The Baha'i Question: Cultural Cleansing in Iran

THE BAH Á’Í QUE STION Cultural Cleansing in Iran THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION Cultural Cleansing in Iran

Bahá’í International Community THE BAH Á’Í QUESTION Cultural Cleansing in Iran Web site: http://question.bahai.org

Copyright 2005 Bahá’í International Community Bahá’í International Community 866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 120 New York, NY 10017, USA Contents

5 CHAPTER I: Introduction 10 The Bahá’í Faith: A global community

13 CHAPTER II: A Campaign of Cultural Cleansing 18 The ISRCC document

23 CHAPTER III: The Current Situation 26 The Bahá’í Institute for Higher Education 30 The Bahá’í community of Iran speaks for itself 44 The ongoing threat of execution

49 CHAPTER IV: “To kill a Bahá’í is a good deed…” 54 Hanged for teaching “Sunday school” 60 How Iran has justified the persecution

65 CHAPTER V: The Historical Background 72 The international response

76 CHAPTER VI: Conclusion and Summary 79 APPENDIX I: Bahá’ís killed since 1978 84 APPENDIX II: The United Nations’ Response 4 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION Chapter I IN TRODUCTION

B Y ALL ACCOUNTS, the house of Mirza Abbas Nuri was a masterpiece of Islamic architec- That the Iranian ture. Mirza Abbas Nuri was a renowned 18th government would century Iranian calligrapher, and his home destroy part of in Tehran — marked by a verdant veranda, flowered courtyard, and tasteful tile-work — was considits country’s own ered among the most beautiful houses of that period. heritage tells much In the summer of 2004, however, Iranian authorities about the current demolished the house. The reason was all too clear: the state of Iran’s 25- home was considered by Iran’s Bahá’ís as a sacred and historic site, inasmuch as Mirza Abbas Nuri was the year-campaign father of Bahá’u’lláh, the Founder of the Bahá’í Faith. to eradicate the That the Iranian government would destroy part 300,000-member of its country’s own heritage tells much about the current state of Iran’s 25-year-campaign to eradicate the Iranian Bahá’í 300,000-member Iranian Bahá’í community. Since community. coming to power in 1979, Iran’s cleric-led Islamic government has systematically persecuted Bahá’ís in

The demolition in June 2004 of the house of Mirza Abbas Nuri, a renowned 18th century Iranian calligrapher, reflects the Iranian government’s willingness to destroy its own cultural heritage to eradicate the Bahá’í Faith from Iran.

CHAPTER I: Introduction | 5 Iran, using execution, imprisonment, torture, and a wide range of measures designed to impoverish and drive out the country’s largest religious minority. Between 1978 and 1998, more than 200 Bahá’ís were executed by the Iranian government. Hundreds more Bahá’ís were imprisoned and tortured, and tens of thousands were deprived of jobs, pensions, businesses, and educational opportunities. In the face of intense international pressure, most significantly through a series of United Nations human rights resolutions, the Iranian government has essen- Farhang Mavaddat tially halted the executions and greatly reduced the was executed in June number of Bahá’ís held in prison. 1981, and his wife Yet while the government has seemingly halted the Mehri Mavaddat was most egregious forms of direct violence against individimprisoned in 1980. ual members of the Bahá’í community, the government has nevertheless continued its campaign of persecution, albeit in a manner that clearly seeks to avoid the scrutiny of international human rights monitors. Bahá’ís in every part of Iran continue to face the threat of short-term detention and harassment. In the spring of 2005, for example, more than 35 Bahá’ís in various areas were imprisoned without charge. While most were held less than a week, others were jailed for up to three months in a kind of “revolving door” detention apparently aimed principally at creating terror and repression. Some of the prisoners, for example, were held incommunicado, in unknown locations, while their families desperately searched for them. In addition, government agents conducted prolonged searches of many of their homes, confiscating documents, books, computers, copiers and other belongings. Moreover, the government has sought overall to suffocate the Bahá’í community through extensive social and economic restrictions. In addition to incidents such as the razing of Mirza Abbas Nuri’s home, which was preceded by the destruction of another

6 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION important Bahá’í holy site in April 2004, this effort at slow strangulation — which must be considered as Beyond the nothing less than cultural cleansing — can be most destruction of Bahá’í clearly observed in the government’s efforts to prevent holy places and the Bahá’í youth from obtaining higher education. In the early 1980s, the government banned Bahá’í denial of education youth from Iranian universities and colleges. In early to Bahá’í youth, 2004, however, apparently in response to international the government condemnation of the ban, the government publicly has in recent years promised to change its policies, indicating that it would allow Bahá’í students to enroll in university in adopted a regimen the autumn of that year. On that basis, about 1,000 of arbitrary Bahá’í youth took university entrance examinations. arrests, short term In August 2004, the government released the results of those exams, on which Bahá’í students scored well. imprisonment, and However, the government also falsely recorded the the confiscation religious affiliation of each Bahá’í student, printing of homes and the word “Islam” in the field listing each Bahá’í stuproperties, designed dent’s religion. Because their religious principle prevents them from even “pretending” to deny their faith, to harass and Bahá’ís were effectively precluded from matriculating. intimidate the Some 800 Bahá’ís — those who had otherwise passed Bahá’í community. their examinations — were denied the right to education for the 2004-2005 school year in this manner. Beyond the destruction of Bahá’í holy places and the denial of education to Bahá’í youth, the government has in recent years adopted a regime of arbitrary arrests, short term imprisonment, and the confiscation of homes and properties, designed to harass and intimidate the Bahá’í community. The community as a whole remains under numerous restrictions, with its administrative institutions dismantled, its worship practices restricted, and its right to equal protection under the law utterly refused. The government’s long term strategy to destroy the Bahá’í community without bringing undue international attention was cruelly outlined in a secret 1991

CHAPTER I: Introduction | 7 Many Bahá’ís have been tortured. The body of Dr. Nasir Vafai, a 49-year-old physician who was executed on 14 June 1981, was found to have a deep gash below his abdomen which ran all the way around his leg, severing the joint.

memorandum that aimed at establishing policy regarding “the Bahá’í question.” Drafted by the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council and signed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the document calls for a series of restrictions on the access of Bahá’ís to education

8 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION and livelihood that is nothing less than a blueprint for the strangulation of the Bahá’í community. Most sig- The Bahá’í nificantly, it lays out unequivocally the government’s community in Iran overall objective — to ensure that the “progress and poses no threat to the development” of the Bahá’í community “shall be blocked.” [See page 18 for full text of document.] Iranian authorities. The recent destruction of holy sites and denial of The principles of the education to Bahá’í youth, as well as the continuing Bahá’í Faith require measures aimed at harassing Bahá’ís and depriving its followers to avoid them of their rightful property and livelihood, indicate that the government’s secret plan is still very much in partisan political effect. All of the evidence flatly contradicts the govern- involvement, ment’s oft-repeated contention that it has no campaign subversive activity, of persecution against the Bahá’ís. The fact is that the Bahá’ís of Iran remain in a and all forms of precarious state. They are denied the right to prac- violence. tice their faith freely, guaranteed under international human rights instruments such as the International Bill of Human Rights, to which Iran is a party. The administrative institutions of their Faith have been dismantled in accordance with a government edict. They live each day knowing that their government seeks to block their development as a community, and that even slight infractions can result in the deprivation of their livelihood, imprisonment or worse. The Bahá’í community in Iran poses no threat to the Iranian authorities. The principles of the Bahá’í Faith require its followers to avoid partisan political involvement, subversive activity, and all forms of violence. The community has painstakingly avoided aligning itself in any fashion with any of the country’s governments, ideologies or opposition movements. While defending their right to worship and practice their religion freely, as promised by international law, Bahá’ís seek only to be peaceful, law abiding and productive contributors to the advancement of Iranian society.

CHAPTER I: Introduction | 9 The Bahá’í Faith: A global community

F OUNDED A CENTURY and a half ago in Iran, the Bahá’í Faith is today among the fastest-growing of the world’s religions. With more than five million followers, who reside in virtually every nation on earth, it is the second-most widespread independent world religion, surpassing every faith but Christianity in its geographic reach. Bahá’ís reside in more than 100,000 localities around the world, an expansion that reflects their dedication to the ideal of world citizenship. The Bahá’í Faith’s global scope is mirrored in the People of every composition of its membership. Representing a cross nationality, race, ethnic section of humanity, Bahá’ís come from virtually every group, and religious nation, ethnic group, culture, profession, and social or background around the economic class. More than 2,100 different ethnic and world have declared tribal groups are represented. their belief in the Bahá’í The Faith’s Founder is Bahá’u’lláh, a Persian noble- Faith. Shown here is man from Tehran who, in the mid-nineteenth century, a group of people from left a life of princely comfort and security and, in the around the world who face of intense persecution and deprivation, brought to have volunteered to serve humanity a stirring new message of peace and unity. at the Bahá’í World Bahá’u’lláh claimed to be nothing less than a new Centre in Haifa, Israel. and independent Messenger from God. His life, work,

10 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION Entrance to the Shrine of Bahá’u’lláh, near Acre, Israel.

and influence parallel that of Abraham, Krishna, Moses, Zoroaster, Buddha, Christ, and Muhammad. Bahá’ís view Bahá’u’lláh as the most recent in this succession of divine Messengers. The essential message of Bahá’u’lláh is that of The essential unity. He taught that there is only one God, that there is only one human race, and that all the world’s reli- message of gions represent stages in the revelation of God’s will Bahá’u’lláh is that and purpose for humanity. In this day, Bahá’u’lláh said, of unity. He taught humanity has collectively come of age. As foretold in all of the world’s scriptures, the time has arrived for that there is only the uniting of all peoples into a peaceful and integrated one God, that there global society. “The earth is but one country, and man- is only one human kind its citizens,” He wrote. race, and that all For a global society to flourish, Bahá’u’lláh said, it must be based on certain fundamental principles. They the world’s religions include the elimination of all forms of prejudice; full represent stages equality between the sexes; recognition of the essential in the revelation oneness of the world’s great religions; the elimination of extremes of poverty and wealth; universal education; of God’s will the harmony of science and religion; a sustainable bal- and purpose for ance between nature and technology; and the estab- humanity. lishment of a world federal system, based on collective security and the oneness of humanity.

CHAPTER I: Introduction | 11 Chapter II A CA MPAIGN OF CULTUR AL CLEANSING

I N THE WORLD today, Iran seeks to portray itself as a deserving partner in international trade, inter-governmental affairs, and other cooperative activities. Understanding that its international reputation on human rights is critical, Iran has embarked on a multi-pronged effort to convince the world at large that it has largely abandoned the practices of execution, torture, imprisonments, and repression that marked the early days of the Islamic revolution. Since 2002, for example, Iran has engaged in a series of “dialogues” with the European Union and others on human rights and trade. The story of its ongoing persecution of the Bahá’í community of Iran offers a singular litmus test of the Iranian government’s degree of sincerity in meeting

The House of the Báb in Shiraz, Iran, one of the most holy sites in the Bahá’í world, was destroyed by Revolutionary Guardsmen in 1979 and later razed by the government. The photo at top was taken before the demolition took place, shown at bottom.

CHAPTER II: A Campaign of Cultural Cleansing | 13 globally accepted human rights standards. Bahá’ís hold no political ambitions, are committed to non-violence, and seek only to help in the redevelopment of their native land. Yet, for more than 25 years, they have been persecuted wholly for their religious beliefs. Consider the following images: • After executing Bahá’ís by firing squad, Iranian officials in the 1980s would frequently demand payment for the price of the bullets from the families of the victims. • Ten Bahá’í women, arrested and charged with the “crime” of teaching religious classes for children and youth, were hanged, one by one, from the oldest to the youngest, as the others stood by. Prisoners who watched the 1983 hangings said that the executioners had hoped to force the younger women to recant their Faith, or even simply to say they were not Bahá’ís. None did, all preferring to die rather Muna Mahmudnizhad, than to renounce their beliefs. 17, was one of 10 Bahá’í • Bahá’ís, seeking simply to educate young people women executed in who had been excluded by government decree from Shiraz on 18 June 1983. higher education in Iran, set up their own college The primary charge classes in private homes around the country in the against her: teaching late 1980s. In 1998, Iranian officials raided some Bahá’í children’s classes. 500 private homes where such classes were held, arresting 30 teachers and confiscating hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of books, furniture and educational equipment. • Bahá’í holy sites, including those associated with the Iranian-born Founders of the Faith, have been systematically destroyed throughout the country, by officials using everything from pickaxes to bulldozers. • When Bahá’ís in Yazd approached government officials in late 2004 to call attention to their

14 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION persecutions, they were warned that any public complaints might cause the Iranian public to rise up against them, invade and burn down their homes, assault them, and possibly even kill them. Within weeks, indeed, Bahá’í homes were invaded, Bahá’ís were beaten, the Bahá’í graveyard was desecrated, and at least one Bahá’í-owned business was set ablaze. Evidence emerged that the police chief, who in theory should have protected the Bahá’ís, ordered the attacks. Although the persecution of the These and other images and events add up to noth- Bahá’í Faith in ing less than a systematic campaign aimed at the complete eradication of an entire minority community. It is, Iran has its roots in in short, a government-led effort at cultural cleansing. Iranian history, the Although the persecution of the Bahá’í Faith in current campaign Iran has its roots in Iranian history [See “The Historical Background,” page 65], the current campaign of of systematic systematic persecution began with the 1979 Islamic persecution began Revolution. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, virtually with the 1979 the entire leadership of the Iranian Bahá’í community Islamic Revolution. was arrested and executed or disappeared. In all, more than 200 Bahá’ís have been killed or executed since the Islamic Republic’s founding, and nearly 1,000 Bahá’ís have been imprisoned. The campaign at that time openly sought the wholesale destruction of the Bahá’í community. Thousands of Bahá’ís also were fired from jobs, deprived of pensions, and excluded from education (including primary and secondary education). Bahá’í properties, sacred sites, and cemeteries were confiscated and destroyed. All manner of rights to religious freedom, worship and assembly were abrogated. All of this has been well documented. Governments, non-governmental organizations, and the news media have widely reported on the persecution of Bahá’ís in Iran. In the 1980s and 1990s, the international

CHAPTER II: A Campaign of Cultural Cleansing | 15 community rose up and condemned this oppression through a series of resolutions at the United Nations and in other venues. For a time, conditions seemed to improve. In the late 1990s, the killings all but stopped. Most of those Bahá’ís held in prison were released. Bahá’í children were allowed to re-enroll in primary and secondary Iran’s anti-Bahá’í schools in most parts of the country. Some Bahá’ís were allowed to obtain new business licenses, and restricactions are not tions on other forms of economic activity appeared to random acts, lessen. but deliberate At the same time, however, those who followed government policy. events in Iran closely could see that the government never gave up its plans of eliminating the Bahá’í com- In 1993, concrete munity as a viable entity in Iranian society. Indeed, evidence emerged continuing through today, the Bahá’í community has that the government been kept off guard through the constant threat of arbitrary arrest and harassment. Restrictions on ownhad in fact adopted ing businesses and property have remained in force. a secret blueprint And Bahá’í youth have been prevented from entering for the quiet institutions of higher education. strangulation of the Bahá’í community. The Bahá’í Question Iran’s anti-Bahá’í actions are not random acts, but deliberate government policy. In 1993, concrete evidence emerged that the government had in fact adopted a secret blueprint for the quiet strangulation of the Bahá’í community. That evidence came in the form of a secret memorandum, which had been drawn up by the Iranian Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council (ISRCC) in 1991. [See page 18 for complete text of the ISRCC document.] Stamped “confidential,” the document was prepared at the request of the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the then President of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

16 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION The memorandum was signed by Hujjatu’l Islam Seyyed Mohammad Golpaygani, Secretary of the Council, and approved by Mr. Khamenei, who added his signature to the document. The memorandum came to light in the 1993 report by UN Special Representative Reynaldo Galindo Pohl. According to Mr. Galindo Pohl, the document came as “reliable information” just as the annual report on Iran to the UN Commission on Human Rights was being completed. The memorandum specifically calls for Iran’s Bahá’ís to be treated in such a way “that their progress and development shall be blocked,” providing for the first time conclusive evidence that the campaign against the Bahá’ís is centrally directed by A photocopy of the 1991 the government. memorandum from The document indicates, for example, that the gov- the Iranian Supreme ernment aims to keep the Bahá’ís illiterate and uned- Revolutionary ucated, living only at a subsistence level, and fearful Cultural Council on at every moment that even the tiniest infraction will “the Bahá’í question.” bring the threat of imprisonment or worse. Although some of its provisions appear to grant a measure of protection to Bahá’ís, its overall impact is to create an environment where the Bahá’í community of Iran will be quietly eliminated. The memorandum says, for example, that all Bahá’ís should be expelled from universities; that they shall be denied “positions of influence,” and instead only be allowed to “lead a modest life similar to that of the population in general”; and even that “employment

CHAPTER II: A Campaign of Cultural Cleansing | 17 The ISRCC document

[Translation from Persian] [Text in square brackets added by translator] In the Name of God! The Islamic Republic of Iran The Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council Number: 1327/.... Date: 6/12/69 [25 February 1991] Enclosure: None CONFIDENTIAL Dr. Seyyed Mohammad Golpaygani Head of the Office of the Esteemed Leader [Khamenei] Greetings! After greetings, with reference to the letter #1/783 dated 10/10/69 [31 December 1990], concerning the instructions of the Esteemed Leader which had been conveyed to the Respected President regarding the Bahá’í question, we inform you that, since the respected President and the Head of the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council had referred this question to this Council for consideration and study, it was placed on the Council’s agenda of session #128 on 16/11/69 [5 February 1991] and session #119 of 2/11/69 [22 January 1991]. In addition to the above, and further to the [results of the] discussions held in this regard in session #112 of 2/5/66 [24 July 1987] presided over by the Esteemed Leader (head and member of the Supreme Council), the recent views and directives given by the Esteemed Leader regarding the Bahá’í question were conveyed to the Supreme Council. In consideration of the contents of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the religious and civil laws and general policies of the country, these matters were carefully studied and decisions pronounced. In arriving at the decisions and proposing reasonable ways to counter the above question, due consideration was given to the wishes of the Esteemed Leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran [Khamenei], namely, that “in this regard a specific policy should be devised in such a way that everyone will understand what should or should not be done.” Consequently, the following proposals and recommendations resulted from these discussions. The respected President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the Head of the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council, while approving these recommendations, instructed us to convey them to the Esteemed Leader [Khamenei] so that appropriate action may be taken according to his guidance.

