# Reflections on Infallibility

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> Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: William S. Hatcher, Reflections on Infallibility, bahai-library.com.
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> Published in the Journal of Bahá’í Studies Vol. 17, number 1-4 (2007)
> © Association for Bahá’í Studies 2007
> 
> Reflections on Infallibility
> William S. Hatcher
> 
> Abstract
> The historical claim to possess infallible authority has often been associated with ideological dogmatism and/or
> attempts to buttress political power on behalf of a certain thought system. In modern times, the notion of infallibility
> has been regarded with suspicion, and viewed as antithetical to rational inquiry, which by its very nature
> acknowledges its limitations and relativity. This paper advances the following theses: (1) The degree of social and
> intellectual progress exhibited in human history would have been impossible without the existence of periodic
> external truth referents (i.e., points of infallible authority). (2) Far from being antithetical to reason, true infallibility
> is the main source of rationality in history, consistently preventing humanity from losing itself totally in superstition
> and fanaticism. (3) The positive contribution to history of infallible sources of authority (e.g., the Manifestations of
> God) does not depend on general recognition of their infallibility. (4) Infallibility (freedom from error) is often
> confounded with omniscience, thereby undermining our understanding of the different grades of conferred
> infallibility. (5) Religious dogmatism and fanaticism do not result from the Prophet’s claim to infallibility (“what my
> Prophet says is true”) but rather from the exclusivist ideological claim made by the Prophet’s followers (“nothing
> else but what my Prophet says is true”).
> 
> Résumé
> De tout temps, le fait d’affirmer détenir une autorité infaillible a souvent été associé au dogmatisme idéologique ou à
> une tentative de soutenir le pouvoir politique au nom d’un certain système de pensée. À l’époque moderne, le
> concept d’infaillibilité a été considéré avec suspicion, comme contraire à l’investigation rationnelle qui, de par sa
> nature même, reconnaît ses limites et sa relativité. Dans le présent article, l’auteur expose les thèses suivantes: 1) Le
> niveau de progrès social et intellectual qui a été atteint dans l’histoire de l’humanité aurait été impossible sans
> l’existence de référents périodiques à une vérité extérieure (c. à d. des référents d’autorité infaillible). 2) Loin de
> s’opposer à la raison, la véritable infaillibilité est la principale source de rationalité dans l’histoire; sans cesse
> empêche-t-elle l’humanité de sombrer totalement dans la superstition et le fanatisme. 3) La contribution apportée à
> l’histoire par des sources infaillibles d’autorité (p. ex. les Manifestations de Dieu) ne dépend pas d’une
> reconnaissance généralisée de leur infaillibilité. 4) L’infaillibilité (affranchissement de toute erreur) est souvent
> confondue avec l’omniscience, ce qui nous empêche de bien comprendre les différents degrés d’infaillibilité
> conférée. 5) Le dogmatisme et le fanatisme religieux ne sont pas attribuables à la pretention du Prophète à
> l’infaillibilité (« ce que dit mon Prophète est vrai ») mais plutôt à une revendication idéologique exclusiviste
> formulée par les disciples du Prophète (« rien d’autre que ce que dit mon Prophète est vrai »).
