Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Ian Kluge, Reason and the Baha'i Writings, bahai-library.com.
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Reason and the Bahá’í Writings

Ian Kluge

Part I

1. Introduction

One of the hallmarks of the Bahá’í Writings is that they place
an enormous emphasis on the power of reason. Indeed, few, if
any, religious Scriptures have as much to say about reason as the
Bahá’í Writings. While other religions such as Judaism,
Christianity, Islam and Buddhism certainly have strong
traditions of rational theology and philosophy — for example,
Maimonides, Aquinas, Avicenna and Nagarjuna — these are
derived and inferred from revealed Scripture. In contrast, the
Bahá’í Writings themselves contain a large number of direct and
indirect statements about the nature and importance of reason,
as well as its appropriate uses and limitations.
The importance of reason in the Bahá’í Writings is directly
emphasized in various ways which will be explored below. Let us
begin with ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s affirmation that “If a question be
found contrary to reason, faith and belief in it are impossible,
and there is no outcome but wavering and vacillation” [PUP 181].
That fact that reason is necessary for a steady faith makes the
clear the fundamental importance of reason for the Writings.
For now, it suffices to note ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s declarations that
“The foundations of religion are reasonable” [PUP 128] and that
“If religion were contrary to logical reason then it would cease
to be a religion and be merely a tradition” [PT 143]. In other
words, reason is a sine qua non for religion to retain its identity
as religion; it is an essential attribute of religion. Elsewhere, he
adds that religion is “founded upon the premises and
conclusions of reason, and both (religion and science) must bear
164 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

its [reason’s] test” [PUP 107]. Reason, in effect, is a touchstone
by which we may distinguish true religion from superstition.
The use of the imperative word “must” indicates not only an
obligation to “test” or assess religion by reason, but also that
religion is obligated to meet the standards of reason. Further
emphasizing the essential nature of reason in religion, ‘Abdu’l-
Bahá asserts that “in this age the peoples of the world need the
arguments of reason,” [SAQ 7, emphasis added] indicating, thereby,
that the contemporary world has a special need for teaching
reason in religion.
To some extent, of course, the need for reason in religion
occurs in any age insofar as the Bahá’í Writings view reason or
rationality as a defining i.e. essential attribute of humankind:

The human spirit which distinguishes man from the
animal is the rational soul, and these two names — the
human spirit and the rational soul — designate one thing.
[SAQ 208, emphasis added]

Consequently, all revelations appeal to rationality though to
different degrees according to humankind’s stage of
development in the process of progressive revelation. The
extraordinary importance of the “human spirit” or “rational
soul” is emphasized by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s declaration that “the
spirit of man is the most noble of phenomena ... the meeting
between man and God” [PUP 239]. This assertion shows the
“rational soul” has a special place in phenomenal creation and
even a special spiritual status. From this we may infer that
rationality, as an essential attribute of the soul, holds an exalted
place the gifts bestowed upon humankind. Furthermore, Shoghi
Effendi’s intriguing reference to the “invisible yet rational
God” [WOB 112] also points to a close link between religion and
reason, though it should be remembered that the ‘rationality of
God’ is not assessable to human thought. We know from Shoghi
Effendi that God is rational, but as humans, we do not
necessarily understand that rationality.
There are at least five reasons why the ubiquitous direct and
indirect references to reason in the Writings require study.
First, without such an examination, our understanding of the
divine Texts will remain incomplete. For example, ‘Abdu’l-
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 165

Bahá’s declares that “The foundations of religion are
reasonable” [PUP 128; cf. 63] — i.e. that the very basis of religion
is reasonable or rational — but that requires some understanding
of the nature of reason and how it is exemplified in the
Writings.
Second, self-knowledge also demands understanding of
reason insofar as the human spirit and the “rational soul” are
identical, as we have seen above. In short, humans have a
divinely bestowed rational essence. As Bahá’u’lláh writes,

Consider the rational faculty with which God hath
endowed the essence of man. Examine thine own self,
and behold how thy motion and stillness, thy will and
purpose, thy sight and hearing, thy sense of smell and
power of speech, and whatever else is related to, or
transcendeth, thy physical senses or spiritual
perceptions, all proceed from, and owe their existence
to, this same faculty. [GWB LXXXIII, p. 163; emphasis added]

The physical senses as well as the “spiritual perceptions” depend
on the “rational faculty” and are informed by it. Bahá’u’lláh’s
statement also makes it clear that the spiritual aspects of our
being are dependent on the “rational faculty” and, therefore,
influenced by it. Clearly, without some knowledge of the soul’s
rational nature, we cannot fully understand our own nature.
Third, the requirements of effective teaching work in the
modern world necessitate a better comprehension of reason in
the Writings. Contemporary culture is increasingly shaped by
science and the scientific method both of which put reason at a
premium. This emphasis on rationality is reflected in ‘Abdu’l-
Bahá’s assertion that “in this age the peoples of the world need
the arguments of reason” [SAQ 7, emphasis added]. The phrase “in
this age” draws attention to a special need for rationality in our
time. This applies even to spiritual matters: “Therefore, it must
be our task to prove to the thoughtful by reasonable arguments
the prophethood of Moses, of Christ and of the other Divine
Manifestations” [SAQ 11].
Fourth, the intended audience of the Writings is humankind
as a whole which will study and learn from the models of
166 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

reasoning given in the divine Texts. These models will influence
the way humanity thinks about religion per se, about religious
issues as well as about the other problems confronting us. It is,
therefore, a matter of considerable significance to understand
what the Writings say about reason, its nature, its uses and its
limitations and how reason is exemplified in the Writings.
Fifth, Bahá’u’lláh’s and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s statements identifying
reason with the essence of humankind have far-reaching
implications especially for the goal of unifying human kind into
one global commonwealth. Because rationality is a universal
aspect of humanity, a connective principle applying to all
peoples and cultures across historical epochs and geographical
barriers, it forms the basis for a positive global dialogue and a
unified world order.
This paper concludes that the Writings make in-depth and
far-reaching use of reason in four senses of the term: (1) the
powers of reasoning, [PT 90] i.e. the “rational faculty” [GWB
LXXXIII 163]; (2) ‘reasonableness’ as in thinking that is
appropriate to its subject matter; (3) ‘reasonableness’ in the
sense of not being random and having a purpose; and (4) the use
of logic as in “logical reasoning” [SAQ 143, emphasis added]. The
most extensively used aspect of reason is logical reasoning
which is found in almost all explications of the Teachings and
principles. Logical reasoning exemplifies what has traditionally
been called ‘Aristotelian’ logic but is also referred to as
‘classical’ or ‘standard logic.’1 The pervasive presence of such
logic should come as no surprise in light of the confirmation of
a variety of Aristotelian concepts and arguments in the
Writings.2 Indeed, as noted in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, in London,
‘Abdu’l-Bahá’ had a deep knowledge of Aristotle’s philosophy:
“The talk [by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’] developed into a learned
dissertation on the Philosophy of Aristotle” [ABL 95]. This
suggests that ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’ thought Aristotelian philosophy
important enough to discourse on it in some detail. We will,
however, also examine whether the Writings include other
forms of reasoning.
The first and major part of this paper explores how reason is
defined and exemplified in the Bahá’í Writings. Portions of this
part may strike some readers as overly technical in regards to
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 167

logic, but this is unavoidable to cover the topic thoroughly. It
also demonstrates the intellectual richness of the Writings.
However, every effort has been made to reduce coverage of
technicalities to an absolute minimum. The second part
concerns itself with various issues surrounding this subject.
These include standard logic and quantum science, standard
logic and non-western logical systems, the preservation of
diversity and standard logic, and post-colonial critiques of
standard logic.
It must be emphasized that this paper concerns itself with a
philosophical understanding of the Bahá’í Writings and does not
in any way reduce the Writings to a “mere philosophy” [WOB
196]. A philosophical understanding studies the philosophical
aspects of the Writings just as a historical understanding
examines them from a historical point of view without reducing
them to history. As divine revelation intended for humanity’s
future development, the Writings are multifaceted and thus, can
be understood from many perspectives, without being
diminished to any one of them. Thus, a philosophic study of
reason in the Bahá’í Writings will help us broaden and deepen
our understanding and appreciation as we seek to cultivate and
develop our faith.

2. The Meanings of Reason and Rationality

In one of its meanings, ‘reason’ refers to a particular human
power, capacity or ability: “the power of comprehending,
inferring, or thinking especially in orderly rational ways.”3
Reason, in this sense, is a ‘power’ or ability or faculty that
humans possess. According to Bahá’u’lláh, this is the “rational
faculty with which God hath endowed the essence of man ...
[which] should be regarded as a sign of the revelation of Him
Who is the sovereign Lord of all” [GWB LXXXIII 163] and which,
as we have seen above, distinguishes humans from animals. As a
particular human capacity, reason carries out such functions as
analysis; argumentation, i.e. giving reasons and/or analysis;
evaluation; application; synthesis; identification of cause and
effect; abstraction; identifying purpose; analogizing; inferring;
induction and deduction. It performs these operations in an
168 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

orderly, step-by-step manner that others can follow and test for
themselves.
We can observe many of these specific functions of reason in
virtually all explications throughout the Writings. For example,
it is obvious in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s discussion about why the human
species undergoes no essential change in evolution, i.e. it does
not change from one species to another as “[c]ertain European
philosophers”4 claim. In the course of explication, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
presents a critical analysis of the scientific view and then
evaluates it, i.e. he assesses its merits and rejects it. What the
scientists say is “not a proof of the change of species” [SAQ 191].
In so doing, he presents an argument for his alternative view,
and gives reasons for accepting it [SAQ 191]. To strengthen his
argument, he presents the analogy of the infant’s development
in the mother’s womb from which he infers that despite physical
changes in form, our human essence does not change. As part of
explaining this analogy, he gives a purpose for this growth, i.e.
to embody God’s image [SAQ 191] in the world. This analogy is
also a synthesis insofar as it integrates the concept of changes in
bodily form with the concept of a stable, unchangeable human
essence and spiritual nature. He uses induction in his references
to specific creatures such as the serpent. Finally, he leads us to
the principle from which we can deduce his teaching from a
spiritual source, i.e. the Bible: “We will make man in Our image
and likeness.”5 Any reader of his talk can observe the careful
step-by-step manner in which he constructs his argument.
A similar process can be observed in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s
discussion of the Bahá’í teachings about the trinity. He says,
“All have confessed that the question is beyond the grasp of
reason, for three cannot become one, nor one three. To unite
these is impossible; it is either one or three” [TAB3 512, emphasis
added]. Consequently, the Trinity cannot be accepted as
Christians understand it because it is irrational i.e. violates
several logical laws as we shall see below. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá performs
a reducto ad absurdum argument by showing that any “division”
in God would lead to an impossible conclusion since “division
and multiplicity are properties of creatures which are
contingent existences, and not accidents which happen to the
self-existent [God]” [SAQ 113]. This conclusion is absurd because
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 169

God cannot be subject to accidental changes. Indeed, as we shall
see below, the Christian concept of the trinity violates the
logical laws of identity, of non-contradiction and the excluded
middle. In the course of explicating the Bahá’í view, ‘Abdu’l-
Bahá analyses and evaluates Christian view and then gives
reasons why an alternative explanation is needed. The first
reason is that “For God to descend into the conditions of
existence would be the greatest of imperfections” [SAQ 113]
while the second is that the “Lordly Reality admits of no
division” [SAQ 113]. He then presents an analogy and a logical
synthesis to clarify his argument:

Now if we say that we have seen the Sun in two mirrors
— one the Christ and one the Holy Spirit — that is to
say, that we have seen three Suns, one in heaven and the
two others on the earth, we speak truly. And if we say
that there is one Sun, and it is pure singleness, and has
no partner and equal, we again speak truly. [SAQ 113]

Thus, by using the capacities of human reason, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
rationalizes, i.e. gives a rational, non-contradictory form to the
doctrine of the Trinity. That which had hitherto been regarded
as a ‘mystery’ beyond reasonable explanation receives a logically
rational explanation. Significantly, he finishes his explication of
the trinity by saying that either his explanation is true or

the foundations of the Religion of God would rest
upon an illogical proposition which the mind could
never conceive, and how can the mind be forced to
believe a thing which it cannot conceive? A thing
cannot be grasped by the intelligence except when it is
clothed in an intelligible form; otherwise, it is but an
effort of the imagination. [SAQ 113, emphasis added]

It is important to note that even when discussing a spiritual
issue, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá emphasizes that the mind cannot “conceive”
of an “illogical proposition” i.e. cannot genuinely understand it
and, therefore, cannot be expected to believe it. Moreover,
even the “form” of a proposition must be “intelligible,” i.e.
reasonable and conforming to logic. It is no longer sufficient to
call the trinity a ‘mystery’ and leave it at that. Moreover, this
170 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

passage also shows that he does not accept the idea that the
“Religion of God” could rest on illogical, irrational premises:
“The foundations of religion are reasonable” [PUP 128]. We
observe this principle at work in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s efforts to
rationalize various Biblical passages such as those dealing with
Adam and Eve: “if the literal meaning of this story were
attributed to a wise man, certainly all would logically deny that
this arrangement, this invention, could have emanated from an
intelligent being” [SAQ 122].
It is worth noting that ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s explication clearly
demonstrates that rationality has a place in considering spiritual
issues. In other words, the scope of rationality is not limited to
the earthly phenomenal realm.
A second meaning of reason refers to ‘being reasonable,’ in
the sense of thinking or acting appropriately. All things, actions
or situations have an inherent nature or essence and our
responses must be in harmony with this essence, or at least,
must not offend against it. An action is reasonable or rational if
it is appropriate to the essence of a situation or the object of
the action. For example, under normal circumstances, it is not
appropriate, and not reasonable to treat an adult like an infant
or a crime like an act of charity; their essential natures are too
different. Indeed, such treatment commits a logical error, a
category mistake, i.e. in treating one kind of thing as if it were
another kind of thing. Bahá’u’lláh, advises that a speaker should
“deliver his words at the appropriate time and place” [TAB 172],
i.e. that words should be in harmony with the nature of a
situation and an audience. Words delivered as Bahá’u’lláh
prescribes will inevitably be reasonable. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá asks,
“How can man be content to lead only an animal existence when
God has made him so high a creature?” [PT 122] Underlying this
rhetorical question is the premise that acting against our higher
nature is unreasonable or inappropriate to our nature; it is a
logical category mistake in which we illogically treat ourselves
as something we are not. A similar idea underlies ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s
statement, “It is not reasonable that man should hold to the old
tree, claiming that its life forces are undiminished, its fruit
unequaled, its existence eternal” [PUP 141]. Here, too, we
observe the concept of ‘inappropriateness’ at work; clinging to
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 171

the “old” revelation is inappropriate and, therefore,
unreasonable in light of its diminished vigor. By implication,
accepting Bahá’u’lláh’s new revelation is appropriate and
reasonable.
The concept of reasonableness as appropriateness is the
foundation of the doctrine of progressive revelation. ‘Abdu’l-
Bahá says, “All religious laws conform to reason, and are suited
to the people for whom they are framed, and for the age in
which they are to be obeyed” [PT 141]. The fact that revelations
are “suited to the people for whom they are framed” means that
they are appropriate and, therefore, reasonable. This supports
‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s statement that “The foundations of religion are
reasonable” [PUP 128]. Religious law must be appropriate to the
nature of the culture to which is applied. If they were not
appropriate to the cultures for which they are revealed, such
revelations would make no sense; it would be irrational to obey
them. The statement that “religious laws conform to reason”
can also mean that such law is consistent with standard logic,
i.e. the logic of everyday experience. We shall explore this in
greater depth below.
If a thought or action is appropriate and reasonable, it is also
just. This principle underlies ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s assertion, “Know
that to do justice is to give to everyone according to his
deserts” [SAQ 266]. In other words, justice is dispensing an
appropriate or reasonable response to an act or statement. This
may even apply to ourselves. Bahá’u’lláh’s injunction, “Be fair
to yourselves and to others” [GWB CXVIII 277, emphasis added]
illustrates this. If we do not behave according to our nature, i.e.
according to our essence, if we behave inappropriately to
ourselves, we are not only being unreasonable or irrational but
also being “unfair” to ourselves. We are diminishing ourselves.
To be fair or just to ourselves we must treat ourselves
according to our immortal spiritual nature and not our
transient animal nature. This applies to intellectual justice as
well. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá declares that “I wish you to be fair and
reasonable in your judgment, setting aside all religious
prejudices” [PUP 364]. In other words, in order judge a subject in
a “fair and reasonable” manner, we must judge it according to
172 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

its true, i.e. essential nature by setting aside inappropriate
prejudices.
The third sense of reason or being reasonable refers to having
a purpose. Actions that have no purpose are simply arbitrary
and random and, therefore, are not informed or shaped by
reason. This is one of the aspects of purpose that seems
appropriate to Shoghi Effendi’s reference to a “rational God”
[WOB 112]. The Writings tell us that God had a purpose in
creation: “the purpose of creation ... is the knowledge of Him
Who is the Eternal Truth” [KA 176]. Creation is not “fortuitous”
[SAQ 181] or accidental but is informed by a plan and purpose.
Since creation has a purpose, it also has a certain consistency
underlying and guiding its processes, which is to say, creation is
fundamentally one. The Universal House of Justice makes this
clear in its assertion that “there is a consistency in the
universe.”6

