# Some Aspects of Baha'i Ethics

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> Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Udo Schaefer, Some Aspects of Baha'i Ethics, bahai-library.com.
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> 
> The 20th Hasan M. Balyuzi Memorial Lecture
> 
> Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics
> UDO SCHAEFER
> 
> I am really overwhelmed and deeply touched by your warm-hearted wel-
> come and introduction. It is an unexpected, great honor to have been cho-
> sen by the Association to present the Hasan M. Balyuzi Memorial Lecture.
> I would like to express my sincerest gratitude and that of my wife for this
> invitation.
> The material that I am presenting—some aspects of Bahá’í ethics—is
> taken from the draft of a forthcoming book, Bahá’í Ethics in Light of
> Scripture.1 A systematic presentation of the new standard of values is, as
> I feel, not only timely, it is rather a matter of urgency in the face of the
> increasing disintegration of traditional morality and the truly apocalyp-
> tic dimension of spreading immorality all over the world. When choosing
> my topic for this conference I had to decide between an outline of the new
> morality which, in the given time frame, could not have been more than a
> general survey, or some few central issues that can be dealt with more in
> depth. I chose the latter option, inasmuch as I can refer to my article pub-
> lished in the Bahá’í Studies Review, “The New Morality: An Outline.”
> Let me start with a few general remarks on ethics: The term derives
> from the Greek ethikos which pertains to ethos (character). Ethics as part
> of practical philosophy is also called “moral philosophy,”2 and, if it is a
> religious ethics based on revelation (a revelatory ethics like Bahá’í ethics),
> one can call it “moral theology,” as it is termed in Catholicism.
> The subject of ethics is the human character and human conduct, so far
> as they depend on general principles commonly known as moral principles.
> 
> 2             The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006
> 
> It is the study of standards of conduct and moral judgment. This field is
> vast, highly complex, and intricate, as the following groups of issues may
> indicate, the enumeration of which is by no means exclusive. One group
> refers to the a priori structures of the moral subject, to the anthropolog-
> ical presumptions and metaphysical objectives. It deals with the image of
> man: his freedom, moral responsibility, and dignity. The subject is
> expressed in the question: What is human nature, what is the purpose of
> life? What is the highest good of human conduct and what are its sanc-
> tions?
> Another group refers to the central issue of the origin, derivation, and
> vindication of moral values. In the focus are questions such as: What is
> the ultimate standard of right or wrong? What is the categorical quality
> of ethical demands, the unconditioned nature of “ought”? Are there uni-
> versally recognized values, unconditioned norms, moral principles of
> good and evil, right and wrong? Where do they come from, how are the
> recognized, and why should I follow them?
> A major part of ethics is dedicated to concrete norms, values, and
> duties. Ethics tries to find answers to questions such as: What shall I do,
> how should human beings live in order to become happy? What is virtue;
> what are the motives which prompt right conduct?
> Revelatory ethics raises some additional questions such as the relation-
> ship between reason and revelation, the concept of liberty and its relation-
> ship to obedience, the concepts of sin and conscience, the virtues and their
> relation to concrete divine commandments.
> My lecture has three parts. Its major part is part 2 in which I will dis-
> cuss the origin and vindication of moral values in the light of
> Bahá’u’lláh’s revelation. The introductory part 1 will deal with the cen-
> trality of ethics in the revelation of Bahá’u’lláh, and the final part, part 3,
> will conclude the lecture by outlining some features of Bahá’í ethics that
> conflict with moral positions which are dominant in Western societies.
> 
> I
> 
> The Bahá’í Faith is not interested in metaphysical speculations or dogmat-
> ic definitions.3 The emphasis is, rather, on moral orientation and education,
> Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics                         3
> 
> on right action and right motivation. The main purpose of the divine mes-
> sage is the transformation of the human being. Consequently, ethics is the
> central theme in Bahá’u’lláh’s writings. The divine ordinances “which con-
> cern the realm of morals and ethics” are, as ‘Abdu’l-Bahá stated, “the “fun-
> damental aspect of the religion of God” (Promulgation 403).4
> Moral instructions and directives in the Bahá’í revelation which can be
> taken as a point of departure for detecting the underlying system of
> Bahá’í ethics are scattered throughout Bahá’í scripture. Not even the
> Kitáb-i-Aqdas, the kernel of Bahá’í law and ethics, is a systematic code of
> laws and of moral prescriptions.5 It is not organized logically, section by
> section, point by point, as are treatises and manuals on Islamic law. The
> Book of God has never come down in the form of a logically developed
> system of intellectual exposition; its laws and commandments have never
> been established in the form of a systematically structured design of gen-
> eral, abstract norms. Nor have they appeared in a rational form, that is,
> with appended reasons and explanations. The Word of God is, as I have
> already pointed out elsewhere,6 an eruptive, visionary, and emphatic out-
> pouring. It is neither systematically structured nor an arid instruction in
> plain terms; as Shoghi Effendi put it: “All Divine Revelation seems to have
> been thrown out in flashes. The Prophets never composed treatises. This
> is why in the Qur’án and our own Writings different subjects are so often
> included in one Tablet. It pulsates, so to speak. That is why it is ‘Reve-
> lation’” (Unfolding Destiny 454).
> This is why the Kitáb-i-Aqdas “jumps from one subject to the next
> without any obvious logical connection” (Lewis 123). The Holy, the
> Divine is in its very essence beyond the rational and its categories of
> thought. At all times, it has been up to man to order the laws of God sys-
> tematically, an essential precondition for their later application.7 My forth-
> coming introduction to Bahá’í ethics is intended as an attempt to system-
> atically analyze the multifarious moral imperatives of Bahá’í scripture and
> to detect their inner architecture.
> The eminent function of man’s character, of his behavior, his actions,
> deeds, and works in Bahá’u’lláh’s scheme of redemption becomes evident
> from His definition of the Covenant of God, the major constitutive prin-
> ciple of all Bahá’í theology. The initial verse of the Kitáb-i-Aqdas clarifies
> 4             The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006
> 
> the basic issue as to the relation of faith to works, which was the central
> controversy between Catholicism and Protestantism: Faith, that is, the
> recognition (‘irfán) of the Manifestation, is the foundation, whereas
> works and deeds are “the essence of faith” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 10:13).
> Faith and works are “inseparable” (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 1).
> Without faith man goes astray, “though he be the author of every right-
> eous deed” (Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 1); but faith without works is, according
> to the Gospel, like a tree that “bringeth not forth good fruit”: its destina-
> tion is “to be hewn, and cast into the fire” (Matt. 7:19). Divine grace is
> not, as Martin Luther asserted, granted through personal faith alone
> (sola fide), but through both faith and righteous deeds. How essential
> man’s works are becomes evident from Bahá’u’lláh’s definition of “faith”
> in His Words of Wisdom: “The essence of faith is fewness of words and
> abundance of deeds” (Tablets 10:13) and from His admonition: “Let deeds,
> not words, be your adorning (Hidden Words, Persian 5)8 . . . Let your acts
> be a guide unto all mankind, for the professions of most men . . . differ
> from their conduct” (Gleanings 139:8).
> In numerous passages Bahá’u’lláh enjoins His followers to “strive . . .
> with heart and soul” (Hidden Words, Persian 76) to distinguish them-
> selves from others by their deeds.9 They should conduct themselves in
> such a manner that they may stand out “distinguished and brilliant as the
> sun among other souls” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Selections 35:5):10 “Strive to be shin-
> ing examples unto all mankind, and true reminders of the virtues of God
> amidst men” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 9:4).