18 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION A. General status of the Bahá’ís within the country’s system 1. They will not be expelled from the country without reason. 2. They will not be arrested, imprisoned, or penalized without reason. 3. The government’s dealings with them must be in such a way that their progress and development are blocked. B. Educational and cultural status 1. They can be enrolled in schools provided they have not identified themselves as Bahá’ís. 2. Preferably, they should be enrolled in schools which have a strong and imposing religious ideology. 3. They must be expelled from universities, either in the admission process or during the course of their studies, once it becomes known that they are Bahá’ís. 4. Their political (espionage) activities must be dealt with according to appropriate government laws and policies, and their religious and propaganda activities should be answered by giving them religious and cultural responses, as well as propaganda. 5. Propaganda institutions (such as the Islamic Propaganda Organization) must establish an independent section to counter the propaganda and religious activities of the Bahá’ís. 6. A plan must be devised to confront and destroy their cultural roots outside the country. C. Legal and social status 1. Permit them a modest livelihood as is available to the general population. 2. To the extent that it does not encourage them to be Bahá’ís, it is permissible to provide them the means for ordinary living in accordance with the general rights given to every Iranian citizen, such as ration booklets, passports, burial certificates, work permits, etc. 3. Deny them employment if they identify themselves as Bahá’ís. 4. Deny them any position of influence, such as in the educational sector, etc. Wishing you divine confirmations, Secretary of the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council Dr. Seyyed Mohammad Golpaygani [Signature] [Note in the handwriting of Mr. Khamenei] In the Name of God! The decision of the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council seems sufficient. I thank you gentlemen for your attention and efforts. [signed:] Ali Khamenei

CHAPTER II: A Campaign of Cultural Cleansing | 19 shall be refused to persons identifying themselves as Bahá’ís.” The provisions regarding arrest, imprisonment and punishment can be read in two ways. The document says: (a) With regard to the general condition of Bahá’ís, Although some of its the following guidelines are hereby adopted: (i) they provisions appear are not to be expelled from the country without to grant a measure reason; (ii) they are not to be detained, imprisoned or punished without reason; (iii) the government’s of protection to treatment of them shall be such that their progress Bahá’ís, its overall and development shall be blocked. impact is to create At first glance, it might seem that the term “without reason” is a move towards greater justice, inasmuch an environment as virtually all of the detentions, arrests and imprisonwhere the Bahá’í ments of Bahá’ís in the past have been without cause. community of Iran However, when the entire memo is understood in the will be quietly context of what to do about “the Bahá’í question,” it is clear that the directive is merely instructing officials to eliminated. be sure that they justify their actions before they make any moves against a Bahá’í. It in no way promises any sort of protection. The memorandum also belies its underlying intentions when it says that Bahá’ís will be allowed to go to school only if they do not identify themselves as Bahá’ís, and that they should be sent to schools “with a strong religious ideology.” The aim here, obviously, is to wrest Bahá’í children from their faith. Ominously, the memorandum says that “A plan must be devised to confront and destroy their cultural roots outside the country.” That Iran would like to reach outside its borders to stamp out the Bahá’í Faith makes clear the degree of blind animosity felt by the government towards Bahá’ís. In the years since the memorandum was written, the Bahá’í community has experienced persecution in all of the areas outlined by it: Bahá’ís have been

20 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION detained, imprisoned, and falsely charged with “spy- Iran’s Bahá’ís have ing”; they have been denied access to education and experienced persecution sources of livelihood; they have been stripped of all in every region of the influence in Iranian society and deprived of their right country. to religious freedom. Indeed, as the next chapter indicates, the Iranian government has focused on social, economic and cultural repression aimed quite clearly at carrying out the plan endorsed by the “Bahá’í question” memorandum.

CHAPTER II: A Campaign of Cultural Cleansing | 21 22 | The Bahá’í Question Chapter III THE CURREN T SITUATION

I N CONTRAST TO its campaign of outright killing, imprisonment, and torture of Bahá’ís during The government’s the 1980s, the Iranian government has in recent efforts to deny years focused largely on economic and social ef- Bahá’í youth access forts to drive Bahá’ís from Iran and destroy their cultural and community life. to higher education Such measures include ongoing efforts to prevent perhaps most clearly Bahá’ís from receiving higher education, to deny them demonstrate the the means of economic livelihood, and to deprive them lengths to which the of the inspiration provided by their sacred and historic sites. Iranian government The government has also used arbitrary arrests and is willing to go in detentions, coupled with the confiscation of personal its campaign of property, to terrorize, oppress and otherwise keep the community off balance — a stratagem that appears to be cultural cleansing. on the rise. Behind these techniques remains the implicit threat of long term imprisonment and execution. Above all else, the Bahá’í community remains

Interior of the house of Mirza Abbas Nuri, an architectural landmark in Tehran, during its demolition in June 2004.

CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 23 without fundamental religious freedoms accorded to it in international human rights documents that Iran has signed. These include the right of Bahá’ís to freely assemble, to choose their leadership, and to openly manifest their religion “in worship, observance, practice and teaching.”

Denial of Access to Education The government’s efforts to deny Bahá’í youth access to higher education perhaps most clearly demonstrate the lengths to which the Iranian government is willing to go in its campaign of cultural cleansing. As previously stated, the Iranian government banned Bahá’í youth from education shortly after the 1979 Islamic revolution. At first, all Bahá’í children were excluded from schooling, but in the 1990s, primary and secondary school children were allowed to re-enroll. But the ban on the entry of Bahá’í youth into public and private institutions of higher education has remained. The Bahá’í Faith places a high value on education, and Bahá’ís have always been among the besteducated groups in Iran. Being denied access to higher education for years has had a demoralizing effect on Bahá’í youth, and the erosion of the educational level of the community is clearly aimed at hastening its impoverishment. In late 2003, early 2004, however, the government indicated that it would allow Bahá’í youth to enroll in university in the autumn of 2004. (It’s worth noting that the government was at the time engaged in a human rights dialogue with the European Union, and one demand of the Europeans was improved access to education for Bahá’ís.) The key to this change was the publication of news articles stating that the question of religious affiliation would be removed from university entrance examina-

24 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION tions and other university enrollment documents. The removal of the data field asking for religious affiliation was critical to Bahá’í youth who sought to enter university. The government had always said that if Bahá’ís simply declare themselves as Muslims, they would be allowed to enroll. But for Bahá’ís, such a false declaration would not only be against the principles of their faith, which precludes lying or dissimulation, it The Iranian would also tacitly play into the hands of government government banned efforts to get them to deny their faith. Bahá’í youth from education shortly False Promises after the 1979 With the promise that religious affiliation would not Islamic revolution. matter, about 1,000 Bahá’ís accordingly signed up At first, all Bahá’í for and took university entrance examinations. And, indeed, no field declaring religion was on the papers. children were Students were asked to take a religious subject excluded from examination, however. It came as part of the whole schooling, but in range of subject tests relating to mathematics, lanthe 1990s, primary guage, history, and so on. The religion tests were offered in four subjects, Islam, Christianity, Judaism and secondary and Zoroastrianism, corresponding to the four recog- school children were nized religions in Iran. allowed to re-enroll. Most Bahá’í students opted for the Islamic subject test since, as the majority religion, Islam is taught in all schools and most Bahá’ís in Iran accordingly have a solid familiarity with its teachings. In August, however, when the examination results were mailed out, government authorities had printed the word “Islam” in a data field listing a prospective student’s religion. Officials cynically explained they did that on the assumption that choosing to take the subject test on Islam amounts to a de facto declaration of faith in Islam. Upon learning of the forced religious declaration, (continued on page 28)

CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 25 The Bahá’í Institute for Higher Education

I N WHAT THE New York Times called “an elaborate act of communal self-preservation,” the Bahá’í community in 1987 established its own higher education program to meet the educational needs of as many of its young people as resources would allow. That program evolved over the years into a full-fledged university, known as the Bahá’í Institute for Higher Education (BIHE), which, until mid-1998, had an enrollment of some 900 students, a faculty of more than 150 first-rate academics and instructors, and complete course offerings in ten subject areas. Because of the continual threat of persecution, the BIHE was forced to operate in a highly circumspect and decentralized manner. Most of its classes were held in private homes throughout Iran and what little permanent infrastructure it had was composed of a handful of rented classrooms and laboratories scattered throughout the capital. Then, in an act that speaks volumes about the government’s real attitude towards Bahá’ís, hundreds of government agents fanned out across the country in September 1998, arresting some 36 BIHE faculty and staff, raiding some 500 homes, and confiscating hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of books, equipment and records in a blatant effort to shut the university down. “The materials confiscated were neither political nor religious, and the people arrested were not fighters or organizers,” said the New York Times, in a 29 October 1998 article about the raids. “They were lecturers in subjects like accounting and dentistry; the materials seized were textbooks and laboratory equipment.” Teaching was done principally via correspondence, or, for specialized scientific and technical courses and in other special cases, in smallgroup classes that were usually held in private homes. “At the beginning, the students did not even know the names of their professors,” said one BIHE professor, who, like most others quoted in this article, wanted to remain anonymous out of fear for his safety and that of his relatives in Iran. “Even after three or four years, the students did not know the names of their professors. They had never seen them. Because it was very dangerous. If somebody knows the name of them, maybe they would tell their friends. So it was all correspondence at the beginning of this plan.”

26 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION Over time, however, the Institute was able to establish a few laboratories, operated in privately owned commercial buildings in and around Tehran, for computer science, physics, dental science, pharmacology, applied chemistry and language study. The operations of these laboratories were kept prudently quiet, with students cautioned not to come and go in large groups that might give the authorities a reason to object. Most of the classes offered by the Bahá’í Among its faculty were approxi- Institute for Higher Education have been mately 25 or 30 professors who had held in private homes, like this one, which been fired from government-run uni- shows a professor with his back to the easel versities after the 1979 Islamic Revolu- and several students on living room couches. tion. Other faculty members included doctors, dentists, lawyers and engineers. The majority were educated in Iran, but a good number have degrees from universities in the West, including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Columbia University, the University of California at Berkeley and the Sorbonne. None of the Bahá’í faculty members were paid for their time; all worked as volunteers. “These youth are very precious people,” said a faculty member, explaining why they were willing to take such risks, without monetary remuneration, to establish the Institute. “We all care about them. They have been through tests and trials and they had no hope. They have been deprived of many things so if there was any chance for us to get something better for them, we did it.” While most of those arrested were ultimately released, and the holding of classes in private homes has resumed on a small scale, the effort by the government to shut down the BIHE clearly demonstrates the degree of hatred and prejudice against the Bahá’ís that remains in certain circles of the government — and shows unambiguously why the Bahá’í community will not be safe until legal protections are firmly institutionalized, regardless of talk of reform.

CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 27 a group of Bahá’í students complained to officials at the Educational Measurement and Evaluation Organization (EMEO), asking if they could return the exam results with corrected information. A footnote in the The Bahá’í Faith letter conveying examination results said that incorrect places a high value names and addresses could and should be corrected on education, and returned. However, no mention was made about correcting and Bahá’ís have religious information. Indeed, Bahá’ís were told by always been among EMEO officials that “incorrect religion would not be the best educated corrected” on the forms since the Bahá’í Faith is not among the officially recognized religions in Iran. groups in Iran. Shortly after that meeting, Bahá’í students wrote a Being denied access letter of protest to the EMEO. The students expressed, to higher education clearly, their objection to having been designated as for years has had a Muslims after having been promised that they would not have to disclose their religion in order to take the demoralizing effect entrance examination. on Bahá’í youth, At first, officials of the EMEO seemed to sympaand the erosion of thize with their problem, even allowing Bahá’ís to fill out revised registration forms with no religious affiliathe educational level tion. However, even though some 800 Bahá’í students of the community who had passed their examinations also met the new is clearly aimed deadline for submission of the revised forms, only at hastening its ten names were published in an EMEO bulletin on 12 September 2004 announcing which students had been impoverishment. admitted to university. It’s worth noting also that many Bahá’ís received high scores on the examinations, and, in fact, many of them were passed over in the admission process, while many lower-scoring Muslim students were accepted. In the end, out of solidarity with the rest of the 800 students who had been unfairly discriminated against, those ten Bahá’ís declined to register in the universities to which they had been accepted. And so, for the school year 2004-2005, Bahá’í young people were once again utterly deprived of access to higher education.

28 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION For Bahá’ís, the entire episode seems calculated to accomplish a number of government objectives. First, it apparently seeks to demoralize Iranian Bahá’í youth in an effort to induce them to leave the country. Second, it allowed Iranian authorities to identify by name those Bahá’ís with outstanding academic ability, who might at some point play a role in helping to revive the Bahá’í community’s fortunes. And, third, it allowed the Iranian government to say to international human rights monitors that they had given the Bahá’ís a chance to enroll — and that it was the Bahá’ís themselves who refused the opportunity. Yet the government, of course, has long been aware that Bahá’ís cannot and will not as a matter of religious principle falsify or misrepresent their beliefs. And so it is clear from the whole affair that the 1991 policy aiming at blocking the development and progress of the Bahá’í community remains in effect.

Destruction of Holy Places In the destruction of Bahá’í holy places, the government also demonstrates the lengths to which it will go to suffocate the Bahá’í community in Iran and to cleanse Bahá’í culture from modern memory — even though it may mean destroying monuments and buildings of historic importance to the society at large. In June 2004, authorities demolished an historic house in Tehran that had been designed and owned by the father of the Faith’s founder. The house was not only significant to Bahá’ís but was also considered to be a sterling example of period architecture of historic importance to Iranians. The house that was destroyed in June was owned by Mirza Abbas Nuri, the father of Bahá’u’lláh. Its destruction prompted an outcry by Bahá’ís around the world. (continued on page 34)

CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 29 The Bahá’í community of Iran speaks for itself

I N NOVEMBER 2004, the Iranian Bahá’í community addressed a letter to Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, outlining the scope of the persecution they have faced for 25 years. The letter examines the persecution in light of those verses of the Qur’an and Islamic law that proscribe violence and uphold freedom of religion. It also notes that Iran signed and ratified the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and associated covenants that protect freedom of religion. It then recounts the government’s recent duplicity in offering university enrollment to Bahá’í youth but then falsely recording them as Muslims. It ends with a call for the full emancipation of the Bahá’í community. Here follow excerpts from the letter: 15 November 2004 The Esteemed Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran Mr. Khatami

For more than 161 years, the Bahá’ís have been exposed, in the sacred land of Iran—the native soil of their forefathers in whose name they take pride—to a series of abuses, tortures, murders and massacres and have tolerated numerous forms of persecution, tragedy and deprivation, for no other reason than believing in God and following their Faith, the largest religious minority in Iran. Contrary to all religious, legal and moral standards, and supported by existing official documentation, they have been, individually and collectively, the subject of unwarranted discrimination and various injustices. Every time a political and social turmoil has occurred in this country, new machinations have been devised against this religious minority, and, in one way or another, their inalienable rights have been violated.

Day after day, the pressure against this wronged community became more intense and the scope of the injustice and infringement of their rights in various aspects of their lives more overt, such that their possessions, their homes, their jobs and their very existence were the target of attacks.

30 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION Bahá’ís would never commit any act contrary to the law of the land; they are well-wishers of the people and the state; they do not involve themselves with any political party; and they tenaciously uphold their Faith’s principles, which call on them to love and serve the entire human race and to bring about peace, amity and unity of religion.

From the perspective of the holy religion of Islam, people are free to choose and follow their own religion, and no one has the right to impose his religion on another. The following noble verses “Let there be no compulsion in religion…” and “To you be your Way, and to me mine” confirm this point. From the perspective of the holy religion of Islam, no one has the right to attack and violate the properties, the life and the dignity of those who live under the banner of this religion, which is to be secure and protected: “…if anyone slew a person—unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land—it would be as if he slew the whole people…”

The equality, the freedom and the inalienable rights of all members of the human family, without discrimination as to race, gender, language and religion, have been unequivocally specified in all international covenants, especially in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Notwithstanding the Divine Standards and social and legal norms, to which brief reference has been made, certain decisions which have baffled humanity were made at the beginning of the [Islamic] Revolution, under authority of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Under the rubric of Cultural Revolution, the authorities of the [Ministry of ] Culture and Education decided to expel Bahá’í students, some of whom were completing their last term, from universities and other institutions of higher learning in which they were studying. Others were barred from entering these institutions solely because of their adherence to the Bahá’í Faith. Then in 1369 [1990/91], the Council of Cultural Revolution, with reference to a well-planned agenda, openly deprived Bahá’í youth from higher education, thereby denying a number of the youth of this land the opportunity to realize their potential. This situation continued for some 20 years until in Ádhar of 1382 [December of 2003]

CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 31 “Peykesanjesh” (the publication of the Ministry of Science) officially announced that for the first time the religious affiliation of applicants would not be included in the application for the [university] national examination, and, instead, applicants would be asked to choose the subject of religious studies in which they would wish to be examined. Owing to the limitation cited in Article 13 of the Constitution, Bahá’í applicants necessarily chose Islamic studies for this examination.

Having received their entrance identification cards and subsequently taking this national examination, the success of Bahá’í youth, based on the government announcement of results in the first phase, was significant in that some 800 students were qualified to choose their fields of study, of whom hundreds ranked in the one to four digit range [a ranking scale extending to 200,000]. After receiving their test result forms, however, the Bahá’í applicants were surprised to see that their religion was specified as Islam. This duplicity astounded the Bahá’í community. Alas, the joyful news that the question about the religion of the applicants had been omitted from the national university entrance examination, which was a reflection of freedom of belief and a sign that the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran was moving toward establishing the foundation of human rights and eliminating discrimination in education, was quite short-lived.

Questions continue to preoccupy the minds of the members of the Bahá’í community in Iran and throughout the world as well as free thinkers and advocates of human rights: Does such unfair decision-making, such resorting to strategies whose direction is obvious and whose aim is to create prejudice and to violate the indisputable rights of a community, conform to standards of justice and equity? Should those who seek progress be barred from acquiring knowledge and deprived of actualizing their God-given potentialities because of their religious belief?

By now, a quarter of a century has elapsed in the reign of the Islamic government. To every act of injustice, Bahá’ís have responded

32 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION with magnanimity. Faced with widespread and intense persecutions and multi-faceted iniquities, the Bahá’ís have never deviated, even by a hair’s breadth, from the straight divine path, and they continue to hold fast onto the cord of patience and tolerance as dictated by their Faith and belief.

They fain would expect that, over such a long period of time, which should have been sufficient to remove suspicions and misunderstandings, the esteemed authorities would have realized that the Bahá’ís firmly believe in the oneness of God and the divine nature of all religions and prophets, as well as the realm beyond as confirmed in all the divine scriptures; they obey the laws and regulations of their country in accordance with the principles of their religion; they strive to preserve the interests of their homeland by offering cultural, social, economic and developmental assistance; and they would never refuse any service to establish human virtues and perfections which fulfil such universal visions as world peace and the oneness of humanity.

It is now hoped that [that respected authority], based on the Constitution, will take immediate action to ensure the emancipation of the Iranian Bahá’í community, reinstating their human rights and restoring the privileges of which they have been deprived.

Respectfully,

The Iranian Bahá’í community

CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 33 In six nations, Bahá’í communities coordinated the publication of a statement in major newspapers that decried the house’s destruction as part of a campaign of “cultural cleansing” against the minority Bahá’í community in Iran. Noting that the house was an “historical monument, a precious example of Islamic-Iranian architecture, ‘a matchless model of art, spirituality, and architecture,’” the statement compared this action by Iran’s extremist Muslim leadership to those of the Taliban of Afghanistan. “The hatred of the extremist mullahs for the Bahá’ís is such that they, like the Taliban of Afghanistan who destroyed the towering Buddhist sculptures at Bamian, intend not only to eradicate the religion, but even to erase all traces of its existence in the country of its birth,” said the statement. “In their determination to rid Iran of the Bahá’í community and obliterate its very memory, the fundamentalists in power are prepared even to destroy the cultural heritage of their own country, which they appear not to realize they hold in trust for humankind,” Destruction of cultural the statement continued. heritage. Another image Mirza Abbas Nuri himself was widely regarded of the interior of the house as one of Iran’s greatest calligraphers and statesmen. of Mirza Abbas Nuri In July, the Iranian newspaper Hamshahri published in Tehran during its a lengthy article about his life and the architecture of demolition in June 2004. his house. “As he had good taste for the arts and for beauty, he designed his own house in such a style that it became known as one of the most beautiful houses of that

34 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION period,” wrote Iman Mihdizadih on 13 July 2004. “The plasterwork and the tile-work in the rooms as well as the verdant veranda, the courtyard with its central pool, and the trees planted in the flowerbeds, all created a tranquil atmosphere in this house.” The house was destroyed over the period of about one week in June. The demolition order was issued in April by Ayatollah Kani, director of the Marvi School In the destruction of and the Endowments Office of the government, ostensibly for the purpose of creating an Islamic cemetery. Bahá’í holy places, When the demolition started on 20 June, officials from the government the Ministry of Information were present, and by 29 also demonstrates June more than 70 percent of the structure had been destroyed. the lengths to The destruction of the house of Mirza Abbas Nuri which it will go to followed the razing in April 2004 of another historic suffocate the Bahá’í Bahá’í property, the gravesite of Quddus, an early community in Iran disciple of the Bahá’í Faith. The action came after demolition work started in February and then halted and to cleanse Bahá’í temporarily in the face of protest at the local, national, culture from modern and international levels. memory — even Indeed, Bahá’ís had approached national authorities after the demolition work had been started, and though it may for a time that work was halted. Then, in April, it was mean destroying discovered that the dismantling of the gravesite had monuments and continued surreptitiously over a period of days until buildings of historic the structure was entirely demolished. The house-like structure marked the resting place of importance to the Mullah Muhammad-Ali Barfurushi, known as Quddus society at large. (The Most Holy). Quddus was the foremost disciple of the Báb, the Prophet-Herald of the Bahá’í Faith. The destruction of two such important holy sites in 2004 was not without precedent. In March 1979, the House of the Báb, the holiest Bahá’í shrine in Iran, was turned over by the government to a Muslim cleric known for his anti-Bahá’í activities. In September that year, that house was destroyed by a mob led by mullahs

CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 35 and officials of the Department of Religious Affairs. Likewise, in the early years of the Islamic Republic, the House of Bahá’u’lláh in Takur, where the Founder of the Bahá’í Faith spent His childhood, met a similar fate: it was demolished and the site was offered for sale to the public. Over the years, as well, in Tehran and other cit- ...in April, it was ies throughout Iran, Bahá’í buildings have been looted discovered that and burned, Bahá’í cemeteries have been bulldozed the dismantling and Bahá’í graves have been broken open. In the Tehran area, the Bahá’ís were forced to bury their dead of the gravesite in a barren stretch of land reserved by the authorities had continued for “infidels.” Having access to their own cemeteries is surreptitiously over especially important to Bahá’ís because, as might be a period of days until expected, they are not allowed to bury their dead in Muslim cemeteries. the structure was entirely demolished. Arbitrary Arrests and Harassment Beyond such specific efforts at cultural cleansing, the government has in recent years continued its policy of keeping the Bahá’í community off balance through various measures, including arbitrary arrests, short term detention, persistent harassment, and other forms of intimidation and discrimination. As noted, hundreds of Bahá’ís were imprisoned during the early 1980s. Then, in response to international pressure, the government gradually released nearly all long-term Bahá’í prisoners. As of July 2005, for example, only two Bahá’ís, Dhabihu’llah Mahrami and Mehran Kawsari, were being held under longterm prison sentences. Yet the use of arbitrary arrest and short-term imprisonment as methods of harassment, terror and oppression against Bahá’ís not only continues but appears to be on the rise. In late July-early August 2005, as this publication was going to press, some 16 Bahá’ís in three

36 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION Gravesite of Quddus, an historic figure of the Bahá’í Faith, during its surreptitious demolition in April 2004. The gravesite is located in Babol, Iran.

CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 37 Bahá’ís gather outside Tehran in 1982 for the funeral of one of their co-religionists who was killed by the government.

locations were arrested and imprisoned. In March, April, and May of 2005 some 35 Bahá’ís across Iran were arrested and held for short periods, ranging from a week to nearly three months. Those arrested included not only prominent members of the community in Tehran, but also six Bahá’ís in Shiraz, nine in the city of Semnan, and nine Bahá’í farmers whose homes and land had previously been confiscated in the village of Kata. Most were arbitrarily detained without any charge being filed against them. Some of the prisoners were

38 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION held incommunicado, in unknown locations, while their families desperately searched for them. Most were released only after having posted significant amounts of money, property deeds or business licenses as bail. Moreover, government agents conducted prolonged searches of many of the homes of those who were The Iranian arrested, confiscating documents, books, computers, copiers and other belongings. government has Among those arrested in the spring of 2005, only in recent years Mr. Kawsari remains in prison at the time this booklet continued its policy was published in August 2005. Mr. Kawsari was arrested of keeping the on 8 March 2005 for distributing the open letter sent to President Khatami [see page 30]. He received a one-year Bahá’í community sentence and has been incarcerated in Evin prison. off balance through Also recently in the city of Yazd, long a center of various measures, anti-Bahá’í activities, it appears that the police chief orchestrated a series of incidents against Bahá’ís. In including arbitrary late 2004 and early 2005, a number of Bahá’ís were arrests, short term arrested, detained, and interrogated; several were beaten detention, persistent in their homes; at least one Bahá’í-owned business was harassment, and set afire; and the Bahá’í graveyard was desecrated. Such incidents are hardly isolated. In 2003, for exam- other forms of ple, some 23 Bahá’ís in 18 different localities in Iran were intimidation and subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention for short peri- discrimination. ods of time. In all cases, Iranian authorities summoned these people because they were Bahá’ís, questioned them about their beliefs, and then released them. In 2002, 17 Bahá’í youth who were participating in a camp were arrested and detained for questioning. Reports about this incident in the Iranian press carried a negative slant, referring to the young Bahá’ís in a derogatory and vulgar manner.

Discrimination in the courts The story of Mr. Mahrami, also in prison at the time of the publication of this booklet, is instructive in that

CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 39 it likewise reflects the very real and continuing threat of imprisonment for the Bahá’ís in Iran — and the degree to which the legal system is prejudiced against Bahá’ís. Mr. Mahrami was first called before the In 2003, some Islamic Revolutionary Court in Yazd in 1995 and questioned about his adherence to the Bahá’í Faith. Several 23 Bahá’ís in 18 meetings were held in an effort to persuade him to different localities in renounce his beliefs; he refused and was charged with Iran were subjected apostasy. In 1996 he was sentenced to death. Since his heirs are not Muslims but Bahá’ís, his properties and to arbitrary arrest assets were confiscated. After his lawyer had appealed and detention for to the Supreme Court, Iranian officials announced short periods of that the Court had rejected the verdict of the Revotime. In all cases, lutionary Court and referred the case to a civil court. However, in 1997, the Supreme Court confirmed the Iranian authorities death sentence (communicated orally to his relatives). summoned these Finally, in 1999, the Bahá’í International Community people because was unofficially informed that a Presidential amnesty had commuted Mr. Mahrami’s death sentence to life they were Bahá’ís, imprisonment. questioned them The government has also used the courts to reinabout their beliefs, force a general sense of second-class citizenship for and then released Bahá’ís. Over the years, there have been numerous discriminatory decisions rendered against Bahá’ís. them. In a recent court case, for example, 12 plaintiffs filed a petition against a man accused of murdering their relative, who was a Bahá’í. The court’s verdict recognized the crime as a “quasi-intentional” murder and convicted the man as charged. But he was sentenced, without payment of blood money, to only four months imprisonment, and that was suspended as time already served. Calling Bahá’ís a “perverse sect” and “infidels,” the court concluded that they should receive neither requital nor blood money in cases of murder. This verdict is alarming, as it could incite Muslims to believe that they are free to take the lives of Bahá’ís in Iran with impunity.

40 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION Economic Measures In the 1980s, over 10,000 Bahá’ís were dismissed from positions in government and educational institutions. Many remain unemployed and receive no unemploy- In the 1980s, over ment benefits. The pensions of Bahá’ís dismissed on religious grounds were terminated, and some were 10,000 Bahá’ís even required to return salaries paid to them before were dismissed they were dismissed. from positions Efforts to impoverish the Bahá’í community and to in government deprive its members of their economic livelihood have continued through a variety of means. In particular, and educational government authorities have in many places around institutions. Many the country continued to block Bahá’ís from receiving remain unemployed pensions, conducting business, or finding employment. Authorities have also continued in the arbitrary confisand receive no cation of homes and properties owned by Bahá’ís. unemployment benefits. The Employment pensions of Bahá’ís Limitations on employment opportunities continue dismissed on to be imposed on Bahá’ís in various sectors of the religious grounds economy. Even when Bahá’ís find employment in the were terminated, private sector, government officials often intervene and force the owners of the companies to fire them. And and some were even when Bahá’ís start a private business, the authorities required to return attempt to block their activities. salaries paid to them Two recent court cases, for example, demonstrate before they were the efforts of the authorities to impede Bahá’ís from conducting private business activities. dismissed. In September 2003, Branch 13 of the Tribunal of Administrative Justice rejected an appeal by a Bahá’í businessman against an injunction that required him to cease his business operations. The court also rejected his petition to obtain a business license. The tribunal held that his appeal was “disqualified as irrelevant, as [it was] outside the scope of the applicable regulations,”

CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 41 citing the information the court had “about the plaintiff ’s being associated with the perverse Baha’i sect.” In 2003, in a second, similar case, an administrative injunction was issued to impede a Bahá’í-owned company in Isfahan from doing business. The company is owned and directed by a Bahá’í engineer and employs some 120 staff — most of whom are Bahá’ís — manufacturing electrical and communication cables. In the The government injunction, the Director-General of the Central Office continues to deny of Protection, which is under the Iranian Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, informed the company many Bahá’ís of an official memorandum issued in April 2003. The rightfully earned document concluded that “the link between the… pension funds. company… and the perverse Baha’i sect is established to be true; therefore it is advisable to adopt measures Documents prove to prevent any collaboration with the above-mentioned that this policy is company.” intentional — and The intergovernmental body most concerned with solely related to the right to employment, the International Labour Organization (ILO), made a number of references to the pensioner’s the ongoing discrimination against the Bahá’ís in Iran membership in the at its annual Conference on Conventions and Recom- Bahá’í Faith. mendations in June 2003. The “situation of members of the Bahá’í Faith, an unrecognized religious minority, continues to be a source of concern,” said the report. “The barriers that these people face in access to higher education and to employment in public institutions are still high.”

Deprivation of Pensions In the first years of its campaign of persecution, the Iranian government stopped pension payments to thousands of Bahá’ís who had been employed in government service. Bahá’ís have, over the years, sought to have their pensions restored. The government, however, continues to deny many Bahá’ís rightfully earned

42 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION pension funds. Documents prove that this policy is intentional — and solely related to the pensioner’s membership in the Bahá’í Faith. In a letter dated 30 May 2003, for example, the Office of Beneficiary Affairs of the Keshavarzi Bank instructed its General Office to discontinue the disbursement of a Bahá’í’s pension to his heirs because he was a member of the Bahá’í “sect.” The decision was later confirmed by the head of the Office of Legal and In virtually Parliament Affairs, who cited a judicial decree of Imam every case, court Khomeini and said a letter of the National Retirement Bureau number 6/18448 (dated 3 November 2003) must judgments or be implemented in such cases. documents have Likewise, in a letter dated 17 December 2003, the emerged that prove General Office of Finance transmitted a letter to the the properties were director of the Retirement Bureau of the Province of Azerbaijan-e-Sharqi, stating that since a Bahá’í’s confiscated because employment had been terminated due to his belief in the owners were “the perverse Baha’i sect,” there was no authorization Bahá’ís. to return or transfer his retirement deductions. Earlier documented evidence involved decisions in four more cases, dating from July 2001 to November 2002, where Iranian Bahá’ís have been denied access to their own, rightfully earned pensions. The documents prove that this action was taken solely on the basis of religious belief, as they explicitly state: “payment of pension to those individuals connected with the Baha’i sect is illegal.”

The Confiscation of Property During the past few years, there has been an increase in confiscation of Bahá’í properties, in particular in the cities of Rafsanjan, Kerman, Marv-Dasht, and Yazd. Property owned by Bahá’ís has also been confiscated in Tehran, in the village of Kata and in the village of Matneq. In October 2004, for example, the homes of

CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 43 six Bahá’í families in Kata (in the Buyir-Ahmad region of Iran) were confiscated on the order of the prosecutor of the city of Shiraz, with the assistance of the local police. In virtually every case, court judgments or documents have emerged that prove the properties were confiscated because the owners were Bahá’ís. For example, one house confiscated in Tehran in 1998 belonged to a Muslim landlord, who was leasing the property to a Bahá’í. The landlord lodged an appeal, and an extract from the court documents (dated 15 Sep-

The ongoing threat of execution

S INCE 1978, MORE than 200 Bahá’ís have been killed or executed in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Most were killed in the early 1980s, before international attention was focused on the crisis. A full list of those killed or executed can be found in Appendix I. Although in recent years the government has sharply reduced its killing rate, it continued occasionally to execute Bahá’ís through the late 1990s. The most recent execution of a Bahá’í in Iran was in July 1998, when Ruhu’llah Rawhani was hanged in Mashhad. Nevertheless, the threat of execution or killing still looms large for Iranian Bahá’ís, who remain without recognized legal status in Iran. A number of Bahá’ís in recent years have been held in prison under the sentence of death, for example. Fortunately, international pressure has helped to convince Iranian authorities to commute or reduce those sentences. One such case surrounded the sentence given to Musa Talibi, a Bahá’í from Vilashahr, who was arrested in 1994 and then sentenced to death in 1996 on the charge of apostasy. He was 63 years old at the time. After appeal and initial confirmation of this sentence by the Supreme Court, the Bahá’í International Community was unofficially

44 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION tember 2001) reveals the underlying judicial issues: “In principle, the foundation for the Ministry of Intelligence taking legal and serious action against the cultural activities of the misguided sect of Baha’ism has been on the order of His Excellency the Supreme Leader.… The action taken by Court 49 regarding the seizure and confiscation of the properties belonging to the misguided sect of Baha’ism is legally and religiously justifiable.… Such opposition [however] must be carried out in a manner and within a framework through which the rights of the righteous [literally, ‘those to

informed in 1999 that his death sentence had been commuted to life imprisonment. Finally, in May 2003, after being visited by members of the UN Working Group on Arbitary Detention that February, Mr. Talibi was freed. Likewise, two men, Bihnam Mithaqi and Kayvan Khalajabadi were released in February 2004, after having been imprisoned since 1989 on charges arising solely from membership in the Bahá’í Faith. They had been sentenced to death in 1991, and their sentences reconfirmed on Ruhu’llah Rawhani, who appeal by the Supreme Court in 1996. was hanged in Mashad by In 2001, however, the chief of the judi- government authorities on 21 cial branch reduced their sentences to July 1998. 15 years in prison for “association with Bahá’í institutions.” Both men were released on 7 February 2004, having served out their full sentences. The stories behind the two most recent executions — in 1998 and 1992 — reflect the arbitrary and terrifying nature of the threat. Ruhu’llah Rawhani, a father of four and an active Bahá’í during his entire life, suffered through the indignities of religious persecution

CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 45 whom rights are due’] would be safeguarded and protected.” In yet another recent case, a Bahá’í appealed for the return of his home, confiscated because of its alleged use as a venue for teaching about the Bahá’í Faith, and for holding classes of the Bahá’í Institute for Higher Education. In rejecting the appeal, the Islamic Revolutionary Court upheld the decision of a lower court on the grounds that the owner had held Bahá’í classes in this home and that over 900 volumes of Bahá’í books

throughout much of Iran’s recent history. In 1984, Mr. Rawhani was arrested and imprisoned for more than a year, during which he was tortured, according to relatives. He was subsequently released but then was arrested a second time in the mid-1990s. The charge was apparently related to his volunteer work at purely religious activities, such as prayer meetings and children’s classes. He was released after 24 hours. In September 1997, however, the medical supplies salesman was arrested for a third time, and placed in solitary confinement in Mashhad. Mr. Rawhani had been accused of “converting” a woman from Islam to the Bahá’í Faith. The woman, however, denied that she had converted; she explained that her mother was a Bahá’í and that she herself had been raised as a Bahá’í. She was not arrested. Mr. Rawhani was kept incommunicado for the duration of his imprisonment and no information is available regarding his treatment in prison. There is no evidence that he was accorded any legal process, and no sentence was announced. It appears certain that he was not allowed access to a lawyer. On 20 July 1998, someone from the Iranian Intelligence Department telephoned a Bahá’í in Mashhad stating that Mr. Rawhani was to be executed the next day. Initially, this statement was not believed, as Bahá’ís in Iran have received similar calls previously in apparent attempts to frighten them. The next morning, the family was called, told to come to the prison

46 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION had been found there. A further attempt to obtain redress was also denied, as Branch 23 of the Appeals Court in Tehran declared the verdict final and ended all legal recourse in this case. Such verdicts demonstrate that the Iranian authorities continue to consider the Bahá’í Faith as an illegal movement and legitimize, through the courts, violations against the rights of Iranian citizens who are members of the Bahá’í community.

to collect Mr. Rawhani’s body, and given an hour to bury him. Rope marks on his neck indicated he had been hanged. Bahman Samandari, a Tehran businessman, was executed in March 1992. Mr. Samandari, who ran a well-known Tehran travel agency, was summoned without explanation to Evin prison by authorities on 17 March 1992. The next day, he was secretly executed. No official charge or verdict was announced, and inquiries by family members produced vague indications that Mr. Samandari’s execution was related to his previous detention more than four years before, when he and four other Bahá’ís were arrested for having a prayer meeting in his home. In addition to these governmentsponsored executions, Bahá’ís have also recently been killed under circumstances Mr. Bahman Samandari, that indicate continuing disregard for who was summarily executed Bahá’ís as individuals who deserve pro- by the Government in tection under the law. March 1992.

CHAPTER III: The Current Situation | 47 48 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION Chapter IV “TO KILL A BAH Á’Í IS A G O OD DEED…”

How the contemporary persecutions started

L ONG BEFORE THE targeting of innocents by suicide bombers and the gruesome webcast of “infidel” executions on the Internet became commonplace, the Bahá’í community of Iran faced and survived a horrific campaign of killing, torture and imprisonment that had “He was a Bahá’í, been inspired by religious fanaticism. and to kill a Bahá’í In 1982, in the village of Rahimkhani, armed assail- is a good deed for ants broke into the home of Askar Muhammadi and devout Muslims.” shot him in the back. Confronted by Mr. Muhammadi’s brother as they were leaving the scene of the crime, the murderers stated simply: “He was a Bahá’í, and to kill a Bahá’í is a good deed for devout Muslims.” While many Iranians hailed the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 as the dawn of a long awaited era of political liberty and national reconstruction, it was clear from the start that the Bahá’ís would be unjustly reviled for their beliefs.

Funeral of Hashin Farnush, arrested 5 November 1980, executed 23 June 1981. His wife is shown kneeling down at his graveside in Tehran.

CHAPTER IV: “To kill a Bahá’í is a good deed...” | 49 Even before Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile to assume power in February of that year, an increase in attacks on Bahá’ís presaged the wholesale persecution that was to come. In 1978 at least seven Bahá’ís were killed, most as a result of mob violence. When the Republic’s new constitution was drawn up in April 1979, certain rights of the Christian, Jew- Courts in the Islamic ish and Zoroastrian minorities in Iran were specifi- Republic have cally mentioned and protected. However, no mention denied Bahá’ís the whatsoever was made of the rights of the Bahá’í comright of redress or munity, Iran’s largest religious minority. Under Iran’s concept of an Islamic government, protection against this exclusion has come to mean that Bahá’ís enjoy assault, killings no rights of any sort, and that they can be attacked or other forms of and persecuted with impunity. Courts in the Republic have denied Bahá’ís the right of redress or protection persecution — and against assault, killings or other forms of persecution have ruled that — and have ruled that Iranian citizens who kill or Iranian citizens injure Bahá’ís are not liable for damages because their who kill or injure victims are “unprotected infidels.” Without any claim to civil rights, the Bahá’í com- Bahá’ís are not munity saw rapid deterioration of its position within liable for damages Iranian society. In March 1979, the House of the Báb, because their victims the holiest Bahá’í shrine in Iran, was turned over by the government to a Muslim cleric known for his are “unprotected anti-Bahá’í activities. In September, the house was infidels.” destroyed by a mob led by mullahs and officials of the Department of Religious Affairs. A November 1979 edict from the Ministry of Education required not only the dismissal of all Bahá’í teachers, but also held them responsible for the repayment of all salaries they had previously received.

50 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION The nine members of the National Spiritual Assembly who were kidnapped in 1980.

At least seven Bahá’ís were killed in 1979. Two were executed by the government and one was hanged in prison. Others were beaten to death or killed in local incidents.