> 
> Resumen
> La afirmación histórica de poseer autoridad infalible con frecuencia se asocia con el dogmatismo ideológico,
> acompañado de vez en cuando de intentos de apoyar al poder político en respaldo de algún sistema particular de
> pensamiento. En tiempos modernos, la noción de infalibilidad se contempla con desconfianza, suponiéndose ser
> contraria a la investigación inteligente la cual, por su propia naturaleza, reconoce sus limitaciones y relatividad. Esta
> disertación adelanta las siguientes tesis: (1) El grado de progreso social e intelectual que exhibe la historia humana
> hubiera sido imposible sin la existencia de aquellos informadores de la verdad, externos a la humanidad, que
> aparecen por etapas (v.g., puntos de autoridad infalible). (2) Lejos de ser contraria a la razón, la verdadera
> infalibilidad es la fuente principal de la racionalidad en la historia, impidiendo con firmeza que la humanidad se
> pierda totalmente en la selvatiquez de la superstición y el fanatismo. (3) La contribución positiva a la historia por
> fuentes de autoridad infalibles (v.g., las Manifestaciones de Dios) no depende del reconocimiento generalizado de su
> infalibilidad. (4) La infalibilidad (condición de ser inerrable) con frecuencia se confunde con la omnisciencia,
> debilitando paulatinamente nuestra comprensión de los diferentes grados de infalibilidad otorgada. (5) El
> dogmatismo y fanatismo religioso no son resultados de la afirmación del Profeta de su infalibilidad (“lo que dice mi
> Profeta es la verdad”) sino mas bien la afirmación ideológica exclusivista suscitada por los seguidores del Profeta
> (“nada más es verdad sino lo dicho por mi Profeta”).
> O     ur initial experience of reality conveys a bewildering diversity of constantly changing systems, impinging on all
> our senses. Our natural response to this primal experience is to look for patterns and regularities underlying the
> shifting stuff of the world. Such patterns, whenever we succeed in finding them, enable us to correlate countless
> factual details and establish principles of relationship between and among them. These relational principles are
> called laws in science and universals (or universal relations)
> in philosophy. Universal relations and laws are usually articulated as propositions, for example, as statements that
> make certain assertions about the way reality is configured.1
> The search for universal relations is the search for meaning—a meaning that does not and cannot inhere in
> mere facts. Meaning arises rather from a second-order experience, an experience of experience, in which isolated or
> seemingly unrelated first-order experiences of concrete reality coalesce into an intelligible whole. Whenever this
> happens we may say (with a certain degree of conscious oversimplification) that we have discovered a general truth
> about reality, in contrast to facts, which are particular truths about reality. The collection of all the propositions that
> we currently hold to be true, whether general or particular, articulates our personal belief system or inner model of
> reality.
> Our personal belief system is parametered by time in that it reflects only our current understanding. We
> may be wrong in our initial perception that a certain relationship is truly universal (that a certain law is universally
> valid). Our experience of the world is always limited at best, and the facts available to test the universality of a
> relationship are always finite in number. A theorem of mathematical logic tells us that there are, generally speaking,
> an infinite number of mutually logically incompatible relationships that are consistent with any given finite set of
> facts. Simply put: there are always several different reasonable ways of generalizing from a given finite set of facts,
> and we can never be sure we have found the ultimately right generalization.2
> It is important here to distinguish between belief and truth. A relationship is true (a law holds) if what the
> relationship asserts (if the causal relationship described by the law) is objectively accurate, i.e., accurate regardless
> of our subjective desires or perceptions. A relationship can be true according to this definition without our knowing
> it to be so. Truth is a question of the validity of the correspondence between a given inner model of reality and some
> portion of reality itself. Such a correspondence may well exist without our ever knowing it to exist.3
> Truth is thus a relationship between propositions and reality, whereas belief is a relationship between
> propositions and a human subject, who either believes or disbelieves in a given proposition. If the preponderance of
> evidence at any given moment is clearly in support of the truth of a given proposition, we can do no better than to
> maintain belief in the truth of the relationship described by the proposition unless and until we encounter convincing
> contrary evidence.
> Such is the essence of rationality: always to choose the most plausible belief in the light of known evidence
> (including coherence with previously verified beliefs). Thus, when we sometimes say that truth is relative, we mean
> not so much that universal relationships change (though that cannot be a priori ruled out) but rather that our
> knowledge of what is or is not true is constantly changing.
> 
> Barriers to Rationality
> The above may be taken as a reasonably accurate account of the existential position of the individual, taken in
> isolation. However, we do not live in isolation. Though our personal belief system is our own, and no one else’s, its
> content is certainly not just the fruit of our persistent, logical analysis of relative plausibilities and of careful choices
> that follow from such an analysis. Indeed, conscious rationality, even as we have broadly conceived it, is very rare.