> What matters is right being (“a good character,” Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets
> 4:1311) and right acting (“good works,”12 “good deeds” [Kitáb-i-Aqdas par.
> 59, 70])13 for they are “the fruits of the tree of man” (Bahá’u’lláh, Epistle
> 26). Those that “yield no fruit on earth . . . are verily counted as among
> the dead” (Bahá’u’lláh, Hidden Words, Persian 81).14 Thus the emphasis
> lies more on orthopractice than orthodoxy. However, this does not mean that
> religion is reduced to morals alone, as philosophers of the Enlightenment
> did in their endeavor to keep an equal distance between unbelief and
> superstition. The morality in religion is not above the mystery in it.15
> The Bahá’í ethos is based on the individual’s participation in God’s new
> Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics                           5
> 
> Covenant, that is, the recognition of Bahá’u’lláh as a Manifestation of
> God and obedience to his teachings and laws (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas
> par. 1).
> The aim of religion is to guide man towards perfection through morals,
> and the aim of all morals is felicity and happiness, which is the ultimate
> desire of all human beings: “Homo naturaliter desiderat beatitudinem,” as
> Thomas Aquinas put it—“Happiness is man’s natural desire” (Summa I-II,
> 1.69, a1).16 The scripture’s moral instructions are “the everlasting torch
> of divine guidance” Bahá’u’lláh, Hidden Words, Persian 35), the “Straight
> Path” (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 184)17 to an “ultimate aim” (‘Abdu’l-
> Bahá, Selections 225:5), to “human happiness.”
> What is happiness? How can it be defined? In his Nicomachean Ethics
> Aristotle defines “happiness” (eudaimonia), the prime mover of human
> actions, as living a life that is determined by reason (not by feelings, not
> by emotions!), as the activity of the soul which is in accordance with
> virtue (1097a 6–18).18 It is a fundamental doctrine of Socrates, Plato, and
> Aristotle that a good man and a happy man are the same. According to
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá human happiness “consists only in drawing closer to the
> Threshold of Almighty God” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Secret 60). On the level of the
> individual, this means here on earth “a tranquil heart;” and, ultimately,
> “happiness in the after-life.” 19 On the level of the political world it means
> “the illumination of the world of humanity” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Selections
> 225:3) and “securing the peace and well-being of every individual mem-
> ber, high and low alike, of the human race” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Secret 60). The
> virtues required for the human being are “the supreme agencies for accom-
> plishing these two objective.” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Secret 60).
> Bahá’í ethics is not merely descriptive, it is normative and prescriptive
> in nature. The scripture contains a wealth of different kinds of normative
> statements relating to ethics: passages that elucidate its doctrinal founda-
> tions, commandments, and prohibitions, catalogues of virtues,20 praise of
> virtues, warnings against wrong-doing and the consequences of evil deeds,
> against a life spent in lust, passion, and vice; instructions and appeals to live
> a life of virtue and service pleasing to God, of service to one’s neigh-
> bor,21 to mankind (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 109:2),22 and of service at the
> 6             The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006
> 
> “Threshold of Holiness” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Will and Testament 3:3). Thus, the
> scripture is not at all a mere textbook of religious and ethical doctrines,
> of abstract moral propositions, but rather a work of moral admonition, of
> general directives which have a driving power, a compelling force motivat-
> ing people to pursue the moral good. Bahá’u’lláh’s ethical instructions
> should not be misconstrued as a dry, bloodless philosophy under the yoke
> of the law. Bahá’í ethics is rather a methodical way of life according to the
> Word and the Law. Bahá’u’lláh assures us that he who takes upon himself
> the “yoke” will find “days of blissful joy . . . in store” (Gleanings 153:9).
> Those who have been spiritually reborn and tread this path are on the way
> to becoming a “new man.”23 In the Suratu’l-Haykal Bahá’u’lláh promises
> that in the fullness of time a “race of men, incomparable in character, shall
> be raised up” (Summons 1:8).
> 
> II
> 
> 1. The discussion of the ontological status of moral norms and values,
> their philosophical or theological justification, is the cardinal issue of
> ethics and the starting point of all reflection about it. The discussion of
> this subject is as old as philosophy. Positions deduced from the Bahá’í
> scripture can be more easily recognized and interpreted in the context of
> views which have been developed in the past by theologians and philoso-
> phers.
> It was Plato who, in his early dialogue Euthyphro, raised the decisive
> question: “Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is
> it holy because it is loved by the gods?” (A10), which he clearly answered:
> “The holy is loved because it is holy, and it is not holy because it is loved”
> (E10). This judgment became the foundation of the philosophy of natu-
> ral law. Over the millennia, from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz,
> and beyond, the idea prevailed that God is not the world’s legislator, that
> the categories of good and evil, just and unjust, are not decisions of the
> divine will, but are rather objective realities, eternal truths preceding the
> will of God like the numerical proportions. God is bound to these eternal
> Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics                          7
> 
> truths, which can (at least to a certain extent) be recognized by human
> reason.
> Another strain of thought in Christian theology, that of ethical volun-
> tarism, can be traced back to St. Paul24 and St. Augustine, and was formu-
> lated by the Franciscan monk John Duns Scotus (1270–1303) in categori-
> cal language: God is not subject to any principle or law. There is no high-
> er law above Him, no moral law independent of Him, no preceding idea of
> good and evil, no a priori system of values, no lex aeterna, no natural law
> that can be deduced from the order of creation that God would be bound
> to. Not the law is eternal, but the lawgiver. It is God’s will that creates
> every law there is. That is why His action is, as He proceeds, always and
> necessarily right and just. As His commandments are ordinances of His
> contingent will, God acts, wherever He does, always justly.25 William
> Ockham followed on this path, as did later on Luther and Calvin, who saw
> the origin of all morals and all law in God’s unfathomable will: “The
> supreme rule of justice is the Will of God, and every thing that he wills
> must be accepted as just because he wills it.”26
> In Islam the study of ethical principles, the discussions of the sources
> of law and ethics, started in the eighth and ninth centuries A.D. Here the
> two antagonistic strains of thought are recognizable as well in the schools
> of the Mu‘tazila27 and of the Ash‘arites.28 The Mu‘tazilites were the pro-
> ponents of rationalistic ethics. For them ethical value has an objective
> reality and cannot be reduced in essence to the will of God and his com-
> mandments. ‘Abdu’l-Jabbár (935–1025)29 and his predecessors stated that
> man has the natural ability to know what is right independently of any
> command or revelation. They allow “a place for revelation as an indispen-
> sable supplement to reason. It tells us some important truths on values that
> reason unaided could not have discovered although reason can recognize
> and accept them as rational once they have been revealed—e. g. the value
> of prayer in building character” (Hourani 18; author’s emphasis).
> The predominant theory in classical Sunni Islam was that of ethical
> voluntarism.30 Traditionalists, in particular Sháfi‘í, Ibn H. anbal, al-Ash‘arí,
> Ibn H. azm, al-Ghazálí and Shahrastání, stated that justice is nothing but
> 8             The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006
> 
> obedience to the revealed law of the sharí‘a: right action is that which God
> has commanded. They objected to the belief that revelation was merely
> supplementary to human reason, and argued that “if God’s command-
> ments followed objective principles of value, such as a real justice, these
> would be something fixed pre-eternally and beyond His control, which
> would thus limit His power and make Him less than omnipotent”
> (Hourani 28). If man could judge what is right and wrong, he could rule
> on what God could rightly prescribe for man, and this would be presump-
> tuous and blasphemous. Furthermore they objected “that the judgements
> of reason were arbitrary, based only on desire; that such judgements in
> fact always contradicted each other; and lastly they arrogated [to them-
> selves] the function of revelation and rendered it useless” (Hourani 17).