“To cut off the head...” Buoyed by their growing influence over all aspects of Iranian life, in 1980 the clergy moved “to cut off the head” of the “heretical” Bahá’í movement by destroying its leadership, believing that the majority of the Bahá’ís would then succumb to social pressures to recant their Faith. This policy is reflected in the fact that nearly half the Bahá’ís executed in Iran since 1979 have been members of national and local governing councils of the Bahá’í community, known as Spiritual Assemblies. The execution on 27 June 1980 of Yusuf Sobhani, a highly regarded member of the Tehran Bahá’í community, was among the first of such killings that targeted Bahá’í leadership. This was followed by the executions of the chairman and another member of the local Spiritual Assembly of Tabriz on 14 July 1980, a member of the Spiritual Assembly of Rasht on 16 July 1980, and two prominent Bahá’í spokesmen in Tehran on 30 July and 15 August 1980. On 21 August 1980, all nine members of the national Bahá’í governing council, the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of Iran, were abducted and disappeared without a trace. It seems certain that they were executed. During 1980 at least 24 Bahá’ís were killed in Iran;

CHAPTER IV: “To kill a Bahá’í is a good deed...” | 51 20 were executed by the government and the rest were “The Qur’an stoned, assassinated or burned to death. recognized only Despite a growing international outcry, the rate of the People of the executions continued to grow through 1981. By late summer that year, revolutionary courts were openly Book as religious sentencing Bahá’ís to death purely on religious grounds communities. Others and announcing the fact in Iranian media. The Attorare pagans. Pagans ney General, Siyyid Moussavi-Tabrizi, stated explicitly: “The Qur’an recognized only the People of the Book as must be eliminated.” religious communities. Others are pagans. Pagans must — Iranian Attorney be eliminated.” Under Islamic law in Iran, “People of General Siyyid the Book” include only Muslims, Jews, Christians and, Moussavi-Tabrizi by special dispensation, Zoroastrians. The National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of Iran was reconstituted through new elections but was again ravaged by the execution of eight of its members on 27 December 1981. In all at least 48 Bahá’ís were killed in Iran during 1981; of those, all but two were executed by the government. Executions continued apace through 1982, 1983 and 1984. At least 32 Bahá’ís were executed or killed in 1982, 29 were executed or killed in 1983, and 30 were executed or killed in 1984. And, again, the targets of

Faramarz Samandari, with his wife Anita, and children. He was a physician and professor at the University of Tabriz. He was excuted in Tabriz on 13 July 1980.

52 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION these executions were often members of Bahá’í governing councils. Four members of the National Spiritual The torture of Assembly, which had once again been courageously Bahá’ís in Iranian re-established through fresh elections, were executed prisons — and in 1984, although by then the institution had been disbanded in accordance with a government decree and particularly of the individuals held no official position in the Bahá’í those who had been community. [See Appendix I for a complete list of those members of Bahá’í who have been killed or executed.] governing councils One of the most dramatic groups of executions came in June 1983, when ten Iranian Bahá’í women, including — was routine and two teen-age girls, were hanged. The primary charge systematic. Again, against them: teaching Bahá’í children’s classes. [See according to Bahá’ís page 54.] The women were subjected to intense physical and who survived, mental abuse in an effort to coerce them to recant their the purpose of the Faith — an option that was almost always pressed torture almost upon Bahá’í prisoners. Yet, like most Bahá’ís who have invariably was to been arrested in Iran, they refused to deny their beliefs. Nevertheless, the fact that so many Bahá’ís were given make the Bahá’ís the option of recanting, with the promise of release recant their Faith if they did so, is among the strongest proofs that the or confess to some persecutions were based solely on religious beliefs. treasonous activity. Imprisonment and Torture Since 1979, nearly 1,000 Bahá’ís have been arrested and imprisoned. At one point in 1986, some 747 Bahá’ís were being held in prisons throughout Iran. In most cases, they had no trials. The torture of Bahá’ís in Iranian prisons — and particularly of those who had been members of Bahá’í governing councils — was routine and systematic. Again, according to Bahá’ís who survived, the purpose of the torture almost invariably was to make the Bahá’ís recant their Faith or confess to some treasonous activity.

CHAPTER IV: “To kill a Bahá’í is a good deed...” | 53 Hanged for teaching “Sunday school”

F EW INCIDENTS ARE more shocking — or revealing of the religious basis of the persecution against Bahá’ís and the courage with which they faced it — than the group hanging of ten Bahá’í women in Shiraz on 18 June 1983. Their crime: teaching religious classes to Bahá’í youth — the equivalent of being “Sunday school” teachers in the West. Ranging in age from 17 to 57, the ten Bahá’í women were led to the gallows in succession. Authorities apparently hoped that as each saw the others slowly strangle to death, they would renounce their own faith. But according to eyewitness reports, the women went to their fate singing and chanting, as though they were enjoying a pleasant outing. One of the men attending the gallows confided to a Bahá’í: “We tried saving their lives up to the last moment, but one by one, first the older ladies, then the young girls, were hanged while the others were forced to watch, it being hoped that this might induce them to recant their belief. We even urged them to say they were not Bahá’ís, but not one of them agreed; they preferred the execution.” All of the women had been interrogated and tortured in the months leading up to their execution. Indeed, some had wounds still visible on their bodies as they lay in the morgue after their execution. The youngest of these martyrs was Muna Mahmudnizhad, a 17-year-old schoolgirl who because of her youth and conspicuous

Muna Mahshid Simin Sabiri Zarrin Muqimi- Akhtar Thabit Mahmudnizhad Nirumand Abyánih

54 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION innocence became, in a sense, a symbol of the group. In prison, she was lashed on the soles of her feet with a cable and forced to walk on bleeding feet. Yet she never waivered in her faith, even to the point of kissing the hands of her executioner, and then the rope, before putting it around her own throat. Another young woman, Zarrin Muqimi-Abyanih, 28, told the interrogators whose chief goal was to have her disavow her faith: “Whether you accept it or not, I am a Bahá’í. You cannot take it away from me. I am a Bahá’í with my whole being and my whole heart.” During the trial of another of the women, Ruya Ishraqi, a 23-yearold veterinary student, the judge said: “You put yourselves through this agony only for one word: just say you are not a Bahá’í and I’ll see that...you are released...” Ms. Ishraqi responded: “I will not exchange my faith for the whole world.” The names of the other women hanged on 18 June 1983 were: Shahin Dalvand, 25, a sociologist; Izzat Janami Ishraqi, 57, a homemaker; Mahshid Nirumand, 28, who had qualified for a degree in physics but had it denied her because she was a Bahá’í; Simin Sabiri, 25; Tahirih Arjumandi Siyavushi, 30, a nurse; Akhtar Thabit, 25, also a nurse; Nusrat Ghufrani Yalda’i, 47, a mother and member of the local Bahá’í Spiritual Assembly. All had seen it as their duty to teach Bahá’í religious classes — especially since the government had barred Bahá’í children from attending even regular school.

Shahin (Shirin) Ruya Ishraqi Izzat Ishraqi Tahirih Siyavushi Nusrat Yalda’i Dalvand (Janami)

CHAPTER IV: “To kill a Bahá’í is a good deed...” | 55 Torture included sustained beating and flogging, Bahá’ís were the bastinado (whipping the soles of the feet), the pullalso subjected ing out of fingernails and teeth, and the deprivation of to psychological food and water for days at a time. Bahá’ís were also subjected to psychological torture, torture, including including mock executions and being forced to witness mock executions the torture of family members and friends. and being forced to Thus an elderly Bahá’í woman, who was a member witness the torture of a local Bahá’í council, was tortured in front of a dozen other Bahá’ís in an effort to persuade her and of family members them to deny their Faith. The woman’s jailer took her and friends. by her hair and continually banged her head against the wall. She was beaten about the head for a long time, until her body was covered with blood. After two years of imprisonment, she was summarily released, with no recourse against the abuse she had received. At least 13 Bahá’ís who died in prison are believed to have been tortured to death. In these cases, the bodies were buried by the authorities before the families could view them. Two of the most recent cases involving torture and intimidation took place in July 1997. Masha’llah Enayati, a 63-year-old Bahá’í resident of Tehran, died on 4 July 1997, after being severely beaten while in custody. During a visit to his native village of Ardistan to attend a Bahá’í meeting, Mr. Enayati was arrested under circumstances which are not clear. He was taken to prison in Isfahan, where he was severely beaten on all parts of the body. It appears that he was held in prison for about a week before being taken to a hospital, where he eventually died. Mr. Enayati’s death certificate is worded in a most unusual way, suggesting that the doctor himself may have been under threat. Under “cause of death” the doctor entered in his own handwriting, “will be known later.” Shahram Reza’i, a young Bahá’í serving as a conscript in the Iranian army on a military base near the

56 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION A woman from Kata, murdered by a mob in 1979, shown with her two younger sisters.

city of Rasht, was shot in the head by his superior officer on 6 July 1997 and died the following day. The officer concerned, who was responsible for weapons training, maintained that the bullets were fired in error. He was released after a few days, once it was determined that the dead soldier was a Bahá’í. The court excused the officer from paying the blood money normally required in such instances, ordering him to pay just the cost of the three bullets used to kill Mr. Reza’i. Mr. Reza’i was the seventh Bahá’í in Iran engaged in compulsory military service to have been slain by offi- cers or other soldiers.

Social and Economic Intimidation As noted earlier, the authorities have also conducted a campaign of economic, social and cultural intimidation against the Bahá’í community of Iran. The objective, it is clear, has been to deprive Bahá’ís of their rights to education, to jobs and to homes of their own — once again with the intention of forcing them to recant.

CHAPTER IV: “To kill a Bahá’í is a good deed...” | 57 Since the 1930s, the Bahá’ís in Iran have been forbidden to run their own educational establishments, and have therefore educated their children at state-run schools and universities where they have often suffered discrimination and persecution. The level of discrimination and persecution in schools rose sharply following the Islamic revolution in 1979. In 1981, an official decree was issued barring Bahá’í students and professors from admission to or employment at any university in Iran. Universities published new prospectuses in 1981 requiring that applicants belong to one of the four religions recognized in the constitution, namely the Muslim, Jewish, Christian or Zoroastrian religions. Admission to primary and secondary schools was refused to those who identified themselves as Bahá’ís, and hundreds of students were expelled.

Deprivation of Employment The Iranian government has also sought to intimidate and stifle Bahá’ís by making it impossible for them to earn a living. In 1979 the government started dismissing all Bahá’í Government document civil servants without compensation. By July 1982, all of permanent dismissal Bahá’í public servants had been dismissed and the from employment for pensions of all retired Bahá’í civil servants had been being a Bahá’í. terminated. In late 1984, the Attorney General started issuing summonses demanding that all those Bahá’í civil servants who had been dismissed repay salaries they had received during their employment. They were threatened with imprisonment if they did not comply. Obviously, repayment of a lifetime’s wages was beyond the means of most victims. Many were imprisoned as a result of failure to meet this absurd demand. The government has also systematically sought to

58 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION drive Bahá’ís in the private sector to economic ruin. In the early 1980s, the trading licenses of most Bahá’í In the early 1980s, businessmen were revoked, the assets of businesses the trading licenses run by Bahá’ís were confiscated, and bank accounts of of most Bahá’í most Bahá’í businessmen were frozen. In addition, the authorities intimidated private employers into dismissbusinessmen were ing many Bahá’í employees. revoked, the assets Almost every dismissal notice served on a Bahá’í of businesses run employee, whether in the public or the private sector, by Bahá’ís were stated that the reason for dismissal was membership in the Bahá’í Faith and that the individual’s job would be confiscated, and restored if he or she would recant his or her faith. bank accounts In addition to depriving Bahá’ís of a livelihood, of most Bahá’í the government in the early 1980s sought to deprive arrested Bahá’ís of many of their possessions, including businessmen were their homes. frozen. Through its takeover of the major Bahá’í savings company, Nawnahalan — literally meaning “new plant,” a reference to the fact that the savings institution was started by Bahá’í children at the turn of the century — the government in one move swept away the life savings of 15,000 Bahá’í shareholders and investors. In addition, thousands of Bahá’ís, rich and poor alike, have had their homes and personal possessions confiscated by the government, and thousands more have had their homes destroyed by arson and looting. In rural areas, the authorities have encouraged the plunder and destruction of the livestock and crops of Bahá’í farmers.

Confiscation of Community Assets The Bahá’í community in Iran has never been allowed to hold community property in its own name. As a result, all community property has been held in the name of a non-profit company created for this purpose. This body, the Umana — meaning “Trustee” — Company, was

CHAPTER IV: “To kill a Bahá’í is a good deed...” | 59 How Iran has justified the persecution

I NEVITABLY, IRAN’S RESPONSES to the world outcry on behalf of the Bahá’ís have proven entirely unsatisfactory. The reaction has ranged from simple silence to attempts to justify the persecutions by charging the Bahá’ís with a wide variety of offenses. An examination of the charges that have been made against the Bahá’ís illuminates the depth of animosity and prejudice directed towards them — as well as the degree of ignorance regarding the basic principles and history of the Bahá’í Faith. Despite the overwhelming proof that the Bahá’í community in Iran is being persecuted solely because of its religious beliefs, the Iranian government continues — in both public and private forums — to justify its behavior with unsubstantiated accusations. Here follow some of the principal accusations advanced by the government: THE ACCUSAT ION: That Bahá’ís were supporters of the Pahlavi regime and the late Shah of Iran; that they collaborated with SAVAK, the secret police; and that the Bahá’í Faith is a political organization opposed to the present Iranian government. THE REALIT Y: Bahá’ís are required by the basic principles of their Faith to show loyalty and obedience to the government of the country in which they live. The Bahá’í community in Iran thus did not oppose the Pahlavi regime, just as it does not oppose the present government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Indeed, members of the community

allowed to administer such properties without undue interference until the change of government in 1979. One of the first acts of the new government was to confiscate the Umana Company and all its holdings. This meant that in one stroke all Bahá’í community properties were arbitrarily transferred to the state without compensation. The government also

60 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION have obeyed every law and instruction of the present government, including the instruction to disband all Bahá’í administrative institutions in Iran. Bahá’í principles also require the avoidance of any form of involvement in partisan politics. Accordingly, Iranian Bahá’ís were precluded by membership in their faith from accepting cabinet posts or similar political positions under the Pahlavi regime. They did not collaborate with SAVAK. On the contrary, the Pahlavi regime consistently persecuted the Bahá’í Faith, and SAVAK was one of the main agencies of this persecution. The Iranian government has alleged that certain SAVAK officials were Bahá’ís. These allegations are completely untrue, fabricated to mask the religious nature of the persecutions. Indeed, the non-political nature of the Bahá’í case was significantly bolstered by the 1996 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance. Professor Abdelfattah Amor of Tunisia wrote: “With regard to the Bahá’ís, the Special Rapporteur hopes that a clear distinction will be drawn between questions of belief or other questions of a political nature. In that connection, it should not be presumed that the entire community has been politicized or is engaged in political or espionage activities. Considering the religious principles of the Bahá’í community, the Special Rapporteur believes that there should not be any controls that might, through prohibition, restrictions or discrimination, jeopardize the right to freedom of belief or the right to manifest one’s belief.”

(continued on page 62)

confiscated the assets of all Bahá’í welfare agencies, which provided services to people of all religions on an equal basis. Among the government’s next steps were to desecrate and in many cases destroy Bahá’í holy places throughout Iran. As noted, these properties include the holiest Bahá’í shrine in Iran, the House of the Báb

CHAPTER IV: “To kill a Bahá’í is a good deed...” | 61 THE ACCUSATION: That Bahá’ís are heretics or enemies of Islam.

THE REALIT Y: Such charges are false. The Bahá’í Faith is widely recognized as an independent world religion — even by Islamic scholars. As long ago as 1924, a Sunni appellate court in Egypt recognized that the Bahá’í Faith was an independent world religion, stating that, in its judgment, “The Bahá’í Faith is a new religion entirely independent.... No Bahá’í therefore can be regarded as Muslim or vice versa, even as no Buddhist, Brahmin or Christian can be regarded as Muslim.” Accordingly, no charge of heresy can be made. Bahá’ís revere Muhammad and His Book, the Qur’an, as they do Jesus, Buddha, and the founders of the other great religions. Indeed, alone among the followers of the world’s other major independent religions, only Bahá’ís recognize the station of Muhammad as a Prophet of God. THE ACCUSATION: That Bahá’ís are agents of Zionism.

THE REALIT Y: This charge is based on the fact that the Bahá’í World Centre is in Israel. The Bahá’í World Centre was, however, established on Mt. Carmel in the 19th century, long before the State of Israel came into existence, in accordance with the explicit instructions of Bahá’u’lláh, who was exiled there from Iran. THE ACCUSAT ION: That Bahá’ís are involved with prostitution, adultery and immorality.

in Shiraz, which was confiscated and then destroyed. The House of Bahá’u’lláh in Takur, where the Founder of the Bahá’í Faith spent His childhood, met a similar fate: it was demolished and the site was offered for sale to the public. In Tehran and other cities throughout Iran, Bahá’í buildings were looted and burned, Bahá’í cemeteries were bulldozed and Bahá’í graves were broken open.

62 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION THE REALIT Y: This charge, like the others, is without foundation. Bahá’ís have a strict moral code and attach great importance to chastity and to the institution of marriage. The Bahá’í marriage ceremony is not recognized in Iran and no civil marriage ceremony exists. Consequently, Bahá’ís have been faced with the choice of denying their faith in order to be married according to the rites of one of the religions recognized in Iran, or of marrying in accordance with the rites of their own faith. They have consistently chosen to be married in accordance with Bahá’í law. The government does not recognize these marriages and denounces Bahá’í wives as prostitutes. The other charges of adultery and immorality against Bahá’ís are based on the fact that, in accordance with the Bahá’í principle of the equality of men and women, there is no segregation of the sexes at Bahá’í gatherings. THE ACCUSAT ION: That the Bahá’í Faith is not a religion but a political movement, devised by colonial powers in the 1800s to influence and control the Persian government. THE REALIT Y: The Bahá’í Faith has been widely recognized by Western historians, religious leaders, and others as an independent world religion. Its founding had nothing to do with the work of British or other colonial powers. Moreover, as noted, the teachings of the Faith explicitly prohibit Bahá’ís from involvement in partisan politics.

In Tehran, as noted earlier, the Bahá’ís have long been forced to bury their dead in a barren stretch of land reserved by the authorities for “infidels.” Having access to their own cemeteries is especially important to Bahá’ís because, as might be expected, they are not allowed to bury their dead in Muslim cemeteries.

CHAPTER IV: “To kill a Bahá’í is a good deed...” | 63 64 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION Chapter V THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

T HE PRESENT DAY status of human rights and social reform in the Islamic Republic Early followers faced of Iran cannot be adequately understood violent opposition without taking into account the histori- from both the cal background of persecution against Islamic religious the Bahá’í community — a history that does much to explain the cultural crisis gripping Iranian society to- authorities and day as its leadership struggles to face the challenge of succeeding dynasties. modernity. The Bahá’í Faith has been persecuted in Iran since its founding there in the mid-1800s. Early followers faced violent opposition from both the Islamic religious authorities and succeeding dynasties. It has been estimated that some 20,000 persons perished in these pogroms during the nineteenth century.

The illustration at top left, depicting the death of an early Bahá’í, appeared in the Persian magazine, Ima’mat, circa 1911. The photo bottom left, a Bahá’í father and son (left) in chains after being arrested with fellow Bahá’ís shown in a photograph taken around 1896. Both were subsequently executed.

CHAPTER V: The Historical Background | 65 The takeover of the National Bahá’í Centre in Tehran during the Khomeini regime, 1979.

The persecutions have continued intermittently in the twentieth century, coinciding most often with the need of various governments to shore up support with certain elements of Iran’s Islamic leadership. And they have come regardless of the leaders’ political orientation. Some of the outbreaks against Bahá’ís were directed by local or regional authorities. In 1903, for example, 101 Bahá’ís were killed in the city of Yazd after the populace was incited by hostile mullahs. At other times the oppression of Bahá’ís was made a part of official national policy. During the early years of the Pahlavi regime (1927 to 1979), the government formalized a policy of discrimination against the Bahá’ís as a concession to the clergy. Beginning in 1933, Bahá’í literature was banned, Bahá’í marriages were not recognized, and Bahá’ís in public service were demoted or fired. Bahá’í schools — of which there were some 50 in

66 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION Mullah Falsafi supervising workmen in the act of destroying the dome of the National Bahá’í Center in 1955, Tehran.

the country — were forced to close. Another round of persecutions commenced in 1955, when the Pahlavi regime allowed the nationwide broadcast of a series of incendiary sermons against the Bahá’ís by a leading Shia preacher in Tehran — apparently hoping to make the Bahá’ís a scapegoat to deflect attention from unpopular government policies. Both the national and army radio stations were put at the disposal of the responsible cleric, Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Falsafi, who joined the Shah’s Minister of Defense, General Batmangelich, in demolishing the dome of Bahá’í national headquarters with pickaxes. A wave of anti-Bahá’í violence swept the country. Murders, rapes and robberies were reported in many areas, while the government assured the Majlis that it had ordered the suppression of all activities of “the Bahá’í sect.”