> The rational pursuit of truth described above may be regarded as an ideal that is only occasionally perceived, much
> less approximated or attained by most human beings.4
> One of the reasons that attaining rationality in our everyday life is so difficult is that we are needful
> participants in the world and not just disinterested observers of it. Reality imposes its structure on us, but we also
> have inner needs that we project onto reality. We want reality to be a certain way, and are rarely content with simply
> finding out how reality in fact is, especially when the answer goes against our wishes or desires. This process of
> projecting our wishes onto reality undermines rationality and distorts our inner model. Let us call these need-
> generated distortions of our inner model.
> There are also other-generated distortions of our inner model, which result from biased or false information
> that we receive from other subjects like ourselves, and which we uncritically assimilate into our personal belief
> system.
> Generally speaking, there are two ways that our inner model can be inaccurate. On one hand, there may be
> features of reality which have no counterpart in our inner model. In such a case, our belief system is inadequate in
> the precise sense that it under represents reality as it is. On the other hand, an individual’s model may contain
> elements which have no counterpart in reality. We say that such a model is false. We should suspect our model of
> inadequacy if we frequently encounter phenomena we do not expect. We should suspect falsity when we frequently
> expect phenomena we do not encounter.
> The combination of need-generated and other-generated distortions in our belief system leads to many
> inadequacies and falsities. To the extent that these distortions dominate our mental and emotional life, they defeat
> our capacity for rationality and for the generation of an inner model based on conscious knowledge and rational
> choice. The mechanism of these distortions can enslave us to untruth.
> Freedom is sometimes conceived as the freedom to believe whatever one wants and to do whatever one
> chooses. But, wherein lies the freedom in believing what is false? Our beliefs, and more particularly our actions
> based on our beliefs, have objective consequences. If our beliefs are false, our actions will be unrealistic and will
> usually lead to negative or unhappy consequences for ourselves and for others. If our beliefs are largely true, our
> actions will be based on knowledge instead of ignorance and will, on the whole, be more positive than negative.
> The above-mentioned mechanisms of belief distortion render the individual’s achievement of rationality
> extremely difficult even in the best of circumstances, and most certainly in unfavorable circumstances (as in early
> abuse, neglect, trauma). Moreover, irrationality tends to breed more irrationality—a sort of entropy law of human
> psychology.5 The exceptional individual may achieve and even sustain rationality within an unfavorable context, but
> the vast majority will succumb to the prevailing atmosphere of unreasoning emotionality. What, then, can or does
> prevent humanity from degenerating into a prerational barbarism, a state which appears inevitable if man is left to
> his own devices? Humankind stands in need of an external source or force capable of liberating and unleashing the
> innate human potential for rationality—a potential that simply cannot be actualized spontaneously by the unaided
> individual.
> 
> External Truth Referents
> In spite of its ups and downs, highs and lows, history does show a progression toward the organization of society on
> ever-higher levels of unity: the family, the tribe, the city-state, the nation. This gradual complexification of society
> would be literally impossible without a corresponding increase in the individual’s capacity to actualize her or his
> potential for rationality. This suggests that social progression has been driven by some external force or forces that
> have counteracted the natural entropic tendency of unaided humans to degenerate into irrationality. In order to
> increase rationality, such an external force would have to serve in some manner as a truth referent, that is, as a
> standard that enabled people generally to clear out distortions from their personal belief systems and hence attain a
> higher degree of rationality in their beliefs and actions. Indeed, such a truth referent would have to be a source of
> truth, perhaps even an incarnation of truth that would serve as an educative example of true rationality for humanity.
> The fact is that human history presents us with a negentropic social evolution, which requires explanation.
> This much is beyond any rational doubt. However, discovering the true explanation for the upward movement of
> social evolution is quite another matter.
> 
> Refining Our Inner Model
> A person’s inner model represents reality for that person. Indeed, for the individual, his or her inner model is reality.