> For them, the primary source of ethics was the divine revelation and tra-
> dition or their derivatives. Whereas a small stream of Mu‘tazilí rational-
> ism survived in the Imámí Shí‘a, the orthodox view has prevailed in Sunni
> countries until the present time (Hourani 19).
> 
> 2. Bahá’í ethics has its roots in the divine revelation. It is based on the
> scripture, that is, on the doctrines of God’s absolute sovereignty and the
> infallibility of the Manifestation, of God’s Covenant and of human nature
> (Bahá’í anthropology). God is the supreme source of all values. Thus, the
> Bahá’í value system is not a philosophical set of moral standards, not the
> outcome of methodical human endeavor to formulate concrete norms
> solely by means of argumentation and rational discourse (no “discourse
> ethics”), rather (as in other religions) guidance under the authority of an
> enlightened Teacher who claims that his book is the standard for good and
> evil, the “unerring Balance established amongst men” (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-
> i-Aqdas par. 99).31
> Bahá’í ethics is theocentric and theonomous32 in its nature: Hence, God
> is the creator of the world and the lawgiver of mankind. He is the primal
> cause “of all good” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 10:2), the supreme source of all
> morals. His commandments (prescribed by the Manifestation) are “the
> essence of justice and the source thereof ” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 88:1).
> The highest criterion in moral judgment is recourse to God’s arbitrary
> will and to the infallibility of the divine messenger who mediates this will
> Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics                          9
> 
> to humanity. To this will (which is arbitrary in the sense of unlimited,
> absolute, depending on volition, not governed by principle), man owes
> absolute obedience.
> Thus, the moral order is not, as Plato saw it, anchored in a preceding
> idea of good and evil, in eternal truths that can be identified by reason,
> nor in a rational concept of man, defining for all eternity the idea of the
> good, nor in a rationally recognizable “nature of things.” but rather in the
> decisions of God’s arbitrary will. God alone is anarchos, absolutely free:
> not submitted to any law or principle. Therefore He can never be unjust.
> He is “the Lord of all things and is the vassal of none” (Bahá’u’lláh,
> Prayers and Meditations 4:1). His Will has no reason to will as He wills,
> other than that He wills it so. His sovereign, unfathomable free will is the
> foundation of all moral obligations. There is no criterion of moral recti-
> tude independent of His will: “Know thou for a certainty that the Will of
> God is not limited by the standards of the people. . . . Verily He is to be
> praised in His acts and to be obeyed in His behests. He hath no associate
> in His judgement nor any helper in His sovereignty. He doeth whatsoev-
> er He willeth and ordaineth whatsoever He pleaseth” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets
> 8:19). A preceding idea of the moral good, the existence of a moral order
> binding upon God, would limit his sovereignty and amount to shirk,33 the
> association of a companion with God.34
> Thus, the norms set by divine legislation are absolute, independent
> from all empiricism, authoritative, categorical, apodictic, and not in need
> of rational justification. This is a clear confirmation of what is called “eth-
> ical voluntarism.”
> One could object that moral values are universal and perennial and not
> confined to any historical outpourings of divine truth. St. Paul had to deal
> with this problem when he promulgated the message of the Gospel to the
> “Gentiles, which have not the law” (Rom. 2:14). He could not ignore that
> they knew moral standards and that the Greeks were in possession of a
> highly developed ethics. According to St. Paul, the gentiles “do by nature
> the things contained in the law” (Rom. 2:14) because the law is “written in
> their hearts” (Rom. 2:15). This doctrine had a far-reaching impact on the
> development of ethical thought in Christian theology.
> The Bahá’í Faith does not support the idea of an innate moral law.
> 10            The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006
> 
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá states that there is no “innate sense of human dignity” that
> prevents “man from committing evil actions and insure[s] his spiritual . . .
> perfection” (Secret 97). Bahá’u’lláh’s new paradigm36 of divine revelation
> as a progressively unfolding process, and of salvation history (Heils-
> geschichte) as a continuum that is open to the future, opens a new dimen-
> sion in ethical thought. The fact that values, virtues, and vices have exist-
> ed in all human cultures from time immemorial, that they are basically
> identical and are taken for granted in the scripture,37 does not contradict
> the ontological status of these values as emanations of the divine Will.
> For God has revealed His Will and behest to man “from time immemori-
> al” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 87:6). He has sent prophets to all peoples:38
> “Unto the cities of all nations He hath sent His Messengers, whom He
> hath commissioned to announce unto men tidings of the Paradise of His
> good-pleasure. . . .” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 76:1).39 The mission of the
> prophets was always “to summon mankind to the one true God,”
> (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 98:6) to guide it “to the straight Path of Truth”
> and to “educate all men” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 81:1) morally.
> Thus, in its religious traditions humankind has a common supply, a
> reservoir, of normative principles of good and evil,40 of basic values
> embodied in virtues and vices, of fundamental standards41 (such as the
> Golden Rule, which exists in all religions42), even though the specific
> accentuation of the values and their mutual relationship in the respective
> religious context and in the hierarchy of values might vary in different
> cultural contexts,43 and though the origin of values in divine revelation
> is often not apparent. These common values constitute the eternal law
> “revealed unto the Prophets of old” (Bahá’u’lláh, Hidden Words, Arabic
> preamble), which “does not change nor alter,” which has been confirmed
> and renewed in all religions and which “will never be abrogated” (‘Abdu’l-
> Bahá, Some Answered Questions 11:9).44 One could call this law a lex aeter-
> na, but it is not a natural law, derived from an order of being, but rather
> one that has its origin in the divine Will. It belongs to the core of God’s
> “one and indivisible religion” (The Báb, Selections 2:24:2), as the Báb
> called it, and, as Bahá’u’lláh put it, the “changeless Faith of God, eternal
> in the past, eternal in the future” (Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 182); it belongs, as
> Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics                      11
> 
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá formulated, to the “Holy of Holies” (Some Answered
> Questions 11:9). The values governing society, however, such as the social
> norms and laws on the family, inheritance, trade, and criminal law as well
> as the forms of worship (‘ibádát), vary greatly in the different religions
> according to the varying conditions and demands of a steadily changing
> world and an “ever-advancing civilization” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings
> 109:2).45 This is why, according to Bahá’u’lláh, “in every age and dispen-
> sation all divine ordinances are changed and transformed according to
> the requirements of the time, except the law of love46 which, like a foun-
> tain, always flows and is never overtaken by change.”47
> 
> 3. The doctrine of divine voluntarism should not be misconstrued. God is
> not a tyrant; His actions are not the result of a senseless, capricious,
> despotic arbitrariness. Man has not been created as an addressee of whim-
> sical injunctions, but as a recipient of God’s love, grace, and mercy.48
> According to Bahá’u’lláh, God’s commandments and all the duties pre-
> scribed for His servants are “but a token of [His] grace unto them, that
> they may be enabled to ascend unto the station conferred upon their own
> inmost being” (Gleanings 1:5). They are, as it is said in the Kitáb-i-Aqdas
> “the lamps of My loving providence among My servants, and the keys of
> My mercy for My creatures” (par. 3), and constitute “the highest means for
> the maintenance of order in the world and the security of its peoples”
> (par. 2). Thus, the “fundamental purpose animating the faith of God,”
> according to Bahá’u’lláh’s definition, is “to safeguard the interests and
> promote the unity of the human race, and to foster the spirit of love and
> fellowship amongst men” (Tablets 11:15). Bahá’u’lláh assures us that the
> one God “hath wished nothing for Himself. The allegiance of mankind
> profiteth Him not, neither doth its perversity harm Him” (Tablets 11:2).