CHAPTER V: The Historical Background | 67 Successive stages of the demolition of the House of the Báb. The first image is an interior room in early 1979; the second photo shows Revolutionary Guards in the process of destruction; the third the collapse of the roof.

Bahá’ís understand that this pattern of persecution is a manifestation of the misunderstanding and fear that often occur when a new religion emerges from the matrix of a wellestablished orthodoxy. The pattern has been repeated through the ages; virtually all of the world’s great religions have faced intense persecution at their birth. In the case of the Bahá’í Faith, the teachings of its two Founders, especially when viewed through the lens of traditional Islam, are as challenging as those of any Prophet in ancient times. The initial wave of persecution came in response to the claims of a young Iranian merchant, known to history as the Báb, who announced in Shiraz in May 1844 that He was the bearer of a new revelation from God. His primary mission, the Báb said, was to prepare humanity for the advent of “Him Whom God Shall Make Manifest,” the universal divine Messenger anticipated in the scriptures of all the major religions. The teachings of the Báb called for the spiritual and moral reformation of Persian society, and for the upliftment of the station of women and the poor. His promotion of education and the useful sciences was also revolutionary. Such progressive and idealistic teachings, which made a clear break with the Islamic frame of reference, were rapidly embraced by thousands of followers and were seen by both secular and

68 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION The area is completely razed in preparation for the later construction of the Mosque of Mihdi. The white circles on the images below indicate the location of the House of the Báb. The last photo shows the Mosque in 1994.

religious authorities as a threat to their power. Widespread persecutions ensued, and, as noted above, some 20,000 believers, who were known as Bábís, paid with their lives. The Báb Himself was executed by the government in 1850. Among the followers of the Báb was an Iranian nobleman named Bahá’u’lláh. In 1863 He announced that He was the Messenger the Báb had heralded, founding the Bahá’í Faith, which develops and extends many of the teachings and principles introduced by the Báb. The central theme of Bahá’u’lláh’s message is that humanity is a single race and that the day has come for unification into one global society. “The earth is but one country and mankind its citizens,” wrote Bahá’u’lláh. Bahá’u’lláh taught that there is only one God, and that all of the world’s religions are expressions of a single, unfolding divine plan, “the changeless Faith of God, eternal in the past, eternal in the future.” Bahá’ís believe that God progressively reveals religious truth to humanity through a series of divine Messengers, each of Whom has founded a great religion. These Messengers have included Abraham, Krishna, Zoroaster, Moses, Buddha, Jesus and Muhammad; the most recent are the Báb and Bahá’u’lláh. Others will follow in ages to come. The idea that there should be new Messengers of God after Muhammad is viewed by many Muslims as heresy. In the Qur’an, Muhammad referred to Himself

CHAPTER V: The Historical Background | 69 as the “Seal of the Prophets,” and most Muslim scholars interpret this to mean that He would be the last Messenger of God. Bahá’ís, however, believe that the coming of the Báb and Bahá’u’lláh poses no contradiction to Islamic Bahá’u’lláh taught teachings or those of any of the other revealed religions. Bahá’ís understand that Muhammad ended or that there is only one “sealed” the prophetic cycle. Then, with the advent of God, and that all of the Báb and Bahá’u’lláh, a new era of religious fulfillthe world’s religions ment began. Bahá’u’lláh referred to this new period in human history as the “stage of maturity.” Bahá’ís are expressions of believe that this is all in accordance with the prophea single, unfolding cies of Islam and the world’s other major religions. divine plan. Other aspects of the Bahá’í teachings also arouse opposition among some followers of Islam. In outlining His vision for a new world civilization, Bahá’u’lláh advocated a series of highly progressive social principles. These include the elimination of all forms of prejudice; equality between the sexes; the elimination of extremes of poverty and wealth; universal education; the harmony of science and religion; a sustainable balance between human society and the natural world; and the establishment of a world federal system, based on collective security and the oneness of humanity. Some fundamentalist Muslims view the progressive nature of these teachings, such as the equality of women and the absence of religious clergy, as particularly antithetical to the traditions of Islam. To Iran’s Shia establishment, especially — and also to many among their Sunni Muslim counterparts — the emergence of an independent religion that postdates the Qur’an by almost thirteen centuries is not only theologically abhorrent but threatens the system of patronage, endowments, political influence, and social perquisites to which they lay claim. The effect has been to arouse in the Shia establishment a determination to extinguish the new faith and suppress its followers.

70 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION The words, “Enemy of Islam,” were found written on the leg of Dr. Masih Farhangi, a Bahá’í who was executed in Tehran on 24 June 1981.

The persecution of the Bahá’ís in Iran is not related to any underlying issue of ethnicity or political agenda. The overwhelming majority of Iranian Bahá’ís come from the same Persian and Azerbaijani ethnic stock as the rest of the population, and they represent a cross section of Iran’s social classes. Only their religious beliefs distinguish them from their fellow countrymen — beliefs which the Bahá’í teachings forbid them from imposing on others. Paradoxically, because of the control exercised by the Islamic clergy over the media of communication, the nature of Bahá’í beliefs remains virtually unknown to a public that has been systematically taught to fear and hate them. The Iranian Bahá’í community has itself consistently been denied the use of any means of mass communication, including radio, television, newspapers, films, the distribution of literature and public lectures. The result has been widespread, unreasoning prejudice.

CHAPTER V: The Historical Background | 71 The international response

T HE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY has responded to the persecution of the Bahá’í community in Iran with overwhelming sympathy, expressing concern for the Bahá’ís and condemnation of the Iranian government. The Bahá’í community believes that this outpouring has been a strong restraining force against the government, preventing a pogrom on a much greater scale. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has passed more than 20 resolutions expressing concern about reports of human rights violations in Iran, and each has made specific mention of the situation of the Bahá’í community there. [See Appendix II]. The specific reference to a religious community is quite unusual for the Commission, which normally confines itself to expressions of diplomatic concern and general references to charges of human rights violations and discrimination. Following the lead of the Commission on Human Rights, the United Nations General Assembly itself has since 1985 approved some 17 resolutions that have specifically mentioned the situation of the Bahá’ís in Iran and expressed concern over reports of human rights violations there. Virtually all of these resolutions have called on Iran to stop violating the rights of Bahá’ís and to abide by the various international covenants on human rights that the government has freely signed. UN resolutions have also called explicitly for the “emancipation” of the Bahá’ís of Iran. Among the most salient features of the United Nations’ attention to the Bahá’í case has been the continuing investigations conducted by a succession of highly regarded human rights specialists. Each was appointed by the Commission on Human Rights and given the mandate to probe into the human rights situation in Iran. And each has reported extensively on the real and serious nature of the persecution of the Bahá’ís of Iran, lending unimpeachable credibility to the Bahá’í case. The first Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, as these investigators are called, was Andres Aguilar of

72 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION Venezuela, who was appointed in 1984. After his resignation in 1986, Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, a law professor and human rights expert from El Salvador, was appointed to the position. Following Mr. Galindo Pohl’s departure in 1994, the Commission appointed Maurice Copithorne, a noted Canadian jurist, as its Special Representative for Iran. Diane Ala’i, a Bahá’í Unfortunately, as part of an effort to engage Iran International Community in a “human rights dialogue,” the Commission on representative to the United Human Rights stopped appointing Special Repre- Nations, addresses the UN sentatives in 2002. And in many respects, the situa- Commission on Human tion has grown worse since that time. Rights in Geneva. Nevertheless, the Commission’s Special Representatives have produced over the years a series of extremely important and influential reports to the United Nations on the situation in Iran. Gathering their information from a variety of sources and — in at least four cases — making visits to Iran, Special Representatives have managed to catalogue the whole range of abuses and persecutions which the Bahá’í community in Iran has experienced. For example, Mr. Galindo Pohl’s 1990 report to the General Assembly noted that he had received extensive documentation that provides “evidence of discrimination, confiscation, rejection by universities, suspension of pensions, demands for the return of pensions earned and paid, denial of passports and other irregularities.” The report added that “it would seem that the attitude towards the Bahá’ís and their situation depends on the temperament and personal convictions of individual officials. This keeps the Bahá’ís in a perpetual state of uncertainty about their activities.” In Mr. Copithorne’s 1998 report to the General Assembly, he wrote that continuing reports of violations of human rights against the Bahá’ís force him “to conclude that the pattern of persecution of members of this community has not abated.” And in his last report, released in 2002, Mr. Copithorne said that while there had been “some hopeful signs” concerning the “commutation of death sentences” and “the release of prisoners,” the Bahá’í community “continues to be subject to harassment and discrimination in the areas of, inter alia, education, employment, travel, housing and

CHAPTER V: The Historical Background | 73 the enjoyment of cultural activities.” Seven Bahá’ís were in prison at that time, he said, and “Bahá’í property continues to be subject to confiscation.” Of interest, Mr. Copithorne also expressed a conviction that the “Bahá’í Question” policy is still operative. Also of concern is the sentence issued by a judge of the Supreme Office of Control and Review, Hamzih Khalili, on 15 September 2001, in the context of an appeal by the Muslim owners of property rented to the Baha’is that was confiscated in 1998. According to an unofficial translation to which the Special Representative has had access, the verdict declares that the “seizure and confiscation of the properties belonging to the misguided sect of Baha’ism is legally and religiously justifiable” and states that “the cultural activities of the misguided sect of Baha’ism — as prescribed by the order of His Excellency the Supreme Leader — do need to be seriously opposed”. This would seem to indicate that the 1991 memorandum on “The Baha’i Question”, issued by the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council and approved by the Supreme Leader, is still in force and therefore that discrimination against Baha’is continues to be official practice, a situation the Special Representative deeply deplores. As well, in 1996, United Nations support for the Bahá’í case was further strengthened by the release of a report by the UN’s Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, which called on Iran to end its ban on Bahá’í institutions and other oppressive measures. Authored by Professor Abdelfattah Amor, a noted Tunisian legal expert, the report explicitly stated that the persecution of the Bahá’ís was based on religious intolerance. More recently, in 2003, the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance took note of the continuing confiscations, imprisonments, and efforts to block Bahá’í youth from receiving higher education, and concluded: While noting some promised improvements in treatment of the Baha’i minority, the Special Rapporteur is of the view that the measures taken by the Iranian authorities to end the persecution of Baha’is, including by non-State entities, and to guarantee them the same rights as any other Iranian citizen are still inadequate. He

74 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION again reminds the Iranian authorities of the need to ensure respect for the relevant provisions of international law, including article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. In addition, as a religious minority, Baha’is are entitled to the respect due to all other religious minorities.

In addition to efforts by the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies and agencies, numerous national legislatures and regional bodies have spoken out against Iran’s treatment of the Bahá’í community over the last twenty years. Expressions of concern for Iran’s Bahá’ís have come from the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and from the legislatures of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, among others. Many heads of state and government leaders have also voiced their dismay over Iran’s treatment of the Bahá’ís. International and national non-governmental organizations have also risen to the defense of Iran’s Bahá’ís. Amnesty International, the Minority Rights Group, and Middle East Watch, among others, have closely monitored the situation of the Bahá’ís in Iran and published extensive reports that confirm the persecutions there. The world’s news media, as well, have reported extensively on the persecution of Iran’s Bahá’í community. Major articles and editorials which detail, confirm and condemn the persecutions have appeared in Le Monde, the Times of London, the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Economist, the Times of India, and the Sydney Morning Herald — as well as smaller and lesser known newspapers such as the Uganda Times, the Papua New Guinea Post Courier, the Straits Times of Singapore, and La Republica in Panama City. The Associated Press, Reuters, and the Agence France-Presse have also carried numerous dispatches on the persecution of Bahá’ís in Iran and the response of international organizations and agencies. In many respects the Bahá’í case has been a model for how international human rights machinery can be used to protect an oppressed minority. Thanks to international support for the Bahá’ís, the wholesale genocide of the Bahá’í community in Iran has so far been prevented.

CHAPTER V: The Historical Background | 75 Chapter VI CONCLUSION AND SUMM ARY

T HE WORLDWIDE BAHÁ’Í community is today one of the most diverse and widespread organizations on earth. Comprising individuals from virtually every nation, ethnic group, trade, profession, and social or economic class, more than five million followers of the Bahá’í Faith reside in at least 235 countries and territories. They represent some 2,100 different tribes, racial and ethnic groups, and come from every religious background: Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, Zoroastrian, Sikh, Jain, and animist, as well as from non-religious backgrounds. Yet in the land where their religion originated, Bahá’ís continue to face a campaign of systematic, centrally directed persecution. At best, by denying them basic rights and freedoms, the government hopes merely to block the growth and development of the Bahá’í community, while keeping it as a ready scapegoat for its own failures. At worst, the government harbors the goal of exterminating the Bahá’í community as a viable entity in Iran and erasing all traces of its culture.

76 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION During the 1980s Bahá’ís were executed, tortured, imprisoned, deprived of jobs, pensions and educa- On the Bahá’í tional opportunities — solely because of their religious question, the beliefs. In the 1990s some aspects of this persecution Iranian government subsided as a result of international pressure. However, in 1993 came the exposure of a secret governmental has been utterly plan to suffocate the Bahá’í community. silent. There has Subsequent actions — ranging from random kill- been no admission ings, revolving door imprisonment, arbitrary arrest of the government’s and harassment, denial of access to higher education, the destruction of important Bahá’í holy sites, and the campaign against continued efforts to deprive Bahá’ís of their livelihood Iran’s Bahá’í — reveal the Iranian government’s intention of con- community and tinuing its efforts to destroy the Bahá’í community without attracting international attention. the need for reform Indeed, as of the time of publication of this book- that it represents, let, the signs point only towards increasing problems let alone public for Iran’s innocent Bahá’ís. The arbitrary arrests and statements that detentions of some 35 Bahá’ís around the country in March, April and May 2005 exemplify the worsening might somehow situation. Held incommunicado for periods ranging pave the way for from one week to three months, these prisoners were recognition of the held without any formal charges while personal possessions were seized by government agents from their Bahá’í community’s homes in wanton searches. Other incidents in Yazd in fundamental rights. January and February, involving the beating of several Bahá’ís and the burning of a Bahá’í-owned business, along with other short term arrests and detentions, point to ominous signs for the future. For most people, whatever their religious background, the continued campaign against the Bahá’ís defies rational explanation. The Bahá’í community in Iran poses no threat to the Iranian authorities. The fundamental principles of the Bahá’í Faith require its followers to be obedient to their government and to avoid partisan political involvement, subversive activity, and all forms of violence.

CHAPTER VI: Conclusion and Summary | 77 In recent years, Iran has sought to portray itself as Continued ready to rejoin the world community as a respected international partner in international affairs, projecting an image of tolerance and civility. President Khatami, for exammonitoring remains ple, spoke of humanity’s entry into a “new century of the only form of humanity, understanding, and durable peace.” protection for Iran’s Yet on the Bahá’í question, the Iranian government Bahá’ís. has been utterly silent. There has been no admission of the government’s campaign against Iran’s Bahá’í community and the need for reform that it represents, let alone public statements that might somehow pave the way for recognition of the Bahá’í community’s fundamental rights. In this regard, continued international monitoring remains the only form of protection for Iran’s Bahá’ís. Any lessening of international support for the Bahá’í community will be perceived by the Iranian authorities as condoning the persecution of the Bahá’ís at the least, and therefore as a license to continue their campaign with impunity. The Bahá’ís in Iran seek no special privileges. They seek only their rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the right to life, the right to liberty and security of person, the right to education and work, and the right to profess and practice their religion. What is needed are legal and entirely public steps that will firmly establish the complete emancipation of the Bahá’ís of Iran. Only then can it be said that Iran has truly complied with its oft-stated commitment to universal human rights.

78 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION Appendix I: BAH Á’ÍS KILLED SINCE 1978

NO. NAME ROLE* DATE PLACE METHOD 19 7 8 1. Mr. Ahmad Ismá’ílí 1978 Ahram Killed 2. Mr. Díyá’u’lláh Haqíqat Aug 13 Jahrum Killed 3. Mr. Shír-Muhammad Dastpísh December Buyr-Ahmad Mobbed 4. Mrs. ‘Avad-Gul Fahandizh Dec 14 Shíráz Mobbed 5. Mr. Sifatu’lláh Fahandizh Dec 14 Shíráz Mobbed 6. Mr. Khusraw Afnání Dec 22 Míyán-Duáb Mobbed 7. Mr. Parvíz Afnání Dec 22 Míyán-Duáb Mobbed 19 7 9 8. Mr. Ibráhím Ma’navi early 1979 Hisár Killed 9. Mr. Hájí-Muhmmad ‘Azizi Jan 9 Khurmúj Beaten 10. Mr. Husayn Shakúrí Apr 2 Ushnavíyyíh Killed 11. Mr. ‘Alí-Akbar Khursandí LSA Apr 12 Tehran Hanged 12. Mr. Bahár Vujdání Sep 27 Mahábád Executed 13. Mr. ‘Alí Sattárzádíh Oct 28 Búkán Killed 14. Mr. ‘Azamatu’lláh Fahandizh Dec 14 Shíráz Executed 19 8 0 15. Mr. Habíbu’lláh Panáhí Feb 4 Urúmíyyih Assassinated 16. Mr. Ghulám-Husayn A’zamí May 6 Tehran Executed 17. Mr. ‘Alí-Akbar Mu’íní May 6 Tehran Executed 18. Mr. Badi’u’lláh Yazdání May 6 Tehran Executed 19. Mr. Parviz Bayáni May 11 Píránshahr Executed 20. Mr. Mir-Asadu’lláh Mukhtárí May 18 Andrún Stoned 21. Mr. Hasan Ismá’ílzádíh June Sanandaj Killed 22. Mr. Yúsuf Subhání Jun 27 Tehran Executed 23. Mr. Yadu’lláh Astání LSA Jul 14 Tabríz Executed 24. Dr. Farámarz Samandari LSA Jul 14 Tabríz Executed 25. Mr. Muhammad Akbarí Jul 16 Rasht Executed

* Many of those killed or executed played a leadership role in the Iranian Bahá’í community. The acronym “LSA” in this column indicates that the person was a member of a local Spiritual Assembly, the community-elected local Bahá’í governing council. “NSA” identifies a member of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of Iran, the national-level governing council. “ABM” identi- fies an “auxiliary board member,” an appointed leadership position within the Bahá’í administrative framework. “CBC” identifies a member of the Continental Board of Counsellors, an appointed leadership position which oversees the auxiliary board members.