> We may know abstractly that our belief system is bound to contain some false propositions, but we do not know
> which propositions are in fact false, for as soon as we recognize the falsity of a certain proposition, we no longer
> believe in (hold as true) that proposition. For example, it would not be possible for me to know that grass is green
> but still believe it to be red, because knowledge implies belief. To believe a proposition is to perceive that
> proposition to be true. If our inner model of reality contains a certain feature, it is because we perceive that feature to
> be part of reality.
> Thus, by the very nature of the role our inner model plays in our life, we have no spontaneous insight into
> dissonances between our model and reality. When our model changes in fact, we will simply perceive reality
> differently, in a new way. We will not usually say: “Oh, I see, my inner model previously incorporated certain false
> propositions and now, in the light of new information, I have replaced this proposition with a true one.” Such a
> statement would represent a more sophisticated second-order knowledge about knowledge (what we might call
> process knowledge) whereas the spontaneous change in our inner model is a first-order experience of reality itself
> (“fact” knowledge), which may or may not be accompanied by the relevant process insight.
> How, then, is it possible for us to gain insight into potential dissonances between our inner model and
> reality? The only way is by careful attention to the feedback information we glean from our encounters with reality.
> Our inner model represents to us the way we expect reality to behave. If our expectations are persistently unmet,
> then we should suspect that part of our inner model is faulty. We can then make guesses (hypotheses) about where
> the falsity may lie and devise specific encounters (experiments) that are especially directed toward testing those
> propositions we regard as suspect. Such a process of observation, hypothesizing, and testing, will lead gradually to
> modifications in our inner model, and hopefully to refinements that render it more accurate and more
> comprehensive.
> Thus, the refinement of our inner model proceeds (if it does proceed) by gradually replacing false elements
> with true ones and by adding novel true propositions to it. But each new step forward opens up new vistas of which
> we were previously unaware, and poses new questions we could not even have formulated at an earlier stage. In
> other words, it is progress in knowledge itself which makes us aware of the extent of our ignorance and which leads
> us to new speculations, some of which will necessarily be false.
> So, no matter how successful we may be in undertaking the process of refining our inner model, at any
> given stage of development, our personal belief system will nonetheless contain a number of false propositions of
> whose falsity we will, of course, be unaware at the time. To say that our knowledge of reality is progressive means
> that we do not have to remain forever in doubt about the same propositions. But it does not guarantee that we will
> ever arrive at a point where we eliminate all falsity from our belief system.
> 
> Fallibility and Infallibility
> To say that our personal belief system must, at every stage of its development, contain falsities is another way of
> saying that we ordinary humans are fallible. We do not possess in ourselves any absolute measure of truth. We are
> liable to error, and (most of us) are aware of that fact. We recognize ourselves as striving for truth but having
> continually to deal with the fact of our liability to false belief.
> To be infallible is thus to be “not fallible,” in other words, not liable to error. A necessary condition of
> infallibility is that the personal belief system of an infallible individual would never contain any false propositions.
> An infallible person does not in fact make any mistakes in judgments about the structure of reality.
> Notice that fallibility and infallibility, as we have here defined them, are properties of persons, not of
> propositions. A proposition is true if it is accurate and is false otherwise. In particular, it makes no sense to say that a
> proposition is fallible or infallible. Infallibility, if and when it ever exists—a question we defer for the moment—is
> the property of being free from all liability to error, and one of the signs of infallibility is that one never has, in fact,
> any false beliefs.
> Even though the above notion of infallibility is quite straightforward, it is nonetheless frequently confused
> with other notions. The most frequent confusion is to consider that infallibility implies, or is equivalent to,
> omniscience (all knowledge). Of course, such a confusion is understandable. How else indeed could a person be
> entirely free from error except by having perfect or special knowledge of all things? The answer is that one can be
> error-free without knowing very much at all, simply by a radical restriction of one’s belief system. One remains
> agnostic about any controversial or nontrivial issue.