> “He enjoineth upon you that which shall profit you. . . . Your evil doings
> can never harm Us, neither can your good works profit Us” (Kitáb-i-
> Aqdas par. 59).
> Consequently, the chosen way under the “yoke” (Matt. 11:29) of the law
> is not “an evidence of self-effacement,” of “self-estrangement,” of “slav-
> ery” (Nietzsche no. 54) and of “hetero-determination,” but rather the path
> 12            The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006
> 
> to man’s true self. Tertullian, a father of the church living in the third cen-
> tury, was referring to this way of life, which is the right response to God’s
> grace and salvation, when he spoke of the “anima naturaliter christiana”:
> “The human soul is Christian by its nature” (Apologeticum 17). Man has
> been created for this manner of existence.
> 
> 4. God is “hidden from the sight and minds of men” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets
> 8:31).49 His knowledge can only be attained through knowledge of the
> Manifestations, the “Repositories of celestial wisdom” (Bahá’u’lláh,
> Gleanings 19:3). God’s sovereign will is mediated to humanity through
> them, who are essentially50 infallible,51 “free of error” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets
> 8:17) in their judgment: “Whatever emanates from Them is identical with
> the truth, and conformable to reality” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered
> Questions 45:6), for each one of them is the “representative and mouthpiece
> of God” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 28:2) and “doth incarnate the highest, the
> infallible standard of justice unto all creation” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings
> 88:1).
> The Manifestation’s charisma of inherent infallibility (al-‘is. ma) is a log-
> ical precondition, an “essential requirement” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered
> Questions 45:2) for being God’s representative.52 By this means God safe-
> guards and protects His laws and ordinances from all error, all later ques-
> tioning and all attempts to modify or to annul them. The doctrine of the
> “Most Great Infallibility” (al-‘is. matu’l-kubrá)53 has been formulated by
> Bahá’u’lláh in captivating and powerful language in the Kitáb-i-Aqdas54
> and in His Tablet, Ishráqát,55 culminating in the formula: “He doeth what
> He pleaseth. He chooseth, and none may question His choice” (Kitáb-i-
> Aqdas par. 7).56
> This formula is a frequently recurring motif throughout Bahá’í
> scripture. It is the very touchstone of man’s faith. Its implications for
> the justification of moral values have been categorically formulated in
> challenging language:
> 
> Blessed is the man that hath acknowledged his belief in God and in
> His signs, and recognized that “He57 shall not be asked of His
> Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics                        13
> 
> doings.”58 Such a recognition hath been made by God the ornament
> of every belief and its very foundation.59 . . .
> Were He to decree as lawful the thing which from time immemori-
> al had been forbidden, and forbid that which had, at all times, been
> regarded as lawful, to none is given the right to question His author-
> ity. Whoso will hesitate, though it be for less than a moment, should
> be regarded as a transgressor.
> Whoso hath not recognized this sublime and fundamental verity,
> and hath failed to attain this most exalted station, the winds of doubt
> will agitate him, and the sayings of the infidels will distract his soul.
> He that hath acknowledged this principle will be endowed with the
> most perfect constancy. (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 161–63)
> 
> God’s laws must be obeyed even if they were to be “such as to cause the
> heaven of every religion to be cleft asunder” (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas
> par. 7) or to “strike terror into the hearts of all that are in heaven and on
> earth,” because they are “naught but manifest justice” (Bahá’u’lláh,
> Gleanings 88:1). By anchoring the system of values in God’s sovereign
> Will, in the infallibility of the Manifestations and the authenticity of the
> scripture, Bahá’u’lláh made it an Archimedean Point60 of knowledge, a
> “sure handle” (‘urwatu’l-wuthqá) (Tablets 8:48)61 for the individual as well
> as for society, an absolute framework of ultimate values. It is thus above
> all criticism and indicates the goal and the path, the “Straight Path”;62 lim-
> its arbitrary human behavior; and offers society and culture a stable bal-
> ance for the variety of diverging interests. This is the theological bedrock
> of divine legislation, a doctrinal foundation of all ethics and law that is
> unique in the annals of religious history.
> 
> 5. The tablets of a new law with its categoric commandments, “Thou
> shalt!” revealed to a humanity that Bahá’u’lláh deemed “feeble and far
> removed from the purpose of God”63 are taken as an “offence,”64 as a
> “stumbling block” by those who still believe, and as “foolishness”65 by
> those who desire to decide what is right and what is wrong according to
> their own promptings, to choose their own way of life, their own
> 14            The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006
> 
> lifestyle.66 A concrete religious law with its binding rules, injunctions,
> prohibitions, and ordinances, with its demand for absolute obedience, is
> deeply challenging for a secular society with its political philosophy,
> according to which religion is exclusively a private matter and man an
> autonomous individual, wholly self-determined and morally responsible
> only to himself. For Western thought which has been shaped by the
> Enlightenment it is hard to accept the claim that the newly revealed word
> of God is the standard of all morals and not, as Bahá’u’lláh put it, “man’s
> fanciful theories.”67
> Bahá’u’lláh has foreseen the commotion His law will provoke, as He
> speaks about “the fears and agitation which the revelation of this law pro-
> vokes in men’s hearts.”68 He nevertheless insists: “Were His law to be such
> as to strike terror in the hearts of all that are in heaven and on earth, that
> law is naught but manifest justice” (Gleanings 88:1).
> The commandments of the Manifestation must not be judged accord-
> ing to human standards. They derive from the lógos (which the philoso-
> phers called the “primal reason,” al-‘aql al-awwal), from the “divine, uni-
> versal mind, whose sovereignty enlighteneth all created things”
> (Bahá’u’lláh, Seven Valleys 52). They are “absolute wisdom,” and are in
> accordance with “the reality of things” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered
> Questions 40:6; 45:6), a reality known to the Manifestation not through
> knowledge gained by reflection or experience, but a knowledge that is
> immediate, innate, and unacquired (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions
> 40:6). This knowledge, by which the Manifestation is “aware of the reali-
> ty of the mysteries of beings” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions
> 40:4, 7)69 is termed “existential knowledge” (‘ilmu’l-wujudí).
> Through the divine ordinances human reason partakes of the divine
> wisdom. Therefore the laws of God are above human wisdom70 and not
> in need of rational justification. They are ta ‘abbudí;71 they must be
> accepted as they are. For that reason Bahá’u’lláh admonishes His people to
> “[c]ast away the things current amongst men and to take fast hold on that
> whereunto ye are bidden by virtue of the Will of the Ordainer” (Tablets
> 6:56). He warns them not to “cavil” at the “Testimony of God” (Gleanings
> 129:5)72 and not to judge the law of God according to human standards,
> Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics                        15
> 
> which are the result of historical processes and are essentially relative.
> Rather, everything which is taken for granted today and considered to be
> immune to criticism—secular society has its dogmas as well!—must be
> judged according to the infallible balance (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par.