APPENDIX I: Bahá’ís killed since 1978 | 79 NO. NAME ROLE* DATE PLACE METHOD 19 8 0 (continued) 26. Mr. Yadu’lláh Mahbubíyán Jul 30 Tehran Executed 27. Mr. Dhabíhu’lláh Mu’miní Aug 15 Tehran Executed 28. Mr. Núru’lláh Akhtar-Khávarí ABM Sep 8 Yazd Executed 29. Mr. ‘Azizu’lláh Dhabíhíyán ABM Sep 8 Yazd Executed 30. Mr. Firaydún Faridání ABM Sep 8 Yazd Executed 31. Mr. Mahmúd Hasanzádíh Sep 8 Yazd Executed 32. Mr. ‘Abdu’l-Vahháb Sep 8 Yazd Executed Kázimi-Manshádí 33. Mr. Jalál Mustaqím LSA Sep 8 Yazd Executed 34. Mr. ‘Ali Mutahari LSA Sep 8 Yazd Executed 35. Mr. Rídá Firúzí Nov 9 Tabríz Executed 36. Mr. Muhammad-Husayn Ma’súmí Nov 23 Núk, Birjand Burned 37. Mrs. Shikkar-Nisá Ma’súmí Nov 23 Núk, Birjand Burned 38. Mr. Bihrúz Saná’í Dec 17 Tehran Executed 19 8 1 39. Dr. Manúchihr Hakim NSA Jan 12 Tehran Assassinated 40. Mr. Mihdi Anvari Mar 17 Shíráz Executed 41. Mr. Hidáyatu’lláh Dihqání Mar 17 Shíráz Executed 42. Mrs. Núráníyyih Yárshátir Apr Shíráz Assassinated 43. Mr. Sattár Khushkhú Apr 30 Shíráz Executed 44. Mr. Ihsánu’lláh Mihdí-Zádih Apr 30 Shíráz Executed 45. Mr. Yadu’lláh Vahdat ABM Apr 30 Shíráz Executed 46. Mr. Muhmmad (Suhráb) Habibí LSA Jun 14 Hamadán Executed 47. Mr. Muhammad-Baqir (Suhayl) LSA Jun 14 Hamadán Executed Habíbí 48. Mr. Husayn Khándil LSA Jun 14 Hamadán Executed 49. Mr. Tarázu’lláh Khuzayn LSA Jun 14 Hamadán Executed 50. Mr. Husayn Mutlaq LSA Jun 14 Hamadán Executed 51. Dr. Fírúz Na’ími LSA Jun 14 Hamadán Executed 52. Dr. Nasir Vafá’í LSA Jun 14 Hamadán Executed 53. Mr. Buzurg ‘Alaviyán LSA Jun 23 Tehran Executed 54. Mr. Háshím Farnúsh ABM LSA Jun 23 Tehran Executed 55. Mr. Farhang Mavaddat LSA Jun 23 Tehran Executed 56. Dr. Masíh Farhangí CBC ASIA Jun 24 Tehran Executed 57. Mr. Badí’ulláh Farid Jun 24 Tehran Executed 58. Mr. Yadu’lláh Pústchí Jun 24 Tehran Executed 59. Mr. Varqá Tibyániyán (Tibyání) Jun 24 Tehran Executed 60. Mr. Kamálu’d-Din Bakhtávar Jul 26 Mashhad Executed 61. Mr. Ni’matu’llah Kátibpúr Jul 26 Mashhad Executed Shahidi 62. Mr. ‘Abdu’l-‘Alí Asadyárí LSA Jul 29 Tabríz Executed 63. Mr. Husayn Asadu’lláh-Zadeh LSA Jul 29 Tabríz Executed 64. Mr. Mihdí Báhiri LSA Jul 29 Tabríz Executed 65. Dr. Masrúr Dakhílí LSA Jul 29 Tabríz Executed 66. Dr. Parvíz Fírúzí LSA Jul 29 Tabríz Executed 67. Mr. Manúchihr Khádí’í LSA Jul 29 Tabríz Executed 68. Mr. Alláh-Vírdí Mítháqi Jul 29 Tabríz Executed 69. Mr. Habíbu’lláh Tahqíqí LSA Jul 29 Tabríz Executed 70. Mr. Ismá’íl Zihtáb LSA Jul 29 Tabríz Executed 71. Mr. Husayn Rastigar-Námdár Aug 5 Tehran Executed 72. Mr. Habíbu’llah ‘Azizí LSA Aug 29 Tehran Executed 73. Mr. Bahman ‘Atifi Sep 11 Dáryún, Isf. Executed 74. Mr. ‘Izzat Atifi Sep 11 Dáryún, Isf. Executed 75. Mr. Ahmad Ridvání Sep 11 Dáryún, Isf. Executed

80 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION NO. NAME ROLE* DATE PLACE METHOD 19 8 1 (continued) 76. Mr. Atá’u’lláh Rawhání Sep 11 Dáryún, Isf. Executed 77. Mr. Gushtásb Thábit-Rásikh Sep 11 Dáryún, Isf. Executed 78. Mr. Yadu’lláh Sipihr-Arfa Oct 23 Tehran Executed 79. Mr. Mihdí Amin Amin NSA Dec 27 Tehran Executed 80. Mr. Jalál ‘Azizi NSA Dec 27 Tehran Executed 81. Dr. ‘Izzatu’lláh Furúhi ABM NSA Dec 27 Tehran Executed 82. Mrs. Zhínús Ni’mat Mahmúdi ABM NSA Dec 27 Tehran Executed 83. Dr. Mahmúd Majdhúb NSA Dec 27 Tehran Executed 84. Mr. Qudratu’lláh Rawhání NSA Dec 27 Tehran Executed 85. Dr. Sírús Rawshani NSA Dec 27 Tehran Executed 86. Mr. Kámrán Samimi NSA Dec 27 Tehran Executed 19 8 2 87. Mrs. Shiva Mahmudi LSA Jan 4 Tehran Executed Asadu’llah-Zadeh 88. Mr. Iskandar ‘Azizi LSA Jan 4 Tehran Executed 89. Mrs. Shidrukh Amir-Kiyá Baqa Jan 4 Tehran Executed 90. Mr. Fathu’llah Firdawsi LSA Jan 4 Tehran Executed 91. Mr. Khusraw Muhandisi LSA Jan 4 Tehran Executed 92. Mr. Kúrush Talá’í LSA Jan 4 Tehran Executed 93. Mr. Atá’u’lláh Yávari LSA Jan 4 Tehran Executed 94. Mr. Ibráhím Khayrkháh Feb 22 Tehran Executed 95. Mr. Husayn Vahdat-i-Haq Feb 28 Tehran Executed 96. Mr. ‘Askar Muhammadi Apr 2 Rahímkhán, Assassinated Kírmán 97. Mr. Ihsánu’lláh Khayyámi Apr 12 Urúmíyyih Executed 98. Mr. ‘Azizu’llah Gulshani Apr 29 Mashhad Executed 99. Mrs. Ishraqiyyih Faruhar LSA May 8 Karaj Executed 100. Mr. Mahmud Faruhar LSA May 8 Karaj Executed 101. Mr. Badí’u’lláh Haqpaykar LSA May 8 Karaj Executed 102. Mr. Agahu’lláh Tizfahm May 10 Urúmíyyih Executed 103. Miss Jaláliyyih Mushta May 10 Urúmíyyih Executed il Uskú’í 104. Mrs. Irán Rahímpúr (Khurmá’í) May 12 Dizfúl Executed 105. Mr. Nasru’lláh Amini LSA May 16 Kháníábad,Tehe. Executed 106. Mr. Sa’du’lláh Bábázádeh LSA May 16 Kháníábad,Tehe. Executed 107. Mr. Atá’u’lláh Haqqání Jun 1 Tehran Killed 108. Mr. Muhammad Abbásí LSA Jul 9 Qazvín Executed 109. Mr. Jadidu’lláh Ashraf LSA Jul 9 Qazvín Executed 110. Manúchihr Farzánih LSA Jul 9 Qazvín Executed Mu’ayyad 111. Mr. Muhammad Mansúrí LSA Jul 9 Qazvín Executed 112. Mr. Manúchíhr Vafá’i Jul 9 Tehran Assassinated 113. Mr. ‘Abbás-Ali Sadiqipur Jul 15 Shíráz Executed 114. Mr. ‘Ali Na’imíyán Aug 11 Urúmíyyih Executed 115. Mr. Habibu’lláh Awji Nov 16 Shíráz Executed 116. Mr. Dhíyá’u’lláh Ahrári LSA Nov 21 Shíráz Executed 117. Mr. Husayn Nayyiri-Isfahani Nov 29 Isfahán Died in Prison 118. Mrs. Guldánih ‘Alipúr Dec 24 Sári Mobbed 19 8 3 119. Mr. Hidáyatu’lláh Síyávushí LSA Jan 1 Shíráz Executed 120. Mr. Yadu’lláh Mahmúdnizhad LSA ABM Mar 12 Shíráz Executed 121. Mr. Rahmatu’lláh Vafá’í LSA Mar 12 Shíráz Executed 122. Mrs. Túbá Zá’irpúr Mar 12 Shíráz Executed 123. Mr. Adadu’llah (Aziz) Zaydí Apr 1 Míyán-Duáb Killed

APPENDIX I: Bahá’ís killed since 1978 | 81 NO. NAME ROLE* DATE PLACE METHOD 19 8 3 (continued) 124. Mr. Jalál Hakímán May 1 Tehran Executed 125. Mr. Suhayl Safá’í May 1 Tehran Executed 126. Dr. Bahrám Afnán LSA Jun 16 Shíráz Executed 127. Mr. ‘Abdu’l-Husayn Azádí LSA Jun 16 Shíráz Executed 128. Mr. Kúrush Haqbín LSA Jun 16 Shíráz Executed 129. Mr. ‘Ináyatu’lláh Ishráqí Jun 16 Shíráz Executed 130. Mr. Jamshíd Siyávushí LSA Jun 16 Shíráz Executed 131. Mr. Bahrám Yaldá’í Jun 16 Shíráz Executed 132. Miss Shahín(Shírín) Dálvand Jun 18 Shíráz Executed 133. Mrs. ‘Izzat Jánamí Ishráqí Jun 18 Shíráz Executed 134. Miss Ru’yá Ishráqí Jun 18 Shíráz Executed 135. Miss Muná Mahmúdnizhád Jun 18 Shíráz Executed 136. Miss Zarrín Muqímí-Abyáníh Jun 18 Shíráz Executed 137. Miss Mahshíd Nírúmand Jun 18 Shíráz Executed 138. Miss Símín Sábírí Jun 18 Shíráz Executed 139. Mrs. Táhirih Arjumandí Síyávushi Jun 18 Shíráz Executed 140. Miss Akhtar Thábit Jun 18 Shíráz Executed 141. Mrs. Nusrat Ghufrání Yaldá’í LSA Jun 18 Shíráz Executed 142. Mr. Suhayl Húshmand Jun 28 Shíráz Executed 143. Mr. Ahmad-‘Alí Thábít- Jun 30 Shíráz Died in Prison Sarvístání 144. Mr. Muhammad Ishráqí ABM Aug 31 Tehran Died in Prison 145. Mr. Akbar Haqíqí Sep 19 Khuy Mobbed 146. Mr. Bahman Díhqání Nov 19 Muhammadíyyíh Mobbed 147. Mr. ‘Abdu’l-Majíd Mutahhar Dec 15 Isfahán Died in Prison 19 8 4 148. Mr. Rahmatu’lláh Hakímán Jan 11 Kírmán Died in Prison 149. Mr. Ghulám-Husayn Hasanzádih- Mar 10 Tehran Executed Shákíri 150. Mr. Muhsin Radaví Mar 13 Tehran Died in Prison 151. Mr. Nusrat’ulláh Díyá’í Mar 19 Báft, Kírmán Died in Prison 152. Mr. Kámrán Lutfí Apr 9 Tehran Executed 153. Mr. Rahím Rahímíyán Apr 9 Tehran Executed 154. Mr. Yadu’lláh Sábíríyán Apr 9 Tehran Executed 155. Mr. Asadu’lláh Kámíl-Muqaddam May 2 Tehran Died in Prison 156. Mr. Maqsúd ‘Alízádih May 5 Tabríz Executed 157. Mr. Jalál Payraví ABM May 5 Tabríz Executed 158. Mr. Jahángír Hidáyati NSA May 15 Tehran Executed 159. Mr. ‘Ali-Muhammad Zamání May 15 Tehran Executed 160. Mr. Nusratu’lláh Vahdat Jun 17 Mashhad Executed 161. Mr. Ihsánu’lláh Kathírí Jun 27 Tehran Executed 162. Dr. Manúchíhr Rúhí Aug 16 Bujnúrd Executed 163. Mr. Aminu’lláh Qurbánpúr Aug 25 near Tehran Died in Prison 164. Mr. Rustam Varjávandí Sep 15 Tehran Died in Prison 165. Mr. Shápúr (Húshang) Markazi NSA ABM Sep 23 Tehran Executed 166. Mr. Fírúz Purdil Oct 30 Mashhad Executed 167. Mr. Ahmad Bashiri NSA Nov 1 Tehran Executed 168. Mr. Yúnis Nawrúzi-Iránzád LSA Nov 1 Karaj 169. Mr. ‘Alíridá Níyákán Nov 11 Tabríz Died in Prison 170. Mr. Díyá’u’lláh Maí’í-Uskú’í Nov 13 Tabríz Died in Prison 171. Dr. Farhád Asdaqí NSA Nov 19 Tehran Executed 172. Mr. Fírúz Atharí LSA Dec 9 Tehran (Karaj) Executed 173. Mr. Ghulám-Husayn Farhand LSA Dec 9 Tehran (Karaj) Executed 174. Mr. ‘Ináyatu’lláh Haqíqí LSA Dec 9 Tehran (Karaj) Executed

82 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION NO. NAME ROLE* DATE PLACE METHOD 19 8 4 (continued) 175. Mr. Jamál Káshání LSA Dec 9 Tehran (Karaj) Executed 176. Mr. Jamshíd Púr-Ustádkár LSA Dec 9 Tehran (Karaj) Executed 177. Dr. Rúhu’lláh Ta’lím LSA Dec 9 Tehran Executed (Kirmánsháh) 19 8 5 178. Mr. Rúhu’lláh Hasúrí Jan 21 Yazd Executed 179. Mr. Rúhu’lláh Bahrámsháhi LSA Feb 25 Yazd Executed 180. Mr. Nusratu’lláh Subháni Mar 5 Tehran Executed 181. Mr. ‘Abbás Idilkhání Aug 1 Tehran Executed 182. Mr. Rahmatu’lláh Vujdání LSA Aug 31 Bandar-‘Abbás Executed 183. Mr. Núr’ud-Din Tá’ifí Oct 12 Gurgán Died in Prison (Kirmánsháh) 184. Mr. ‘Azízu’lláh Ashjárí Nov 19 Tabríz Executed 19 8 6 185. Mr. Paymán Subháni (reported) Apr 28 Saráván Mobbed 186. Mr. Sirru’lláh Vahdat-Nizámí May 4 Tehran Executed 187. Mr. Fidrus Shabrukh May 9 Záhidán Executed 188. Mr. Farid Bihmardí NSA Jun 10 Tehran Executed 189. Mr. Habíbu’lláh Muhtadí Aug 27 Tehran Killed 190. Mr. Bábak Tálibí Sep 2 Karaj Beaten 191. Mr. Iraj Mihdi-Nizhád Sep 4 Bandar-‘Abbás Mobbed 19 8 7 192. Mr. Ahmad Kávih Jan 26 Isfahán Killed 193. Mr. Surúsh Jabbári Mar 3 Tehran Killed 194. Mr. Abu’l-Qásim Sháyiq Mar 3 Tehran Killed 195. Mr. Ardishír Akhtarí Sep 28 Tehran Executed 196. Mr. Amír-Husayn Nádiri Sep 28 Tehran Executed 19 8 8 197. Mr. Bihnám Páshá’í presumably Nov Tehran Executed 198. Mr. Iradj Afshín presumably Nov Tehran Executed 199. Mr. Mihrdad Maqsudi Feb 16 Urúmíyyih Killed 19 9 2 200. Mr. Bahman Samandari Mar 18 Tehran Executed 201. Mr. Ruhu’lláh Ghedami Jun 17 on Qum Highway Killed 19 9 5 202. Mr. Shirvin Falláh Approx Dec Arak Killed 19 9 7 203. Mr. Mansúr Dawlat Apr 4 Kírmán Killed 204. Mr. Shahrám Reza’i Jul 7 Rasht Killed 205. Mr. Mashá’lláh Enáyatí Jul 4 Isfahán Beaten in prison 19 9 8 206. Mr. Rúhu’lláh Rawhání Jul 21 Isfahán Executed

APPENDIX I: Bahá’ís killed since 1978 | 83 Appendix II THE UNITED NATIONS’ RESPONSE

Since 1980, human rights organs of the United Na- Grave concern for the Bahá’í minority is expressed tions have been expressing concern about the tragic by members of the Human Rights Committee at its situation of the Bahá’í religious minority in Iran. This 16th session, when the Committee discusses with repdemonstration of international concern has played a resentatives of the Iranian Government the preliminary critical role in moderating the actions of the Iranian report submitted by the Government of the Islamic authorities and providing a measure of security to the Republic of Iran in accordance with its reporting obli- Bahá’í community. gations under the International Covenant on Civil and A summary history of this issue at the United Na- Political Rights. tions is outlined below: Resolution 1982/25 (8.9.1982) of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 1980 Minorities recalls its earlier resolutions on the plight Resolution 10 (XXXIII) (10.9.1980) of the Sub- of the Bahá’ís and expresses its continuing concern at Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and human rights violations in Iran. Protection of Minorities expresses profound concern for the Bahá’ís both individually and collectively, and 1983 invites the Government of Iran to protect their funda- Resolution 1983/34 (8.3.1983) of the Commission mental human rights and freedoms. on Human Rights expresses its profound concern at the religious persecution of the Bahá’ís and requests 1981 the Secretary-General to continue his direct contacts Resolution 8 (XXXIV ) (9.9.1981) of the Sub- with the Government of Iran on the human rights Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and situation in that country, “including the situation of Protection of Minorities draws the attention of the the Bahá’ís.” Commission on Human Rights to the perilous situ- Resolution 1983/14 (5.9.1983) of the Sub-Comation facing the Bahá’ís and requests the Secretary- mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec- General to report on their plight to the next session of tion of Minorities expresses its grave concern at the the Commission. continuing religious persecution of the Bahá’ís and 1982 suggests that the Commission on Human Rights appoint a Special Rapporteur to study the human rights Resolution 1982/27 (11.3.1982) of the Commission situation in Iran. on Human Rights notes the Secretary-General’s report on the Bahá’ís and requests him to establish direct 1984 contacts with the Government of Iran and to continue Resolution 1984/54 (14.3.1984) of the Commishis efforts to ensure the Bahá’ís full enjoyment of their sion on Human Rights expresses its concern for the human rights and fundamental freedoms. Bahá’í minority and requests its Chairman to appoint

84 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION a Special Representative to establish contacts with the religion” (operative paragraph 2); Government of Iran and to make a thorough study of “Decides to continue its examination of the situahuman rights in Iran. tion of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Decision 1984/138 of the Economic and Social including the situation of minority groups such as Council endorses the Commission’s decision to appoint the Bahá’ís, during its forty-first session in order to a Special Representative. examine this situation anew in the light of additional Resolution 1984/14 (29.8.1984) of the Sub-Com- elements provided by the Commission on Human mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec- Rights and the Economic and Social Council” (operation of Minorities expresses alarm at the continuing tive paragraph 8). gross violations of human rights in Iran, including the 1986 religious persecution of the Bahá’ís, and welcomes the Commission’s decision to appoint a Special Represen- Resolution 1985/41 (12.3.1986) of the Commission tative. on Human Rights “expresses its deep concern over the specific and detailed allegations of grave human rights 1985 violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran to which the Preliminary Report of the Special Representative Special Representative refers in his report”; endorses to the Commission on Human Rights expresses great his conclusion that “specific and detailed allegations concern at the number and gravity of alleged violations concerning grave human rights violations” in Iran canof human rights in Iran, including denial of the right to not be dismissed; decides to extend the mandate of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Commission’s Special Representative and requests him Resolution 1985/39 (13.3.1985) of the Commission to present an interim report on the situation, “including on Human Rights endorses the general observations of the situation of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís” to its Special Representative, expresses its deep concern at the General Assembly at its forty-first session and a the number and gravity of alleged violations of human final report to the Commission at its forty-third sesrights to which his preliminary report bears witness, sion in 1987. extends his mandate, and requests him “...to present an Decision 1986/137 of the Economic and Social interim report to the General Assembly at its fortieth Council approves the Commission’s decision to extend session on the human rights situation in the Islamic the Special Representative’s mandate and its request Republic of Iran, including the situation of minority to the Special Representative to submit reports to the groups such as the Bahá’ís...” forty-first session of the General Assembly and the Decision 1985/148 of the Economic and Social forty-third session of the Commission. Council endorses the Commission’s decision. It is announced on 14 July 1986 that, in response Resolution 1985/17 (29.8.1985) of the Sub-Com- to this request, the Chairman of the Commission apmission on Prevention of Discrimination and Pro- pointed Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl to serve as the tection of Minorities welcomes the Commission’s Special Representative of the Commission. decision, expresses its alarm at the continuing reports Resolution 41/159 (4.12.1986) of the General Asof gross violations of human rights and fundamental sembly “Expresses its deep concern over the specific freedoms in Iran, “in particular at the evidence of per- and detailed allegations of violations of human rights secution of the Bahá’í religious minority...,” endorses in the Islamic Republic of Iran and in particular over the general observations of the Special Representative those related to the right to life, such as summary and in his preliminary report, and expresses the hope that arbitrary executions, the right to freedom from torture the initial contacts of the Government of Iran with or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishthe Special Representative will develop into a positive ment, the right to liberty and security of person and to cooperation. freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention, the right to Resolution 40/141 (13.12.1985) of the General a fair trial, the right to freedom of thought, conscience Assembly “Expresses its deep concern over the specific and religion and to freedom of expression and the right and detailed allegations of violations of human rights in of religious minorities to profess and practice their own the Islamic Republic of Iran to which the Special Rep- religion”; resentative refers in his interim report, and in particular, “Requests the Commission on Human Rights to those related to the right to life, such as summary and study carefully the final report of the Special Reprearbitrary executions; the right to freedom from torture sentative, as well as other information pertaining to the or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish- situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of ment; the right to liberty and security of person and to Iran, and to consider further steps for securing effective freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention; the right to “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms a fair trial; the right to freedom of thought, conscience for all in that country”; and religion and to freedom of expression; and the right Decides to continue its examination of the situation of religious minorities to profess and practice their own of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran includ-