> Suppose, for example, that during my whole lifetime I choose never to assert anything other than
> propositions that are trivially and obviously true (for example, grass is green, fire burns, water flows, good is better
> than evil). Then, I will never be liable to error, since I choose only to believe in propositions that are certain because
> they are obvious and trivial. This would require, of course, that I deliberately suspend judgment about a host of
> propositions that are probably true but not certainly known to be so. I would be infallible, but without having any
> knowledge useful to other people whatsoever. You may protest that this is a contrived example, but the logical point
> it illustrates is nonetheless significant: that the mere fact of infallibility does not, in itself, necessitate any degree of
> useful knowledge.
> The converse, of course, is not true. If a person were indeed all-knowing, then that person would be an
> infallible authority, providing of course that he or she chose not to lie to others. This latter condition shows that
> omniscience, infallibility, and moral behavior are intricately linked.
> Another logical possibility is that a person is, in fact, infallible but does not know himself to be so. He
> would suspend judgment concerning the question of his own infallibility but take into account the possibility of his
> fallibility by being so careful and cautious in his judgments that he indeed never makes mistakes. No one would
> recognize the infallibility of such a person. All (including the person himself) would consider his judgments as just
> one more potentially fallible human opinion among others. In this case, the person would be infallible in fact but
> regarded as fallible.
> The opposite case is also possible: an individual who is in fact fallible but who sets out to convince others
> of his infallibility. An example would be a charming psychopath who attracts a cult of followers having absolute
> faith in him. This example is not so contrived and, as we all know, has appeared regularly throughout history and
> persists within the modern cultural milieu. For followers of such a charismatic leader, the payoff is the feeling of
> security they derive from the sense of absolute certitude, although the price they pay is that of abandoning totally
> their own autonomous judgment. They freely regard their own judgments as fallible, except for the particular
> judgment that their leader is infallible.
> How does a fallible human being convince others of his infallibility? Techniques vary, but usually include
> one or more of the following: stating trivial and obvious truths, but in a way that makes them appear deep and
> oracular; making ambiguous statements and prophecies which are subject to virtually any interpretation and can
> therefore be regarded as confirmed no matter what happens in reality; telling people what they want to hear (for
> example, that they can and should freely indulge their sexuality). Charismatic psychopaths develop a keen sense of
> who is or is not vulnerable to manipulation. They concentrate on those who are and find mechanisms for excluding
> from the group those who are not (e.g., persons who are insincere because they question, who threaten the unity and
> coherence of the group, who are an insult to the sacred leader, or who are shallow and unable to perceive the deep
> truths being offered by the leader).
> Disregarding trivial variations, there are basically two inner models of a person’s self (self-concepts) that
> are possible in a case of a false claimant to infallibility. Either he knows himself to be fallible, in which case he is a
> liar and an imposter, or else he is himself convinced of his own infallibility, in which case he is self-deluded. The
> former would be the case of clever psychopaths, whose success depends on awareness of their fallibility, an
> awareness that enables them to take measures to prevent their unmasking. The latter case would be more typical of
> some psychotics whose capacity for self-delusion seems virtually infinite. However, in certain cases, such
> individuals can be quite successful in attracting a following. One reason is that they appear so certain of their
> infallibility. How indeed, some will ask, could a fallible person be so sure of himself ?
> Considering all possible claimants for infallibility, there are thus four logical possibilities: the person is
> fallible and knows himself to be so (the case of most of us, but also of deceiving psychopaths who may knowingly
> advance false claims to infallibility); the person is infallible but does not know himself to be so (perhaps a very
> sincere, humble, and careful person); the person is fallible but thinks himself infallible (self-delusion); finally, the
> person is infallible and knows himself to be so. This last possibility would be the case of the true Prophets and
> Messengers of God. We have left for last the discussion of this latter case, since it is the one that interests us the
> most.