> 148, 183): “Weigh not the Book of God with such standards and sciences
> as are current amongst you, for the Book itself is the unerring Balance
> established amongst men. In this most perfect Balance whatsoever the
> peoples and kindreds of the earth possess must be weighed, while the
> measure of its weight should be tested according to its own standard. . .
> .” (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 99). And in the same book the warning:
> “Hold ye fast unto His statutes (ah. wamir) and commandments (ah. kam),
> and be not of those who, following their idle fancies and vain imaginings,
> have clung to the standards (h. udúd) fixed by their own selves, and cast
> behind their backs the standards (us. úl) laid down by God” (17).
> 
> 7. If the origin of all morals is God’s sovereign will, embodied in the reve-
> lation of the Manifestations, the primary source of ethical knowledge is
> revealed scripture. The question arises as to the part assigned to reason in
> Bahá’í ethics. Unfortunately this issue of Bahá’í epistemology cannot be dis-
> cussed here because of the lack of time. I have to refer to my forthcoming
> book (Bahá’í Ethics 1:257–311) and to confine myself to a summary of the
> results of my research.
> In the realm of values human rationality is limited insofar as it is
> dependent on a preordained framework, a God-given standard, an hier-
> archy of supreme values, which is not subject to reason—fixed points
> that constitute an immovable yardstick. Human beings cannot cognize
> the moral order by reason; they are dependent on divine revelation.
> Nevertheless, reason can under certain conditions attain such “discern-
> ment” that man “will discriminate between truth and falsehood even as he
> doth distinguish the sun from shadow” (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-íqán 217).
> The conditions are
> 
> • that reason is not directed by “natural impulse and desire” (‘Abdu’l-
> Bahá, Promulgation 41) and not guided by vital interests;
> 16            The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006
> 
> • that the human being has internalized the normative injunctions of
> the revelation, including the normative image of human nature pro-
> claimed therein;
> • that the individual is illumined by “the spirit of faith” (ar-rúh. u’l-
> imání)”73 and has burned away “the veil of self ” (Bahá’u’lláh,
> Gleanings 147:1) that obscures his understanding, “with the fire of
> [God’s] love” (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 132, 171).74
> 
> Bahá’u’lláh has elucidated the condition that can be attained through rea-
> son in another passage: “They whose sight is keen, whose ears are reten-
> tive, whose hearts are enlightened, and whose breasts are dilated, recog-
> nize both truth and falsehood, and distinguish the one from the other”
> (Epistle 10).75
> “Whose breasts are dilated” is a Qur’ánic metaphor for embracing the
> faith.76 With the guidance of the absolute standard of revelation and its
> normative anthropology, rational thought can independently recognize
> what is permitted and what is forbidden in all concerns and situations,
> even if these are not mentioned in the holy texts. When it is stated in the
> scripture that “man should know his own self and recognize that which
> leadeth unto loftiness or lowliness, glory or abasement, wealth or pover-
> ty” (Bahá’u’lláh Tablets 4:8), or when the scripture refers man directly to
> his power of reason: “Approach not the things which your minds con-
> demn” (Gleanings 128:8), it becomes clear that reason illumined by faith is
> granted a wide scope to distinguish good and evil within the framework
> of the revealed moral order. Without reason, moral judgment and a moral
> life are not possible at all. In this sense, Thomas Aquinas’s judgment is
> valid that it is “reason that guides us to the works of morality,” as is also
> demonstrated in the emphasis Bahá’u’lláh has placed on the cardinal
> virtues of h. ikma: wisdom and prudence.
> 
> III
> 
> I think I have already made it clear that the “Book of God” establishes a
> value system of its own77 which is “not limited by the standards of the
> people” since “God doth not tread in their ways” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 8:19).
> Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics                       17
> 
> The Book is the divine law for the whole of humanity: no wonder it con-
> flicts in some respects with moral views which are dominant in Western
> societies, which are no longer molded by the Christian faith and Christian
> morals. Let me conclude this lecture by outlining some features of the
> new morality that differ from moral positions which are current in secu-
> lar society.
> One fundamental difference can be seen in the concepts of liberty that
> underlie the two moral systems. In secular society the supreme authority
> as regards morals is reason, and reason draws the limits to personal free-
> dom at the point where one person’s liberty infringes on the rights of
> another. This idea that goes back to Immanuel Kant is expressed, for
> instance, in Article 2 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
> Germany: “Everyone shall have the right to free development of his per-
> sonality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others.”
> The unlimited freedom of each individual is thereby both legally con-
> strained and legally guaranteed within the bounds of its compatibility
> with the liberty of every other individual. The same article mentions the
> “moral law” as a further limit of personal freedom. The fathers of the
> German Constitution (enacted in 1949) considered the moral law as an
> objective, absolute barrier that restrains the freedom of the individual.
> Today, half a century later, it is interpreted by jurisprudence and jurisdic-
> tion as something relative, as “the moral consciousness of our society”
> (Maunz and Dührig, art. 2, §1, n.16)—a vague concept, since this con-
> sciousness is subject to social change and in constant flux.
> In contrast to this, Bahá’u’lláh approves of liberty within “the limits of
> moderation” (Tablets 11:19; 6:31), “the moderate freedom which guaran-
> tees the welfare of the world of mankind” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Selections
> 227:27). Unrestrained liberty “causeth man to overstep the bounds of
> propriety, and to infringe on the dignity of his station” (Bahá’u’lláh,
> Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 123). It is unbridled liberty, licentiousness, that
> Bahá’u’lláh is speaking of when He states that liberty will ultimately
> “lead to sedition, whose flames none can quench” (Kitáb-i-Aqdas par.
> 123). His concept of “true liberty” that “consisteth in man’s submission
> unto My commandments” (Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 125) is the liberty that
> results from obedience to the Will of God as manifested in the divine
> 18            The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006
> 
> laws. It is liberty in submission to God. Bahá’u’lláh’s concept of “true lib-
> erty” is a rejection of revolutionary anarchy as well as of permissive soci-
> ety, of a society where there are no taboos and whose goal is emancipa-
> tion from all traditional patterns of behavior; a society where everyone
> is allowed to do as he likes provided he does not violate the rights of
> others.
> There is another basic difference between the two ethical systems.
> Whereas secular moral standards are based on the doctrines of individu-
> alism and liberalism,78 the Bahá’í value system is balanced; it is—and in
> this point more similar to Islamic and Confucian ethics—less individual-
> istic, less focused on the interests and rights of the individual and more
> concerned with the common weal. The Bahá’í position derives from the
> basic political concept according to which the common weal and the secu-
> rity of the public have priority to the rights of the individual, notwith-
> standing the community’s duty to respect and protect the unalienable
> rights of the citizen.79 Strong emphasis is placed on the “security and pro-
> tection of men” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 7:32), the “common weal”80 and the
> “prosperity, wealth and tranquillity of the people” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets
> 7:29). The different emphasis in the two moral systems may be elucidated
> by Bahá’u’lláh’s provisions relating to sexual ethics and to penal law.
> In our largely hedonistic societies the idea prevails that the bounds of
> sexual freedom are usually set by the prohibition of violent sexual acts
> and the abuse of children and wards of court. All sexual behavior between
> mutually consenting adults that does not directly infringe on the rights of
> third parties is today generally regarded as morally permissible, analo-
> gous to the Roman legal formula “Volenti non fit iniuria” (No injustice is
> done to him who consents). Moreover, the idea is generally accepted that
> it is up to the individual to determine his own sexual orientation. Conse-
> quently, so-called ethical minorities have been placed under legal protec-
> tion. Marriage between homosexual partners has recently been made law-
> ful in Germany and other European countries.