APPENDIX II: The United Nations’ Response | 85 ing the situation of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís, Resolution 42/136 (7.12.1987) of the General during its forty-second session....” Assembly takes note of the Commission’s resolution 1987/55 requesting the Special Representative “to 1987 submit an interim report to the General Assembly Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1987/55 (11.3.1987) at its forty-second session on the situation of human of the Commission on Human Rights recalling its rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the resolution 1986/41, extends the mandate of the Special situation of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís...”; Representative for one year; requests him to present an again expresses “its deep concern about the numerinterim report on the human rights situation including ous and detailed allegations of grave human rights the situation of minority groups, such as the Bahá’ís; violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran to which regrets “that the Government of the Islamic Republic the Special Representative had referred in his report, of Iran has so far provided no comment or information namely, those related to the right to life, the right to to the Special Representative and has not allowed him freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading to visit the country”; again expresses “its deep concern treatment or punishment, the right to liberty and secuover the numerous and detailed allegations of grave and rity of person, and to freedom from arbitrary arrest or extensive human rights violations to which the Special detention, the right to a fair trial, the right to freedom Representative refers in his report (E/CN.4/1987/23) of thought, conscience and religion and to freedom and in particular, those related to the right to life, the of expression, and the right of religious minorities to right to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or profess and practice their own religion”; expresses “its degrading treatment or punishment, the right to liberty grave concern, in particular, that although the Special and security of person and to freedom from arbitrary Representative indicates that the number of alleged arrest or detention, the right to a fair trial, the right violations of the right to life has diminished over the to freedom of thought; conscience and religion and past two years, according to information made available to freedom of expression, and the right of religious to him, some one hundred persons were alleged to have minorities to profess and practice their own religion”; been executed in the period October 1986-September requests “the Special Representative to present an 1987 because of their political and religious convicinterim report to the General Assembly, at its forty- tions”; expresses “its deep concern at allegations that second session on human rights in the Islamic Republic maltreatment and torture, both physical and psychoof Iran, including the situation of minority groups such logical, are common practice in Iranian prisons during as the Bahá’ís....” interrogation and before and after the final verdict, and Decision 1987/150 of ECOSOC approves the at the existence of extremely summary and informal Commission’s decision to extend the Special Represen- proceedings, unawareness on the part of the prisontative’s mandate. ers of specific accusations, lack of legal counsel and Resolution E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/1987/12 (1.9.1987) other irregularities with respect to fair trial”; endorses of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina- “the conclusion of the Special Representative that acts tion and Protection of Minorities refers to “various continue to occur in the Islamic Republic of Iran that resolutions and documents published by other interna- are inconsistent with the provisions of international tional bodies and organizations including resolutions instruments....”; decides “to keep under consideration ratified by the European Parliament and Council of the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic Europe ... all of which have expressed great concern of Iran, including the situation of minority groups such over the violations of human rights and violation of the as the Bahá’ís, during its forty-third session...” most basic rights of the ethnic and religious minorities..”; learns “with renewed concern that the number 1988 of those allegedly executed by the ruling Government, Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1988/69 (10.3.1988) of including Bahá’ís and others, now exceeds 70,000...”; the Commission on Human Rights recalls its deciexpresses “strong concern over the grave violations of sion to request the Special Representative to present human rights and basic freedom such as...the right to an interim report to the General Assembly on human freedom of belief and religion...”; urges “determined rights situation including the situation of minority protest by the Commission to the Islamic Republic of groups, such as the Bahá’ís; expresses “again its deep Iran concerning continuing disrespect for the Charter concern about the numerous detailed allegations of of the United Nations in relation to human rights”; and grave human rights violations... in particular those “requests the Secretary-General to inform the General related to the right to life,... the right to freedom of Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights and its thought, conscience and religion and to freedom of Special Representative of the information obtained expression...”; requests “the Special Representative to from the Sub-Commission on the grave violation of present an interim report to the General Assembly at human rights and the most basic freedoms in the Is- its forty-third session on the human rights situation, lamic Republic of Iran.” including the situation of minority groups, such as the

86 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION Bahá’ís, and a final report to the Commission at its has referred in his reports, namely, those related to the forty-fifth session.” right to life, the right to freedom from torture or cruel, Decision 1988/137 of ECOSOC approves the inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the Commission’s decision to extend the Special Represen- right to liberty and security of person, the right to a fair tative’s mandate. This decision refers also to Commis- trial and to freedom of thought, conscience, religion sion resolution 1984/54. and expression,”; requests “the Special Representative Resolution 43/137 (8.12.1988) of the General to present an interim report to the General Assembly Assembly takes note of the Commission’s resolution at its forty-fourth session on human rights situation in 1988/69 requesting the Special Representative “to Iran, including the situation of minority groups, such as submit an interim report to the General Assembly at the Bahá’ís and a final report to the forty-sixth session its forty-third session on the situation of human rights of the Commission.” in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation R e s o l u t i on E / C N . 4 / S u b. 2 / RES / 1 9 8 9 / 1 0 of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís....”; notes “the (31.8.1989) of the Sub-Commission on Prevention recent contacts between the Special Representative of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities takes and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, note “of numerous reports by United Nations special which it is hoped will lead to a state of full co-operation rapporteurs and by NGOs,...”; concerned “also at between the Special Representative and that Govern- reports of denial of rights of minorities to enjoy their ment, including a visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran, own culture, to profess and practice their own beliefs”; so that he can fulfil his mandate”; notes “that the is “further concerned at reports about persecution and Bahá’ís in the Islamic Republic of Iran continue to be detention of members of the Bahá’í community in the subjected to various forms of harassment and discrimi- Islamic Republic of Iran.” nation, although there are indications that the intensity Resolution 44/163 (15.12.1989) of the General of the campaign of persecution against the Bahá’ís has Assembly takes note “with appreciation of the interim diminished somewhat in recent months, and that report of the Special Representative of the Commisa number of them have been released from prison”; sion on Human Rights”; takes note “of the view of the expresses once more “its deep concern about the nu- Special Representative that, in order to achieve full merous and detailed allegations of grave human rights co-operation between the Government of the Islamic violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran to which Republic of Iran and the Special Representative, there the Special Representative had referred in his report, is a need to proceed to another stage in the discharge of namely, those related to the right to life, the right to his mandate”; welcomes “the invitation by the Islamic freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading Republic of Iran to the Special Representative for him treatment or punishment, the right to liberty and secu- to visit that country”; decides “to continue its examinarity of person, the right to a fair trial and the right to tion... during its forty-fifth session.” freedom of thought, conscience and religion”; expresses 1990 “its deep concern also at the existence of extremely summary, informal and irregular proceedings, failure Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1990/79 (7.3.1990) of to inform defendants of specific accusations against the Commission on Human Rights notes “the findthem, lack of legal counsel, absence of an appropriate ings of the Special Representative on the situation of instance for appeal and other irregularities that con- the Bahá’ís in the Islamic Republic of Iran”; expresses travene international standards on fair trial”; endorses “its concern that testimony gathered by the Special “the conclusion of the Special Representative that acts Representative reiterated complaints about unlawful continue to occur in the Islamic Republic of Iran that executions, torture, substitute prisoners, imprisonment are inconsistent with the provisions of international beyond the period specified in the sentence, spontaneinstruments...”; decides “to keep under consideration ous decisions by low-ranking officials and the absence the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of council for defence as well as restrictions on the right of Iran, including the situation of minority groups such to assemble...”; requests “the Special Representative to as the Bahá’ís, during its forty-fourth session....” submit an interim report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session on the human rights situation in 1989 the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation of Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1989/66 (7.3.1989) of minority groups, such as the Bahá’ís, and a final report the Commission on Human Rights recalling “...the to the Commission at its forty-seventh session.” situation of minority groups, such as the Bahá’ís...”; Decision 1990/243 of ECOSOC approves the notes “that the situation of the Bahá’ís in the Islamic Commission’s decision to extend the Special Represen- Republic of Iran continues to be uncertain”; expresses tative’s mandate. once more “its deep concern over the numerous and Resolution E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/1990/9 (30.8.1990) detailed allegations of grave and extensive human of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discriminarights violations to which the Special Representative tion and Protection of Minorities notes “that the

APPENDIX II: The United Nations’ Response | 87 situation of the Bahá’ís in the Islamic Republic of Iran ernment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and to report continues to be uncertain”; expresses “its deep concern on further progress. about the grave violations of human rights namely Resolution E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/1991/9 (23.8.1991) those related to the right to life, the right to freedom of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discriminafrom torture and from cruel, inhuman and degrad- tion and Protection of Minorities notes “that the situing treatment or punishment, the right to liberty and ation of the Bahá’í community in the Islamic Republic security of person, the right to a fair trial, and the right of Iran continues to be a matter of great concern”; to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and expres- expresses “its deep concern at the escalating grave sion...”; decides “to consider the situation of human violations of human rights in the Islamic Republic rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the of Iran, in particular of the right to life, the right to situation of minority groups such as the Bahá’í, at its freedom from torture and from cruel, inhuman and forty-third session.” degrading treatment or punishment, the right to liberty Resolution 45/173 (18.12.1990) of the General and security of person, the right to a fair trial and the Assembly noting “the findings of the Special Represen- right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and tative on the situation of the Bahá’ís in the Islamic Re- expression, and calls upon the Commission on Human public of Iran”; calls upon “the Islamic Republic of Iran Rights at its forty-eight session, to extend the mandate to intensify its efforts to investigate and rectify the hu- of the Special Representative and the monitoring of man rights issues raised by the Special Representative, the situation of human rights”; decides “to consider the in particular as regards the administration of justice situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of and due process of law in order to comply with inter- Iran, including the situation of minority groups such as national instruments on human rights, including the the Bahá’í community, at its forty-fourth session.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1992 to which the Islamic Republic of Iran is a party, and to ensure that all individuals within its territory and Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1992/67 (4.3.1992) of subject to its jurisdiction, including religious groups, the Commission on Human Rights takes note “with enjoy the rights recognized in these instruments”; notes appreciation of the report of the Special Representative “that the co-operation of the Islamic Republic of Iran of the Commission (E/CN.4/1992/34) and the obserwith the Special Representative has improved and has vations contained therein”; expresses “its deep concern included replies by the Government to allegations that at the continuing reports of violations of human rights have been transmitted to it, and urges the Government in the Islamic Republic of Iran”; expresses “its concern to reply in detail to all allegations referred to by the more specifically at the main weaknesses, according to Special Representative in his reports.” the Special Representative, of the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, namely, the lack of 1991 guarantees of due process of law, discriminatory treat- Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1991/82 (7.3.1991) of ment of certain groups of citizens for reason of their the Commission on Human Rights noting further religious beliefs, notably the Bahá’ís....”; welcomes “the “the findings of the Special Representative on the situ- fact that the Government of the Islamic Republic of ation of the Bahá’ís in the Islamic Republic of Iran”; Iran has permitted the Special Representative to visit welcomes “the full cooperation extended by the Gov- the country and has continued to reply to allegations ernment of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Special of human rights violations transmitted to it by the Representative, which has reached its highest level, as Special Representative”; calls upon the Government well as the intention of the Government to continue “to ensure that all individuals within its territory and its full cooperation with the Special Representative”; subject to its jurisdiction, including religious groups, requests “the Special Representative to maintain his enjoy the rights recognized in the international instrucontact and cooperation with the Government...and ments”; decides “to extend the mandate of the Special to report on further progress with regard to the recom- Representative requesting him to submit an interim mendations contained in his report, on the basis of his report to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh mandate pursuant to Commission on Human Rights session”; decides “to continue its consideration of the resolution 1984/54 of 14 March 1984”; also requests situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms the Special Representative “to submit a report to be in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a matter of priority, considered by the Commission which will consider the at its forty-ninth session.” report with the view to its discontinuing the mandate if Decision 1992/239 of ECOSOC approves the there is further progress achieved regarding his recom- Commission’s decision to extend the Special Repmendations.” resentative’s mandate and its request to the Special Decision 1991/261 of ECOSOC approves the Representative to submit an interim report to the forty- Commission’s request to the Special Representative to seventh session of the General Assembly and a final maintain his contacts and cooperation with the Gov- report to the forty-ninth session of the Commission.

88 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION R e s o l u t i on E / C N . 4 / S u b. 2 / RES / 1 9 9 2 / 1 5 sentative … for a further year,” requesting “the Special (27.8.1992) of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Representative to submit an interim report to the Discrimination and Protection of Minorities notes “in General Assembly … on the human rights situation particular that the situation of the Bahá’í community in in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to be a matter of minority groups, such as the Bahá’ís,” continuing of concern”; condemns “the continuing grave violations its consideration of Iran’s human rights situation “as a of human rights by the Government of the Islamic matter of priority, at its fiftieth session.” Republic of Iran, especially: (d) renewed persecution of Decision 1993/273 of ECOSOC approves the religious minorities and summary killings of Bahá’ís.” Commission’s decision to extend the mandate of the Resolution 47/146 (18.12.1992) of the General Special Representative for one year, to request him to Assembly expresses “its concern at continuing reports submit an interim report to the General Assembly at its of violations of human rights in the Islamic Republic forty-eighth session on the situation of human rights of Iran”; expresses “its concern more specifically at the in the Islamic Republic of Iran and to report to the main criticisms according to the Special Representative Commission at its fiftieth session and to request to the of the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Secretary-General to give all necessary assistance to the Iran, namely, the high number of executions, the prac- Special Representative. tice of torture, the standard of the administration of R e s o l u t i on E / C N . 4 / S u b. 2 / RES / 1 9 9 3 / 1 4 justice, the absence of guarantees of due legal process, (20.4.1993) of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of the treatment of the Bahá’í community and restriction Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, gravely of freedoms of expression, thought, opinion and press”; concerned at “the systematic repression of the Bahá’í regrets “that the Government of the Islamic Republic community and at the plight of the Iranian Kurds,” of Iran has not permitted the Special Representative strongly condemns “the continuing and flagrant huto visit the country and failed to reply to allegations man rights violations of the Islamic Republic of Iran, of human rights violations” and regrets also “that, as including: (d) The continued persecution of the Bahá’ís the Special Representative concluded, the Islamic and other religious minorities,” and decides to “consid- Republic of Iran has not given adequate follow-up to er further the situation of human rights in the Islamic many of the recommendations contained in the previ- Republic of Iran, including the situation of women and ous reports”; decides “to continue the examination of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís and the Kurds, at the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic its forty-sixth session.” of Iran during its forty-eighth session under the item Resolution 48/145 (20.12.1993) of the General As- ‘Human rights questions’ in the light of additional ele- sembly expresses its concern “at the main criticisms of ments provided by the Commission on Human Rights the Special Representative with regard to the human and the ECOSOC.” rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, namely, … discriminatory treatment of certain groups of 1993 citizens by reason of their religious beliefs, notably the Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1992/62 (10.3.1993) of Bahá’ís, whose existence as a viable religious commuthe Commission on Human Rights, noting “the Spe- nity is threatened…,” also calls upon “the Government cial Representative’s … view that during 1992 there was of the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply with interno appreciable progress in the Islamic Republic of Iran national instruments on human rights, in particular the towards improved compliance with human rights stan- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, dards in conformity with international instruments,” to which the Islamic Republic of Iran is a party, and to “expresses its deep concern at continuing reports of ensure that all individuals within its territory and subviolations of human rights in the Islamic Republic of ject to its jurisdiction, including religious groups, enjoy Iran; expresses “its concern more specifically at the the rights recognized in those instruments” and decides main criticisms of the Special Representative of the … to “continue the examination of the situation of human discriminatory treatment of certain groups of citizens rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the for reason of their religious beliefs, notably the Bahá’ís,” situation of minority groups, such as the Bahá’ís…” while conveying “its regret that the Government of the Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1994/73 (9.3.1994) of the Islamic Republic of Iran has not granted the request of Commission on Human Rights expresses its concern the Special Representative to visit the country for more “at the main criticisms of the Special Representative than a year,” “calls upon the Government … to comply with regard to the human rights situation in the Islamic with international instruments on human rights … Republic of Iran, namely, … discriminatory treatment to which the Islamic Republic of Iran is a party, and of certain groups of citizens for reason of their relito ensure that all individuals within its territory and gious beliefs, notably the Bahá’ís, whose existence as subject to its jurisdiction, including religious groups, a viable religious community in the Islamic Republic enjoy the rights recognised in these instruments,” and of Iran is threatened, as well as the ill-treatment of “decides to extend the mandate of the Special Repre- certain Christians and restrictions on the freedoms of

APPENDIX II: The United Nations’ Response | 89 expression, thought, opinion and the press, and that, as Republic of Iran to comply with international instrunoted by the Special Representative, there is continued ments on human rights, in particular the International discrimination against women,” also calls upon “the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply Islamic Republic of Iran is a party, and to ensure that with international instruments on human rights, in all individuals within its territory and subject to its juparticular the International Covenant on Civil and risdiction, including religious groups and other persons Political Rights, to which the Islamic Republic of Iran belonging to minorities, enjoy the rights recognized is a party, and to ensure that all individuals within in those instruments”; and decides “to continue the its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, including examination of the situation of human rights in the religious groups, enjoy the rights recognized in these Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation of instruments” and requests the Special Representative to minority groups, such as the Bahá’ís, during its fiftieth submit an interim report to the General Assembly at its session under the item entitled ‘Human rights quesforty-ninth session on the situation of human rights in tions’ in the light of additional elements provided by the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation of the Commission on Human Rights and the Economic minority groups, such as the Bahá’ís, and to report to and Social Council.” the Commission at its fifty-first session. 1995 Decision 1994/263 of ECOSOC approves the Commission’s decision to extend for a further year the Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1995/68 (8.3.1995) of mandate of the Special Representative, to request him the Commission on Human Rights expresses “its deep to submit an interim report to the General Assembly at concern at continued violations of human rights in the its forty-ninth session on the situation of human rights Islamic Republic of Iran, including those highlighted in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation by the Special Representative in his report, namely of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís, and to report to … the discriminatory treatment of minorities by the Commission at its fifty-first session and to request reason of their religious beliefs, notably the Baha’ís, the Secretary-General to give all necessary assistance to whose existence as a viable religious community in the Special Representative. the Islamic Republic of Iran is threatened” … also R e s o l u t i on E / C N . 4 / S u b. 2 / RES / 1 9 9 4 / 1 6 urges “the Government of the Islamic Republic of (25.8.1994) of the Sub-Commission on Prevention Iran, as a State party to the International Covenants of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities deeply on Human Rights, to abide by its freely undertaken concerned “at extensive and continuing human rights obligations under the Covenants and under other inviolations by the Government of the Islamic Republic ternational instruments on human rights, and to ensure of Iran, including … freedom of religion,” shocked that all individuals within its territory and subject to “by the systematic repression of the Bahá’í community its jurisdiction, including religious groups, enjoy the and at the situation of the Iranian Kurds and the Arab rights recognized in these instruments,” further urges minority in Iran, and at increasing intolerance towards “the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Christians, including recent murders of Christian intensify its efforts to investigate and rectify the hureligious ministers,” condemns “the flagrant viola- man rights issues raised by the Special Representative tions of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran in his observations, in particular with regard to the which, as noted by the Special Representative of the administration of justice and due process of law, and, Commission, include: (d) Religious discrimination, in fulfilment of its obligations under article 27 of the notably against the Bahá’ís and Christian individuals International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and groups,” and requests the Secretary-General to to take steps to ensure the recognition and enjoyment “continue to keep the Sub-Commission informed of of human rights of persons belonging to minorities” relevant reports and United Nations measures to pre- and requests “the Special Representative to submit an vent human rights violations in the Islamic Republic interim report to the General Assembly at its fiftieth of Iran, including, in particular, those concerning the session on the situation of human rights in the Islamic situation of the Kurds and the Arab minority and the Republic of Iran, including the situation of minority religious freedoms of the Bahá’í and Christian com- groups such as the Baha’ís, and to report to the Communities in Iran.” mission at its fifty-second session.” Resolution 49/202 (23.12.1994) of the General Decision 1995/279 of ECOSOC approves the Assembly expresses “its concern more specifically at Commission’s decision to extend for a further year the the main criticisms of the Special Representative in mandate of the Special Representative on the situation his recent reports with regard to … the discriminatory of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, to treatment of minorities by reason of their religious request him to submit an interim report to the General beliefs, notably the Bahá’ís, whose existence as a viable Assembly at its fiftieth session on the situation of hureligious minority is threatened …,” urges “the Islamic man rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including