3. Reason as Logic in the Writings

In its fourth, technical sense — which we will explore in some
depth — ‘reason’ refers to the use of logic which is often
mentioned through the Writings. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá states, “The
human spirit consists of the rational, or logical, reasoning
faculty” [TAB1 115, emphasis added]. The “human spirit,” of course,
is the rational soul which is identified here as a “logical
reasoning faculty” which distinguishes humanity from animals
[SAQ 208]. This identification of reason with logical thought also
applies to religion: “If religion were contrary to logical reason
then it would cease to be a religion and be merely a tradition”
[PT 142]. In short, religion must not violate “logical reason.” The
association of ‘reason’ and ‘logic’ are also seen in statements
like the following: “By intellectual processes and logical
deductions of reason this superpower in man can penetrate the
mysteries of the future and anticipate its happenings” [PUP 49,
emphasis added]. We must note that reason is described as a
“superpower” that transcends nature and, therefore, reveal its
secrets. He also declares,

If we insist that such and such a subject is not to be
reasoned out and tested according to the established
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 173

logical modes of the intellect, what is the use of the
reason which God has given man? [PUP 63, emphasis added]

In other words, all subjects — mundane or spiritual — must be
“reasoned out” i.e. examined by such rational procedures as
analysis, inference, extrapolate as well as “tested” by logical
reason. Failing to do so is neglect of the divine gift of reason
bestowed on humankind. Conversely, the gift of reason imposes
on us an obligation to use it.
The reference to the “established logical modes” is significant
because it suggests that ‘Abdu’l-Bahá is thinking of the kind of
logical reasoning that is generally established in Europe and
America at the time. Hegel’s dialectical logic was not generally
used, and other developments in non-standard or non-
Aristotelian logic were only beginning and were still the
province of specialists in a few universities. Thus, ‘Abdu’l-
Bahá’s reference to the “established logical modes” is most likely
to Aristotelian or standard logic which had widespread use.
Indeed, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá believed that Aristotelian logic was
globally known: “Today the philosophy and logic of Aristotle
are known throughout the world” [PUP 327]. Given that belief, it
makes sense for him to make considerable use of Aristotelian
logic in the Writings since it would help the Teachings reach a
world-wide audience. Furthermore, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá marks
Aristotle for special praise because he was “interested in both
natural and divine philosophy” which is one of the reasons for
the survival of his teachings [PUP 327].
Standard, classical or Aristotelian logic is based on three
rules: the law of identity; the law of non-contradiction and the
law of the excluded middle. We shall examine in some depth
how each of these laws is exemplified in the Bahá’í Writings.

3.1 The Law of Identity (LI)

Logical reasoning and all coherent discourse must obey the
law of identity (LI) according to which at any given moment, a
thing, situation, or process is the same as itself and not
something else. A thing can only have one identity, not two at
the same time in the same sense and in the same context: a
174 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

cactus cannot be a dinner plate, and a horse cannot be a
crescent wrench. Of course, a thing may have a variety of
characteristics — a horse may be brown, with white feet and a
variegated tail — but these characteristics are parts of its
existence as a single, specific thing.
When applied to discourse, i.e. discussions and explanations,
the LI means that terms must be used consistently; if words
change their meanings or slip from one sense of a word into
another, confusion ensues and understanding becomes
impossible. We are all familiar with disagreements caused by
people using a word in different senses, e.g. gendered and
ungendered uses of the word ‘men.’ The statement ‘All people
are equal’ is another example. We must, for example, be careful
to use the word “equal” consistently, i.e. not slip from spiritual
to legal to economic to sociological equality. We may, of
course, discuss how these distinct forms of equality are related
but we cannot conflate one meaning into another. In this sense,
the Writings, like every other explicatory text, follow the LI.
More important, the Writings apply the LI to a number of
metaphysical and spiritual teachings. For example, the principle
of identity underlies the Bahá’í teachings about the unique
existence of all things, i.e. the teaching that each thing is what it
is and never has been or will be something else `Abdu’l-Bahá
also applies the LI when he says, “in the sensible world
appearances are not repeated” [SAQ 282, emphasis added]. He
informs us that no two seeds of grain are alike. Elsewhere he
applies this principle to the sun: “the sun is one in its essence,
unique in its real identity, single in its attributes” [TAB1 117]. We
also observe the LI exemplified in the teachings about human
evolution; as noted in a foregoing discussion, `Abdu’l-Bahá
declares that humans have always been human despite any
animal-like appearances in their outward form. The human
essence or identity has not changed, i.e. is itself and nothing else
despite variations of outward form or which of its inherent
potentials it exhibits. The identity or essence of a thing is
stable.
This principle even applies to things involved in processes.
For example, `Abdu’l-Bahá sees humankind as involved in an
evolutionary process but, as we have seen above, he is emphatic
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 175

that the human essence is always the same regardless of our
stage of development: [PUP 358] “Throughout this journey of
progression [through the mineral, plant and animal stations] he
has ever and always been potentially man” [PUP 225]. The inner
potentials of our essence are present from the beginning and are
actualized or externalized over time — which only makes it
appear as if a change in essence or identity had occurred. In his
potential, i.e. in his essence “Man from the beginning was in
this perfect form and composition”7 These ever-present
potentials are revealed over time.
`Abdu’l-Bahá makes theological use of the LI in his argument
to explain the impossibility of reincarnation. This is important
because it clearly demonstrates that he does not see the laws of
logic as applying only to worldly or empirical matters but also
to spiritual matters. He states that a rose’s “specific identity can
never return” [SWAB 184]. The general or essential qualities that
return are shared by all roses but they do not return in the
unique form of one particular rose; that rose is what it is, and
cannot be replaced by anything else. Its “intrinsic elemental
reality” [PUP 421] is absolutely unique. He applies the same
principle to the return of Elijah [SAQ 134].
Another theological or spiritual application of the LI is
found in `Abdu’l-Bahá’s discussion of the Trinity.

If we say that the Trinity was originally one and was
later divided, change and transformation will be
necessarily applied to the Essence of Oneness, and
change and transformation are necessities of the
contingent world and not of the Essence of Divinity.
[TAB3 512]

He faults this argument with violating the LI. God, Who is the
“Essence of Oneness” cannot be divided and changed; to derive
the doctrine of the trinity from such a division denies God’s
identity with Himself, and is, therefore, a logical error. It
violates the LI by treating God as if He were an ordinary being
subject to division, time and space.
176 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

3.2 The Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC)

The second — and central — law of standard, classic or
Aristotelian logic is the law of non-contradiction (LNC). In
general terms, this means that a statement cannot
simultaneously make two contradictory claims about the same
issue. More technically, the LNC says that a thing cannot have
and not have the same attributes at the same time in the same
sense and from the same perspective or context. We cannot
weigh 180 pounds and not weight 180 pounds at the same time,
in the same sense and in the same context i.e. our place on earth.
On the moon, we would only weigh 29.8 pounds, but that is the
result of a change of context or perspective. Another example:
an act cannot simultaneously be just and unjust in the same
sense and from the same viewpoint. However, we can argue that
a punishment is just from the perspective of a person’s act, but
unjust from the viewpoint of the person`s deficient mental
capacity.
The Writings’ strong commitment to the LNC is based in an
equally strong commitment to the unity of truth. Since truth is
one, it cannot be divided by contradictions because these
fracture truth into mutually exclusive parts. As `Abdu’l-Bahá
affirms, “No one truth can contradict another truth” [PT 136].
This pithy statement is the essence of the LNC and logically
obligates us to resolve contradictions to avoid clashing truths.
The same may be said of the declaration that “truth or reality is
not multiple; it is not divisible” [PUP 106]. This is further re-
enforced by his assertion that “truth is one, although its
manifestations may be very different” [PT 128, emphasis added].
Differences in the “manifestations” of truth do not necessarily
imply logical contradictions which `Abdu’l-Bahá seeks to avoid.
Here, too, is an implied obligation to resolve apparent
contradictions. Shoghi Effendi re-affirms this theme, saying,
“Truth may, in covering different subjects, appear to be
contradictory, and yet it is all one if you carry the thought
through to the end”8 which he emphasizes by asserting that
“Truth is one when it is independently investigated, it does not
accept division” [JWTA 35]. Again, we detect the implied
obligation to “carry the though through to the end” in order to
resolve contradictions and, thereby, comply with the LNC.
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 177

There are two main ways of resolving a contradiction to
comply with the LNC: the first is to eliminate one part of the
contradiction; the second is to show that each statement is
refers to a different perspective, or a different sense or time;
and the third is to demonstrate an underlying unity. `Abdu’l-
Bahá applies the first method in his philosophical argument for
the unity of God:

For the realities of the Essence of Unity, knowledge,
and the things known, have an absolute unity which is
real and established. Otherwise, the Essence of Unity
would become the place of multiple phenomena ...
which is absurd. [SAQ 291]

In other words, God, the “Essence of Unity” cannot at the same
time and in the same sense be both one and multiple. It is worth
noting that he declares the denial of the LNC in this case to be
“absurd,” i.e. irrational and, therefore, not only beyond human
thought or conception [SAQ 114] but also to be avoided. In
addition, he follows this method when dealing with the
contradiction between accepting God as an “Ultimate Cause”
and asserting that a causal process can go on forever without
God. He dismisses the second alternatively as “manifestly
absurd” [TAF 18]. In logical terms, He is saying that the causal
sequence of creation cannot both go on forever and not go on
forever, i.e. end with God. By dismissing one alternative, He
enjoins the other.
Generally, resolving contradictions by taking
viewpoint/context, time and sense into consideration allows us
to reconcile the conflicting sides insofar as conflict is
eliminated thereby allowing us to accept the truth of both sides.
This allows us a more inclusive view that encourages acceptance
of complexities and nuances. In The Seven Valleys, Bahá’u’lláh
illustrates the first — and more commonly used in the Writings
— alternative of resolving contradictions by referring to
different perspectives.

let thine Eminence consider his own self; thou art first
in relation to thy son, last in relation to thy father. In
thine outward appearance, thou tellest of the
178 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

appearance of power in the realms of divine creation; in
thine inward being thou revealest the hidden mysteries
which are the divine trust deposited within thee. [SV 26]

Bahá’u’lláh reconciles these contradictory differences — first,
last; outward, inward — not by asserting relativism but by
correlating these contraries to differences in viewpoint or
perspective, i.e. “in relation to” father and son; and to “outward
appearance” and “inward being.” Nowhere does He suggest that
the father can be both first and last in “relation to [the] son.”
In regards to time sequence, “firstness” is the only possible
relationship. Here is another example of Bahá’u’lláh modeling
this method of resolving contradictions:

Wonder not, if my Best-Beloved be closer to me than
mine own self; wonder at this, that I, despite such
nearness, should still be so far from Him.... Consider
what God hath revealed, that “We are closer to man
than his life-vein”. By this he meaneth that his heart,
which is the seat of the All-Merciful and the throne
wherein abideth the splendor of His revelation, is
forgetful of its Creator. [GWB XCIII 185, emphasis added]

From the perspective of our human spiritual condition, we can
be distant from God, whereas ontologically, from the
perspective of our dependence on God as the pre-condition for
our existence, God is “closer to us than our own selves. Once
this shift is taken into account, the contradiction is harmonized
with the LNC.
What the foregoing examples teach us is that the LNC readily
accommodates seemingly contradictory statements made from
different perspectives or viewpoints. However, while
differences of perspective are quite compatible with
Aristotelian or standard logic,9 they do not necessarily imply
relativism. Relativism allows contradictory truth-claims — even
from the same perspective — because there supposedly is no
ultimate standard by which to judge between various truth-
claims. Thus, all truth-claims must be accepted. Standard logic
rejects contradictory truth-claims from the same perspective
since they cancel each other out. My chair cannot be under me
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 179

and not under me at the same time, in the same sense from the
same perspective or context. Similarly, because the spiritual and
physical perspectives are different, there is no violation of the
LNC in claiming that spiritually, humans are the acme of
creation [GWB XC 177; cf. GWB XC 179] while at the same time
claiming that physically “the animal is nobler, more serene,
poised and confident” [PUP 184]. The statements come from the
spiritual and physical perspectives, and, therefore, do not
contradict each other. Another example: `Abdu’l-Bahá uses
differing perspectives to resolve the contradiction between
sophists who claim the external world is “an absolute illusion”
[SAQ 278] and those who claim the external world is real. He says
that from God’s perspective, our existence is an “illusion,” but
from our own perspective, it is not. In this case, he uses the
difference of perspective to synthesize apparently conflicting
beliefs. Similarly, he informs us that while a scorpion is evil
from the perspective of man, it is not evil from its own
perspective [SAQ 263] thereby reconciling two seemingly
conflicting views.
It is essential to understand that the principle of the LNC
also applies to religion and spiritual issues. Bahá’u’lláh teaches
that “the foundation of all the religions of God is one; that
oneness is truth and truth is oneness which does not admit of
plurality” [PUP 454, emphasis added]. In logical terms, truth cannot
have the attribute of oneness and not have this attribute (i.e. be
multiple) in the same sense etc. By returning to the foundations
we recover the lost oneness of truth because we resolve any
contradictions: the “unity of truth, through the power of God,
will make these illusory differences [among religions] to vanish
away” [SWAB 30, emphasis added]. Here, too, the LNC is affirmed
insofar as differences, including contradictory differences, will
be dissolved. The “different religions have one truth underlying
them; therefore, their reality is one” [PUP 106]. If their “reality is
one,” they cannot be contradictory. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá makes a
similar affirmation in regards to science, reason and religion:
“weigh carefully in the balance of reason and science everything
that is presented to you as religion. If it passes this test, then
accept it, for it is truth” [PT 144, emphasis added]. Instructing us to
use the “balance of reason” includes employing the tools of
180 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

logic. If an idea cannot pass this test, “reject it, for it is
ignorance!” [PT 144]
By following Bahá’u’lláh’s and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s example, we
can resolve even seemingly intransigent contradictory
statements. One of the most challenging is Bahá’u’lláh’s
declaration about the origin of creation:

The world of existence came into being through the
heat generated from the interaction between the active
force and that which is its recipient. These two are the
same, yet they are different. [TB 140]

The statement appears to violate the LNC insofar as it says
these two forces are “the same, yet ... different.” However,
there is no self-contradiction in saying that these two are the
same in origin and substance but are different in form and
function. In terms of origin and substance they both
instantiations of God’s Will, while in terms of form and
function one is active and the other is receptive. In either case,
they are manifestations of God’s Will. We may also analyze this
paradox with the aide of the Writings endorsement of
Aristotle’s four causes: the material, efficient, formal and final
causes [SAQ 280]. Both the active and passive parts share a
material cause, i.e. a substance which is a manifestation of
God’s Will; in this sense they are alike. However, they differ
formally, i.e. in form and, therefore, they differ in function.
Yet, they are alike vis-à-vis their efficient cause which is God
Who brings them into existence and is the origin of their
action. Finally, they are alike in their final cause — which is
creation — by means of the “heat” or energy released by their
interaction. In both of these interpretations, the contradiction
has been settled by observing that different perspectives explain
the otherwise contradictory attributes.
Interestingly, two real-life phenomena illustrate this
situation. The first, and clearer of the two is magnetism. Every
magnet has two poles, i.e. it is one thing or substance but
always has two polar opposite functions which generate an
electromagnetic field just as the active and receptive forces
generate the heat “from which existence [comes] into being.”
The second example is water. Both ice and steam have the same
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 181

substance, i.e. water, yet these two obviously differ in form and
function, and in these different forms can also interact.