> 
> The Theory of Progressive Revelation
> Bahá’u’lláh (1817–92), the Prophet-Founder of the Bahá’í Faith, has articulated a theory of history that seeks to
> explain rationally and scientifically the negentropic upward movement of human history. According to this theory,
> the motive force of human social evolution and progress has been the periodic intervention in history of an all-
> knowing, morally perfect, intrinsically infallible Prophet or Messenger of God. Being all-knowing, the Prophet is
> intrinsically infallible, and being morally perfect, he will not lie or deceive others. The Prophet thus serves as an
> external truth referent for the whole of humanity, a perfect pitch pipe which sounds the pure note allowing all who
> hear to readjust their inner models to reality. As Shoghi Effendi has said, “. . . the whole theory of Divine Revelation
> rests on the infallibility of the Prophet, be He Christ, Muhammad, Bahá’u’lláh, or one of the others. If They are not
> infallible then They are not divine, and thus lose that essential link with God which, we believe, is the bond that
> educates men and causes all human progress” (qtd. in Universal House of Justice, Issues 6).
> Commenting on the inherent infallibility of the Manifestations, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says, “Since the Sanctified
> Realities, the supreme Manifestations of God, surround the essence and qualities of the creatures, transcend and
> contain existing realities and understand all things, therefore, Their knowledge is divine knowledge, and not
> acquired—that is to say, it is a holy bounty; it is divine revelation” (Some Answered Questions 157–58).
> Elsewhere, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá affirms both the infallibility and the sinlessness of the Manifestations: “. . . the
> supreme Manifestations certainly possess essential infallibility, therefore whatever emanates from Them is identical
> with the truth, and conformable to reality. . . . Whatever They say is the word of God, and whatever They perform is
> an upright action” (Some Answered Questions 173). The “essential infallibility” spoken of here is uniquely
> characteristic of the Manifestation: “. . . this condition is peculiar to that Holy Being, and others have no share of
> this essential perfection. . . . the Manifestation arises with perfect wisdom—so that whatever the supreme
> Manifestations says and does is absolute wisdom, and is in accordance with reality” (Some Answered Questions
> 173).
> Let us sum up the principal points contained in these passages: (1) the Manifestations of God are endowed
> with an essential infallibility which is unique to them; (2) essential infallibility is based on divinely endowed
> omniscience and on perfect virtue (sinlessness); (3) the pronouncements of the Manifestations are true in the generic
> sense (that we have defined above) of accurately reflecting the structure of reality. (The important point here is that
> there is no specially religious form of truth distinct from scientific truth or truth in general.)
> Thus, according to the Bahá’í theory of progressive revelation, it is the Manifestations who have served as
> the external truth referents for humanity, releasing the latent capacity for rationality inherent in the human soul and
> thus allowing for social, intellectual, and spiritual progress throughout our history. Of course, this progress has not
> been anything like a constant linear progression. There have been highs and lows, fits and starts, rises and falls. But
> that there has been overall progress is beyond any serious doubt.
> 
> Conferred Infallibility
> According to the theory of progressive revelation, the average time interval between two successive occurrences of
> the phenomenon of divine revelation is about one thousand years. If true, the theory of progressive revelation
> explains rather well the overall or general evolution of humanity. But one thousand years is a long time, and there is
> bound to be change and evolution within the framework of a given dispensation (the term used by Bahá’ís for the
> interval between the coming of one Manifestation and the next). Consequently, there is also need for external truth
> referents within the dispensation of a given Manifestation.
> Of course, there are the texts either written directly or dictated by the Manifestation during his lifetime.
> However, the problem of interpretation of the texts can, and usually does, give rise to conflicting views, even
> leading eventually to the disintegration of the religious community. The solution to this problem lies in a second,
> derivative form of infallibility, called “conferred infallibility” in the Bahá’í writings. Such infallibility is not held to
> be inherent or essential, like that of the Manifestation, nor is it based on omniscience. Rather, conferred infallibility
> derives from, is conferred by, and is based upon the essential infallibility of the Manifestation.