90 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION the situation of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís, 1996 and to report to the Commission at its fifty-second ses- Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1996/84 (24.4.1996) sion and to request to the Secretary-General to give all of the Commission on Human Rights expresses “its necessary assistance to the Special Representative. concern at the continuation of violations of human R e s o l u t i on E / C N . 4 / S u b. 2 / RES / 1 9 9 5 / 1 8 rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in particular (24.8.1995) of the Sub-Commission on Prevention … the discriminatory treatment of minorities by of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities deeply reason of their religious beliefs, notably the Bahá’ís, concerned at “extensive and continuing human rights whose existence as a viable religious community in the violations by the Government of the Islamic Republic Islamic Republic of Iran is threatened…,” calls upon of Iran, including arbitrary and summary executions, “the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to torture and inhuman or degrading treatment and implement fully the conclusions and recommendations punishment, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, un- of the Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance explained disappearances, the absence of guarantees relating to the Bahá’ís and to other minority religious essential for the protection of the right to a fair trial groups, including Christians,” urges “the Government and disregard for freedom of expression and freedom of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a State party to the of religion,” noting “that relevant international orga- International Covenants on Human Rights, to abide nizations and bodies emphasize the role of the Islamic by its obligations under the Covenants and under other Republic of Iran in intimidating and harassing the reli- international instruments on human rights to which gious minorities in the Islamic Republic of Iran during it is party, and to ensure that all individuals within the past year, in particular in the assassination of three its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, including Christian leaders,” condemns “the flagrant violations religious groups, enjoy the rights recognized in these of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran which, instruments” and requests “the Special Representative as noted by the Special Representative of the Com- to submit an interim report to the General Assembly mission, include: (f ) Religious discrimination, notably at its fifty-first session on the situation of human rights against Bahá’ís and Christian individuals and groups,” in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation requests “the Secretary-General to continue to keep of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís, and to report to the Sub-Commission informed of relevant reports the Commission at its fifty-third session.” and United Nations measures to prevent human rights Decision 1996/287 of ECOSOC endorses the violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including, in Commission’s decision to extend for a further year the particular, those concerning the situation of the Kurds mandate of the Special Representative, and approves and the Arab minority and the religious freedoms and the Commission’s request to the Special Representative the emancipation of the Bahá’í and Christian com- to submit an interim report to the General Assembly munities in Iran.” at its fifty-first session on the situation of human rights Resolution 50/188 (22.12.95) of the General As- in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation sembly expresses “its concern at violations of human of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís, and to report to rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in particular … the Commission at its fifty-third session. the discriminatory treatment of minorities by reason Resolution E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/1996/7 (20.8.1996) of their religious beliefs, notably the Bahá’ís, whose of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discriminaexistence as a viable religious community in the Islamic tion and Protection of Minorities gravely concerned Republic of Iran is threatened …,” urges “the Govern- “at reports of: (a) Extensive and continuing human ment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a State party rights violations by the Government of the Islamic to the International Covenants on Human Rights, to Republic of Iran, including arbitrary and summary exabide by its obligations freely undertaken under the ecutions, torture and inhuman or degrading treatment Covenants and under other international instruments and punishment, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, on human rights and to ensure that all individuals unexplained disappearances, the absence of guarantees within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, in- essential for the protection of the right to a fair trial cluding religious groups, enjoy the rights recognized in and disregard for freedom of expression and freedom those instruments,” and decides “to continue the exam- of religion,” requests “the Government of the Islamic ination of the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran to investigate fully in order to end Republic of Iran, including the situation of minority the alleged violations of human rights in the Islamic groups such as the Bahá’ís, during its fifty-first session Republic of Iran which include: (d) Religious discrimiunder the item entitled “Human rights questions,” on nation, notably against Bahá’ís and Christians,” urges the basis of the report of the Special Representative “the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to and in the light of additional elements provided by the implement fully the conclusions and the recommenda- Commission on Human Rights and the Economic and tions of the Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance Social Council.” relating to the Bahá’ís and to other minority religious

APPENDIX II: The United Nations’ Response | 91 groups, including Christians, until they are completely ations of discrimination against the members of this emancipated” and requests “the Secretary-General to religious community, as well as at the discriminatory continue to keep the Sub-Commission informed of treatment of minorities by reason of their religious relevant reports and United Nations measures to pre- beliefs, including certain Christian minorities, some vent human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of members of which have been the targets of intimida- Iran, including violations of the religious freedoms of tion and assassination,” calls upon “the Government the Bahá’í and the Christian communities in Iran.” of the Islamic Republic of Iran: (b) To abide by its Resolution 51/107 (12.12.96) of the General As- freely undertaken obligations under the International sembly expresses “its concern at the grave breaches of Covenants on Human Rights and under other interhuman rights of the Bahá’ís in the Islamic Republic national instruments on human rights, and to ensure of Iran and situations of discrimination against the that all individuals within its territory and subject members of this religious community, as well as at to its jurisdiction, including members of religious the discriminatory treatment of minorities by reason groups and persons belonging to minorities, enjoy of their religious beliefs, including lack of adequate all the rights enshrined in those instruments; (c) To protection for the Christian minorities, some members implement fully the recommendations of the Special of which have been the target of intimidation and Representative and the relevant recommendations of assassination,” urges “the Government of the Islamic the Special Rapporteurs on religious intolerance and Republic of Iran, as a State party to the International on freedom of opinion and expression, in particular the Covenants on Human Rights, to abide by its freely recommendations relating to the Bahá’ís, Christians, undertaken obligations under the Covenants and under Sunni and other minority religious groups; (g) To other international instruments on human rights and to ensure that capital punishment will not be imposed for ensure that all individuals within its territory and sub- apostasy or non-violent crimes, or in disregard of the ject to its jurisdiction, including members of religious provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and groups and persons belonging to minorities, enjoy all Political Rights and the United Nations safeguards” the rights enshrined in those instruments,” calls upon and decides: “… (c) To continue its examination of the “the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of implement fully the conclusions and recommendations Iran, including the situation of minority groups such as of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Hu- the Bahá’ís, at its fifty-fourth session under the agenda man Rights on the elimination of all forms of religious item entitled ‘Question of the violation of human intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or rights and fundamental freedoms in any part of the belief relating to the Bahá’ís and to other minority reli- world, with particular reference to colonial and other gious groups, including Christians,” expresses its grave dependent countries and territories.’ ” concern at indications, according to the information Decision 1997/262 of ECOSOC endorses the received by the Special Representative of the Com- Commission’s decision to extend for a further year the mission on Human Rights on the situation of human mandate of the Special Representative on the situation rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, of a significant of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, aptoughening of criminal legislation and its application proved the Commission’s request to the Special Repin the Islamic Republic of Iran and in particular at the resentative to submit an interim report to the General incidence of capital punishment imposed for apostasy Assembly at its fifty-second session on the situation of and non-violent crimes, in violation of the relevant human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran and to reprovisions of the International Covenant on Civil port to the Commission at its fifty-fourth session, and and Political Rights and United Nations safeguards,” to keep a gender perspective in mind when seeking and and decides “on the basis of the report of the Special analysing information, and to request the Secretary- Representative and in the light of additional elements General to continue to give all necessary assistance to provided by the Commission on Human Rights and the Special Representative to enable him to discharge the Economic and Social Council, to continue the his mandate fully. examination of the situation of human rights in the Resolution 52/142 of the General Assembly ex- Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation of presses “its concern: (b) At the grave breaches of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís, during its fifty- the human rights of the Bahá’ís, the discrimination second session under the item entitled ‘Human rights against members of other religious minorities, includquestions.’ ” ing Christians, and the death sentences pronounced against Dhabihullah Mahrami, Musa Talibi and 1997 Ramadan-Ali Dhulfaqari, on the charge of apostasy, Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1997/54 (15.4.1997) and against Bihnam Mithaqi and Kayvan Khalajabadi of the Commission on Human Rights expresses “its because of their beliefs,” calls upon the Government concern: (b) At the grave breaches of the human rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran: “… (b) To abide by its of the Bahá’ís in the Islamic Republic of Iran and situ- freely undertaken obligations under the International

92 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION Covenants on Human Rights and under other inter- its fifty-fifth session under the same agenda item.” national instruments on human rights and to ensure Decision 1998/273 of ECOSOC endorses the that all individuals within its territory and subject to Commission’s decision to extend the mandate of the its jurisdiction, including members of religious groups Special Representative for a further year, to request the and persons belonging to minorities, enjoy all the rights Special Representative to submit an interim report to enshrined in those instruments; (c) To implement fully the General Assembly at its fifty-third session and to the conclusions and recommendations of the Special report to the Commission at its fifty-fifth session, and Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on to keep a gender perspective in mind when seeking and the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance and analysing information, and to request the Secretaryof discrimination based on religion or belief relating General to continue to give all necessary assistance to to the Bahá’ís and to other minority religious groups, the Special Representative to enable him to discharge including Christians, until they are completely eman- his mandate fully. cipated; E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.2. (g) To ensure that Resolution 53/158 (9.12.1998) of the General Ascapital punishment will not be imposed for apostasy sembly expresses “its concern at the discrimination or non-violent crimes or in disregard of the provisions against religious minorities and in particular remains of the International Covenant on Civil and Political gravely concerned at the unabated pattern of persecu- Rights and United Nations safeguards” and decides tion against the Bahá’ís, in particular the execution “to continue the examination of the situation of hu- and sentencing to death and arrests of members of the man rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including Bahá’í community, and calls upon the Government of the situation of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís, at the Islamic Republic of Iran to implement the recomits fifty-third session under the item entitled ‘Human mendations of the Special Rapporteur of the Comrights questions,’ in the light of additional elements mission on Human Rights on religious intolerance provided by the Commission on Human Rights.” relating to the Bahá’ís and to other religious minorities, until they are completely emancipated”; calls upon “the 1998 Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ensure Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1998/80 (22.4.1998) of that capital punishment will not be imposed for other the Commission on Human Rights expresses “its con- than the most serious crimes, for apostasy, or otherwise cern: (c) At continuing grave violations of the human in disregard of the provisions of the International Covrights of the Bahá’ís, as well as at the discrimination enant on Civil and Political Rights and United Nations against members of other religious minorities, includ- safeguards, and to provide the Special Representative ing Christians, despite constitutional guarantees, at with relevant statistics on this matter”; and decides “to the increased pressure on religious communities and continue the examination of the situation of human persons suspected of proselytizing, and at the death rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the sentences pronounced against Mr. Dhabihullah Mah- situation of minority groups such as the Bahá’ís, at its rami and Mr. Musa Talibi on the charge of apostasy, fifty-fourth session under the item entitled ‘Human and against Mr. Bihnam Mithaqi and Mr. Kayvan rights questions,’ in the light of additional elements Khalajabadi because of their beliefs,” calls upon “the provided by the Commission on Human Rights.” Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran: (b) To abide by its freely undertaken obligations under the 1999 International Covenants on Human Rights and under Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1999/13 (23.4.1999) of other international instruments on human rights, and the Commission on Human Rights notes with interto ensure that all individuals within its territory and est: “… (b) The reported elimination of discrimination subject to its jurisdiction, including members of reli- against Bahá’í youth in enrollment in the pre-university gious groups and persons belonging to minorities, en- year at the high-school level, while remaining conjoy all the rights enshrined in those instruments; … (e) cerned that their entry to universities continues to be To implement fully the conclusions and recommenda- refused, expresses its concern: (c) At the continued tions of the Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance discrimination against religious minorities, in parrelating to the Bahá’ís, Christians and other minority ticular the unabated and, in some instances, worsened religious groups, until they are completely emancipated pattern of persecution against the Bahá’ís, including … (j) To ensure that capital punishment will not be death sentences, executions, arrests and the closure of imposed for non-violent crimes, for apostasy, or other- the Bahá’í Institute for Higher Education” and calls wise in disregard of the provisions of the International upon the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United “… (b) To ensure that capital punishment will not be Nations safeguards” and decides: “… (c) To continue imposed for other than the most serious crimes, not its examination of the situation of human rights in the for apostasy or otherwise in disregard of the provisions Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation of mi- of the International Covenant on Civil and Political nority groups such as the Bahá’ís and the Christians, at Rights and United Nations safeguards, and to provide

APPENDIX II: The United Nations’ Response | 93 the Special Representative with relevant statistics on the sentencing to death of some of them”. Calls upon this matter; (c) To implement fully the conclusions the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran…”to and recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on implement fully the conclusions and recommendations religious intolerance relating to the Bahá’ís and other of the Special Representative with regard to religious minority religious groups until they are completely intolerance relating to the Bahá’ís and other minority emancipated”; and decides: “… (c) To continue its religious groups, Ibid,. para 110. until they are comexamination of the situation of human rights in the pletely emancipated”; Decides “to continue the exami- Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation of the nation of the situation of human rights in the Islamic Bahá’ís and other minority groups, at its fifty-sixth ses- Republic of Iran, including the situation of minority sion under the same agenda item.” groups such as the Bahá’ís, at its fifty-sixth session, Resolution A/RES754/177 (17.12.1999) of the under the item ‘Human rights questions’, in the light General Assembly expresses its concern… “at the dis- of additional elements provided by the Commission on crimination against religious minorities, in particular Human Rights”. Bahá’ís, and remains gravely concerned at the unabated 2001 pattern of persecution against the Bahá’ís, including death sentences, arrests and the closure of the Bahá’í Resolution E/CN.4/RES/2001/17 (20.4.2001) the Institute for Higher Education, and calls upon the Commission on Human Rights notes: Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to imple- “ recent positive steps regarding the situation of the ment fully the conclusions and recommendations of Bahá’ís, including the report that they will be allowed the Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance relating to re-establish their cemetery in Tehran, but expresses to the Bahá’ís and other religious minorities until they its concern at the still-existing discrimination against are completely emancipated”; Decides… “to continue persons belonging to minorities, in particular against the examination of the situation of human rights in Bahá’ís, and calls upon the Government of the Islamic the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the situation Republic of Iran to eliminate all forms of discriminaof minority groups, such as the Bahá’ís, at its fifty-fifth tion based on religious grounds or against persons session under the item entitled “Human rights ques- belonging to minorities and to address this matter tions”, in the light of additional elements provided by in an open manner with the full participation of the the Commission on Human Rights”. minorities themselves, as well as to implement fully the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Rap- 2000 porteur on religious intolerance relating to the Bahá’ís Resolution E/CN.4/2000/L.16 (10.4.2000) the and other minority groups until they are completely Commission on Human Rights expresses its concern: emancipated”. Decides… “to continue its examina- …”At the discrimination against religious minori- tion of the situation of human rights in the Islamic ties, in particular the unabated pattern of persecution Republic of Iran, paying particular attention to further against the Bahá’ís, including death sentences and ar- developments, including the situation of the Bahá’ís rests”; calls upon…”To ensure that capital punishment and other minority groups, at its fifty-eighth session will not be imposed other than for the most serious under the same agenda item”. crimes, not for apostasy or otherwise in disregard of Resolution A/RES/56/171(19.12.2001) The Genthe provisions of the International Covenant on Civil eral Assembly expresses its concern: … “At the conand Political Rights and United Nations safeguards, tinuing discrimination against persons belonging to and to provide the Special Representative with rel- minorities, in particular against Bahá’ís, Christians, evant statistics on this matter”; “To implement fully Jews and Sunnis”. It calls upon the Government of the the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Islamic Republic of Iran: …”To eliminate all forms of Rapporteur on religious intolerance relating to the discrimination based on religious grounds or against Bahá’ís and other minority religious groups until they persons belonging to minorities and to address this are completely emancipated; Decides:…” To continue matter in an open manner, with the full participation its examination of the situation of human rights in the of the minorities themselves, as well as to implement Islamic Republic of Iran, paying particular attention to fully the conclusions and recommendations of the further developments, including the situation of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Bahá’ís and other minority groups, at its fifty-seventh Rights on the question of religious intolerances relatsession under the same agenda item”. ing to the Bahá’ís and other minority groups until they Resolution A/RES/55/114 (4.12.00) The General are completely emancipated.”. Decides : ..”To continue Assembly expresses its concern: “At the discrimina- the examination of the situation of human rights in the tion against persons belonging to religious minorities, Islamic Republic of Iran, paying particular attention to in particular the unabated pattern of persecution of further developments, including the situation of the the Bahá’ís, including the continuing detention and Bahá’ís and other minority groups, at its fifty-seventh

94 | THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION session, under the agenda item entitled “Human rights tions”, in the light of additional elements provided by questions”, in the light of additional elements provided the Commission on Human Rights”. by the Commission on Human Rights”. 2004 2003 Resolution A/RES/59/205 (02.11.04). The General Resolution A/RES/58/195 (22.12.03). The Gen- Assembly expresses its serious concern at:..” The coneral Assembly expresses its serious concern at:..” The tinuing discrimination against persons belonging to mi- Continuing discrimination against persons belonging norities, including Christians, Jews and Sunnis, and the to minorities, including the Bahá’ís, Christians, Jews increased discrimination against the Bahá’ís, including and Sunnis, including cases of arbitrary arrest and cases of arbitrary arrest and detention, the denial of free detention, the denial of free worship or of publicly worship or of publicly carrying out communal affaires, carrying out communal affairs and the disregard of the disregard of property rights, the destruction of sites property rights”. It calls upon the government of the of religious importance, the suspension of social, educa- Islamic Republic of Iran:…” To eliminate all forms of tional and community-related activities and the denial discrimination based on religious grounds or against of access to higher education, employment, pensions persons belonging to minorities, including the Bahá’ís, and other benefits”. It calls upon the Government of Christians, Jews and Sunnis, and to address this matter the Islamic Republic of Iran: …” To eliminate all forms in an open manner, with the full participation of the of discrimination based on religious grounds or against minorities themselves”. It decides:… “to continue its persons belonging to minorities, including the Bahá’ís, examination of the situation of human rights in the Christians, Jews and Sunnis, and to address this matter Islamic Republic of Iran, paying particular attention in an open manner, with the full participation of the to further developments, including the situation of the minorities themselves, and to ensure respect for the Bahá’ís and other minority groups, at its fifty-ninth freedom of religion or belief of all persons”. session, under the item entitled “Human rights ques-

APPENDIX II: The United Nations’ Response | 95 THE BAH Á’Í QUESTION Cultural Cleansing in Iran Copyright 2005 Bahá’í International Community Web site : http://question.bahai.org