3.3 The Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM) in the Bahá’í
Writings

The Bahá’í Writings are consistent with the LNC and,
therefore, exemplify a two-value logic — the two values being
‘true’ and ‘false.’ The law of the excluded middle (LEM) says
that a statement or its negation must be either true or false:
either an elephant is heavier than a flea or an elephant is not
heavier than a flea. There is no middle ground and one of these
two propositions must be true. (The difference between the
LNC and the LEM is that the LNC says no proposition can be
both true and false, and the LEM says that a statement or its
specific negation must be either true or false.) There is no
middle ground between them.
The Writings, of course, are not a logic and philosophy text,
but they contain numerous passages which are consistent with
the LEM’s principle that there is no middle ground between a
proposition and its negation. For example, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says,
“This is the Truth and beyond the Truth there is only error”
[TAB1 115]. In other words, a statement is either true or not true
— and by implication, we must choose one or the other. There is
no valid third alternative. The same thinking underlies statement
as such as “This is the truth and there is nothing beyond the
truth but manifest error” [TAB2 304] as well as “This is the truth
and there is naught beyond the truth save error” [TAB3 524]. By
asserting that ‘outside’ the truth there is only “error” or falsity,
these statements affirm the principle of the LEM that there is
no middle ground between falsity and truth. It also implies that
we must choose one or the other. The same is true of the
following statement: “‘Verily this is the truth and naught is
there beside the truth but manifest error’” [TAB 25]. According
to ‘Abdu’l-Bahá we should all have “a sword which divides truth
from falsehood” [TAB1 166]. This metaphor shows a clear
division between true and false without any suggestion of a
middle ground; moreover, the rigor of the language used
strongly suggests we are obligated to choose between the two.
182 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

Two-value reasoning also applies to theological matters.
Speaking of Christ, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says, “The sword [Christ]
carried was the sword of His tongue, with which He divided the
good from the evil, the true from the false, the faithful from
the unfaithful, and the light from the darkness” [PT 55, emphasis
added] He also says, “When Christ appeared, He possessed a
sword; but it was the sword of His tongue with which He
separated the false from the true” [PUP 292, emphasis added].
Referring to Biblical issues, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá asks, “Question: How
shall we determine the truth or error of certain biblical
interpretation?” [PUP 212] We observe the principle of the LEM
at work in these choices between negations.
The same rigorous division between truth and error is
observed in Bahá’u’lláh’s statement that “This, verily, is the
truth, and all else naught but error” [GWB CXX 255]. The
unmistakable implication here, as in all other such statements, is
that we should choose truth. Bahá’u’lláh also says, “Behold how
the divine Touchstone hath, according to the explicit text of the
Book, separated and distinguished the true from the false” [KI
227, emphasis added]. Third alternatives are clearly excluded as they
are in His statement that one of the tasks of the Manifestations
is to ensure that “the true should be known from the false, and
the sun from the shadow” [KI 53, emphasis added; cf. KI 228]. In
other words, the mission of the Manifestations is to help
humans distinguish between truth and falsity and to choose one
or the other. There is no suggestion that we evade such choices
by trying to find a middle ground. Indeed, God tests our ability
to distinguish “truth from falsehood ... guidance from error”
[KI 8; cf. KI 202, 221]. As required by Aristotle’s definition of the
LEM, each of these terms is a negation of the other, e.g.
happiness and misery, “guidance and error.”
As we have shown, ‘LEM-statements,’ i.e. statements that
demand either affirmation or denial without recourse to an
alternative or ‘middle’ are consistently found throughout the
Writings. For example, in discussing the trinity, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
asserts “for three cannot become one, nor one three. To unite
these is impossible; it is either one or three” [TAB3 512]. God is
one or not. God is three or not. There is only one correct
answer in each proposition — which is that God is one and He is
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 183

not three. In criticizing the doctrine of the trinity, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
is, in effect, asserting that no middle ground exists, i.e. that the
Christian view of God as being one and three is false, i.e. a
violation of the LEM. Here is another example: “Absolute
repose does not exist in nature. All things either make progress
or lose ground. Everything moves forward or backward,
nothing is without motion” [PT 88]. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá clearly
eliminates any middle ground — that repose exists — and gives
us a choice between progress and not making progress. The
LEM is also applied to spiritual or theological issues: “Now,
either one must say that the Blessed Beauty hath made a mistake,
or He must be obeyed” [SWAB 214]. Once again, the middle
ground has been eliminated. In logical form, this argument reads
as follows: Bahá’u’lláh has made a mistake or He has not made a
mistake; if He has not made a mistake, He must be obeyed and
if He has made a mistake, He must not be obeyed. One of the
two alternatives must be accepted.
There are also other forms of the LEM statements in the
Writings. These are statements about the existence of God, the
existence and immortality of the soul, progressive revelation
and the essential infallibility of the Manifestation. The Writings
leave no room between accepting these teachings as divine
revelation or rejecting them outright. For example, “The human
spirit which distinguishes man from the animal is the rational
soul” [SAQ 208] is a LEM statement that is either true or false.
Either the human spirit is the rational soul or it is not. Even to
have a degree of rationality is to have rationality. Of course,
LEM statements can be interpreted by different readers, but
such interpretation must rest on either acceptance or rejection.
Appearances to the contrary, agnosticism is not a viable middle
ground since agnosticism is a statement of one’s inner mental
condition and not a statement about the propositions
themselves.
In reflecting on the LEM in the Writings, we should not be
misled by apparent paradoxes which seem to undermine it. For
example, in order to explain why He does not, contrary to the
custom in Persian writing, use numerous quotations, Bahá’u’lláh
quotes,
184 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

If Khidir did wreck the vessel on the sea,
Yet in this wrong there are a thousand rights. [SV 26]

At first glance, it seems as if right and wrong were conflated to
make some middle ground between them. This does not
necessarily follow. Rather than conflating the two and positing
a hypothetical middle ground, it is more logical to say that the
“wrong” is, indeed, “wrong” in itself, but that it has some
“right” consequences. Because an act and its consequences are
not the same things, there is no logical necessity to interpret
this example as violations of the LEM.

4. The Principle of Sufficient Reason

In addition to the three laws of standard logic, the Writings
also implicitly employ the principle of sufficient reason (PSR).
According to this principle there must be a necessary and
sufficient reason why every thing or event is what it is and not
something else. All of science is based on the PSR since science
is a quest for necessary and sufficient reasons why certain
events happen and why they happen in the way they do. All
humans, regardless of culture or historical time, implicitly or
explicitly use the PSR insofar as they ‘troubleshoot’ problems,
i.e. try to find the causes of problems. A potter seeking to
know why a pot shattered in a fire, uses the PSR to explain and
correct the problem.
`Abdu’l-Bahá appeals to the PSR when he says that the order
and complexity of nature “is the creation of God, and is not a
fortuitous composition and arrangement” [SAQ 181]. In other
words, physical nature alone does not meet the PSR, i.e. it is not
sufficient to explain its own existence, order, composition and
arrangement. Thus all purely naturalist/materialist explanations
are incomplete. `Abdu’l-Bahá confirms this, saying, “The divine
philosophers declare that the world of nature is incomplete”
[PUP 329]. Precisely because physical nature cannot explain itself
even in principle, logic forces us to posit something else that
transcends physical nature as a sufficient cause. Elsewhere,
`Abdu’l-Bahá amplifies this argument by appealing to God as the
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 185

only sufficient reason or explanation for the order in the
universe:

were it not for this Director, this Co-ordinator, the
universe would be flawed and deficient. It would be
even as a madman; whereas ye can see that this endless
creation carrieth out its functions in perfect order ... it
is clear that a Universal Power existeth, directing and
regulating this infinite universe. Every rational mind
can grasp this fact. [SWAB 48, emphasis added]

‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s final remark is significant because he
associates his argument which is based on the PSR with
rationality itself. Not paying attention to the PSR which
provides the logical foundation of his argument, is a failure in
rationality itself. Another demonstration of the PSR is `Abdu’l-
Bahá’s argument to show the necessity for God by means of a
First Mover. There must be a First Mover because no sequence
of causation can go on forever. He rejects the concept that a
causal series can be infinite:

to maintain that this process goes on indefinitely is
manifestly absurd. Thus such a chain of causation must
of necessity lead eventually to Him who is the Ever-
Living ... the Ultimate Cause. [TAF 18]

‘Abdu’l-Bahá rejects an infinite causal sequences as
“manifestly absurd,” though he does not specifically say why.
However, the reasons are not hard to fathom. Explaining the
existence of contingent beings by even more contingent beings
leads to an infinite regress which explains nothing and can only
be stopped by an “Ultimate Cause” that is not Itself a
contingent being. Second, an infinite causal sequence has the
“present problem.” If the causal sequence is made up of an
infinity of individual causal acts, how can it ever arrive at the
present? There are an infinite number causal acts between each
causal act.10 Third, how can there be an infinite, i.e. indefinite
number of individual things or acts? Any collection of
individual things/acts, must be definite, countable, though it
may of course be very large. This renders the notion of an
infinite causal chain implausible.
186 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

In the Writings, there is another aspect to the PSR based on
the Bahá’í theory of causality which explicitly confirms
Aristotle’s four causes: material, efficient, formal and final
[SAQ 280, emphasis added]. According to ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, a chair has
a material cause, i.e. wood; an efficient cause, i.e. the carpenter;
a formal cause, i.e. a plan, or the way the parts are put together;
and a final cause i.e. the reason(s) for building the chair. This
final cause activates and guides the other three causes. Without
it, there is no PSR for building the chair in the first place. Since
all “phenomena are preceded by causes,” [SAQ 280] it follows
that all things have a PSR or final cause. For humans, this PSR is
explicitly noted in the Noonday Prayer: “I bear witness that
Thou hast created me to know Thee and to worship Thee.” It is
also implicitly contained in Bahá’u’lláh’s statement that “All
men have been created to carry forward an ever-advancing
civilization” [GWB CIX 214]. No explanation of natural
phenomena that fails to include a final cause or satisfy the PSR
is complete or valid. For example, `Abdu’l-Bahá says, “For the
noblest part of the tree is the fruit, which is the reason of its
existence. If the tree had no fruit, it would have no meaning”
[SAQ 196-197; cf. PT 98]. Without the fruit, the tree lacks a
sufficient reason to exist. This has enormous implications for
the practice of science which seeks to make its explanations as
complete as possible but is averse to the concept of final
causes.

5. Deductive Reasoning

Standard logic provides the basic laws that correct reasoning
must obey regardless of whether our reasoning methods or
procedures are deductive, inductive, analogical or Socratic
dialectical. We shall now examine how the Writings make use of
these methods.
Deductive reasoning begins with a general or universal
statement and then deduces specific consequences entailed in
the general statement. For example, the universal statement ‘All
birds have two wings’ entails the conclusion that ‘My parrot has
two wings.’ This conclusion follows the LI, the LNC and the
LEM. My bird cannot both have and not have two wings; it
must be either true or false that it has two wings.
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 187

Deductive reasoning is especially suited to the Writings
because it depends primarily on the truth of the initial universal
statement. This makes deduction the appropriate mode of
reasoning for those in authority with completely trustworthy
knowledge. Unlike scientists still looking for the truth, the
essentially infallible Manifestation and His interpreter (who has
acquired infallibility) are able to give us absolutely reliable
universal propositions — e.g. humans are made in God’s image —
from which we can draw specific conclusions. Their universal
propositions provide the guidance we need for our own
reasoning process so that we do not wander too far from the
truth.
Deductive arguments can be presented formally as one or a
series of syllogisms, i.e. a three-part argument in which a
conclusion is inferred from first two premises. Here is the most
famous deductive syllogism in western philosophy.

1) All humans are mortal;
2) Socrates is human;
3) Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

The conclusion is implicitly embedded or entailed in the first
universal premise. If the first two premises are true, the
conclusion is necessarily true; no other answer is logically
possible without violating one of the rules of reasoning. The
conclusion can only be challenged by disproving the first and/or
second premises. If ‘Socrates’ is my cat, the syllogism is false.
We must also realize that all universal premises are
embryonic syllogisms, i.e. fully developed syllogisms can be
inferred from them. The second premise and conclusions are
implied but easily ‘unpacked.’11 For example, to say that “All
humans are mortal” automatically includes every individual
human being. The syllogistic form is simply an efficient way of
‘unpacking’ the implicit steps to a conclusion. Take, for
example, Abdu’l-Bahá’s declaration that “[t]he human spirit
which distinguishes man from the animal is the rational soul”
[SAQ 208]. This is a universal premise about all humans, which
188 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

includes everyone, including our friend, Bill. A syllogism makes
this clear:

1) The human spirit distinguishes man from animal;
2) Bill has a human spirit, i.e. is human;
3) Therefore, Bill is distinguished from animals.

Wherever we find a universal premise in the Writings (or any
other work) we can test its conclusion by putting it into
syllogistic form.
We shall use syllogisms to illustrate the careful deductive
structure of the arguments presented in the Writings. Although
the Writings do not contain any formalized deductive
syllogisms as shown above, many of the arguments they present
have a syllogistic structure embedded in them. A well known
example of an explicit universal statement from the Writings is,
“All men have been created to carry forward an ever-advancing
civilization ... To act like the beasts of the field is unworthy of
man” [GWB CIX 214], from which Bahá’u’lláh immediately draws
the conclusion that we should not behave like animals. The core
logical argument can be expressed as a syllogism:

1) “All men have been created to carry forward an ever-
advancing civilization;”
2) Behaving like beasts will not advance a civilization;
3) Therefore, humans should not behave like beasts. (“To
act like the beasts of the field is unworthy of man.”)