> Since essential infallibility is the conjunction of perfect knowledge and perfect virtue, and is restricted to
> the Manifestations, it follows logically that any form of conferred infallibility must derogate either perfect
> knowledge, perfect virtue, or both. Thus, in the Bahá’í dispensation, we find the following instances of conferred
> infallibility. First, there is Bahá’u’lláh’s eldest son, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, upon whom Bahá’u’lláh explicitly and textually
> confers infallibility. In commenting upon ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s rank, Shoghi Effendi makes it clear that ‘Abdu’l-Bahá has
> perfect virtue but not all knowledge (World Order 134 and 139).6 Thus, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s knowledge and
> understanding is not inherent in his nature, as is the case with the Manifestation, but rather is conferred upon him or
> guaranteed by the Manifestation (Bahá’u’lláh). Put another way, the Manifestation is “omniscient at will” (Shoghi
> Effendi, Unfolding Destiny 449), whereas ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s knowledge was dependent not on his will but on the will
> of Bahá’u’lláh.
> As historians of the Bahá’í Faith are aware, Bahá’u’lláh conferred infallibility upon the Universal House of
> Justice (Tablets 68). ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, in his Will and Testament, confirmed this, explaining that the House of Justice
> and Shoghi Effendi, as the Guardian of the Faith, were “both under the care and protection of the Abhá Beauty,
> under the shelter and unerring guidance of the Exalted One” (12). In the latter case, the mantle of infallibility
> devolves upon the shoulders of an individual, who is held to have neither all knowledge nor perfect virtue.7 In the
> former case, infallibility is conferred upon an elected institution whose individual members are held to be fallible
> human beings with no special spiritual endowment either epistemological or moral. We refrain here from entering
> into a detailed discussion of the relationship between these two institutions and refer the interested reader to the
> author’s companion paper, “Epistemological Implications of the Gradated Claims to Divine Authority in the Bahá’í
> Writings.”
> In his discussion of conferred infallibility in Some Answered Questions, Abdu’l-Bahá suggests that, in
> some instances, God will protect a person from error but without any explicit or public designation of this fact:
> “Thus many of the holy beings who were not dawning-points of the Most Great Infallibility [i.e., not Manifestations
> of God], were yet kept and preserved from error under the shadow of the protection and guardianship of God, for
> they were the mediators of grace between God and men. If God did not protect them from error, their error would
> cause believing souls to fall into error, and thus the foundation of the Religion of God would be overturned, which
> would not be fitting nor worthy of God” (172).
> Thus, it would seem there have been other figures in religious history who were in fact protected from
> error, but without any public or explicit designation of infallibility. For example, it is an article of Bahá’í belief that
> the twelve Imams of Shi‘ah Islam were indeed infallible (Shoghi Effendi, World Order 102), even though there is no
> record of any explicit designation of such infallibility, as witnessed by the fact that the larger Sunni Islamic
> community does not recognize the legitimacy of the Imamate, much less its infallibility. Be these things as they
> may, the main thesis of the present essay seems incontestable: that infallibility is not bizarre and exotic, but has been
> intricately woven into the fabric of our lives from the beginnings of history.
> Notes
> 1. A thorough and detailed discussion of the concepts contained in and underlying this compact statement
> can be found in the following works by William S. Hatcher: The Science of Religion (1980), Logic and Logos (1990)
> Love, Power, and Justice (2002), and Minimalism (2004); and by John S. Hatcher and William S. Hatcher: The Law
> of Love Enshrined: Selected Essays (1996).
> 2. See William S. Hatcher, Minimalism, p. 77, and relevant endnotes for a more detailed exposition of these
> results.
> 3. See William S. Hatcher, Minimalism, for a thorough discussion of these points.