> In Bahá’u’lláh’s revelation marriage is the exclusive place of legitimate
> human sexuality. Pre- and extramarital sexual activity is morally stigma-
> tized as unchastity, and pre- and extramarital intercourse penalized as
> Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics                        19
> 
> ziná.81 Marriage is only intended as a bond between heterosexual part-
> ners. Consequently, homosexual relationships and homosexual acts (liwát. )
> have been condemned by Bahá’u’lláh as immoral.82 The idea that it is up
> to the individual to determine his own sexual orientation is incompatible
> with Bahá’u’lláh’s normative image of the human being. Bahá’u’lláh’s sex-
> ual ethics correspond to the basic tenets of the other Abrahamic religions,
> and also of Buddhism, though it avoids the extreme positions represent-
> ed by zealots.83 Chastity does not amount to a defamation of human sex-
> uality; its aim is not the suppression of the sexual urge, but the disciplined
> use and control of the reproductive force and the human ability to express
> love.84
> As to penal law, it is today generally accepted in Europe by legal theo-
> ry and jurisdiction that the supreme purpose of punishment is the reha-
> bilitation of the criminal. The idea of retaliation and expiation as funda-
> mental purposes of punishment, and capital punishment as well, are
> denounced as expressions of subliminal feelings of hatred and revenge, as
> barbaric relics of premodern times. The abolition of the death penalty has
> been celebrated as a milestone on the path to the progressive humaniza-
> tion of society. The abrogation of capital punishment is, so to speak, le bil-
> let d’entré—the ticket of admission—for the states that want to enter the
> European community.
> By contrast, the penal provisions of the Kitáb-i-Aqdas are based on the
> metaphysical principle of justice, “reward and punishment,” upon which
> “the structure of world stability and order hath been reared” (Bahá’u’lláh,
> Tablets 11:6).85 According to ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, the primary purpose of pun-
> ishment is retaliation and expiation,86 as well as the protection of socie-
> ty. The Kitáb-i-Aqdas ordains capital punishment in cases of intentional
> killing of a person (qatl = murder and homicide) and arson (par. 62). This
> raises the question as to the Bahá’í Faith’s attitude to the European
> Enlightenment.
> The anchorage of penal law in the metaphysical principle of justice,
> and thus the reaffirmation of the idea of expiation and retribution, can-
> not be denounced as a return to pre-Enlightenment positions. While it is
> true that some Enlightenment philosophers emphasized the idea of crime
> 20            The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006
> 
> prevention by deterrence and resocialization instead of retaliation, and
> demanded the abolition of both torture and the death penalty,87
> Immanuel Kant, who marked the epitome of European Enlightenment
> thinking, and subsequently Hegel (Philosophy of Right, §§ 97–102), were
> radical advocates of the principle of retribution (Kant, Metaphysics of
> Morals, Doctrine of Right) and of the death penalty. This was also the
> position upheld by Catholic and Protestant theology until the early
> 1960s.88 Even the Catholic world catechism published in 1993 (no. 2266)
> justifies the death penalty under certain circumstances.
> Furthermore, the message of Bahá’u’lláh can certainly be described as
> compatible with “Enlightenment values” with regard to many of its prin-
> ciples and demands, such as the unconditional dignity of every individual
> and the equality of all before the law; equality of the sexes; freedom of
> conscience, thought, and speech;89 the high esteem for human reason
> (‘aql) as “the most precious gift bestowed upon man” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris
> Talks 11:4);90 the abolition of the clergy; the democratic structure of the
> community; the preference for democratic forms of rule; the rejection of
> absolutism, tyranny, despotism, imperialism, colonialism, exploitation and
> religious fanaticism; as well as the protection of religious, political, and
> ethnic minorities. These are all positions upheld by Enlightenment
> thinkers. The vision of a federal world commonwealth in a peaceful glob-
> al order corresponds to Kant’s conviction “that at last . . . the highest pur-
> pose of nature, a universal cosmopolitan existence, will at last be realised
> as the matrix within which all the original capacities of the human race
> may develop” (Universal History prop. 8, p. 51) and that “the perpetual
> peace is no empty idea but a task” that “comes steadily closer to its goal”
> (Toward Perpetual Peace 391). Kant’s definition of the Enlightenment as
> “man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity” and his maxim,
> sapere aude (Horace)—“Have courage to use your own understanding!”
> (An Answer 54)—is remarkably similar to Bahá’u’lláh’s principle of the
> independent search for truth, according to which the people are admon-
> ished “to see with their own eyes and to hear with their own ears” (Kitáb-
> Íqán 176) and “know of thine own knowledge and not through the knowl-
> edge of thy neighbor” (Bahá’u’lláh, Hidden Words, Arabic 2). That this is
> Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics                           21
> 
> a fundamental principle with far-reaching implications for ethics becomes
> evident from the many warnings against “vain imitation” 91 and the
> implicit rejection of the Islamic principle of taqlíd,92 and of the necessi-
> ty of having a “moral guide”—a mujtahid or a shaykh—without whom
> human beings go astray, as al-Ghazali put it: “He who has no shaykh to
> guide him will be led by the Devil into his ways” (Qtd. in Abdullah 225).
> The “coming of age of the human race,” the “stage of maturity,” is a
> recurring theme in the revealed scripture. In this context it is highly sig-
> nificant when Bahá’u’lláh states: “No sooner had mankind attained the
> stage of maturity, than the Word revealed to men’s eyes the latent ener-
> gies with which it had been endowed. . . .” (Gleanings 33:2). Kant, through
> whom the European Enlightenment had reached its apex, died in 1804.
> Forty years later the Báb proclaimed His message.93
> The conflict between the two different sets of values—that of Western
> secular civilization and that of the Book of God is inevitable, and it will
> be a long time before humankind will accept that not “man is the measure
> of all things,” as the Greek philosopher Protagoras (d. 410 B.C.) stated, but
> that rather it is God’s unfathomable will that is the “infallible standard”
> (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 88:1) of all morality.
> 
> NOTES
> 
> This lecture was presented at the 26th Annual Conference of the Association
> for Bahá’í Studies–North America, 1 September 2002, Mississauga, Ontario,
> Canada.
> 1. Volume 1 of the book (Doctrinal Fundamentals) was published in 2007 by
> George Ronald, Oxford
> 2. From Latin mos, moris: custom, manner.
> 3. In this respect it resembles Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism. There is no
> “rage for defining,” for “dogmatising on questions of faith,” no tendency to “high
> flown speculations and sterile, abstract mysticism” such as prevailed in early
> Christianity (cf. Küng, Christianity and the World Religions 115). Moreover, the
> Bahá’ís are warned against “empty, profitless debates,” “useless hair-splittings and
> 22              The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006
> 
> disputes” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Secret 106), “fruitless excursions into metaphysical hair-
> splitting” (Shoghi Effendi, qtd. in Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas n. 110).
> 4. He emphasizes: “The most vital duty, in this day is to purify your charac-
> ters, to correct your manners, and improve your conduct” (qtd. in Shoghi Effendi,
> Advent 21).
