bahá’u’lláh’s system, nowhere contra- identical to His essence; of the eternal- dicted in His writings though expressed ity of God’s creation; and of the role of in various ways depending on the char- the intermediary principle of the First acter of His particular audience. Intellect or Primal Will—such central In this connection, it should be ac- affirmations are rendered intelligible, knowledged that there has been a con- and their rational basis elucidated, trasting view, in the literature of Bahá’í through an appreciation of Avicennian scholarship, that Bahá’u’lláh “does not metaphysics. assert the truth of any particular meta- Avicenna can serve a vital role in physical position,” and even “denies Bahá’í studies for yet other reasons, that metaphysics itself is the core of however. First, Avicennian philosophy, religion” (Momen 38). It is naturally with its insistence on rational demon- outside the scope of this article, in the stration in addition to its conformity space of a conclusion, to address this to Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings, could well perspective fully, as it is expressed in prove to be an invaluable resource the essay “The God of Bahá’u’lláh,” for Bahá’í scholars as they undertake which differs from this paper’s account the enterprise of articulating Bahá’í of the existence, consistency, and ro- teachings, defending them, and clar- bust nature of definite metaphysical ifying their rational structure, just as principles in Bahá’u’lláh’s writings. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá encouraged when He It should first be noted that the thesis stated that in this day rational argu- of “epistemological relativism,” which ments (dalá’il-i-‘aqlíyyih) are requisite “The God of Bahá’u’lláh” argues is for the people of the world (Some An- operative in Bahá’u’lláh’s writings, swered Questions 8; Mufávaḍát 5). Avi- springs from a laudable goal of ex- cenna’s argument for God’s existence, plaining how Bahá’u’lláh reconciles for example, is in full harmony with different faith traditions with contrast- Bahá’í teaching, clarifies the content ing metaphysical claims. Accordingly, of Bahá’u’lláh’s own theological state- it is suggested there that Bahá’u’lláh ments, and illuminates the reasoning in accomplishes this by generally teach- support of God’s existence found in the ing that “religious metaphysical truth is Bahá’í Writings. Second, one who has an individual truth which each person a foundation in classical, and indeed sees from his or her own viewpoint” Avicennian, philosophy will more eas- (38). ily realize that Bahá’u’lláh’s writings Though there is indeed a kind of form a coherent and fully consistent “perspectivism” implicit in the no- metaphysical system. Matters such as tion of progressive revelation—and God’s existence, necessity, simplicity, though Bahá’u’lláh clearly notes, in a and complete transcendence, as well as number of places, that differing per- the contingent nature of the world, are spectives qualify the truth values of Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 87
certain statements—it nonetheless in the Bahá’í Writings,” does not en- seems to me that epistemological rel- tail any monism or pantheism when ativism is not plausible, in any strong read in context. Bahá’u’lláh simply formulation, vis-à-vis Bahá’u’lláh’s affirms in that passage that God alone teachings. This is because definite and exists necessarily, while other things intrinsically metaphysical and onto- exist contingently and conditionally, logical claims, open to human knowl- by asserting that essential or absolute edge—such as the existence of God, existence is not preceded by a cause, His transcendent reality, the station and that such existence is limited to of Bahá’u’lláh as the Manifestation God (Majmúʻiy-i-Alváḥ-i-Mubárakih of God, the immortality of the human 165). This statement from Bahá’u’lláh, soul, the reality of objective moral ob- therefore, actually confirms the tran- ligation, and many others—are essen- scendence and ontological distinction tial, even foundational, to the Bahá’í of God from a creation that exists con- Faith, and consistently stated as true tingently, and it is not at all a monist without qualification. In addition, it position differing from Bahá’u’lláh’s likewise seems to me that the thesis of other statements. epistemological relativism is supported Consequently, and