Of course, we must emphasize that Bahá’u’lláh Himself is not
dependent on such deductions for His knowledge and
understanding. However, he uses this form as a pedagogical tool
to help us grasp His teachings.
Deductive reasoning does not necessarily use the word “all”
or “every” explicitly in its general or universal statements, but
“all” or “every” must be implied. That is what makes them
universal. For example, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says,
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 189

thou wilt see that a lower plane can never comprehend a
higher. The mineral kingdom, for example, which is
lower, is precluded from comprehending the vegetable
kingdom... [SWAB 46]

There is a syllogism using an implied universal premise and
syllogism embedded in this passage.

1) “A lower plane can never comprehend a higher”;
2) The “mineral kingdom ... is lower”;
3) Therefore, the mineral kingdom cannot comprehend
the vegetable kingdom.

Putting ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s arguments into syllogistic form can be
quite a laborious step-by-step procedure which is probably why
‘Abdu’l-Bahá does not do it. It would quickly prove tedious.
However, what is important is that it can be done in order to
reveal the rigorous logical structure underlying his and
Bahá’u’lláh’s arguments. This provides demonstrative support
to show that the doctrine that the Teachings are reasonable.
The use of deductive reason includes both “spiritual
proof[s]” [SAQ 197] and logical proofs. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá identifies
the following as a “spiritual proof,” i.e. one that does not
depend on empirical knowledge.

it cannot be said there was a time when man was not ...
from the beginning which has no beginning, to the end
which has no end, a perfect manifestation always exists.
This man of whom we speak is not every man; we mean
the perfect man. For the noblest part of the tree is the
fruit, which is the reason of its existence; if the tree had
no fruit, it would have no meaning. Therefore it cannot
be imagined that the worlds of existence ... were
without man! [SAQ 196]

The core of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s explanation, parts of which
expressed metaphorically, can be formalized in the following
syllogism:
190 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

1) The “Perfect Man” is the final cause (“noblest part”)
of existence;
2) The “worlds of existence” require a final cause;
3) Therefore, there can be no world without the
“Perfect Man.”

Of course, `Abdu’l-Bahá supplements this argument with
considerably more details than we find in the syllogisms, but the
two foregoing deductive syllogisms represent the logical heart
of his argument.
What follows is an example of what `Abdu’l-Bahá calls “the
logical evidences for the immortality of the soul” [SAQ 228].

The logical proof of the immortality of the spirit is
this, that no sign can come from a nonexisting thing —
that is to say, it is impossible that from absolute
nonexistence signs should appear — for the signs are the
consequence of an existence, and the consequence
depends upon the existence of the principle. So from a
nonexisting sun no light can radiate ... [SAQ 225]

In this and the subsequent passages, `Abdu’l-Bahá goes to
extraordinary lengths to show how the soul or spirit can operate
without the body. If we focus on the main ideas to be proved in
his detailed argument, we can detect two central deductive
syllogisms at work. The first proves the existence of the spirit
and the second, the spirit’s immortality.

1) All things that exist show signs of existence (“No sign
can come from a nonexisting thing”);
2) The spirit shows signs of existence;
3) Therefore, the spirit exists

and

1) All things that depend on the physical body to exist
cannot survive the dissolution of the body;
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 191

2) The spirit (which exists) does not depend on the
physical body for existence;
3) Therefore, the spirit can survive the dissolution of
the body i.e. is immortal.

These two deductive syllogisms represent the formal structure
of `Abdu’l-Bahá’s argument. Of course, he goes into far more
detail than these core syllogisms but the logical nucleus of his
argument is readily apparent.
The other common form of deductive reasoning has its first
premise in the conditional i.e. ‘if-then’ form. For example, here
is a passage from Paris Talks:

I say unto you: weigh carefully in the balance of reason
and science everything that is presented to you as
religion. If it passes this test, then accept it, for it is
truth! If, however, it does not so conform, then reject
it, for it is ignorance! [PT 144]

The formalized logical argument embedded in this statement
can be written as follows:

1) If statement X is presented “as religion”;
2) X passes the test of reason and science;
3) Therefore, we must accept X.

There are numerous examples like this throughout the
Writings.12
We have demonstrated that deductive reasoning is pervasive
throughout the Writings and that it is rigorous enough to be
formalized in syllogistic form. This demonstrates that careful
logical reasoning is embedded in the Texts which not only
advocate but also practice reason. This point becomes more
salient when we realize that deductive reasoning follows the
four laws of classical reasoning we have discussed.
192 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

6. Inductive Reasoning

Instead of working from the top down, as deduction does,
inductive reason works from the bottom up and draws general
or universal conclusions on the basis of specific examples. We
observe that in the past, ants were always attracted to the food
at our picnics, and conclude that ants are attracted by picnic
food. Unlike deductive conclusions which are logically certain,
inductive conclusions have only a degree of probability. For
example, we could improve the probability of our conclusion
by observing 20,000 picnic sites instead of six. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
illustrates inductive reasoning when he writes, “Also
[humankind] bringeth to light the past events that have been
lost to memory, and foreseeth by his power of induction future
happenings that are as yet unknown” [TAF 11, emphasis added]. In
other words, on the basis of past events, we can reach a
conclusion about future events or likely future events. This is
exactly what science does which studies numerous examples of a
phenomena and then reaches a conclusion. Elsewhere ‘Abdu’l-
Bahá says that “through processes of inductive reasoning and
research” [PUP 50] we can learn a great deal about humanity. In
other words, we learn from or conclude from specific individual
events.
The Writings nonetheless show us many examples of
induction in practice. For example, here is a complete inductive
argument with its conclusion stated at the end:

But when you look at Nature itself, you see that it has
no intelligence, no will. For instance, the nature of fire
is to burn; it burns without will or intelligence. The
nature of water is fluidity; it flows without will or
intelligence. The nature of the sun is radiance; it shines
without will or intelligence ... Man is able to resist and
to oppose Nature because he discovers the constitution
of things ... all the inventions he has made are due to his
discovery of the constitution of things ... It is evident,
then, that man rules over Nature. [SAQ 3, emphasis added]

Because humans have knowledge and the will to resist nature
which has no will of its own, “man rules over nature.” This
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 193

example models the proper form of an inductive argument:
evidence from specific examples is accumulated and then a
general or universal conclusion is reached. Here is another
example of induction:

Alas that humanity is completely submerged in
imitations and unrealities ... They follow superstitions
inherited from their fathers and ancestors ... That which
was meant to be conducive to life has become the cause
of death; that which should have been an evidence of
knowledge is now a proof of ignorance; that which was
a factor in the sublimity of human nature has proved to
be its degradation. [PUP 179, emphasis added]

In this passage we observe how ‘Abdu’l-Bahá bases his
conclusion — that we have turned the opportunities for new life
into our degradation — on a wide variety of examples
specifically named or alluded to. We should note that in this
example, he is drawing a spiritual conclusion from these worldly
examples.
Bahá’u’lláh also uses inductive arguments. He lists a series of
historical examples in which people have yearned for the
Manifestation and then, ironically, turned away from Him when
He appeared. Indeed, Bahá’u’lláh goes into considerable detail
in each case to give us evidence to support His argument. He
then provides us His conclusion:

It behoveth us, therefore, to make the utmost endeavor,
that, by God’s invisible assistance, these dark veils,
these clouds of Heaven-sent trials, may not hinder us
from beholding the beauty of His shining Countenance,
and that we may recognize Him only by His own Self.
[GWB XIII 26]

From this litany of failures to recognize a new Manifestation,
Bahá’u’lláh draws the practical conclusion that we must strive
not to make the same error and that, with God’s assistance, we
learn to recognize the Manifestation for Himself.
194 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

7. Analogical Reasoning

The Bahá’í Writings make frequent use of analogical
reasoning to explain and support the teachings. In analogies, we
observe that two things are similar but not identical, and then
reason or draw conclusions about one thing, i.e. the target, by
comparisons with something else, i.e. the source.13 The more
similarities between the source and the target, the stronger the
conclusion will be. However, while analogical arguments
provide good reasons to accept a conclusion, they do not
provide logically necessary proof.
One of the most striking arguments by analogy in the
Writings concerns the organic nature of human society.
According to Bahá’u’lláh, we should

Regard the world as the human body which, though at
its creation whole and perfect, hath been afflicted,
through various causes, with grave disorders and
maladies. [GWB CXX 254]

The underlying analogy is that initial appearances not
withstanding, both the human body and the world/society are
living organisms. Because they are the same kinds of things, we
can transfer attributes from one to the other, i.e. from the
source — the human body — to the target — the world/society.
Thus, He says that the world/society, like the human body, can
also suffer “disorders and maladies.” For health, we need
properly integrated parts functioning for the good of the
whole.
Shoghi Effendi uses this organic concept of society to build
his argument for dealing with Covenant breakers. He describes
the Faith “as a living organism” [WOB 23], which, like an
organism is able “to expand and adapt itself to the needs and
requirements of an ever-changing society” [WOB 23]. He
transfers the attributes of an organism, i.e. the source, to the
target, i.e. the Bahá’í Faith. Consequently, Shoghi Effendi
concludes that internal existential threats to the Faith must be
excised from the Bahá’í community like “a cancer” [DG 16,
emphasis added]. Tolerating internally rebellious and destructive
elements within itself would expose the Faith to mortal danger.
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 195

Another example of an argument from analogy is ‘Abdu’l-
Bahá’s use of the sun and its planets to show why an
intermediary between God and humankind is necessary. He
informs us that “An intermediary is needed to bring two
extremes into relation with each other” [PT 57]. This is the
principle on which ‘Abdu’l-Bahá constructs his analogy. It
asserts that when two extremes are to be connected, a third
connecting entity is necessary.

The Divine Reality may be likened to the sun and the
Holy Spirit to the rays of the sun. As the rays of the sun
bring the light and warmth of the sun to the earth,
giving life to all created beings, so do the
‘Manifestations’ ... bring the power of the Holy Spirit
from the Divine Sun of Reality to give light and life to
the souls of men. [PT 57]

The rays are the necessary intermediaries between the sun and
the earth because the sun itself cannot descend to earth just as
God does not descend into materiality. Consequently, “there
must be a Mediator between God and Man, and this is none
other than the Holy Spirit, which brings the created earth into
relation with the ‘Unthinkable One’, the Divine Reality” [PT 57].

8. Socratic Dialectical Reasoning

In his guidance to the conduct of consultation by a Spiritual
Assembly, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says, “The shining spark of truth
cometh forth only after the clash of differing opinions” [SWAB
87, emphasis added]. This statement encapsulates the essence of
Socratic dialectic reasoning14 in which we seek the truth by
carefully cross-examining all ideas, by trying them against
contradictory or alternative suggestions and by analyzing them
in light of divine revelation and for logical consistency.
Naturally, we must take into account the spiritual context of
this intellectual procedure for it is this spiritual context which
forms the psycho-spiritual environment that helps us find the
truth. This spiritual focus is essential because it discourages
human idiosyncrasies, foibles and/or personal agendas from
derailing the dialectical reasoning process.
196 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

Two words stand out in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s statement: “clash”
and “only.” The former strikes a somewhat ‘Hegelian chord’ in
its allusion to a “clash” or collision to test viewpoint and its
rivals. The word “only” seems to re-enforce this ‘Hegelian
chord’ insofar as the “clash” of opinions (not individuals) is
necessary for testing viewpoints. However, in contrast to the
Hegelian dialectic, Socratic and Bahá’í dialectical reasoning does
not necessarily end in a synthesis of views; truth may be with
one point of view or another.
Although dialectical reasoning is necessary to Bahá’í
consultation, it is not sufficient. Bahá’í consultation makes a
key improvement in the process of dialectical reasoning by
requiring participants to surrender personal ownership of ideas.

When an idea is put forth it becomes at once the
property of the group. Although this notion sounds
simple, it is perhaps the most profound principle of
consultation ... When followed, this principle
encourages those ideas that spring forth from a sincere
desire to serve, as opposed to ideas that emanate from a
desire for personal aggrandizement or constituency-
building.15

Eliminating the concept of ‘ownership’ of ideas is essential to
dialectical reasoning because the required objectivity is easily
lost if the participants are side-tracked by personal ‘politics.’ As
‘Abdu’l-Bahá says, “They must in every matter search out the
truth and not insist upon their own opinion” [SWAB 87]. Truth is
all that matters.
The role of dialectical reasoning is seen primarily in the
requirements of consultation and less so in the Writings which
have few clear-cut examples of dialectic reasoning. This is not
unexpected since the Writings characteristically reason
deductively from infallibly given universal premises and do not
generally show the ‘debating’ process by which actual
conclusions are reached. However, we do have an example of
dialectical reasoning in its embryonic stage in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s
discussion of pantheism in Some Answered Questions. Here we
observe the pattern of exposition and refutation and/or
improvement that characterizes dialectical reasoning. In the
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 197

discussion of pantheism, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá explains Sufi and
Theosophist beliefs about God’s relationship to the phenomenal
world and then contrasts them with what the Prophets have
taught. According to him, the Prophets teach that phenomenal
reality emanates from God Who “remains and continues in the
exaltation of Its [God’s] sanctity” [SAQ 293]. Manifestation,
however, means something appears in various forms. He
demonstrates the weaknesses of the Sufi-Theosophical
arguments for manifestation and why emanation is the correct
alternative. A similar pattern of exposition and refutation is
found in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s discussion about reincarnation [SAQ
282] and “The Birth of Christ” [SAQ 87].

It should be mentioned in passing, that dialectical reasoning
requires adherence to the four laws of reasoning discussed in
previous sections. A dialogue in which terms are not used
consistently, in which the choice of truth or falsity is evaded, in
which logical self-contradictions are rampant and in which
reasons are not adequate to the subject matter quickly
degenerates into nonsense that communicates nothing except
confusion. No one will know what anyone else is talking about
and that makes communication impossible. It destroys the very
possibility and purpose of consultation.

9. A “Rational God”

Perhaps the most intriguing statement about rationality in
the Bahá’í Writings is Shoghi Effendi’s reference to

that invisible yet rational God Who, however much we
extol the divinity of His Manifestations on earth, can
in no wise incarnate His infinite, His unknowable, His
incorruptible and all-embracing Reality in the concrete
and limited frame of a mortal being. Indeed, the God
Who could so incarnate His own reality would, in the
light of the teachings of Bahá’u’lláh, cease immediately
to be God. So crude and fantastic a theory of Divine
incarnation is as removed from, and incompatible with,
the essentials of Bahá’í belief ... [WOB 112, emphasis
added]
198 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

Shoghi Effendi’s explanation tells us that an infinite and perfect
God cannot incarnate Himself in finitude and imperfection
without losing His identity as God. As Shoghi Effendi says,
were God to do so, He would “cease immediately to be God.”
i.e. God must be infinite and perfect to be God. Therein we see
consistency with the law of identity (LI). Shoghi Effendi’s
statement is also consistent with the law of non-contradiction
(LNC) which tells us that God cannot be infinite and perfect as
well as finite and imperfect at the same time in the same sense.
Next, we observe the law of the excluded middle (LEM) insofar
as one or the other of following statements must be true: ‘God
is infinite and perfect’ or ‘God is not infinite and perfect.’ A
third choice — which is precisely what the Christian
understanding of the trinity asserts — is not logically possible.
Shoghi Effendi describes this non-existent third choice as “crude
and fantastic” which is a very strong rejection of a doctrine
from another religion. Consistency with the three basic laws of
standard logic is clearly one reason why Shoghi Effendi refers to
a “rational God.” We hasten to add that this does not
compromise God’s absolute freedom to act as He pleases. As
creator of the laws of logic He is free to choose to act in
agreement with them.
Further evidence of God’s rationality is also seen in creation.
As shown above, creation has a final cause, or purpose, a reason
for being by which we can begin understanding it as an orderly
composition and not “as a fortuitous composition and
arrangement” [SAQ 181]. Order and purpose are essential
attributes of rationality, and, in this case, signs of a “rational
God” acting in the phenomenal world. Bahá’u’lláh says,

And when the sanctified souls rend asunder the veils of
all earthly attachments ... then will the purpose of
creation, which is the knowledge of Him Who is the
Eternal Truth, become manifest. [KA 176]

Speaking of natural creation, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says, “the creation
of God ... is not a fortuitous composition and arrangement
[SAQ 181, emphasis added] and is “composed and combined with the
greatest strength, conformable to wisdom and according to
universal law” [SAQ 181]. Here, too, we observe that God reveals
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 199

Himself as acting consistently with purpose and reason. This
does not, of course, mean that we humans always understand
this purpose or the reasons for creation, but it means we can
rest assured that such reasons and such a purpose exist.