> 5. Bahá’u’lláh does not want the book to be considered as a mere code: “Think
> not that We have revealed unto you a mere code of laws (ah. kam). Nay, rather, We
> have unsealed the choice Wine with the fingers of might and power” (Kitáb-i-
> Aqdas par. 5).
> 6. Schaefer, Towfigh, and Gollmer 340ff.
> 7. Saiedi has dealt with this issue at length (Logos and Civilization, 235ff.,
> 259ff.). He detects not “a series of hierarchical arrayed categories,” but “an organ-
> ic and graceful order” (236), based on “four constitutive principles that create the
> hermeneutic structure of the text. Each time a principle is introduced, diverse
> laws and commandments which are implications and expressions of the principle
> are mentioned. The Kitáb-i-Aqdas can be seen as a discourse on the metaphysical
> and spiritual principles which underlie the diverse legal and moral reflections of
> these principles” (238).
> 8. This is in accordance with Matt. 7:21: “Not every one that sayeth unto me
> Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of
> my Father which is in heaven.”
> 9. See also Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 139:8.
> 10. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, in Selections, exemplifies this injunction: “Should any one of
> you enter a city, he should become a centre of attraction by reason of his sincer-
> ity, his faithfulness and love, his honesty and fidelity, his truthfulness and loving-
> kindness towards all the peoples of the world. . . . Not until ye attain this station
> can ye be said to have been faithful to the Covenant and Testament of God”
> (35:5).
> 11. “A goodly character” (Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 6:3; 11:28), “a saintly character”
> (Tablets 6:4; Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 127:4), “a praiseworthy character” (Tablets 6:27;
> 17:91, Gleanings 147:2; 158), “an upright character” (Tablets 8:56; 15:11; Gleanings
> 158).
> 12. See also Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 138:5.
> 13. “Goodly deeds” (Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 43; Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets
> 15:11; 17:91, “praiseworthy deeds” (Tablets 8:56; 15:11), “pure deeds” (Tablets
> Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics                           23
> 
> 11:28; 15:11; Gleanings 43:4; 101; Bahá’u’lláh, Hidden Words, Persian 39), “holy
> deeds” (Gleanings 137:4; 43:4; 101), “deeds of stainless holiness” (Hidden Words,
> Persian 35, 69).
> 14. See also Bahá’u’lláh, Hidden Words, Persian 81, 5, 76; Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings
> 128:1; 139:8.
> 15. As asserted by the philosopher Charles Blount in his treatise, Summary
> Account of the Deist’s Religion (1695).
> 16. “Beatitudo ultimus finis humanae vitae” (Happiness is the last end of
> human life) See also Summa q. 90, a2.
> 17 See also Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 4:13.
> 18. Baruch de Spinoza formulated in his Ethica more geometrico (1677): “Blessed-
> ness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself ” (V, prop. 42).
> 19. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, in Star of the West, vol. 16, p. 404.
> 20. Cf. Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 120; Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Íqán 213–14;
> Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 9:4-5; 15:2; Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 133; 134; 137:4; 139:8;
> Bahá’u’lláh, Epistle 149; ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Secret 40, 55; ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Will and
> Testament 1:8, 23–24.
> 21. See ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Selections 225:3.
> 22. See also ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Secret 46, 60.
> 23. Cf. Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 99; 106:3. On this subject see Schaefer,
> Imperishable Dominion 206ff; Schaefer, Bahá’í Ethics 1:173ff.; Schaefer, Was ist der
> Mensch?, 49ff.
> 24. Rom. 9:15, 20.
> 25. “Omne aliud a Deo ideo est bonum, quia a Deo volitum, et non converso . . .
> Quia est bonum, ideo acceptatum” (Duns Scotus, op. Oxoniense IIId.19qu.1n.7).
> On the moral theology of Duns Scotus, see Welzel 66ff.
> 26. “Adeo enim summa est iustitiae regula Dei voluntas, ut quidquid eo ipso
> quod vult iustum habendum est” (Calvin III,23,2).
> 27. Cf. al-mut‘tazila, in Encylopedia Iranica 2:783–93. According to Hourani its
> literature “is all the more remarkable because it owes little to the Greeks except
> in an indirect and diffuse way.” It appears to him “as chronologically the second
> major occurance in history of a profound discussion on the meanings and gener-
> al content of ethical concepts, the first being that of the ancient Greek sophists
> and Plato” (21).
> 28. Abu’l-Has.an al-Ash‘arí was a leading conservative theologian in Sunni
> 24             The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006
> 
> Islam (260/873–324/935). An introduction to his work is given by Hourani
> (118–123). A summary of the controversies of both schools is provided by Saiedi:
> “These two schools took contradictory positions on five essential theological
> questions. First, the Mutazilites believed in the validity of reason and rational
> understanding. For them, the use of rational discourse to discover the hidden
> meanings of the verses of the Qur’án was necessary and valid. The Ash’arites, on
> the contrary, rejected the validity of reason and called for a blind and literal
> understanding of scripture—that is, the Qur’án and the Islamic traditions.
> Second, the rationalistic premises of the Mutazilites led them to maintain that
> God is a transcendental reality devoid of attributes and determinations.
> Ash’arites believed in an anthropomorphic God, with attributes taken to be real
> and literal, and not metaphorical. Third, the Mutazilites believed that the Word
> of God—the Qur’án—is not eternal and co-existent with God, but created and
> temporal. Hence for them, the verses of the Qur’án should be understood to be
> specific and applicable only to a relevant context. For the Ash’arites, however, the
> Qur’án was eternal and uncreated and, therefore, valid for any time, for any situ-
> ation, and in any context. Fourth, Mutazilites accepted the notion of the law of
> casuality and the laws of nature, while the Ash’arite theology casuality was mere-
> ly an illusion; every event in the world is directly created by the will of God, and
> nothing can be explained in naturalistic terms. Finally, Mutazilite theology
> admitted some freedom of will for individual human beings. Ash’arites advocat-
> ed a deterministic philosophy. Unfortunately for the cause of reason, the religious
> and political battle between the rationalist Mutazilites and the literalist
> Ash’arites was concluded in the eleventh century by a decisive victory of the
> Ash’arites” (“Faith, Reason and Society” 12). For a brief discussion of this debate,
> see Rahman.
> 29. On “the rationalist ethics of ‘Abd al-Jabbár,” see Hourani 98ff.
> 30. Hourani calls it “theistic subjectivism” (17).
> 31. Cf. 148, 183.
> 32. From Greek, theos: God, nomos: law.
> 33. Polytheism. Cf. Qur’án 4:48, 116; 31:13. See also Shorter Encyclopedia of
> Islam (SEI), 542ff.
> 34. A philosopher, Baruch de Spinoza, came to the same conclusion: “I confess
> that this opinion, which subjects all things to a certain indifferent will of God,
> Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics                            25
> 
> and makes all things depend on his good pleasure, is nearer the truth than that of
> those who maintain that God does all things for the sake of the good. For they
> seem to place something outside God, which does not depend on God, to which
> God attends, as a model, in what he does, and at which he aims, as at a certain
> goal. This is simply to subject God to fate. Nothing more absurd can be main-
> tained about God, whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause, both
> of the essence of all things, and of their existence” (The Ethics [Ethica more geo-
> metrico], I Proposition 33 [II/76]).
> 35. According to Thomas, the laws of the Decalogue belong to the natural law.
> 36. See Schaefer, Beyond the Clash 135ff., 147ff.
> 37. Cf. Baha’u’lláh, Gleanings 134:2; 133:2.