more generally, by underemphasizing the remarkable what is presented as two contrasting conceptual consistency, over a life- positions in Bahá’u’lláh’s writings, long ministry, of Bahá’u’lláh’s writ- “theism” and “monism,” are in fact one ings, and by overemphasizing apparent consistent position, variously described disparities in them, which can be rather and elaborated: God, even as Avicen- easily resolved, or even disappear, with na logically deduced and Bahá’u’lláh reference to the evident metaphysical repeatedly affirms, is the Necessar- content of His explicit statements on ily Existent and thus exists without a the nature of God. cause or on any condition, whereas all As a case in point, we may con- other things are contingently existent sider Momen’s suggestion that some and thus depend on God ceaselessly of Bahá’u’lláh’s statements, such as as their ultimate cause. Shoghi Effendi “absolute existence is strictly confined expresses this metaphysical doctrine of to God” (Gleanings 157; Majmúʻiy-i- Bahá’u’lláh—God’s absolute transcen- Alváḥ-i-Mubárakih 165) are monis- dence and ontological distinction— tic or pantheistic, and substantively succinctly when he writes: differ from other statements from Bahá’u’lláh that support what the ar- So crude and fantastic a theory of ticle calls the “theistic view of God,” Divine incarnation is as removed which holds that God completely tran- from, and incompatible with, the scends the world. This statement from essentials of Bahá’í belief as are Bahá’u’lláh, which we discussed in the no less inadmissible pantheistic the section “The Necessarily Existent and anthropomorphic conceptions 88 The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 31.3 2021
of God—both of which the utter- Who is the Eternal Truth is the one ances of Bahá’u’lláh emphatically Power Who exerciseth undisputed repudiate and the fallacy of which sovereignty over the world of be- they expose. (112–13) ing, Whose image is reflected in the mirror of the entire creation. Much more, of course, might be said to All existence is dependent upon do justice to the arguments in “The God Him, and from Him is derived of Bahá’u’lláh.” In closing, however, it the source of the sustenance of should only be noted that, to the de- all things. This is what is meant gree that there are explicit and implicit by Divine unity; this is its funda- metaphysical principles in the writings mental principle. (Gleanings 166; of Bahá’u’lláh and of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Iqtidárát 158) we may regard Avicenna as an import- ant ally in approaching the Baháʼí cor- W C pus as scholars determined to discover and understand the precise nature of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. Khiṭábát. Bahá’í-Ver- Their teachings on the nature of reality. lag, 1927. 2 vols. It remains for future studies to illu- ———. Min Makátíb ʻAbd al-Baháʼ. mine further what positions of past phi- Editora Baháʼí Brasil, 1982. losophers are affirmed by Bahá’u’lláh, ———. Muntakhabátí az Makátíb-i- and how the philosophical tradition Ḥaḍrat-i-‘Abdu’l-Bahá, vol. of classical theism can be used to ex- 1. US Bahá’í Publishing Trust, plicate, articulate, defend, and clar- 1979. ify the metaphysics and theology of ———. An-Núr al-Abhá fí Mufávaḍát Bahá’u’lláh. We may, nevertheless, ‘Abd al-Bahá. Mir’át Publica- remain confident in the explicit content tions, 1998. of Bahá’u’lláh’s unequivocal testimo- ———. Selections from the Writ- ny to the existence, transcendence, sin- ings of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. Bahá’í gleness, and unity of the self-subsistent World Centre, 1982. and infinite God, on Whom all things ———. Some Answered Questions. ceaselessly depend, from Whom they Bahá’í World Centre, 2014. derive their being: ———. Tablet to Auguste Forel. George Ronald Publishers, Regard thou the one true God as 1978. One Who is apart from, and im- Amanat, Abbas. Iran: A Modern His- measurably exalted above, all cre- tory. Yale UP, 2017. ated things. The whole universe Aristotle. Metaphysics. reflecteth His glory, while He is Avicenna. An-Naját. Dár Áfáq li an- Himself independent of, and tran- Nashr wa at-Tawzí‘, 2020. scendeth His creatures. This is the ———. The Metaphysics of The Heal- true meaning of Divine unity. He ing (ash-Shifá: Iláhíyyát). Ed- Bahá’u’lláh and the God of Avicenna 89
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