10. The Limits of Reason

There are, broadly speaking, three viewpoints about the
powers of reason. Rationalism in its strongest form, often
associated with empiricism and logical positivism, maintains
that reason can tell us ‘everything.’ Whatever cannot be known
by reason is not knowledge. Reason alone is both necessary and
sufficient. At the other extreme is skepticism, in our time
mainly in its as postmodern guise, which says reason can tell us
nothing. There is no truth and we only have opinions or
viewpoints, none less or more true than any other. Reason is
neither necessary nor sufficient. Moderate rationalism lies
between these two extremes. It holds that reason can tell us
some things but not others; it has the ability to provide some
knowledge but it also has limits. In short, reason is necessary
but not sufficient.
In our view, the Bahá’í Writings espouse moderate
rationalism, i.e. the view that reason is necessary but not
sufficient. Having examined the necessity of reason in the
Writings, let us turn our attention to its limitations. Doing so
requires a brief excursion into ontology since Bahá’í
epistemology has an ontological foundation. In a nutshell, the
Writings teach that ontology determines epistemology, i.e. what
can be known is determined by a thing’s ontological status.
Because “the degrees of existence are different and various,
some beings are higher in the scale than others” [SAQ 130]. The
result is that “everything which is lower is powerless to
comprehend the reality of that which is higher” [SAQ 146, emphasis
added] which brings us to the first limitation: human reason
cannot comprehend God.

It is evident that the human understanding is a quality
of the existence of man, and that man is a sign of God:
how can the quality of the sign surround the creator of
the sign? ... Therefore, the Reality of the Divinity is
200 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

hidden from all comprehension, and concealed from the
minds of all men. It is absolutely impossible to ascend
to that plane. We see that everything which is lower is
powerless to comprehend the reality of that which is
higher. [SAQ 146, emphasis added]

The ontological difference between God and humankind is
intrinsic and cannot be overcome. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá states
categorically that “it is absolutely impossible to ascend to that
plane.” This impossibility forbids all claims to know “the
reality” or Essence of God and rejects all claims to having
attained and experienced ontological unity with God, even if
only in a subjective, emotional or ‘mystic’ state. This
impossibility is “absolute” and, therefore, falsifies any claim to
have attained such union from any perspective.16
However, our understanding of this ontological difference
must be fine-tuned for, as ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says, “The existence of
the Divine Being hath been clearly established, on the basis of
logical proofs, but the reality of the Godhead is beyond the
grasp of the mind” [PUP 47, emphasis added]. In other words, we
may know by logical proofs that God exists but not what God
is, i.e. we may know about His existence which can be logically
demonstrated, but we cannot know His Essence. In a similar
vein Adib Taherzadeh writes,

It is essential to differentiate between the ‘Essence of
God’ which Shoghi Effendi describes as the ‘innermost
Spirit of Spirits’ or ‘Eternal Essence of Essences’, and
‘God revealed’ to humanity. The former is unknowable,
while the latter is comprehensible to man.17

The “Essence of God” is unknowable but “God revealed’ to
humanity” i.e. God as revealed in phenomenal creation — can be
known. He is known to us through the revelation of the
Manifestations. What the Manifestation reflects is derived
from and associated with God — that is precisely what makes
him a Manifestation — and what He reveals to us about God, is
knowledge about God appropriate to human understanding.
Another limitation of reason is identified when ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
affirms that by “intellectual development and power of reason,
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 201

man cannot attain to his fullest degree — cannot accomplish the
progress effected by religion” [PUP 170]. Yet again, this time
from a new perspective, the Writings support the central
contention of moderate rationalism that reason while necessary
is not sufficient for the full development of humankind. “No
system of philosophy has ever been able to change the manners
and customs of a people for the better” [PT 164] — a fact amply
illustrated by the tragic history of various ideologies in the 20th
Century. Genuine human development requires the power of the
Holy Spirit:

The world of humanity must be confirmed by the
breath of the Holy Spirit in order to receive universal
education. [PUP 170]

Another limitation of reason is that it cannot learn about the
essence of things directly. This brings us to one of the most
philosophically important passages in the Writings.

Know that there are two kinds of knowledge: the
knowledge of the essence of a thing and the knowledge
of its qualities. The essence of a thing is known through
its qualities; otherwise, it is unknown and hidden. [SAQ
220, emphasis added]

‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s wording in the second statement requires careful
examination. It asserts that the “essence of a thing is known
through its qualities; otherwise it is unknown and hidden.” In
other words, it is, in fact, possible to know about essences but
only by means of their “qualities” or attributes. Knowledge of
essences is indirect, mediated by “their qualities.” There is no
direct knowledge of the essence. Consequently, our reasoning is
limited to these externalized, manifested qualities and actions of
things. Abdu’l-Bahá adds,

the inner essence of anything is not comprehended, but
only its qualities. For example, the inner essence of the
sun is unknown, but is understood by its qualities,
which are heat and light. The inner essence of man is
unknown and not evident, but by its qualities it is
characterized and known. Thus everything is known by
202 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

its qualities and not by its essence. Although the mind
encompasses all things, and the outward beings are
comprehended by it, nevertheless these beings with
regard to their essence are unknown; they are only
known with regard to their qualities. [SAQ 220]

This passage reinforces the interpretation that the essence of
things is not known in-itself but only externally by manifested
qualities and their inter-action with the world. Only God has
such knowledge of “inner essence[s].” Once again, we observe
that this distinction puts restrictions on the powers of reason
by forestalling all claims to immediate, ‘inside’ knowledge of
essences. This prohibits any claims of ontological ‘mystical
union’ with God since that would obviously provide such
‘inside’ knowledge of the divine.
We must also recognize that reason cannot comprehend the
higher spiritual realms such as the Abhá Kingdom, i.e. “the
worlds beyond this, and their condition” [ABL 66]. This is
another important limitation of reason, one which has a direct
effect on beliefs regarding the after-life and the existence of
super-sensory realms of being. Of these worlds, we can only
know what the Writings tell us.
Furthermore, reason by itself cannot complete its quest for
knowledge, i.e. it lacks the power to attain the certainty with
which the process of reasoning completes itself. (If it did not
seek certainty what would be the point of the quest for
knowledge?) Reason is necessary but is not sufficient to attain
its natural goal of certainty. To attain certainty by itself, reason
could only rely on still more reason, thus setting up an infinite
regress which never achieves its goal. To achieve this certainty
we must go beyond reason.

How shall we attain the reality of knowledge? By the
breaths and promptings of the Holy Spirit, which is
light and knowledge itself. Through it the human mind
is quickened and fortified into true conclusions and
perfect knowledge. [PUP 21, emphasis added]

In our view, the “reality of knowledge” includes the certainty
that all knowledge seeks. This is only attained by the
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 203

“promptings of the Holy Spirit” which enliven and strengthen
the mind and “fortify[ ]” it into “true conclusions.” In short,
the reasoning capacities are strengthened so that our findings
have truth and certainty, i.e. “perfect knowledge.” Abdu’l-Bahá
also says,

It is most certain that if human souls exercise their
respective reason and intelligence upon the divine
questions, the power of God will dispel every difficulty,
and the eternal realities will appear as one light, one
truth, one love, one God and a peace that is universal.
[PUP 79]

What makes this statement especially interesting is that
assistance from the “power of God,” is conditional upon our
“exercise” of “reason and intelligence.” If we fail in this
“exercise,” divine help cannot or will not assist us, a situation
similar to The Arabic Hidden Words which state, “If thou
lovest Me not, My love can in no wise reach thee” [HW Ar. 5].
Equally noteworthy is the reference to using “reason and
intelligence upon the divine questions,” i.e. to using reason in
regards to spiritual issues thereby emphasizing that reason is not
only applicable to the phenomenal realm. This passage illustrates
yet again that reason is necessary but not sufficient in the quest
for knowledge. The same idea is expressed in the following
passage:

He has bestowed upon him the power of intellect so
that through the attribute of reason, when fortified by
the Holy Spirit, he may penetrate and discover ideal
realities and become informed of the mysteries of the
world of significances. As this power to penetrate the
ideal knowledges is superhuman, supernatural, man
becomes the collective center of spiritual as well as
material forces... [PUP 303, emphasis added]

Reason, when “fortified by the Holy Spirit,” may acquire
knowledge of “ideal” i.e. non-material realities and the
supernatural realm because reason is “superhuman,
supernatural.” When properly assisted, reason is not confined
204 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

to the phenomenal world. However, without help from the Holy
Spirit, even our natural, scientific knowledge is not possible.

Without the Holy Spirit he [man] would have no intellect,
he would be unable to acquire his scientific knowledge
... The illumination of the Holy Spirit gives to man the
power of thought, and enables him to make discoveries
by which he bends the laws of nature to his will. [PT 58;
cf. FWU 51]

Without the Holy Spirit, humans would have no “intellect”
i.e. no mind and no reason by which to make scientific
discoveries. Obviously, the “illumination” of the Holy Spirit is
a pre-condition for the intellect or reasoning power in
humankind; this divine illumination “gives to man the power of
thought” and “enables him to make discoveries.” This explains
why the action of the Holy Spirit cannot be explained in strictly
rational and empirical terms. Illumination from the Holy Spirit
is a pre-condition for reason and is therefore, ontologically
superior to it. As we recall, the ontologically lower cannot
understand the higher. Thus, the conclusion that the Holy
Spirit’s actions are beyond reason is not merely a ‘mystification’
or evasion but rather a strict logical consequence of the
relationship between the dependent things and that on which
they depend.
Finally, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says that the

Holy Spirit gives the true method of comprehension
which is infallible and indubitable. This is through the
help of the Holy Spirit which comes to man, and this is
the condition in which certainty can alone be attained.
[SAQ 297, emphasis added]

Here, too, we find reference to the “true method of
comprehension” which is available to the “quickened” mind as
well as to the certainty or infallibility that “perfect knowledge”
requires. Knowledge acquired with assistance of the Holy Spirit
is described as “infallible and indubitable.” Elsewhere, ‘Abdu’l-
Bahá also notes the possibility of certain knowledge: if we have
proof that is acceptable to the senses, to reason, to “traditional
authority” [PUP 254] and to the heart, we will have knowledge
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 205

that can be “relied upon as perfectly correct” [PUP 254]. Later he
adds that we can absolutely rely [on] and declare to be
complete” [PUP 256, emphasis added] a proof that meets these four
criteria. These statements suggest that in principle it is possible
for humans to have certain knowledge — a topic we shall now
examine more closely.

11. The Reliability of Reason

There is yet one more, extraordinarily important limitation
of reason i.e. the unreliability of the reasoning process itself.
‘Abdu’l-Bahá refers to this limitation in his discussions when he
that philosophers cannot come to any final agreement on a wide
variety of issues.

Therefore, it is evident that the method of reason is not
perfect, for the differences of the ancient philosophers,
the want of stability and the variations of their
opinions, prove this. For if it were perfect, all ought to
be united in their ideas and agreed in their opinions.
[SAQ 296, emphasis added]

‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s conclusion is based on the premise that truth is
one; consequently, if the reasoning process were fully reliable,
this one truth would be evident to all. Elsewhere he adds that
these differences among scientists and philosophers are “clear
proof that human reason is not to be relied upon as an infallible
criterion” [PUP 21].
We must carefully examine ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s statements about
the unreliability of reason because they can easily be
misinterpreted to undermine virtually everything the Writings
say about epistemology, i.e. about knowledge and reason. First,
we must note what the passage does not say. Although it
discusses the reasoning process, the construction of chains of
inferences, the formation of “opinions,” and debates among
philosophers and scientists, it does not discuss what we may call
the ‘basic knowledge’ we use to build rational inferences and
arguments. In other words, this limitation of reason does not
undermine or relativize statements such as fire is hotter than
ice; a triangle has three sides; an elephant has more mass than an
206 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

ant; you either went to bed last night or did not; the sun seems
to go around the earth. The Writings, of course, make constant
use of such basic knowledge in developing arguments,
explicating teachings and illustrating spiritual principles: spring
is preceded by winter and followed by summer [SAQ 73]; a clear
sky lets us see the sun [PT 62]; we can travel underwater in
submarines [PT 41]. The significance of this observation is that it
limits human fallibility to the process of reasoning and does not
necessarily apply to all knowledge claims. We may acquire
certain knowledge or facts and though they are very basic, they
are absolutely necessary to the construction and explication of
arguments whether our own or those in the Writings. In fact,
the Writings depend on basic knowledge being certain and
universal in order to reach a world-wide audience. The full
significance of this will become apparent later. For now we shall
only conclude that the Bahá’í Writings avoid skepticism about
all knowledge by recognizing the validity of basic knowledge.
If misinterpreted, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s statements about the
imperfection of the reasoning process can lead to claims of a
serious self-contradiction in the Writings. On one hand, the
Writings note the unreliability of reason while on the other,
they put enormous emphasis on reason and rationality, even for
religion and spiritual issues. As we have seen, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
admonishes us to use reason as a test for distinguishing religion
from ignorance and superstition. However, if reason is
unreliable, how can we use it as instructed by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá?
How can it be useful in recognizing superstitions when reason
itself is not reliable? On the surface at least, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s
critique of reason seems to undermine and contradict the
Writing’s strong advocacy of reason. This confronts us with a
stark question: Do the Writings contradict themselves?
Before demonstrating how Shoghi Effendi resolves this
contradiction, it is important to recall that reasoning
“fortified” [PUP 22] by the Holy Spirit can attain “certainty”
[SAQ 299]. Therefore, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s declaration about the limits
of reason do not apply in such cases. This means that
infallibility is possible in principle — a fact of immense
importance in regards to the Universal House of Justice which
is the recipient of divine guidance.
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 207