> 38. Qur’án 16:36; 35:24. According to Baha’u’lláh, Gleanings 87:1,6, there have
> been messengers sent down to mankind who have not been mentioned in the
> sacred scriptures, and revelation took place even before Adam.
> 39. See also Baha’u’lláh, Tablets 11:2.
> 40. Everywhere, even in “primitive” cultures, there are duties of parents
> towards their children, of children towards their parents; everywhere kindness,
> gratefulness, truthfulness, benevolence, rectitude are regarded as “good,” greed
> and covetousness, envy, cruelty, malice as “evil.”
> 41. This truth has been expressed by the declaration of the Parliament of the
> World’s Religions on 28 August 1993 in Chicago as a principle of a global ethic,
> according to which “there is already a consensus among the religions which can
> be the basis of a global ethic,” a “fundamental consensus on binding values, irrev-
> ocable standards, and personal attitudes” (Küng and Kuschel 18 and 21). For more
> on this subject, see Küng, Global Responsibility; Yes to a Global Ethic.
> 42. On this subject, see Schaefer, Beyond the Clash 114ff.
> 43. It is true that the existing religious moral systems are different in many
> aspects, but what they have in common exceeds their differences by far, even if the
> differences are more conspicuous because we regard their common features as self-
> evident. Revelation is related to the capacity of the people to whom it is directed,
> and this capacity differs according to their spiritual, cultural, and social develop-
> ment: “These principles and laws, these firmly-established and mighty systems,
> have proceeded from one Source, and are the rays of one Light. That they differ
> one from another is to be attributed to the varying requirements of the ages in
> 26              The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006
> 
> which they were promulgated” (Baha’u’lláh, Gleanings 132:1). On the relativity of
> the revelation, see Momen, “Relativism”; Schaefer, Beyond the Clash 131ff.
> 44. “[I]t is faith, knowledge, certitude, justice, piety, righteousness, trustworthi-
> ness, love of God, benevolence, purity, detachment, humility, meekness, patience
> and constancy. . . . These virtues of humanity will be renewed in each of the dif-
> ferent cycles; for at the end of every cycle the spiritual Law of God—that is to
> say, the human virtues—disappears, and only the form subsists” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá,
> Some Answered Questions 9–10).
> 45. On the horizontal dimension of the revelation see Schaefer, Beyond the Clash
> 137ff.
> 46. “The law of love” appears here as pars pro toto for the unchangeable “Law
> of God” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions 11:9).
> 47. Bahá’u’lláh, “Lawh.-i-Umm-i-Rah.im,” qtd. from Bahá’í Scripture 248f. (see
> also Esslemont 181).
> 48. Cf. Baha’u’lláh, Hidden Words, Arabic 3, 4-6.
> 49. On the “hidden God” (deus absconditus), see Schaefer, Beyond the Clash 122ff.;
> Lambden, “Background and Centrality.”
> 50. Cf. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions 45:2, where ‘Abdu’l-Bahá eluci-
> dates the two categories, “essential” and “conferred” infallibility. For more detail
> on the concept of infallibility, see Schaefer, Towfigh, and Gollmer 168ff and
> Schaefer, “Infallible Institutions?” 7–11.
> 51. Ma‘s. um, from ‘is. ma, infallibility.
> 52. Manifested in the verse: “Whoso recognizeth them hath recognized God.
> Whoso hearkeneth to their call, hath hearkened to the Voice of God, and whoso
> testifieth to the truth of their Revelation, hath testified to the truth of God
> Himself. Whoso turneth away from them, hath turned away from God, and
> whoso disbelieveth in them, hath disbelieved in God” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 21).
> 53. Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 47, 183; Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 8:17-19; ‘Abdu’l-
> Bahá, Some Answered Questions 45. On this subject, see also ch. 2:4.
> 54 . See Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas, par. 47, 162–63, 183.
> 55. See Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 8:17–19.
> 56. Cf. Qur’án 2:254, 22:14.
> 57. I. e., the Manifestation.
> 58. Cf. Qur’án 21:23.
> Some Aspects of Bahá’í Ethics                             27
> 
> 59. This doctrine is also the subject of Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 8:17-19.
> 60. An imaginary fixed point outside the earth, after a legendary saying by
> Archimedes: “Give me a place to stand and I will move the earth.”
> 61. See also Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 17:34, 45.
> 62. Qur’án 1:6; Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 4:8, 5:17.
> 63. Bahá’u’lláh, qtd. in Introduction to the Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 6.
> 64. Cf. Luke 17:1; Mat. 18:7; Gal. 5:11. The underlying Greek word skandalon
> means originally a snare, something that causes people to stumble.
> 65. Cf. I Cor. 1:28.
> 66. Refer to my essay “‘The Balance Hath Been Appointed’” 46ff. and Schaefer,
> Towfigh, and Gollmer 411ff.
> 67. Bahá’u’lláh, qtd. in Shoghi Effendi, World Order 109.
> 68. These fears “should indeed be likened to the cries of the suckling babe
> weaned from his mother’s milk” (Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 88).
> 69. Their knowledge is “like the cognizance and consciousness man has of him-
> self ” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions 40:4).
> 70. “For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways,
> saith the Lord” (Isaiah 55:8).
> 71. Cf. SEI, s.v. “Sharí‘a,” 525.
> 72 . See also Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 8:30; 9:11; 11:41.
> 73. See ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks 9:20; 17:10; 22:4-5.
> 74. See also Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 131:3.
> 75. See also ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks 31:5.
> 76. Sharaha; cf. Qurán 6:125; 94:2.
> 77. Cf. Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 5:5; 6:56.
> 78. Individualism is the view according to which the individual, his interests,
> and rights are superior to those of the society and the state. Liberalism is the doc-
> trine that individual freedom in economic enterprise should not be restricted by
> government or social regulation (laissez faire).
> 79. Cf. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks 47:5.
> 80. Cf. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Secret 2, 3, 20, 32, 97, 103; ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks 47:5.
> 81. In the English edition of the Kitáb-i-Aqdas (par. 19, 49) reductionistically
> translated as “adultery.”
> 82. In an unpublished tablet quoted in a letter of the Universal House of
> 28             The Journal of Bahá’í Studies 16. 1/4. 2006
> 
> Justice to the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States
> dated 11 September 1995.
> 83. Such as Cyprian, Tertullian, Hieronymus, Augustine, and others, with ref-
> erence to I Cor. 7:1ff.
> 84. For further details, see Schaefer, Imperishable Dominion 175ff.
> 85. See also Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 3:25 and 8:61.
> 86. Cf. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Selections 152; ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions 77:2-
> 3, 6-10. On this subject see Schaefer, “Crime and Punishment” 51.
> 87. The great Italian jurist Cesare Beccaria who lived in the eighteenth centu-
> ry was the first to plead for this goal in his work Dei delitti e delle pene (1764).
> 88. Lexicon 1986, vol. 9, col. 1097, with reference to the dictum Punitur quia pec-
> catum est.
> 89. See ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Promulgation 197.
> 90. See also ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks 23:8; Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 83:1; 95:1;
> ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Secret 1.
> 91. Cf. Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 75:1; 84:2; Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets 10:23, etc.
> 92. SEI 562ff.; Halm 118ff., 133ff.; Momen, Introduction 175.
> 93. Cf. Bahá’u’lláh, Kitáb-i-Aqdas par. 189; Bahá’u’lláh, Gleanings 33:2.
> 
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> — *Some Aspects of Baha'i Ethics (Used by permission of the curator)*