> 4. The Enlightenment ideal of reason was not so broadly conceived and considered pure reason as a
> normative (perhaps even ultimate) expression of the essential human. But pure reason by itself is capable only of
> analysis, not synthesis. Without synthesizing and globalizing capacities such as intuition, global gestalt (spontaneous
> perception of context), and mystic consciousness, reason is, to paraphrase ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, like a perfect mirror in a
> dark room (Minimalism 67): it has the potential to be “enlightened” but can realize this potential only when
> illuminated with inner experience. This may help to explain why the Enlightenment ideal, as narrowly defined by its
> exponents, has led to so much fragmentation, alienation, extreme individualism, and the competitive seeking of
> power. However,
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá does clearly view pure reason as a useful and necessary step toward total (synthesized)
> knowledge: “If thou wishest the divine knowledge and recognition, purify thy heart from all beside God, be wholly
> attracted to the ideal, beloved One; search for and choose Him and apply thyself to rational and authoritative
> arguments. For arguments are a guide to the path and by this the heart will be turned unto the Sun of Truth” (Tablets
> of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá 68). Notice that, according to ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, the proper use of our rational faculties results in
> opening up the heart. Thus, Enlightenment philosophy was not so much wrong in stressing the importance of reason,
> but in taking one of the means to knowledge, namely reason, as an end in itself.
> 5. On one hand, the further we advance in the path of need-generated distortions (projecting our needs onto
> reality)—that is, the more elaborate the self-deception—the less willing we become to endure the pain of the
> readjustments we intuit will be necessary when we finally face reality. On the other hand, it often takes an
> uncommon amount of courage to act decisively against the prevailing social myth, even when we come to see and
> know that it is false.
> 6. At the same time, Shoghi Effendi also makes clear that ‘Abdu’l-Bahá was endowed with “superhuman
> knowledge” (World Order 134).
> 7. See Shoghi Effendi, World Order of Bahá’u’lláh, pp. 150–51.
> 
> Works Cited
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. Foundations of World Unity. Wilmette, Ill.: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1971.
> ———. Some Answered Questions. Comp. and trans. Laura Clifford Barney. 4th ed. Wilmette, Ill.: Bahá’í
> Publishing Trust, 1981.
> ———. “Tablet of the Universe.” Provisional English translation, n.p.
> ———. Tablets of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. Vol. 1. Chicago: Bahá’í Publishing Society, 1909.
> ———. Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. Wilmette, Ill.: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1971.
> 
> Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings from the Writings of Bahá’u’lláh. Trans. Shoghi Effendi. 2nd rev. ed. Wilmette, Ill.: Bahá’í
> Publishing Trust, 1976.
> ———. The Kitáb-i-Aqdas: The Most Holy Book. Haifa: Bahá’í World Centre, 1992.
> ———. Tablets of Bahá’u’lláh Revealed after the Kitáb-i-Aqdas. Comp. Research Dept. of the Universal House of
> Justice. Trans. Habib Taherzadeh et al. 2nd ed. Wilmette, Ill.: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1988.
> 
> Hatcher, John S. and William S. Hatcher. The Law of Love Enshrined. Oxford: George Ronald, 1996.
> 
> Hatcher, William S. The Science of Religion. Ottawa: Canadian Association for Studies on the Bahá’í Faith, 1980.
> ———. Logic and Logos. Oxford: George Ronald, 1990.
> ———. Love, Power, and Justice. 2nd ed. Wilmette, Ill.: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 2002.
> ———.Minimalism: A Bridge between Classical Philosophy and the Bahá’í Revelation. 2nd ed. Hong Kong: Juxta,
> 2004.
> 
> Shoghi Effendi. Unfolding Destiny: The Messages from the Guardian of the Bahá’í Faith to the Bahá’ís of the
> British Isles. London: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1981.
> ———. World Order of Bahá’u’lláh. Selected Letters by Shoghi Effendi. 2nd rev. ed. Wilmette, Ill.: Bahá’í
> Publishing Trust, 1974.
> 
> The Universal House of Justice. Issues Concerning Infallibility: Extracts from Letters Written on Behalf of the
> Universal House of Justice. Haifa: Bahá’í World Centre, 2000.
> ———. The Universal House of Justice: Authority and Functioning. Comp. Research Department of the Universal
> House of Justice. Haifa: Bahá’í World Centre, 2000.
>
> — *Reflections on Infallibility (Used by permission of the curator)*