One way of resolving this apparent contradiction between
advocating and apparently undermining reason is to recall
Shoghi Effendi’s statement that the Bahá’í Faith is “scientific in
its method.”18 This has several applications. The first is that
science recognizes that in principle reason is fallible and that all
truth-claims are provisional, but at the same time, it recognizes
that in practice truth-claims are accepted as true until there is
empirical evidence and demonstrably better reasoning to prove
otherwise. No mere imaginative speculation about possibilities
suffice to dislodge a provisionally certain fact; better empirical
evidence and better reasoning are required. Thus, while from the
perspective of principle, there are no absolute certainties in
science, from the perspective of practice there are pragmatic
certainties we use until contrary concrete observational and
rational evidence arises. All accepted scientific facts are in this
position: fallible in principle but having pragmatic certainty.
For example, in principle the heliocentric theory of the solar
system is fallible, but in practice no one questions it given the
absence of empirical evidence. The suggestion that it is simply
an illusion from Descartes’ clever demon — or the Matrix — is
of no value to science. In this way, science strikes a balance
between stability and change.
Applied to the Writings, this leads to the view that ‘Abdu’l-
Bahá’s occasional statements about the fallibility of natural,
unassisted reason concern principle, while his frequent
statements extolling and recommending reason concern
practice. This means there is no contradiction between principle
and practice because they refer to different aspects of
reasoning. Therefore, they do not really contradict or
undermine each other.
We might also say that while the main emphasis is on the use
of reason, passages on the limitations of reason are meant
primarily as a heuristic admonition to forestall hubris about our
reasoning processes and the resulting conflicts. This ‘corrective
view’ is supported by the enormous disparity between the
number of passages extolling and recommending reason and the
very small number of passages about its limitations [SAQ 207; PUP
21 and 254]. Like any good teacher, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá highlights the
main lesson he wants to teach, in this case, the importance of
208 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

using reason in the quest for both spiritual and worldly
knowledge. However, he also provides a corrective if arguments
get out of hand, and forestalls the hubris of extreme rationalism
that might even claim to know God in His Essence.
The inherent fallibility of reason also raises the problem of
circular reasoning. If reason is fallible, how can we use it to
judge a work of reasoning with any confidence in the results?
We are caught in a vicious circle. Is there a way of escape? In
principle, for science there is no escape since there is nothing
superior to reason by which to judge its results. One can only
check and re-check one’s data and conclusions in hopes of
finding hidden errors — and await the results of other research.
On the other hand, Bahá’í epistemology distinguishes between
natural reason working alone and natural reason “fortified” [PUP
22] by the Holy Spirit and, therefore, has a superior platform by
which to judge the results of reasoning. The problem for Bahá’ís
is knowing which reasoning process has been “fortified” and
which has not.
To help us judge the results of our reasoning, the Writings
are “scientific in [their] method” in a second way. The sciences
use a “negative gate-keeper” method of excluding inadequate
viewpoints that cannot meet certain criteria — such as
quantification, physicality, objectivity or falsifiability. Any
hypothesis that meets the various criteria is acceptable until
experimentation or the discovery of an internal reasoning error
rule it out. For example, although in quantum physics the
Copenhagen interpretation is most often cited, (a trend that is
now changing) there are, in fact, several other scientifically
valid interpretations of quantum data. They all make the same
predictions and are, therefore, recognized as equally valid, e.g.
interpretations by Everett, Gell-Mann and de Broglie-Bohm.19
The negative gate-keeper has two correlated functions. First,
it tells us what criteria a hypothesis or viewpoint must have to
be acceptable. In physics, quantification is one of them.
Second, the negative gate-keeper tells us what to avoid.
Physicists must avoid Aristotelian concepts of momentum and
chemists must avoid the phlogiston theory of combustion. The
negative gate-keeper does not dictate any specific interpretation
or hypothesis but only criteria which our theories must satisfy.
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 209

Within that framework, we may believe or hypothesize anything
we believe is true. The net effect is that both unity of subject
matter and diversity of exploration and hypothesizing are
preserved.
A similar situation prevails in the Writings. They lay out
certain criteria for our beliefs. For example, they must be based
on the Writings and at least be conflict-free vis-à-vis guidance
from the Universal House of Justice. Furthermore, Bahá’u’lláh
and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá also tell us particular beliefs to avoid. For
example, the criteria that God does not manifest Himself in His
creation, leads to the rejection of metaphysical pantheism [SAQ
289], and God’s literal incarnation in Christ [SAQ 152]. On the
basis of the criteria that “there are no repetitions in nature”
[PUP 285] the concept of re-incarnation [PUP 167] is rejected.
Ontological materialism [PUP 262], is denied because it asserts
that spiritual and non-material aspects of existence are not real.
‘Abdu’l-Bahá rejects the traditional Biblical interpretation of
the Fall [SAQ 122] because it violates the criterion of logical
reason: “the intelligence cannot accept it” [SAQ 122]. He rejects
a host of traditional Biblical interpretations on this ground.20
Among the other views rejected are the concepts of a real
infinite regress [SAQ 148], atheism, the materiality of the soul
and the mortality of the human soul. This list tells us what
beliefs to avoid, and, thereby, helps us set aside viewpoints
which imply or directly invoke rejected positions. However, as
with science, the negative gate-keeper here does not dictate any
specific understanding per se; it only gives us criteria for
whatever understandings we may develop.
‘Abdu’l-Bahá presents this idea in the image of the garden.
Although he envisages a garden made up of many kinds of
flowers, he also distinguishes between the plants in the garden
and those outside in their “wild state” [SAQ 194]. The latter he
associates with unfruitfulness. However, just as some plants or
trees can be cultivated to become fruitful, some concepts can
be revised to meet the criteria of the Writings [SAQ 7]. ‘Abdu’l-
Bahá’s example gives a concrete illustration how negative gate-
keeping preserves the unity, i.e. identity of the Bahá’í teachings
and, at the same time allows the maximal diversity of ideas and
understandings.
210 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

The need for negative gate-keeping is clear. Without the
ability to make critical judgments and to impose criteria of
understanding, without some way of distinguishing truth from
error, the independent investigation of truth would be a
pointless exercise. Why bother seeking the truth if every
proposition or viewpoint is true? Indeed, if every proposition
or truth-claim is true, how can we even try to distinguish truth
from error or identify “the people of error” [TDP 51; SAQ pp. 59,
75]. In such situations, no guidance — even divine guidance — is
necessary: we can simply believe whatever suits us at the
moment which is the very antithesis of the Manifestation’s
mission.
There are several advantages to the negative gate-keeper
method used by the Writings. One is that it preserves the unique
identity and nature of the Bahá’í Faith and its teachings while,
at the same time, allowing the maximal variety of ideas and
understandings. It balances unity-in-diversity with as much
emphasis on the unity as on the diversity. Any ideas that do not
run afoul of the criteria the Writings establish are acceptable,
even though they may clash with each other.
The negative gate-keeper has one other advantage, namely, it
provides what we have called ‘practical certainty’ in a foregoing
section of this paper. While reason alone cannot give us
absolute certainty, our understandings and practices can have
‘practical certainty’ as long as they meet the criteria of reason
and the guidelines given by the Writings. This, too, strengthens
diversity because it encourages different understandings and
practices to flourish without threatening the unity of the
teachings.
Inevitably, it will be asked ‘How do we determine which
interpretation is to be passed by the negative gate-keeper?’ In
our opinion, there is no hard-and-fast answer to this question.
Instead, there are several means by which an idea may be tested.
The Bahá’í Faith, of course, has no clergy or ‘official
philosopher’ to ensure harmony with the Teachings because it
guarantees that individuals have a duty and right to investigate
and think for themselves. Thus, in our view, this determination
is first made by those who suggest an idea; they have an obvious
interest in seeing that their ideas harmonize with the Writings
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 211

or at least are neutral. Second, whether or not an idea can pass
the negative gate-keeper may emerge in discussion with others
who might be able to show an explicit or implicit problem.
Moreover, given the enormous emphasis on reason in the
Writings, we might also say that the application of reason itself
can help us make this determination. If an argument logically
implies conclusions that violate certain Teachings, and/or are
logically deficient, then obviously there is a problem to be
rectified. Finally, in the case of papers intended for publication,
the review process may also play a role under some
circumstances.

12. Non-Discursive Knowing and Thinking

So far we have examined what is called ‘discursive reason,’
i.e. reaching conclusions on the basis of chains of inference
based on universal premises, empirical evidence or analogies.
Discursive reasoning requires clearly articulated steps according
to the laws of logic. In our view, this kind of reasoning is
pervasive throughout the Writings — but does not cover all
ways of acquiring knowledge and reaching conclusions. The
Writings, as noted before, espouse a moderate rationalism
which recognizes the validity of non-discursive methods of
knowing and finding truth. Some authors such as Ken Wilber21
refer to these methods as ‘transrational,’ i.e. psycho-spiritual
processes that include but transcend reason. They do not violate
rationality but go beyond it.
Before proceeding, it is important to highlight that non-
discursive reasoning is not to be confused with irrationality.
The irrational and the non-discursive differ insofar as
irrationality involves a cognitive deficiency or confusion in the
reasoning process. It may involve setting aside reason in favor
of something else, e.g. a personal preference or desire, a
political agenda, an advantage to be gained or a sheer assertion
of will power for its own sake. On the other hand, non-
discursive reasoning is a way of acquiring knowledge or
reaching conclusions about reality that does not involve the
chains of inference we have previously examined.
212 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

When speaking of non-discursive reasoning, we must
distinguish between the process and the result. By definition,
the process itself is non-discursive i.e. it cannot be
communicated by laying out a chain of logical inferences.
About the process we must remain silent, or communicate by
metaphors, analogies or by various forms of artistic expression.
However, the result, i.e. the conclusions we reach or the actions
we take on the basis of the non-discursive process must, at the
very least, not contradict the Writing’s emphasis on rationality.
The Writings would be weakened by another serious self-
contradiction in their epistemology if intrinsic rationality of
the soul and ‘other ways of knowing’ conflicted with reason
instead of complementing it. Even if the process of attaining
knowledge is non-discursive, the results must still make sense in
and be applicable to this world. If they do not, they will simply
be irrational — which means they would not pass the test of
rationality which the Writings recommend. Indeed, if such
‘other ways of knowing’ were irrational, they would also be
violating the very essence of man, i.e. the “rational soul.”
It is noteworthy that irrationality has only negative
connotations in the Writings. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá associates the
irrational with the “foolish” [SWAB 185], and with the “irrational
drinker” [TAB3 492]. Shoghi Effendi associates it with the
“illogical,”22 with “irrational instincts of youth, its follies, its
prodigality, its pride, its self-assurance, its rebelliousness, and
contempt of discipline” [PDC 117] and “superstition” [WOB 137].
Irrationality has no place in the Bahá’í quest for knowledge and
truth.

13. Non-Discursive Thinking: The Heart

Although the heart is the most important ‘organ’ or capacity
for non-discursive reasoning, it is not in inherent conflict with
reason. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá tells us, “The world of minds corresponds
with the world of hearts [PUP 270, emphasis added]. In other words,
the heart and mind or reason23 are distinct but they are not
opposed, i.e. do not necessarily contradict one another although
they ‘deliberate’ in different ways. The Writings show this in
several ways. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says, “And among the teachings of
Bahá’u’lláh is, that religion must be in conformity with science
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 213

and reason, so that it may influence the hearts of men.”24 It is
noteworthy that reason is able to “influence the heart.” This
idea is emphasized in the following:

If religious belief and doctrine is at variance with
reason, it proceeds from the limited mind of man and
not from God; therefore, it is unworthy of belief and
not deserving of attention; the heart finds no rest in it,
and real faith is impossible. How can man believe that
which he knows to be opposed to reason? Is this
possible? Can the heart accept that which reason denies?
Reason is the first faculty of man and the religion of
God is in harmony with it. [PUP 231]

There are several issues here. First is the suggestion that what
is rational comes from God, and what is irrational comes from
the human mind. Here, too, God is associated with rationality —
as in Shoghi Effendi’s reference to the “rational God” — though
this trait does not, of course, exhaust His nature. Second, the
heart cannot find rest in beliefs and doctrines that are “at
variance with reason.” In other words, the heart cannot find
rest in the irrational and even more — “real faith” in the
irrational is “impossible.” The heart cannot accept ideas that
violate reason which means that in some sense the heart is
rational too or at least sufficiently sensitive to rationality to
make it a requirement.
Throughout the Writings we are instructed to “ponder in
[our] hearts” [SWAB 241] a variety of subjects such as
Bahá’u’lláh’s prophesies [SWAB 17], “the mysteries of Divine
Revelation” [KI 47], and the social principles of the Faith. The
heart is described as “the seat of the revelation of the inner
mysteries of God” [GWB CXXV 264]. It is clear that the heart, like
reason, is able to cogitate, assess, reflect, analyze, understand
and conclude, albeit it ways that we cannot explain discursively.
For example, Bahá’u’lláh says, “Ponder this in thine heart, that
thou mayest comprehend its meaning” [GWB XVII 46], and
“Ponder this in thine heart, that the truth may be revealed unto
thee” [GWB XXXII 76] thereby showing that the heart can
examine, reflect on, understand and comprehend the truth. The
heart has an epistemological function as indicated by the phrase
214 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

“understanding heart” [GDM 51]. The heart’s function in
acquiring truth is noted elsewhere as well: “May your hearts
become clear and pure like unto polished mirrors in which may
be reflected the full glory of the Sun of Truth” [PT 95] and “men
of enlightened heart worship truth on whatever horizon it
appears” [PT 128, emphasis added]. It also has a cognitive function
as indicated by the phrase, “sight of thy heart” [SWAB 37] which
is to say that in its own way, the heart can perceive things, in
this case, “intellectual realities” among which ‘Abdu’l-Bahá lists
“all the qualities and admirable perfections of man” [SAQ 263]
and “love” [SAQ 83]. The heart is also described as a “spiritual
faculty” [TAB1 208] gifted in “spiritual susceptibilities” [PUP 7; cf.
TAB2 286] which is to say, it is open to spiritual influences:
“reflections of the spirit and impressions of the Divine are now
mirrored clear and sharp in the deep heart’s core” [SWAB 19].
However, what can it mean to ‘ponder in our hearts’? How
can we ‘ponder’ or reach understandings or conclusions without
abstract concepts or discursive logical operations or, possibly,
even without words? To what extent can we be conscious of
these deliberations? On the basis of our studies, we conclude
that the Writings do not provide us with precise information
about this because one cannot give exact discursive descriptions
of non-discursive processes. We can only experience them and
feel their influences on our thinking as we “ponder in [our]
hearts” [SWAB 241].
Given the consistent association of the heart with various
kinds of love in the Writings, it seems plausible that the
deliberations of the heart are intimately connected with the
feelings of love for God and His creation, i.e. the ‘agapeic’25
aspects of humankind. These include sympathy, empathy,
personal and existential concern, compassion, and devotion.
But even this love is rational in the sense of being appropriate
to the soul that God has created in each person. Thus, when we
“ponder in [our] hearts,” it seems likely that we deliberate under
the guidance of, or in the light of, love as the fundamental force
in the cosmos: “Love is the fundamental principle of God’s
purpose for man, and He has commanded us to love each other
even as He loves us” [PT 121]. When pondering in our hearts, we
observe and reflect about people, things and issues from the
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 215

perspective of God’s universal love as reflected in us and, in
doing so, reach our conclusions. How exactly this happens,
cannot, as said before, be discursively explained. It is a process
that must be personally experienced directly to be understood.
In that way, it resembles what ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says about our
understanding of immortality:

But if the human spirit will rejoice and be attracted to
the Kingdom of God, if the inner sight becomes
opened, and the spiritual hearing strengthened, and the
spiritual feelings predominant, he will see the
immortality of the spirit as clearly as he sees the sun.
[SAQ 225]

This heart-knowledge is immediate, like the knowledge of our
own physical sensations and even spiritual insights. According
to the Writings, the mind and spirit are directly aware of our
own bodily states as well as our own feelings and “spiritual
conditions” [SAQ 157].
Such knowledge is not based on a clear-cut subject/object
division as are all other kinds of knowledge and thought. When
we perceive a tree or think about an idea, there is a difference
between the object of thought and the person thinking, i.e.
between subject and object, the knower and what is known.
Consequently, we must consciously exert “effort and study” to
know and think about them because they are external to us.
However, with our bodily, emotional and spiritual states, we are
both subject and object, knower and known. It is a direct,
immediate, intimate “knowledge of being” not a mediated,
objective knowledge about being. Moreover, this knowledge is
not limited to ourselves alone. Because humans are a
“microcosm” [PUP 69] the laws, principles or ‘mysteries’ of entire
universe is “expressed or revealed” [PUP 69] within us. This
suggests that in our heart-ponderings, we may, if we go deep
enough, also gain knowledge about creation in this way.
216 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

14. Intuition

Intuitions are another non-discursive way of knowing
according to the Writings. Speaking about the divine origin of
the universe, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says,

These obvious arguments are adduced for weak souls;
but if the inner perception be open, a hundred thousand
clear proofs become visible. Thus, when man feels the
indwelling spirit, he is in no need of arguments for its
existence. [SAQ 6]

If we have direct sight or experiential knowledge we have no
need of discursive, step-by-step inferential reasoning. Opening
our eyes — not devising arguments — will prove the existence of
the sun. The direct experience is identified with feelings in this
passage, once again suggesting that feelings are the medium of
this kind of direct, non-discursive knowledge. After discussing
the immortality of the soul, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá declares,

if the inner sight becomes opened, and the spiritual
hearing strengthened, and the spiritual feelings
predominant, he will see the immortality of the spirit as
clearly as he sees the sun. [SAQ 225, emphasis added]

Here, too, we observe that direct insight — “inner sight” — and
“spiritual feelings” give us non-discursive knowledge about
spiritual topics like immortality. However, we must bear in
mind that direct “inner sight,” though not subject to inferential
reasoning, is not inherently irrational, and thereby, opposed to
the “rational soul.”
‘Abdu’l-Bahá shows the necessity of intuition for ontological
reasons. There are “invisible realms which the human intellect
can never hope to fathom nor the mind conceive” [SWAB 185].
These cannot be known by discursive reasoning no matter how
astute; rather we must cleanse the channel of our “spiritual
sense” [SWAB 185] which leads us to “the sweet scents of
holiness” [SWAB 185] or intuitions from the “invisible realms.”
Again, we should note that nothing here suggests that these
intuitions are not in harmony with reason even though the
process of receiving them cannot be described discursively.
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 217

Like intuitions, ‘transcendent experiences’ also seem to take
us out of the world of ordinary time and space. Such
experiences can only be discussed — if at all — only by means of
poetic metaphors. We find one such described in The Seven
Valleys. Having explained His statements about firstness and
lastness, Bahá’u’lláh informs us that these statements apply to
the “sphere of that which is relative,” i.e. the ordinary world,
“of variation and oneness, of limitation and detachment” [KI
160].

These statements are made in the sphere of that which is
relative, because of the limitations of men. Otherwise,
those personages who in a single step have passed over
the world of the relative and the limited, and dwelt on
the fair plane of the Absolute, and pitched their tent in
the worlds of authority and command — have burned
away these relativities with a single spark, and blotted
out these words with a drop of dew. And they swim in
the sea of the spirit, and soar in the holy air of light.
Then what life have words, on such a plane, that “first”
and “last” or other than these be seen or mentioned! In
this realm, the first is the last itself, and the last is but
the first. [SV 26]

A few “personages” have transcended this ordinary plane of
existence. In some indescribable way, they have attained a realm
beyond explanation by discursive reasoning, though what
transpires in that realm is not be incompatible with reason.
God, after all, is a “rational God” and we would not expect His
creation to violate His own nature. What we encounter in this
realm is beyond discursive explanation, a knowledge that must
be experienced, not discursively described. The acceptance of
such experiential knowledge emphasizes the moderate
rationalism in the Writings.
One of the conclusions we may draw from our discussion of
the heart, intuition and transcendent experience is that
rationality and discursivity are not synonymous in the Writings.
Viewing a work of art may give us experiential knowledge but
such knowledge is not necessarily non-rational because it is non-
discursive, i.e. cannot be satisfactorily be explained in
218 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

inferential steps. Indeed, given our essential nature as “rational
souls” and the existence of a “rational God” it is hard to see
how any true knowledge or understanding of any sort could be
non-rational even though it is non-discursive.

15. The Uses of Reason in the Writings

Perhaps the most important use of reason in the Writings is
to test the validity of religion and religious beliefs.

Consider what it is that singles man out from among
created beings, and makes of him a creature apart. Is it
not his reasoning power, his intelligence? Shall he not
make use of these in his study of religion? I say unto
you: weigh carefully in the balance of reason and
science everything that is presented to you as religion.
If it passes this test, then accept it, for it is truth! If,
however, it does not so conform, then reject it, for it is
ignorance! [PT 144]

‘Abdu’l-Bahá notes that reasoning is humanity’s distinguishing
feature and, in the form of a rhetorical question, tells us to use
our “reasoning power” in our “study of religion.” There is no
suggestion here that reason cannot deal with spiritual issues. He
then commands us to “test” religion by reason. Elsewhere he
tells us that “Religion must stand the analysis of reason” [PUP
175]. If religion must pass the test of rationality, then obviously
reason is sufficiently reliable to make such analysis feasible and
worthwhile. If it were not, there would be no point to ‘Abdu’l-
Bahá’s command to use it. This demonstrates yet again that
while we must be aware of reason’s limitations, we should not
let them deter us from using and relying on reason. He says,

In divine questions we must not depend entirely upon
the heritage of tradition and former human experience;
nay, rather, we must exercise reason, analyze and
logically examine the facts presented so that confidence
will be inspired and faith attained. [PUP 327, emphasis
added]
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 219

It is important to note the imperative — “we must exercise
reason” which implies not only that reason is sufficiently
reliable for the task but also that we are remiss if we do not use
it. Noteworthy as well is the command that we must “logically
examine” religious teachings. Moreover, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá also
declares that “If religion were contrary to logical reason then it
would cease to be a religion and be merely a tradition” [PT 142,
emphasis added]. Here, too, we observe the association of reason
and logic.
Further evidence of reason’s ability to deal with and test
spiritual subjects is ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s declaration that

The intellectual proofs of Divinity are based upon
observation and evidence which constitute decisive
argument, logically proving the reality of Divinity, the
effulgence of mercy, the certainty of inspiration and
immortality of the spirit. This is, in reality, the science
of Divinity [PUP 326].

Even the existence of God — Who is absolutely non-material —
can be “decisive[ly]” proven by reason and logic, a view re-
affirmed elsewhere when he says, the “existence of the Divine
Being hath been clearly established, on the basis of logical
proofs.”26 It is significant that he accepts the validity of logical
proofs of God’s existence as being “decisive” and “clearly
established” without the slightest suggestion that we should
doubt these results. Once again we observe that reason and
logic are not only applicable to metaphysical and theological
subjects but are also deemed sufficiently reliable to be used in
this way. Other spiritual topics which reason can demonstrate
are “the effulgence of mercy,” “the certainty of inspiration” and
the “immortality of the spirit” all of which transcend the
empirical-physical aspects of reality. In a similar vein, he
affirms “The Unity of God is logical, and this idea is not
antagonistic to the conclusions arrived at by scientific study”
[PT 141]. He also asserts that “If a question be found contrary to
reason, faith and belief in it are impossible, and there is no
outcome but wavering and vacillation” [PUP 181]. Reason is
necessary to attaining genuine faith that can withstand the tests
of this world; without such support from reason, faith will
220 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

vacillate or waver. This suggests that reason is also necessary to
faith and that faith without reason is deficient.
‘Abdu’l-Bahá sums up his teachings about reason and religion
with the assertion that “The foundations of religion are
reasonable” [PUP 128]. In other words, reason is at the very base
of religion and is, fundamentally, a rational enterprise though
we cannot grasp all aspects of this rationality in logical
discursive reason. This reasonable foundation is, of course, why
religion and science can be in harmony: they share the same
foundation and, therefore, are unified in their beginnings.

16. The Search for Truth

The Writings are clear that reason enables us to discover
truth; after all, if reason could not discover truth, there is no
point in requiring us to use it. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says, “God has
created man in order that he may perceive the verity of
existence and endowed him with mind or reason to discover
truth” [PUP 287, 303, emphasis added].27 Similarly, he says, “He
[God] has endowed him [man] with mind, or the faculty of
reasoning, by the exercise of which he is to investigate and
discover the truth” [PUP 291, emphasis added]. He declares that
“God has created man and endowed him with the power of
reason whereby he may arrive at valid conclusions” [PUP 312,
emphasis added]. Indeed, the Bahá’í Writings constantly emphasize
that truth exists and that reason can discover it. As ‘Abdu’l-
Bahá says,

[t]he power of the rational soul can discover the
realities of things, comprehend the peculiarities of
beings, and penetrate the mysteries of existence. All
sciences, knowledge, arts, wonders, institutions,
discoveries and enterprises come from the exercised
intelligence of the rational soul. [SAQ 217, emphasis added]

The last sentence is especially important, telling us that “all
sciences, knowledge ... come from the exercised intelligence of
the rational soul.” If all knowledge comes from the rational
soul, this includes non-discursive knowledge which is still
rational though not open to discursive explanation. As noted
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 221

before, discursivity and rationality are not synonymous in the
Writings. There are levels of truth which, though rational,
cannot be set down in step-by-step inferences of discursive
reasoning. To emphasize reason’s ability to discover truth,
‘Abdu’l-Bahá says,

God has created man in order that he may perceive the
verity of existence and endowed him with mind or
reason to discover truth. Therefore, scientific
knowledge and religious belief must be conformable to
the analysis of this divine faculty in man. [PUP 287; cf.
PUP 291]

It is noteworthy that he says that “religious belief” must be
“conformable” to reason, implying, thereby, that irrational
religious beliefs are unacceptable and that such beliefs are
unworthy of the “rational soul.” This statement also implies
that there are real differences between truth and nonsense.

Part II: Questions Concerning Reason
In the first part of this study, we have examined the role of
reason in the Writings. We shall now turn our attention to
some the issues that may arise in regards to this topic.

17. The Issue of Diversity

Because of the strong and pervasive emphasis on reason
throughout the Bahá’í Writings, the issue of diversity arises. It
may be argued that the prominence of reason and especially
standard or Aristotelian reason throughout the Writings
undermines the teachings on diversity, notably cultural
diversity. Standard reasoning is, after all, the associated with a
particular, i.e. Western culture and is not necessarily relevant to
all cultures. Some might even argue that the emphasis on such
reason is little more than a “post-colonialist” attempt to impose
Western thought forms on the non-Western world. In general
terms, we may ask, ‘Why is there such a pervasive presence of
Aristotelian or standard logic when such logic seems to
222 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

undermine diversity and privilege works that harmonize with
reason or at least do not contradict it?’
Before continuing, we must emphasize the unchallengeable
right of individuals to hold any view/interpretation of the
Writings they like, rationally tenable or not. That right is never
in question and must be vigorously upheld: “at the very root of
the Cause lies the principle of the undoubted right of the
individual to self-expression, his freedom to declare his
conscience and set forth his views” [PBA 43]. Nonetheless, saying
that nothing can diminish our right to hold even rationally
untenable views is not the same as saying that all views are
equally rational and/or tenable. The first is a judicial issue while
the second is epistemological.
However, the Writings instruct us to use the “divine faculty”
[PUP 287] of reason as a tool to distinguish tenable from
untenable views. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá directs us to

weigh carefully in the balance of reason and science
everything that is presented to you as religion. If it
passes this test, then accept it, for it is truth! If,
however, it does not so conform, then reject it, for it is
ignorance! [SAQ 144]

Elsewhere he tells us that “both [religion and science] are
founded upon the premises and conclusions of reason, and both
must bear its test” [PUP 107]. This makes it clear that reason is
inherently a selective mechanism which involves rejecting some
views or, at least, setting them aside until they have been made
rationally tenable. Such a selective mechanism is necessary
because the whole point of investigating the truth is lost
without it. Why seek the truth if there is no way of
distinguishing it from error, or if we have no standard by which
to differentiate the more plausible from the less plausible?
Without the standard of reason “anything goes”28 and
consequently, one of the foundational teachings — seeking the
truth — of the Bahá’í Faith is lost. Indeed, the concept of
consultation is also lost without the goal of distinguishing the
tenable from the untenable. Making such distinctions is
precisely the point of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s declaration that “The
shining spark of truth cometh forth only after the clash of
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 223

differing opinions” [SWAB 87]. Finally, the doctrine of the
harmony of science and religion is undermined if we refuse to
recognize that reason is necessary to help us distinguish tenable
from untenable views, e.g. oxidation versus the phlogiston
theory of combustion.
If all viewpoints were equally rational or tenable or all
harmonized with the Writings to an equal degree it is difficult,
if not impossible, to explain why Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá
reject some ideas as false. Metaphysical pantheism [SAQ 289],
ontological materialism [PUP 262], and re-incarnation [PUP 167]
are explicitly disallowed. Furthermore, Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-
Bahá refer to some ideas as “absurd” [SAQ 291], “childish” [PUP
219], “erroneous” [SAQ 278; TB 124], “mistaken” [PUP 87], and
“wrong” [SAQ 6] thereby, obviously rejecting them, and, by
implication, guiding us to reject them too. In other words,
acceptance and encouragement of diversity does not necessarily
mean that “anything goes” and that there are no standards by
which to distinguish the tenable from the untenable. The
Writings make reason, and specifically standard reason, one of
those standards.
It might be argued that making such judgments on the basis
of the pervasive presence of standard or Aristotelian reasoning
in the Writings is a manifestation of a ‘post-colonialist’ sense
of superiority. However, there are several problems with the
‘post-colonial’ critique. Most obviously, the objection is, in the
last analysis, beside the point. Whether it is ‘post-colonial’
thinking or not, the Bahá’í Writings see rationality as the
essential attribute of the human soul and pervasively and
consistently model rationality in the form associated with
Aristotelian or standard reasoning. In other words, this form of
reasoning is unavoidable in any encounter with the Writings.
Regardless of what culture people come from and what level of
education they have, they will have to enrich themselves with
this aspect of the Writings if they wish to understand the
arguments used by Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. Since “in this
age the peoples of the world need the arguments of reason”
[SAQ 7, emphasis added] it would especially difficult to overlook
the ubiquity of Aristotelian reasoning in the Writings simply
224 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

because a number of current academic theories find this model
of rationality problematic.
The main problem with the ‘post-colonialist’ critique is that
it commits the genetic fallacy, i.e. a fallacy of irrelevance which
makes a pejorative judgment about something on the basis of
its supposed origins or past use instead of by its inherent
content and application. The fact that standard logic originated
in the West and spread globally by means of Western
imperialism does not necessarily make it inapplicable on a
global basis to other cultures and in our time. Indeed, since the
Bahá’í Writings make such extensive use of standard logic
decisively, it seems obvious that neither its content nor its
application is necessarily and inherently harmful to anyone or
any culture. Without a doubt, the Writings use and recommend
such reasoning and provide such models precisely because they
are deemed helpful and conducive to human development
during the remainder of this dispensation. Would we expect the
Bahá’í Writings to model or recommend anything that does not
have positive potential for human development? Surely, given
the pervasiveness of standard logic in the Writings, it is more
likely that such reasoning is essential or necessary to positive
human development.
A second major problem with the ‘post-colonial’ critique is
that it overlooks the universality of the Law of Non-
contradiction (LNC), which encapsulates the essence of standard
or Aristotelian reasoning. No matter what individuals or
cultures claim to believe about logical contradictions, no matter
what models of logic they have, in the practice of daily life they
behave according to the LNC. People in all ages and in all places
know that we cannot have eaten lunch and not eaten lunch at
the same time, in the same sense and from the same perspective.
Recognizing this is a survival skill. Hunters and gatherers know
that they have either bagged a kill or collected berries — or they
have not. No tribe’s winter storage both contains and does not
contain meat. Nor do humans act as if a truck — or a lion or a
mastodon — is both coming and not coming at them at the same
time and the same sense. A failure to recognize the LNC and act
on it is potentially injurious or even fatal. The LNC does not
even need to be known discursively or consciously. A newborn
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 225

‘knows’ that it cannot be fed and not fed at the same time in the
same sense — and will let us clearly know which is the case! In
other words, regardless of what theoretical superstructures or
models of reason/logic are constructed by various cultures, they
do not negate the practical, daily application of the LNC.
In our view, the Writings make use of this daily, practical
logic which humans apply precisely because it is universally
accessible to people everywhere and at all times. In that sense, it
is not culture-bound: no matter what culture we are in or at
what time we live, my child cannot be fed and not fed at the
same time and in the same sense. What parent — even one who
explicitly ‘disbelieved’ in the LNC — would confuse one with
the other? This universality makes standard, i.e. Aristotelian
reasoning ideal for meeting the world’s need for a unified,
global method of reasoning without which human cross-cultural
communication will be severely hindered and, thereby, impede
the quest for world unity and peace.
In reflecting about reason in the Bahá’í Writings, the
question arises whether or not ‘other kinds’ i.e. non-standard
logic may be found in the Writings. More specifically, we must
consider if the Writings rule out the use of logical systems that
deny the law of non-contradiction (LNC). In our view, the
answer is negative: there is no mandate to limit such matters a
priori although it is difficult to see how two such contradictory
systems can be reconciled. The most we can say is that this study
has found no evidence of non-standard logic whereas we have
found plentiful evidence of the implicit and explicit use of
standard, Aristotelian reasoning. Nowhere, for example, do we
find we find many-valued logics such as Nagarjuna’s catuskoti.
We can, of course, debate why anyone would follow adopt such
logic in light of the persistent and pervasive use of standard or
Aristotelian reasoning throughout the Writings. Furthermore,
we may discuss if such a strategy actually succeeds in regards to
a particular Text.
More specifically, we have found no intentionally
paradoxical, i.e. self-contradictory passages that cannot be
resolved by the resources of standard logic as given in the
Writings. Two examples follow.
226 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

Our first passage concerns the “mystic knower” [SVFV 51] and
the “grammarian” [SVFV 51] in Bahá’u’lláh’s parable in The Four
Valleys. When the two travelers arrived at “Sea of Grandeur”
[SVFV 51], the mystic “flung himself onto the waves but the
grammarian stood “lost in his reasonings” [SVFV 51]. First
appearances to the contrary, this story is not a critique of
reason per se but a critique of the misuse of reason. The moral
is clear: there is a time for discursive reason and there is a time
to act. The grammarian’s fault is not in reasoning — after all, his
reasoning has brought him to the Sea of Grandeur — but in
failing to distinguish between situations that require reasoning
and those that require action. He fails to act appropriately i.e.
reasonably, and he lacks the courage to act on the basis of his
reasoning. He misuses reason, not having understood that
reason cannot tell us everything as moderate rationalism asserts.
Some things can only be learned by doing and experience. That
is why “the death of self is needed” [SVFV 51], i.e. complete,
unreserved existential commitment, not further rationalization.
Another apparent conflict with reason is found in the Báb’s
statement that “reason, even in its utmost level of abstraction,
is confined to the understanding of limited phenomena.”29
Reading this, we must be careful not to assume that “limited
phenomena” are material/physical phenomena, and, therefore
reason is limited to these. Reason, as we have seen, can also deal
with “intellectual realities which are not sensible, and which
have no outward existence” [SAQ 186] as well as with spiritual
issues. It is true that reason cannot understand unlimited
phenomena because reason requires concepts which are
inherently limited but that is exactly why the Writings espouse a
moderate rationalism — to allow other avenues of knowing.
However, as we have shown in regards to other ways of
knowing, i.e. non-discursive knowledge and reasoning, non-
discursive is not synonymous with non-rational.
These examples remind us that the Writings espouse a
“moderate rationalism” according to which reason cannot tell us
everything. Other ways of knowing are also available, such as
‘action’ in the example of the mystic knower and the
grammarian. There is also the knowledge of the heart as noted in
previous discussions. The ubiquity of Aristotelian logic in the
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 227

Writings does not necessarily negate the validity of these other
ways of knowing, so there is no necessary conflict between
them. Indeed, we would not expect such conflicts because truth
is one, i.e. it cannot be divided by contradictions. As `Abdu’l-
Bahá affirms, “No one truth can contradict another truth” [PT
136].

18. Standard Logic and Modern Science

One critique of standard or ‘classical’ reasoning is that it is
limited to the ordinary macroscopic world in which we live, and
is, therefore, out of step with developments in quantum physics
which operates at the microscopic level. Our reasoning should
be in harmony with the microscopic level which is the basis for
macroscopic reality. It is argued that the Writings would not
model and recommend standard logic since it is not in harmony
with quantum logic.
The most obvious answer to this critique is that
notwithstanding developments in quantum physics, the Writings
clearly show a persistent and pervasive use of standard or
Aristotelian reason. The evidence we have presented — as well as
the greater volume of evidence excluded — cannot be avoided.
Moreover, in our view, it is doubtful that Bahá’u’lláh and
‘Abdu’l-Bahá would make such widespread use of this type of
reasoning if we were not meant to understand it and use it as a
model. Nor is it likely that the Writings would present believers
with insurmountable obstacles vis-à-vis quantum theory and
logic.
Furthermore, in daily practice it is difficult to see how we
would we apply quantum logic — especially in the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum phenomena — to life at the
macroscopic level. What application can there be in the
macroscopic world of the Copenhagen principle that objects or
persons do not exist until they are observed and only as long as
they are observed? How can we use quantum logic derived from
this fact vis-à-vis trains or mastodons? Is there anything we can
practically do in our lives with the Heisenberg Uncertainty
Principle which dictates that we cannot simultaneously ascertain
the position and velocity of a particle? While this may be true at
228 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

the microscopic level, at the macroscopic level traffic police
seem to have no trouble doing both. The application of
quantum logic in the macroscopic world seems like a recipe for
incredible confusion. We must also bear in mind that while the
Copenhagen interpretation is the best known version of
quantum theory, it is not the only one. Indeed, there are at least
six other viable interpretations at least one of which, David
Bohm’s, is consistent with standard logic. In other words, all
quantum interpretations do not necessarily lead to the strange
effects associated with the Copenhagen model.30
Indeed, the claim that standard logic is out of step with the
quantum logic used to study events at the micro-level is
questionable and open to debate. Mathematical physicist
Roland Omnes, who has done pioneering work in reconciling
classical (standard) logic and quantum logic, sees no reason to
abandon standard logic because

it can be shown that common sense logic is actually a
logic of consistent quantum histories and that common
sense arguments are ultimately verbalizations of
implications that can be demonstrated in quantum logic
... the probability for common sense to be wrong is
practically always negligible as long as it deals with
macroscopic objects.31

He adds,

common sense conforms to the quantum nature of laws
governing the material world, at least in normal
conditions, and for objects on our human scale (and
often, even well below it).32

In other words, there is no irreducible and necessary conflict
between standard logic and quantum logic. This is exactly what
we would expect from a Bahá’í perspective because reality is
one: “As reality is one and cannot admit of multiplicity,
therefore different opinions must ultimately become fused into
one” [SWAB 298]. If reality is truly one, it seems unlikely that it
is bifurcated into two, mutually contradictory, i.e. absolutely
incompatible parts or levels. Reality would be fragmented and
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 229

multiple. At the very least we would expect that the two types
of reasoning are complementary and not contradictory.
A different critique of the standard logic used in the
Writings is that standard logic does not work in the
astronomical sciences because of relativity. This argument
appears to confuse relativity theory in astronomy and relativism
in philosophy. Unlike philosophic relativism which has no
absolutes by which to make judgments about various truth-
claims, scientific relativity theory has an absolute — the speed
of light — which is the same in all frames of reference i.e. the
same for all observers regardless of their motion. It is a
universal constant, a universal speed limit. From this it is readily
apparent that a particle either has or has not attained light speed
or some fraction of it. Such measurements — subject to the
LNC — fall well within the purview of standard logic. In
addition, even though the same event can appear contradictory
in different frames of reference, i.e. in different perspectives,
the same event cannot have all contradictory appearances in the
same frame of reference or perspective. In other words, the
LNC still applies.
Let us examine one more case. Heisenberg accepts that
standard and quantum logic are related (one is an extension —
not negation — of the other).33 However, Heisenberg also
endorses the Aristotelian concepts of act and potency in his
understanding of the quantum world.34 For him, the
superposition of a particle refers to its potentials for
actualization; for potentials — even opposite potentials — to
exist simultaneously does not violate standard logic.35
Heisenberg’s view that quantum logic is an “extension” of
classical logic means that like Newtonian physics, standard logic
is valid within its own sphere, i.e. the macro-world, which
means that there is no inherent conflict with quantum physics.
Standard logic is the appropriate logic for the macro-world
which is why Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá make use of it.

19. Conclusions

On the basis of this study of reason in the Bahá’í Writings,
we may reach seven major conclusions.
230 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

1. The Bahá’í Writings assert that “The foundations of
religion are reasonable” [PUP 128] and consistently
advocate and even require the use of reason in regards to
phenomenal and spiritual/religious matters and as a test
for truth and falsity.
2. The Bahá’í Writings pervasively model standard,
Aristotelian or classical reasoning in their explications,
illustrations and arguments.
3. he Bahá’í Writings espouse moderate rationalism which
recognizes ‘other ways of knowing.’ They reject the idea
that non-discursive reasoning is necessarily non-rational;

4. The Bahá’í Writings use a negative gate-keeper method to
protect both the ‘unity’ and the ‘diversity’ in “unity-in-
diversity”;

5. The Bahá’í Writings adopt a scientific response to the
fallibility of reason;

6. Given the pervasive use of standard logic in the Writings,
it is reasonable to conclude that they intend this as the
universal logic for humankind;

7. Arguments against standard logic in the Writings based on
post-colonial theory, quantum mechanics or relativity
theory are untenable and not persuasive.

B IBLIOGRAPHY

Al-Khalili, Jim. Quantum: A Guide for the Perplexed. London.
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2003.
Bunin and Yu. The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy.
Chichester: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009.
Heisenberg, Werner. Physics and Philosophy. New York:
HarperCollins, 2007.
Omnes, Roland. Quantum Philosophy. Princeton. Princeton
University Press, 1999.
Reason and the Bahá’í Writings 231

N OTES
Nicholas Bunnin; Jiyuan Yu (2004). The Blackwell Dictionary of Western
philosophy, p. 266: “[Logic] is divided into standard (or classical) logic,
non-standard logic and inductive logic. Standard logic includes traditional
logic (Aristotelian syllogism) and modern classical logic which is an
expansion of traditional logic ...” Also L. T. F. Gamut (1991). Logic,
Language, and Meaning, Volume 1: Introduction to Logic, pp. 156–157:
propositional and predicate logic (classical logic is propositional) “can
nevertheless be regarded as standard logic.”
See Ian Kluge, The Aristotelian Substratum of the Bahá’í Writings in Lights
of Irfan 4, p. 17–79, 2003.
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reason
‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 191. cf. Chapter 49, “The
Growth and Development of the Human Race.”
Genesis 1:26 in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 192.
From a letter written on behalf of the Universal House of Justice,
dated 22 June 1977, online at http://bahai-
library.com/compilation_bahai_scholarship_khan
‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 193; emphasis added; see also
Shoghi Effendi in The Unfolding Destiny of the British Bahá’í Community,
p. 458.
Letter written on behalf of Shoghi Effendi, Feb. 24, 1947 in Lights of
Guidance, p. 476.; emphasis added.
However, we must not mistake an acceptance of differences in perspective
with relativism. Classical, Aristotelian logic asserts that from any one
given perspective, only one claim can be true whereas relativism asserts
that no truth-claim can be established because there is no absolute
standard by which to judge. Relativism accepts even contradictions as
‘true,’ whereas standard logic does not.
This is not a repetition of Zeno’s arrow paradox since Zeno was discussing
a single trajectory subject to mental divisions and this statement deals
with real — not mental — divisions between individual, definite acts.
An incomplete syllogistic form called an ‘enthymeme’ is missing one of the
propositions, or the conclusion is implied but not stated.
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 7, 90, 177, 258, 293, 304 to
identify only a few.
Bunnin and Yu, editors, The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy,
p. 25.
These are known as the dialogues of Plato but feature Socrates as the usual
protagonist.
232 Lights of ‘Irfán Book Fourteen

Bahá’í International Community,”Consultation,”
http://info.bahai.org/article-1-3-6-3.html
See Ian Kluge, “Relativism in the Baháí Writings,” (Lights of Irfan ) for an
examination of various passages on this topic.
Adib Taherzadeh, The Revelation of Bahá’u’lláh v 4, p. 129; emphasis
added.
Shoghi Effendi, Extracts from the USBN, # 85, July 1934, p. 6.
Jim Al-Khalili, Quantum: A Guide for the Perplexed, p. 132 — 153.
‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions in Part 2 “Some Christian
Subjects,” pp. 83–143.
Ken Wilber, The Marriage of Sense and Soul, p. 92.
From the Guardian to an individual believer, October 1, 1935: Canadian
Bahá’í News, February 1968, p. 11) Compilations, Lights of Guidance, p.
490.
Reason and mind are the same in the Writings. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, The
Promulgation of Universal Peace, p. 22; also p. 360, p. 287.
‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Tablet to the Hague, p. 5; emphasis added.
From the Greek ‘agape’ i.e. love for humanity-in-general.
‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Selections from the Writings of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, p. 46. See
also Some Answered Questions, p. 225 in regards to logical proof for
immortality.
‘Abdu’l-Bahá The Promulgation of Universal Peace, p. 303, p. 287;
emphasis added.
Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, p. 5. “The only principle that does not
inhibit progress is anything goes.”
The Báb, in Nader Saiedi, Gate of the Heart, p, 211.
Nick Herbert, Quantum Realities.
Roland Omnes, Quantum Philosophy, p. 190; emphasis added.
Roland Omnes, Quantum Philosophy, p. 193.
Werrner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, p. 155.
Werrner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, p. 154.
Heisenberg also writes, “The probability wave of Bohr, Kramers, Slater…
was a quantitative version of the old concept of “potentia” in Aristotelian
philosophy.” Physics and Philosophy, p. 15.

اختر نصًّا ثانيًا لقراءته بالتوازي — ترجمةً، أو أيّ نصٍّ آخر.