# The Archeology of the Kingdom of God *Exported from [Holy-Writings.com](https://www.holy-writings.com/) on 2026-06-20 — 1 clipping.* --- > Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Jean-Marc Lepain, The Archeology of the Kingdom of God, bahai-library.com. > ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── > > The Archeology of the Kingdom of God > > originally published in French as > > Archéologie du royaume de Dieu: > Ontologie des mondes divins dans les écrits de Baha'u'llah > > Jean-Marc Lepain, author > > Peter Terry, translator > > ————— > > DEDICATION > > To the memory of Dr. 'Ali Murad Davudi, philosopher, martyr. > > “As for the question concerning the worlds of God, know that in truth that these worlds > are infinite in their number as much as in their extent. No one can count or embrace them, > except for God, the Omniscient, the Most Wise.” > > — Baha’u’llah (1817-1892) > ————— > > TABLE OF CONTENTS > > FOREWORD > > INTRODUCTION > > 1. Philosophical and mystical character of the work of Baha’u’llah > 2. Baha’u’llah, his life and his work > 3. The philosophy of Baha’u’llah > 4. From hermeneutics to ontology > 5. The hermeneutical question > 6. Problems and methods > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > FIRST PART: HERMENEUTICS > > CHAPTER I. In search of the Kingdom > > 1. The Kingdom as intelligible structure > 2. The Tablet of All Food > 3. The hierarchy of the divine worlds > 4. The world of Hahut > 5. The world of Lahut > 6. The world of Jabarut > 7. The world of Malakut > 8. Malakut as a metaphorical world > 9. The unity of the divine worlds > 10. The infinite continuum of the divine worlds > 11. The Tablet of Haqqu'n-Nas > 12. Hermeneutical character of the nomenclature of the divine worlds > > CHAPTER II. The Kingdom of Abha > > 1. The Kingdom of Abha as the world of the spirits > 2. The mystery of preexistence > 3. The soul and the world > 4. The three spheres of Malakut > 5. The leaven which makes the world rise > > CHAPTER III. The Aramaic origins of the nomenclature of the divine worlds > > 1. Malakut in the Qur'an > 2. The Kingdom in Jewish tradition > 3. The Kingdom of the heavens in the Gospel > 4. The tenth sefirah in the Kabbala > 5. Leibniz and Malkut > > CHAPTER IV. The divine worlds in the tradition of Islam > > 1. The lexigraphical origins of Hahut, Lahut and Nasut > 2. The couplet Lahut-Nasut according to al-Hallaj > 3. The metaphysical system of al-Makki > 4. The divine worlds according to al-Ghazali > 5. The influence of al-Suhrawardi > 6. Ibn al-'Arabi > 7. Jabarut as the world of decree > 8. Malakut as the angelic world > 9. The school of Isfahan > 10. Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > CHAPTER V. The divine worlds in the work of Baha’u’llah > > 1. Hermeneutical aspects > 2. Vocabulary > 3. Malakut > 4. The Kingdom of Creation > 5. The Kingdom of Names > 6. The Kingdom of the Visible and of the Invisible > 7. Jabarut > 8. Malakut associated with Jabarut > 9. The world of Revelation, of Commandment and of imperative theology > 10. The world of Mulk or world below > 11. The superior worlds > 12. Hahut and Lahut > > CHAPTER VI. The divine worlds as theophany > > 1. Theophanic hierarchy and ontological hierarchy > 2. The divine worlds in the Tablet of Varqa > 3. The primal will > 4. Volition, capacity and power > 5. The archetypes of time > 6. The time of the soul > 7. The three metaphysical worlds > 8. The condition of servitude and of lordship > > SECOND PART: THEOSOPHY > > CHAPTER VII. Gnosis and the interior transformation of man > > 1. Gnosis and reality > 2. The veiled reality > 3. The three conditions of the true seeker > 4. The three kinds of gnosis > 5. Gnosis as knowledge of the divine Manifestations > 6. The unity of spiritual understanding > 7. Certitude > > CHAPTER VIII. Hermeneutics and theosophy of the divine worlds > > 1. The macrocosmic man and the anthropic Spirit > 2. The theophany of the divine Names > 3. Anagogic hermeneutics and interpretation > 4. From the active imagination to the spiritual vision > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > 5. Exotericism and esotericism > 6. The limits of spiritual hermeneutics > 7. A Baha’i theosophy > 8. The supreme Talisman > 9. Man as the foundation of knowledge > 10. The knowledge of self and the knowledge of God > 11. The alchemy of the divine Elixir > > CHAPTER IX. Philosophical consequences of Baha’i theosophy > > 1. Revelation and tradition > 2. The age of maturity > 3. Process of individuation and process of spiritualization > 4. Meditation and the spiritual hermeneutic > 5. Reason and the re-enchantment of the world > 6. The divine worlds and the angelic hierarchies > 7. New aspects of the cosmo-anthropic principle > 8. The Pleroma and the active imagination > 9. Heuristic consequences of the speculative theology of the divine Names > 10. The transcendence of the discursive and intuitive thought > 11. Excursion in scholasticism > > CHAPTER X. Philosophical consequences of Baha’i psychology > > 1. Metaphysics and psychology > 2. The psychology of the Old Testament > 3. The soul according to the Church Fathers > 4. First considerations of Origenism > 5. The doctrine of the Syriacs > 6. The spirit and the breath > 7. The Spirit of Faith > 8. The tribulations of the soul from Plato to Origen > 9. New tribulations from St. Thomas Aquinas to Descartes > 10. The spirituality of the soul > 11. The nature of the soul and the theology of knowledge > 12. The union of the soul and the body > 13. The conscience and the divine self > > THIRD PART: METAPHYSICS > > CHAPTER XI. The philosophical and technical vocabulary of Baha’u’llah > > 1. A unique problem in religious history > 2. The cultural heritage > 3. Technical aspects of the vocabulary of Baha’u’llah > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > 4. The implicit character of the metaphysics of Baha’u’llah > 5. The Neoplatonic influence in Persian culture > > CHAPTER XII. The evolution of Neoplatonism from its origins to Baha’u’llah > > 1. The Neoplatonism of Plotinus > 2. The Neoplatonic problematics > 3. The One, principle of all things > 4. The Intelligence > 5. The Soul > 6. The Procession > 7. The Emanation > 8. The pseudo-Theology of Aristotle > 9. The book of Causes > 10. Al-Kindi > 11. Al-Farabi > 12. Ibn Sina > 13. Baha’u’llah and the hellenistic philosophy > > CHAPTER XIII. The emanationist metaphysic of Baha’u’llah > > 1. The divine Verb as Being > 2. The Baha’i concept of emanation > 3. Speculative theology > 4. Emanation and manifestation > 5. The function of the concept of emanation > 6. The refutation of the system of the hypostases > 7. The divine Verb as ontological cause > 8. The world of the Aeon > 9. Speculative theology and the divine Verb > > CHAPTER XIV. The World of the Manifestation > > 1. The divine manifestation as mirror of the essence of God > 2. The veritable divine unicity > 3. The Alpha and the Omega > 4. Progressive Revelation > 5. Progressive Revelation and the axiological hermeneutics > 6. The World of Revelation > 7. The divine Word > 8. The primal Will and the Countenance of God > > CHAPTER XV. The nature of the sensible universe > > 1. The first nature of the universe > 2. Sensible realities and intelligible realities > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > CHAPTER XVI. The world of spiritual realities > > 1. The Commentary on the Hidden Treasure > 2. The station of the Hidden Treasure and the Absconditum > 3. The mirror of the divine science > 4. Love as the manifestation of the divine essence > 5. Love as the organizer in principle of the Cosmos > 6. The mode of existence of the hierarchy of essences and their speculative character > 7. The question of the adventicity of the essential realities > 8. Ontology and language > 9. The essential degrees > 10. The spiritual realities > 11. The unity of the created world > > CHAPTER XVII. The world of images > > 1. The spiritual images, forms and realities > 2. The hermeneutical scheme of the deployment of the essences > 3. The spiritual realities of the world of images > 4. The image realities and the cosmic laws > 5. The world of images as intermediary world > 6. The place of the active imagination > 7. The nature of Nature > > CONCLUSION > > BIBLIOGRAPHY > > ————— > > FOREWORD > > The Occident has believed for several centuries that Islamic philosophy was lost in the sands of the > desert after the death of Averroes (Ibn Rushd)1. It required all the talent and erudition of Henri > > Translator’s Notes: > This electronic publication is with the permission of the author Jean-Marc Lepain, the translator, and the > publisher Kalimat Press. > As much as possible, a consistent use of bold, italics and underlining has been employed throughout this > volume in order to facilitate the ease of its perusal. All terms in Arabic and Persian are rendered in > italics, except for the names of persons and places and movements or communities, which will not be > italicized. All references to written documents, be they epistles (Tablets, letters), commentaries, articles > or books will be cited in quotation marks. Virtually no accents have been used in rendering the Arabic > and Persian words; the alternative to omitting accents was to be consistent in providing accents and that > would have entailed a great deal of unnecessary labor, which is not in any case conducive to a better > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Corbin to reveal to the French public, that at the very moment when the great Andalusian > civilization disappeared, and when the Maghrib (North Africa) and the Mashriq (Near East) > slumbered in torpidity, there appeared in Persia with Suhrawardi, a flowering of new Schools that > were to carry universal philosophy to one of its summits. In his principal work, “En Islam Iranien,” > Corbin has retraced for us all of this course from the first Suhrawardian treatises to the Shaykhi > School and he was one of the first to do justice to the founder of this School, Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i. > It is to be feared furthermore that our misunderstanding of the civilizations of the Orient is impelling > us to repeat the same injustice as our fathers, who imagined that Islamic philosophy perished with > Ibn Rushd, and that we continue to ignore the extraordinary spiritual revolution which Persia > witnessed in the 19th century. > > An always greater number of studies published in the four corners of the world has progressively > shown us the historical importance of the Babi, and then the Baha’i movement, not only for Persia, > but in a general manner for the religious history of humanity. It is practically a unique case in which > independent observers have been able to observe the birth of a religion which has progressively > liberated itself from the cultural context in which it was born to take up a truly universal dimension. > The historical studies devoted to this phenomena, often based upon the analysis of the political and > social thought of the Baha’i writings, have moreover and for a long time masked from us the > philosophical importance of these texts, and their mystical dimension. > > Historians have not been able to ignore the important consequences which the emergence of a > movement heterodox to Islam had in the Middle East, its repercussions upon the life of the States > and its diffusion well beyond the frontiers of the cultural world in which it was born. But it is feared > that insufficient attention has been accorded to the spiritual and philosophical bases of this > movement. If certain studies have been devoted to the influence of Baha’i ideas in the process of > social transformation, we do not know of any study of the mysticism, the metaphysics or the > philosophy of Baha’u’llah2. Certain articles have nevertheless permitted to see the richness which > this immense work contained, which is to a large degree unpublished.3 > > INTRODUCTION > > 1. Philosophical and mystical character of the work of Baha’u’llah > > The work of Baha’u’llah represents one of the very rare attempts in several centuries to extract > philosophy from a problem born of the confrontation between Plato and Aristotle; between platonic > idealism of which we know the heritage up to Hegel, and the pragmatic realism of Aristotle which > > understanding of the text. Footnotes and endnotes already possessing the accents have been retained > without modification. > Translator’s Note: Baha’u’llah is the ceremonial, spiritual name adopted by Mirza Husayn ‘Ali Nuri. > ‘Abdu’l-Baha is the ceremonial, spiritual name adopted by ‘Abbas Effendi, the eldest son of Baha’u’llah. > It is these ceremonial names that are already recognized worldwide, and so they are utilized throughout > this study. There are no capitalizations of personal pronouns, except in references to God. > See for example the article of Alessandro Bausani in “The Encyclopedia of Islam”; see also in the > Bibliography, the articles of Moojan Momen, Juan Ricardo Cole and Stephen Lambden. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > impregnates the greater part of twentieth century philosophy; between the philosophies of > transcendence and the philosophies of immanence. In doing so, Baha’u’llah assigns philosophy a > new task, that of effecting the synthesis between the different modes of man's knowledge, between > the intuitive knowledge appropriate to his interior and his spiritual life, and the discursive knowledge > appropriate to empirical and scientific knowledge. For, finally, the purpose of philosophy is nothing > other than to permit man to know the reality of the universe and to know himself. In this sense, the > aim of philosophy is not different from that of religion and of science. Philosophy enables religion to > be intelligible to science and science intelligible to religion, and to create between them a fecund > dialectical relationship, capable of engendering almost increasing intelligibility, so that science does > not fall into the mire of materialism, so that spirituality does not lose itself in the swamps of > subjectivism, and so that religious tradition does not become fossilized in any form of dogmatism > [integrisme] blind and destructive to the interiority of man. > > Attempting to discover this philosophy of Baha’u’llah is not an easy affair, for the work of > Baha’u’llah is of an essentially mystic nature. It speaks to the heart before speaking to the rational > faculty. It affirms itself to be impenetrable to him who is not engaged in the path of his own interior > transformation. Furthermore, this bewildering work was composed in Persian and in Arabic at a > time when these languages did not yet employ the modern terminology with which they are endowed > today, and it is expressed in a style close to the literary conventions of that time and in a language > marked by centuries of a culture which, in the eyes of many Westerns, appears today to be disused. > > The result is that the reader who opens for the first time a work by Baha’u’llah, not knowing his > intuitive and quasi-gnostic method of depicting things, could believe that this was just another of > those books of Oriental spirituality which teach nothing that is really new. The result risks being > worse yet if this is a specialist in Persian or Arabic literature, for he will be tempted immediately to > interpret these writings according to what he knows of the vocabulary and the phraseology of the > Islamic philosophical schools, and to ignore thereby the new problematic evoked by Baha’u’llah. > Nevertheless, nobody can remain insensible to the poetic beauty of the writing of Baha’u’llah. This > formal beauty has always accompanied the expression of the great visionaries, and it constitutes the > most certain trait of a genius which transcends the expression of the words. If this reason was the > only one, may it be sufficient for this work to merit being known by the general public. > > We can regret that the French Orientalists have not played here their role and that they have > preferred to ignore this magisterial work. To study it has necessitated a certain courage, for > unfortunately, in all the countries of the Middle East, the work of Baha’u’llah is forbidden > publication and his adepts are still persecuted. The censure and the repressive measures with which > authoritarian governments afflict the work of a man who is deceased for over a century, demonstrate > to what an extent this work has retained all of its actuality. > > It is thus entirely regrettable that the French public, with the exception of certain apologetic or > polemical works4, has not had the possibility of access to a comprehensive work which presents him, > > For example, in French: Hippolyte Dreyfus, “Essai sur le Bahá’ísme,” Charles Hakim, “Les Bahá’ís ou > victoire sur la violence,” Charles Canuyer, “Les Bahá’ís.” Only the investigation of two French journalists, > C. Gouvion and Philippe Jouvion, “Les Jardiniers de Dieu; A la rencontre de cinq millions de Bahá’ís” > seems to be an investigation relatively free of all prejudices. For more detailed references see the > Bibliography. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > with all the necessary rigor, the life, the work and the thought of Baha’u’llah. Let us say right away, > that for reasons which we have explained in the Foreword, this book does not have as its objective > the filling of this gap. One could even accuse us of having undertaken this presentation by the wrong > end of the opera-glasses (binoculars). The question of the ontology of the divine worlds can seem > altogether minor in the work of Baha’u’llah. But this question, minor in appearance, permits us to > raise a span of his metaphysics, while leaving aside questions which will certainly necessitate years of > research before being settled. > > This study will permit us, we hope, to put an end to a certain number of prejudices which are widely > held by certain Orientalists or specialists in the religious sciences, who wish to situate Baha’u’llah in > the category of “social reformers,” implying that for the rest, Baha’u’llah did nothing other than > repeat a certain number of the common places of philosophy and of mysticism. Some have believed > to find in him an important heritage of Falsafa and of Hellenistic philosophy, others have us look at > Ibn 'Arabi, at Suhrawardi and at Sufism. This underlines the light in which for a long time we have > remained concerning the metaphysical opinions of Baha’u’llah. This situation is explained by the > fact that what most struck the Orientalists of the last century, like E.G. Browne, Baron Victor > Rosen, Thomas Cheynes, Ignaz Goldziher and Armin Vambery, was the “progressive” character of > the social ideas of Baha’u’llah. Even Hippolyte Dreyfus in his “Essai sur le Baha’isme” (1909), insists > upon what he calls “the social import.” Those who wished to go further were struck by certain > similarities in language and were contented with a superficial reading of a few texts. > > As for similitudes of language, there obviously exist such between Baha’u’llah and the theological, > philosophical and mystical schools which preceded him. Baha’u’llah was born in a world which had > a rich cultural and spiritual tradition; he made use of all of the resources which were offered to him > by the culture of his time. It is thus normal that he should have recourse to the technical vocabulary > of philosophy and mysticism. But the danger is to believe that identified these terms, we have > necessarily progressed in our comprehension. Baha’u’llah often profoundly transformed the > meaning of the words and the expressions which he employed. He formulated his ideas with a great > prudence so as not to shock the conservative elements of society. This explains that he advanced > revolutionary ideas while at the same time using a formulation which gives them the appearance of > tradition and of orthodoxy. His metaphysic of the divine worlds gives us the best example of this. > > He who approaches for the first time the original language of the text of the “Tablet of All Food”— > the text which will serve as the point of departure for our investigation—could believe that he is in > the presence of what is for him a very familiar vocabulary. This vocabulary is none other than that > of the “five presences” which constitute a theory which is well known in Islamic ontology- > cosmology, the origins of which are found in Ghazali and al-Makki, but the completion of which > was not achieved until some centuries after them. This theory, centered upon the Angelic World, or > “Malakut,” had a great influence as much upon the Ishraqis and the later philosophical systems, as > upon Sufism which made an abundant utilization thereof. A somewhat hurried enquirer might then > conclude that Baha’u’llah's metaphysic of the divine worlds is directly related to this well-known > theory of the “five presences,” and that apart from certain questions of nuance, his system does not > present anything original in comparison with what was said before him. > > This first impression could be reinforced by the very abundant usage which Baha’u’llah made of this > very particular vocabulary in numerous writings where we very frequently find the terms which > designate these worlds, like “Nasut,” “Malakut,” “Jabarut,” “Lahut” and “Hahut.” However, he who > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > would make the effort to study the texts in greater depth must face three principal problems. The > first is that in the “Tablet of All Food,” as in other texts in which we encounter the same vocabulary, > the typology of the divine worlds is used in a context which has no metaphysical implication. > The second problem will arise if the enquirer perceives that there exist in the work of Baha’u’llah an > abundance of different worlds such as the world of the Visible and of the Invisible, the world of the > Command, the world of invention, and he will have the greatest difficulty in articulating these > worlds with the theory of the five presences. Finally, the enquirer would encounter a certain number > of metaphysical affirmations which are at the same time impossible to describe and totally > incompatible with the preceding theories. A more subtle approach will show us that Baha’u’llah has > made use of a typology of the divine worlds in a manner that is totally foreign to metaphysics, and > will show us that, in the case of the “Tablet of All Food,” the utilization which Baha’u’llah makes of > this terminology is purely hermeneutical. > > One of the fundamental aspects of the teaching of Baha’u’llah resides in his conception of the divine > Word and the mystical experience as a hermeneutic of the world. One of our efforts will consist > precisely in encompassing the meaning of this hermeneutics. We will see as well that the utilization > which Baha’u’llah makes of this typology is not limited only to this hermeneutical utilization. In the > course of our study, we will devote two chapters to the development of the nomenclature of the > divine worlds, from its Aramaic origins until its definitive elaboration in the seventeenth century. > > This theological-cosmological conception was formed slowly as by sedimentation, and every epoch > has left its trace as much in its vocabulary as in its theoretical elaboration. But, that which strikes us > in the utilization of this typology by Baha’u’llah, is that it is not connected to a single specific period. > Sometimes Baha’u’llah utilizes the bipolarity “Nasut-Lahut” in a sense which is very Hallaj-like, > sometimes he seems to restrict his horizon to the triad “Nasut-Malakut-Jabarut” of Ghazali, sometimes > finally he seems to make allusion to a more evolved stage of typology. This brings us to bring to the > fore one of the characteristics of the Writings of Baha’u’llah. These do not allow themselves to be > enclosed in a system of language in which the words have a previously codified definition. > > The definition of the metaphysical and mystical terms utilized by Baha’u’llah is not found in a norm > exterior to the work; it is not found even in the work itself as a whole, but is unceasingly redefined in > relation to each text. The meaning of the texts is rarely univocal. Baha’u’llah wanted an abundance > of meaning. For, as he said, not only is there a meaning for every enquirer, but furthermore there is > a meaning for each spiritual state which the enquirer is destined to traverse. The meaning of the text > is not found then in an absolute normative truth, but is relative to the subjectivity of each individual. > > The work of Baha’u’llah can be read at different levels. That one who should wish to find there > nothing but inspiration, will penetrate it without difficulty if he does not allow himself to be blinded > by scholastic rationalism. That one who should wish thereafter to deepen this thought, will certainly > perceive that this is not easily enclosed by the narrow limits of our comprehension. From there open > two paths: that of the mystical enquirer who lets himself be guided by his intuition, and that of the > academic enquirer who will be rapidly confronted with a multitude of linguistic, philological, > methodological and philosophical problems of which we can only give here a vague idea. In any > case, we think that the voyage merits being undertaken. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > 2. Baha’u’llah, his life and his work > > Baha’u’llah was born on 12 November 1817 in Tihran5. He descended from an illustrious family > which traced its heritage to a local dynasty, that of the Ispahbudan, and through this, to the prophet > Zoroaster. His ancestors had for a long time lived the life of country gentlemen in the district of Nur > where they possessed important domains. The assumption of power by the Qajar dynasty in 1798, > and the foundation of Tihran shortly thereafter, was to change the course of their life. The new > capital and the royal court which was established there, lacked competent persons to make > functional the machinery of the State. This new situation was to convince the grandfather of > Baha’u’llah to install himself at Tihran, where he occupied important functions and where he ended > in possessing a prosperous and influential position. His son, heir of his title of “High clerk” (Mirza > Buzurg) and acquired the much sought after position of “vazir,” a title which does not designate a > minister as is all too often believed, but the special secretary and intendant of the finances of one of > the princes who shared amongst them the government of the provinces of the Kingdom. Baha’u’llah > was thus promised to the soft life of the court, having the choice either of assuming the quasi- > hereditary charge of his father, or of living in leisure (idleness) due to the comfortable revenues > procured from the villages which his family had acquired in the neighborhood of the capital. > However, something altogether different was to be the destiny chosen by him who was then known > only by the name of Mirza Husayn ‘Ali Nuri. > > As often for those who are promised a great spiritual destiny, the signs of his election were > manifested very early, at the same time by a penetrating intelligence, a temperament given to > meditation, and a predisposition to defy social conventions. Baha’u’llah was but an adolescent, when > already he did not hesitate to denounce social injustice, the corruption of certain political > personalities and the hypocrisy of certain members of the clergy, to the point where the prime > minister, embarrassed by such a disruptive person, dreamed of making him join his government in > order to sober him, which, obviously, he refused. > > When he attained seventeen years of age, Husayn ‘Ali married Navvab, the daughter of another > vazir [minister], who was to remain his faithful companion to the end of his days. From this > moment, he decided to retire from public life, neglecting to appear at court, in order to undertake a > life entirely consecrated to meditation and to pious and charitable acts which were already noted by > the little people and which contributed to his nascent popularity. > > A tenfold years flowed by in this way, when, on the [22nd] of May 1844, in the town of Shiraz an > event took place that was to upset the history of Persia, and the influence of which has perhaps not > yet been completely measured. > > Some months earlier, Siyyid Kazim Rashti, the master of the Shaykhi School—which had been > founded forty years earlier by Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i—died at Karbala in 'Iraq. At the moment of > his death, Siyyid Kazim refused to name a successor. Upon his death bed he affirmed that the > hidden Imam, the Promised One awaited by all the Shi'is, the appearance of whom would > announce eschatological times, this Promise so much awaited, was already in the world. He > > For the life of Bahá’u’lláh one can refer to the basic work of Shoghi Effendi, “God Passes By,” as well as to > the two biographies of Hasan Balyuzi, “Bahá’u’lláh, the Word made Flesh,” and “Bahá’u’lláh, King of > Glory,” which are very well documented. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > ordained for his disciples to disperse as soon as he passed away in all directions, so that, perhaps, > God might guide those whose hearts were pure, that they might encounter him whom the true > Shi'is, for generations, had prayed to God to hasten for centuries in vain. > > It is thus that a little group of disciples, conducted by Mulla Husayn Bushru'i, on [22] May 1844 > entered the town of Shiraz. It is there, that, during the first evening of his sojourn, a young merchant > of twenty-[four] years, being called Siyyid 'Ali Muhammad, announced to Mulla Husayn, that he > was the Promised One: declaring that he was “the Bab”, that is to say “the Door”, and that he, > Mulla Husayn, was to be “the Babu'l-Bab”, that is to say “the Door of the Door,” through which > would enter all those who would believe in him. Finally he declared, that his mission carried a > universal message addressed to all the nations, faithful and infidel, without distinction of race or of > belief, and that he came to announce the coming of one greater than him for whom he was charged > only with preparing the way, “Him Whom God shall make manifest” (Man Yuzhiruhu'llah), for > according to the Shi'i tradition of Islam, after the Qa'im—a term which one can translate by “He > who arises” or “the Resurrector”—must appear the Qayyum, “the Eternal”, “the Ancient of Days”. > > A short time thereafter, he announced to his first disciples his intention to go to Mecca to proclaim > his mission to the Guardian of the sacred places there. During his absence, he asked them all to go > from town to town announcing the appearance of the Promised One. Alone to Mulla Husayn, he > confided a special mission. He gave him a letter and directed him to go to Tihran where divine > inspiration would indicate to him whom he should remit this message. It is thus that having arrived > at Tihran and having determined the identity of all the persons possessing remarkable degrees of > wisdom or virtue, Mulla Husayn acquired the inner conviction that this message could not be > addressed to anyone but Baha’u’llah. He went to his home and gave him the autograph message of > the Bab in the presence of his brother Mirza Musa. Having taken account of the text, Baha’u’llah > turned to his brother and declared: > > “Musa, what do you say? In truth, I tell you, he who believes in the Qur'an, who recognizes > its divine character, and who nonetheless hesitates, be it but for an instant, to admit that > these moving utterances are endowed with the same regenerative power, is assuredly > mistaken in his judgment and has deviated far from the path of justice.”6 > > From this moment on, and during the six years which followed until the martyrdom of the Bab at > Tabriz on 9 July 1850, the life of Baha’u’llah was caught up with the Babi movement, the history of > which we will not try to retrace here. During these six years, Baha’u’llah retained with the Bab this > privileged relationship which had been so mysteriously inaugurated by the first epistle brought by > Mulla Husayn. Shortly after his return from Mecca, the Bab was no longer anything but a prisoner > relegated from prison to prison in places increasingly distant. It was the eighteen first disciples, called > “Letters of the Living” who administered the Babi community and Baha’u’llah who assured its > spiritual direction, while remaining in the shadow. His role was particularly crucial at the time of the > “conference of Badasht” where, at his initiative, the principal Babi personalities were gathered with > the intention of proclaiming the abolition of Islamic law and the total independence of the Babi > religion from Islam. > > Nabil-i-Zarandi, “The Chronicle of Nabil” p. 101. Nabil-i-Zarandi who was the chronicler of Bahá’u’lláh, > bases himself on the memories of Mirza Musa, the brother of Bahá’u’lláh, in reporting this event to us. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > The Bab began by throwing into confusion Islamic theology and with reinterpreting the Qur'an in a > totally different manner than that of [Islamic] tradition. He explained that the resurrection of the > dead was not a resurrection of the body, but a spiritual resurrection which caused the believer to be > delivered from the death of this life to an eternal life that is purely that of the spirit. He taught that > neither paradise nor hell-fire existed, for what existed were spiritual states in which the believer was > more or less separated from God. He explained that the end of time was but an allegorical figure to > designate the end of a world, that is to say, of a cycle of civilization. Muhammad was presented as > the last of the “prophets” to prophecy (nabi), but not as the last of the “Messengers” (rasul), as attested > the expression “Seal of the prophets” (khatam al-nabiyyin) which applies to the minor prophets, the > nabi, and not to the appearance of a new law capable of abrogating that of the Qur'an and the > revelation of a new sacred text susceptible to be substituted to that revealed by the archangel Gabriel > to Muhammad. The signs of the end of time mentioned by the Qur'an were interpreted in a purely > symbolic manner. > > All of his principles were thus of an unheard-of audacity. They upset Persian society more surely > than any political or economic reform could do so today. Daring to touch, even in declaring himself > a prophet of God, what was considered one of the intangible principles of Islam, that God Himself > could not change, was to introduce a subversive element in human thought that, according to the > Persian clergy, no temporal or religious authority could tolerate. > > The work of Baha’u’llah is not, of course, without kinship with that of the Bab. This does not mean > however that Baha’u’llah did no more than develop and explicate the message of the Bab. The work > of Baha’u’llah distinguishes itself from that of the Bab upon at least two levels. In first place, the > work of Baha’u’llah encompasses a political and social dimension which, without being absent in the > Bab, do not reveal the same character. An entire portion of the message of Baha’u’llah would be > centered upon the process of development of civilization with its cycles organized according to an > organic model, the interpretation in historical terms of the spiritual destiny of man, the finality of > human existence placed in the perspective of the social future, the advent of a world order which > integrates the vertical dimension of the transcendence with the horizontal dimension of the > development of civilizations, the relationship between the process of individuation and the process of > spiritualization, etc. > > In second place, the work of Baha’u’llah does not appear to be as marked by Shi'i culture. In > “preparing the way” the Bab accomplished a work of “deconstruction”. He liberated the Muslim > from secular prejudices cultivated by centuries of obscurantism. The first Babis were still prisoners of > the cultural model of Shi'ism. He lived the advent of this new Revelation like a repetition of the > drama of Karbala where the armies of the khalif Yazid killed the Imam Husayn and his family. He > taught them less to grasp the universal implications of this new message than to bring to light the > meaning of certain obscure verses of the Qur'an. Their thought was still turned towards the past. > > The genius of the Bab was to have understood and to have provided his adepts a key which, once > mastered, gives a new meaning to history, justifies the endurance of sufferings, and reveals the > essentially transcendental value of the spiritual destiny of man. But it is Baha’u’llah to whom it was > given to illuminate the future. > > The proclamation of the Bab had an immense repercussion throughout Persia and even beyond. > The new faith soon counted tens, then hundreds of thousands of adepts. Diplomatic dispatches > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > estimated that a third perhaps of the population manifested a penchant for the new doctrine7. The > rapid progress of the new faith struck the Muslim clergy with panic, and everywhere they raised an > immense clamor, called for holy war and declared that to spill the blood of the impious was a pious > act. Even the Shah began to fear that such a powerful movement might only finish by taking his > throne. The first martyrs fell. Bit by bit a climate of civil war was established. > > The clergy, who had always contested the royal power, and who claimed to rule the life of the State > as the only interpreters of the will of the hidden Imam, in order to save its influence and its > privileges, sealed an unnatural alliance with the political power which it had so much denigrated. An > immense repression was unleashed upon the entire population; a repression that was to result in > more than twenty thousand deaths in the space of a few years. It was only at this price that the > progress of Babism could be arrested. The Bab was shot, the “Letters of the Living” decimated, the > elite of the movement hounded and delivered to the executioners to die in the most frightful and > spectacular tortures. Every person found in the possession of a writing of the Bab was rendered with > a sentence of death, to be executed immediately. > > Towards 1852, Nasiri'd-Din Shah and the Shi'i clergy could believe that they had accomplished > their aims. The mass of the people, whose fanaticism had been excited, and whose most base > instincts had been solicited, had turned away from the movement, as soon as it had understood that > the Babis were not disposed to take the lead in a social revolution against the feudal order. From this > deception fifty years later the constitutional Revolution was to be born, which seems to have been a > secularized version of the ideas of the Bab and Baha’u’llah, mixed with the theories of the Century > of Lights and of parliamentary democracy. Babism no longer existed except as a clandestine > movement of which the adepts were hounded everywhere. > > It is then that took place a dramatic event which was to rebound the course of the story. In August > 1852, two Babis decided to assassinate the Shah. The attempt failed. Nasiri'd-Din Shah, who up > until that time had exercised a certain moderation in the course of the repression, made the entire > Babi community responsible for this isolated act, and ordered the arrest and the more debased > tortures to death of all the Babis who could be found. A ringleader was sought behind the plot. > > At this time, most of the “Letters of the Living” had already fallen as victims of the repression. > Suspicion fell on Baha’u’llah who appeared now to be the most important personality of the new > religion. Baha’u’llah was arrested and thrown into an underground hole which served to collect used > water, and which also occasionally served as a prison. A hundredfold criminals were already > detained there. Baha’u’llah was imprisoned there with some other Babis. Previously he had been > shackled with a fifty kilo chain about his neck, and his feet had been fettered to a truss to which were > attached other prisoners. > > It is thus that he passed several months in the most frightful conditions, without hygiene, lacking air > and nourishment. The chains so deeply cut his flesh that all his life he retained the trace. Every day > the door opened to announce the names of those who were to be executed. Yet, it is in this noisome > hole that Baha’u’llah had a mystical experience of a great intensity which he considered as the start > of his mission. > > 7Moojan Momen, editor, “The Babi and Baha'i Religions, 1844-1944 : Some Contemporary Western > > Accounts”, George Ronald, 1981. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Baha’u’llah was an eminent personality, the issue of an influential family having numerous > influences in the court; it was not easy to have him killed like a simple Babi. The commission of > enquiry did not find a single element to accredit the assumption of a plot, how much less so to > implicate him directly. Baha’u’llah had become an encumbrance, a prison who could neither be > declared innocent, nor condemned. Finally, the Shah signed an edict. Baha’u’llah was condemned > to be banished from the realm and his belongings were confiscated. > > This winter of 1853 is the beginning of a long life of errancy, of successive banishments and > imprisonments. Baha’u’llah spent ten years in Baghdad, which were ten years consecrated to the > spiritual regeneration of the Babi community. Bit by bit a new nucleus of disciples constituted itself > around him who lived in an extraordinary fervor nourished by his teaching. > > It is at Baghdad that Baha’u’llah wrote the “Book of Certitude” (Kitab-i-Iqan) which essentially treats > of prophetology, but engages also numerous aspects of the spiritual life, mixed with metaphysical > questions8. It is also in Baghdad that Baha’u’llah wrote perhaps his most popular book, “The > Hidden Words,” which presents in an aphorismic form “the essence” of “that which hath descended > from the realm of glory, uttered by the tongue of power and might, and revealed unto the Prophets > of old”9, that is the say the essence of the prophetic message common to all the religions; the > immutable laws at the basis of the spiritual development of man. This little masterwork, of a great > poetical beauty, merits by itself that we consecrate a study to him. Each one of the aphorisms which > he composed begin by apostrophes such as “O son of man!” or “O son of being!”, or “O son of > dust!” which give to the prose its rhythm. One of the themes which permeates all of this work is the > mystery for man of the love of God: > > “O son of being! My love is your stronghold. Whoever penetrates it has nothing to fear, > whoever turns away therefrom strays and is lost. O son of the Bayan! My stronghold is you; > penetrate it then to find yourself in the shadow. My love is in you: know it in order to find > yourself close to me.”10 > > During the course of years, Baha’u’llah acquired considerable influence. The Babis disoriented since > the death of the Bab came to draw a new inspiration from him. Many did not hesitate to undertake > a long voyage on foot in order to encounter him whom the epistles, known under the name of > “Tablets” (lawh, pl. alwah), began to circulate throughout Persia. His reputation for wisdom was > known in all Baghdad. His house was permanently frequented by a crowd of people of all social > classes who came at every hour to hear his teaching. The governor of Baghdad and the most > influential personalities of the town perceived themselves honored to be among his friends. His > renown grew every day, which did not fail to excite jealousies, to begin with that of the Shi'i clergy, > who along with the Persian legation, set out to send alarming reports to Tihran. > > English: Bahá’u’lláh, “Kitab-i-Iqan,” translated by S. Effendi Rabbani, Wilmette, 1989; French: “Le Livre > de la Certitude,” translated by H. Dreyfus, 4th ed., Paris, 1973. See Bibliography for text in original (Persian) > language. > English: “The Hidden Words,” Part One – Arabic, translated by S. Effendi Rabbani, Wilmette, n.d.; > French: “Les Paroles cachees,” ed. 1970, p. 3. > Ibid., p. 5. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > All efforts were made to convince the Shah that, from Baghdad, Baha’u’llah had plotted once more > to foment a revolution in Persia and that he exercised a detrimental influence throughout the > kingdom. Nasiri'd-Din Shah anxiously initiated negotiations with the Ottoman court so that > Baha’u’llah would be sent further away in order to neutralize his influence. The effect was exactly > the opposite of that sought. The Sultan 'Abdu'l-'Aziz of Turkey began to find interesting an exile > who inspired so much anxiety in his rival the Shah of Persia, and asked himself if he could find him > a role to play in his pan-Islamic political strategy, aiming to make himself recognized, to the great > displeasure of the Shi'is, as the khalifah of all Muslims. It is thus that a firman (decree) was published > requiring that Baha’u’llah render himself to the court of Istanbul. The governor of Baghdad who > first received this decree was so dismayed by it that he waited several weeks, and reiterated > repetitions of the order, before daring to communicate the purport thereof to Baha’u’llah. This news > plunged the Babi community into consternation and Baha’u’llah himself announced in his Tablets > the dangers that this voyage would contain. > > The departure of Baha’u’llah from Baghdad was to serve as the foundation stone of a capital event. > Baha’u’llah left the town in the midst of a considerable popular emotion, and retired to a garden > situated a short distance away where during nine days he was to receive the incessant flow of his > friends and his admirers who came to say their farewells. It is this precise moment that Baha’u’llah > chose to announce to a small group of disciples that he was the one of whom the Bab had > prophesied the coming, the Man-Yuzhiruhu'llah, “He Whom God shall make manifest”. From this > moment on, the Babi movement changed in its nature. During the space of some years the vast > majority of the Babis were to become Baha’is, and a new movement was to be stamped upon the > young Faith which was to know an unparalleled expansion which in less than a half-century was to > carry it beyond the frontiers of Islam and to have it take foot upon the five continents. > > The voyage of Baha’u’llah from Baghdad to Istanbul was accompanied with all the pomp reserved > to the official guests of the monarchy, although Baha’u’llah knew that a tyrant and a prophet were > not made to understand each other. Having arrived at Istanbul, he voluntarily omitted to > accomplish the visits which were prescribed by protocol and he clearly made it known to the prime > minister 'Ali Pasha that he had no intention of supporting the politics of the Sultan. 'Ali Pasha had > the greatest respect for Baha’u’llah, but he could not resist the campaign waged by the > representatives of the Persian government who had but one fear, that Baha’u’llah would obtain the > allegiance of the Turkish princes and ministers. Sultan 'Abdu'l-'Aziz was burdened with a prisoner > who did not serve his politics and who was denounced every day for his activities dangerous to the > morality, the religion and the stability of the State. Finally, after having assured himself that there > was no other way to corrupt him, the Sultan published a new decree of banishment. Baha’u’llah was > informed that he must immediately leave Istanbul to render himself in Adrianople (Edirne) where he > must live under a watchful guard. > > At the heart of a particularly rigorous winter Baha’u’llah had to undertake by foot the voyage to > Adrianople. This painful voyage was the beginning of a long series of tribulations and sufferings. > Nevertheless, notwithstanding the difficult and precarious conditions of life in his status of deportee, > Baha’u’llah was soon to win the heart of the population of the town. The immense distance which > separated the Bulgarian frontier from Persian and from 'Iraq did not discourage pilgrims who began > anew to arrive in numbers. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > The Epistles of Baha’u’llah circulated throughout the Orient and his preaching continued every day > to win new adepts. All of that did not take place without difficulty. Baha’u’llah did not have only to > face the opposition of the Muslim clergy and the incessant denunciations of the Persian ambassador > Mirza Husayn Khan, but his enemies concealed themselves in the bosom of his own family. His > own half-brother Mirza Yahya, better known under the name of Azal, consumed with jealousy, was > the hand who was found behind these plots. He tried to poison Baha’u’llah, and this one was for > several days between life and death. > > Around Azal began to regroup a small number of Babis who accepted neither the changes, nor the > authority of Baha’u’llah, and who, living a dissolute life, worked without ceasing to discredit > Baha’u’llah before the authorities. They sent to Istanbul alarmist reports in which they accused > Baha’u’llah of plotting with the Bulgarian tribes in order to foment a uprising against the Ottoman > Empire. It was their actions which soon determined the authorities to transfer Baha’u’llah to a > prison in which he would be submitted to a more severe control. > > Shortly before his departure from Edirne, Baha’u’llah took up the writing of a series of letters > addressed to the kings and directors of his epoch. These letters, completed by a series of admonitions > inserted in several of his works, have as they aim to announcement of the bewilderment of the world > which will mark the coming century and to proclaim the principles upon which a new civilization > could be established. Baha’u’llah announces that the present political and social order upon which > the world is founded is on its way out and already condemned and that a “new order” (nazm-i-badi') > is destined to follow it11. > > The new order, made inevitable by eminent catastrophes and by a series of more and more difficult > tests for humanity, would be characterized by a collective system of peace between the nations. But > this peace could not be possible until man accepts a universal form of government and if social > justice reducing the extreme wealth and the extreme poverty could be definitively installed and > secured. Otherwise, adds Baha’u’llah, no political program can arrive at such a result, for the > directors do not have any means for efficaciously transforming society. The new civilization rests > upon a new system of values the nature of which is spiritual and the foundation religious. Only > religion, through the means of a new message, has the power to change the world, even as > Christianity and Islam have already done so. It alone can touch the hearts of people, transform their > vision of the world, make them accept a new system of values of which the rootedness of which must > be situated in the transcendence and the recognition of the spiritual nature of man. > > This collection of letters, written for the most part between 1868 and 1871, is fairly astonishing in its > prophetic character12. Baha’u’llah assures that monarchy will provisionally disappear as a form of > government and that it will reappear later in a different form. He declares therein his preference for > a tempered democratic government and, in addressing Queen Victoria, he praises her for having > placed government in the hands of Parliament and for having abolished slavery13. Queen Victoria > was besides the only monarch to render a friendly response to Baha’u’llah. > English: “Gleanings from the Writings of Bahá’u’lláh”, translated by S. Effendi Rabbani, Wilmette, 1982, > CXLIII; French: E.E.B., CXLIII, p. 291. > English: Bahá’u’lláh, “The Summons of the Lord of Hosts”; “The Proclamation of Bahá’u’lláh”; French: > “La Proclamation de Bahá’u’lláh,” Bruxelles, 1967. > Ibid., pp. 31-32. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Baha’u’llah affirms in these letters that universal peace will not be installed except by a pact of > collective security that will be founded upon a plan of general disarmament negotiated during the > course of an international conference in which all of the governments will be represented, as well as > upon an international force to secure the peace14. He insists upon the urgency of this disarmament > in Europe and upon the necessity of creating an international court of justice to which would be > submitted all the differences between States for arbitration, and which alone would be able to > authorize the usage of force. > > Notwithstanding, underlines Baha’u’llah, a pact of collective security and a general disarmament are > not sufficient to assure the basis of social development. He announces that the new civilization which > he advocates cannot develop unless the foundations of society are profoundly shaken up to make the > injustices which undermine it disappear and only on the condition that the new institutions be > created whose aim is to administer the planet in a global fashion. He recommends the creation of a > global parliament where will be represented not the States, but all of humanity, and where the > deputies will not consider themselves the representatives of this or that nation, but as the > representatives of the entire human race. From this Parliament will emanate a global executive > charged with managing the great problems of international dimension. Implicitly, the political > system of Baha’u’llah condemns the modern State such as it has been constituted since 1848. > > These States, founded upon competing economic entities and given over to ethnic and linguistic > unity, are for him the source of major potential conflicts. The security and the prosperity of > humanity requires that these States renounce the greatest part of their sovereignty for the sake of > international institutions which along have the capacity to install a global system of cooperation and > not of competition, of managing the planetary resources in the interest of all in such fashion that no > one people will be deprived, and to resolve problems which require the bringing together of > considerable means. > > Among the most dramatic of the letters are those which Baha’u’llah addressed to Napoleon III. In > the first, he asks him to put into action his liberal proclamations. Legend reports that Napoleon > upon reading this letter declared: “If he is God, then I am God times two.” Baha’u’llah replied with > a second letter in which he announces to Napoleon III that because of his attitude his empire will be > lost to him and will fall into confusion and that a revolution is on the verge of taking place in Paris15. > Some months afterwards there took place the defeat of Sedan and the Paris Commune. In > addressing Wilhelm II who had come to Palestine but who was deaf to his appeals, he announced > that war would bloody the shores of the Rhine twice and that Berlin would be ruined16. > > In writing Pope Pius IX at the very moment in which the sovereignty of this one over the pontifical > states was being discussed and in which the Vatican position opposed for this reason the unification > of Italy, Baha’u’llah recommended not only to the Pope to abandon his States, but asks him to > renounce his palaces and his riches in order to live in the poverty of which Christ gave the example > all of his life. He condemns the celibacy of the priests, asceticism and the monastic life, and asks the > > Ibid., p. 109. > Ibid., pp. 17-22. > Ibid., pp. 79-81. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > monks and nuns to abandon their retreats in order to make themselves useful to society17. > > Such letters were not made to attract much sympathy in the Western courts and without doubt they > were not destined for this purpose. They had no other aim than to make a date with history, and > one must say that history has given reason to him who wrote them. They are proof of a prodigious > vision. More than a century afterwards, conferences on disarmament are part of actuality. In the > Hague there is an international court of justice and a number of international treaties compose > abandonments of sovereignty. The United Nations can be seen as a far-off precursor of a global > Parliament which Baha’u’llah envisioned. > > The interest inspired by these letters explains furthermore how the teaching of Baha’u’llah was > reduced to this political and social aspect alone. In doing so, one commits a grave error and one > misrepresents the foundation of his thought. The political and social teaching of Baha’u’llah is > inseparable from his mystical and spiritual teaching. From this mystical and spiritual teaching > derives a metaphysic and a philosophy of which the aim is first to elucidate the nature of man, to > situate his finality in creation, in order to determine the rules of his interior evolution. It is only once > one has elucidated these rules, that one can explore his spiritual interior in order to determine his > potentialities, and that one can study the basis of society that will permit these potentialities to > blossom. > > There is a relationship of narrow dependence between the interior which is man and the exterior > which is society. For it is by his interior that man constructs society. It is in mastering his impulses > and in putting an end to the primitive interior chaos that he will infuse more order into the social > reality. But the conquest of this interior order is far from being a purely discursive and rational > process. It contains a mystical dimension which puts man in contact with transcendental and > absolute values that he is destined to impregnate progressively, but the objective understanding of > which escapes him. > > The activities of Azal and of his partisans gave credit to the denunciation of the enemies of > Baha’u’llah at the Ottoman court and convinced the Turkish government that Baha’u’llah was a > prisoner whom it was dangerous to keep at Edirne, where nobody could assure his silence or control > his correspondence. It was wished to find for him a prison far from the great urban centers and from > the caravan routes where his voice could be smothered, and where perhaps he would die of > privation or of sickness. Having examined all the possibilities, the Ottoman government decided to > deport Baha’u’llah to what seemed to be the most backward, the most antiquated and the least > populated province of the Empire: Palestine. There was found the famous fortress of Acre, enclosed > on three sides by the sea, which even the canons of Napoleon [Bonaparte] could not conquer. It is > there that the worst criminals were sent, for the fortress was regularly ravaged by epidemics of > plague and cholera, and the prisoners rarely survived more than a few years under these conditions > of imprisonment. Actually, several disciples of Baha’u’llah were to die [there] during the first weeks > of their detention. > > Arriving in Palestine in August 1868, Baha’u’llah did not leave this land until his death in 1892. > During the first two years, Baha’u’llah was made to submit to a particularly severe regime of > detention, but little by little the attention of the jailers relaxed, such that they themselves succumbed > Ibid., p. 91. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > to the irresistible charm of their prisoner. When movements of troops rendered the fortress > necessary for their billeting, Baha’u’llah was transferred to a particular house destined to serve as his > prison and where he could live a little more comfortable life. As at Baghdad and at Edirne his > reputation did not fail to spread in the region and the notables began to come visit this strange > prisoner before whom they came seeking comfort or in quest of some words of wisdom. > > It is there that Baha’u’llah wrote the most important of his books, the “Most Holy Book” (Kitab-i- > Aqdas) in which he formulated the essential laws of his religion18. From this period date a great > number of Tablets and of writings belonging to the most divers varieties and touching also upon as > varied subjects. The conditions of detention being progressively relaxed, Baha’u’llah could receive > an always more numerous crowd of visitors. The immense distance and the deserts which separated > Persian and 'Iraq from Palestine did not discourage the pilgrims who did not hesitate to undertake a > voyage of several months in order to encounter him whom they called “the Well-Beloved” or “the > Blessed Beauty”. > > Baha’u’llah had become such a respected person that the question was asked whether he could > continue to be considered a prisoner. The mufti and the governor of the town who were among his > friends declared that nobody but he retained him as a prisoner for if he had decided to leave the > walls of his prison and to go outside of the town not one soul would have dared to stop him19. > Finally, in 1877 Baha’u’llah accepted to follow the injunctions of those who asked him to quit his > prison. In June of this year he settled in a country house some kilometers north of Acre. Two years > later because of the revolution which unseated Sultan 'Abdu'l-'Aziz, he settled in Bahji in a vast > property the owner of which had deserted because of the unhealthy water and a cholera epidemic. > > It was there that he was to live out the last twelve years of his life, dividing his time between his > correspondence and the movement of pilgrims who came to hear his teaching for weeks at a time > before leaving again for 'Iraq, for Persia, for Turkestan or India, for during this time the diffusion of > his spiritual message had made considerable progress and Baha’i communities were in place in > Cairo, in Khartoum, Ishqabad, and Bombay. Baha’u’llah counted friends now as distinguished as > Professor Edward Granville Browne of Cambridge University20 and Comte Leo Tolstoi21. > > Baha’u’llah having for more than forty years lived in conditions of exile and imprisonment, it is > essentially in writing that his teaching could be spread, he wrote much and it is said that his work, of > which a part was lost, could fill a hundred volumes. Baha’u’llah wrote but very few books in the > proper sense of the term. There are only four: the “Book of Certitude” (Kitab-i-Iqan); the “New > Book” (Kitab-i-Badi')22; the “Most Holy Book” (Kitab-i-Aqdas); and the “Epistle to the Son of the > Wolf” (Risaliy-i-Ibn-i-Dhib)23. > > Bahá’u’lláh, “The Most Holy Book,” Haifa, 1992. > English: Shoghi Effendi, “God Passes By”, 1944; French: “Dieu passe pres de nous.” > E.G. Browne, “Five Years among the Persians,” and H. Balyuzi, “Edward Granville Browne and the > Bahá’í Faith,” Oxford. > Luigi Stendardo, “Tolstoi and the Bahá’í Faith,” Oxford, 1985. > “Kitab-i-Badi'“, Brno, 1992. There is no translation of this book into a Western language; it was recently > published in the Czech Republic from a facsimile of a manuscript dating from the epoch of Bahá’u’lláh. > English: “Epistle to the Son of the Wolf,” translated by S. Effendi Rabbani, n.d.; French: “L'Epitre au fils > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Most of his writings take the form of “Tablets” (alwah), that is to say of texts between one and several > tens of pages which for the most part take the form of letters, but which can also be poems, mystical > meditations, prayer or invocations, and admonishments addressed to celebrated persons. It is not > easy to penetrate such a diverse work. The letters which compose the greatest part are of unequal > interest inasmuch as, addressed to different recipients, they are obviously repetitive. > > Baha’u’llah never wished to give a didactic form to his teaching. Beside the “Book of Certitude”, he > never composed the systematic exposition of any question. For him the essential was elsewhere. > What was important to him, was to transmit a spirit, to uplift the spirit, to open the hearts to > spiritual realities, to transform the beings. For this reason the language he employs is essentially > mystical. It is an art which uses all the resources of poetry and of psychology and which furthermore > often respects the complicated literary conventions in usage at this time. > > 3. The philosophy of Baha’u’llah > > The brief account which we have just given of the life of Baha’u’llah has permitted us to touch upon > certain of the major philosophical themes of his work, and we hope that it will have convinced the > reader of the legitimacy of speaking of a veritable Baha’i philosophy. His Writings embrace the > greater part of the large philosophical questions: social and political organization, ethics and > morality, the status of woman, justice, political economy, education and pedagogy, science, > epistemology and the theory of knowledge. > > These themes suffice to characterize the modernity of the thought of Baha’u’llah. However, they do > not form a philosophy in the sense to which we are accustomed. Classical philosophy has habituated > us to consider metaphysics as the foundation of philosophy and for this reason metaphysics has been > called “the first philosophy”. During the 18th century the first transformation was produced when > mathematics and the natural sciences acquired their autonomy. On the other hand, metaphysics no > longer appeared to be the principal instrument of man in knowing and explaining the real, and from > Locke onwards the reflective effort was progressively replaced by political philosophy and with Kant > by the theory of knowledge. > > At the end of the 19th century a similar revolution was produced and the central theme of > philosophy was replaced by the individual and the exploration of his subjectivity. It is interesting to > note that the philosophy of Baha’u’llah is altogether found in this evolution. Metaphysics has lost the > central character it had in all the classical systems and, on the other hand, a development of political > philosophy is found, but the political philosophy which is derived from a social dimension, is > counterbalanced by a very modern concern with the individual accompanied by an unreserved > accounting of his subjectivity. Furthermore, the approach towards the individual and his subjectivity > is not carried out in the same manner as in Western philosophy. For Baha’u’llah, the > comprehension of the individual and of his subjectivity necessitates going beyond the philosophical > field in order to open oneness to the transcendental domain which bursts the boundaries of our > purely rational understanding. Man is a mystery which reason cannot totally know and which > language cannot render in an adequate manner. The knowledge of the individual and of his > > du loup,” trad. H. Dreyfus, Paris, 1913. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > subjectivity belongs then to the spiritual domain the comprehension of which is one of the principal > tasks of the philosophy of Baha’u’llah. While the classical metaphysics begin with God to descend > thereafter through the degrees of the hierarchy of Being, from the world of essences to that of > individuals, the question which is found at the heart of the philosophy of Baha’u’llah is an inquest > upon the nature of man. It is because one begins by defining the nature of man that one can > thereafter ascend the degrees of the hierarchy of Being. This explains that the philosophy of Ideas or > of Forms appropriate to Platonism or Aristotelianism is replaced by a philosophy of values. It is in > the function of the meaning which is given to human life that one can define the finality of the > physical reality of the universe. > > The question is no longer to explain how the universe exists, a task clearly assigned by Baha’u’llah to > science, but why the universe exists. It is only from this that man can derive an idea of his Creator. > Nevertheless, Baha’u’llah recognizes that the process is much more complex, for if man does not > know his Creator except in the measure in which he knows himself, he cannot know himself except > in the measure in which he knows his Creator. Baha’u’llah writes: > > “Whatever duty Thou hast prescribed unto Thy servants of extolling to the utmost Thy > majesty and glory is but a token of Thy grace unto them, that they may be enabled to > ascend unto the station conferred upon their own inmost being, the station of the knowledge > of their own selves.”24 > > In another text, he declares: > > “Could ye apprehend with what wonders of My munificence and bounty I have willed to > entrust your souls, ye would, of a truth, rid yourselves of attachment to all created things, > and would gain a true knowledge of your own selves—a knowledge which is the same as the > comprehension of Mine own Being.”25 > > However, this true comprehension of human nature is not attainable by a purely philosophical > process. For Baha’u’llah, man is not a given of nature. Man at the state of nature is but an animal. > That which constitutes his essential reality is something that is found beyond the state of nature, > which is to begin with but a potentiality submitted to becoming. Humanity (Latin: humanitas, Arabic: > insaniyya) is not something that is, but something to be conquered, a spiritual perfection that is not > acquired except through a process of interior transformation, a horizon which is never totally > attained. Whatever may be the progress of civilization, whatever may be the progress of spirituality > and morality, humanity receives a perfectibility the potentialities of which can never be exhausted, > because they constitute what Baha’u’llah calls “the divine deposit”. Through spiritual perfection, it is > God who actualizes Himself in man. > > The principle which is the resume of the anthropology of Baha’u’llah, and which constitutes the key > to the vault of his teaching is contained in the affirmation that the nature of man is spiritual. The > fundamental philosophical problem which this principle poses consists then in understanding what > the word “spiritual” signifies. We can say that this question is the object of the metaphysic of > > English: “Gleanings from the Writings of Bahá’u’lláh”, I, pp. 4-5; French: I, p. 6. > English: Ibid., CLIII, pp. 326-327); French: CLIII, p. 304. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Baha’u’llah, for the concept of the spiritual refers to a world of transcendental values, intermediary > values between God and His creation, the existence of which one must explain. > > Now we understand why the metaphysic of Baha’u’llah is not presented according to the mode to > which the classical systems have habituated us. Being is no longer at the center of metaphysics; it is > replaced by the spirit and the consciousness. > > 4. From hermeneutics to ontology > > Our study is divided in three parts: the first is named hermeneutics, the second theosophy and the > third metaphysics. In fact, this is not a strict division. Each one of these titles does not more than > indicate the dominant theme of the chapters which follow, but for the reasons which we have > delineated, these different aspects are inextricably mixed in the work of Baha’u’llah and they can > never be totally separated. Our first part will show how Baha’u’llah transforms the metaphysical > system of the “five presences” into a hermeneutic system. > > But the hermeneutic of this system cannot be clearly perceived except in reference to a metaphysical > system of which we will summarize some of the large features at the end of Chapter V. We could > have, from there on, continued directly with the ontological and metaphysical questions which are > at the center of our study, but that seemed impossible to us according to the measure that, as we > have underlined it, metaphysics occupies a particularly atypical place in the philosophy of > Baha’u’llah. It seemed important to us to begin by redefining this philosophy as a theosophy with all > of these implications. > > When we speak of “theosophy” with regard to the thought of Baha’u’llah, one must of course > understand this word in a technical sense. Generally one calls “theosophy” a system of thought > where are found three elements closely related: a hermeneutic, a gnosis and a philosophy of nature. > This bring us to define the word “gnosis”. The “gnosis” which is considered here has nothing to do > with the gnostic movements of the first centuries of our era. It consists of a knowledge which is > acquired not by study, but by a process of transformation in the interior of man. While philosophy is > the quest of an objective knowledge, theosophy accents the subjectivity and the personal and > incommunicable character of all spiritual knowledge. Of course, gnosis must be accompanied by a > noetic, that is, a theory of knowledge which defines not only the modalities of sensory knowledge > and of its intelligibility, but also the conditions which permit man to acquire a supra-sensory > knowledge of the spiritual worlds. > > The noetic of Baha’u’llah is at the same time an epistemology and a gnosiology. Consequently, the > noetic must be situated in the greater framework of an anthropology and in the more restrained > framework of a psychology of which we will attempt to encompass the principal consequences. This > psychology will bring us to the metaphysical fundamentals of the teaching of Baha’u’llah, for one > cannot treat of spiritual consciousness without speaking of the relationship of the soul and the body, > and thus without questioning the ontological mode of the essential reality of the soul. > > The third part entitled “metaphysic” is strictly devoted to the metaphysical problem of the divine > worlds and of the entities which people them. We have wished to situate this metaphysical problem > in a fairly large body which is the emanationist philosophy of Baha’u’llah, and we have tried to > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > define this as much in relationship to the Neoplatonism of Plotinus as to the Islamicized version of > Greek philosophy (Falsafa) and particularly that of Aristotle. There is in effect a deeply rooted > prejudice among the specialists in religious sciences who attribute to Baha’u’llah Neoplatonic ideas > and who make of his metaphysic a derivative of that of al-Farabi, of Ibn Sina, of Suhrawardi, and of > Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i. We admit to have shared with prejudice for a very long time. However, one > cannot seriously consider such an opinion without subjecting it first to philosophical and scientific > criticism. That is what we have done, and the result was not conclusive. > > Indeed, in order to characterize a philosophical system in relation to a school of thought, it is not > sufficient to recognize one or two elements which seem to be vaguely alike; no more than one can > base oneself upon certain similitudes in vocabulary. One must show that the economy of the system > is organized according to the same model, or at least that the economies of the different systems > being compared are compatible. There are indeed points of contact between the thought of > Baha’u’llah and the Neoplatonic systems, but we hope that one of the principal results of our study > will be to have demonstrated that in no case have these points of contact permitted that the teaching > of Baha’u’llah be ranked in the posterity of al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. One can even say that the > teaching of Baha’u’llah presents itself as an implicit but nevertheless systematic refutation of Ibn > Sina. For him, all of Hellenistic philosophy reposes upon a misunderstanding which consists of > assimilating God with the necessary Being, as al-Kindi and al-Farabi did at the first. > > For Baha’u’llah, God must exist distinct from Being. Furthermore, to pose a necessary Being results > in a philosophy of necessity which negates at once the liberty of man and the liberty of God. > Necessity (wajib) is not for him the concept antinomial of contingence (mumkinat). All the world of > Being, of which he proclaims the unicity26, belongs to contingency, for it is the property of Being to > be contingent. Only the sphere of Hahut, that is to say the divine essence, escapes contingency and > affirms itself as a transcendental absolute, source of all reality, but inaccessible to human knowledge. > We reach here the limits of Western vocabulary in order to translate the Arabic philosophical > vocabulary. In effect, we speak here of “the divine essence”, which might imply that Baha’u’llah > situates divinity in a world of essences which would be the counterpart of a sensible world. But, that > which one calls “the divine essence” (dhat) as a matter of convenience has nothing to do with the > world of “essential realities” (haqa'iq). It is the world of “In-Itself”, an In-Itself beyond Being and > Existence, forever impenetrable to the human spirit; an In-Itself which appears furthermore to man > but in Himself, but by His manifestations. It is no doubt in order to escape the vocabulary of the > philosophy of essences that Baha’u’llah often utilizes the term of “ipseity” or “identity” (huwiyya), or > that he speaks of the “nature” of God (kaynuna), rather than of His Being. > > This brings us to a delicate point in our study which is that of ontology. We have subtitled our study > “Ontology of the divine worlds”. We should have called it “Ontology and hermeneutic of the divine > worlds”, for the question which one must pose is “What is a 'world'?” We will show that for > Baha’u’llah, the divine worlds do not constitute a cosmology, nor even a onto-cosmology such as the > onto-cosmology of Ibn Sina. The divine categories are in reality onto-hermeneutic categories. A > “world” is first a category of intelligibility. Every world represents a mode of Being: Being > characterizes itself by a number of infinite modalities, but these existential modalities are not entirely > separable from the operational modalities of the human spirit. It its essential and absolute reality the > world of Being is one, but in its epistemological and phenomenological reality, as it presents itself to > ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, “Makatib,” vol. I, p. 341. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > the spirit of man, reality appears according to infinite modalities, which are conditioned by the > ontological situs of man, the ontological place from which the landscape of Being is provisionally > revealed to him. This is what makes Baha’u’llah say in “Seven Valleys” that the differences which > the voyager perceives between the different worlds of God derive from the condition and the > spiritual state of the seeker and not from the independent reality of these worlds.27 > > The divine worlds are thus structured by the human consciousness. It is in this way that the thought > of Baha’u’llah rejoins the phenomenological preoccupations of our epoch and that his metaphysic > implies a hermeneutic which permits one to question and to encompass the relationships of > consciousness with the objective and subjective reality of the world. > > For Baha’u’llah, there are two complementary ways of apprehending the world: the one rational > and scientific which exists from our exteriority, and the other intuitive and mystical which exists > from our interiority. But, in order to take this second path, man must first explore and understand > his interiority. Furthermore, in that which concerns God and the spiritual worlds in general, the way > of interiority alone exists. This is why Baha’u’llah, after the knowledge of self, assigns as finality to > human existence “to know and love God”. He affirms that this is not only the finality of all human > existence but that it is also the finality of all creation, for it is impossible to conceive of a divine > creation without a consciousness which knows his Creator. This is what we have called “the > anthropic principle” of Baha’u’llah. > > This principle overturns all of philosophy and had multiple and fundamental implications which are > far from being explored. It is this principle which explains that the reality of the universe appears to > be structured in its functioning by a law of intelligibility which the universe shares with the human > spirit. It is this principle which also implicates the necessity of a noetic and epistemological link > between the creature and the Creator which is at the source of the Baha’i hermeneutic. From that > also follows that Being cannot be at the center of the metaphysic, and even of the ontology, of > Baha’u’llah. > > We have for a long time hesitated to know if we should include in our study one or several chapters > on the ontology of Baha’u’llah or if we should content ourselves with considering the problem only > with reference to the question of the divine worlds, and finally it is the second solution which we > have retained. Some could be shocked that we approach a question which finally is revelatory of an > entire metaphysical system without having first defined the concept from all philosophy since Plato > and Aristotle. It is surely true that such a preliminary study would have permitted us to attain a > higher level of precision in certain questions. But a certain number of scruples have stopped us. > > The first is that Baha’u’llah does not explicitly define an ontology, even though in very numerous > texts he seems to pose the limits of his general framework. Thus, it is not at all certain that the > ontological givens of Baha’u’llah could receive a unique interpretation and, furthermore, and it > seemed entirely possible to construct not one but various ontological systems within the general > > English: Bahá’u’lláh, “The Seven Valleys,” Wilmette, 1991, p. 18; French: “Les sept vallees,” Bruxelles, > 1970, p. 27: “...all the variations which the wayfarer in the stages of his journey beholdeth in the realms of > being, proceed from his own vision.” Bahá’u’lláh compares the seekers to a light which is white but in > reflecting itself in different objects (the worlds) causes colors to appear which in their reality are not the true > attributes of the objects but which are the properties of the light. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > framework which he himself traced, and we think that this was so wished. To take to the fore the > ontological problem would have brought us to a very speculative terrain which is entirely outside of > the framework and the spirit of our study. > > We have wished first of all to comment upon the texts of Baha’u’llah and to offer as faithful as > possible an interpretation of his thought. Of course, all interpretation implies hypotheses and > choices, but it did not seem to us that it would betray the spirit of our search to construct second > degree hypotheses which themselves rested upon the first degree hypotheses. Furthermore, to be > altogether honest, we must admit that certain of our choices and of our first degree hypotheses were > certainly influenced by our conception of the ontology of Baha’u’llah and we have thus forged a > certain number of principles the essentials of which we give here. > > Being cannot be an explanation of the existence of beings (mawjud), because Being seems in Baha’i > philosophy to have nothing but a purely conceptual existence. Being is that which is in action in all > individuals, but Being is not dis-associable from individuals, as form is not dis-associable from > matter. Being is not thus be considered as the origin of things. The origin of things comes directly > from God, but his principle must be sought in the “First emanation” (al-sadir al-awwal) which is the > divine Verb (kalama). > > And, the divine Verb is also the Spirit (ruh); from that follows that all that exists has a spirit and that > the Spirit must be regarded as the first principle of creation. It is the manner in which the Spirit > actualizes itself and diversifies itself in the things that determines the modalities of Being. The > material world is but a modality of Being among an infinite number of others which constitute what > are called “the spiritual worlds”. > > The spiritual worlds are peopled by entities which are essences which this very important reserve > that the essences are not reducible either to Being or to Existence, which is why, rather than of > essence, it is better to speak of “reality” or of “essential realities” (haqa'iq). Man cannot, at this stage > in his spiritual development, understand the true nature of essential realities. These essential realities > do not constitute spiritual substances for their mode of existence is totally impenetrable. From this > fact, the metaphysic of Baha’u’llah does not enter into the framework of a philosophy of essences. > > These are some of the great lines of the ontology of Baha’u’llah such as we have tried to reconstitute. > These few principles are far from constituting a system and multiple questions remain open. We > think that it was the very wish of Baha’u’llah to leave them open and thus to permit schools to > flourish. According to the measure in which the concept of Being is no longer central to his > metaphysic, the reader will attest that it is altogether possible to treat the ontology of the divine > worlds, for here the word ontology reveals an altogether particular significance. It is no longer an > ontology of Being, but an ontology of Spirit. > > The perspective which we have chosen for our study will not permit us to develop a general > interpretation of the metaphysic of Baha’u’llah. We have limited ourselves to four themes of unequal > importance. The first theme is an attempt at definition. It concerns what we have called “the > emanationist metaphysic of Baha’u’llah and its like with 'speculative theology'“, that is to say the > conception of a creation mirroring the Names and the Attributes of God. Our second theme will > turn around the study of the concept of “divine Manifestation” which appears to us to be the > fundamental element of all the philosophy of Baha’u’llah and the key of all the other metaphysical > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > developments. > > It is the introduction of this concept of divine Manifestation which indicates that the teaching of > Baha’u’llah appears to be breaking with all the Islamic systems of thought. The world of the > manifestation is a central world around which are organized all the other ontological modalities. > This will bring us to question ourselves on the ontological spheres which separate man from this > world and more particularly to study the nature of the “essential realities” (haqa'iq) which populate > the spiritual worlds and the status of the Imaginal World which becomes thus an intermediary world > between the thought of man, his imaginal reason, and the realities as intellectual as intelligible which > structure the real. > > 5. The hermeneutic question > > We have until now much spoken of hermeneutic without having specifically specified the meaning > thereof. An effort of theorization is imposed here in order to define the Baha’i hermeneutic, for the > question presents itself like a game of mirrors: on the one hand we are convinced that the work of > Baha’u’llah is a hermeneutic, and on the other hand this work, in order to be understood, itself > requires a hermeneutical effort. > > The usage of the term hermeneutic has become considerably diversified over the course of this last > century under the influence of the work of Husserl28, of Heidegger29, of Gadamer30 and Ricoeur31. > Here are constituted not one but several philosophies of hermeneutic in relation to which it is not > always easy to find oneself. These works are nevertheless of a great interest and they have > considerably aided us in comprehending the hermeneutic character of the work of Baha’u’llah. > > We name “hermeneutic” the theory of interpretation or the theoretical reflection upon interpretive > action32. This term comes from the Greek hermeneuein which signifies “explain,” “enunciate,” > “interpret” and “translate” or “serving as interpreter”. In a general manner, hermeneutic > characterizes the discipline, the problems and the models which treat of the interpretation and the > criticism of texts. But hermeneutic has rapidly passed beyond simple criticism and exegetical > commentary in order to constitute a veritable theory of inspiration, whether profane or mystical33. > > For the property of hermeneutic is first of all to be a science of the sacred, of which the laicization is > > E. Husserl, “Idee directrice pour une phenomenologie,” translated by P. Ricoeur, Paris, 1950. It is all the > work of Husserl which is indirectly an introduction to hermeneutics. > M. Heiddeger, “Etre et temps,” translated by E. Martineau, Paris, 1985, and “Acheminement verse la > Parole,” Paris, 1976. > H.G. Gadamer, “Verite et methode,” trad. partielle de E. Sacre, Paris, 1959, and “L'Art de comprendre,” > Writing I: “Hermeneutique et tradition philosophique,” Paris, 1982; Writing II: “Hermeneutique et champ > de l'experience humaine,” Paris, 1991. > P. Ricoeur, “Le conflit des interpretations, Essai d'hermeneutique,” Paris, 1969; and “Du texte a l'action, > Essai d'hermeneutique II,” Paris, Seuil, 1986. > Jean Grondin, “L'universalite de l'hermeneutique,” Paris, 1993, p. 2. > Bernard Dupuy, article, “Hermeneutique,” in “Encyclopedia Universalis.” > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > nothing but progressive. Hermeneutic, since Antiquity has distinguished itself from simple literary > commentary by its religious source. Already in the “Politics” of Plato34, the function which is > assigned to hermeneutic is religious and sacred. This religious and sacred character has done > nothing else but reinforce itself since Christianity adopted the hermeneutic techniques for its own > exegesis. The determination of the rules of hermeneutic in the 3rd century entailed passionate > debates between the School of Alexandria and the School of Antioch. From this moment onwards > the life curve of sacred hermeneutic married that of Christianity. It knew a first apogee with the > Fathers of the Church and a second in the Middle Ages before beginning to decline. From the work > of certain pioneers in the 17th and 18th centuries (Dannhauer, Meier, Chladenius), the hermeneutic > question was to truly reappear in the philosophical field in the 19th century because of the work of > Schleiermacher. A new step was taken towards the universalization of hermeneutics with Dilthey > who sought in hermeneutic a methodology and an epistemology of the human sciences. > > From this moment on, hermeneutic was to progressively invade all the field of philosophy. With the > development of linguistics and of the cognitive sciences, and especially with the inroads of > psychology and of all the techniques of exploration of the human psyche, the question of meaning > became a fundamental question. From here one passed from the hermeneutic of texts to the > hermeneutic of the sciences. Hermeneutic finished by appearing as the collection of the constitutive > rules of all human knowledge, and this is one of the meanings which we will retain. However, > hermeneutic is distinguished from epistemology. While this is interested in the heuristic mechanisms > and with the rules by which science tried to reproduce a faithful image of reality, hermeneutic is not > interested directly in this reality but in the process of human comprehension in the production of > meaning and in its transmission. All knowledge hence implies the putting to work of an > hermeneutic. > > If now we confront what modern philosophy has taught us on the hermeneutic problem with the > texts of Baha’u’llah, there is no doubt that all the work of Baha’u’llah constitutes a hermeneutic, but > not only in the sense of a sacred hermeneutic, but as a universal philosophical hermeneutic. > > One can distinguish in Baha’u’llah three forms of hermeneutic: a sacred hermeneutic (ta'wil), a > psychological hermeneutic ('irfan), and a phenomenological or semiotic hermeneutic. > > In the course of our study, rather than using the expression “sacred hermeneutic”, taken from the > Latin “hermeneutica sacra”, we have preferred the expression “spiritual hermeneutic” devised by > Henri Corbin to translate the Arabic “ta'wil”. We consecrate Chapter VIII to a long development of > the usage of “ta'wil” as spiritual hermeneutic. “Ta'wil” is distinguished from the Christian > “hermeneutica sacra” by a much greater interpretive liberty. The word signifies “redirect to its > source”, for spiritual hermeneutic is founded upon the idea that if the Qur'an descended upon the > earth through the arc of prophethood (nubuwa), a true comprehension requires that it be redirected > to its source by the arc of “ta'wil”, that is to say, returned to its first inspiration in the heaven of > revelation. > > This hermeneutical art consists in considering each Quranic term as the metaphorical expression of > a more profound spiritual truth. In this sense “ta'wil” is not without resonance with the typology > developed by Origen and the exegetical methods of certain Fathers of the Church. But while > French: Platon, “La Politique,” 260 d 11. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Christianity was very conscious that anagogical interpretation could conduct to the dissolution of > dogma and of orthodoxy, and felt very early the need to codify and to regulate the usage thereof, > this effort of codification did not take place in Islam and engendered a profusion of hermeneutics > and finally a dissolution of meaning. One part of our work will consist in seeing how Baha’u’llah > reacts to this dissolution of meaning in delimiting the field of “ta'wil”, while at the same time taking > up himself a hermeneutic work the methods of which remain to be studied. > > In taking up the spiritual hermeneutic of the Gospel and the Quran, Baha’u’llah suggests the > hermeneutic of his own work. He furnishes us thus with a theory of prophetic inspiration. > > The purpose of the prophetic discourse is not to announce a code of law, a morality and a > philosophy, but to put man in touch with the world of transcendental values which constitute the > laws of the spiritual world. The prophetic revelation aims then to communicate that which > constitutes the most fundamental reality of the universe. In order to communicate this fundamental > reality, language is insufficient. He cannot proceed except by “allusions” (ishara) and constitutes a > “cryptic language” (ramz) which aims to communicate the “secrets” (asrar) which constitute the > reality of things in the invisible world in which the spiritual laws are found written. In natural > language, the allegorical symbol refers to a “crypte” which it is necessary to decode in order to arrive > at the objective reality it symbolizes and which belongs to the world of experience. In the language > of revelation, the reality aimed at does not belong to the world of objective experience, it is the > aimed at reality which must be decrypted and not the symbol which is an intermediate scheme > between the spiritual world and the world of experience from which has issued our symbolic > universe. > > This sacred hermeneutic brings us to the threshold of psychological hermeneutic from which it > issues directly. The language of revelation, to reveal the world of values, must first put man in > contact with his interiority. This language derives support from the great myths of our unconscious, > and it is in this sense that sacred hermeneutic is linked to the mythical thought which derives its > source from the interiority of man. The revealed Word finds its origin in the world of transcendental > values which is one beyond the ineffable; it is for this reason that it has no other recourse but > symbolic language. > > Psychological hermeneutic establishes this link between this symbolism and the interior world of > man. At the same time, it fixes the rules of this knowledge. The expression “psychological > hermeneutic” can translate the Arabic word “'irfan” which we have rendered in our study by “true > comprehension”; but it goes beyond this, for it unifies all the fields of empirical and spiritual > knowledge. > > In this sense, the three types of knowledge of the gnoseology of Baha’u’llah which are the “true > knowing” (ma'rifat), the “true comprehension” ('irfan) and “wisdom” (hikmat) constitutes a > psychological hermeneutic which we have also called “gnosis”, in a manner that certain ones will > judge perhaps as a bit adventurous, but which corresponds well to the technical definition of this > term; that is to say a knowledge which is not acquired except by the interior transformation of man. > There is moreover a particularly important point which justifies that the expression “psychological > hermeneutic” is better adapted than “gnosis”, which is the personal and subjective character of the > mystical knowledge in Baha’u’llah. This “gnosis” does not aim like classical “gnosis” for an absolute, > eternal and immutable knowledge. On the contrary, the “gnosis” of Baha'u'llah is affirmed as a > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > relative and personal experience. The world of values cannot be perceived except according to the > function of the spiritual rank (maqam) of each individual. > > In considering spiritual hermeneutic, we find a third hermeneutic which one could also very well call > semiotic, phenomenological or philosophical. All these forms of hermeneutic rest upon the idea that > creation is a sign (ayyat) of God. The universe appears to the mystic as a universe of signs > hierarchically arranged in an ontological manner. All having issued from the Spirit, the Spirit speaks > in everything. The creation is thus a universe of signs in which every “world” carries the image or > the “trace” (athar) of the world which is immediately superior to it. The natural world speaks to us by > natural signs as the spiritual world speaks to us by spiritual signs. The material thus manifests the > spiritual. In the appearance of things is hidden an order which constitutes the invisible thread of > reality. But the experience of this invisible order is not possible except through a gnostic experience, > which unifies the different modes of the knowledge of man. > > Finally, there exists a real unity of the Baha’i hermeneutic. It consists in putting into relationship the > signs which are in man, the signs which are in the sensible world, the signs which are in the spiritual > world and the signs which are in revelation. This is the problem which the ontology of the divine > worlds poses. Every “world” conveys to a universe of signs which constitute an onto-hermeneutic. > > The Baha’i hermeneutic must reconcile two antinomian exigencies. On one hand, Baha’u’llah > explains that the universe is structured according to the same law of intelligibility as the human > spirit, on the other that the limited spiritual development of man in this world fixes a limit upon his > capacity to understand. The spiritual universe does not escape him totally, but the representation he > can make for himself cannot be other than metaphorical. This explains the relative character of all > metaphorical discourse. We will see in Chapter V that there exist in the Writings of Baha’u’llah an > abundance of different worlds, such as “the world of the visible and the invisible”, “the world of > invention”, “the world of decree”, “the world of the commandment”, etc. > > These “worlds” do not correspond to realities independent from the human spirit. There is no > realistic implication of this description which does not but constitute a relative approach to reality. > We must there avoid a very serious misconception. This typology of worlds corresponds before all > else with a reality of the human spirit which because of its exigency of intelligibility can consider that > this description gives him a provisionally satisfactory response to his questions. This typology of the > worlds is a hermeneutic and has nothing to do with any cosmology. > > The three forms of hermeneutic which we have just described, spiritual, psychological and semiotic > or phenomenological, form a system in which each one among them is closely linked to the others in > a logical order. Beside these three fundamental forms of hermeneutic, there exists a fourth form > which we have called “axiological hermeneutic” and which corresponds to what the Baha’is call the > concept of “progressive revelation”, that is to say the progressive and relative, by the means of > Revelation, of the world of transcendental values which the Baha’is habitually call “divine laws” or > “spiritual laws”. This axiological hermeneutic forms the foundation of the philosophy of history of > Baha’u’llah which we will not treat. We will content ourselves with evoking this briefly in Chapter > XIV consecrated to the world of the Manifestation. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > 6. Problems and Methods > > Our work has been a work of clearing. There was practically no previous study upon which we > could apply ourselves. We hope that it constitutes a step towards a complete analysis of the > metaphysic of Baha’u’llah. But in awaiting this, we are clearly conscious that this work of clearing is > composed of many approximations and interruptions. In the course of our research we have > discovered many new “tracks”. There could be no question of following all of them. We have said a > few words about ontology and hermeneutic, but all of Baha’i ontology and hermeneutic remains to > be elaborated. > > We have wished to approach the work of Baha’u’llah as a philosopher. In this we had considered > that the texts had a double message. There is a message which resides in the first intentionality of the > text and which constitutes its principal meaning. But the principle meaning can hide many > secondary meanings. In other terms, there exists a whole collection of questions upon which the > texts of Baha’u’llah do not speak unless one questions them. The whole then is to ask good > questions. Many are those among the Arab and Persian commentators of Baha’u’llah who could not > do so because of their too great dependence upon Islamic culture from which he had arrived at > extracting himself. One finds the same lack of detachment among the first Christian apologists of the > 2nd century or even among certain Fathers of the Church who were too influenced by their Greek > or Jewish culture to understand all the significance of the evangelical message. The first Baha’i > commentators sought for a catalogue of principles. We have sought for ourselves a system, that is to > say that we have wished to take the architectural measurement of the whole and to show how it > functions as an organic totality while respecting a principle of auto-coherency. > > In order to reconstitute this system, the comparative approach seemed to us to be the most simple > and the most efficacious. In selecting a certain number of great philosophies such as those of Plato, > of Aristotle, of Plotinus, of Saint Augustine, of Farabi, of Ibn Sina, etc., we have attempted to > determine what replies Baha’u’llah brought to their great preoccupations. We have left the great > fundamental questions of this type—”What is being?”—in order afterwards to treat subsidiary > questions such as, for example, those which touch upon the debate between realism and > nominalism. This method has had a double advantage: It immediately shows the originality of the > thought of Baha’u’llah and it makes apparent the great lines of his system. It can have a double > disadvantage: first that of concealing questions which can reveal totally original preoccupations and > secondly to draw the philosophy of Baha’u’llah towards the habitual presentation of the classical > philosophies. > > The classical philosophies generally leave from ontology to construct their metaphysics, whereas the > metaphysic of Baha’u’llah seems rather to be built from anthropology. > > This step explains the very great use that we have made of certain Fathers of the Church such as > Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Basil of Caesaria and Gregory of Nazianze, because they seemed to > us to derive from an extremely neighborly problem. Besides that, the comparison with the system of > al-Kindi, Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn 'Arabi, Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra imposed itself. It is a work > which we have conducted with much attention to minutia but of which we can here only trace the > great lines. Certain readers will find perhaps stranger the references which we have made to certain > philosophers of the Middle Ages and notably to St. Thomas Aquinas, Dun Scot and William of > Ockham. The reason is that all three of them have reacted, as did Baha’u’llah, to the philosophy of > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Ibn Sina. Also, all have sought to grapple with the difficulties born of Platonism and of its adaptation > to the revealed religions. Finally, until William of Ockham, European philosophy and Muslim > philosophy spoke the same language; Islam having transmitted to the West the knowledge of the > great Greek authors most often by translations made in Latin from the Arabic. It seems to us that a > great project of the Baha’i philosophy of today must be to restore this ancient unity. This moment in > which we witness in Europe a renaissance of interest in metaphysical questions seems to us to be > particularly opportune. This does not signify a restoration of scholasticism which is dead for evident > reasons. But the ignorance of its medieval and patristic sources in which Western philosophy is > found confines it to amnesia. > > Another of our preoccupations has been to treat the thought of Baha’u’llah as a living thought. In > order for it to remain alive, one must then continue to question it about the future. It is not sufficient > to know how Baha’u’llah is situated in relation to Ibn Sina. It is even more interesting to question it > in relation to a modern problem such as the cognitive sciences, epistemology, the great movements > of linguistics, of semiotics and of hermeneutics, of the phenomenology of Husserl, of existentialism > and of Heidegger's posterity, of logical empiricism and of neo-realism. Of course, it could not be a > question of arriving face to face with these problems. But this modern problem has not stopped > being present in our spirit, and the reader will occasionally find a trace, even as other > preoccupations touching notably upon certain developments of modern physics. > > In order to carry out this task well, it was not possible for us to rely upon the translations of the texts > of Baha’u’llah which are found in print, because these translations, always of a very high quality > when they were made by Shoghi Effendii, do not lend themselves to a critical study. It was necessary > to return to the original text in Arabic and in Persian for these languages use an untranslatable > philosophical terminology. In order to rise above these problems of interpretation, we have had to > elaborate a certain number of rules. > > The French translations, other than those of Dreyfus, being made based on those in English, we > have always cited in their current French version. When differences or subtleties of translation > existed between the English and the French we have made them apparent. When the deviation > between the English translation and the original text was too great we have supplemented it with a > second literal translation which is identified as such and printed between parentheses but without > italicization. But most often, we have contented ourselves with inserting in the translation the Arabic > or Persian term in furnishing an appropriate commentary. The reader who is little broken in to the > habits of Orientalists should not let himself be effected by this jargon. He will perceive that in > mastering at most a tenfold of technical Arabic terms he can understand the essentials of the > metaphysics of Baha’u’llah. The technical terms in Arabic or Persian which are found between > parentheses are not there for the simple concern for erudition. They underline that the French > translation utilized poses a problem and refers to a specific concept the explanation of which has > already been given. > > When we have cited untranslated texts, we have furnished no translation, that would perhaps have > given rise to polemic, but we have contented ourselves with a paraphrase which is made without > inverted commas, but with references to the original text at the bottom of the page. > > The usage which we have made of the texts being essentially philosophical, in our paraphrases and > our commentaries we have not hesitated to utilize philosophical terms to translate certain > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > expressions rendered in a literal fashion in the translations. For example, Shoghi Effendi translates > the word “wahm” by “imagination”, which is altogether literal. On certain occasions, it has seemed > preferable to us to speak of “subjectivity”, which is a term which refers to a precise philosophical > content. It is the same for “tajrid” sometimes rendered by “privation” and “tafrid” for > “individualization”. Also, the word “'aql” is habitually translated by “reason” and by “intellect”. We > have rendered it in certain occasions by “active imagination”, for it clearly corresponds to the > imaginative faculty in medieval philosophy which permits one to realize abstractions. > > We have translated “ta'wil” by “spiritual hermeneutic” in order to follow the usage of the > Orientalists and everywhere that this was possible, we have re-established the vocabulary used in > France to facilitate a better comprehension for those who are habituated to this terminology. Of > course we consider all these translations as temporary and replying to momentary technical > exigencies. It would be dangerous to take them out of their context. In no case, are they destined to > be substituted to the more literal translations which have had the advantage of being heard by the > greatest number. > > The transliteration retained is that in usage in the Baha’i translations which is not distinguished from > the habitual transliterations except that the form of the accents are those of Arabic, with Persian > having the same appearance but the system of vocalization of the Arabic alphabet. For reasons > having to do with the means of printing, we have omitted all the diacritical signs which the > specialists will have no trouble in reestablishing. > > FIRST PART: > HERMENEUTICS > > CHAPTER ONE: > IN SEARCH OF THE KINGDOM > > 1. The Kingdom as a structure of intelligibility > > The question of the ontology of the divine worlds might appear to be a purely metaphysical > question. We have chosen to treat the problem from the angle of hermeneutics because this > approach is suggested to us by Baha’u’llah in a text of particular importance, the “Tablet of All > Food”. Undertaking the spiritual hermeneutic of the word “food” in the Qur'an, he assures us > that this word has a significance of function in each of the worlds of God. We have therefore > from one side a text that can be read in a purely hermeneutic manner, in its inventory of all the > recorded meanings of the word “food”, and from the other side we have a question which > initially appears to be purely ontological which is that of the divine worlds. > > However, this analysis is mistaken and it is the source of all the errors that have been made in the > study of the metaphysics of Baha’u’llah. The ontology of Baha’u’llah is not, as in the classical > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > systems, the foundation of metaphysics. > > The foundation of his metaphysics is instead in an anthropology and a new humanism that places > the question of the nature of man at its very core. The role of ontology in the field of metaphysics is > thus found to be displaced. Hence, Baha’i ontology splits into two branches. The first is an onto- > hermeneutic which we find exemplified in the “Tablet of All Food” and which defines a “world” as > a level of perception of the revelation dependent upon the spiritual “situs” of the seeker. The second > is an onto-cosmology which defines a “world” as a mode of being which is itself a modality of the > Spirit upon which depends a structure of intelligibility. It is this structure of intelligibility which > establishes the unity of ontology and which assures communication between the onto-hermeneutic > and the onto-cosmology. > > Like every philosophical explanation, this one may appear to be complicated. The reading of the > writings of Baha’u’llah permits one to generally ignore these problems because instead of employing > philosophical language, Baha’u’llah utilizes a poetic language the communicative power of which is > composed of images and upon the resonances which these images awaken at an intuitive level in the > symbolic universe of our collective and personal unconscious. > > This does not mean that the study of the onto-hermeneutic which we present here should be > neglected. On the contrary, it opens the way to understanding the metaphysical by rendering > explicit what is implicit, and furnishes us with a true key for reading the writings of Baha’u’llah. > What may initially be taken for an innocent poetization, or the excesses of an Oriental style which > would curtail verbiage in order to arrive at the heart of a subject, represents in fact an indispensable > network of indications that situate the level of the reading of the text and its philosophical meaning. > > 2. The Tablet of All Food > > Baha’u’llah revealed the “Tablet of All Food” (Lawh-i-Kullu't-Ta'am) shortly before his departure to > the mountains of Kurdistan, in April 1854, at a moment when he was experiencing intense tests due > to the dissensions and disunity which then reigned in the surviving Babi community. From the time > of his arrival in Baghdad, Baha’u’llah endeavored to gather around himself the Babis, many of > whom were disoriented after the martyrdom of the Bab, and the great persecutions that followed his > death. These persecutions had brought about the disappearance of the elite of the Babi community, > beginning with the principal “Letters of the Living”35. Mirza Yahya, then addressed as Jinab-i-Azal, > a half-brother of Baha’u’llah, had been designated the nominal leader of the community but had > shown himself to be particularly incompetent and lacking in wisdom. His relations with his older > brother had deteriorated. Baha’u’llah had occupied himself with some success in reanimating the > spiritual life of his co-religionists, which threatened to become utterly debased and extinguished. His > efficacious action and his wise counsels rapidly bore fruit. Numerous Babis turned to him to receive > spiritual advice and direction. But this situation inspired the jealousy of certain other Babis, > including Mirza Yahya. He had fallen under the influence of a deceitful and ambitious person, > named Siyyid Muhammad-i-Isfahani, who sowed the seeds of dissension in the community. > > Shoghi Effendi writes: > That is to say the first eighteen disciples of the Báb. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > “A clandestine opposition, whose aim was to nullify every effort exerted, and frustrate > every design conceived, by Baha’u’llah for the rehabilitation of a distracted community, > could now be clearly discerned. Insinuations, whose purpose was to sow the seeds of > doubt and suspicion and to represent Him as a usurper, as the subverter of the laws > instituted by the Bab, and the wrecker of His Cause, were being incessantly circulated. > His Epistles, interpretations, invocations and commentaries were being covertly and > indirectly criticized, challenged and misrepresented. An attempt to injure His person was > even set afoot but failed to materialize.”36 > > Baha’u’llah saw that the very efforts he was making to revive the Babi community were becoming > the cause of disunity. Faced with this situation, he soon decided to completely retire from the world, > to leave Baghdad in order to carry out the life of a wandering darvish in the mountains of > Kurdistan. The purpose of this retreat was to allow for the passions of his enemies to subside while > simultaneously delivering a salutary shock. At the time that Baha’u’llah wrote the “Tablet of All > Food”, he certainly already meditated this retreat for he declares: > > “Give ear, O Kamal! to the voice of this lowly, this forsaken ant, that hath hid itself in its > hole, and whose desire is to depart from your midst, and vanish from your sight, by > reason of that which the hands of men have wrought.”37 > > This period was for Baha’u’llah one of intense moral and spiritual suffering, for nothing could afflict > him more than to see the disunity of the Babi community and the believers debasing themselves and > defiling their Faith by committing vile acts. The “Tablet of All Food” reflects this suffering which > returns as an echo in the text: “Oceans of sadness have surged over Me, a drop of which no soul could bear to > drink”38, and “Such is my grief that My soul hath well nigh departed from My body”39, and finally: > > “Woe is Me, woe is Me!...All that I have seen from the day on which I first drank the > pure milk from the breast of My mother until this moment hath been effaced from > My memory, in consequence of that which the hands of the people have > committed.”40 > > The Tablet is addressed to a believer named Haji Mirza Kamalu'd-Din, originating from the little > town of Naraq in Iran. Kamalu'd-Din had become a Babi some years earlier. After the death of the > Bab he had remained firm in his faith notwithstanding the persecutions of the Babis and the > dissensions he witnessed among the believers. The state in which the Babi movement found itself > preoccupied him a great deal and this is without doubt one of the reasons that impelled him to go to > Baghdad. His avowed aim was to encounter Mirza Yahya, then considered the nominal > > Shoghi Effendi, “God Passes By,” 1944, p. 117; French: “Dieu passe pres de nous,” ed. fr. 1970, p. 147. > Translator’s Note: For biography of Shoghi Effendi included in the author’s footnote, see the endnote > attached to the first reference to Shoghi Effendi in the book. > Ibid., p. 118. > Ibid., p. 148. > Ibid. > 40Ibid. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > representative of the Bab, intending to ask him for clarifications on a certain number of points of > exegesis and mysticism. Having arrived in Baghdad, Kamalu'd-Din found it impossible to find a > trace of Mirza Yahya who at this moment lived in hiding and refused to enter into contact with the > believers. Kamalu'd-Din wrote then to Baha’u’llah and asked him to solicit from Mirza Yahya a > commentary upon a verse of the Qur'an taken from the Sura of the Family of 'Imran which says: > > “All food was lawful to the children of Israel except what Israel forbade to itself > before the Torah was sent down.”41 > > According to tradition, this verse was revealed by the Prophet in order to reply to the attacks of the > Jews of Medina who were astonished that the alimentary prohibitions of Islam were not the same as > those of the Torah (Pentateuch), and especially, that they were less numerous, for the scrupulous > observance of the Law was their pride. > > Baha’u’llah transmitted Kamalu'd-Din's letter to Mirza Yahya who in his turn wrote a response that > so superficial that his interlocutor lost all faith in his spiritual eminence. Kamalu'd-Din then turned > to Baha’u’llah whose grandeur and knowledge he had begun to catch a glimpse of. It is under these > circumstances that Baha’u’llah revealed for him the Tablet today known by the name of “Tablet of > All Food”42. > > The reading of this Tablet completely transformed Kamalu'd-Din. He was convinced that he who > had written it could not be any other than “Him Whom God shall manifest”43. Baha’u’llah enjoined > him to keep secret a mystery which it was premature to divulge and sent him to Iran, encouraging > him to share this Tablet with the believers44. > > The fundamental question taken up by the traditional exegesis of this Qur'anic verse is that of the > divine laws of a social character (shari'a) and the divinely ordained capacity of the Prophets to modify > these laws. Baha’u’llah took up this question again in the “Book of Certitude” (Kitab-i-Iqan) in a more > profound and didactic manner. The explanation that he gives here is by nature much more > mystical, as are most of his writings of this period. > > 3. The hierarchy of the spiritual worlds > > The Tablet is written in Arabic and begins with a long prologue of great poetical character weaving > > Qur'an III:92. The purpose of our study of Qur’anic verses being essentially linguistic, all the verses cited in > this essay were retranslated through our efforts in order to come closest to the context so as not to find it > necessary to utilize four or five different translations. Translator’s Note: The original Arabic transliterated is > as follows: kullu't-ta'aami kaana hillaa'l-libanii israa'iila illaa maaharrama israa'iylu 'alaa nafsih min qabli aan > tunazzala't-tawratu. The second phrase of this verse, which is not discussed in Bahá’u’lláh's commentary, is > transliterated as follows: qul fatuu biat-tawrati fatluuhaa in kuntum s.adiqiin and has been rendered into > English by Mawlavi Sher Ali as: “Say: Bring then the Torah and read it, if you are truthful.” > “Ma'idiy-i-Asmani,” volume IV, pp. 265-276. We will abridge the title hereafter as “MA”. > “Him Whom God shall manifest” (Man Yuzhiruhu'llah) was the title by which the Bab designated he whose > appearance he was charged with announcing. > Adib Taherzadeh, “The Revelation of Bahá’u’lláh,” Oxford, 1974, volume I, pp. 55-60. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > a chain of metaphors upon light. An impression of grandeur and of majesty is emitted by the whole > of this treatise and finishes up by captivating the reader. Baha’u’llah puts in motion oceans of light > and of fire on which the waves break into one another before our eyes45. He describes the > inundation of an enflamed gushing ocean from the “Temple of saintliness”, a Temple which > constitutes in all likelihood to an allusion to his own person46. Then, changing register, he > announces that the “Dove of light”, symbol as we know it of divine inspiration, has newly begun > singing the eternal melodies, that a “Light” shines upon Mount Sinai, and that the “Bird of light” > has come out from behind the veils which concealed it from the view of men47. > > Baha’u’llah begins his commentary by explaining that the word “food” has numerous meanings and > these meanings cannot be understood except through the hierarchy of spiritual worlds which are > four in number. These four worlds are the worlds of Hahut, Lahut, Jabarut and Malakut48. > > 4. The world of Hahut > > The world of Hahut is that in which the unmanifested essence of God is totally veiled. There does > not exist, upon that ontological level, any other being but God; His singularity is total, and there > exists no creature to know Him. It is to this station of Hahut that apply the words of the Prophets > such as: “In the beginning was God; there was no creature to know Him” and “The Lord was alone; > with no one to adore Him”49. The world of Hahut is the world of the beginning in a time outside of > time in the anteriority of causes. Baha’u’llah affirms elsewhere that God has always been a creator > and that there was always a creature to know Him. This is why he indicates that these words signify > “that the habitation wherein the Divine Being dwelleth is far above the reach and ken of any one > besides Him.”50 > > Baha’u’llah describes this world as the world of “He is” (Huwa), and “the Paradise of the Absolute > unicity” (Ahadiyya).51 It is the “Absconditum” where no intelligence has ever penetrated. One refers to > this world as to that of the “Hidden Mystery” or as to the “Primal Point”, for the primal point (al- > nuqta al-awwaliyya) is the first singularity from which all has proceeded, that which contains in itself all > the potentialities of existence. It is the One who contains only Himself and from whom furthermore > all the numbers have been engendered. God, in that world, is an unmanifested essence, for the > essence manifests itself by attributes, but these are not yet distinct from the essence. The ancient > philosophers made reference to this world as the world of the “One”. > > “MA,” volume IV, pp. 265-266. > Ibid., p. 265. > Ibid., p. 266. > Ibid., p. 269. > English: “Gleanings from the Writings of Bahá’u’lláh,” LXXVIII, p. 150; French: “Extrait des Ecrits de > Bahá’u’lláh,” LXXVIII, p. 140. We will cite hereafter this book by the initials EEB followed by the number > of the extract with Roman numeral and the number of the page of the Belgian edition of 1949. Translator’s > Note: Hereafter the English translation will be cited by the initials GL followed by the Roman numeral for > the extract and the number of the page from the U.S. edition of 1952. > Ibid., p. 151; Ibid., p. 140. > “MA” volume IV, p. 269. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > This passage of the Tablet can be related to a Commentary (Tafsir) that ‘Abdu’l-Bahaii wrote in > 1861, seven years later, when he was only seventeen years old, upon the famous saying (hadith) of the > Prophet Muhammad “I was a hidden treasure, I desired to be known and for this purpose I brought > creation into being”. The first part of this Commentary is consecrated to the station of the Hidden > Treasure which Baha’u’llah in our text has clearly identified with the world of Hahut. ‘Abdu’l-Baha > explains that the station of the Hidden Treasure corresponds to the invisible level of the divine > essence where it lives in its most absolute unicity. To speak of this station the philosophers and the > theologians have used multiple terms and all are obscure each more than the other, such as “the > hidden identity” (Ghayb al-huwiyya), “the pure Unicity” (Sarf al-ahadiyya), “the Occultation of > occultations” (Ghayb al-ghuyyub), “the unknown Absolute”, “the inaccessible to all qualification” > (Mahjul al-na'at), or “the inaccessible to consciousness” (munqata al-wujdani) and others besides.52 The > diversity of these expressions does no more than reveal the perplexity of man. The only thing which > one can affirm with certitude is that the divine essence is inaccessible to the human intelligence and > above all comparisons and all metaphors which are generally utilized to describe it. ‘Abdu’l-Baha > however takes on one of the images employed in this literature in giving it an original meaning. He > writes that the only way to represent the divine essence consists in imagining a point and to consider > how in the point are hidden all the letters and all the words (in the writing of Arabic the point is an > essential element which gives value to the letter), without being able to find in the point any trace of > their ipseity (huwiyyat), and without also being able to establish the least distinction among them.53 > > Hence, if one considers the divine essence on the ontological level, one attests that the names, the > attributes and the essential potentialities (shu'unat-i-dhatiyyih)54 are in a state of non-existence, and it is > for this very reason that one speaks of the essence as of a “Hidden Treasure” for even though > nothing is manifest upon this ontological level, it is nevertheless from the non-manifestation of this > essence that the existence of all things is derived. ‘Abdu’l-Baha employs then another image that is > also a common feature of this metaphysic of Being. He takes the image of the One (Ahad) which > contains in itself all the numbers. Without the concept of the One the other numbers could not exist > (in modern language we would say that if there existed no secret quantity the measurement of > quantity would be impossible). Therefore, one can consider that it is the One which engenders all > the other numbers, and that all the numbers are contained in the One without, of course, finding in > the One the least trace of these numbers.55 Thus the character of absolute transcendence of the > divine essence is preserved. Baha’u’llah says, speaking of this stationiii: “The door of the knowledge > of the Ancient Being hath ever been, and will continue for ever to be, closed in the face of men.”56 > > Finally, the Hidden Treasure retains its mystery, for, contrary to what the greater part of the > thinkers and the philosophers have said before them, Baha’u’llah and ‘Abdu’l-Baha do not identify > the Primal Point, or the One, with the divine essence. For them these are all at best images (tamthil), > or if one wishes, mental representations (tasawurat) destined to facilitate our comprehension. In one > > “Makatib-i-’Abdu’l-Bahá,” volume II, p. 7. Abbreviated from henceforth as “Makatib”. > Ibid., p. 8. > The expression “shu'unat-i-dhatiyyih” is an Arabic and Persian expression conveying the concept of “seminal > reasons” borrowed from Greek Stoicism. > “Makatib,” volume II, p. 9. > English: GL, XXI, p. 49; French: EEB, XXI, p. 47. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > of his Tablets in Persian Baha’u’llah affirms that it is false to speak of God as One for that introduces > already a sign of quantity, and God is above all number and all quantity. It is not thus a question of > affirming as did the Alexandrian philosopher Plotinus the fact that God is the One or that the One > is God, or like the Muslim Platonists as well as the Isma'ili philosophers such as Nasiri'd-Din Tusi, > Nasir-i-Khusraw or the School of the Brothers of Purity (Ithwan al-safa), who were to influence all the > subsequent philosophy in Persia, that God created the One as the first emanation of Himself, and > that the One was in his turn the agent of the creation of all things, or further that the One is the first > hypostasis which emanates from God and which engenders in its turn the hypostases of intelligence > ('aql) and of the soul (nafs). All reference to the Point or to the One is but a convenience of language. > > 5. The world of Lahut > > In the world of Lahut, the attributes of God begin their exteriorization. The potentialities contained > in the divine essence manifest themselves, but only to the interior of His divinity. Upon this level of > existence, the divine manifestations exist, but their existence is in total union with the essence of > God. They have no individuality, no separate identity. They do not possess any other “me” but the > divine “me”; this is why this world is called the kingdom of “He is He Who is and there is no other > but Him” (Huwa huwa wa la ila huwa).57 This world is the world of the first divine emanation (tajalli, > that is to say the Holy Spirit or the divine Verb). This Verb is the spiritual force which God uses to > create the world. The philosophers have on their part referred to this spiritual force in calling it the > Logos or the Nous. > > In the many passages of the writings of Baha’u’llah that refer to the world of the divine Verb, he > describes it as the invisible force that animates his manifestation and the inspiration that moves his > pen. Sometimes he speaks of it as a totally divine world and exterior to himself where the essence of > God manifests in him as “the Lord of Lords”. Sometimes he describes it as manifesting through his > own person and incarnating in him. This indicates two points of view, both of which are relative and > neither of which is exclusive. In his writings Baha’u’llah frequently distinguishes these two > ontological points of view. The Western reader would be mistaken in believing that they are pure > artifices of poetry. When, for example, Baha’u’llah refers to himself as “the Tongue of Grandeur”, > or “the Most Exalted Pen”, he does not utilize simple poetic metaphors. He wishes to precisely > indicate that the voice which speaks through him is situated, at that moment, upon the level of the > world of Lahut, as at other moments it situates itself upon the level of the world of Jabarut. Also > these expressions are precious indications enabling the metaphysical and spiritual comprehension of > these texts. > > In the world of Lahut it is not possible to make a distinction between God and His Manifestation. > The Manifestation expresses Himself in the absolute nakedness of his own essence in union with the > divine essence; every other vestige of his personal identity has disappeared. When Baha’u’llah > manifests himself in this “station” (maqam), he is totally identified with the “Universal Manifestation” > (Mazhar-i-kulli). It is the “Universal Manifestation” who spoke to Moses in the Burning Bush. It is he > whom the Prophet Muhammad encountered during his ascension to heaven (mi'raj), taking the form > of the “Tree of the boundary” (Sidrat al-muntaha)58, the image that designates the point beyond which > “MA,” volume IV, p. 269. > For example: English: “Persian Hidden Words,” #77; GL, XLII, pp. 91-92; French: EEB, XLII, p. 85. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > there is no passage for any human spirit. It is speaking of this ontological level of existence that Jesus > was able to say “I am the Alpha and the Omega”, and Muhammad “I am the first and the last of > the messengers of God”. For on this level of existence each divine messenger is the return of all those > who have preceded him and the incarnation of all those who will follow Him for they form but one > spirit in total union with the divine Being. > > The world of Lahut contains in potentiality all the other levels of existence and all the creatures of > these worlds. It is the capacity of the Verb of God which permits this virtual creation to become a > creation in action. This is why Baha’u’llah refers to this level of existence as a world in which the two > letters K and N (which form in Arabic the word “Kun!” Be!] “were joined and knit together”59, for > according to the Qur'an60, it is by this word that God created the world. > > Only the divine manifestation has access to the world of Lahut. It is from this world that upon him > descends the inspiration which has been symbolized by the flying dove above the Christ on the day > of his baptism, or by the archangel Gabriel who appeared to Muhammad. In the writings of > Baha’u’llah, the prophetic inspiration is sometimes symbolized by a dove or a nightingale, > sometimes by a virginal and angelic creature which is called “Huri”. This celestial “Huri” appeared it > should be noted to Baha’u’llah in the Siyah-Chal at the moment in which he received the first > intimation of his prophetic mission. However one must not believe that this heavenly “Huri” > represents an actual vision. It is rather an image permitting the description in symbolic terms of the > mystical experience of prophetic inspiration which results from total union with God. > > 6. The world of Jabarut > > Below the world of “Lahut” is found the world of “Jabarut”. In the world of Jabarut there exists > nothing but the divine will (Jabr). In this world one finds only God and His manifestations. It is the > level of existence where they descend after having left the level of the fusional union of essences > which is particular to Lahut in order to acquire an individual existence. Baha’u’llah describes this > level of existence of the divine manifestations as “the station of pure abstraction and essential > unity”61. In this world, the manifestations become the channels of the divine will. They are the > archangels of which the Mosaic tradition speaks. To them is applied the formula “I am He, > Himself, and He is I, myself.”62. > > English: Long Obligatory Prayer, “Bahá’í Prayers,” USA, 1985, pp. 13; French: “Livre de Priere,” ed. > 1973, p. 94. Cf. “Abwab al-Malakut,” ed. Beyrouth, p. 4. The Arabic text reads: Wa innahu huwa'l-sirru'l- > maknunu wa'l-razmu'l-makhzunu aladhi bihi iqtarana'l-kafa bi-ruknihi'l-nun. This recalls the repeated > phrase from the opening chapter of the Book of Genesis (Bereshit in Hebrew): “And God said” (ve yomer > elohim), and among the first words of the opening chapter of the Gospel of John (1:1-3): “In the beginning > was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. 2 The same was in the beginning > with God. 3 All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made. > Qur'an 36:82. > “Kitab-i-Iqan,” p. 152; English: GL, #XXII, pp. 50-51; French: EEB, XXII, p. 48. The English translation > by Shoghi Effendi: “One is the station of pure abstraction and essential unity”. The French translation says > somewhat vaguely “their abstract, pure condition, the condition of incomparable unity.” > 62Translator’s Note: “Kitab-i-Iqan,” Part Two. The English translation by Shoghi Effendi: “They are the > > Treasuries of divine knowledge, and the Repositories of celestial wisdom. Through them is transmitted a > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Baha’u’llah refers to this world by various expressions such as “the Kingdom of unity” (Wahidiyya), > “the most exalted Paradise”, “the Paradise of Justice”, or “the world of divine decrees” for in this > world there exists only the decree (qada) of God, and it is by this that the divine Manifestation speaks > and acts. Through the Manifestation the divine decree rules over the world, for the word of God > always prevails in the end. The divine decrees are the spiritual laws which will never be changed. > They constitute the fundamental Order hidden behind the reality of all things, the source of all > knowledge, human or divine. Whoever has arrived at comprehension of these laws has entered > Paradise and has grasped the ultimate reality of Unity, for the true Unity is the unity of will between > the creature and the Creator. Baha’u’llah also speaks of this world as the “World of > Command”('alam al-amr)63, for it is by this command that all the creatures (khalq) have come into > existence. The “World of Command” is distinguished from the “World of the creation”, or “created > world” ('alam al-khalq), by the fact that one is the world of divine justice, as we have seen, while the > other is the world of mercy; for, without the divine mercy, the creatures, because of their > imperfection, could not subsist. > > Jabarut is also the world of the “Mother-Book” (umm al-kitab)iv and of the “preserved Tablet” (lawh al- > muh.fuuzhin)v. In both cases, these are Qur'anic expressions which are found utilized with new > meanings in the writings of Baha’u’llah. In order to understand the meaning of these expressions, > one must remember that, for Muslims, the Qur'an is an uncreated book. In the eternity of God > there exists a celestial prototype of the Book which is called the “Mother-Book” engraved upon a > plaque made of an inalterable substance. The angel Gabriel did no more than dictate the book to > the Prophet Muhammad who transmitted it to human beings. The “preserved Tablet” also > represents in Muslim theology the plaque upon which the divine decrees are inscribed. > > Baha’u’llah gives a different interpretation to these expressions. The “Mother-Book” and the > “preserved Tablet” represent the quintessence of revelation (wahy). This is the divine science which > the Manifestations share with God in the world of Jabarut. Hence, in Jabarut the revelation exists > independently of all human knowledge, it has no need of the garment of words and is not submitted > to the contingency which characterizes the created world. When the divine Manifestation transmits > the revelation to men, he gives it a contingent form which is that of human language, and it is for > this reason that one cannot totally identify revelation with the writings of the Manifestations, even as > Baha’u’llah clearly indicated in one of his Tablets, for revelation is transcendent and cannot be > captured in its plenitude by language. > > The “Mother-Book” thus does not represent the prototype of any particular book, but the matrix > from which all the revealed books have issued forth, the science which God shares with His > Manifestations and which is unique to Them and common to all Dispensations. > The “preserved Tablet”, which Baha’u’llah sometimes calls the “Tablet of Chrysolite”vi, has an even > larger meaning. It is upon this Tablet that the divine decrees (qada) are inscribed and consequently > upon it is the science of the past and of the future. It is the symbol of the omniscience of the divine > > grace that is infinite, and by them is revealed the light that can never fade. Even as He hath said: “There > is no distinction whatsoever between Thee and them; except that they are Thy servants, and are created > of Thee.” This is the significance of the tradition: “I am He, Himself, and He is I, myself.”” > We will see in Chapter V that the expression can also be translated by “world of Revelation”. Certain > philosophers and Orientalists speak of 'alam-i-amr as the “world of the imperative”. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Manifestations as of the omnipotence of God. Indeed, the omniscience of the Manifestations derives > from this omnipotence, and omniscience and omnipotence should be considered as two aspects of > the same reality which is the reality of Jabarut. The “divine Pen” (qalam-i-ilahi) becomes then the > expression of this omnipotence for this pen registers the divine decrees; at the same time it is the sign > of omniscience for it is the channel of revelation. > > 7. The world of Malakut > > The world of “Malakut”, which is found below Jabarut, is the angelic kingdom of those souls to whom > God has revealed Himself in the splendour of His “greatest manifestation” (al-mazhar al-akbar)64. In > the “Tablet to Varqa” Baha’u’llah has given us a striking description of this world. He explains that > the term Malakut covers two significances. The first concerns the Manifestation and the second “the > world of images” ('alam al-mithal) which is an intermediary world between Jabarut and the human > world of mortality(Nasut), between the “heavens” and the “earth”. > > Malakut is actually a dimension of the contingent universe ('alam al-mumkinat). It is in Malakut that the > soul resides, for the soul is an essence (jawhar) and can never leave the world of essences. The soul > cannot incarnate itself in matter; it can only reflect itself in matter even as light reflects in a mirror. It > is the soul that communicates with the divine worlds, and consequently everything that comes from > those worlds must pass through Malakut to reach man. This explains the intermediary character of > the world of Malakut. For example, Baha’u’llah explains that when the Verb of God descends from > the world of Lahut towards man, it passes into the world of Jabarut where it is made manifest, this > constituting the first step of “substantification” (taqyid)65. When the Verb descends to the level of > Malakut, it confers to those who dwell therein the blessings of the power coming from the superior > levels. > > From many points of view, Malakut as a “world of images” has resemblances to the platonic world of > ideas. Baha’u’llah tells us that the world of man (Nasut) is but a metaphorical image of Malakut. > Malakut is the destiny, the finality of man. It is the spiritual world par excellence, “the Kingdom of > Abha”, the world of souls, where, beyond physical death, man pursues his spiritual development in > his infinite voyage towards God. > > Baha’u’llah tells us that the world of Malakut is itself hierarchized according to the degree of spiritual > development of the souls therein. At the summit of Malakut is found “the celestial Arc”, “the > Crimson Ark” upon which navigate the souls of the Prophets, the martyrs and the saints who form > “the Supreme Concourse” (Mala-i-A'la)66, “the angelic troops”, “the Celestial Assembly”, ready at > every moment to come to the rescue of those who arise to uphold the Cause of God. > > 8. The metaphorical character of Malakut > > “MA,” volume I, p. 19; volume IV, p. 226 (“Tablet of the Examination,” Lawh-i-Istintaq). > Ibid., volume I, p. 18. > For example: English: PHW: #77; GL, XLII, p. 91; French: XLII, p. 85. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > When man pursues his spiritual development in the world of Nasut, he does so by means of actions > such helping and serving his fellow human beings, sacrificing his comfort in order to accomplish > noble and altruistic tasks, contributing from his means to the support of religion, augmenting his > love for others through philanthropic acts, developing his spiritual comprehension by associating > with pure and detached persons, daily recitation and reading of the revealed Word, and promoting > and promulgating the teachings of his Faith. These actions, Baha’u’llah tells us, contribute to the > spiritual development of man because they are the symbolic representations, one could say the > “images”, of the functions of the soul in Malakut. > > Our life in this world, the world of Nasut is then a metaphorical image of what our life will be in the > other world, the world of Malakut. In this world man exercises and develops his spiritual functions > which will become his “senses” in the other world, permitting him to live a new existence > conforming to the spiritual nature of the unembodied soul. If the soul fails to develop its spiritual > qualities in this world, it will not grow and it will enter the Kingdom in a state of spiritual atrophy > that will render its existence in Malakut similar to that of the blind and the deaf upon this earth. As > for those who will have developed their spiritual qualities, these will become new senses for them by > which they will breathe “the celestial breezes”, will hear the “divine melodies”, and will contemplate > meta-physical landscapes that will cheer them in their deepest selves. The quality of the world of > man (Nasut) as a metaphorical reflection or image of Malakut is illustrated by an anecdote which > ‘Abdu’l-Baha transmits in his book “Memorials of the Faithful” (Tadhkiratu'l-Wafa). In this book, he > tells us of the life and death of seventy-four of the close companions of Baha’u’llah. In the chapter > consecrated to Mulla 'Ali-Akbar, who was named by Baha’u’llah a “Hand of the Cause of God”, > and who played a very significant role in the propagation of the Baha’i teachings during his early > sojourn, ‘Abdu’l-Baha describes a dream that he had some years after the death of this individual: > > “One night, not long ago, I saw him in the world of dreams. Although his frame had > always been massive, in the dream world he appeared larger and more corpulent than > ever. It seemed as if he had returned from a journey. I said to him, 'Jinab, you have > grown good and stout.' 'Yes,' he answered, 'praise be to God! I have been in places where > the air was fresh and sweet, and the water crystal pure; the landscapes were beautiful to > look upon, the foods delectable. It all agreed with me, of course, so I am stronger than > ever now, and I have recovered the zest of my early youth. The breaths of the All- > Merciful blew over me and all my time was spent in telling of God. I have been setting > forth His proofs, and teaching His Faith.'“67 > > ‘Abdu’l-Baha added this particularly significant commentary: > > “The meaning of teaching the Faith in the next world is spreading the sweet savors > of holiness; that action is the same as teaching.”68 > > This short text teaches us two things. The first is that the most important actions of our terrestrial life > such as loving one's fellows, propagating the divine teachings, giving and receiving unselfishly, all > have a counterpart in Malakut and should be regarded as the symbolic expressions of the life of the > > ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, “Memorials of the Faithful,” translated by Marzieh Gail, USA, 1971, pp. 9-12. > Ibid., p. 12. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > soul in the divine Kingdom. The second is that as long as man inhabits this mortal realm, he can > neither comprehend nor directly express the realities of the spiritual world. As long as he is the > prisoner of this world his intelligence cannot comprehend these realities, and no human language > can describe them. All he can do, at the very best is to have a vague intuition of their reality. Poetic > language is the only way to mediate this communicational impossibility, and recourse to metaphors > based upon this sensible world is therefore inevitable. > > However, these metaphors are not simple poetic artifices. They contain a portion of the spiritual > truth that goes beyond the limitation of words. Thus, in the story of ‘Abdu’l-Baha we must > understand that the pleasures of our physical senses, such as in smelling a perfume, contemplating a > landscape, savoring a delicious platter, are the terrestrial images of the life of the soul in Malakut. To > go beyond that in the comprehension of this mystery seems to be impossible. Nevertheless, for those > who possess spiritual comprehension, meditation upon this world permits some degree of intuitive > understanding of the spiritual world. > > 9. The unity of the divine worlds > > The relations which exist between this world, the world of Nasut, and the spiritual worlds is a very > rich theme. All the great mystics have intuited this connection, and, for example, in the writings > attributed to Hermes we read: “The world below is the image of the world above”. Baha’u’llah > explains to us that the world below (Nasut) and Malakut are not two worlds totally separated from one > another but are rather two parts of one greater world, which he calls “the world of creation” ('alam-i- > khalq) or “the contingent world” ('alam-i-mumkinat), and both are governed by the same laws. In a > Tablet addressed to a believer named Yusuf-i-Isfahani69, Baha’u’llah explains that all the divine > worlds revolve around this world. He says that for this reason, the soul who in this world has always > behaved himself according to the Will of God and according to His commands, after his departure > for the other world, will show qualities which were before but potentialities. He adds that in each > world there exists for every soul a state which was previously assigned to him. ‘Abdu’l-Baha writes in > one of his Tablets: > > “Those souls who are pure and unsullied, upon the dissolution of their elemental frames, > hasten away to the world of God, and that world is within this world. The people of this > world, however, are unaware of that world, and are even as the mineral and the vegetable > that know nothing of the world of the animal and the world of man.”70 > > It is this differentiation and interdependence between the two worlds that explains that the spiritual > laws governing the whole of creation take different forms adapted to the requirements of each. The > similitude between “the world above” and “the world below” had been understood since the most > remote antiquity. But each religion, each tradition, has developed its predilected themes. The Baha’i > Writings suggest that meditating upon the physical realities of this world can be a means of > comprehending the spiritual realities of the other world, on condition that in doing so we do not lose > “MA,” volume IV, pp. 19-20. > ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, “Muntakhabaaty az makaatiib min had.rat-i-’Abdu’l-Bahá'“, USA, 1979, #150, p. 280; > English: “Selections from the Writings of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá,” [SWAB] Haifa, 1978, #163, pp. 194-195; French: > “Selections des Ecrits d’Abdu’l-Bahá,” [SEAB] trad. fr. Pierre Coulon, Bruxelles, 1983, p. 193. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > sight of what has been outwardly conveyed to us through divine Revelation, and that we allow > ourselves to be guided by this divine Revelation. If the world of creation reflects spiritual laws, it is > not only because of the unity of the physical world and the spiritual world, for inasmuch as these > worlds are a divine emanation, the least atom of the physical world reflects the divine attributes > according to its capacity. In “Words of Paradise” (Kalimat-i-Firdawsiyyih) Baha’u’llah writes: > > “Every created being however revealeth His signs which are but emanations from Him > and not His Own Self. All these signs are reflected and can be seen in the book of > existence, and the scrolls that depict the shape and pattern of the universe are indeed a > most great book.”71 > > The spiritual worlds being exalted above language, only metaphor can permit us to approach them. > When one reads Baha’i literature, one notices thus that there are a number of recurrent themes. > > One of these themes is the similitude that we find between the embryo in the womb of his mother > and the terrestrial life. When he is in the womb of his mother, the embryo could believe that this is > the only world that exists. He has no consciousness of the world that exists outside of the uterine > membrane. He is not even conscious of his mother. In the physical world, we are in the same > situation as the embryo in the uterine world. We are inclined to rely exclusively on our senses and to > believe that this world is the only world that exists, even though the distance that separates this > world from the spiritual worlds is even thinner than the uterine membrane. Furthermore, the > situation of this world in relationship to the spiritual world, is the same as the situation of the uterine > world in relation to the physical world. The physical world surrounds on all sides the matrix in > which the embryo lives; and in reality, the matrix and the embryo are both part, without being > aware of this, of the physical world. So also, the spiritual world surrounds the physical world as the > physical world surrounds the matrix, and there exists between them the same relationship. It is for > this reason that the physical world and the spiritual world form but one actual world. While the > matrix is narrow and confined, in comparison the extent of the physical world can appear to be > infinite. The relation is the same with the spiritual world; in comparison with the spiritual world this > world is as narrow and confined as the uterine world, while the spiritual world seems to be infinite. > > We can also attest that the uterine world is governed by the same laws as the physical world, even if > these laws do not manifest themselves in the same fashion in these two worlds. So also, the physical > world is governed by the same laws as the spiritual world, for the physical world is but the very least > part of a much more vast system which is the “World of Creation” and which includes the spiritual > world. The physical world is as much integrated into the spiritual world as the uterine world is into > the physical world. > > The relationships which we may posit between the uterine world and the physical world do not stop > here, but also relate to the development of the soul which we can compare to the development of the > embryo. In the uterine world, the embryo is born of the fertilization of an ovule. From this moment > > “Majmu'iy-i-Ishraqat,” p. 116; English: “Tablets of Bahá’u’lláh,” p. 60. The Persian text does not speak of > “emanation” but of manifestation: “dar kull ayyat-i u zahir” which is to say “in all things His attributes > manifest themselves”. Also, the English “the shape and pattern” which refers to the world translates a single > Persian word which is “naqsh” which means “plan, structure,” and can be effectively rendered by the > English “pattern” even though it has a richer and more extended meaning. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > on, the primordial cell begins to multiply and to diversify, and in this way the embryo takes form. > From the moment of fertilization we can be sure that the gestation will not exceed nine months. At > the end of these nine months, the embryo will have attained perfection; that is to say that it will have > expended all of its possibilities of development in the uterine world. Its development could no longer > be pursued in that world, and requires that it be transferred to another world in which it can begin a > new cycle of growth. In this fashion, birth results in detachment from one world and passage from > this world into another. In the same fashion, the process of human development in this world has a > predetermined duration that is terminated by physical death. If man remained eternally in this > world he would make only very limited spiritual progress and early on he would exhaust all the > potentialities of his development. > > Sometimes the infant is born before term. The infant then passes through a critical phase in which > he is fragile and must receive careful attention. Nevertheless, having passed through this critical > phase, the infant continues his development in a normal way. This is what happens to the souls of > men who are prematurely deceased. Some leave this world early because they have evolved more > rapidly than others and have arrived more rapidly at the requisite level of spiritual maturityvii. > Others leave this world prematurely. While they have not attained the optimum temporal threshold > of spiritual development, nevertheless, the world rather than being a means and an instrument for > this development, has instead become an obstacle72. > > In the womb of his mother, the embryo lives and develops. He grows in dimensions and in > proportion and according to the degree of his growth, the cells diversify and new organs appear. > Some biologists think that the embryo passes through all the steps of morphogenesis, that is to say > that it recapitulates the entire evolution of life upon the earth. However that may be, the organs > which the embryo develops in the uterine world are of no utility to him there. He has no need of > eyes to see, nor of ears to hear, nor of legs to walk. All his organs will be without use to him until > after his birth into this world. So also, in the course of this terrestrial life, we must develop our > spiritual qualities. The physical world being already a more evolved world than the uterine world, > these qualities can make a fitting start. There are those who believe that one can live very well in this > world without bothering with our spiritual development. But the Baha’i writings explain that in the > other world these spiritual qualities will become like the eyes and the ears of this world. Those who > will have failed to develop their spiritual qualities will be, in the spiritual world, like the blind, the > deaf and the dumb of this world. > > ‘Abdu’l-Baha developed this theme in many of his Tablets and talks73. In one of his Tablets in > Persian74 he explains that as long as the embryo is in the womb of his mother his physical defects > and imperfections are hidden, for these do not become manifest until after birth. So also, to a large > degree, our spiritual defects and imperfections are not apparent in this world, but when we enter the > other world then they in their turn become evident and manifest75. > > ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, “Some Answered Questions,” LXVI, pp. 238-240 passim.; French: “Les Lecons de Saint > Jean d'Acre,” 5eme ed. corrigee, Paris 1982, LXVI, pp. 244-245 passim. > For example: English: SWAB, #156, pp. 183-185; French: SEAB, # 156, p. 184. > “Makatib,” volume I, pp. 337-342. > Ibid., p. 339. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > The infant in the uterine world can not imagine what seeing, smelling or speaking signifies, for these > are functions that belong to the physical world. So also, as long as we are in this world, we can not > imagine what the awakening of our spiritual senses will represent in the other world76. > > If we reflect further upon this metaphor we may more deeply penetrate its meaning. If an infant is > born without the capacity to see, smell, speak or walk we say that this infant is handicapped. But, > what is a handicap if it is not the impossibility of enjoying certain characteristics of the physical > world from which man derives a particular pleasure? That which makes us love life is the beauty of > the world which surrounds us and the pleasures which our senses make us capable of deriving > therefrom. The life of a man who is incapable of communicating through his senses with the world > surrounding him is akin to a vegetative existence. Many would feel that such an existence would not > be worth the effort of being lived. It would render the existence of man to the level of the protozoa, > for if an infant were to appear in this world without senses, his very intelligence could not awaken. > > A failure to develop our spiritual qualities will result in us entering the other world with spiritual > handicaps similar to the status of the physically handicapped in this world. Our spiritual qualities > become our spiritual senses and if these senses do not function, we will be deprived of the enjoyment > of certain aspects of the spiritual world. In the other world there are spiritual senses which > correspond to each of the physical senses such as vision, hearing, or taste in this world. To fail in our > development of these spiritual senses will deprive us of the full enjoyment of the other world. > > It is for this reason that in the same Tablet cited above, ‘Abdu’l-Baha declares that human life can > be compared to a tree and that the metaphorical heaven and the hell of the tree are contained in the > fruit77. The tree is responsible for the fruit it produces. Paradise and hell are in us. They are spiritual > states. > > ‘Abdu’l-Baha adds that those men who negate the existence of the spiritual worlds are in the same > position as the mineral which negates the existence of the vegetable world, or the vegetable which > negates the existence of the animal world. In the case of the mineral, vegetable and animal worlds, > their internal organization provides no information about these higher worlds78. Likewise, for the > heedless, for those whose spiritual senses have not begun to awaken, the internal organization of > their human nature does not disclose the existence of higher spiritual worlds. In reality, the world of > existence, physical and spiritual, is one world79. > > Another theme which one encounters in the Baha’i writings is the similarity between the laws which > govern the growth of a tree and those which govern the spiritual development of man80. The image > of the tree shows us the interdependency which exists between the different divine worlds. The tree > belongs to the vegetable world, while it derives all of its substance from the mineral world, that is to > say from an inferior world. In similar fashion, God did not wish for man to be a pure spirit, for > otherwise He would have created him spiritually perfect, and not assigned him this mortal sojourn > > Ibid. > Ibid., p. 338. > Ibid., pp. 340-341. > Ibid., p. 341. The Persian text says: 'alam-i-vujud 'alam-i-vahid ast. > Adib Taherzadeh, “The Revelation of Bahá’u’lláh,” Oxford, 1992, p. 8. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > in which to begin his process of spiritual development. The material world is the world in which > man roots his future growth, even as the tree plunges his roots into the earth. Man has need of the > material world to nourish his growth; without it he could not make a beginning. Even as the > vegetable world is built upon the mineral world and the animal world upon the vegetable world, so > also the spiritual world is built upon the human world ('alam-i-insani). Each of the superior worlds > encompasses the inferior worlds and all are interdependent as we see in the different kingdoms of > nature. > > While the nature of the tree is to plunge its roots in the soil to take from the earth its substance, if a > tree chose to bury its branches in the soil, it would condemn itself to wither away and to rot. Its very > nature pushes it to lift up its branches towards the sky in the opposite direction to the earth. For > man, the equivalent of this upreaching of branches, is the law of detachment. Even though the > material world is there to take care of the needs of his spiritual development, nevertheless, he can > not arrive at this development without detaching himself from the things of this world. It is because > of this that without detachment there is no spiritual development possible. The essential nature of > man is spiritual, and it attracts him to the spiritual world even as the branches of the tree are > attracted to the sky. > > If the tree directs its branches to the sky, it is because it is attracted by the light of the sun. So also > man is attracted by the “Sun” of the divine Manifestation and it is this spiritual light which > conditions his spiritual development. The light of the sun permits the tree to produce leaves, then > flowers and fruits. So also the light of the “Sun” of the Manifestation permits man to develop his > spiritual qualities and produce good actions. If we then consider a forest, we will find trees of varied > heights. Some are immense and tower to the summit of the forest. These trees are in direct contact > with the rays of the sun. Then there are trees that live in their shadow. In the final analysis however, > all the trees derive their life through the light of the sun, even those that do not directly receive this > light. There even exist parasitic plants like the tropical creepers, ivy or mistletoe, which > notwithstanding their own feebleness make use of other trees to attain this light. Human life is > composed in a similar fashion. There are men who live directly in the light of the Manifestation and > those who never see that light. But in the two cases it is always the light of the Manifestation that is > the cause of their existence and of their spiritual development. This is why the path of spiritual > development is never totally closed, even to those who do not recognize God and His Manifestation. > > Another of the ways in which the unity of the created world is effected, besides the interdependency > of the worlds which has already been noted, is that they exist only by the breath of the Holy Spirit > transmitted through the divine Manifestation. Nothing would exist without this light which is the > cause of the existence of all things. > > One could elaborate infinitely upon this theme of the similarities between the laws of the physical > world and those of the spiritual world. There are many examples of this theme found in the writings > of Baha’u’llah and ‘Abdu’l-Baha. But what is important is that we understand the profound reasons > for this similarity. Our aim is not to diversify the examples of this theme, but to facilitate > comprehension of the fundamental unity of the universe and of its laws. Does not ‘Abdu’l-Baha say > that universal gravity is an example of the Law of Love which is the fundamental Law governing all > of creation and indeed all the divine worlds? > > These few reflections permit us to see that the metaphorical character of the physical world in > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > relation to the spiritual world is not like a simple play of mirrors, as if the physical world were similar > to the image of the sky reflected in the water of a lake. This metaphorical relation is the expression > of something much more profound which derives from the unity of the creation of God; unity which > encompasses as much the physical world as the spiritual, the sensible as the intelligible. > > 10. The infinite continnum of the divine worlds > > All that we have said about the different divine worlds obviously implies that when Baha’u’llah refers > to these worlds, his explanation is necessarily limited by human language and by our > comprehension. It is but a faint glimmer and without doubt very distant from reality. The divine > worlds form an infinite continuum. Every attempt to establish distinctions between them is but a > creation of the human spirit based upon arbitrary criteria, as are arbitrary for example the criteria > which permit us to distinguish the colors of the chromatic spectrum, for, as everyone knows, one > passes from one color to another in an imperceptible manner. > > Nevertheless, the definitions which Baha’u’llah gives of the divine worlds furnish a precious key for > the comprehension of his writings. It often happens that when reading his writings one may ask who > is speaking. In the same text Baha’u’llah often utilizes several levels of language. Sometimes he > speaks as a mere man, at others as Divinity personified. Sometimes he introduces distinct entities > such as the nightingale, the dove, the celestial pen, and so forth. At others, his writings represent a > dialogue between various voices, as in the “Tablet of Fire”. These different levels of language > represent the different aspects of the divine Manifestation as viewed from the perspective of worlds > of Lahut, Jabarut, Malakut and Nasut. > > This hierarchy of spiritual worlds does not derive its meaning from a creationist theology, or in > relation to human existence, as in Muslim philosophy or among certain Christian authors such as > Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite81. Baha’u’llah's intention is to explain the relationship of God with > His Manifestation, and consequently between His Manifestation and man. In order to understand > that idea one must abandon the old modes of thought, whether of Muslim philosophy or of > Christian scholasticism, and not permit oneself to be seduced by the Neoplatonic charms of these > spiritual worlds. If Baha’u’llah utilizes a Neoplatonic vocabulary it is because it is the vocabulary > which was in usage among the Muslim thinkers of his time, and perhaps also because all every > spiritual philosophy based upon a revealed message has necessarily a Neoplatonic look. We will > return to these problems in the third part of this book. > > 11. The Tablet of Haqqu'n-Nas > > Baha’u’llah consecrated an entire Tablet82, which is sometimes called “Lawh-i-Haqqu'n-Nas”, to > explain the metaphorical character of this world. Unfortunately we do not know the circumstances > of the revelation of this Tablet. It was written in response to a correspondent whom Baha’u’llah calls > “friend of my heart”, and who in all likelihood asked him a whole series of questions. The principal > question that is taken up in this Tablet is a particularly obscure point of Muslim theology: How is it > For example Rene Roque, “L'Univers Dionysien, Structure et hierarchie des mondes selon le Pseudo- > Denys,” Paris, 1983. > “MA,” volume VII, pp. 199-125. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > possible, as tradition [hadith] teaches, that we can acquit ourselves of our debts in the next world > after we die? This is the principle which Muslim theology calls “haqqu'n-nas”, literally the “right of > people”. It affirms that in the other world there is compensation for whatever is owed to us, > including everything stolen or usurped. In the context of the Baha’i teachings, this question has no > meaning, and this is what Baha’u’llah endeavored to have his interrogator comprehend. > > The question nevertheless reflects the Persian mentality of the time. The Shi'i theologians and jurists > were partial to this kind of problem, engaging in long contradictory debates which in turn gave rise > to multiple interpretations in which are systematically envisioned all of the germane cases even the > most absurd. Baha’u’llah himself cites a particularly absurd example83 of such cases of casuistics > which recalls the question posed to Jesus by the Sadduccees, regarding the status, on the day of > resurrection, of a widow who would have successively married the six brothers of her first husband. > > The problem is posed in the following terms: Let us imagine a Christian who lends another > Christian a jar of wine and a piece of pork meat—two things which are permitted to Christians but > forbidden to Muslims. After a certain time the debtor and the lender both become Muslims. How > can the debtor acquit himself of his debt, for not only can Muslims not consume either wine or pork > meat, but they are forbidden to engage in the commerce of either, and it is thus impossible to pay > back the lender with money. If the debt cannot be repaid in this world, how will it be in the other > world for the debtor? Persian society of the 19th century was passionately fond of this kind of > problem84. > > Jesus gave the following response to the Sadducees: > > “Those who belong to this world take wife and husband. But those who have been judged > worthy of having part in the world to come and in the resurrection of the dead take > neither wife nor husband. It is that they cannot die, for they are the same as angels...”85 > > Baha’u’llah responds in a similar vein. Baha’u’llah begins by indicating that in order to comprehend > this problem, one must have a detached heart and an intelligence purified from communal > superstitions, and only in this case can one arrive at the true comprehension of what life is after > death and resurrection. He proceeds by explaining that all that exists in the world of Nasut, which > He also calls the “world of limitations” ('alam-i-hudud), whatever may be its name (ism), form (rasm), > appearance (surat) or characteristics (vasf), exists in the divine worlds in an appearance (shuhudi) and a > manifestation (zuhuri) which is appropriate to each of these worlds. The things which exist in the > spiritual worlds thus exist in these worlds with totally different characteristics from those of the world > below, in such manner that no category of our understanding such as place, extent, form or time > can apply them86. > > What Baha’u’llah says here is very different from what Muslim philosophy affirmed, and in > > Ibid., p. 125. > This taste has been preserved until today if one judges by various recent appearances. > Op. cit., p. 120. Translator’s Note: Loosely citing Gospel of Luke 20:34-36; also found in modified working > in Gospel of Gospel of Matthew 22:29-30, Gospel of Mark 12:24-25. > 86Ibid. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > particular the Ishraqi or Shaykhi philosophy of his time. In Ishraqi philosophy, to every thing of this > world is attached an intelligible reality (haqa'iq) which exists in Malakut or in the world of images > ('alam-i-mithal). It is thus that this world (Nasut) is the mirror of the other world, as in Plato's myth of > the Cave. But for Baha’u’llah it is not only the world of Malakut and the world of Nasut which are the > image of each other, but a plurality of worlds which he calls divine (ilahi). In several places he insists > upon this plurality in speaking of innumerable worlds87. > > Death in this world is thus but the disappearance of forms and appearances. It never touches the > “reality” (haqiqat) and the “essence” (dhat) of beings, for the spiritual reality (haqa'iq) of things exists in > each world with a manifestation adapted to each of these worlds corresponding to degrees of > different realities, which is to say to different ontological levels88. > > This explains why it is that everything that man does in this lower world affects his “essential reality” > in the other worlds. Thus our acts and words live on from one world to the other89, and though > manifested in this world are found again in Malakut. There is no avenging God Who judges and > condemns us, but rather the consequences of our actions follow us into the next world. God does not > intervene except to pardon the sinner and to assist him in surmounting the handicap which he has > created for himself. > > Baha’u’llah continues with this theme by explaining that if we wish to comprehend the way in which > the reality of things is manifested in the infinite worlds, the only fashion in which we can approach > this comprehension is to utilize metaphorical images. The best image that we can find is that of > sleep, because sleep is just like death. It is so similar, that one can say that sleep and death are > brothers. It happens sometimes that we see things in our dreams that are unintelligible and without > relation to our lives. Yet, if we ask for the interpretation of these dreams from a specialist, this one > will explain that the things we have seen in our dream are symbolic representations of other things, > and once we have understood the key to this interpretation and the correspondence between the > symbol and the reality, we see that the things which we have seen in dream corresponded to real > situations in our lives. The only difference, in this case, between the world of sleep and the world of > waking is that these things appear in one form in the world of sleep and in another in the world of > waking. The world after death, that is to say Malakut or the Kingdom of Abha, is like the world of > sleep. The things which we see in the temporal world may also appear in the other world, but in > another form which can be as far removed from the reality of this lower world as the metaphorical > language of our dreams. > > In another Tablet, Baha’u’llah explains that we cannot comprehend the metaphorical character of > this lower world in relation to the spiritual worlds without comprehending the nature of the soul. He > says in speaking of the soul that “It is, in itself, a testimony that beareth witness to the existence of a > world that is contingent, as well as to the reality of a world that hath neither beginning nor end.”90 It > is the absence of any spatial and temporal reference in the spiritual worlds which makes these so > different from our world, and which ultimately renders them incomprehensible to us. It is for this > > Ibid., p. 121. In Arabic, la-tuhsa. > It is we who interpret here. > Op. cit., p. 121. > English: GL, LXXXII, pp. 161-162; French: EEB, LXXXII, p. 150. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > reason that a comparison can be made between the world of dreams and the spiritual world (after > death), because the dream is the only experience which man can have in this world which is exempt > from space and time. Baha’u’llah says: > > “Behold how the dream thou hast dreamed is, after the lapse of many years, re-enacted > before thine eyes. Consider how strange is the mystery of the world that appeared to thee > in thy dream.”91 > > In the “Lawh-i-Haqqu'n-Nas”, in order to illustrate his point with an example, Baha’u’llah cites the > dream of Joseph. Joseph dreamed that the sun, the moon and twelve stars prostrated themselves > before him. This dream announced the imminent ascension of Joseph to the rank of the Pharaoh's > prime minister and to the arrival of his family in Egypt, who prostrated themselves before him > without recognizing his real identity. Baha’u’llah points out that the world of dreams is strange > inasmuch as in that world the father and mother appear in the form of the sun and the moon, and > the brothers in the form of stars92. This shows to what extent the forms and representations of this > world are different from the forms and representations of the world of waking. The difference > between the world below and the world of death, he says, is of the same order. > > To explain the metaphorical link which ties the changing of forms from one world to another, > Baha’u’llah cites another example. Let us imagine that in the springtime a powerful man robs a > weak man of his provision of seeds and that he plants these seeds in his own garden. The seeds > germinate and in summer produce plants, trees and ultimately fruits. Then, it befalls that a just king > decides to redress the wrong that was done to the weak one. In what manner should this just king > proceed? Should he require from the oppressor that he return the same quantity of seeds? At > harvest-time the seeds are of no immediate utility. Or should he return to him the product of the > seeds that were stolen from him? We understand immediately that justice requires that we return to > the victim not the original seeds but that which they produced. The seeds changed in form, they > were transformed into something else, the appearance and the qualities of which are only distantly > related to their first appearance and qualities. The relationship between this world and the other > world is of the same nature, and of the same nature also is the nature of justice that links the two. > Here below things exist only in the state of seed. When they evolve in the divine worlds, they are > completely transformed in form, appearance and qualities. Nevertheless, the qualities of the tree and > of the fruit depend upon the qualities of the seed that produced them. > > In this Tablet, Baha’u’llah proceeds with a digression of a moral rather than a metaphysical > character. He indicates that it does not matter much what we lose in this life. In due course, the > good things of this world show their true colors, becoming tests and of calamities in our spiritual > evolution, while tests and calamities prove to be the source of true riches. At the final count, the fact > that we have lost material goods for spiritual reasons, whether we have offered them to God in a > spirit of detachment, or lost them because of the oppression of men, makes no difference. The man > who robs another man of his wealth removes from him a portion of the tests that weigh upon his > victim's shoulders. In this subtle manner, Baha’u’llah explains that the principle of “Haqqu'n-Nas” > can not apply to material goods. One cannot pay these material debts in the next world, when he > > Ibid., p. 162; Ibid., p. 150. > “MA,” volume VII, p. 122. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > who has unjustly seized the goods of another in order to accumulate his own riches has in fact but > accumulated obstacles to his own spiritual development. Without fail, the consequences of our > actions follow us from one world to the next. > > 12. The hermeneutic character of the nomenclature of the divine worlds > > This first chapter has permitted us to introduce the notion of the divine worlds as found in the > “Tablet of All Food” and to present a sort of synthesis of what we find regarding these worlds > throughout the writings of Baha’u’llah. We have not however precisely defined this nomenclature > and its relation to the metaphysics of Baha’u’llah. This will be the purpose of the following chapters. > In brief, the reader who peruses the writings of Baha’u’llah would be mistaken in believing that > Baha’u’llah, in the “Tablet of All Food” wished to explain his metaphysical conception of the divine > worlds. If this was the case, there would not be many differences between Baha’i metaphysics and > Muslim metaphysics. We will see on the contrary that the metaphysical system of Baha’u’llah is > composed of only three worldsviii: the World of the divine Essence ('alam-i-haqq), the World of > Revelation ('alam-i-amr), and the World of Creation ('alam-i-khalq). The problem which is posed then > is to relate this threefold metaphysical system to the nomenclature of the divine worlds as it is found > in the “Tablet of All Food”, and in its other significant variations in writings of Baha’u’llah. The > solution to this problem that is here proposed is that the system of the four divine worlds in the > “Tablet of All Food” is not for Baha’u’llah a metaphysical system which claims to describe an > objective and independent reality, but rather a hermeneutical scheme the purpose of which is both > exegetical and theosophical. This is what Baha’u’llah himself underlines when he says that the word > “food” has a meaning in each of the four worlds that he cites. This is a very beautiful example of the > spiritual hermeneutic (ta'wil) which Baha’u’llah practices in a number of his writings, and in > particular in the “Book of Certitude” (Kitab-i-Iqan).” This does not mean however that there is no > link between this hermeneutical system and the metaphysical system of Baha’u’llah. The points of > crossing are on the contrary numerous. Both proceed from the principle that the fundamental > reality of the universe is beyond the capacity of language to describe it. Every attempt to describe it > is thus an incomplete and partial attempt, and several complementary points of view may be called > for to reach a more complete understanding of reality. > > In the continuation of this study we will begin by privileging the “archeological” point of view, that > is to say that we will retrace the entire history of the evolution of the terms and concepts employed > by Baha’u’llah to show how he utilizes and interprets this historical heritage. We will show thereafter > that when Baha’u’llah refers to the philosophical tradition, it is often in order to veil the audacity of > his own thought. In reality, the conceptions which Baha’u’llah develops regarding the divine worlds, > upon the unfolding of Being and upon the existence of spiritual “realities” have virtually no kinship > with the metaphysical developments of Islam upon these same subjects. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > CHAPTER TWO: > THE KINGDOM OF ABHA > > 1. The Kingdom of Abha as the world of spirits > > Is Malakut identical with the Kingdom of Abha (Malakut-i-Abha)? > > One must begin by affirming that the expression “Kingdom of Abha” is used by ‘Abdu’l-Baha, who > speaks of it principally as the spiritual world from which divine confirmations come and the world to > which we repair after death. The “Kingdom of Abha” does not therefore necessarily belong in the > hierarchy of the spiritual worlds which we have earlier described. > > The epithet “Abha” attached to the word “Malakut” is the superlative of Baha' (glory, splendour), and > thus evokes at the same time the name of Baha’u’llah and one of the essential attributes of God. It is > the “very glorious Kingdom”, or the “Kingdom of the Most Glorious”. Hence, the name is at the > same time an homage to Baha’u’llah that places the Kingdom under his authority, and a reference > to the divine glory which is the essential characteristic thereof, a characteristic which the spirits that > inhabit it and the souls which enter it are destined to share. > > If one reads the Baha’i writings carefully, one notices that the Kingdom of Abha is at the same time > the world of the afterlife and a spiritual world distinct from other worlds. The Kingdom of Abha is > before all else the world of the spirits or of the Spirit93. Secondarily, it is the world of the deceased > souls. Soul or spirit, according to the terminology that one has chosen to adopt, is the immortal > essence found in man and which animates him. ‘Abdu’l-Baha explains that the soul is not found in > the body, for the soul is sanctified from all notions of place and of space94. As the soul communicates > with our consciousness by the intermediary of the spirit (the intellect, pillar of our faculty of thought), > and as it is strongly linked to our identity, we have become accustomed to thinking that the soul is > identical with this consciousness which is manifested through the mediation of our physical body; > but the soul being a spiritual being, never leaves the spiritual world, and this spiritual world is > nothing other than Malakut. > > If we now search to retrace the life of the soul in the spiritual world, we will see that it passes through > at least three phases: prior to the terrestrial life, during the terrestrial life, and after the terrestrial life. > > 2. The mystery of pre-existence > > Before the terrestrial life, the soul is found in a state which Baha’u’llah calls pre-existence. The soul > being an essence, it is eternal, to the extent that creation itself is eternal. However, to say that in pre- > eternity the soul exists or does not exist is but a question of one's point of view. That which exists in > > ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, “Some Answered Questions,” LXVII, p. 281; French: “Les Lecons de Saint-Jean d'Acre,” > LXII, p. 246. (“...the life of the Kingdom is the life of the Spirit...”) > Ibid., p. 280; Ibid., p. 246. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > pre-existence cannot even been considered as a trace of Being, but constitutes only a capacity of > existence. This form of Being does not constitute what we call Existence from a purely human point > of view, for in pre-existence the soul is deprived of all that we are accustomed to consider as the > essential attributes of existence, such as individuality, identity and personality. It is only but by its > passage into this world that the soul acquires these three attributes. It is also possible that these three > terms describe a unique phenomenon. It is in individuating (tafrid) that the soul acquires its identity > (huwiyya) and it is upon this identity that the terrestrial personality will construct itself. The passage > from pre-existence to existence permits this differentiation of the soul that is at the origin of active > consciousness. > > In no case should one comprehend here that the soul can have any kind of existence before > conception. The term “pre-existence” is particularly paradoxical. It signifies before all else the fact > that the soul is not created from nothingness but that it is an emanation of the divine worlds and > thus, as Shoghi Effendi writes “the depository of the ancient and divine mystery of God”95. Pre- > existence is a non-existence that is distinguished from nothingness. Furthermore, this non-existence > already has the capacity to receive the divine in itself and it is this capacity to receive the divine in > the form of the “sign of God” (ayyat'ullah) which permits it to pass from non-being to Being. The > state of pre-existence is situated outside of time, for pre-existence does not know any notion of > duration. It is a purely virtual existence that is distinguished from potential existence. The potential > existence is the existence of the tree in the seed, while this virtual existence can be compared to the > existence of the posterity of a couple who do not yet have a child but will one day. From the point of > view of conscious existence this pre-existence is like nothingness, but without pre-existence, the soul > could not arrive at existence. This virtual existence already possesses all the potentialities of Being. In > order to enable us to comprehend that existence in pre-eternity is different from nothingness, > Baha’u’llah explains that the Covenant that God established between men and His Manifestation > was effected in pre-eternity. In this pre-eternity, all the souls were summoned from their virtual > existence in order to witness the establishment of the Covenant. > > In the “Hidden Words” Baha’u’llah writes: > > “O My friends! Call ye to mind that covenant ['ahd] ye have entered into with Me upon > Mount Paran, situate within the hallowed precincts of Zaman. I have taken to witness the > concourse on high and the dwellers in the city of eternity, yet now none do I find faithful > unto the covenant ['ahd]. Of a certainty pride and rebellion have effaced it from the hearts, > in such wise that no trace thereof remaineth. Yet knowing this, I waited and disclosed it > not.”96 > > “Paran” is an other name for Mount Sinai; “Mount Paran” thus symbolizes the place of the meeting of > the divine Manifestation with the Divinity, that is to say the source and the most elevated point of > Revelation. “Zaman” signifies simply “Time”. Baha’u’llah wishes to say here that all souls, in their > > Letter on behalf of Shoghi Effendi, 5 January 1948, published in “Lights of Guidance,” e. Helen Hornby, > 1983, # 1012, p. 375. (“Concerning your question concerning the passage from the “Seven Valleys” which > refers to pre-existence, this does not suppose in any case the existence of the individual soul before > conception. The word has not been translated in an absolutely adequate manner and what it signifies is that > the soul of man is the depository of the ancient and divine mystery of God.”) > Bahá’u’lláh, “Persian Hidden Words,” #71; French: PCP, trad. Lucienne Migette, Bruxelles, 1988, p. 57. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > pre-existence, were in his presence upon Mount Paran and at that moment accepted his Covenant. > This Covenant was a sacred promise97 taken in the most elevated of the celestial spheres, in the > presence of the celestial Assembly, that is to say the Celestial Concourse98 which gathers all the souls > of the saints and the martyrs who are the source of the inspiration of this world, and in the presence > of the inhabitants of the celestial city99 who are the souls of the prophets. In one of his Tablets100, > ‘Abdu’l-Baha explained that the Covenant which is here referred to is the Testament of > Baha’u’llah101 which he revealed in Palestine102. This signifies that the Covenant which Baha’u’llah > put down in his Testament is not of a purely contractual nature such as a normal juridical > document, but is in fact a spiritual link which exists between the divine Manifestation and the soul of > the creatures, a link which goes back to their pre-existence. Of course, one must not understand that > the souls, in their pre-existence, truly encountered Baha’u’llah. This is a purely metaphorical > encounter which signifies that in coming to the world the soul was already gifted with the capacity to > recognize the divine Manifestation. The spiritual capacities with which the soul comes into this > world constitute its pre-existence. In another of the “Hidden Words,” Baha’u’llah also alluded to the > Covenant between himself and the souls in pre-existence: > > “O My friends! Have ye forgotten that true and radiant morn, when in those hallowed and > blessed surroundings ye were all gathered in My presence beneath the shade of the tree of > life (shajarat anisaa) , which is planted in the all-glorious paradise (firdus a'zam)? Awestruck ye > listened as I gave utterance to these three most holy words: O friends! Prefer not your own > will to Mine, never desire that which I have not desired for you, and approach Me not with > lifeless hearts, defiled with worldly desires and cravings. Would ye but sanctify your souls, ye > would at this present hour recall that place and those surroundings, and the truth of My > utterance should be made evident unto all of you.”103 > > “The Tree of Life” or the “Tree of Anisa” here has the same meaning as Mount Paran in the > preceding passage. Here also, it is the highest point that a soul can attain in its encounter with the > divine Manifestation. In the same Tablet we mentioned earlier, ‘Abdu’l-Baha explained that the tree > of life represents Baha’u’llah and “the true and radiant morn” the manifestation of the Bab. The > Covenant of Baha’u’llah was already contained in the Covenant of the Bab. This is a single > Covenant that is the Covenant which exists between the creature and all the. This primal covenant > is part of the spiritual potential of every human soul. ‘Abdu’l-Baha added that the expression “those > > This passage evokes the reading from the Qur'an (VII:172) in which God brought forth from nothingness > all the souls and commanded them to recognize Him as the sovereign of the universe in posing the question: > “Am I not your Lord?” > In Persian: “Mala-i-a'la” > In Persian: “Ashab-i mada'in-i baqa” > “Asraru'l-Athar,” volume V, p. 39. > The testament of Bahá’u’lláh is also called “The Book of My Covenant” (Kitab-i-'Ahdi). cf. English: > “Tablets of Bahá’u’lláh,” pp. 217-223; “Bahá’í World Faith,” pp. 207-210; French: “Foi Mondiale Bahá’í,” > 2e edition, Bruxelles, 1968, pp. 369-375. > Shoghi Effendi, “God Passes By,” pp. 237-243; French: “Dieu passe pres de nous,” pp. 295-299; Hasan > Balyuzi, “Bahá’u’lláh, King of Glory,” pp. 420-425. > Bahá’u’lláh, “Persian Hidden Words,” #19; French: PCP, p. 36. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > hallowed and blessed surroundings” designated the soul and the heart104 of man105. > The soul of man can not have any memory of pre-existence. This is one of the differences between > the soul of man and the soul of the divine Manifestations. The Manifestations are endowed with an > individuality and with an identity even before they appear in this world, and this pre-existent > identity enables them to remain always in contact with the divine worlds106. It is this absence of > individuality, of personality and of identity in the human being that determines that pre-existence as > other than a sui generis form of existence and which therefore implies no consciousness. The pre- > existence of the human soul can be compared to the passage from non-being to Being. For man, > minerals exist, but as they are not endowed with life and with all the attributes of human existence, > for a man to be changed into a stone would be equivalent to his return to nothingness. Yet stones > exist and this existence manifests itself, as ‘Abdu’l-Baha says, in “the mineral spirit.” The degrees > that separate the mineral spirit from the human spirit are such that we consider that the one is non- > existent in relation to the other. The same relation exists between pre-existence and existence. It is > for this reason that ‘Abdu’l-Baha and Shoghi Effendi have said that the true life of the soul begins > with the conception of the embryo107. Pre-existence is distinguished from nothingness by the fact > that it possesses this capacity to pass one day into existence and that it contains in this virtual state all > the attributes of being and its own determinism. Certain authors have written that pre-existence is > the existence of things in the thought of God108. Nevertheless it is not certain that such a principle > would be compatible with the teachings of Baha’u’llah. He and ‘Abdu’l-Baha alluded to this > problem, but it seems likely that the allusions to the existence of things in the thought of God in the > Baha’i writings must rather be understood in a metaphorical sense. > > Everything we have said regarding pre-existence does not inhibit the Baha’is from believing that the > life of the soul and its development begin with the embryo. Shoghi Effendi writes: > > “With regard to the soul of man. According to the Baha’i Teachings the human soul starts > with the formation of the human embryo, and continues to develop and pass through > endless stages of existence after its separation from the body. Its progress is thus infinite.”109 > > Even as it is impossible for man to comprehend life after death110, it is impossible for him to > comprehend the nature of the soul. It being impossible for us to comprehend the nature of the > soul111, even less are we able to grasp its origin and its formation. The only sure thing that we find in > > In Persian: “Jan-u-dil,” less precise and more poetic as metaphysical terms than the Arabic terminology > which Bahá’u’lláh usually utilizes. > “Asraru'l-Athar,” volume V, p. 39. > Same as (62). > Ibid., #1128, p. 413. > This is the position taken by 'Ali-Murad Davudi in his book, “Uluhiyyat va Mazhariyyrat.” > Letter on behalf of Shoghi Effendi, 31 December 1937, in “Lights of Guidance,” 2e edition, New Delhi, > 1988, #680, p. 204. > Letter on behalf of Shoghi Effendi, 19 January 1942, in Ibid., #702, p. 209. (“The Guardian feels that, > while there is no harm in speculation on these abstract matters, one should not attach to much importance > to them. Science itself is far from having resolved the question of the nature of matter, and we cannot, in this > physical world, grasp the spiritual one more than in a very fragmentary and inadequate manner.”) > GL: LXXXI, p. 156 (EEB: LXXXI, p. 145): “The nature of the soul after death can never be described, > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > the Baha’i writings on this subject are the very brief allusions to pre-existence, as for example when > Baha’u’llah writes in the “The Hidden Words”: “O son of man! Veiled in My immemorial being > (qidami dhati) and in the ancient eternity of My essence (azaliyyati kaynunati)112, I knew My love for > thee; therefore I created thee, have engraved on thee Mine image (mithali) and revealed to thee My > beauty (jamali).”113 We also find the affirmation that the soul is an emanation of the worlds of > God114. > > We will return in Chapter XIII to the concept of emanation and its significance in the Baha’i > writings. However, it is important to note that these writings say that the human soul is an > emanation of the worlds of God and not of God Himself, as believed by various Christian and > Muslim schools influenced by Neoplatonism. The conditions of this emanation remain totally > unexplained in the writings of Baha’u’llah, and it would be in vain for us to wish to go beyond the > very fragmentary references thereto which have been cited already. The world of pre-existence will > remain forever an unfathomable mystery for man. > > 3. The soul and the world > > The transition from pre-existence to existence permits the soul to achieve individual life and thus to > acquire the self-consciousness necessary to its maturation and spiritual progress. This world is like > the humus in which one plants the seed so that it will germinate and begin its growth. For this > purpose, the soul has need of a provisional vehicle which is the body. The consciousness which > animates the body is a complex phenomenon engendered by the interaction between the animal > psyche of man—in other words his terrestrial self (nafs)—and the celestial self which is the real > identity of the soul. > > The celestial self, which has its seat in the soul, communicates with the body through its intellective > ('aqli) activity, that is to say through the faculty of reason ('aql) which, says Baha’u’llah, emanates > from the soul as do the rays of a lamp, and which possesses the property of reflecting in the mirror of > the self (nafs). This relation of the soul with the self explains the relationship of the spiritual world > with the physical world, a relationship which is itself in the image of the relation which God > > nor is it meet and permissible to reveal its whole character to the eyes of men.” Translator’s Note: Also see > GL: CLXV, pp. 345, 346: “The mysteries of man's physical death and of his return have not been divulged, > and still remain unread…As to those that have tasted of the fruit of man's earthly existence, which is the > recognition of the one true God, exalted be His glory, their life hereafter is such as We are unable to > describe. The knowledge thereof is with God, alone, the Lord of all worlds.” > The Arabic expression literally means “the pre-existence of my being”. “Kaynuna” is a term which > designates “the being” of God in contradistinction to “wujud” which designates the Being (esse) or the > existence of the creatures. The word is of Syriac origin and also signifies “nature” in the sense in which one > can speak of the two “natures” of Christ. It might be useful to reintroduce this term as “nature” in our > translations as in this case: “Hidden...in the eternity of My nature...” The pre-existence of God signifies the > time in which God existed before being creator. Inasmuch as God has always been creator, this refers to a > purely ontological past which corresponds to the “Hidden Treasure” and to “the unmanifest identity” > (ghayb-i-huvviyyih). This is one of the texts which is cited by those who believe that all beings first existed in the > thought of God. > “Majmu'iy-i-mubarakih,” p. 18; English: “Arabic Hidden Words,” #10; French: p. 10. > Adib Taherzadeh, “The Covenant of Bahá’u’lláh,” Oxford, 1992, pp. 6, 7, 10. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > maintains with His creation, as we will see later on. Reason, or the intellective faculty, is an > emanation of the soul in the spiritual world which directly affects the self in the physical world. This > explains why the sensible world (Nasut or Mulk) is constructed like a transparent reflection of the > spiritual world, as was explained in the preceding Chapter. > > Hence the expression “Kingdom of Abha” (Malakut-i-Abha) has a much broader meaning than the > word Malakut as it is defined in the framework of an ontological system which includes several other > worlds like Jabarut and Nasut. In the writings of Baha’u’llah, the word Malakut can assume an > inclusive meaning which encompasses the whole of the spiritual worlds. > > The pair Malakut-Nasut sometimes expresses the duality that the ancient philosophers expressed > when they opposed the intelligible world to the sensible world. We have already demonstrated that > this classic opposition is only symbolic in Baha’i thought. In effect, in Baha’i thought, the hierarchy > of worlds serves above all to express their interdependence. The physical world cannot then be > considered as inferior to the spiritual world, because the physical world derives from the spiritual > world and the spiritual world would not be perfect without it. > > To every physical reality there corresponds a spiritual reality. But, as we will have occasion to > develop, this does not correspond in any way to the Platonic “ideas” or to the opposition of “form” > and “matter” in Aristotelian philosophy. > > The link that exists between the soul and the body is there to remind us of this interdependence > between spiritual and physical reality. The spiritual world is a world of spirit. The spirit, in a certain > fashion, is the essence of things. But, the Holy Spirit created the world in order to permit the > differentiation of different forms of spirit and to open the way to a new form of evolution. To > comprehend the nature of the links which unite the soul with the body, permits one to comprehend > the link of the manifestations of the spirit with the universe, for it is thus that ‘Abdu’l-Baha explains, > that every created thing is endowed with a form of spirit115. > > The soul is not something which is added to the body. It is not the “form” of the body as Saint > Thomas believed. Nor can one say that the soul is pure thought as Descartes said. The soul, > according to ‘Abdu’l-Baha, is rather like a principle of life, a gem that is situated at the heart of > Being. It is a hidden reality the existence of which does not manifest itself except in obscurity. Our > thoughts and our psychic life are not the manifestations of the soul, even though the soul can > influence them. As long as the soul is linked to the body, it can not deploy its full capacities. It is still > in a period of formation, of gestation and of education which is precisely the “raison d'etre” of our > terrestrial life. In this sense, one can say that the existence of the soul depends upon the existence of > the world, but in another sense one can show that this world would not exist without the spiritual > world. The soul is thus the intermediary that links the two worlds one to another. > > There is much to be written on this subject but to digress would risk conducting us beyond our > present purpose. There exist many writings of Baha’u’llah on the nature of the soul and on life after > death, but the soul only interests us here to the extent that it is a sign of the spiritual world. The full > treatment of the relation of the soul with these two worlds would unfailingly raise up numerous > epistemological and noetic questions which in order to be worthily resolved would require a > ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, “Some Answered Questions,” XXXVI, pp. 163-166; French: XXXVI, pp. 149-151. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > complete explanation of the metaphysic of Baha’u’llah. Among these questions, one would have to > ask how it is that the soul knows spiritual realities and if it can share this consciousness with our > consciousness, or if, which is a distinct question, our consciousness, that is to say our mortal psyche, > can approach spiritual realities. All philosophies have been aimed at answering these questions. To > attempt to resolve them in this case would be premature as long as we have not yet established the > nature of the spiritual realities. This is what we try to do in the latter part of this book. > > 4. The three spheres of Malakut > > The infinite worlds which are found in the writings of Baha’u’llah, are they part of the Kingdom of > Abha and of Malakut? On the one hand, in Malakut there are three different dimensions, which are > the dimension of the pre-existence of souls, the dimension of terrestrial existence, and the dimension > of the souls. It is the dimension of the souls that the qualification of Kingdom of Abha is related. On > the other hand, the Kingdom of Abha encompasses in within its limits worlds infinite in number, > worlds that correspond to the degrees of the perfectibility of the soul. > > One can ask oneself at this point whether the worlds that are included in the Kingdom of Abha are > radically different from each other such as in the case of the sensible world and the spiritual world. > Through the examination of these texts it is probable that one will conclude that the differences > which characterize these worlds are of the same nature as those which characterize the worlds of the > “Tablet of All Food.” To employ a simile, one could say that these worlds are characterized by > differing intensities, and that the variation of intensity from one to another is progressive and > continuous. > > One might also consider whether the worlds which we encounter in these text correspond to the > “stations” (maqamat) and “degrees” (rutbat) which other texts speak of, and if so, then in every world > there exist stations and degrees. > > We have seen that Malakut, as a world of souls is a hierarchical world. Baha’u’llah expresses this > hierarchy by what he calls the “station” (maqam). Every soul has a station in this world and in the > other. Our personal station depends upon two things: on the spiritual potentialities with which our > soul was endowed by divine decree, and on our efforts to actualize those potentialities. The nature of > Malakut being spiritual, the souls in that world live in relation to the spirituality which they have > acquired in this world. It is the level of this spirituality that determines the station of the individual. > Baha’u’llah tells us however that this does not mean that the souls of different stations are not > conscious of each other…on the contrary. Even as in this life we see that individuals manifest > different degrees of intelligence, even so in the other world the souls manifest different degrees of > spirituality. This hierarchy does not imply any condemnation. It is not because we have arrived at a > station that we will suffer by not arriving at a superior station, in the same fashion that in this world > nobody feels suffering by being less intelligent than another man. The other world is only a > dispenser of joy. We all know that there are men who surpass us in intelligence, but that does not > create a problem in our lives. One could even say that social life would be impossible if there were > not an inequality and diversity of the various forms of intelligence. On the other hand, we can suffer > if, having failed our “tests” we are condemned to live mediocre lives. In the same fashion, the soul > can feel regret in that it has failed to develop the spiritual potential with which it was endowed. The > difference between the station (maqam) and the state (hal), is that the station is definitive. Never can > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > any soul change its station although it can know numerous changes of states. It is because of this that > Baha’u’llah has sometimes spoken of different stations as different worlds. From the work of the > mathematician Cantor, we know that there are infinities which are more or less large in relation to > other infinities. This is an illustration of this principle. > > To every soul is destined a station to which a form of “service” (khidmat) corresponds, for spiritual life > in the other world is a life of service. It is service that truly qualifies and differentiates one station in > relation to another. The nature of this service can not be understood in this world. It is possible > sometimes that man has the choice between different stations, as is the case for the martyr. Some > accept martyrdom and hasten to it, while others prefer to avoid it. It is for this reason that we speak > of destination and not of predestination. He who fails to attain the station for which he was created > finds himself deprived of the service that was destined for him. But there are different ways of > arriving at the destined station. These ways constitute the “degrees”. Even within a particular > station, the soul can always elevate itself from degree to degree. > > 5. The leaven which leavens the world > > Another aspect of the Kingdom of Abha is that it shelters the soul of the prophets and of the elect. In > truth, rather than consider it a hierarchical succession of worlds, one can understand the Kingdom > of Abha as a hierarchical succession of souls, with the souls of the prophets at its summit, the souls of > the martyrs and saints below them, and after them the other souls according to their station and > merit. > > Certain texts insist upon the influence that the souls of the Kingdom of Abha exercise upon the > world. Baha’u’llah writes: > > “The souls which these souls radiate is responsible for the progress of the world and the > advancement of its peoples. They are like unto leaven which leaveneth the world of being, > and constitute the animating force through which the arts and wonders of the world are > made manifest. Through them the clouds rain their bounty upon men, and the earth > bringeth forth its fruits. All things must needs have a cause, a motive power, an animating > principle. These souls and symbols of detachment have provided, and will continue to > provide, the supreme moving impulse in the world of being.”116 > > This faculty is not reserved to the souls of the prophets. All the souls of the righteous exercise an > influence upon this world, as Baha’u’llah writes in another Tablet: > > “The soul that hath remained faithful to the Cause of God, and stood unwaveringly firm in > His Path shall, after his ascension, be possessed of such power that all the worlds which the > Almighty hath created can benefit through him. Such a soul provideth, at the bidding of the > Ideal King and Divine Educator, the pure leaven that leaveneth the world of being, and > furnisheth the power through which the arts and wonders of the world are made manifest. > Those souls that are symbols of detachment are the leaven of the world.”117 > > English: GL, LXXXI, p. 157; French: EEB, LXXXI, p. 146. > English: GL, LXXXII, p. 161; French: EEB, LXXXII, p. 150. Upon this same theme cf. “Ma'idiy-i- > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > CHAPTER THREE: > THE ARAMAIC ORIGINS OF THE NOMENCLATURE OF THE DIVINE WORLDS > > 1. Malakut in the Qur'an > > In the nomenclature of the divine worlds which we have seen, only one of the terms, Malakut, is of > Quranic origin. The other terms are later creations the tracing of which is particularly instructive. > > The Qur'an possesses four references to Malakut. This word, in its Quranic sense, seems to have two > meanings and these are related closely to each other. The first meaning is that of “sovereignty” and > of “power”. > > In the Surah of the Believers [Suratu'l-mU'minUna], we read this injunction addressed to the > unbelievers: > > “Say: 'In whose hands is the sovereignty [malakUt] of all things, protecting all, while against > Him there is no protection?'“118 > > In the Surah of Ya Sin [Suratu Yasin] we find a verse very similar to the first: > > “Glory be to Him who has control [malakUt] over all things. To Him you shall all be > recalled.”119 > > As we see no specific allusion is made to a divine world in either of these verses. The second > meaning of the word which we find in the Qur'an is that of “Kingdom” and more particularly the > “Kingdom of the heavens and of the earth,” as in the Surah of the Cattle [Surata'l-an'am] where it is written: > > “Thus did We show Abraham the kingdom [malakUt] of the heavens and the earth, so that > he might become a firm believer.”120 > > We find the same expression in a verse of the Surah of the Heights [Surata'l-a'raf]: > > “Will they not ponder upon the kingdom [malakUt] of the heavens and the earth, and all that > God created, to see whether their hour is not drawing near? And in what other revelation > will they believe, those that deny this one?”121 > > Asmani,” volume IV, p. 20. > Qur'an, XXIII:88. > Qur'an, XXXVI:83. > Qur'an, VI:75. > Qur'an, VII:185. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > The indication we find in the Qur'an is that there exists a Kingdom of the heavens and of the earth > but upon the nature of that Kingdom we are not particularly informed. In relating these verses to > each other, we understand however that this Kingdom is defined as the empire over which God > exercises His sovereignty; an empire which encompasses at the same time the physical world and the > spiritual world, and in fact everything that was created (kullu shay, all things). Malakut, in the Quranic > sense, is not then a kingdom distinct from this world; on the contrary, the physical world is clearly > found to be included within its limits. In the four verses cited here it is difficult to find material that > could enflame human imaginations. From whence then came the prolific usage of the term Malakut? > > It is probable that the word Malakut so attracted the first Muslims because this word appeared > foreign to the Arabic language, and was thus endowed with a perfume of mystery. The word is > clearly not Arabic, for Arabic does not possess a suffix in “Ut”. On the other hand, the term did not > offer any semantic difficulty. Its meaning appears in the three letter root MLK which is common to > most of the Semitic languages, and which we find just as easily in Amharic, in Yemenite, in > Chaldean, in Sumerian, in Hebrew, in Syriac and in Aramaic as well as Arabic. The root MLK > refers to the idea of possession and sovereignty. We find it in the Arabic “malik” (king), “mamlaka” > (kingdom) and “mulk” (dominion). In Ethiopic the word “malakot” serves to designate the Divinity, > for this language does not possess the Semitic root 'LH. A few linguists have suggested that the > Quranic utilization of “malakUt” derives from Ethiopic. The Semitic languages are so close to each > other that between them there are numerous cases of semantic contamination. However the > existence of similar forms from one language to another does not necessarily imply a case of > borrowing. The “malkUtO” of Syriac had no influence upon our “malakUt” even though Syriac has a > very great linguistic, geographical, cultural and chronological proximity with the Arabic language. > > Previous scholarship has that the term “malakUt” was borrowed from Aramaic, like a great number > of other Quranic terms. We know that in the VIIth century, the Arabic dialect of Mecca that served > to record the Qur'an was a language which did not possess a written literature, with the exception of > some 98 epigraphical inscriptions, and that its oral literature was composed entirely of poems mostly > of the epic variety. This explains why all the terms found in the Qur'an which contained a religious > significance were borrowed from other languages possessing a more developed religious culture. > These borrowings were from Hebrew (malak, for angel), from Aramaic (malakUt, tAbUt), from Greek > (barzakh), from Pahlavi (dIn for religion, sirat for the bridge which spans hell), etc. In this context, it is > thus not surprising that “malakUt” should be confirmed as a Aramaic term. > > We can ask ourselves why the Prophet Muhammad would have had to employ a foreign term when > he could have used equivalent words in the Meccan dialect. The response is perhaps that the words > in Arabic appeared to him to be too concrete and too prosaic, too marked by daily life or too > charged with ancient cultural values linked to the Arab trivial conception of sovereignty. We may > wonder if the recourse to a foreign term permitted him to intellectualize and to spiritualize the > concept by insisting upon the essentially abstract character of divine sovereignty as well as upon the > spiritual nature of the Kingdom of God. It is certainly this abstract character which created the > fortune of the word. > > It is difficult to know how this Aramaic term was able to penetrate the language of the Qur'an. Also, > the word does not appear to have been of frequent usage in Aramaic. One finds no trace except in > certain “Targum” of later Judaism where one speaks of the “malakUta” (sovereignty) of God, and > one can think that it was probably Jesus, and thereafter the first Christians who popularized the > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > expression. Hebrew, which itself uses the term, had to borrow it again from Aramaic and normally > used in these places and cases the word “mamlAka”. Nevertheless, the fact that the sources are rare, > does not prevent that there could have existed a more developed oral tradition which already > elevated the Aramaic “malkUt” to the rank of a veritable spiritual Kingdom, and which perhaps had > even made a Kingdom of the angelic powers. We see that there exist numerous indications of this > meaning. It is thus probable that the interest behind the introduction of this word into the Quranic > language resided less in the semantic virginity of the term that would have permitted the > development of an autonomous conception of the divine sovereignty, than in the echo that it > awakened in effecting a bridge between the ancient Judaic tradition and the newborn Quranic > tradition. > > 2. The Kingdom in Judaic tradition > > One may suppose that between the 2nd century before our era and the 6th century [of our era] a > Judaic conception was formed of “malkUt” as the Kingdom of divine sovereigntyix and that “malkUt” > was associated with “gabrUt” or “gebura”x, perhaps not as an independent kingdom or world, but > probably as a particular attribute of “malkUt”. A priori, sovereignty and power are complementary > concepts. It is more probable to imagine that they developed together in order to acquire, bit by bit, > an autonomous existence than to imagine the opposite. For reasons which are difficult to precisely > articulate, but perhaps finally in conformity with the most ancient Judaic tradition, the Qur'an > retained only “malkUt,” perhaps considering that the concept was plainly sufficient and that it > already included in itself the idea of the power of “gebura”. > > “JabarUt” was also borrowed from Aramaic, but through recourse to other paths, for no trace is > found for it in the Qur'an, even though the word appears very early in the language of the Muslim > mystics. In the past there no doubt existed an Aramaic word “gebarUt” or “gebrUt” about which we > are little informed and which derived from the Hebrew “gebUra”. Unfortunately we are not > sufficiently acquainted with the thought of the Jewish communities of Mecca and Medina in order > to know what conception they had of “malkUt” and “gebrUt” and if they associated these two terms. > It is furthermore not sure that “gebrUt” was known to them. It is more probable that the concepts of > “malkUt” and “gebrUt” remained in living use among the Jews of Syria, Mesopotamia and Egypt, > and even among Christians who perhaps had adopted the Judaic metaphysical theories, as is > demonstrated in certain writings of the Syriac Fathers such as Ephraem [306?-373] and Aphraate. It > is likely that it was from one of these cultural sources the Muslim mystics, already in possession of > “malakUt” by way of the Qur'an, appropriated “JabarUt”, taking it from Judaic “GebrUt”. We do not > suppose that they would have enacted this borrowing if the two words had not already been > associated by Jews or by Christians, in a metaphysical theory or in a literary or exegetical usage that > has not been transmitted to us. Probably there existed an embryonic system or at least a semantic > association upon which the Muslim mystics constructed their later development. Perhaps this > indicates the trace of an esoteric Judeo-Christian teaching that would not have been transmitted to > us in another form. > > Certain Muslim authors, such a Ghazali, hold not only that the Qur'an knew MalakUt, but that the > Prophet was well informed of the existence of JabarUt and that this concept was integral to the > threefold partition of the world which associated the physical world “Mulk” with these latter two > worlds. In coming to this conclusion he relies upon a “saying” (hadith) of the Prophet, in which he is > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > alleged to have declared: > > “Blessed is God who governs the physical world (Mulk) and the spiritual Kingdom (MalakUt) > and who resides in His singularity by the grandeur ['izzat] and power (JabarUt).”122 > > Nevertheless, the authenticity of this “hadith” is very much in doubt, and the triad so dear to > Ghazali, of Mulk-MalakUt-JabarUt united in one system appears more clearly to reflect the Muslim > thinking of the 10th century than the doctrine set forth in the Qur’an. Numerous “hadith” were > forged at this epoch to support contemporary theoretical developments. > > The “hadith” which we have just cited is probably apocryphal, but it nevertheless indicates that at the > time at which it was forged, “'izza” and “jabarut” were regarded as closely related terms, and > probably synonymous. However this is possible only if the Hebrew “gebUra” that underlies “jabarUt” > is not totally lost to usage at that time. > > The word “jabarUt” does not have the same transparency in Arabic as “malakUt”. The root JBR has > multiple meanings in Arabic. At the same time it means “being restored” and of “forces”. The verb > “jabara” means “to replace the bones in position”, “to put back on feet”, “to restore to its original > state” and “to force”, “to oblige”, and “to console”. “Jabr” also designates the action of returning > bones to their original position, as well as “force”, “coercion”, and “power”. Hence if the idea of > power exists at its very root but in a very limited sense. It consists in the power to oblige something > or someone to do the will of another. “Jabr” has come to designate destiny and predestination. > Furthermore, for the Arab ear the meaning of “JabarUt” was not easy to grasp through its poly- > Semitic root. To give it a particular meaning of “power” one must have retained the consciousness > of the Hebrew “gebUra” or the Aramaic “gebrUt”. > > It is difficult to advance beyond these conjectures without discovering Hebrew or Aramaic writings > which may enlighten us. It is not impossible that a study of the Aramaic “targum”xi would prove to be > fruitful for we already know that the two concepts are found there. One might also undertake > research in the manuscripts of Qumran and in Essene thought. Finally, it is not impossible that the > Babylonian Talmud might yield something. But these studies could not be carried out except by > specialists. > > Without for the moment entering into profound studies of Judaic thought, at least two pathways > open to us in order to show the relation which MalakUt and JabarUt maintained with these > preceding words. The first path is the study of Christian texts, and in particular the Gospels, which > offer the advantage of having fixed Judaic thought at a very precise date; the second is found in the > Talmud and the Kabbalah. > > Whenever we refer to “MalkUt” in its Aramaic or Hebrew version, we always return to the idea of > Kingdom and royalty. But, this idea of “Reign” or “Kingdom of God” is not very familiar to Old > Testament [Biblical] Judaism. It is, as we have indicated earlier, a development of Judaic thought > which began in the 2nd or 1st century before our era, at a time where the perceived division and > opposition between the terrestrial kingdom and the celestial kingdom was hardening. If the concept > The Arabic text of this hadith says exactly: “Al-hamdu'llah mudabiru'l-mulk wa'l-malakUt wa'l-munfaridu bi'l- > 'izzati wa'l-jabarUti”. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > of a celestial Kingdom is unknown to the Prophets, the idea of divine royalty is on the contrary well > known in the Old Testament Biblical text. The Lord is king (melek) of Israel and Israel is His heir > (nahalah). From this position, there progressively arises an eternal royalty over all the universe123. > This royalty is at the same time terrestrial124 and celestial125. > > 3. The Kingdom of the heavens in the Gospels > > In Christianity the theme disappears because royalty is transferred from God to Christ. However, > the Gospels abundantly speak of the “Kingdom of the heavens” in a context which leaves to doubt > that the expression must have been in common usage at the time of Jesus in a manner understood > by all, even if the Gospel gives it a new meaning. In fact, it seems that the word “heaven” was, for > the Jews of this epoch, naught a substitute for the word God that it was forbidden to pronounce. > “Kingdom of the heavens” thus means “Kingdom of God”, and there is thus no distinction made > between the celestial kingdom and the terrestrial kingdom, for, as in the Qur'an, the sovereignty of > God (mamlaka) encompasses the earth and the heavens. We must explain here that the heavens > conceived of here were very abstract, for the practice of placing paradise had not yet taken root and > orthodox Judaism at the time of Jesus did not admit the existence of angels or of other spiritual > creatures. > > In the Gospels, the Kingdom of the heavens becomes altogether something else from a simple > metaphor which serves to designate the divine Omnipotence. The kingdom of the Gospels is at the > intersection of several dimensions. On the one hand, it would one day encompass the earth and > seem to have a material dimension. In this way Jesus said: > > “Verily I say unto you, That there be some of them that stand here, which shall not taste of > death, till they have seen the kingdom of God come with power.”126 > > One can furthermore ask if the power which is referred to here is not the “gebrUt” which > accompanies “malkUt”. > > On the other hand, this Kingdom is situated in a beyond that is difficult to define and which is not > totally synonymous with the beyond of the soul. If on one hand Jesus invites the good thief to sit with > him to the right of his Father, he elsewhere declares: > > “Verily I say unto you, I will drink no more of the fruit of the vine, until that day that I drink > it new in the kingdom of God.”127 > > It is difficult to determine whether this “fruit of the new vine” is material or spiritual. > > Psalm 45:8; 145:13; 146:10. > Psalm 29:3; 3:24. > Psalm 93:4; 29:9. > Gospel of Mark 9:1. > Gospel of Mark 14:25. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > In other passages, the Kingdom seems to refer to the afterlife situated beyond the material world. > Hence when it is said: > > “There shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth, when ye shall see Abraham, and Isaac, and > Jacob, and all the prophets, in the kingdom of God, and you yourselves thrust out. > > “And they shall come from the east, and from the west, and from the north, and from the > south, and shall sit down in the kingdom of God.”128 > > The Kingdom of God here greatly resembles the “MalakUt-i-Abha” of Baha’u’llah, populated by the > “celestial Concourse” constituted of the souls of the Prophets and of the elect. > > Finally, the Gospel kingdom has a strong eschatological dimension. It is first announced by John the > Baptist129, then by Jesus130, who asks his apostles to announce it in their turn. It must develop > systematically131, but it will be consummated only at the end of times132, after the harvest133, at the > Second Coming134, in order to consummate in a celestial Royalty of the beyond135. It must grow by > itself136 and it will be the lot only of those who form “the little flock”137. If the Kingdom begins in > this world, it does not find its fulfillment except in a spiritual otherness, another dimension apart > from this reality that must have been difficult for the Jews who heard Jesus preach to grasp. > > The Gospels, having been written in Greek, make it difficult for us to have an idea of the Aramaic > vocabulary employed by Jesus. In this regard, it is not by chance that the most numerous references > to the Kingdom are in the Gospel of Matthew which is the Gospel closest to rabbinical thinking and > to the extent that it has been suspected that the Greek text of this Gospel was based upon an original > in Aramaic or in Hebrew. > > The proclamation of the Kingdom forms the heart of the Gospel message. All of the thirteenth > chapter of the Gospel of Matthew is consecrated to this theme. It is like the seed which one sows138, > or like a mustard seed139. It is like a treasure or fine pearls140, or like a net141. It is the leaven which > > Gospel of Matthew 8:11-12; Gospel of Luke 13:28-29. > Gospel of Matthew 3:2. > Gospel of Matthew 4:17; 10:7; Gospel of Luke 10:9,11. > Gospel of Matthew 13:24-31; Gospel of Mark 4:11; 26:30-31; Gospel of Luke 13:18-21. > Gospel of Mark 9:1; 14:25. > Gospel of Mark 4:29; Book of Revelation 14:15. > Gospel of Matthew 16:27; 24:30; 26:64; Gospel of Mark 13:26; 14:62; Gospel of Luke 22:69. > Gospel of Mark 9:47; 14:25. > (106)Gospel of Matthew 13:3-9; Gospel of Mark 4:26-32; Gospel of Luke 8:5-15. > (107)Gospel of Matthew 20:16; 22:14; Gospel of Luke 12:32. > (107a)Gospel of Matthew 13:24; Gospel of Mark 4:12-20; Gospel of Luke 8:11-15. > (108)Gospel of Matthew 13:31; Gospel of Mark 4:30-32; Gospel of Luke 13:18-19. > (109)Gospel of Matthew 13:44. > (110)Gospel of Mathew 13:47. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > leaves the meal142. > > Every man is summoned to the Kingdom and each must have the chance to enter therein. For this > Matthew gives us the secret: > > “Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but > he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven.”143 > > And the will of the Father is to love one's fellow, practice charity and forgiveness, as depicted in the > parable of the pitiless lender144. One must be poor of heart or poor of spirit145 and become like the > children146. > > There would be many called and few chosen. It would be easier for a camel to pass through the > head of a needle than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom147 and the scribes and Pharisees are > barred from entry148. > > Other aspects of the kingdom are more mysterious. It is already in us or among us149, for it is not an > observable fact. It is mysterious and seems already to be working in the terrestrial world. > > If the words of Jesus are sometimes unclear and in apparent contradiction it is, on the one hand, > because the Gospel kingdom symbolizes a spiritual and metaphysical dimension difficult to > apprehend through language and difficult for questioners to comprehend who are not familiar with > rabbinical subtleties. On the other hand, one must not forget that the Jews of the epoch awaited a > Messiah who would be their military leader and who would come to restore a terrestrial kingdom > the crown of which he would assume. > > At the end of this preliminary search we may conclude that the Kingdom of Abha (Malakut-i-Abha) > of the Baha’i writings and the Gospel Kingdom are one and the same reality. On the other hand the > Quranic Malakut has little relation either to one or the other. It seems to refer to a much more > archaic state of Judaic and rabbinical thought. The Qur'an, which is, in general, well informed of > Old Testament [Biblical] tradition, has totally ignored Christian tradition on this point. The > examination of the Gospel teaches us only that the terms “Kingdom of God” or “Kingdom of the > heavens” were terms in common usage in Aramaic in the first century. It is interesting to see that in > borrowing the expression, the Qur'an affirmed the sovereignty of God in the heavens and upon the > earth (al-samawat wa'l-ard); hence a certain bipolarity was created which favored the splitting of the > world into a physical universe and a spiritual universe. This would constitute a major impact of > > (111)Gospel of Matthew 13:33; Gospel of Luke 13:20. > (112)Gospel of Matthew 7:21; Gospel of Luke 6:46; 13:25. > (113)Gospel of Matthew 18:23-35. > (114)Gospel of Matthew 5:3; Gospel of Luke 6:20. > (115)Gospel of Matthew 18:1-6. > Gospel of Matthew 9:23-24; Gospel of Mark 10:24-25. > Gospel of Matthew 23:13; Gospel of Luke 11:52. > Gospel of Luke 17:20-21. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Muslim thought upon Judaism, which does not appear to have had a clear idea of the antinomy of > these two dimensions. > > It is striking with regard to the concept of Malakut, that Baha’u’llah is situated closer to the Gospel > revelation than to the Quranic or Islamic conception. In Baha’i tradition as in Christian tradition, > the Kingdom is first the outcome of the divine will. The eschatological perspective of Christianity is > simply replaced in Baha’i thought by the revealed divine will to construct a new civilization that > assures the future well-being of man and its efflorescence and that causes the celestial Jerusalem to > descend upon earth in a manner that altogether corresponds to Christian eschatology. > > The advent of the kingdom of Christ is fulfilled with the proclamation of Baha’u’llah, who > announces the beginning of this process. On one hand, he refers to a concrete Kingdom which was > prophesied by all the Prophets of the past and which must incarnate itself in the new Order of the > world. On the other, there is a spiritual Kingdom. In this regard, the Writings of Baha’u’llah > certainly illuminate the teaching of Christ in a new way. Having established the fact that the > Kingdom of Abha includes at once the spiritual world and this lower world, without there being > uncrossable borders between them, it enables us to conceive of how the Kingdom of Christ can be > at the same time of this world and of the next. > > It is from this world that we enter into the Kingdom, by doing the will of the Father, said the Christ; > in executing the plan of God, as Baha’u’llah would say. The souls of the kingdom, whether they be > of this world or not, are the salt of the earth, and the cause of the advancement of humanity. It is > because the work of promulgation is the most important that the kingdom is like a net which catches > the souls that have the capacity to accept the Cause. It is in proclaiming the establishment of the > kingdom from now on, and in calling its builders to join in the work, in the construction of the > kingdom in this world, that we enter into the Kingdom of the other world. The souls that are in > service to the Cause of God are the doors to the Kingdom. They become agents of the > transformation of the world. It is interesting to see Jesus and Baha’u’llah using the same image and > comparing the souls who accept the new revelation to be the leaven who cause the meal to rise. > Finally, as the Gospel Kingdom is preceded by Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the Kingdom of Abha is > preceded by the celestial Concourse (mala-i-a'la) bringing together the souls of the Prophets and the > saints. A systematic comparison of the two kingdoms would be easy to carry out, and would > certainly produce interesting results. > > 4. The Tenth Sefira of the Kabbalah > > We have been able to grasp the reality of the Kingdom just before and after the manifestation of > Christ, and we have seen that at this epoch the concept of “Kingdom” began to take on an > importance that would be greatly magnified in the message of Christ. We understand for what > reasons the Kingdom of Christ was not acceptable as such to contemporary Jews. But is it possible to > follow outside of Christianity the career of “MalkUt” and of “JebarUt” before 622 A.D. and after 622 > A.D.? For that which is before 622 A.D., we have already partially admitted our ignorance. In fact, > the question of “MalkUt” seems to completely disappear from Judaic consciousness during ten > centuries, and one would have to await the development of a kabbalistic movement in order to hear > it spoken of again; which proves that it was not completely forgotten. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > “MalkUt”, considered as kingdom and sovereignty, appears again in Jewish theology through the > intermediary of the ten “sefirot” of the Kabbalah150. We cannot here enter into the problem of the > origins of the Kabbalah; these are extremely confused, as is confusing the elaboration of the > kabbalistic doctrine which is profoundly influenced by the Arabo-Muslim philosophy and by > Neoplatonism. This is what explains that the “sefirot”, originally simple attributes of the Divinity, > were later transformed into hypostases, successive emanations from the eternal One. The Kabbalah > distinguishes God in His singularity, inaccessible to intelligence, the “En Sof” which corresponds to > “Hahut” or the unmanifested essence (huwiyya) in the writings of Baha’u’llah, state in which “the > primordial uniqueness” is designated by no name, and, on the other hand, God known in His > manifestations which are the “sefirot”. The “sefirot” are thus the names of divine attributes such as > Wisdom, Intelligence, Love, Beauty, Glory or Power, which are the different aspects by which the > primordial One manifests Himself to the world151. > > The lists of “sefirot” among the most ancient kabbalists do not include MalakUt, but, on the other > hand, always mention “Gebura” in the fifth position. It is in “The Book of the Meditations” > (Kawwanat) of Jacob of Lunel that appears, in the 12th century, for the first time, the term “MalkUt” > as the tenth “sefira”. This one takes the place of “shekhina” (divine presence; the “sakina” of the > writings of Baha’u’llah)152 in the later lists. Afterwards, Judah ben Barzilai would identify Glory > (kavod) with “MalkUt”, and Judah Halevi would explain in his turn that “Kavod,” “shekhina” and > “MalkUt” are three aspects of one reality153. > > It would be too long here to retrace the elaboration of the concept of “MalkUt” and of “Gebura” in > the kabbalistic thought. We will content ourselves with turning towards a work of maturity, that of > Meir ibn Gabbai. This one expresses himself in a clearly Neoplatonic language which goes back to > Maimonides. For him, the “sefirot” represent the world of Emanation (atsilUt) as opposed to the > world of “En Sof”. Of all the “sefirot”, “MalkUt” is the tenth, that is to say that the one which closes > the procession and thus the furthest removed from the primordial source of the divine essence and > the closest to the world of sensible realities. This suffices to distinguish “MalkUt” from all the other > “sefirot”, for being at the frontier of the sensible realities, it is in a certain way their “mother” and > the essential cause. Ibn Gabbai, in his “Derekh 'EmUna,” describes “MalkUt” as “the point of > junction and of unification between the inferior beings and the superior beings”. Commenting upon > this passage and upon its context, Roland Goetschel writes: “MalkUt is thus taken here as the > receptible of all other entities issued from the cause of causes as well as nexus between this world > above and the world below which permits that it establish a reciprocal relation between these two > worlds”154. > > “Sefirot” is the plural of “Sefira”. > The literature concerning the Kabbalah is extremely abundant and diverse. We have contented ourselves > here to recommend the reader to the introductory works of Gershom Sholem, “Major Trends in Jewish > Mysticism,” Schocken Books, 1995; French: “Les grands courents de la mystique juive,” Paris, 1977; and > “Origins of the Kabbalah,” Jewish Publication Society, 1987; French: “Les Origines de la Kabbale,” Paris, > 1966. One can also profitably consult N. Sed, “La Mystique cosmologique juive,” Paris, 1981. > Arabic text: “The Fire Tablet and the Tablet of the Holy Mariner,” Langenhain, 1985. > “MajmU'iy-i-MunAjAt,” p. 75. > Roland Goetschel, “Meir ibn Gabbay, le discours de la Kabbale espagnole,” p. 175. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > We do not seek to follow the adventures and misadventures of “MalkUt” in the Kabbalah; these > were fertile, such as how MalkUt can unite with Beauty (Tiferet) in order to incarnate the union of the > king and his spouse, or as, in a beautiful example of spiritual hermeneutic, to typify Rachel in > opposition to reason (bina) incarnated by Leah, or how reason (bina) was able to engender the > heavens typifying Beauty (Tiferet) and the earth typifying MalkUt, or how in another register MalkUt > was able to represent the lower Elohim in the creation from the forces of the heavens and the earth. > These are but simple examples of the fertile imagination of the kabbalists. The proteiform reality of > the kabbalistic MalkUt obliges us to concentrate upon a single one of its aspects, that is to say its > mediatory function which composes a veritable intermediary world, which is not without recalling > some of the aspects of the MalkUt of the Ishraqi philosophers and of the “barzakh” (“intermediary” > world identified with the world of images) of Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i. > > The MalkUt of the Kabbalah possesses certain attributes of the “World of images” of Ghazali. The > Zohar considers the material world as a world of exile aspiring to receive the light of the world > above and to unite itself with the superior realities as the Wife aspires that the Husband place the > crown upon her brow. This encounter between the world below and the spiritual light from above > constitutes the “completion of the world” which is the manifestation of the “En Sof” and of the first > “sefira,” “Keter” (crown), for finally it is only through this world that the unmanifest and the hidden > can manifest itself. Goetschel writes: “it is from the splendour of the luminaries which are superior to > it and which are the perfection of the world above that were created the realities in their image > below MalkUt, which are their chariots, its palaces and its ornaments”155. > > We see appear here the difference, in truth secondary, between the MalkUt of Kabbalah and the > World of images. The world of images of the Suhrawardi tradition is the world of archetypes that > are reflected in the world of sensible realities. In the Kabbalah, the world of the archetypes and of > the intelligible realities is placed above MalkUt which serves as an intermediary world, as “barzakh” of > the Ishraqi and Shaykhi tradition. The images of the Lights of the superior worlds descend into > MalkUt in order to incarnate themselves then into the sensible world. If the role of MalkUt is > conceived differently from that of MalakUt, the superior realities create therein a world of images in > imitation of Muslim thought. > > The MalkUt of the Kabbalah is also a sphere of “recapitulation”. All the “sefirot” have as vocation to > unite themselves, directly or indirectly, with MalkUt. MalkUt is the sphere of the white light, for the > white light is the union of these lights of all the other colors. > > Goetschel writes: > > “Thus MalkUt defines herself as the universal receptacle susceptible to receive all the colors > and all the superior visions, thus as a sort of analogoon of the first matter of the philosophers, > which she could do only if she possessed an appropriate color. MalkUt defines herself thus as > this midda composed of all the sefirots, and which constitute a general force (koah kelali) in > relation to all the entities. Every sefira is married and in relationship with her...Otherwise > said, MalkUt is not only the place where all the sefirots unite but that by which they carry out > this operation.”156 > Ibid., p. 82. > Ibid., p. 97. We have conserved the feminine for MalkUt. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > All the Jewish reflection upon the intermediary function of MalkUt will conduct to enlarge the > meaning and underline the importance of this inter-world, and will end finally with bringing it closer > to MalakUt such as the Muslim tradition has made it known. > > This was not the least of the surprises which were attested in the course of our study of the > convergences between the Spanish or Langedoc Kabbalah of the Middle Ages with the thought of > numerous Iranian philosophers. Without doubt this is once more a case of one of these mysterious > phenomena of convergence which one encounters often in the history of human thought; > convergence which always leads to Baha’u’llah, the blessed Beauty who incarnates in himself the > glory (Kavod; Baha') and the beauty (Tiferet; Jamal) and who manifests the Shekhina-Sakina to the world. > > The essential problem that Kabbalah posed is found in the question of knowing how MalkUt could > be in contact with the sensible reality without being degraded itself, and how it was possible not to > render MalkUt responsible for the evil which reigns upon the earth? Goetschel replies to this > question in writing: “The diminution of MalkUt is justified by the necessity of giving autonomy to the > sphere of rigour symbolized by Elohim. This autonomy is itself posed as a condition of possibility of > the emergence and the existence of especially just inferior beings capable of operating the necessary > acts in view of relieving MalkUt from decadence”157. But this decadence is but apparent. Ibn Gabbai > says that it is as if one were to condemn the mother for the sins of her son. This does not at all imply > that MalkUt is not part of the world of emanation (atsilUt) and that it does not receive on its part > from the light from on high or be part of the “domain of the uniqueness” (reshUt ha-Yahid). > Nevertheless, MalkUt is not only a frontier sphere with the world below and the world above. There > is visibly a reciprocal influence, because it is the actions of the just which contribute to the > maintenance of MalkUt. This is not without recalling certain Shi'i and more particularly Shaykhi > doctrines. Not only do the “sefirot” present resemblances with the pleroma of fourteen immaculates, > but Shaykh Ahmad and especially Siyyid Kazim insisted upon the fact that at every moment there > must exist in the world a perfect believer who assures the junction between this world below and the > spiritual world, so that the order of the world be preserved. This doctrine of the perfect believer is > certainly a development of the Sufi doctrine of the “pole” (qutb), who is the Master par excellence > instructed in the secrets of gnosis such that there exists but one in [every] generation. In certain > schools, the perfect master is himself at the head of a spiritual hierarchy, the “nujabA” (les noble ones) > and the “nuqaba” (the close ones), who are the guardians of the esoteric sciences, and who at the > same time assure the order of the world, for without their existence, permitting the interpenetration > of MalakUt in the sensible world, the world could not exist. In this way the “nuqaba” and the “nujaba” > become the channels by which the sensible world is irrigated by the light of MalakUt. As we see it, we > are not far from the thesis of Ibn Gabbai. Finally, having once posed the idea that the junction > between the spiritual worlds and the sensible world is necessary, the most simple fashion of resolving > this problem is to imagine that there exist men who belong at the same time to the spiritual world > and to the sensible world and who establish the communication between the two. One can say that > all philosophy of Neoplatonic inspiration arrives almost by necessity to pose this kind of problem. > From the moment in which one installs a bipolarization of the spiritual cosmos apportioned between > an intelligible world (spiritual) and a sensible world, unfailingly the question of the relations between > the two is posed. In admitting a decadence of the sensible world, considered as the world of > imperfection and the source of evil, Kabbalistic thought is closer to Plotinus' thought and to the > Gnosis of the first centuries. Muslim philosophy managed to avoid this danger. We will see later on > Ibid., p. 181. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > how Baha’u’llah resolves this problem. The construction of this same scheme shows that it is > necessary to manage a transition between the intelligible world and the sensible world, from when > the concept of an intermediary world or sphere: the world of ideas of Plato. > > 5. Leibniz and MalkUt > > One could believe that the concept of MalkUt has remained foreign to Western culture. Thanks to > Kabbalah this is not the case. The concept enters into contact with European thought by the > intermediary of the Platonic School of Florence, the members of which had an avid interest in the > Kabbalah. This explains why we find references to MalkUt (at the time spelled Malcuth) in at least > three places in the work of Leibniz. > > Leibniz had an early interest in alchemical and Kabbalistic questions. From 1688 he was linked in > friendship with the Baron Christian Knorr von Rosenroth, the celebrated kabbalist and > theosophist158. Circa 1706 Leibniz became more closely interested in the Kabbalah due to a book of > Johan Georg Wachter, entitled “Elucidarius Cabalisticus seu de Recondita Hebraerum philosophia” > in which he affirms the accord of Spinoza and the Kabbalah. Leibniz read the book with attention > and even wrote “anima-adversiones”, that is to say notes in the form of a commentary which were > later published by Foucher de Careil under the title “Refutation inedite de Spinoza par Leibniz”159. > It is from this time that Leibniz was interested in Malkuth160. In his commentary, Leibniz is closely > interested in the sin of Adam and the interpretation thereof by the Fathers of the Church, as well as > in the procession of the Verb. Among the points discussed by Wachter and commented upon by > Leibniz is found the question of whether the Kabbalah recognizes the Trinity, notably through the > “Sefirot” of the kabbalistic Tree and the “En Sof”161. According to the interpretation of the Kabbalah > by Wachter, the true sin of Adam was a sin towards Malkuth. In seeking other attributes through the > secondary “sefirot” and in neglecting Malkuth, representing the summit of the Tree of the “sefirot” and > thus the Omniscience of God, Adam did not understand that God governs irresistibly, and he > thought to claim presumptuously a liberty which, in reality, was totally illusory because nothing > escapes the divine power162. We will not enter into all the details of the reflections of Leibniz > concerning Malkuth. This subject only has an anecdotal interest for us. However, the question > certainly assumed a very great importance for Leibniz, for he found therein all sorts of > correspondences for his own conception of human liberty, and the subject would reappear in two of > his major works, the “Political Treatise” and the “Ethics”. > > G. Friedmann, “Leibniz et Spinoza,” Paris, 1975, p. 205. > Foucher de Careil, “Refutation inedite de Spinoza par Leibniz,” Paris, 1854, reproduced later by the same > author in his book “Leibniz, Descartes et Spinoza,” Paris, 1862. The exact title of the treatise of Leibniz > rediscovered by Foucher in the Libary of Hanover is “Animadversiones ad Joh. Georg. Watcheri librum de > recondita Hebraerun philosophia.” > G. Friedmann, op. cit., p. 201. > Ibid., p. 210. > Ibid., p. 211. Friedmann does not seem to have understood very well the question, because of an > insufficient knowledge of the Kabbalah. The interpretation which we reconstitute here is thus lightly > different from his own. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > In the “Political Treatise” he writes: “But most believe that the ignorant trouble the order of nature > rather because they do not follow it and they conceive men in nature as an empire within an empire > (imperium in imperio)”163. Leibniz means to say that men arrogate to themselves the functions of > Malcouth as imperium, that is to say as Kingdom and as sovereignty. The idea must certainly have > stuck with him, for one finds it again in a practically identical form in the “Ethics” where he writes: > “Most of those who have written upon the affects and the principles of conduct seem to treat not of > natural things which follow the general laws of Nature, but of things which are outside of this > Nature. It seems even that they conceive man as an empire in an empire.”164 It is certain that if one > does not know that here the word imperium translates the Hebrew MalkUt and what this concept > signifies in the Kabbalah, then the remark of Leibniz must appear particularly obscure, and one > would ask oneself truly if it could hope to be understood. We will not seek to enter more deeply into > the arcanities of Leibnizian thought. Beyond the anecdote, our purpose was simply to show what > power of fascination the idea of this MalkUtian Kingdom could have upon the intellectual history of > humanity in order to know such a diffusion. It is probable that if we push further our investigations, > we will find references to the MalkUt of the Kabbalah in the most unexpected authors. > > CHAPTER FOUR: > THE DIVINE WORLDS IN THE TRADITION OF ISLAM > > To retrace the history of MalakUt and of the system of the five divine worlds in Muslim tradition > represents an enormous task which must be undertaken on day. It will require without doubt > numerous years of research inasmuch as the sources are abundant and the problems which it > encounters arduous. Our aim here is only to explain why and how Baha’u’llah sheltered this > heritage. > > To begin with, we must be skeptical of the remarks in the Arabic encyclopedias—sometimes copied > without critical spirit by certain Orientalists—as well as the later mystical treatises by Muslim > authors, which consider the theory of the five worlds (or presences: hadrAt) as a dogma or as > something that is evident and has always existed. On the contrary, it is the product of a very long > process of evolution through successive phases, the origins of which will doubtlessly remain forever > obscure. Only later on in this process were the five worlds given the significance that is associated > with them today by all the glosographs. > > We must ask ourselves what was the purpose of Baha’u’llah when, in the “Tablet of All Food” he > employed this cosmology of the five worlds. His intention was perhaps to humor the mystical > penchant of Kamalu’d-Din by evoking esoteric questions which were bound to fascinate him. > However, that is not the question, for if Baha’u’llah retrieves old materials in this way, it is in order > to completely transform them. Even while his description of the divine worlds follows, in its great > > Leibniz, “Traite politique,” Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques, texte, trad. et notes par S. Zac, Paris, > 1968, pp. 40-41. > Leibniz, “L'Ethique,” trad. R. Misrahi, Paris, 1990, p. 155. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > themes, that of the later Muslim tradition such as we find it in the last generations of Ishraqi thinkers > and in Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa’i, it is with important modifications. Nevertheless, that is not the issue, > for what is important here is the role which Baha’u’llah has this mystical cosmology play in his > metaphysic and in his hermeneutic. We will see in the following chapters that this question cannot > be fully appreciated except after we will have considered the relationship which Baha’i thought has > with Neoplatonism, permitting us thereby to identify on the one hand the elements common to both > systems and on the other hand their sometimes profound differences. > > This work cannot be undertaken without a prefatory knowledge of the evolution of mystical > cosmology in Islam generally and of the theory of the five presences in particular. As we are not able > to explain this question in a comprehensive fashion, for the reasons earlier cited, we have contented > ourselves with proceeding with some soundings in the history of Muslim mysticism and to suggest > some future directions for research. We will begin by returning to the lexicographical origins of the > nomenclature of the divine worlds. > > 1. The lexicographical origins of Hahut, Lahut and Nasut > > We have noted the Aramaic origin of MalakUt and JabarUt, and no doubt it would appear logical to > posit the same origin for Hahut, Lahut and Nasut. However, nothing is less certain. One can relate > LAhUt to the Aramaic-Hebraic ElahUt which signifies “divinity”. But to explain HAhUt from an > Aramaic etymology is more difficult. One can imagine that the radical HAh- could come from the > root HYH which signifies “being” and which one finds in the tetragrammaton YHWH, the name of > God. But NAsUt resists every attempt at explanation of this kind, for one finds no Hebrew > [translator's question for author: Aramaic?] root to explain it. Furthermore, one must state that one > does not find any attestation of these three words (Hahut, Lahut and Nasut) in Hebraic or Aramaic > literature in a form permitting their passage into Syriac or into Arabic. In order to imagine that > these words could have passed thus from Aramaic to Arabic, one would have to admit that they are > evidence of an oral tradition that has left no traces. > > The words LAhUt and NAsUt, according to certain philologists, came from Syriac, which is an > intermediary language between Aramaic and Arabic. The Syriac language was in its time the carrier > of a great culture and played a significant role in the development of Oriental Christianity. > Furthermore, a substantial part of Greek philosophy was transmitted to the Muslim world through > the intermediation of Syriac translations carried out by Christian monks. The utilization which we > know of LAhUt and NAsUt in Syriac refers to the theological definition of the double nature, divine > and human, of Jesus Christ. Lahut serves to describe the divine nature of Jesus Christ and Nasut his > humanity. This usage was also transmitted to Arab monophysitism which, in the same context, > forged the adjectives LAhUtI and NAsUtI. > > However, even in Syriac, the terms have an Aramaic allure, which permits one to think that the > Syriac could have served as the intermediary between an Aramaic origin and the Arabic result. If > this thesis elegantly explains the transmission from Aramaic elAhUt to Syriac alOhUt or elOhUt and > then lAhUt in Arabic, it poses a problem for the word Nasut. Without any similar form appearing in > Aramaic, one does not find any attestation of Nasut in this linguistic heritage, although Syriac > possesses the word noshUt from which Nasut could conceivably derive. The Syriac term also appears > in the form nOshO which designates “man” in the general sense and which has the same etymology > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > as the Arabic nAs. The problem is heightened when we discover that notwithstanding the similarity > of their forms, what we know of the phonological evolution of Syriac does not permit us to relate > noshUtO and nOshO to a common form. It is thus probable that one of the two terms was borrowed > from a closely related Semitic language, most likely from Aramaic. However we must be prudent for > an identical problem exists in Arabic in which we find that the trilateral root ANS gives the word > insAn (man in a general sense, humanity) and the root NAS gives the word nAs (man in the collective > sense of a group of men). NashUtO as the initial silent Alif indicates, must have been formed from the > same root as insAn, without our being able to explain the addition of an Aramaic suffix beyond pure > conjectures upon the possible borrowings or the variances of dialect. > > The Aramaic forms of alOhUtO and nashUtO indicate that these words were used among the learned > and thus would have appeared among the clerics. We find their traces for the first time in a text > dated to the 4th century from the pen of Aphraatexii, who employs the expressions shem alOhUtO > (name of the divinity) and shem malkUtO165. Of course, the discovery here of alOhUtO in association > with malkUtO seems to prefigure the elaborations of the Muslim mystics upon the divine worlds and > specifically recalls the usages found in al-Makki and al-Ghazali. Unfortunately, this is nothing more > than a simple presumption and it may be that the relationship between the two is purely fortuitous. > Elsewhere, one finds the employment of the word nOshO with regard to the humanity of Christ in > the 15th sermon of the “Liber Graduum”166. As is evident, these testimonies are, from a philological > point of view, extremely fragile, but this fragility may be explained by the rarity of Syriac sources in > general. Otherwise, the written sources may be out of sync with the oral usage of the time. We have > thus theorized that it was Arab Christians who assured the transmission of this terminology from > Syriac into Arabic. It is clear furthermore that these terms were particularly apt for articulating the > double nature of Christ and one senses the possibility of a distant Nestorian influence. However, it is > also possible that the lexicographical development of these terms in a Muslim context reciprocally > influenced the usage of the Christian Arabs. > > These problems, which we will speak of again with regard to al-Hallaj, place in evidence the fact > that the circulation of ideas was considerably favored by the very great proximity of the Semitic > languages, the vocabulary of which reposes in its essentials upon common roots for which only > vocalization changes. It is also this characteristic which explains, to the degree to which the Jewish > people were, with the Phoenicians, Semitic peoples who sustained highly advanced cultures, the very > great influence, particularly from a theological point of view, of Hebrew upon Quranic Arabic and > thereafter upon the language of the Muslim clerics. > > The adoption of the words Lahut and Nasut into Arabic was greatly favored by the proximity of these > words to Arabic roots, with Syriac being much closer to Arabic than either Hebrew or Aramaic. In > the word Lahut we find the root LAH which gave “AllAh” in Arabic, and later the adjective “ilAhI”. > In the word NAsUt we find the word “nAs” which is frequent in the Qur'an and which signifies “the > people” in a collective sense, a group of men, and can serve to designate the entire collective entity > of humanity. The Aramaic consonance of Lahut and Nasut will itself suggest and favor the lexical > relation of these terms with the couple Malakut-Jabarut. > > “Patrologie Syriaque,” Paris 1894, tome I, col. 794. > “Patrologie Syriaque,” tome III, p. 379, “Liber Graduum,” sermon XV. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > The explanation of Hahut is more complex and does not go in the same direction. We surmise, > following an established tradition in doing so, that the word is deconstructed into “hA-h-Ut” and that > “hA” comes from the Arabic “huwa”, meaning “he”, which is written “HW”; the “W” being a semi- > vowel susceptible of taking the form of whatever long vowel whether “A, U, I”; the second “H” > would not have been added except in homophony with Lahut. When one is familiar with the > reticence of the Arabophones to introduce any parasitical letter into the development of roots, one > may suspect that such a manipulation could not but be the work of Persian ears and one can be > almost positive that this development could not have taken place except in Persia. > > The explanation which we have just mentioned for the etymology of Hahut is that which is > recognized by all the Arab and Persian commentators, notwithstanding that it is not without > problems at the linguistic level. We know that, in the mystical tradition, to qualify God in saying > simply of Him “He is”—which in absence of a verb “to be” in Arabic brings one to “huwa” or to > “huwa huwa” (He is He)—without ascribing to the divine essence any attribute, constitutes the most > pure affirmation of the divine unicity (tawhId). Hahut is thus a term designed to qualify the divine > essence in the state in which its attributes are potential and not manifested. The extremely > sophisticated character of this concept indicates further that the term it conceals could not have > been forged except in the course of extended philosophical reflection, and thus must be considered > very late in provenance. > > 2. The couple Lahut-Nasut in al-Hallaj > > If we admit that Hahut, Lahut and Nasut were formed in the image of Malakut and Jabarut at a later > epoch, one must be able to explain with what purpose and how these words were associated from > the start. But the question appears to be very complex in the absence of an exhaustive inventory of > the sources and thus we are left with conjectures. From a preliminary investigation, it appears that > Hahut must be set aside because of its very late appearance. It is then apparent that the four > remaining terms function in pairs. We have on the one hand the pair Malakut-Jabarut which belongs > to the literature of Quranic commentary, and we have the second pair composed of Nasut-Lahut > which belongs to the mystical literature and which was to rapidly acquire a considerably extended > usage, much more widely known that the first pair. > > Numerous authors prior to the 10th century utilize Nasut in the sense of the human nature and Lahut > in the sense of the divine world, opposing one to the other. Among these same authors we do not > find references either to Malakut or to Jabarut. It is the case for example of Mansur al-Hallaj (858- > 922) for whom Lahut designates the sphere of the divine essence in opposition to the sphere of the > human nature. Lahut and Nasut also represent for him two aspects of the human soul, aspects which > are especially in evidence in the soul of the Prophet, who represents the Perfect Man, a lineage > which recalls Aphraate. Lahut and Nasut thus represent a universal bipolarity. Their opposition will > become as fundamental to Muslim thought as the opposition between Nature and Culture in > Western thought. To this we must add that, while al-Hallaj is familiar with Malakut, he does not use > it except in its most narrow Quranic sense of divine sovereignty. Never does the term Malakut > assume for him an ontological or metaphysical dimension. For him it is above all a divine attribute. > As for the term Jabarut, it seems to have been simply unknown to al-Hallaj. That which we have > established for al-Hallaj can be considered as true for all the Muslim authors until the end of the 10th > century, and even for a large part of the 11th century. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > What appears most curious about this lexicographical evolution over the course of the three first > centuries of Islam, is that the couple Lahut-Nasut was formed long before the couple Malakut-Jabarut. > This considerably weakens the linguistic hypothesis often put forward which indicates that Lahut and > Nasut were formed in imitation of the word Malakut, by a sort of alliteration. > > We have already made reference to the Syriac Christian influence as a plausible explanation for this > usage. This explanation seems to adapt itself well to what we know about the formation of the > metaphysical conceptions of al-Hallaj and appears to play an important role in the evolution of all > later Sufism. This metaphysical stance insists that the union of man and God is not possible unless > man possesses something divine within himself. Man, by seeking the annihilation of his own “me”, > strives to fill himself with God, to the point of confusing himself with Him; from whence the famous > exclamation of al-Hallaj, “Anna’l-haqq!”, “I am God”, a statement which led him to the gallows. It > seems altogether possible that in order to describe this process of divinization, the community of al- > Hallaj in Syria had recourse to a Christian terminology that was already being used to describe the > double nature of Christ. > > The possibility of their being a Christian influence upon the thought of al-Hallaj has caused much > ink to flow, because every linking of this kind, especially if it emanates from Western Orientalists > who, like Louis Massignon (1883-1962), have their own agenda, is susceptible of interpretations > which can be suspected of being inspired by religious prejudice. We think that this is not the > appropriate juncture to consider this theme in depth. Massignon at first adopted the explanation of > a Christian influence precisely through emphasizing the use by al-Hallaj of the couple Lahut-Nasut, > but later he rejected this association, probably based on philosophical rather than philological > reasons. He writes: “for him as for the ghulat, nasut, nur, sha’sha’ani and amr are synonymous167; > which has nothing Christian in it”168. Massignon then came to the conclusion that the antinomic > concepts of Lahut and Nasut were formed amongst the extremist Shi’is (Ghulat) which groups > developed gnostic tendencies that divinified the Imams and particularly ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib. Even if > this is an accurate attribution, one would have still to ask from whom, in the purely linguistic and > lexicographical plan, the Ghulat borrowed this vocabulary. > > Al-Hallaj in any case had recourse to this vocabulary, whether he borrowed it from the Ghulat, or > from others including Christians, and whether or not this linguistic borrowing was characterized by > any theological contamination. It remains the case that if the adjective lahuti could serve to describe > the divine nature of Christ, it could also service to describe al-Hallaj’s divinization of man. Al-Hallaj > describes the process of this divinization in a text that is particularly interesting because of the usage > it makes of this vocabulary: > > “I and “I”, and there is no other attribute. I am “I” and there is no other qualification. My > attributes, in effect (separated from my personality) have become a pure human nature > (nasutiyya); this humanity of mine is the annihilation of all the spiritual qualifications > (ruhaniyya) and my qualification is now a pure divine nature (lahutiyya).”169 > > “Nur” signifies “light”; “sha'sha'ani” [signifies] “burst of light”; and “amr” [signifies] “command”. > Massignon, “La passion de Hallaj,” Paris, 2e ed., tome III, p. 51. > Al-Hallaj, “Tanzih 'an al-na'at wa'l-wasf,” cited by Massignon, Ibid., tome III, p. 53. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > When we examine this text, we perceive that the thought of al-Hallaj does not depart from the > framework of Islamic orthodoxy, for it does not conceive the divinization of man in other terms than > through his union with God. The union of man with God is not the union of man with the divine > essence, but the union of man with his divine nature (lahutiyya). > > It is curious that al-Hallaj frequently linked the world of Nasut to the world of the divine Imperative > (amr), a concept which thereafter would become one of the attributes of Malakut, and especially of > Jabarut after the essential contribution of Kamalu’d-Din ‘Abdu’r-Razzaq Kashani (died 1329). For > al-Hallaj, Lahut and Nasut express the double nature of man; but this double nature is of a spiritual > character and not essential. We are far from the sensible-intelligible bipolarity that Muslim > hristologic will introduce and in particular its most famous exponent, Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 980- > 1037). For al-Hallaj, Nasut represents the irreducible essence of man once it is stripped of all its > temporal and ephemeral “qualifications”. From Nasut we pass to the concept of Nasutiyya which > precisely describes this nature, that is at the same time spiritual and human and which, once > stripped of its non-essential attributes, enters into a transformative union with God, thereby > acquiring a divine nature (lahutiyya). Up to this point, al-Hallaj’s position would probably not be > disavowed by Baha’u’llah. The central thesis of Baha’i anthropology is precisely to affirm the > spiritual nature of man, but we must not confuse this spiritual nature with the divine nature of the > self preached by certain Sufis. In the mysticism of Baha’u’llah this spiritual nature of man forms “the > divine trust”170, and its capacity is to be a mirror of divine grace and thereby to acquire divine > qualities through stripping itself of the terrestrial part of the “me” constituted by man’s animal > heritage. > > For al-Hallaj, union is effected through the “kun!”, the creative word of God, the Biblical “fiat!” This > creative word emanates from Lahut, the sphere of creative omnipotence. > > Massignon writes: > > “To give an acceptable theological formula of his expert mental gifts, al-Hallaj called upon > all the technical resources of the contemporary lexicon. He borrowed in particular from the > lexicon of the extremist Imami theologians the scale of their expressions designating the > divine action, lahut, nasut, ruh, while considerably modifying their meanings. Lahut is the > creative omnipotence; nasut is the divine commandment (amr), the essential word which > unlatches the fiat! Kun! Of the divine creations, uncreated words of which the human > language is the created image… It is no longer a series of emanations, but rather the > revelation of a certain internal structure particular to the creative act of which the Qur’an > enumerates in this way the stages: irada, takwin, ibda…”171 > > The thought of al-Hallaj is complex. It is probable that we will never completely unravel its sources > and influences. We lack written traces and besides that, the entire environment of his times escapes > us. The only thing that we can affirm with certitude is the etymological associations of the > vocabulary. One cannot offhandedly reject the possibility of a Christian influence. Roger Arnaldez, > > English: GL, ?, p. ?; French: EEB, ?, p. 63. > Massignon, op. cit., tome III, p. 51. “Irada” signifies “will”; “takwin” designates the creative act; and “ibda” > signifies creation. We will have occasion to return to these terms in the following Chapters. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > who defends this thesis172, depends upon Muslim authors such as ‘Afifi in his great work upon > Sufism173 and al-Shibli174 to demonstrate the possibility of a Nestorian influence. He writes: “We > can in effect consider the Nasut of al-Hallaj as the equivalent of the prosópon of union in which is > united the will of God and the will of man”175. The lexical and semantic evolution of these ideas > must have been long and complex; for before a term enters into the written language, it generally > passes through a phase of acclimatization in the oral language, and when al-Hallaj employs the > words Lahut and Nasut, he does so as if these terms were already known to the public in the > framework of the definitions he gives them. In fact, one cannot exclude a superposition of multiple > influences which might have included Judaic elements, notably in the Aramaic elahUt, and Christian > elements resulting from the hristological controversies of the epoch. Nevertheless, numerous > indications suggest that the Hebraic-Aramaic substratus was not entirely lost and permitted > suggestive relationships. > > 3. The metaphysical system of Al-Makki > > From the 11th century onwards, the meaning of the word Malakut began to evolve and to acquire a > semantic content that is differentiated from its Quranic usage. We find evidence of this development > in Ibn Sina, for whom Jabarut clearly becomes the world of the celestial souls and Malakut the world > of the Intelligent Agents in the philosophical system he was developing which was strongly > impregnated with Neoplatonism. However the Avicennian system is not an ontological scheme in > the sense in which it was to be elaborated subsequently, and we are well aware that Quranic or > pseudo-Quranic terms were here employed in a scheme which was purely Hellenistic in spirit. > > If we consider the greater part of the Arabic sources, the true founder of the first onto-cosmological > system of the divine worlds would be Abu-Talib al-Makki (d. 996) who set forth his theory in “The > Food of the Hearts” (Qut al-Qulub). This system became the basis of that articulated by Abu Hamid > al-Ghazali (1058-1111), and al-Ghazali himself says that he borrowed it from al-Makki and it is to > him that he attributes its paternity. This statement of al-Ghazali certainly establishes a strong > presumption, but it is also possible that this system was engendered in the environment in which al- > Makki frequented and that his contribution was only to express it in writing, or that he did no more > than amplify already existing ideas. > > Al-Makki identifies Mulk (we will say Nasut) with the exoteric (zahir) physical world, and Malakut with > the hidden and invisible (batin, that is to say esoteric) world, indicating that the latter can not be > perceived except subsequent to an interior illumination of which the heart serves as location. The > heart itself represents the esoteric and invisible dimension of man and the instrument of mystical > knowledge. The heart is thus the door of Malakut, or the seat of the spiritual realities in man himself. > > 4. The divine worlds in the work of al-Ghazali > > R. Arnaldez, article “Lahut-Nasut,” in Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edition. > 'Afifi, “Al-tasawwuf: al-thawra al-ruhiyya fi'l-Islam,” Alexandria, [Egypt], 1963, pp. 82-83. > Kamil Mustafa al-Shibli, “Shahr Diwan al-Hallaj”. > R. Arnaldez, op. cit., p. 617. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > The great promoter of the first onto-cosmological theory of the divine worlds is incontestably al- > Ghazali, and we can be sure that without his work an onto-cosmological theory would not have > taken form, at least in reference to the lexicographical elements which interest us. This is why we > have difficulty following Henri Corbin (1903-1978) who, in his “Histoire de la Philosophie > Islamique”, presents al-Ghazali as a marginal thinker and without influence upon the evolution of > Islamic philosophy, the importance of whom the Occident has exaggerated, principally because of > the influence al-Ghazali undoubtedly had upon Western philosophy in the Middle Ages176. > Contrary to Corbin's contention, al-Ghazali's philosophical contributions influenced generations of > thinkers, and indeed constituted the common patrimony of the Arab and Persian mystics beginning > when they separated themselves from the philosophy of Kalam. Without al-Ghazali, Shihab al-Din > Yahya al-Suhrawardi (1154-1191) could not have formulated his doctrine and the School of Isfahan > would not have seen the light of day. > > The system of al-Ghazali is a system of three degrees — the world of Mulk, the world of Jabarut and > the world of Malakut. It is not difficult to see that in this form he reproduces the three hypostases of > the “Theology of Pseudo-Aristotle” — the world of Nature (tabi'a), the world of the soul (nafs) and > the world of the Spirit or Intelligence ('aql). > > The world of Mulk is at the same time the physical world, the world of the creature (khalq) and the > world of that which is manifest (shahada). In relation to Aristotelian thought, it is the “world of > generation and corruption” ('alam al-kawn wa'l-fisad). > > The world of Jabarut is for al-Ghazali the world of the invisible (ghayb). It manifests attributes which > in the case of later authors will become those of Malakut while always remaining distinct from that > world, without doubt due to the scheme of Hellenistic inspiration which it adopts. It is in Jabarut that > he situates the sensible and imaginative faculties of the human soul. In this regard, it is interesting to > note that the onto-cosmological scheme of al-Ghazali seeks less than explain how it is possible to > pass from a first divine emanation to the different spheres of being, and thus to the physical world, > than to determine the functions of the soul in relation to a reality with multiple dimensions > corresponding to the different types of knowledge of man. > > Finally, for al-Ghazali, Malakut is the world of Intelligence. It is a supra-sensible world directly > opposed to the world of Mulk. It is also the world of the angelic entities. Malakut thus includes within > itself a spiritual hierarchy which, first of all, is composed of the spiritual creatures which populate it, > and, secondarily, corresponds to the different degrees of elevation of the human soul. As the world > of Intelligence, Malakut contains all the intelligible realities, whereas the sensible world (Mulk) > constitutes the reflection of the intelligible realities, and hence Malakut is similar to the world of > Platonic ideas or of Aristotelian forms. > > The system of al-Ghazali is not without ambiguities, for it hesitates between adopting a dualist vision > of the world that would oppose the sensible world to the intelligible world, and affirming a vision > closer to Plotinian Neoplatonism based upon a hierarchy with three degrees of hypostases. > Nevertheless there exists an important difference between the system of al-Ghazali and that of > Plotinus (204-270) — for al-Ghazali the three degrees of reality are directly willed into being by God > Who remains exterior to the system. In his system, one cannot say of Malakut or of Jabarut that one > Henri Corbin, “Histoire de la philosophie islamique,” 1964, pp. 253, 259. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > leads to the other or that there exists a relationship of causality between them. Hence al-Ghazali saw > very well that a system of hypostases in which one was engendered by the other was incompatible > with the fundamentals of Islam. (We will find a similar critique of Plotinian Neoplatonism in the > “Tafsir” of ‘Abdu’l-Baha.) This conviction leads al-Ghazali to split the functions of the suprasensible > world between two worlds, and to make of Jabarut an intermediary world between the sensible world > and the world of intelligible realities, and calls this latter world Malakut. The Jabarut of Ghazali is > located in the same onto-cosmological position as the Imaginal World in the later systems of the > Islamic mystics and philosophers. It is the later authors who tend towards gnosticism and pantheism, > and in particular the Sufis and other adepts of existential monism (wah.dat al-wujuud), who will situate > Jabarut above Malakut in order to give this onto-cosmological scheme the allure with which it is > associated in the Islamic literature of the 18th and 19th centuries. Seeking to delineate the function of > Jabarut, al-Ghazali writes: > > “The negation which you oppose to the world of Malakut is analogous to that which the > sumaniyya (atheists) oppose to that of sovereignty (Jabarut). They have limited consciousness to > the findings of the five senses; they have thus negated the existence of power, of will and of > knowledge”177 > > Elsewhere, he adds this commentary: > > “The limits of the world of sovereignty (Jabarut) are found between two worlds in such > fashion that it seems to be part of the world of the reign (Mulk); also it has been regarded as > part of the eternal power in the world of the Kingdom (Malakut).”178 > > The “Treatise of the Tabernacle of Lights” (Mishkat al-Anwar), representing without doubt a less > advanced stage in the thought of al-Ghazali, gives more evidence of the sensible-intelligible duality, > however it still indicates that the assimilation of Malakut to the world of Platonic ideas and to the > Imaginal World is already clearly realized. Al-Ghazali writes: > > “Know that the world is double: a spiritual world and a corporeal world or, if you prefer, > intelligible and sensible, or rather superior and inferior. All these expressions are about > equivalent...Often also one is called world of the divine sovereignty (Mulk), and of the visible, > and the other the world of the invisible (ghayb) and of the celestial kingdom (Malakut)...But the > sensible world is a point of application in order to elevate oneself towards the intelligible > world. If between the two there were no links and correspondences, the rising path would be > closed. And if that were not possible, it would thus be impossible to approach the presence of > the Lord and to become closer to God...The divine mercy has caused there to be a > homologic relation between the visible world (Mulk) and that of the celestial kingdom > (Malakut). Consequently, there is nothing in the first which is not a symbol (mithal; that is to > say an archetypal image) of something in the second. It could be that one and the same thing > is the symbol of several things in the world of Malakut, and inversely a single thing of Malakut > can be represented by several things in the visible world. One thing is the symbol of another > if it represents that other by virtue of a certain similitude and if it corresponds to it by virtue > > Al-Ghazali, “Ihya,” IV. 218. > Ibid., I.168. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > of a certain correlation. To enumerate these symbols would require the exhaustive study of > all the beings found in the two worlds; the forces of man would not suffice for this...”179 > > Al-Ghazali is, after al-Makki, the first to set forth an onto-cosmological (or cosmo-ontological, it is a > question of nuance) system of the worlds of God. For the first time, this theory is articulated with a > certain coherency; yet without always clearly resolving all the problems which it poses. One of these > problems resides in the concept of an intercourse between the two worlds, sensible and intelligible. > Many authors were tempted to imagine an intermediary world between these two, and for certain > among them this would be “the Imaginal World” ('alam al-mithal), while for others it would be, as we > will see with the Shaykhi School, the “world of Huqalya”. Al-Ghazali also seems to have been the > first thinker to link the problem of the world of the Platonic ideas to the Aramaic-Arab lexicon of the > divine worlds. It is for this reason that he and al-Makki should be regarded as the fathers of all the > later developments of this theory. > > Was this an original theory? It seems very probable that this idea was already in formation in the > Muslim world and that al-Makki and al-Ghazali did but formalize and clarify the ideas already in > circulation. The text cited above shows without doubt that the passage of the double polarity > Malakut-Jabarut and Nasut-Lahut to a system with three degrees was already operating. This could > not have happened without the influence of the famous “Theology of Aristotle” and other > Neoplatonic texts. It is thus that the environment in which these texts were accessible that research > into the origins of these ideas should be pursued. > > 5. The contribution of al-Suhrawardi > > After al-Ghazali, the next important step in our study is to consider the work of al-Suhrawardi > (Shaykh Ishraq). This might be considered to be paradoxical inasmuch as the theoretical > contribution of al-Suhrawardi to the concept of the five worlds is quite marginal, and represents > somewhat of a retreat in comparison to Ghazali. But al-Suhrawardi was not a theoretical > philosopher but rather a great mystic, and so his contribution is thus situated in another domain. > > One could say that the entire work of al-Suhrawardi is an effort to synthesize philosophy and > mysticism, and to generate a synthesis in which the mystical experience dominates. When he > explains his project, al-Suhrawardi declares himself convinced that the philosophers of ancient > Greece, the Magi of Persia and the Prophets of the Sacred Books derived their inspiration from the > same source, the famous “Niche of Lights” (Mishkat al-Anwar)180, and he therefore affirms that there > is an accord and a hidden harmony between their doctrines181. Al-Suhrawardi attempted to give > expression to his conviction by borrowing a portion of his terminology from the philosophers as well > as using a mass of images, symbols and parables derived from the ancient reserves of the Zoroastrian > religion. But above all the work of al-Suhrawardi is that of a poet who derives his motive force from > the power of the symbols he manipulates and the collective archetypes he invokes, bringing thereby > > Al-Ghazali, “Le Tabernacle des lumieres,” trad. Roger Deladriere, Paris, 1981, pp. 64-65. > Deladriere translates the expression “Mishkat al-anwar” by “Taberacle of lights” which is certainly more > elegant than “Niche of lights”; but in speech the word “Mishka” designates a place serving to lodge a lamp in > a wall. > We see here the great dependency of al-Suhrawardi upon al-Ghazali. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > into a fusion the fundamental myths of humanity. > > This quality of al-Suhrawardi's assured its success. It contributed to the establishment of a series of > literary and mystical themes that then became part of the collective patrimony of Persian culture, > and fixed a defined vocabulary which became that of most philosophy in Persia. These themes and > this vocabulary is part of the heritage of Baha’u’llah. He in fact deliberately foreswore the abstract > vocabulary of the Peripatetic philosophers and adopted the poetic vocabulary of the Ishraqiyyun > (followers of Shaykh Ishraq). However, one must not interpret the philosophy of Baha’u’llah in a > Suhrawardian manner. Baha’u’llah utilizes this vocabulary in a purely metaphorical fashion. > Notwithstanding this, Baha’is must recognize this heritage in Baha’u’llah's writings, and its lineage of > transmission ending in Shaykh Ahmad and Siyyid Kazim – which began in al-Suhrawardi. > > For the generations that would follow him, al-Suhrawardi became “the Guide of Malakut”. It was he > who sought to determine how the world of intelligible realities can encounter the sensible world and > how man can elevate himself from one world towards the other. However, if al-Suhrawardi wrote > abundantly about Malakut, we did not develop a global theory of the divine worlds. The reason for > this is doubtless because the work of Shaykh Ishraq was principally the product of his intuition. > Questions in abstract metaphysics did not interest him at all. As for his metaphysics, the Shaykh on > the whole accepted the philosophy of Ibn Sina, with its procession of six Intelligences, probably > because this was the philosophy that was the most universally admitted in his time. Upon this, he > superimposed the theory of the divine worlds which existed at the time, that is to say limited to the > three worlds. One might think that it was in al-Makki that al-Suhrawardi discovered the articulation > of this theory, for he cites this author182. One thus finds in al-Suhrawardi on the one hand the > couple Lahut-Nasut employed in a way very similar to that of al-Hallaj, and on the other hand the > three divine worlds — Mulk, Jabarut and Malakut — in a formulation very close to that of al-Ghazali > which must derive from al-Makki, but which had been considerably enriched by the speculations of > the mystic environments in which this theory must have been very popular, for al-Suhrawardi > employs it as if it were well known to his public. > > Regarding the first couple, Lahut-Nasut, al-Suhrawardi writes that the soul has torn itself from the > sensible world in order to rise to the heights of the mystical consciousness: “It passed through the > paths of the human condition (Nasut), and it attained to the habitation of the divine condition > (Lahut).”183 > > We see here that in a very classical manner Nasut and Lahut are contrasted; but nevertheless the > world of Lahut is not closed to the human soul and it is able to penetrate therein. This is one of the > rare examples in which the thought of the Shaykh was open to the possibility of a human > participation in the divine. > > As for the three worlds also cited, al-Suhrawardi writes: > > “According to the philosophers the universes are three in number: the world of the > Treatise of the tongue of the ants (Risalih-yi Lughat-i-muran), in “L'archange empourpre,” translated by > Henri Corbin, p. 422. We will abbreviate this reference henceforth by “Archange” followed by the page > number. > Epistle of the high towers (Risalatu'l-abraj) in “L'archange,” p. 350. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Intelligences, and that is the world of Jabarut; the world of Souls, and that is Malakut; the > world of Mulk, and that is the domain of material bodies.”184 > > In “the Book of the Temples of Light” (Kitab Hayakil al-Nur), al-Suhrawardi tried to reconcile this > conception of the three divine worlds with the Neoplatonic philosophy of Ibn Sina. He wrote: > > “Know that the divine worlds are three in number, according to the philosophers: “There is > a world which the philosophers call world of Intelligence ('alam al-'aql, the Neoplatonic > Nous). The word Intelligence in their lexical technique designates all substance (every > substantial being) that cannot be the object of an indication perceptible by the senses, and > which has not exercised action upon the body. There is the world of the Soul ('alam al-nafs). > While the thinking soul is neither a body nor corporeal, nor provided with a sensible spatial > dimension, it must exercise its action in the world of bodies. The thinking souls are > distributed among those who have to exercise their action in the sidereal regions (les Animae > caelestis motrices des spheres), and those who exercise their action for the human kind (les > Animae humanae). There is the world of the body ('alam al-jism) which is distributed into an > etheric world (athiri, the sidereal world) and the world of the elements ('unsuri).”185 > > In his “Book of the Verb of Sufism” (Kitab Kalimat al-Tasawuf), al-Suhrawardi draws closer links > between the two systems and gives a resume of the hierarchy of the worlds: > > “There is the world of Intelligence ('aql) and it is Jabarut. There is the world of the Soul (nafs) and of > the Verb (Kalima) and it is the world of Malakut. There is the visible material world (Mulk), which > obeys the Soul, this one [obeys] Intelligence, this one [obeys] its principle (Mubdi')”186 > > There would be much to write in order to give a thorough exegesis of these citations, and this is > unfortunately impossible in the narrow framework which we have fixed for ourselves. However, > what is important here, is less the theory of the divine worlds than the exploration of Malakut and > Jabarut in which the Shaykh was engaged, for al-Suhrawardi had difficulty distinguishing between > these two worlds. The only innovation which he seems to have introduced was in making Malakut > the domain of the soul and Jabarut the domain of Intelligence. Even this distinction is directly > derived from a Neoplatonic approach to the problem and represents nothing entirely original. > Malakut and Jabarut appear to the eyes of the soul, he says in the “Book of the Temples of Light”, like > twins187. > > This confusion has no importance, for what interests al-Suhrawardi is not the ontological scheme, > but rather the development of a theory of visionary knowledge founded upon the Imaginal World. > This theory would become a classic, and even if it was left to the later philosophers to enrich and > develop it, all the credit returns to al-Suhrawardi. > > It is not easy to determine if al-Suhrawardi places the Imaginal World ('alam al-mithal) in Malakut or > > The symbol of the faith of the philosophers (Risalat fi i'tiqad al-hukama), in “L'archange,” p. 22. > “L'archange,” pp. 51-52. > Ibid., p. 165. > Ibid., p. 63. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > in Jabarut, or rather if this Imaginal World encompasses these two at the same time or if it is separate > from them. This question greatly troubled later commentators such as Ghiyathu'd-Din Shirazi, who, > commenting on one of the passages which we have cited, believes it necessary to explain that the > worlds are four in number, that so as to include the Imaginal World, for one must distinguish “the > world of Intelligences...the world of bodies which encompasses the spheres and the elements which > that which they include, the world of Souls...the Imaginal World ('alam al-mithal wa al'khayal) > designated as barzakh (the between-two, the inter-world) and that the philosophers also designate as > the world of appearing Forms (ashbah mujarrada), a world to which the ancient philosophers already > refer.”188 > > Authors argued about this for a long time, and the same questions rose again to the surface with > Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i, and discover him trying to determine where the Imaginal World is situated. > In our judgment, the problem is insoluble in the framework of Avicennian Neoplatonism, and even > in Platonism in a general sense, because of certain irreducible axioms from which this theory is > composed. We will ultimately discuss the manner in which Baha’u’llah resolves the problem, by > completely transforming the nature of the intelligible realities (haqa'iq). In fact, in al-Suhrawardi, > Malakut progressively absorbed the Imaginal World. > > Malakut is the world of spiritual realities, and these realities are not abstract; rather they are angelic > realities which, reflecting themselves in the soul of the contemplative, determine a spiritual state > which results in a transubstantiation of his whole being and to an expansion of interior space in > which the imaginative faculty is deployed. In its capacity as interior space, Malakut is the domain of > the events of the soul, events which have nothing to do with the events of the world or of > consciousness. In its capacity as ontological sphere, Malakut is the domain of the universal Soul and > of the human soul that is related to it. The primordial question for al-Suhrawardi is thus not so > much to explain the relations of the sphere of Malakut with inferior or superior spheres, but rather to > find a practical way which would permit the human soul to elevate itself from the sensible world to > Malakut. This is possible through actualizing in the soul an angelic state (malakiyya) thereby > permitting it to have access to the contemplation of superior realities. The acquisition of this angelic > state is at the same time the result of a cultivated asceticism, and the fruit of a gnosis. This gnosis > results as much from a teaching as from a putting into practice a theory of the faculties of the soul, > the methods of their control and their deployment, and awareness of the different types and modes > of knowledge which are the fruits thereof. > > The theory of the contemplative knowledge of al-Suhrawardi is founded upon five faculties of the > soul — the faculty of discernment (hiss-i-mushtarik), which certain ones referring to this old Christian > scholasticism call the sensorium; the representative imagination (khayal); the cogitative faculty > (fikriyya; mufakira); the estimative faculty189; [and the memory190]. > > Ibid., pp. 78-79. > The Book of the Temples of Light, in “L'archange,” p. 44 > Translator’s Note: ‘Abdu’l-Bahá repeats this same set of powers of the soul in “Some Answered Questions” > (LVI, pp. 245-246): “ Man has likewise a number of spiritual powers: [2]the power of imagination, which > forms a mental image of things; [3]thought, which reflects upon the realities of things; > [4]comprehension, which understands these realities; [5]and memory, which retains whatever man has > imagined, thought, and understood. The intermediary between these five outward powers and the > inward powers is a [1]common faculty, a sense which mediates between them and which conveys to the > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > The theory of the active Imagination goes back to Ibn Sina and has a complex family tree. Ibn Sina > based himself upon the “De Anima” of Aristotle (384-322 BCE) and upon the interpretation of > “Stragite” by Abu al-Nasr al-Farabi (870-950) in a Neoplatonic context which in its turn borrowed > from the “Theology of Pseudo-Aristotle” as well as from Porphyry (232/3-305) and from diverse > Neoplatonic authors for which Arabic translations began to become available at this epoch. Al- > Suhrawardi simplified this theory of the active Imagination and adapted it to his concepts of the > Imaginal World and Malakut. This Suhrawardian meeting between a metaphysical theory of the > divine worlds and a noetic theory of mystical intuition is fundamental for the subsequent > development of Persian philosophy. It opens the way to a hermeneutical interpretation of exegesis > and of theology, but at the same time it closes the way to the maintenance of a relationship of > complementarity between the physical and the metaphysical, between a mystical theosophy and a > true philosophy of nature. It is this last point that will be implicitly criticized by Baha’u’llah, as we > will see. > > The discriminating faculty, or sensorium, is for al-Suhrawardi the faculty which establishes the > synthesis of the findings of the senses and which permits contemplation of the forms which one sees > in dreaming. It is the “synaisthesis” or the “aistherion koinion” of Greek philosophy of which Aristotle > tells us that is it an incorporeal sense which is the organ of the spiritual body191. The representative > imagination (khayal), adds al-Suhrawardi, is simply the theorization of the sensorium which is the > intellectual organ capable of saving the forms (suwar) after they have disappeared from the external > senses. The cogitative faculty is the active imagination that perceives the realities beyond all > solicitation of the external senses by the direct and intuitive contemplation of the realities of the > Imaginal World which projects its vision in the sensorium. The estimating faculty is the faculty of > pure imagination, which is controlled neither by the intellect, nor by the cogitative faculty. It is this > that eventually fails us, be it in negating the perception of the senses, be it in negating the perception > of the active imagination. Finally comes memory, which permits us to keep the souvenir both of > external and internal sensations. > > We recognize that in this scheme the only thing which truly interests the Shaykh, is the active > imagination which gives access to the Imaginal World. Thereafter, al-Suhrawardi will demonstrate > the need of the seeker for truth to relieve himself of this encumbering apparatus and he will explain > that the estimating faculty, the active and the passive imagination, are one and the same thing. The > definition of the active imagination will open the way to the exploration of Malakut. It is the only > human attribute that will interest the philosophers of the Ishraqi School. It is upon this point that > there exists a fundamental divergence between the Ishraqiyyun and the Baha’is. > > As we see it, al-Suhrawardi turned his back to pure metaphysical speculation about ontological > > inward powers whatever the outward powers have perceived. It is termed the common faculty as it is > shared in common between the outward and inward powers.” > ‘Abdu’l-Bahá speaks in the same sense in “Some Answered Questions” (LVI, pp. 245-246) of the > “discriminating faculty” (hiss-i-mushtarik) which the translator has rendered literally as “common faculty”. > The function of this is to establish the link between the perceptions of the senses and the intellectual faculties > including the imaginative faculty. There is obviously a reconciliation to be made between the exposition of > al-Suhrawardi and the Chapter of “Some Answered Questions” which is devoted to this question. Like > Henri Corbin we prefer to revive the Aristotelian vocabulary which permits us to make the unknown known > and shows that these developments are far from being foreign to the Western tradition. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > questions, in order to transform the theory of the divine worlds into a psychological theory of > knowledge. We find a certain echo of this method in the “Tablet of All Food” of Baha’u’llah when > he declares that the word “food” has a meaning in relation to each of the divine worlds. > > Al-Suhrawardi moves in the direction of simplification. One thing alone interests him — the > perception of the Imaginal World. He did not preoccupy himself therefore with philosophical > coherency and his doctrine is characterized in great part by imprecision, and sometimes by > incoherency. But notwithstanding this it would know have an extraordinary success and for several > reasons. The first is because Ithna 'Ashari (Twelver Imami) Shi'ism would make it theirs, for it > facilitates the development of its metaphysic of the hidden Imam. The second reason is that it > furnishes a theoretical framework for the lovers of mystical experiences. The third is that al- > Suhrawardi develops a symbolic framework for the Imaginal World which served as a common > reservoir for all Persian thinkers who come after him. We find numerous echoes of his symbolism in > the work of Baha’u’llah. Al-Suhrawardi identified the Holy Spirit with the Tenth Intelligence of Ibn > Sina or the angel Sorush of the Zend Avesta. He revived Zoroastrian angelology, making of > Bahman (Avestan: Vohu Manah, one of the archangels Amahraspand) the angel of Jabarut and the > first of the Intelligences. He described Malakut, as the “Na-koja-Abad”, the Land of Not-where, the > “U-topos”. He symbolized the meeting of the soul with the spiritual realities by the mountain of Qaf, > the point at which the soul can lose itself in contemplation, Qaf being identical in his concept to > Mount Sinai. He also made Malakut the fortified city of the soul (Shahristan), the oratory of the > personal angel. Meditation in Malakut confers the light of Glory, the “Khvarnah” the particular > charisma which the royal dignity conferred upon the just kings of ancient Persia. > > Al-Suhrawardi establishes in this way a series of correspondences between themes from diverse > origins, Zoroastrian included, and the concepts of Muslim theology. This gives to his thought a great > spiritual openness and inclines it towards a certain universalism. The great philosophical project of > al-Suhrawardi was to unite the sciences of the Qur'an and its theology to the wisdom of ancient > Persia and to Greek philosophy. This great project remained the unrealized dream of all Persian > philosophy. Its realization was prevented by the irreducibility of certain fundamental concepts of > Islamic theology which lose all operational value when recast in the framework of Ibn Sina's > Neoplatonism. The assignment of a role to the Platonic Intelligences inevitably resulted in the ruin > of Islamic theology and the impossibility of constructing a theology of the divine Verb. It was > because he was conscious of this problem that al-Suhrawardi sought to interpret the hierarchy of > Intelligences in terms of the angelic hierarchy. His epoch was still too marked by the influence of al- > Farabi, Ibn Sina and al-Ghazali, for him to be able to divest himself of the prevailing Greco-Islamic > eclecticism so as to return either to true Platonism, or to true Aristotelianism, which would have > been the only way to resolve his dilemma. This critique does not detract at all from the value of his > philosophical project. It has taken a certain blindness on the part of Orientalists not to see that > Baha’u’llah is the only direct heir to this project. His theory of “progressive Revelation” furnishes > the only philosophical framework in which one can reinterpret the entirety of the message of > Zoroaster on the same footing as the teaching of the Qur'an. No Muslim would have dared to go so > far. From another angle, Baha’u’llah establishes the basis of a new metaphysic which, while being a > philosophy of emanation, and thus a philosophy grounded in a reinterpretation of Plato and > Aristotle, is nonetheless a philosophy which has broken every link of dependency towards that Greek > heritage. Indeed, Greek philosophy is assigned a new place in the panorama of human history and > its value is thus clearly recognized. The Baha’i philosophical project goes even beyond this, for it > aspires to effect the synthesis of all these wisdoms, and proclaims that all the virtualities of the > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > message of Baha’u’llah cannot be known until every people reinterprets its own tradition in the new > light of this universal teaching, in order that each may then bring its contribution to the edification > of a global civilization which is truly universal in its values. > > 6. Ibn al-'Arabi > > If al-Suhrawardi is the Persian theoretician par excellence of the Imaginal World and of visionary > knowledge, we must not forget that the theme had already been developed by Ibn Sina and by other > Muslim thinkers. Al-Suhrawardi remains in the framework of “orthodox” thought, notwithstanding > his condemnation to death by a college of jurists in Aleppo who branded him as a heretic for having > affirmed that God can raise up a Prophet whensoever He wishes and by thereby calling into > question the doctrine that Muhammad was the last of the divine messengers — a theme that is > found at the heart of the message of the Bab. Other thinkers were not so “orthodox” as al- > Suhrawardi, for they would adopt the theory of the Imaginal World to their pantheistic conceptions > (wah.dat al-wujuud), and among these Muhyi'd-Din Ibn al-'Arabi (1165-1240) is the most eminent > representative.xiii The movement of “wah.dat al-wujuud” is nevertheless important for it will nourish > the speculations of the greater part of the Sufi schools. > > Ibn al-'Arabi writes in his “Book of the Meccan Victories” (Al-Futuuh.aat al-Makkiyya) that the mystic, > in order to arrive at the contemplation of intelligible realities, must retire from this world so as to > remove from his soul the images of this sensible world, for the spiritual images can not be reflected > above the images of the inferior worlds: > > “Thus, the spiritual voyager aspires to retreat and to make mention (adhkar) of God through > the praise of him 'in the hands of whom is found sovereignty'. So, when the soul is found > purified and the veils of nature which interposed between it and the spiritual world (Malakut) > are lifted, all the sciences engraved in the forms of the world of worlds will come to be > reflected in the mirror of the soul.”192 > > Ibn al-'Arabi occupies a central place in the history of Muslim mysticism. From the very fact that he > was a mystic and not a philosopher, his doctrine is difficult to interpret, and one must always take > care to distinguish his teaching from the doctrines of those who refer to him. To attempt to go into > these problems more deeply, and notably those which his ontology poses, would sidetrack us > significantly, so we will content ourselves with a brief reference. The teaching of Ibn 'Arabi > impregnated a good part of Persian philosophy and contributed in a significant manner to the > formation of its vocabulary. The attitude of Baha’u’llah to this heritage is complex and merits being > studied closely. The vocabulary of Ibn 'Arabi certainly leaves a trace in the work of Baha’u’llah. This > was inevitable because Baha’u’llah was in contact with numerous Sufis who were inspired by the > teaching of Ibn 'Arabi and who posed numerous questions about this teaching to Baha’u’llah. We > recall that while Baha’u’llah was in retreat amongst the mountains near Sulaymaniyyih in > Kurdistan, he spent numerous weeks with a Sufi hermitage revealing a commentary upon the most > important work of Ibn 'Arabi, “The Meccan Victories”. Apparently, his interpretation pleased and > did not shock his audience. On the other hand, Baha’u’llah energetically condemned the > fundamental theses of existential monism in a number of his letter, including, with exquisite tact, in > Ibn 'Arabi, “Futuhat al-makkiya,” II, 48, 20; and II, 129, 19. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > “The Seven Valleys” [Haft Vadi]. The relationship between the philosophy of Ibn 'Arabi and > development of that philosophy by subsequent writers is extremely complex, for one must take note > of numerous direct and indirect commentators, such as Mulla Sadra and Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i, > who sometimes diverge profoundly amongst themselves. > > 7. Jabarut as the world of decree > > A century after Ibn al-'Arabi, Kamalu'd-Din 'Abdu'r-Razzaq al-Kashani, in his “Treatise on > Destiny” sought to comprehend the distinction between Jabarut and Malakut which had often been > blurred by earlier writers. He made of Jabarut the world of the divine decrees (qada) and the sphere in > which the creation is entirely determined by God. Jabarut is the world of pure spirit totally distinct > from Malakut which is the world of the soul. From the world of Jabarut emanates a compelling force > that governs creation. The Ishraqi philosophers were to assimilate this force to the “victorious lights” > (al-anwar al-qahira) which are the archangelic lights of al-Suhrawardi. From al-Kashani onwards a > new conceptualization was elaborated which returned to the ontological problems al-Suhrawardi > had abandoned. > > Al-Jurjani (died 1413) made of Jabarut the world of the divine names and attributes, functions that > would later be transferred to Lahut. This transfer took place when Lahut ceased being identified as the > world of the pure essence upon the delegation of its characteristics to Hahut, thereby making Lahut > available to receive the divine attributes in their deployment from the essence. > > It is interesting to note that the contribution of al-Kashani is an important link that leads to the > metaphysic of Baha’u’llah, who likewise represents Jabarut as the world of decree, and in an > imperative theology, describing every world as representative of a type of decree, occupies an > important place in the presentation of his metaphysic, as we will see in the following chapter. > > 8. Malakut as angelic world > > Another modification in the system of the divine worlds which was produced in this epoch was the > progressive transformation of Malakut, from a world of the spirit (ruh), to a world of the > contemplative soul, to a world of angels arbitrating the spiritual pleroma of the hierarchy of spiritual > creatures and finally even to a world of the souls of the just. The conceptualization of Malakut as an > angelic world was without doubt produced because of a new understanding of the origin of the word > once the awareness of its Aramaic origin had been lost. We have already found numerous traces of > this new understanding in the authors which we have already cited. Many authors believed that > Malakut came from Malak which signifies “angel”. This other meaning comes from the fact that > Arabic words are all derived from three-letter roots. Mulk as we have seen comes from the root MLK > which we also find in Malakut, malik (king), mamlaka (country), and so forth. The Arabic dictionaries > attach malak (angel) to the same root for the reason that the root of malak is MLK. However, this is > only a sameness in appearance, for there are two roots MLK which have two completely different > origins. One comes from Arabic and expresses possession, domination and sovereignty, and the > other comes from Hebrew and signifies messenger. Malak is one of the numerous Quranic terms > which were directly borrowed from Hebrew, and malak before meaning “angel” meant “envoy”. > The famous angels of Genesis who married the daughters of men were simply divine envoys, that is > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > to say, the elect. Malakah signifies “mission” in Hebrew. From this etymological confusion was born > the idea that Malakut is the world of angels193. The theme was further developed in the course of the > centuries. > > Having arrived at this point, we see that we have surveyed all of the themes related to the question > of the divine worlds such as we find them in the writings of Baha’u’llah. From this point of view, > Baha’u’llah seems to attach value to a long tradition by organizing it, giving it a new internal > coherence and a new interpretation. > > 9. The School of Isfahan > > After al-Jurjani and al-Kashani we are tempted to pass over a few centuries and arrive directly at > Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i and the Shaykhi School. This jump could be explained by the fact that this > system of the divine worlds is not enriched by a single new element except for the introduction of > Hahut at the summit of the construction, at a date which we have not been able to precisely fix, but > which is perhaps situated in the course of the 18th century. The developments of the School of > Isfahan were often of a speculative character and had but little influence upon the tradition to which > Baha’u’llah referred. > > If we were to effect this jump, we would make a blind alley of the School of Isfahan, and we might > would be justified in doing so, with regard to the aim we are pursuing, and considering the > mediocrity of its contribution, notwithstanding what certain authors have written on the subject. > The School of Isfahan did no more than take up again the theories of Ibn Sina, al-Suhrawardi and > Ibn al-'Arabi in giving them new elaborations marked by the Ithna 'Ashari Shi'i doctrine. To this > School are attached the names of Mir Ghiyathu'd-Din, Mansur Shirazi, Mir Damad, Mulla Sadra > Shirazi, Mulla Rajab, 'Ali Tabrizi, Siyyid Ahmad 'Alavi, Mulla Khalil Ghazvini, Muhsin-i-Fayd, > 'Abdu'r-Razzaq Lahiji, Qadi Sa'id Qumi and many others of lesser importance. These authors who > lived in the 17th and 18th centuries formed Persian Shi'i culture and stamped upon its theology an > imprint from which it has yet to detach itself. > > The School of Isfahan does not interest us here except to the extent that it collected in an onto- > cosmological manner the theories of al-Suhrawardi and Ibn al-'Arabi upon the Imaginal World and > visionary knowledge. That which characterizes this School, is not so much its doctrine, as its > inclination for the visionary narrative which became a distinct literary and philosophical genre. All > of these authors were ecstatics. Almost all were blessed with visions in which the secrets of the other > world were revealed to them. These visions permitted them to closely associate with the Prophet > Muhammad, his daughter Fatima, the twelve Imams and the companions of the Prophet and to be > instructed by them personally in the inner true doctrine of Islam. While it is undeniable that some of > these authors were sincere reporters of authentic visions, they nevertheless created a precedent > which would give rise to numerous emulators. From the 18th century onwards, the most effective > way of deciding a theological debate was not through the articulation of a decisive argument, but by > relating a dream or a vision that invoked the authority of the hidden Imam. This inclination was > conducive to the worst excesses imaginable, for charlatans and mystifiers were legion. In many > > From whence the error, in our judgment, of the English translator of the “Seven Valleys” who renders > Malakut with “Kingdom of the angels”. Cf. “The Seven Valleys,” p. 25; “Les Sept Vallees,” trad. fr., p. 27. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > regards the Writings of Baha’u’llah are written in response to these excesses. > > The authors of the School of Isfahan did not differ amongst themselves except upon subtle nuances. > This basic agreement impelled them to take up untiringly the same premises, to develop their theory > of Malakut and of the Imaginal World in a systematic manner, and to extent their ontological > reasonings to extremes of all sorts. Their method of reasoning was to become of formidable > complexity. We will give but a couple of examples. > > For Mir Damad, Malakut contains the forms and images of all that exists, that is to say: > > “the primordial existences and the existences engaged in what is to become, divine and > natural, celestial, perennial and temporal; and the people of infidelity and those of the Faith, > and the notions of Unconsciousness and, those of Islam; those which come from in front, > those which fall behind; those which precede, and those which succeed, in the centuries of > the centuries of the past and of the future. Briefly, the monads of the coalescences of the > possible, and the atoms of the existing universes, all in totality, in all their sides.”194 > > We could cite many other texts which would enable us to enter into the arcanities of the School of > Isfahan, but we will cite but one other example taken from a later author, Qadi Sa'id Qumi (1633- > 1691). In his “Commentary on the tradition of the cloud” (Shahr-i hadith-i al-ghamama), Sa'id Qumi > distinguishes three ontological degrees (hadrat): first, the world of the invisible ('alam al-ghayb) which is > the suprasensible world; second, the world of sensible perception ('alam al-shahada); and a third world > born of the coalescence of these two worlds which he calls the world of the imaginative perceptions > ('alam al-khayal) which is nothing other than the Imaginal World hypostasized and considered as an > intermediate sphere between the sensible and the intelligible. The world of the imaginative > perceptions is Malakut or the door of Malakut; for in fact, either there exist various kinds of Malakut, > or Malakut represents an intermediate sphere where the existing realities are hierarchically > organized. There is the Malakut of the vegetable world, then the Malakut of the animal world, then > the Malakut of the human reality which recapitulates in itself the three preceding degrees, for in man > there exists a Malakut of the vegetable life and of the animal life to which is added the Malakut of the > soul endowed with reason which permits man to elevate himself towards the intellectual realities. > This is not the ratiocinating reason that differentiates man from the animal, but the imaginative > faculty with which his soul is endowed which permits him to penetrate the world of the intelligible > realities. The word Malakut corresponds here to what ‘Abdu’l-Baha calls spirit (ruh). > > Qumi thinks that man, having a spiritual dimension, possesses a “subtle body” which corresponds to > his dimension in Malakut. He calls it also “the Malakuti body”, and describes it as an intelligence > living in a subtle time and space which is different from the time [and space] of the sensible world. > The world of visions is thus a world of subtle bodies. It is only by means of the subtle body that the > Imams can manifest themselves to men. Malakut becomes in this way “the subtle dimension” of the > sensible realities. There is thus a Malakut for each kind of sensible reality and each Malakut is > governed by an angel which is the spirit of that reality. Corbin continues with the views of Sa'id > Qumi: > > Henri Corbin, “En islam iranien,” tome IV, p. 45. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > “a)there is a being of the Malakut which is the lord of the exoteric of the Earth (Kalimat > ardiyya); b)there is a being of the Malakut which is the lord of the esoteric of the Earth; he > designates it as Angel or Verb of the Malakut of the Earth (Kalimat Malakutiyya); c)below the > one and the other, there is the lord Jabarut and Lahut of the earth (that is to say the Earth at > the level of the cherubic Intelligences and at level of the divine Names; he designates it as > Logos or divine Verb (Kalimat ilahiyya). Under the authority of the Angel of Malakut or > esoteric of the Earth is found the metaphysical reality of time, and it is by this Angel that the > involution of the time of our chronology is produced.”195 > > If we wished to make explicit the theory of Malakut of Qadi Sa'id Qumi, his thought becomes so > complex that a single book would not suffice. His understanding of the hierarchies recalls that of > Proclus (410-485). We have not wished here to give more than a foretaste in order to permit the > reader to appreciate and begin to comprehend the subtlety of the metaphysics taught in the time of > Baha’u’llah. This permits us to better grasp what is original in his thought and how it breaks with > tradition. The theoretical simplicity of his writings is certainly in reaction to the philosophical > doctrines of his time. > > 10. Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i > > Before returning to the work of Baha’u’llah, it is left for us to take one last step in preparation which > is represented by the work of Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i. This one is considered as one of the two > precursors to the revelation of the Bab. Baha’u’llah, in his “Book of Certitude” (Kitab-i-Iqan) renders > him homage, even qualifying his inspiration as divine. > > Before explaining the doctrine of Shaykh Ahmad upon the divine worlds, we must first address a > certain number of ambiguities. Henri Corbin has negated with much insistence all kinship between > Shaykhism and Babism and even more strongly any kinship between Shaykh Ahmad and the Baha’i > Faith. If he was speaking of the Shaykhi school of Kirman, which was opposed by the way to the less > numerous [school] of Tabriz, he had good reason to insist upon this point. The modern Shaykhis > were profoundly reformed by Haji Mirza Karim Khan-i-Kirmani after the death of Siyyid Kazim > Rashti, the immediate successor to Shaykh Ahmad. For the Baha’is, there is no doubt that Karim > Khan considerably distanced himself from the message of the founders of the Shaykhi School. The > history of the Shaykhi School traces its gradual absorption into the bosom of Shi'i orthodoxy in the > 20th century. In 1950, the fundamentalist leader Falsafi, who agitated against the Baha’is with the > support of the army as with that of the government, brought about a great “witch-hunt” against all > ideological deviations from the Ithna 'Ashari Shi'i norm. He addressed twenty-five questions to the > head of the Shaykhi School who replied in a treatise entitled “Risalih-yi falsafiyyih” in so orthodox a > manner that Falsafi could only be astonished at why the Shaykhis insisted upon being designated by > a different name from their fellow Shi'is. This is an indication of how far they had come on the road > of accommodation from the theological audacities of Shaykh Ahmad which scandalized his > contemporaries.196 > > Ibid., tome IV, p. 161. > Moojan Momen, “An Introduction to Shi'i Islam,” Oxford, 1985, pp. 222, 225-231. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > If we wish to evaluate the relationship between the present-day Shaykhi doctrine with the Baha’i > teachings, we will discover that there exists between the two doctrines a certain opposition. But how > it is with the writings of the founders? The Baha’is give a reading of the writings of Shaykh Ahmad > and Siyyid Kazim which reconcile them considerably to the writings of the Bab. But, this reading > was not inherent in the Shaykhi School. It was transmitted to them as an heritage by the first Babis, > the greater part of which were former Shaykhis who had received the teaching of Shaykh Ahmad > from the very mouth of Siyyid Kazim. He who today reads the treatises of Shaykh Ahmad might > well have the impression that in form and spirit they are written in a very different manner from the > writings of the Bab, but nonetheless, he would discover numerous themes in common. This does not > indicate, as some have written, that Baha’is today affirm that the two doctrines are identical. That > would be absurd, and indeed if it were so, from a Baha’i point of view, what would have been the > purpose of the Bab's ministry if the Shaykhis had already said everything he wanted to say? Actually > there are fundamental divergences between the two which we would do well to recognize. > Nevertheless, these divergences are perhaps less important than some believe. For this there are two > reasons: The first is that the doctrine of Shaykh Ahmad can receive several interpretations. One of > these interpretations is that which wishes to conform to orthodoxy, for one must not forget that the > Shaykh was menaced with persecutions his whole life long and that because of this he was > constrained to practice what the Shi'is call taqiyyih or kitman, which is to say a mental restriction or > pious dissimulation, permitting one to profess in public the contrary from what one teaches in > private. The responses of Shaykh Ahmad to the attacks of the 'ulama' of Qazvin when he visited that > town show that the Shaykh willingly practiced this pious dissimulation.197 Also, Shaykh Ahmad > himself attests that his written teaching is incomprehensible if one does not have access to his oral > teaching and if one does not understand the particular meaning which he gives to the usual > philosophical expressions. The problem is this, that this oral teaching is lost. Nobody today possesses > the key, and to reconstitute this key would necessitate long and patient research, if this could be > accomplished at all. The second reason is that one can interpret the doctrine of the Shaykh as an > enterprise in the deconstruction of Shi'i dogma opening the way to the theological revolution of the > Bab. It is arguably with this aim that the Shaykh negates the reality of the dogma of the physical > resurrection of the dead. He would empty it of all traditional significances in saying that this > resurrection must be limited to a symbolic subtle body. This greatly facilitated the introduction of > the doctrine of the Bab who reduces the resurrection to an event produced in the soul of the > believer. This is but one example.198 > The Bab, and Bahá’u’lláh after him, forbade this practice of pious dissimulation with the aim of protecting > one's life or one's tranquillity. For example, in one of his letters, Bahá’u’lláh wrote: “In this Day, We can > neither approve the conduct of the fearful that seeketh to dissemble his faith, nor sanction the behavior of > the avowed believer that clamorously asserteth his allegiance to this Cause. Both should observe the dictates > of wisdom, and strive diligently to serve the best interests of the Cause.” (GL, CLXIV, p. 343) > When I found myself in Iran in 1977 and 1978, I had occasion to frequent Shaykhi communities at some > length. At the request of Dr. Bahmayar, I translated a little book of Shaykh Ibrahimi, the last Shaykh who > issued from the lineage of Karim Khan-i-Kirmani, entitled “Nazar bar qarn-i-bistum” (View of the Twentieth > Century). I was thus able to experience firsthand that there is no longer much separating the modern > Shaykhis from orthodox Shi'is. The writings of Shaykh Ahmad and Siyyid Kazim are practically unknown > to them, even if their memory continues to be the object of veneration. Henri Corbin has unfortunately > been abused upon many points by Shaykh Ibrahimi. Dr. Bahmanyar was among those who thought that > the Bahá’ís had calumniated Shaykh Ahmad in ascribing to him their doctrine under the pretext that his > doctrines resembled the teachings of Bahá’u’lláh. It seems that this is the reason why the Shaykhi hierarchy > formally discourages the reading of the writings of Shaykh Ahmad and Siyyid Kazim except those who first > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > We recognize that there are important differences between the doctrine of the Shaykh and the > message of the Bab, but we must also recognize that the Shaykh prepared a vast public to accept the > doctrine of the Bab. To those who would wish to oppose their own interpretations of the writings of > the Shaykh to its function of spiritual parentage, we contrast its historical impact. In depth > sociological studies have shown that the great majority of the first Babis were of Shaykhi origin and > many of these were numbered among the closest disciples of the Shaykhs199. If they accepted with > such enthusiasm the message of the Bab, surely we can surmise that this was because that message > was perfectly consistent with the teaching they had received from the Shaykhs, even if the contents > and the spirit were not totally identical. > > We do not claim here to sort out this complex question, and perhaps future publications will permit > us to return to it in detail. > > Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i on the one hand took up the development of the doctrine of the intermediate > world (barzakh), the Imaginal World ('alam al-mithal) and Malakut, in giving it a new orientation. On > the other hand, he elaborated his doctrine of an intermediary world which he calls Huqalya, a term > which he borrows from the Sabean religion and the etymology of which is uncertain. The word does > not appear to be of Semitic origin and must go back to an old Sumerian or Mesopotamian > substratus which is lost in the night of time. In the “Jawami' al-Kalim” he writes: > > “As for the word Hurqalya, the significance relates to another world. That which is > designated by this word, is the world of barzakh (interworld); there is in effect the inferior > world, the terrestrial world; it is the world of the material bodies constituted of Elements, the > world visible to the senses. And there is the world of Souls, which is the intermediary world > between the visible material world ('alam al-mulk) and the world of Malakut in another > universe. It is another Material world. Otherwise said, the world of the bodies composed of > elements constitutes that which we call the visible material world. The world of Huqalya, this > is another material world (world of a material of subtle state).”200 > > Shaykh Ahmad situates Barzakh between Malakut and the world of Muluk. If there is the employment > of the term Huqalya it is because this intermediary world has a complex geography which responds > above all to the preoccupations imposed by the architecture of its metaphysical and ontological > theory. Shaykh Ahmad has written regarding this complex geography: > > “The term Huqalya is employed to designate the heavens of this intermediary world. Jabalqa > is a city of the Orient (this is a metaphysical orient), that is to say from the side of the return > and the result...the world of Malakut is constituted of substances and of beings separated from > matter, even as our visible physical world is constituted of material realities. It is necessary > that between the two worlds there is an intermediary, a barzakh, that is to say a world the > > become well versed in the writings of the more recent Shaykhs under the direction of Shaykh Ibrahimi > himself. > Abbas Amanat, “Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Bábí Movement in Iran, 1844-1850,” > Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989, pp. 261-273, 275-284. > Extract from “Risalat al-Qatifiyya” published in the collection of the works of Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i entitled > “Jawami' al-Kalim,” Tabriz, 1273 A.H., volume I, 3rd part, 9th risalat, pp. 153-154; translated by Henri > Corbin in “Terre celeste et corps de resurrection,” p. 294. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > state of which is not the absolutely subtle state of the separated substances, nor the opaque > density of the material things of our world. Without this universe, the gradation of being > world make a jump, there would be a hiatus.”201 > > Many others have made use of the theory of the divine worlds as a hermeneutical key to expand the > repertoire of their exegetical figures. But the originality of Shaykh Ahmad resides in the fact that he > used this cosmo-ontological theory as a hermeneutical process applied to eschatology, and more > particularly to the question of the resurrection. This hermeneutical employment of a cosmo- > ontological theory gives a preview of the method of Baha’u’llah in the “Tablet of All Food.” > > According to Shaykh Ahmad, man possesses four bodies, which are associated with one another. > These bodies represent the different ontological dimensions of man. > > First is the physical body (jasad) which represents the world of Mulk. Associated with this physical > body is a subtle body that represents the dimension of the body in the world of Huqalya. Shaykh > Ahmad tells us that this body is imperishable and that it lives on “in the tomb” until the day of > resurrection. > > With these two bodies (jasad) are associated two other bodies (jism). The first jism is the astral body of > Huqalya. It is composed of the substance of Huqalya. It is this which serves as the vehicle of the spirit, > but it is not spirit. It is a sort of support for the second body. It plays in relation to the second jism the > same role that the physical body plays in relation to the subtle body. Its habitation is barzakh. Finally > comes the archetypal body whose habitation is the Imaginal World. > > At the moment of resurrection, Shaykh Ahmad tells us, only the subtle body that lives on in the > tomb is reborn. The process of rebirth is effected through its reunion with the archetypal body. > > One can see in this theory a way of resolving the difficulties pertaining to the resurrection of the > flesh. This was what Shaykh Ahmad said to those detractors who accused him of purely and simply > denying the resurrection. But, innumerable elements indicate that the Master had two doctrines — > an exoteric one destined for the orthodox theologians, and an esoteric one reserved for his faithful > disciples. For the former, he maintained that his doctrine was no more than a different way of > speaking about the resurrection. For the latter, he explained that the resurrection was an interior > event in the life of the soul, and that this interior event would be the fate of those alone who would > live to witness the parousia of the Imam. This is confirmed for us by the “doctrine of the tomb”. The > doctrine of the tomb of Shaykh Ahmad has two meanings. When he says that the subtle body lives > on like a trace in the tomb, in appearance he appears to grant a concession to the orthodox > theologians. But for his followers, who understand the technical meaning that he gives to the word > “tomb”, it is recognized that he completely empties out all the Islamic traits of the theological > concept of the resurrection. In his “Risalat al-qatifiyya”, he writes that, far from designating the place > in which the physical body is buried, “the tomb signifies the nature of the person, his life, his most > intimate desire.” Later he adds: > > “Expressions such as that 'the Spirit will return to man (who is in the tomb)' are expressions > which correspond to the apparent or the exoteric meaning. In reality, this refers to events > Ibid., pp. 295-296. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > which are not accomplished in the inferior world, that of the objective thing, but at the most > elevated level among the degrees of time, that is to say in Huqalya. And if I say 'at the most > elevated level', 'at the highest of the degrees of time', it is because Huqalya is a between two > (barzakh). Sometimes one employs it to designate the highest degree of time > (zaman),sometimes one employs it to designate the inferior level or degree of eternity > (dahr).”202 > > The Bab does not say anything substantially different when he affirms that “for every spirit there is a > tomb which is predestined for him according to the limitations of his rank”203, that is to say that the > tomb is nothing other than the physical and psychical person that is not reborn through the power > of revelation. Later he adds: “The tomb in which all will be questioned is in this world of > contingency.”204 > > We thus see that for Shaykh Ahmad the ontological questions are secondary. That which counts, is > that the believer prepared himself for the parousia in renouncing the old Muslim myths, so as to > prepare himself for an event which, if it takes place in the interior of his soul, no less so has an > historical dimension. What was the reality of the Huqalya for him? One could be tempted to think > that it is but a commodity of language that served to justify theological audacities. > > The work of Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i, as also that of Siyyid Kazim Rashti is extremely rich upon the > ontological question of the divine worlds. One would have to effect a global study of his metaphysic > and especially to precisely determine his terminology in order to definitely determine the points of > contact between the Shaykhi writings and those of the Bab and Baha’u’llah. There is no doubt that, > putting aside his theory of subtle bodies and of the world of Huqalya, the esoteric purpose of which > we have succinctly described, in certain ways the Malakut of Shaykh Ahmad prefigures the Kingdom > of Abha in the Baha’i writings. We also find a kinship between the theories of the Shaykh and the > “Commentary on the Hidden Treasure” (Tafsir-i-Kuntu kanzan) of ‘Abdu’l-Baha which we will > discuss in depth in Chapter XVI. > > Shaykh Ahmad in his commentary upon the “Book of Metaphysical Penetrations” (Kitab al-Masha'ir) > of Mulla Sadra gave a definition of Malakut very close to that which is found in the writings of > Baha’u’llah. Shaykh Ahmad writes: > > “Almost always, when the philosophers employ the word Malakut, they mean by this the > world of the souls ('alam al-nufus), that is to say the world of the entities separated from the > elementary matter and from chronological duration (muddat zamaniyya), but not from form, > because their forms and faces are analogous to those of the visible world through the senses > ('alam al-shahada).205 But it also happens that the word is employed to designate in general > fashion the hegemony of things (zimam; literally “guide,” “reign”) because of which these > things continue to exist, as in the Quranic verse (sic): 'Ask them in whose hands is the Malakut > > Ibid., pp. 292-293. > “Bayan-i-farsi,” Vahid II, Bab 9; translated by A.L.M. Nicolas, “Le Beyan Persan,” Paris: Librairie > Geuthner, 1911, tome I, p. 88. Translator’s Note: French rendered into English by yours truly. > Ibid., p. 89. > It is what we call elsewhere the sensible world. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > of all things, He Who protects and Who needs no protection”206 And in this Malakut are the > suprasensible realities of things (haqa'iq al-ashya al-ghaybiyya).”207 > > Here, Corbin translated haqa'iq (plural of haqiqa) with “suprasensible realities”. The Baha’i writings > generally translates this word by “spiritual realities”, or by “essences”. “Essence” would seem to be > an appropriate word if one takes care not to project upon it notions inherited from Aristotle, from > the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages, or even from the metaphysics of the 20th century. Thus for > Shaykh Ahmad as for ‘Abdu’l-Baha in his “Tafsir,” Malakut is the world of the “spiritual realities” > (haqa'iq). Does this term represent the Platonic Idea or the Aristotelian Form? Certainly not in the > case of ‘Abdu’l-Baha. It can not refer to the Aristotelian Form because the existence of this Form is > purely rational. It consists of an abstract entity that can not be separated from matter except to exist > in itself in the course of being in action, which seems to be impossible. However, for Shaykh Ahmad > matter is not a being in action as believed by the Peripatetics208. It is also not a Platonic Idea because > the Platonic Idea does not multiply itself in order to exist individually in the reality of things. The > Idea is a universal from which the existence of the particular beings derives. But, for Shaykh > Ahmad, the realities of Malakut are clearly individualities. They are simply the spiritual realities that > are the counterpart at the level of Malakut of the terrestrial realities. Every terrestrial reality, or every > sensible reality, has its counterpart in Malakut which is in some way its image (Baha’u’llah will invert > the metaphor in explaining that the sensible realities are the projected dimension of the spiritual > realities). The sensible realities are hierarchically submitted to the spiritual realities; it is they which > govern them, and because of this Shaykh Ahmad says that Malakut constitutes the reins (zimam) of > the physical world, which Corbin translates by “hegemony” alluding to the Stoic concept of > “hegemonikon”. The action of God is thus directly upon the spiritual realities. > > In another passage, closer in sensibility to Ibn 'Arabi, the Shaykh lightly distances himself from this > interpretation. He writes: > > “The 'urafa209 most often employ the word Malakut for the world of the souls. As in the case > of Jabarut, most employ the word to designate the world of the pure intelligences210. Certain > ones however employ it to designate the ensemble of Mulk (the visible world) and Malakut. > There are some who inverse this and who put Malakut above Jabarut. Often in the Qur'an > (sic) and in the traditions [hadith], the word Malakut is employed to signify the malakut (the > hegemony) of a thing, because of which this thing lives. For the author211 it signifies the > intelligent agent ('aql fa'al), that is to say the God by Whom creation is created (al-Haqq al- > > Quran 23:90. The English translation cited here is derived from the French of Corbin, quoted by the > author. The Arabic original is as follows: Surat al-mu'minun (Surah of the faithful): qul man biyadihi malakUtu kulli > shay'in wa huwa yujiyru wa lA yujAru 'alayhi... > Text translated and cited by Henri Corbin in “Le Livre des Penetrations Mystiques,” of Mulla Sadra > Shirazi, Paris, 1988, p. 175, note 1. Translator’s Note: French rendered into English by yours truly. > In a text that we will study in the following Chapter we see the great Bahá’í commentator and philosopher > Ishraq-Khavari giving an interpretation of Malakut which is altogether Peripatetic. For reasons which we will > develop, this does not appear to us to conform to the thought of Bahá’u’lláh. > That is to say the mystics who possess gnosis (ma'rifat). > This is thus a Neoplatonic gnosis such as that found in Ibn Sina. > This is Mulla Sadra whom Shaykh Ahmad is in the midst of discussing. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > makhluqbihi).”212 > > Mulla Sadra, whom Shaykh Ahmad comments upon without contradiction, believed that God first > created the spiritual realities and that it was from this first creation that secondarily flowed the > existence of the sensible realities. It is interesting to note that the expression borrowed from Ibn al- > 'Arabi is here completed turned away from its original meaning. It seems that for Ibn al-'Arabi the > term “the God by Whom and from Whom the creation is created” implied a certain pantheism if > one admits that “al-Haqq” (the absolute reality) designates God; and this is how Henri Corbin > translates the expression, thus indicating a counter meaning. For we see Mulla Sadra and Shaykh > Ahmad identify “al-Haqq” with the Intelligent Agent, that is to say the first emanation of God213. We > can not fail to think here of the “Most Great Spirit” of which Baha’u’llah speaks in “The Surah of > the Temple” (Suriy-i-Haykal) which he describes as the true generative agent of creation and the > first divine emanation. Nevertheless, the intentions of Shaykh Ahmad are often ambiguous and the > impression remains that he does not reveal the depth of his thought. Furthermore, Shaykh Ahmad > often kept his distance from the 'urafa, the mystics and the philosophers, including Ibn al-'Arabi and > Mulla Sadra. In particular, he explained why he could not adhere to the doctrine of existential > monism (wah.dat al-wujud) of Ibn al-'Arabi. Shaykh Ahmad explains that he doubts that one can > speak in the same fashion of the absolute reality (al-Haqq), which is an absolute being (wujuud mutlaq), > and of the creation (khalq). He establishes a distinction between the being which is adventitious, > which has come to the world and which depends upon states (ahwal), and the absolute eternal and > non-contingent being. > > Human experience is limited to the adventitious being that corresponds to the created world. About > the absolute being (wujuud al-Haqq) one can speak only in an apophatic manner in saying what “is > not” without being able to say what “is”. Baha’u’llah would not disagree. > > “Le Livre des Penetrations Mystiques,” op. cit., p. 19. The expression “al-Haqq al-makhluq bihi” is borrowed > from the vocabulary of Ibn 'Arabi. > He it is Who created the heavens and the earth by Haqq, the day in which He said “be!”, and it was. His > speech is Haqq; to Him belongs the physical world (mulk), the day in which He will breathe in the trumpet. > He it is Who knows the invisible and the visible (al-ghayb wa'l-shuhud). He is the Wise, the Informed.” This is > clearly a translation of Qur'an 6:73, Surat al-an'am (Surah of the cattle): wa huwa'l-ladhiy khalaqa'sh-shumawati > wa'l-arDa bi'l-haqqi wa yawma yaquwlu kun fayakuwnu qawluhu'l-lhaqqu wa lahu'l-mulku yawma yunfakhu fi's-suwri > 'alimu'l-ghaybi wa'sh-shahAdati wa huwa'l-hakiymu'l-khabiyru. Another vocalization of the verse permits one to > read: “the day in which He breathes in the trumpet of the world of the invisible and the visible.” We will > develop this notion of the invisible and the visible in the following Chapter. The commentators often > translate the word “haqq” by “truth”, which gives “He it is Who created the heavens and the earth by the > truth”, or as suggests Kasimirski “by a true creation”. However the philosophers and the mystics have given > the word “haqq” in this verse a much larger meaning. They considered that “haqq” was the instrument > which God made use of in order to bring the world into being or to organize the cosmos and they identified > “haqq” with the Intelligent agent ('aql fa'al) or to the First emanation. We find the same expression in three > other verses of the Qur'an: 15:85; 39:5; 46:3. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > CHAPTER FIVE: > THE DIVINE WORLDS IN THE WORK OF BAHA’U’LLAH > > 1. Hermeneutical aspects > > If we have taken the trouble to retrace the entire history of the doctrine of the spiritual worlds in > Islam, particularly in the School of Isfahan and in the Shaykhi School, and at the risk of distracting > the reader and of losing sight of the Baha’i texts, it is not out of a simple concern to be > comprehensive in scope, but rather to represent the large lines of the historical development of this > spiritual terminology. It seemed important to us that the reader take notice of the intellectual world > in which Baha’u’llah lived. Persian society was a organism impregnated with the sacred in which > metaphysical and ontological problems constituted the very basis of its religious culture. For > centuries, theories, increasingly complex, progressively sophisticated, were created to explain these > problems. These theories, the fruits of a long tradition inherited from the Hellenistic world, served as > the basis for new metaphysical investigations founded upon logical reasonings fairly similar to those > present in Western scholasticism. To the degree that confidence in reason was lost, increasing > reliance was placed upon intuition. Every “doctor” produced his own system, each one more > complex than its predecessor, with no other concern than for the internal coherency of that theory. > Each system was susceptible to admitting numerous variations and nuances, and these variations > and nuances became, in the theological schools, the subject of unending discussions. > > The aim of this enterprise was no longer to arrive at a global explanation of the universe and of > divine Revelation, but rather to produce an exegesis which presented itself as a true theosophy to > such a degree that the link between its hermeneutic of Revelation and the sensible world was > ruptured. Esotericism made the exoteric disappear. The abusive usage of metaphysical imagination > had destroyed the basis of reason. The sciences of nature had totally disappeared, replaced by vague > superstitions. There no longer existed any operational representation of nature, even though we > know that such a representation constitutes a fundamental element in every theosophy. Even > medicine, which originally had been one of the most advanced in the world, had disappeared in its > scientific form. The brief specimens of these philosophical discussions which we have furnished to > the reader in the preceding chapter no doubt seemed foreign to him. An abyss now separates the > man of the twentieth century from the “doctors” of the School of Isfahan or even the “masters” of > the Shaykhi School. It is necessary to take the measure of this abyss in order to understand the > original, nay the revolutionary character of the thought of Baha’u’llah, which will restore the > philosophy of nature and the search for the fundamental reality of the universe to the body of mystic > thought and spiritual hermeneutic. > > Whenever Baha’u’llah takes up the mystical language of the Arabo-Persian tradition it is always in a > metaphorical sense and not in order to approve the dogmas which were generated therefrom. This > is the case with all the vocabulary of the Ishraqi theophany, such as ishraq (auroral light), mashriq > (orient, dawn), tajalli (radiance, effulgence, emanation), zuhur (manifestation, appearance), mazhar > (place of manifestation), ufuq (horizons), and so forth. These words are, in the work of Baha’u’llah, > redirected from their original meaning to express new ideas in the midst of a philosophy that denies > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > all dogmatism and all systematic philosophical theorization. It is in the spirit of this transformation > that we must examine the role and the place of the terminology of the divine worlds in the work of > Baha’u’llah. > > It is also important to emphasize that Baha’u’llah broke with the entire philosophical tradition of > Islam. He rejects the ontology of Ibn Sina which furnished that tradition with its principal structure > over the course of several centuries. He repudiates the theory of the creative Imagination which Ibn > Sina, Ibn al-'Arabi and al-Suhrawardi developed. He also rejects existential monism which, since al- > Hallaj, seemed to be the only form of thought definitely opposed to Islamic orthodoxy. He dares to > affirm the eternity of the creation and reduces to allegorical symbols the greater part of the Quranic > dogmas, including the resurrection, the final judgment, the appearance face to face with God, the > angels, the Imams, and so on. The profundity of his thought manifests itself above all in its limpidity > which contrasts it with the extreme sophistication of the thought systems of his time. > > One does not find in the work of Baha’u’llah a single exposition sui generis of an ontological or > metaphysical theory. This does not mean to say that Baha’u’llah did not have any conception of his > own in this domain. But this conception is implicit. The only way to rediscover it is to become > impregnated with his work, to study it deeply and to meditate thereon. Then abysses of wisdom > reveal themselves. This refusal of all theorization by Baha’u’llah is fundamental. The Manifestations > of God do not come to construct systems. The elaboration of a knowing discourse is the province of > theologians, mystics and philosophers who follow the Manifestations in each Dispensation. > > In the Writings of Baha’u’llah, it is often necessary to compare one text with several others in order > to release the complete image of his thought. This brevity exemplifies the great reserve which > Baha’u’llah leaves to be penetrated in the case of metaphysical questions. This reserve exists for two > reasons. The first refers to the concept which Baha’u’llah has of his own mission. A Manifestation of > God is not a professor of philosophy, no more than he is a medical doctor, a biologist, a physicist or > other specialist. The Manifestation of God does not come to reveal to us the secrets of the universe, > but to give us a moral and spiritual teaching susceptible of contributing to the spiritual expansion of > man. The spiritual blooming of man is found in detachment, in the service of humanity and in > teaching the Cause of God, not in metaphysical speculation. > > However, the brevity of the discourses consecrated by Baha’u’llah to the divine worlds, and the > evident reserve with which these are treated, should not make us believe that the subject has little > importance in his eyes. He habitually employs this concise and stripped down manner of writing > which delivers only the essential. One could even say that the absence of literary ornament always > characterizes the most important passages of his writings. The “Most Holy Book” (Kitab-i-Aqdas) is > the very model of brevity and concision. The establishment of Houses of Justice, signally the > foundation of the Baha’i Administrative Order, is treated in less than three lines and none of his > essential points receives a long elaboration. > > What is fundamental in the exposition of Baha’u’llah in the “Tablet of All Food” is the link that he > establishes between the question of the divine worlds and a spiritual hermeneutic (ta'wil), in which he > indicates that a certain food (understood as spiritual in nature) corresponds to each world, and that > at the same time the word “food” itself is susceptible to receiving an interpretation particular to its > function in each of these worlds, so that in fact the term contains innumerable significances. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Hence, the importance of this hierarchy of the divine worlds does not reside in its articulation of a > metaphysical system, but rather in the key which it yields for unlocking the symbolic language of > Baha’u’llah. Their function is purely hermeneutic. In other words, and contrary to the entire > philosophical tradition of Islam, the description of these worlds does not seem to imply adherence to > the positive existence of these worlds as realities in the cosmic plan. Baha’u’llah does not say that > these five worlds objectively exist. His hermeneutical vision as developed in the “Tablet of All > Food”, is contrasted thereby to his metaphysical concept of the three worlds —World of the divine > Essence, the World of Revelation and the World of Creation. But even these three worlds are not > presented as the only accurate picture of reality but rather they function as an operational vision of > reality. > > 2. Vocabulary > > One of the best means to decipher the thought of Baha’u’llah is to proceed with a detailed study of > his vocabulary. Of course, it was impossible for us to read the whole of the work of Baha’u’llah. > Therefore we had to select a body of work to study in depth. We chose the anthology of selections > chosen by Shoghi Effendi, entitled “Munajat” in the original Arabic and “Prayers and Meditations” > in his English translation. An excellent edition of the Arabic text was published in 1981 in Rio de > Janeiro. This edition has greatly facilitated our work. These texts are particularly interesting because > they are among the most mystical from the pen of Baha’u’llah. One does not find therein any > didactic exposition, but nevertheless it is a mine of information for those examining metaphysical > questions. > > We must then ask whether the vocabulary which Baha’u’llah utilizes here is representative of the > whole of his work. It is not certain that it is, inasmuch as the greater part of these texts appear to be > dialogues between Baha’u’llah and God, and do not lend themselves to philosophical development. > However, the examination of other texts, notably “The Book of Certitude” (Kitab-i-Iqan) and the > Tablets revealed after the Kitab-i-Aqdas, has not modified the conclusions we have reached while > studying “Munajat”. > > A detailed study of the vocabulary of the divine worlds in the “Munajat” shows that the usage of these > terms is extremely complex and the following are my impressions of the full range of their meanings. > > Baha’u’llah very frequently employs the expression Malakut but this term does not have one but > rather various different meanings. We also find a very frequent employment of the pair Malakut- > Jabarut. The gathering of the four worlds of Lahut, Jabarut, Malakut, Nasut is mentioned only twice214. > Outside of these two citations, there is no other reference to Lahut or Nasut. The term Mulk is used > but rarely. > > 3. Malakut > > If we take up the citations which refer to Malakut, we find that the term appears forty-one times in an > isolated manner, in two hundred twenty-seven pages of texts. With the exception of the expressions > > “Prayers and Meditations” (henceforth abbreviated as PM), No. 38, p. 53; No. 178, p. 295. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > “Thy Malakut”215 and “Our Malakut”216, the term is always accompanied by qualifiers or > determinants. These are rarely adjectives; one finds only one example of this: “the resplendent (usna) > Malakut”. The expressions which are repeated the most frequently are “the Malakut of creation > (insha)” which is mentioned eight times and “the Malakut of names ('asma')” which is mentioned seven > times. For all the other expressions, which are sixteen in number, one finds only one or two > examples for each. This variety of usage shows the refusal of Baha’u’llah to utilize stereotypical > expressions, and contradicts the impression of certain Western readers who find his writings very > repetitive. In fact, repetitions are very rare and one finds on the contrary a great wealth of > verbalizations. We find expressions which are Quranic remembrances, such as “the Malakut of the > earth and the heavens” (al-ard wa'l-samawat)217; “the Malakut of the domain of the earth and the > heavens” (Malakut mulk al-ard wa'l-samawat)218; “the Malakut of all things (kullu shay)”219; “the Malakut > of Thy Revelation [or of Thy Cause or of Thy Command (amrika)]”220, with variations such as “the > Makakut of Thy Revelation and of Thy sovereignty” (amrika was sultanika)221 and “ the Malakut of Thy > Revelation and Thy creation” (amrika wa khalqika)222. There are other expressions, such as “the > Malakut of existence (wujud)”223; “the Malakut of bounties [or of gifts (ahsan)]”224; “the Malakut of Thy > proximity (ghurbika)”225; “the Malakut of the visible and the invisible (al-ghayb wa'l-shuhud)”226; “the > eternal Malakut (Malakut-i-baqa)”227; “the Malakut of Thy exposition (bayanika)”228; “the Malakut of Thy > signs [or of Thy verses (ayyatika)]”229; “the Malakut of Thy Beauty (Jamal)”230; and “the Malakut of > Thine irrevocable decree (qada)”231. > “Munajat,” No. 38, p. 41; English: PM, No. 38, p. 49. “Munajat,” No. 172, p. 134. > “Munajat,” No. 77, pp. 88-89. “Munajat,” No. 172, p. 181. > “Munajat,” No. 14, p. 17; English: PM, No. 14, p. 17. Shoghi Effendi gives the following translation: > “Glorified be Thy name, Thou in Whose hands are the kingdom of earth and heaven.” > “Munajat,” No. 75, p. 86; English: PM, No. 75, p. 123. “Munajat,” No. 80, p. 92; English: PM, No. 80, p. > 133. > “Munajat,” No. 97, p. 111; English: PM, No. 97, p. 163. Shoghi Effendi translates this as: “the empire of all > things.” > “Munajat,” No. 129, p. 146; English: PM, No. 129, p. 217. Shoghi Effendi translates by “the kingdom of > Thy Cause”. “Amr” can have three meanings. > “Munajat,” No. 38, p. 39; English: PM, No. 38, p. 50. Shoghi Effendi translates this as: “the kingdom of > Thy revelation and Thy sovereignty.” > “Munajat,” No. 179, p. 202; English: PM, No. 179, p. 302. > “Munajat,” No. 16, p. 18; English: PM, No. 16, p. 19. Shoghi Effendi translates: “the empire of all things”. > “Munajat,” No. 62, p. 72; English: PM, No. 62, p. 99. Shoghi Effendi translates this as: “the source of all > gifts”. > “Munajat,” No. 31, p. 30. > “Munajat,” No. 38, p. 41; English: PM, No. 38, p. 54. Shoghi Effendi translates this as: “the visible and > invisible kingdoms”. > “Munajat,” No. 173, p. 178. Unusual to this collection of writings, this is a text in Persian. “Baqa” can be > understood be it as an adjective or be it as a substantive. > “Munajat,” No. 176, p. 181, 182. > “Munajat,” No. 176, p. 185. > “Munajat,” No. 177, p. 192. > “Munajat,” No. 96, n.p.; English: PM, No. 96, p. 161. Shoghi Effendi translates this as: “the Kingdom of > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > 4. The Kingdom of creation > > Among all these terms, the one which is repeated the most frequently, is that of the “Kingdom of > creation (Malakut al-insha)”. “Insha” is one of the words which Baha’u’llah utilizes for creation (the > others being “ikhtira”, “ibda”, “khalq”, “sun'“ and “ijad”)232. The term is sometimes rendered into > English by Shoghi Effendi by the word “invention”233. In certain cases, this word designates the > lower, terrestrial world. This is the case when Baha’u’llah writes, speaking of himself: > > “No sooner had He proclaimed Thy Cause, and risen up to carry out the things > prescribed unto Him in the Tablets of Thy decree, than the Great Terror (al-faza al-akbar) > fell upon Thy creatures (bariyyatika). Some turned towards Thee, and detached themselves > from all except Thee, and sanctified their souls from the world ('an ma 'ala ard) and all that > is therein, and were so enravished by the sweetness of Thy voice that they forsook all > Thou hadst created in the kingdom of Thy creation(Malakut al-insha).”234 > > In this case, Malakut al-insha is clearly a synonym of Mulk or of Nasut. It thus denotes the physical and > sensible world. In other cases, Malakut al-insha has a much more immaterial meaning which Shoghi > Effendi renders by “Kingdom of invention”. Insha in this case does not refer to the sensible world, but to > a state in which the cosmos exists upon a level different from the physical world. It is another > ontological sphere that one could, perhaps, reconcile with the Imaginal World. Everything that > exists in creation, be it in the physical world or in the spiritual worlds, exists in the World of Insha, > but this is an existence ontologically different from sensible or even spiritual existence. Perhaps one > could speak of virtual existence; perhaps one could even speak of virtual existence in the thought of > God or in a world of pure thought. > > An example of the immaterial character of the World of Insha is given us by the following citation: > > “I implore Thee, O Thou Who causest the dawn to appear, by Thy Lamp which Thou > didst light with the fire of Thy love before all that are in heaven and on earth, and whose > flame Thou feedest with the fuel of Thy wisdom in the kingdom of Thy creation (Malakut al- > insha)...”235 > > In another text the World of Insha designates all the spiritual favors which man can have at his > command: > > “Hold Thou Thy creatures, O my God, with the hands of Thy grace, and make Thou > known unto them what is best for them of all the things that have been created in the > kingdom of Thine invention. (Malakut al-insha)”236 > > Thine irrevocable decree”. > Note creation. > Translator’s Note: PM, No. 152, p. 244; No. 80, p. 133. > Translator’s Note: PM, No. 61, p. 97. > “Munajat,” No. 28, p. 27; English: PM, No. 28, pp. 32-33. > 236PM, No. 27, p. 31. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > 5. The Kingdom of Names > > Another important expression is that of the Kingdom of Names (Malakut al-'asma'). In the work of > Baha’u’llah there exists a veritable theology of the divine Names which deserves profound study and > the waters of which we may only dip into in this context. The divine Name (ism; plural asma) is in > fact an attribute (s.ifa), which is distinct from the divine Essence. The divine Names are collectively > the first manifestation of God, and it is through them, and because of them, that all contingent > existence was created. Even as the Holy Spirit represents the active force of creation, they represent > the passive force. The Holy Spirit is the agency of cause, while the Names are the efficient cause. For > example, Love is the manifestation of one of the Names of God, for it is by the Love that God had > for His own Essence that the Love of His manifestation was engendered, and from the Love of His > manifestation was engendered the Love of His creation. We understand that Love is the cause of > creation, but it is not the acting instrumental force.237 It is the same for the Beauty of God. > However, in reality, all of these explanations are born of the limitations of the human spirit. The > distinction of the divine attributes from the divine Essence proceeds from a primary illusion. Every > divine Name contains in itself all the other divine Names, and therefore, to distinguish the divine > Names from each other is a second illusion. To wish to distinguish the passive force of the Names > from the active force of the divine Verb or Holy Spirit is a third illusion. These illusions are > nevertheless necessary in order to apprehend the inapprehendable. > > The Kingdom of Names, is not a world distinct from the other divine worlds; it is a world which > manifests itself within all the divine worlds from the sphere of Lahut to the sphere of Nasut. The > divine Names are not just the efficient cause of creation, they constitute, in a certain fashion, the > ultimate reality of the universe, and the very foundation of the cosmos. Every thing, every being, is a > reflection, even far-off, of the divine Names. If something ceased to reflect these Names, even to the > slightest degree, it would immediately cease to exist. > > Upon the level of Lahut, the divine Names are identified with the Verb (Kalimat), with the Primal Will > (mashiyyat-i-avvaliyyih) and with the Holy Spirit (ruh). In the lower worlds, the supreme manifestation > of the divine Names is the divine Manifestation, that is to say the soul of the Prophet. Baha’u’llah > tells us for example that his name is “the name of Him round Whom circleth in adoration the > kingdom of Thy names”238. This means that the particular name which is in question, the name > which remains unnamed, but which in other Tablets he designates by the name of Baha', is > considered upon the ontological level in which it exists to be in total union with the divine Essence. > It is because this Name exists upon this level of undifferentiated union that it reflects the totality of > the divine perfections and that thus the individualized manifestations of these Names are totally > subordinated thereto. This ontological level we have described in Chapter Two as the state of > Jabarut. The name of Baha' in this state does not designate the actual identity of an individual, but, > rather the name which the Prophet assumes as the Alpha and Omega, as the Spirit united to the > divine Essence in communion with all the other Manifestations and one in being with them. > > The Kingdom of Names is also manifested to men in the Word of the divine Manifestation, not > > On the different kinds of love, see “The Seven Valleys”, p. 25; and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, “Paris Talks,” pp. 179- > 181 (4 January 1913). > “Munajat,” No. 71, p. 83; English: PM, No. 71, p. 117. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > merely in the words nor even in the phrases, but in the Revelation (wahy), that is to say in the innate > knowledge of the divine Manifestations. It is for this reason that each Name plays an essential role in > creation. For example, if the manifestation of Oneness were to diminish, the world would perish. > Thus Baha’u’llah writes: > > “I recognize, moreover, that were any of the revelations (zuhurat) of Thy names and Thine > attributes to be withheld, though it be the weight of a grain of mustard seed, from > whatsoever hath been created by Thy power and begotten by Thy might, the foundations of > Thine everlasting handiwork (sun') would thereby be made incomplete, and the gems > (jawhar) of Thy Divine wisdom would become imperfect.”239 > > The equilibrium of the divine Names, such as Justice and Mercy for example, assure the equilibrium > of the world. Every Name is reflected in all the degrees of being, which is why there exists a Malakut > of each Name, and it is for this reason that Baha’u’llah speaks for example of the Malakut of Beauty. > Baha’u’llah says: > > “I testify that through Him the Pen of the Most High was set in motion, and with His > remembrance (dhikrihi) the Scriptures (lawh) in the kingdom of names were embellished.”240 > > The “Scriptures” here referred to are not, it seems to us, the Holy Books in their terrestrial version, > but more likely, the “Mother-Book,” “the preserved Tablet” (al-lawh al-mahfuz), the celestial > prototype of all the Books, the matrix from which all the revelations originated. > > In a lower ontological level, the divine Manifestations appear in their differentiated states. Thus > Baha’u’llah writes: > > “No sooner had Thy most sweet voice been raised, than all the inmates of the Kingdom of > Names and the Concourse on high were stirred up.”241 > > The Kingdom of Names here designates the habitation of the souls of the Prophets, who are > distinguished from the Concourse on high representing the martyrs and the saints. We are at this > point in the sphere properly denominated Malakut. > > In the world of man, the Kingdom of Names and attributes manifests itself in human qualities. > These qualities are but the reflection of the divine qualities in man. In the state of potentiality, they > represent “the divine bestowal”. The aim of terrestrial existence is to develop these qualities and thus > to permit the Kingdom of Names to manifest itself through us. In one of his Tablets, Baha’u’llah > explains that an excessive attachment to the “names” can become an obstacle to spiritual > development.242 This is the case of a person who has arrived at developing in himself a divine > quality such as benevolence for example; this man can take a liking to becoming a manifestation of > benevolence, he can come to enjoy it as he would a pleasure. He becomes attached to benevolence > > “Munajat,” No. 184, p. 218; English: PM, No. 184, p. 325. > “Munajat,” No. 31, p. 30; English: PM, No. 31, p. 37. > “Munajat,” No. 176, p. 180; English: PM, No. 176, p. 268. > “MA,” volume IV, p. 26. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > as a good in itself. He hopes that he will be regarded as benevolent, and loves it when other persons > mention his benevolence. That is what Baha’u’llah has called “the barrier of names”. It is caused by > our forgetting that the names and qualities belong only to God. Total union with the divine will > requires the forgetfulness of all our own qualities. It is the meaning of true modesty. > > 6. The Kingdom of the visible and the invisible > > We have seen that every divine Name, every attribute, forms in itself a Malakut. Some have said that > every Name and every attribute forms a Malakut in the interior of every human being, such that > every human being has a Malakut or Malakuts which are his own. This appears in an interesting > commentary by 'Abdu'l-Hamid Ishraq-Khavari in his book “Qamus-i-Iqan”, a combination of > commentary and dictionary in Persian on the “Book of Certitude” (Kitab-i-Iqan). The commentary > was written in relation to the expression “the Kingdom of the Visible and the Invisible (Malakut-i- > ghayb va shahadat)” which is a Persian lexical variant of the Arabic expression that we have cited > earlier—”Malakut al-ghayb wa'l-shuhud”. The Persian term “shahadat” (Arabic: shahada) is an expression > which has a certain currency, in particular with al-Ghazali. The word is of typical usage among the > “mutakalimin” and the Neoplatonic philosophers and it derives from the Arabic translation of certain > Greek philosophical works. In the corpus of this Hellenistic philosophy, this word has a very > particular meaning, referring to the Platonic distinction between the “sensible (shahada, shuhud)” and > the “intelligible(ghayb)”.243 The term “ghayb” signifies “hidden, invisible or secret”. Sometimes the > World of Ghayb ('alam al-ghayb) is designated as “the world of mystery.” > > Ishraq-Khavari begins by citing the text of the “Tablet to Varqa” to which we referred earlier. He then > expands upon the meaning of the expression “Most Great Manifestation” (manzar-i-akbar), saying > that Baha’u’llah designates himself therewith. Then he defines the World of Ghayb as the world of > “Intelligences” ('uqul) and of “spiritual realities” (haqa'iq), and the world of shahadat as the world of > Nasut and the world of the “physical bodies” (jismaniyyat). The introduction of the word > “Intelligences” ('uqul) seems here doubtful inasmuch as this word does not appear in the works of > Baha’u’llah with this meaning. ‘Abdu’l-Baha speaks sometimes of “maqulih”, from the same root, > which designates either the product of human reason ('aql) or concepts apprehendable by human > reason. Ishraq-Khavari appears here to be relying upon the Muslim philosophical tradition of Ibn > Sina, which is why we approach what he has written with reserve. > > After these preliminaries, Ishraq-Khavari elaborates the idea that there exists a Malakut belonging to > each individual. It is interesting to cite in extenso this rather curious text: > > “Every human being must develop the qualities (istidad) which are deposited in his nature > (sirisht) so that they may find a way to become manifest in the World of shahadat. These > perfections, which are in limited quantity within him, form his own Malakut which must pass > through all the degrees of his development until man attains the rank of perfection (maqam-i- > > This distinction comes from the “Pseudo-Theology of Aristotle”; in reality a compilation from the > “Enneads” of Plotinus to which were added Proclusian elements which associate the change of domain to > sensible things, and immortality and permanence to intelligible realities. This distinction is not made by > Plato, who insists more upon the unity of the sensible and intelligible worlds, thus agreeing with Bahá’u’lláh > for whom the created world constitutes one reality. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > kamal) which is concealed in him (dar ghayb) as the fruit is concealed in the tree. When the > tree, before the fruit appears, finds the way of its own perfection, then the fruit passes (from > the world) of ghayb of this tree to existence. Thus, when the tree arrives at its own Malakut the > fruit passes from the ghayb to shuhud (from existence in concealment in the intelligible world > to sensible existence) and becomes thus manifest. For every individual there exists a rank of > perfection and a Malakut which is his and which was determined and fixed (by God) and > which must, by the means of the light of existence (nur-i-vujud) which is conferred ('ata) upon > it by the effusions (fayad) of the supreme reality (haqiqi) permit him to traverse progressively > the degrees (darijat) of perfection until he arrives at his Malakut which is the highest degree of > perfection which it is possible for him to attain. He must do so only within the process of his > own development and his own evolution without anything stopping him or interposing itself > between him and it, for otherwise, never will he enter into his Malakut. > > “For example, one can say that Malakut, which is the supreme degree of perfection of the > tree, consists in producing a fruit; but if the tree believes that injurious insects are attacking it, > its growth will be stopped and it will not be able to arrive at its degree of perfection which is > the production of the fruit, which is to say that it will not enter into its Malakut. Furthermore, > it can fall from the vegetable rank and descend to the rank of inorganic bodies (jamad). In the > same fashion, man in the course of his own spiritual development towards his Malakut can > follow the same path, as we can understand by analogy. If he succumbs to vices such as > envy, pride or jealousy, these vices will become like injurious insects in the wood which > ruminate and transform it into dead wood; and these regrettable vices, rather that elevating > him towards his Malakut, can make him fall from his human nature (insaniyyat) and debase > him to a rank which is no longer human, that is to say to the rank close to the animal. He > loses thus the elevated station of man and can not enter into his Malakut. To this attests a > saying of the Blessed Beauty which declares in “The Hidden Words”: > > “Know, verily, the heart wherein the least remnant of envy yet lingers, shall never attain My > everlasting dominion (jabarut), nor inhale the sweet savors of holiness breathing from My > kingdom (malakut) of sanctity.”244 Consequently, it is clear from this citation that every > individual possesses his own Malakut and that he must endeavour, from this world around > which turn all the other worlds, to purify himself from the blamable vices and from the > influence of disgraceful actions so that the injurious aggressors will be kept far away and his > tree can become green and grow to produce the fruits of human qualities (fada'il) so and that > he enters into the celestial Malakut; this Kingdom in concealment (Malakut-i-ghayb) is within > the reach of everyone. Whoever strives to attain it will enter; otherwise it will escape him. > Consider that the fruit which is the manifestation of the Malakut of the soul was in > concealment (dar ghayb) in the tree at the moment in which the tree was planted and if the > gardener had not had the knowledge and the certitude of the existence of this fruit he would > never have planted this tree...thus as the poet Mawlavi Rumi says it: > > If it was not by desire and hope of fruit > Never the gardener would plant the tree. > > “Consequently the Malakut which represents the fruit which is the degree of perfection of the > Bahá’u’lláh, Persian Hidden Words, #6. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > tree existed in the moment in which it was planted but this existence was but in capacity (dar > ghayb), and it was necessary that it traverse the steps and the specific degrees of the tree > towards the fruit so that the secret which was hidden would become manifest. So also man > must all his life make efforts to traverse the degrees of existence and to elevate himself to the > stations which Baha’u’llah has described in “The Seven Valleys” and many other books.”245 > > We have cited this text because Ishraq-Khavari has been considered one of the greatest Persian > commentators on the work of Baha’u’llah, inasmuch as his “Encyclopedia of the Book of Certitude” > (Qamus-i-Iqan) was widely read and has had a considerable influence. Nevertheless this text is very > representative of the defects of the interpretations of erudite Persians and Arabs who have never > undertaken methodical and systematic analysis of their subject. The interpretation of Ishraq- > Khavari seems to represent three major defects. First of all, the texts he cites from the work of > Baha’u’llah do not establish a strong foundation for his argument. Next, he introduces vocabulary > and concepts which are foreign to the Baha’i writings. Finally, his interpretation is not systematic > and it confuses the part with the whole. > > In support of his interpretation, Ishraq-Khavari cites only one Hidden Word, and this saying > certainly affirms that whoever succumbs to envy will not enter Malakut. When we examine the > wording, we find that Baha’u’llah actually says “Malakut-i-taqdis-i-man”, which is to say “My sanctified > Malakut”, which means that Malakut belongs only to God, Who does with it as He wishes. > Furthermore, we must not neglect the association of Malakut with Jabarut. In this case Jabarut is > clearly described as superior to Malakut. For if man can enter into Malakut, from Jabarut he can only > receive “the breezes.” These “breezes” are one of the terms which is most characteristic of the > superior Kingdoms which influence the inferior Kingdoms by emanation. What do these “breezes” > (aryah) consist of? It is they which Baha’u’llah describes as “graces” (fuyud) or “confirmations” > (ta'yidat). The term “breeze” also served to describe the prophetic inspiration which emanates from > Jabarut. In the writings of Baha’u’llah, there is a very strong link between prophetic or human > inspiration on the one hand, and grace on the other. The purpose of prayer is to attract grace and > divine confirmations, but this often will manifest itself as “an inspiration which directs the believer” > (hidayat), a technical term which is rendered in English by “guidance”, and which is translated into > French, for lack of a better term, by “direction”. > > The commentary of Ishraq-Khavari also appears to us to make use of concepts which are foreign to > the Baha’i writings. We have already pointed out the author's definition of the World of Ghayb as the > world of “Intelligences”, a concept fundamentally foreign to the thought of Baha’u’llah. We may > also wonder: what is this “light of existence” which comes to aid man to attain the rank of > perfection? Finally, the idea that there exists a Malakut for each individual is elsewhere suggested in > the thought of Shaykh Ishraq, al-Suhrawardi, and we may ask, in the absence of a larger scriptural > foundation from the Baha’i writings, to what degree Ishraq-Khavari was influenced by his cultural > past and in particular his long association with the Ishraqiyyun before his conversion to the Baha’i > Faith. > > On another point, it seems unduely limiting to assimilate the World of Ghayb to a world of potential > because the World of Ghayb includes for example Jabarut. If we define the World of Ghayb as the > world of the “spiritual realities” (haqa'iq), which seems to us the only acceptable definition, then one > Ishraq-Khavari, “Qamus-i-Iqan,” pp. 1527-1531. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > certainly cannot say that these spiritual realities are endowed only with virtual existence, that is, of > being in potential. They are much more real than that and their mode of being is not unique. We > will return in another Chapter to the nature of the spiritual realities. > > It is clear to the reader, from the contemplation of this one example, the numerous problems of > interpretation brought up by the work of Baha’u’llah. To resolve them broaches the delicate issue of > the adoption of a methodology carefully controlled by hermeneutical and philosophical definition. > Undoubtedly, the philosophical activity of the future Baha’i society will have a completely different > basis from the philosophy of today, upon which we are unfortunately still very dependent. > > What we have seen heretofore is ample evidence that the word Malakut has multiple meanings in the > work of Baha’u’llah. It is not a technical term which has one definition for all contexts and usages. > As we have seen, Baha’u’llah seems to have known all the different historical meanings of the > terminology of the divine worlds and to have made use of them all, sometimes in the very same > Tablet. Sometimes, he utilizes the word Malakut in its Quranic sense, sometimes in its Gospel > meaning; sometimes he refers to it as the intellectual world like the “mutakalimin”; sometimes he uses > it in the sense of the Imaginal World as among the Ishraqiyyun; sometimes he gives it meanings > which are his very own. This clearly denotes the refusal of Baha’u’llah to fix once and for all an > entire terminology so that it would be easy to recognize and to define. We find throughout the > length of his work semantic slidings, transformations and permutations. The rule that should guide > us in our reading is that the context illuminates the word, and the word illuminates the context. > > 7. Jabarut > > What we have said about the vocabulary of Baha’u’llah is particularly true when the word Malakut > appears alone. In this case it often has a very broad and multi-faceted meaning, as is likewise the > case when it appears in association with another word of the nomenclature of the divine worlds, > such as Jabarut for example. > > Unlike Malakut, Jabarut rarely appears alone—we find but eight examples in the “Munajat”. In most > cases, Jabarut seems to be a synonym of Malakut, and there is a simple permutation between the > words. It is thus that we find the “Jabarut of Revelation and creation” (Jabarut al-amr wa'l-khalq)246; > “Jabarut of the contingent world” (Jabarut al-imkan)247; “Jabarut of Names” (Jabarut al-asma)248. > > In other texts, Jabarut takes on a more specific meaning in association with the divine Manifestation. > In this case we come closer to its technical meaning. In a prayer Baha’u’llah describes himself as a > > “Munajat,” No. 63, p. ?; English: PM, No. 63, p. 102. Shoghi Effendi translates this as: “the realms of > revelation and of creation”. “Munajat,” No. 80, p. 93; English: PM, No. 80, p. 133. Shoghi Effendi translates > this as: “the heaven of Thy Revelation and the kingdom of Thy creation”. “Munajat,” No. 179, p. 206; > English: PM, No. 179, p. 308. Shoghi Effendi translates this as: “the kingdoms of Thy revelation and of Thy > creation”. > “Munajat,” No. 114, p. 132; English: PM, No. 114, p. 195. Shoghi Effendi translates this as: “the lordship > of all things”. > “Munajat,” No. 177, p. 194; English: PM, No. 177, p. 291. Shoghi Effendi translates this as: “the kingdom > of Thy names”. “Munajat,” No. 189, p. 126. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > prisoner and asks God to deliver him “that I may soar on the wings of detachment towards the > loftiest summits (Jabarut) of Thy creation (ikhtira').”249 In another text, He speaks of “Jabarut of > decree (qada)” which is precisely the technical meaning of Jabarut which we have described in > Chapter II. “Jabarut al-Qada”250 designates the place from which “the Celestial Dove” or “the > Heavenly Nightingale” sing their melody.251 We are thus in the world of the divine Manifestation, > and it is particularly interesting and altogether in conformity with his metaphysic that Baha’u’llah > takes up here the tradition of 'Abdu'r-Razzaq Kashani, by associating the world of decree with the > world of the Manifestation. In another text consecrated to the Bab, Baha’u’llah says: > > “I yield Thee such thanks as can cause the Nightingale of Glory ('andalib al-baha') to pour > forth its melody in the highest heaven (jabarut al-'ama)...”252 > > This is one of the numerous examples in which Baha’u’llah, in his prayers, disassociates his > terrestrial person from his Manifestation in the spiritual world, and establishes a dialogue between > himself as Manifestation in the sensible world and himself as Manifestation in the spiritual world. > Shoghi Effendi has not attempted to translate the term “'ama” which is truly difficult to render, and > which is a semi-synonym of “ghayb”, that is to say “invisible”, “intelligible” or “suprasensible”. > Notwithstanding these usages, in most cases Jabarut appears in association with Malakut and they > constitute an inseparable pair, somewhat as in the work of al-Ghazali. We find twenty-one examples > of this in the “Munajat”. > > 8. Malakut associated with Jabarut > > We can distinguish two precise usages of the pair Malakut-Jabarut. In the first usage Malakut precedes > Jabarut in the phrase and this indicates an ontological difference between the two terms, in which > Malakut is clearly an inferior sphere to Jabarut. We see an example of this in this prayer in which > Baha’u’llah says: > > “...the souls of Thy servants were stirred up in their longing for Thy Kingdom (Malakut), and > the dwellers of Thy realms253 rushed forth to enter into Thy heavenly dominion > (jabarutika).”254 > > A detailed analysis of the attributes of the pair Malakut-Jabarut might become fastidious so we will > limit ourselves to the most important facts. The attributes which characterize the first member of the > couple are all terms that we have already analyzed. For the second member, there appear only a > > “Munajat,” No. 64, p. 74; English: PM, No. 64, p. 103. > PM, No. 96, p. 161: “Malakut al-qada” with “Jabarut taqdir” > “Munajat,” No. 128 [No. 178], p. 197; English: PM, No. 178, p. 295. > “Munajat,” No. 184, p. 220; English: PM, No. 184, p. 330. > The Arabic text says: “man fi'l-bilad”, which Shoghi Effendi translates “the dwellers of Thy realms”. > “Munajat,” No. 38, p. 38; English: PM, No. 38, p. 49. “Bilad” has a very imprecise meaning in Arabic > which literally means “town,” “country,” “district”. “Jabarutika” was translated by Shoghi Effendi by “Thy > heavenly dominion”. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > very few new attributes. We find only “elevation/height” (irtifa)255, “grace” (fadl)256, “will” > (mashiyyat)257, “face/countenance” (liq)258. It appears to be difficult to find a vocabulary that is > distinctive to Jabarut. Sometimes Malakut and Jabarut seem to be nothing but synonymous terms as in > the verses: > > “...O Thou Who rulest all things, and in Whose hand is the kingdom of the entire > creation.”259 > > A literal translation would read: “O Thou between Whose hands is found the Jabarut of creation > (ibda) and the Malakut of invention (ikhtira').” As we have already seen, “ibda” and “ikhtira'“ are > almost synonymous words. > > 9. The World of Command and imperative theology > > More than through the analysis of vocabulary, it is in taking note of context that will enlighten us as > we reconstruct the function of the pair Malakut-Jabarut, and it is here that we discover most of the > characteristics of the two terms in Muslim thought. The expression which is repeated most > frequently is that of “Malakut of the heavens and of the earth” and “Jabarut of Revelation (amr) and of > creation (khalq)”260, which situates Jabarut in a more immaterial sphere than Malakut. The most > important word here is “amr” which Shoghi Effendi translates by “Revelation”. “Amr” signifies in the > first place “command” from the verb “amara”, to command. It also signifies “Cause” in the sense of > the “Cause of God”, “the affair”, “the work”. Revelation, command and Cause are related concepts > in the work of Baha’u’llah. > > The word “amr” has such an importance in the work of Baha’u’llah that one might consider that > even as a divine Name implies a veritable theology, there exists a theology of the divine Command, > which we might call imperative theology. > > The word “amr” is one of the terms of Qur'anic origin which has a rich philosophical history. The > word appears more than a hundred times in the Qur'an in various contexts. Creation results from > “Munajat,” No. 58, p. 65; English: PM, No. 58, p. 88. Shoghi Effendi translates “Jabarut al-'izza wa'l-irtifa'“ > with “the realms of loftiness and grandeur”. > “Munajat,” No. 62, p. 72; English: PM, No. 62, p. 99. Shoghi Effendi translates: “Jabarut al-fadl” as “the > heaven of Thy grace”. > “Munajat,” No. 82, p. 96; English: PM, No. 82, p. 138. Shoghi Effendi translates: “Jabarut al mashiyyat” with > “the heaven of Thy will”. > “Munajat,” No. 179, p. 202; English: PM, No. 179, p. 302. Shoghi Effendi translates: “Jabarut liqa'ika” as > “the heaven of Thy presence”. The Arabic “liqa” literally signifies “face,” “visage” from whence by > extension “to encounter face to face”. It is this term which the Qur'an employs when it affirms that one day > men will see God face to face. The Bab explained that the expression “the face of God” refers to the divine > Manifestation. > “Munajat,” No. 96, p. 110; English: PM, No. 96, p. 161. > “Munajat,” No. 28, p. 27; English: PM, No. 24, p. 32. “Munajat,” No. 31, pp. 29-30; English: PM, No. 31, > p. 36. “Munajat,” No. 63, p. 73; English: PM, No. 63, p. 102. “Munajat,” No. 176, p. 191; English: PM, No. > 176, p. 286. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > an order of God and it obeys this order. A special order was given to men261 as to the angels, to Iblis > and to the jinn. The order of God fixes the destiny of man262. It is by His order that God, through > the intermediary of the Prophets, communicates with men263. The variety of occurrences of the > term resulted in a rich exegesis. Very early the term also entered into the language of philosophy. > We find it in the famous “Theology of Aristotle”, that is to say in a purely Hellenistic context, > although the word has no equivalent in Greek. Certain erudite ones have argued that this fact > constitutes the proof that the long recension of the “Theology” could not have been collected except > in an existing Islamic environment based on an original work which is lost today264. The “Theology > of Aristotle” identifies “amr” with the Verb of God (kalima) and with His Will (mashiyya) which is itself > described as an intermediary between the Creator and the first Intelligence; “amr” then is the > efficient cause, and it is for this reason that it is sometimes called “Cause of causes”. > > This conception was adopted thereafter by the Isma'ili and we find it again in works attributed > (wrongly for certain) to Nasir-i-Khusraw, such as the “Khvan-i-ikhvan” and the “Zad al-Musafirin”, > despite the fact that these works express fairly contradictory doctrines. For Nasir-i-Khusraw, “amr” is > identical with the creative act (ibda) of God. This induces him to oppose, in his “Jami'a al-Hikmatayn”, > including the physical world in the world of “amr”. Nasiri'd-Din Tusi, on the other hand, expresses > in his work “Rawdat al-Taslim” a theory of divine knowledge in which Command figures as the > noetic apex in which the different faculties culminate in a union between themselves and the divine > command. Isma'ili gnosis was transmitted to the Ithna 'Ashari (Twelver) Shi'i and the interpretations > of the concept of “amr”, sometimes as the manifestation of the divine will, sometimes as the creative > act of God, are numerous in its schools, with subtle variations.265 > > Sunni thought for the most part is inclined to focus on the question of human responsibility in > relation to the divine command. It is here that we find the old debate about predestination. How > can man obey an order if God, in advance of his action, has elected the believer and rejected the > unbeliever? The Mu'tazili crystalized the debate, in forming their doctrine upon the liberty of man, > and by affirming that there must be a necessary connection between the divine command (amr) and > the divine will (irada). > > The Neoplatonists, on their part, were interested in ontological questions linked to the deployment > of the divine Command. They assimilated the word of “amr” to the intelligible world in giving a > curious interpretation to a passage from the Qur'an. The Qur'an declares: > > Qur'an IV:58,66,77. > God is He Who “fixes destiny by His order”. cf. Qur'an II:210; V:52; VI:8; VII:54; VIII:42,44; IX:106; > X:3,31; XI:44,73,94; XII:21,41; XIII:2,31; XIV:24; XVI:1-2; XIX:21,39; XXX:4; XXXII:5; > XXXIII:37,38; XL:79; XLI:12; XLV:17-18; LIV:3,12; LXV:12; LXXXII:19; XCVII:4. > Qur'an II:27,63,67-68,222; III:80; IV:58,66,77; V:117; VI:14,71,163; VII:28-29,77; IX:31; X:72,104; > XI:112; XII:40; XIII:21,25,36; XV:65-66,94; XVI:50,90; XVII:16; XXI:73; XXIV:63; XXVII:91; > XXVIII:24; XXXVII:102; XXXIX:11-12; XL:66; XLII:15; XLIX:9; LI:44; LXV:5,8; LXVI:6; > LXXX:23; XCVIII:5; etc. > For a discussion of the “Theology” of Aristotle and its influence, cf. supra chapter IX:9. > On the concept of “amr” in Isma'ilism see Christian Jambet, “La grande Resurrection d'Alamut; les formes > de la liberte dans le shi'isme ismaelien,” Paris, 1990, pp. 68, 191-192 in particular. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > “He covers the day and the night which follow one another rapidly; He submits the sun, the > moon and the stars to His command (bi-amrihi); the command (amr) and the creation (khalq) > do not belong to Him?” Blessed be God, the Lord of the worlds.”266 > > The commentators among the “falasifa” [Islamic philosophers] interpreted the terms “amr” and > “khalq” as referring to distinct ontological spheres being the object of a distinct creation. By “amr” > God created the spiritual realities, by “khalq” the material substances. > > We rediscover here the famous pair “Amr-khalq” which we have so often encountered from the pen > of Baha’u’llah, sometimes associated with Malakut, sometimes with Jabarut, and which in any case > has a Qur'anic origin. For Baha’u’llah, “khalq” does not designate the sensible world but the world of > man in his double dimension of physical and spiritual which results in the human being belonging as > much to the sphere of Malakut as to the sphere of Mulk, and from whence the ambiguity of a concept > like Nasut to describe human nature. “Amr” refers to the divine manifestation. The ontological sphere > of “amr” penetrates all the divine worlds from Lahut to the physical world. “Amr” is the expression of > the attributes of the divine Manifestation Himself. At the level of Lahut, it is assimilated to the Verb > or to the universal Manifestation (mazhar-i-kulli). Command (amr) is thus the creative act par > excellence originating in the “Kun!” (Be!).267 It is also the Verb or the Holy Spirit in their creative > aspect. It is in this sense that one can interpret the passage of the Apostle Paul who attributes the > creation to Christ acting as Logos. This Logos is nothing other than the universal Manifestation, which > serves as the channel of Command. Jesus was but a particular manifestation of this universal > Manifestation, which is why in every Dispensation one can attribute creation to the divine > messenger who becomes the particular channel of Command and of the expression of the divine > will. > > At the level of Jabarut, “amr” takes the form of divine Revelation. It is for this reason that Shoghi > Effendi translates “al-amr wa'l-khalq” by “Revelation and creation”, and in this way establishes the > ontological link which exists between the two. It does not refer only to the fact that it is the Verb > which created the world, but that Revelation, in the sense of the “Mother-Book” and the “preserved > Tablet” contains all the spiritual laws, and thus is not only the guarantor of the order and stability of > the world, but in fact constitutes the very cause of its existence. > > We see here that the concept of “amr” in the writings of Baha’u’llah is rather distant from the > Muslim concept, and is perfectly coherent with his treatment of the divine worlds. In fact, we find > him employing always the same procedure, that of applying what Islam says about God to the > Divine Manifestation. For Baha’u’llah, God is an unknowable Essence. We can not discuss Hahut. > The vision of man is limited to the sensible world and to Malakut. He does not comprehend the > superior spheres except through the divine Manifestations. From Jabarut he receives only the > “breaths” and the “breezes”. Indeed, the ontology of Baha’u’llah can be reduced to three essential > spheres: the sphere of the divine Essence, which is impenetrable; the sphere of the divine > Manifestation; and the sphere of man or of creation as a whole. We will return to this subject. > > Qur'an VII:53. [yughshiy al-layla an-nahara yaTlubuhun hathiythan wa'l-shmsa wa'l-qamara wa'l-nujuwma > musakharatin biamrihi ala lahu al-khalqu wa'l-amru tibaraka allah rabbu al-'alamina] > Qur'an 36:82. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > In conclusion, associated with Jabarut we find terms which pertain to Revelation (amr), to divine > power (taqdir), to grace (fadl), and finally, to the Countenance (liqa) of God, which is to say the divine > Manifestation at the level of Jabarut or Lahut. All of these terms are related to one another in the > work of Baha’u’llah. They characterize the power ('izza) which is the principal attribute of the > Manifestation and of Jabarut. Jabarut is manifested to men through the personality of the divine > Manifestation and through the divine Verb which is incarnated in his writings. Baha’u’llah speaks of > “the dominion of utterance” (Jabarut al-ayyat)268. > > If the pair Malakut-Jabarut appear together with extreme frequency, the same is true of other terms > such as Mulk, Nasut, Lahut and Hahut. > > 10. The World of Mulk > > Mulk appears only rarely in the writings of Baha’u’llah, and when it does appear it appears not to > have a very specific meaning, unlike in the case of ‘Abdu’l-Baha in which is clearly designates the > sensible world. Most often, for Baha’u’llah Mulk designates the earth in a very prosaic sense. It is > therefore synonymous with Mamlaka which refers to the terrestrial kingdoms. Mamlakat signifies the > country, or the land populated with believers and infidels. In this way we understand the phrase: > > “Submit to Thy power, by Thy Name the Conqueror, the peoples of Thy domain (mamlaka) > so that they will turn towards Thy Countenance.”269 > > Mamlaka has a quasi-political meaning, for it contrasts the government of men to the government of > God, obedience to human powers and passions in contrast to obedience to God. Sometimes, Mulk > has an abstract meaning that designates the sphere of the power of God as in the verse: > > “...so that from the land (mulk) wherein they dwell no voice may be heard except the voice > that extolleth Thy mercifulness and might...”270 > > 11. The superior Worlds > > The term Hahut appears only exceptionally in the writings of Baha’u’llah and then in those rare > occasions when he has formulated the theory of the five presences/worlds. In most cases, > Baha’u’llah ends his citation of that theory with the world of Lahut. > > In “Munajat”, we find only one mention of the trilogy Mulk-Malakut-Jabarut: > > “Lo, the All-Possessing (malik) is come. Earth (mulk) and heaven (malakut), glory ('izza) and > dominion (jabarut) are God's, the Lord [mawla] of all men, and the Possessor [malik] of the > > “Munajat,” No. 38, p. 41; English: PM, No. 38, p. 53. Shoghi Effendi translates “Jabarut al-ayyat” by “the > dominion of utterance”. > “Munajat,” No. 38, p. 85. The examples being innumerable we will leave off citing them here. > “Munajat,” No. 58, p. 66; English: PM, No. 58, p. 89. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Throne on high ['arsh] and of earth below [ithara]!”271 > > We see the term “'izza” (power, majesty, glory) here as an essential attribute of Jabarut. > > If it is rare to see Baha’u’llah cite the five presences, it is less uncommon to see him cite the first four > worlds. We give here three examples: > > “Cast upon this poor (faqir) and desolate creature, O my Lord, the glance of Thy wealth, and > flood his heart (qalb) with the beams (nur) of Thy knowledge (ma'rifa), that he may apprehend > the verities (haqa'iq) of the unseen world (Lahut), and discover the mysteries (asrar) of Thy > heavenly realm (Jabarut), and perceive the signs and tokens (zuhurat) of Thy kingdom > (Malakut) and contemplate the manifold revelations (shu'unat) of this earthly life (Nasut) all set > forth before the face of Him Who is the Revealer of Thine Own Self.”272 > > It is probable that the Western reader will recognize that this text takes on an entirely different > dimension now that he is familiar with the names of the presences/worlds. > > Another example is particularly interesting for the wealth of its metaphysical contents: > > “I testify that no sooner had the First Word (kalima) proceeded, through the potency of Thy > will (mashiyya) and purpose (irada), out of His mouth, and the First Call gone forth from His > lips than the whole creation was revolutionized, and all that are in the heavens and all that > are on the earth were stirred to the depths. Through that Word the realities of all created > things (haqa'iq al-wujuud) were shaken, were divided, separated, scattered, combined and > reunited, disclosing, in both the contingent world (Mulk) and the heavenly kingdom > (Malakut), the entities of a new creation (takwin)273, and revealing, in the unseen realms > (Jabarut, Lahut), the signs and tokens of Thy unity and oneness.”274 > > Finally, the best known example is found in “The Seven Valleys”. In the Valley of Unity [tawhid], > > English: PM, No. 182, p. 315. We see in this translation of the word “Jabarut” that Shoghi Effendi has > sustained the original meaning of the Aramaic “gebura” which is actually a synonym of the Arabic “'izza”. > The Arabic text of the Medium Obligatory Prayer is found in “Munajat,” No. 182, p. 210. > “Munajat,” No. 38, p. 40; English: PM, No. 38, pp. 52-53. > The word “takwin” designates the creative act of God. The text says literally: “the word of the creative act > (takwin) was manifested.” In Quranic exegesis “takwin” designates the production of the corruptible being. > The word derives from the root KWN which means “to be”. The verb “kawwana” signifies “to constitute a > being which can be generated”. It explicitly aims at the divine order “kun!” (be!) which corresponds to the > “fiat!” of the Bible. “Takwin” is thus an act of speech for it is by speech that God created the world. This > speech, or rather this Verb is for Bahá’u’lláh an aspect of the Spirit emanating from the divine Essence. > “Munajat,” No. 178, p. ?; English: No. 178, p. 295. Shoghi Effendi translates this last phrase in these words: > “…and revealing, in the world of Jabarut the manifestations (zuhurat) of unity (wahidiyya), and causing to > appear the signs (ayyat) of unity (ahadiyya) in Lahut.” The English expression “unseen realms” translates > Jabarut as well as Lahut which in this context are impossible to distinguish. This clearly shows that Shoghi > Effendi considered it impossible to convey through translation the allusions contained in the original > terminology, which would, in any case, be unrecognizable or superfluous for the greater part of Western > readers. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Baha’u’llah enters upon the question of the spiritual worlds: > > “Although the divine worlds be never ending, yet some refer to them as four (rutbih): The > world of time (zaman), which is the one that hath both a beginning and an end; the world > of duration (dahr), which hath a beginning, but whose end is not revealed; the world of > perpetuity (sarmad), whose beginning is not to be seen but which is known to have an end; > and the world of eternity (azal), neither a beginning nor an end of which is visible. > Although there are many differing statements as to these points, to recount them in detail > would result in weariness. Thus, some have said that the world of perpetuity (sarmad) hath > neither beginning nor end, and have named the world of eternity (azal) as the invisible, > impregnable Empyrean (ghayb). Others have called these the worlds of the Heavenly > Court (Lahut), of the Empyrean Heaven (Jabarut), of the Kingdom of the Angels (Malakut), > and of the mortal world (Nasut).275 > > “The journeys in the pathway of love are reckoned as four276: From the creatures to the > True One; from the True One to the creatures; from the creatures to the creatures; from > the True One to the True One. > > “There is many an utterance of the mystic seers and doctors of former times which I have > not mentioned here, since I mislike the copious citation from the sayings of the past; for > quotation from the words of others proveth acquired learning, not the divine bestowal. > Even so much as We have quoted here is out of deference to the wont of men and after > the manner of the friends.”277 > > He insists upon the fact that “all the variations which the wayfarer in the stages of his journey > beholdeth in the realms of being, proceed from his own vision.”278. It is this statement which we > have called the “phenomenological principle” of Baha’u’llah. We will later return to the discussion > of its importance. If we consider that man cannot elevate himself above Malakut, we must > understand that this statement affirms the essential unity between Malakut and the sensible world > (Mulk), which in itself conforms to everything that we know of the teaching of Baha’u’llah. He also > explains that the differences that we suppose to exist between the different divine Manifestations > originate from the differing perspectives of the human spirit which we are invited and advised to > transcend. > > These three texts project interesting views on the four worlds. The first establishes an interesting > correspondence between the terms designating the divine worlds and the deployment of reality. We > find ourselves considering the following scheme: > > Lahut...................Spiritual realities (haqa'iq) > Jabarut.................Secrets (asrar) > > “The Seven Valleys,” p. 25. > We will re-encounter this question when we study the chapter which ‘Abdu’l-Bahá consecrates to Love in > the “Commentary on the Hidden Treasure” (Tafsir-i kuntu kanzan makhfian). > “The Seven Valleys,” pp. 25-26. > “The Seven Valleys,” p. 18. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Malakut.................Manifestations (zuhurat) > Nasut...................Qualities (shu'unat) > > To what degree does this hierarchy correspond to a deployment of being in the framework of a > particular metaphysical conception? We think that we would be in error to give this hierarchy a > metaphysical significance alone, and that, on the contrary, its value is hermeneutical. The > significance of the terms that are employed here, should be understood in a “gnostic” framework; > they constitute the foundations of a theory of knowledge which we will have the opportunity to study > in the second part of this work. > > Four ways are open to the knowledge of man, and these four ways, as in the “Tablet of All Food”, > correspond to the four worlds. We will return to these problems, but, in summary, we can say that > man can first of all approach the divine mystery through the contemplation of the material world > (Mulk) which, by its “qualities” (shu'unat) offers him an analogical and homological representation of > the superior worlds. Secondly, he can penetrate the mysteries of the other world, which is to say of > Malakut, thanks to its “manifestations” (zuhurat) because that world is directly in contact with the > material world and we can directly feel its influence. It is for this reason that Shoghi Effendi > translates “zuhurat” by “signs” and “tokens”. In other words, Malakut is manifested in the interior of > the sensible world. Here we are in the domain of natural Religion. Then thirdly, man can not > elevate himself above this level of knowledge without assistance from the intermediary of the divine > Manifestation, that is to say, a Prophet, and here we enter into the framework of revealed Religion. > The prophetic teaching must be interiorized, and it is only this interiorization which gives access to > the “mysteries of the celestial world”, that is to say to the “secrets of Jabarut”, if we translate literally. > This step can not be taken, as we see in other texts, except through the purification of the heart. > Finally, the fourth and last way, that of Lahut, represents the true gnosis (ma'rifat), the illuminative > knowledge which presents itself to man like a light (nur), like the reflections in himself of the divine > Names and attributes that permit him to “know” through an inner experience the reality of God in > all of His naked reality through “the truths of Thine invisible world”, that is to say the “truths” that, > by means of the Names and attributes, are the expression of the hidden Essence of God. > > From the second citation, three things are asserted. The first, is that the creative act (takwin) concerns > only Malakut and Mulk. We may then think that Jabarut is found outside of this process and that the > spirit of the divine Manifestations was not created by the act of “takwin”. It is thereby that it is > affirmed that the divine Manifestations are eternal beings and that one speaks of their pre-existence > or pre-eternity (qidam)279. The second indication which the text furnishes, is that the world of Lahut is > the world of divine unity (ahadiyya) and that the world of Jabarut is that of unicity (wahidiyya). When > we are considering a scheme of four worlds, one which excludes Hahut, a part of the attributes of > Hahut passes over to Lahut. This indicates that we should not give any of the various statements of > Baha’u’llah about the divine worlds the character of an absolute authority, one that would > exhaustive depict reality. All we can know of them is always relative. We will return to this point > when we develop the hermeneutic aspect of the divine worlds and of the writings of Baha’u’llah in > general. The divine worlds appear then to be a pedagogical scheme employed to help us > comprehend various relationships, including: what unicity is in relation to unity, the names and > attributes of God in relation to the divine Essence, the difference of degree between man and the > Manifestation. The error would consist in us believing that these are concepts which inform us of the > “Lights of Guidance,” New Delhi, 1983, No. 1012, p. 375. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > nature of the divine worlds and which permit us to describe them. The divine worlds are beyond all > description. Finally, a third indication is furnished us by the fact that “the realities of all created > things”, for which we would be tempted to utilize the word “essences”, are described as a category > belonging as much to Malakut as to this world below, that is to say to the world of Mulk. > > While the first citation situated us in a hermeneutic context, we now find ourselves in a metaphysical > context, which explains why the word “haqa'iq” would be employed with a totally different meaning. > We are no longer in the presence of the “truths” of the divine Essence that divine knowledge effects > to appear to human consciousness, but of the “realities of all created things”. The text says literally > “the realities of being” or “the realities of existence” giving us to understand that the “realities” > (haqa'iq) constitute the diversification of Being which produces “the entities of a new creation”. > > The third citation, taken from “The Seven Valleys” does not give information on the divine worlds > as such, but establishes a link between the ontological problem of their existence on the one hand, > and the problem of time and of love on the other. We will not digress by venturing to explain these > links, both of which would necessitate vast research and the conclusions of which would in > themselves require a monograph. We will limit our remarks to two points. The first concerns the > phrase of Baha’u’llah “all the variations which the wayfarer in the stages of his journey beholdeth in > the realms of being, proceed from his own vision”. This is what we have called the > “phenomenological principle” of Baha’u’llah. Of course, by “realms of being” Baha’u’llah may be > referring to the “seven valleys”, but there we take it to indicate that this phrase should be accorded a > more general import. In other words, reality can always be described from various points of view, > and that which we discover depends necessarily upon the position and perspective of the observer. > Thus the thought of Baha’u’llah expresses itself always in a relative manner. Man cannot arrive at a > totally objective knowledge of reality. Reality always presents itself to man in the form of “degree”, > and hence we can speak of different levels of profundity; furthermore, the more we seek to descend > into these profundities the more our modes of knowledge are confirmed as inadequate. In this way, > we see as one what is multiple and what is multiple what is one. > > The second important point of this text is located in the justification given by Baha’u’llah for the > employment of this terminology and for making reference to old theories, both of which have as > their aim to show “deference to the wont of men and after the manner of the friends”. Baha’u’llah > manifestly distances himself from what might otherwise constitute a rigid interpretation of these > metaphysical speculations. > > 12. Hahut and Lahut and the problem of the divine attributes > > We may wonder why Hahut so rarely occurs in the writings of Baha’u’llah. The examples of the > divine worlds that we have cited earlier have often referred to three worlds, sometimes to four > appear, and very rarely five. In all cases when one of the worlds is omitted, it is Hahut that > disappears. We may thus question the validity of positing a distinction between Hahut and Lahut. > > Until now, we have limited ourselves to stating the facts according to what is found in the writings of > Baha’u’llah. We will now discuss the consequences of these observations at the level of metaphysics. > In order to do this we must once again take leave of our standard definitions. We have seen that > Hahut is the world of the unmanifested Essence of God, while Lahut represents the sphere in which > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > God exists in the deployment of His attributes. Does this distinction have meaning in the thought of > Baha’u’llah? Evidently not. We will see in the following pages that we cannot distinguish between > the Essence of God and His attributes except at the conceptual level, making a distinction that is > purely intellectual, even as it is impossible, except on a purely intellectual level, to distinguish the > attributes of God from one another. The distinction that we establish between these attributes, is > thus a distinction which is governed by human language. However, language is not reality. > Consequently, it is impossible, other than on a purely conceptual level to distinguish between Hahut > and Lahut. When Baha’u’llah has recourse to these expressions it is in a purely allegorical manner > having a hermeneutical purpose. > > CHAPTER SIX: > THE DIVINE WORLDS AS THEOPHANY > > 1. Theophanic hierarchy and ontological theophany > > The previous Chapters have introduced us to the hermeneutic value of the divine worlds in the > writings of Baha’u’llah. Now we will we add a theophanic value that will once again touch upon > metaphysical questions. Every world is in its own manner a mirror of the names and attributes of > God. Consequently, all of creation is a theophany. The hierarchy of the divine worlds is a > theophanic hierarchy, for it is evident that the higher one rises in this hierarchy the more the > reflection of the divine names grows in plenitude. The intelligibility of these worlds diminishes for > man as we travel up this hierarchy because each theophanic level has its own ontological modality, > and man can only understand what is found within the limits of his own ontological horizon. > > 2. The divine worlds in the Tablet to Varqa > > Baha’u’llah explains in the “Tablet of Varqa” that Malakut is the world which is situated between the > human world and the world of Jabarut. This latter realm is the world of Revelation and of the divine > Manifestations. When the divine Verb is manifested in the world of humanity, it brings into this > manifestation all of the potentialities of Jabarut which thereby descend with him to the lower levels of > creation. Thus this divine speech (bayan) has the power to manifest the superior worlds which are, > according to this Tablet, the world of Will (mashiyyat), the world of divine Volition (iradih), the world > of Power (qadar), the world of decree (qada), the world of Eternity which has no beginning (azal), the > world of Eternity which has no end (sarmad), the world of the Aeon which has neither beginning nor > end (dahr), and finally, the world of Time (zaman).280 > > Baha’u’llah utilizes a series of terms each of which has a specific meaning in Islamic philosophy. To > each, he assigns a “world,” that is to say an ontological category. The question for us is to know how > to situate these ontological categories in the Baha’i metaphysic. In order to take this step, we are > > “Lawh-i-Varqa”. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > obliged to start from the conventional meaning of this terminology as it was understood by Muslim > philosophers during the lifetime of Baha’u’llah. But everything we know of the thought of > Baha’u’llah indicates that it is improbable he would have allowed himself to be limited in the > expression of his ideas by the contemporary meanings attached to these terms. On the contrary, > everything we have experienced so far convinces us that the true meaning of this terminology can > not be understood except by making a detailed study of this text by situating it in the context of the > overall metaphysic of Baha’u’llah. > > What we clearly discern from the “Tablet of Varqa” is that the worlds cited above are all situated > above Malakut, and this is because the Tablet explains that the function of Malakut is to serve as the > mediator, the transmitter of the influences of these worlds to the human and physical world. If we > examine the ontological categories more closely, we perceive that they are easily arranged in two > series. We find three terms all of which proceed from the divine power—they are “mashiyyat” (will), > “iradih” (volition) and “qadar” (decree). We then find four terms which are concerned with time but > which, in context, must also be linked to the divine power. They are the terms of pre-existence (azal), > of sempiternity (sarmad), of Aeon (dahr) and of time (zaman). > > The first category of terms falls within the domain of divine Omnipotence. Of these, decree poses > the least number of problems. Decree is that which actualizes the divine Will: it is its fruit and its > result. We have already seen how the divine decrees are registered in the preserved Tablet which is > the matrix of revelation. In the scale of divine Omnipotence, decree is closest to the world of > Revelation, which is also the world of Command (amr). Hence there exists a certain link between > decree and Jabarut. Decree supposes that there is some matter to decree, in the same manner that > one cannot imagine a king without a subject, a legislator without legislation. The divine decree > presupposes the existence of the world. Decree can be general and it can be particular, in the same > fashion that when a legislator legislates, he begins with setting forth general principles before arriving > at particular cases. In the same fashion, divine decree is the organizer of the cosmos, but it is not the > cause thereof. > > This brief description permits us to grasp the difference that exists between the divine decree and the > different forms of the divine Will. The divine decree is ontologically situated as the result of the > divine Will. > > 3. The Primal Will > > In the sequence cited and prior to divine decree, Baha’u’llah speaks of the world of the Will > (mashiyyat) and of the world of Volition (iradih). The distinction which we establish here between > “Will” and “Volition” is, in English, purely artificial. It permits us to distinguish between two Arabic > words which do not have exact equivalents in English. One may ask if the distinction between > “mashiyyat” and “iradih” is significant in the framework of the metaphysic of Baha’u’llah. “Mashiyyat” > certainly has a much more precise content in the writings of Baha’u’llah than “iradih” which seems > to be employed in a more relaxed manner. > > “Mashiyyat” is a term that was borrowed by Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i from the Arab Peripatetic > [Aristotelian] philosophy, which speaks of “Primal Will” (al-mashiyyat al-awwaliyya). The Primal Will > is one of the names which is generally given in Islamic metaphysics to the first emanation from God. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Other philosophers have proposed to give this name to the movement whereby the divine Essence > gave birth to this first emanation. The Bab made extensive use of this word, by which he sometimes > designated himself. ‘Abdu’l-Baha employs the term in the same context in the “Tafsir”. The word > thus comes to us charged with a substantial past life. It seems that Baha’u’llah does not employ as > much to express his own philosophy as to establish a link between his thought and the philosophy > which was taught in the Islamic schools of theology. It is probable that he gives it a new meaning the > definition of which we will seek to discover. > > In the writings of Baha’u’llah, the expression “Primal Will” refers to the Holy Spirit. It is in some > cases a synonym and in others a precise term describing a particular aspect of the Holy Spirit, that > is, the Holy Spirit as manifestation of the divine Will. We will see later that the Holy Spirit has two > aspects: one as Will, the other as divine Love, and that Love is the first cause of creation. > > The Primal Will incarnates the primordial aspect of the Holy Spirit which is destined to descend > into all the worlds of God and which is also the expression of divine Omnipotence. It is this Primal > Will permits the Holy Spirit to be the creator of the created world. ‘Abdu’l-Baha gave a precise > definition of the Primal Will in “Some Answered Questions”. He writes in the same chapter in > which he establishes the difference between Manifestation and Emanation: > > “Therefore all creatures emanate from God; that is to say, it is by God that all things are > realized, and by Him that all beings have attained to existence. The first thing which > emanated from God is that universal reality, which the ancient philosophers termed the > 'First Mind,' and which the people of Baha' call the 'First Will.' This emanation, in that > which concerns its action in the world of God, is not limited by time or place; it is without > beginning or end; beginning and end in relation to God are one. The pre-existence of God is > the pre-existence of essence, and also pre-existence of time, and the phenomenality of > contingency is essential and not temporal... > > “Though the 'First Mind' is without beginning, it does not become a sharer in the pre- > existence of God, for the existence of the universal reality in relation to the existence of God > is nothingness, and it has not the power to become an associate of God and like unto Him in > pre-existence.”281 > > This text is particularly explicit. The Primal Will appears here as the first emanation. Later we will > explore what this concept signifies in Baha’i metaphysics. But the fact that this is an emanation and > not a manifestation signifies that the Primal Will represents the first element of differentiation in the > cosmos. It is the first being, the first existence, distinct from God, but at the same time it is pure > divine Will, that is to say that this differentiation is purely existential. This is what ‘Abdu’l-Baha > underlines in saying that the Primal Will has no existence independent from the Essence of God. > Another interesting point in this chapter is his link between the ontological problem of the Primal > Will and the varieties of time. The existence of the Primal Will is situated within the sphere of divine > eternity, which we identify with the world of the Aeon, that is to say a time outside of time which has > no duration, where, as ‘Abdu’l-Baha says, the beginning and the end make no difference. > > 'Ali-Murad Davudi, in his book “Divinity and Manifestation” (Uluviyyat va Mazhariyyat) offered > “Some Answered Questions,” LIII, pp. 237-238. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > another formulation of the Primal Will which we cite here with great circumspection, one which > refers to the existence of things in the thought of God. This appears to us to represent an interesting > image upon the purely metaphorical and hermeneutic level, but which it may be imprudent to > transpose this formulation to the ontological level to the extent that we have not found sanction for > this perception in the writings of Baha’u’llah. > > Davudi begins his argument by explaining that the Primal Will belongs to the world of revelation > (amr) and that it plays an intermediary role between God and creation. He says that all beings are > the products of this Primal Will and not the manifestations of the inaccessible Essence (huviyyat-i- > ghaybiyyih) of God. Then he continues by proposing an image which appears to be very much > influenced by Islamic Neoplatonism and in particular the philosophy of Ibn Sina. Before an artisan > has created an object, this object must exist in his intellect ('aql). This means that the form of the > thing pre-exists in the intellect of the artisan. He concludes from this that the world must have > existed first in the thought of the Creator and that it is thus this thought, serving as intermediary > between the Creator and His creation, which is the Primal Will. Thus, the form in the thought of > God would constitute its interior (batin) reality while its sensible realization would be its manifestation > in the world of creation. > > What appears troublesome to us in the image employed by Davudi, is that he appropriates the > Aristotelian distinction between form and matter, a distinction we would qualify as purely > intellectual and without a real ontological foundation. Conversely, Baha’u’llah seems to indicates > that the Primal Will expresses an aspect of the divine Verb which tends to include the first moment > of the differentiation between the divine Essence and its emanation. It is in this sense that the notion > of the Primal Will is narrower and more precise than that of the divine Verb. The Primal Will is at > the origin of the creation, and it is an aspect of the Verb, but it is the Verb which descends into the > different worlds of God. Otherwise said, the Primal Will expresses the aspect of the divine Verb in > the most elevated ontological level, which is that realm which is the closest to the divine Essence and > it is this aspect which signals the first instance of its differentiation. > > 4. Volition, Might and Power > > We will not seek to encompass with so much precision the world of the divine Volition, for it > appears to be impossible to do so in the actual state of our knowledge, and besides to be altogether > secondary in the thought of Baha’u’llah. The concept of “irada” belongs to Muslim theology, and in > particular to the Mu'tazili, who make it one of the attributes of God. “Irada” seems then to be > Islamic counterpart of the Hellenistic concept of “mashiyyat” and that perhaps explains the > differences in the contents of these two terms. > > In the “Tablet of Varqa” Baha’u’llah cites “iradih” between “mashiyyat” and “qadar” (decree). He > appears to give it an intermediary status between these two concepts. Volition (Iradih) would be thus > the intermediary step which assures transition between the first emanation and the actualization of > the divine decrees. However, in actuality this concept plays only a minimal role in the metaphysic of > Baha’u’llah. One must understand that the world itself is the expression of divine Omnipotence and > hence of the Will of God. This Omnipotence penetrates all the divine worlds and in each of these > worlds, it takes an appropriate form. In the world of Revelation, it appears in the aspects of > “mashiyyat,” “iradih” and “qadar”; in the world of creation in the form of “qudrat” (might) and > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > “quwwat” (power), two other expressions which we also find from the pen of Baha’u’llah. These latter > two are essential attributes of the divine Manifestation. In a prayer found in “Munajat” Baha’u’llah > declares: > > “I give praise to Thee, O my God, that Thou hast chosen me out of all Thy creatures, and > made me to be the Day-Spring of Thy strength (matla'a quwwatika) and the Manifestation of > Thy might (mazhara qudratika), and empowered me to reveal282 such of Thy signs and such > tokens of Thy majesty and power (iqtidar) as none, whether in Thy heaven or on Thy earth, > can produce.”283 > > This capacity and this power are the actualization at the level of the world of humanity of the Will, > the Volition and the Decree which exist at the level of the world of Revelation. In the same text, > Baha’u’llah speaks of the “heaven of Thy Will (mashiyyat)” in relation to the “might” (qudrat) of the > Manifestation of which men are unaware.284 Thus this “might” proceeds from the “heaven of Thy > Will”. It is, at the created level, the manifestation of the same force. In another prayer, Baha’u’llah > makes the same association in speaking of the unity of the divine Manifestations. He declares that > manifest through the divine Manifestation is that which God wished (aradtahu) by His volition (irada) > and that which He ordained (qaddartahu) by His “irrevocable purpose” (taqdir).285 The English > translation of Shoghi Effendi says, speaking of Moses: > > “At one time, Thou didst raise Him up, O my God, and didst attire Him with the ornament > of the name of Him Who conversed with Thee (Moses), and didst through Him uncover all > that Thy will (irada) had decreed (aradtahu) and Thine irrevocable purpose (taqdir) ordained > (qaddartahu).”286 > > In the same manner, he writes: > > “At another time, Thou didst adorn Him with the name of Him Who was Thy Spirit (Jesus), > and didst send Him down out of the heaven of Thy will (sama'u mashiyyatika)...”287 > > In many other places, Baha’u’llah indicates that all the divine Manifestations have descended from > the “heaven of Will,” and indicates that this “Will” is a particular expression of the Holy Spirit. In > this sense, “might” and “power” which return untiringly as essential attributes of the Manifestations > are in effect the garments which clothe the Holy Spirit in the world of creation. This shows that in > the thought of Baha’u’llah the role of the Holy Spirit is far from limited to being the inspirer of the > prophets, that it represents the active force of Revelation as conceived in its largest sense, that is to > say, the force which intervenes in all the levels of the created world, from Malakut to the human > world, and including in the unfolding of human history. Baha’u’llah also speaks of the “breezes” > > Literally this is: “Thou hast manifested from me” (azharta minni). > “Munajat,” No. 36, p. 36; English: PM, No. 36, p. 46. > “Munajat,” No. 36, p. 36; English: PM, No. 36, p. 47. > “Munajat,” No. 38, p. 39; English: PM, No. 38, p. 50. > 286Ibid. > > 287Ibid. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > which blow from the World of “Mashiyyat”288 which are the origin of the movement which animates > the divine Manifestations in such manner that they have no other will (mashiyyat) nor any other > volition (iradat) than the Will and Volition of God. In another of his prayers, Baha’u’llah makes the > Will (mashiyyat) an attribute of Jabarut289. We have already seen that Jabarut is also the world of decree > (qadar or taqdir), and these associations demonstrate that in the technical vocabulary of Baha’u’llah, > Jabarut tends to be identified with the world of Revelation ('alam-i-amr). > > 5. The archetypes of time > > We will not attempt here to reconstruct a theory of Time according to the writings of Baha’u’llah. > Such a reconstruction, if it were possible, would take us too far from our purpose. We will therefore > restrict ourselves to underlining certain characteristics of time in the Baha’i writings. > > Western translators always have difficulties with translating Arabic terms which describe the > different aspects of time in Islamic texts, and for good cause, because these distinctions are > completely foreign to modern philosophy. Also the reader should not be perturbed if our attempt to > translate this terminology appears to be altogether arbitrary. It is for this reason that it is sometimes > preferable to refer to the Arabic terms. > > Firstly let us say that the conception of time in the Baha’i writings is always relative to our > understanding. We find multiple texts which affirm that the time which is known to human > experience, whether that be empirical time which clocks measure or the psychological time which is > formed in the subjectivity of our consciousness, has existence only in the physical world (nasut). This > does not necessarily mean that time as we know it is an illusion. Time is rather a limitation (hadd). In > numerous places, ‘Abdu’l-Baha affirms that the spiritual worlds, beginning with Malakut, are > sanctified from time. In one of his Tablets, he declares that all the spiritual realities (haqa'iq-i- > mujaradih) are sanctified as from every notion of space and time, for space and time are > characteristics which belong to physical realities290. In another Tablet, he declares that the worlds of > Mercy ('alam al-rahmani) and the divine (lahutiyya) stations (maqamat) of sovereignty (rububiyya) are > outside of time. To this statement he appends an explanation that in these higher worlds, there is a > unicity of the moment and that this unicity of the moment contains the past, the present and the > future. To these spiritual realms he cites the terms of eternity (abad), of sempiternity (sarmad), and of > Aeon (dahr). In these divine worlds, the beginning coincides with the end291. > > It is particularly interesting to find that in the “Tablet of Varqa” Baha’u’llah seems to establish a link > between the specific archetypes of time and particular divine worlds. This moreover appears to be > altogether coherent with what we know of the spiritual worlds. Every world is characterized with a > > “Munajat,” No. 66, p. 77; English: PM, No. 66, p. 108. The Arabic text: “Ay rabbi! Laysa li min iradatin ila > iradatika wa la li min mashiyyatin ila bi-mashiyyatika”, and later: “wa ma taharraktu ila bi-aryahi mashiyyatika.” The > English translation of this passage by Shoghi Effendi reads: “I have no will but Thy will, O my Lord, and > cherish no desire except Thy desire...I am stirred by nothing else except the winds of Thy will...” > “Munajat,” No. 82, p. 96; English: PM, No. 82, p. 138. > “Makatib,” volume I, p. 458. > “Makatib,” volume I, p. 58. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > differentiated manifestation of the Spirit and therefore each of these worlds corresponds to a specific > ontological category. In this system, the different archetypes of Time would appear as linked to these > ontological categories. To every level of realities there corresponds a category of duration. We find > that in all the writings of ‘Abdu’l-Baha the notion of time is linked to the notion of space. Obviously, > if we omitted from our world three of its four dimensions, the remaining dimension would seem, if > in any case the human spirit could understand it, to be altogether something else. Time cannot be > conceived outside of space. > > If we affirm that the spiritual worlds are outside space and time, we affirm at the same blow that > they are inaccessible to the human intellect and to our current language, for the human intellect can > not understand anything without giving it a representation in three dimensions and without situating > it upon the arrow of time. That is due to the fact that our conception of causality is intimately linked > to our experience of space and time. Time serves to express that which is second in relation to that > which is first, while in the world of Revelation, as ‘Abdu’l-Baha says, the beginning coincides with > the end. The spiritual worlds are worlds in which the links of causality and the relations between the > realities exist outside of all temporal relationship. > > What we know about the manner in which Baha’u’llah writes causes us to think that it must be > impossible to associate any of the archetypes of time (azal, abad, sarmad, zaman) to a world or to any > other precise ontological category. This follows from what we have observed about ‘Abdu’l-Baha's > discussion on the limits of human perception. If the divine worlds are inaccessible to the human > intellect, then it is the same for the temporal category which is associated with each of them. The > archetypes of time which we find in the writings of Baha’u’llah are sometimes listed as four, > sometimes five, depending on whether or not “abad” is differentiated from “azal”. But it is probable, > that if one had asked Baha’u’llah to enumerate the archetypes of time, he would have replied that > the archetypes can be considered infinite in number and that they can all be reduced to a single > archetype. It is best then not to place too much importance in the distinctions which have been > established between these archetypes or the particulars in their definitions. We will restrict ourselves > therefore to recall some facts which emphasize the relations between the archetypes of time and the > question of the ontology of the divine worlds. > > In his book “Seven Valleys” Baha’u’llah writes: > > “On this same basis, ponder likewise the differences among the worlds. Although the divine > worlds be never ending, yet some refer to them as four: The world of time (zaman), which is > the one that hath both a beginning and an end; the world of duration (dahr), which hath a > beginning, but whose end is not revealed; the world of perpetuity (sarmad), whose beginning > is not to be seen but which is known to have an end; and the world of eternity (azal), neither > a beginning nor an end of which is visible. Although there are many differing statements as > to these points, to recount them in detail would result in weariness. Thus, some have said > that the world of perpetuity [sarmad] hath neither beginning nor end, and have named the > world of eternity [azal] as the invisible, impregnable Empyrean.”292 > > Here we find that Baha’u’llah himself underlines the imprecision of the philosophical terminology. > In fact, it is stated, the meaning attached by him through the employment of this terminology > “Athar-i-Qalam-i-A'la,” volume III; “The Seven Valleys,” p. 25. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > fluctuates in each usage by his pen. It is thus in each case that in its own context one must seek for > the explanation. > > If for the moment we speak of the four archetypes of time they will be: that which has no beginning > nor end; that which has a beginning but no end; that which has no beginning but an end; finally, > that which has a beginning and an end. This is a classical distinction derived from Sufi literature. It > is its provenance that requires that we read this part of his exposition with the greatest reserve and > refrain from attributing this formulation to Baha’u’llah himself. Following the reference to these > archetypes, the Persian text speaks of the “contradictions” or the “opposing views” (ikhtilaf) which > characterize this theory. Finally, Baha’u’llah does not seem to accord much importance to this > subject because he declares that to enter into the subtleties of this question would risk wearying the > reader. This kind of remark generally expresses a certain disapproval which envisions the quibbles > which theologians will not fail to raise in response to such questions. For Baha’u’llah, it is clear that > human understanding is too limited to bring such problems from obscurity to the light of day. > > The reader will hopefully understand that we do not seek here to construct a system having a > complete theory of all things and closed within itself. Our ambition will be limited to clarifying with > precision the meaning of certain terms employed in the Baha’i writings, by taking into account the > fluctuations of terminology which we have already described. > > There is a term with which there is no difficulty, the term “zaman”. This refers to common time, > including that measured by clocks and psychological time. This dimension of time pertains to the > physical world and more particularly the human world (nasut) which is the only one to have a > consciousness of time. This time is characterized by a beginning and an end and by its aptitude to be > divided and analyzed in its component units. > > Contrasted to the world of Nasut is the world of Lahut, that is to say the world of the divine Essence. > It is the world of the invisible (ghayb). In the “Seven Valleys” Baha’u’llah associates this world with > the term “azal” and in other texts with “dahr”. Both terms describe a time outside of time, which has > neither duration, beginning, nor end. It is following an ancient tradition that we have chosen to > name this world of time outside of time by utilizing the Greek term “Aeon” so as to distinguish this > Aeon from simple eternity, for eternity implies causality, or rather an anteriority in causes, which is > distinct from the world of the divine Essence which is preceded neither by a cause, nor by an > anteriority. We will return to this question in Chapter IX where we will treat in more detail the > world of the Aeon. > > The term “azal” is generally translated by “pre-eternity”. We have already encountered the problem > of pre-eternity when, in Chapter II, we discussed the pre-eternity of the soul. However, the concept > of pre-eternity is not at all the same when it is applied to a creature of God on the one hand, and > when, on the other hand, it is applied to God in His Essence. The pre-eternity of God designates the > ontological sphere in which God exists in a manner totally independent from His creation, as if the > world had not “yet” come into existence. In one of his Tablets, Baha’u’llah defines the world of > “azal” as the world which has no beginning (azal al-la-badayat).293 This is thus Hahut. It is thus that we > read in “Hidden Words”: > “Munajat,” No. 28, p. 64; English: PM, No. 38, n.p. Shoghi Effendi has not sought to render the distinction > between “azal” and “abad”. Both members of the phrase are summed up by the expression “from eternity...” > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > “Veiled in My immemorial being and in the ancient eternity (azaliyya) of My essence, I knew > My love for thee.”294 > > Let us remark that even though the expression “pre-eternity which has no beginning” renders well > the meaning of “azal”, Baha’u’llah does not speak here of the pre-existence of God, but of the pre- > existence of the contingent creatures (ka'inat). This indicates that pre-eternity has different degrees, > and that the pre-eternity of contingent beings is distinguished from the pre-eternity of the divine > Essence. In both cases, the epithet “which has no beginning” defines precisely, and following the > usage of the Arabic language, the word “azal”. The Arab glosograph Tahanawi writes that “azal is > the persistent duration of duration in the past, even as abad is the persistent duration in the > future”295. This altogether corroborates what Baha’u’llah says in the “Tablet of Varqa'“ which we > cited earlier296, in which after having spoken of “azal” “which has no beginning”, he speaks of > “abad” “which has no end”297. Hernandez, attempting to define these terms, indicates that if “azal” > implies the negation of a first beginning, “azal” and “abad” coincide in God. He adds “the two > eternities are but negative conceptions to which reflective thought has recourse in order to grasp > eternity in relation to time, but which does not correspond to the infinite reality of time in the two > senses; they are relative to the mode of thought fitted to the human spirit”.298 This remarks perfectly > fits the thought of Baha’u’llah. It is without doubt in order to remove the ambiguity which exists > between the pre-eternity of the divine Essence and the pre-eternity of the contingent creature that > Baha’u’llah sometimes had recourse to the term “dahr” which for him most often signifies the same > thing as “azal”. > > The word “abad” corresponds to the eternity of the creature. “Abad” supposes a beginning but no > end. It is the eternity of the soul. The soul has a temporal and individual beginning with the > conception of the embryo, but its existence has no end. Its eternal and archetypal beginning is found > in its ontological cause which is situated in the spiritual worlds independently of its terrestrial > generation. > > As for the meaning of the word “sarmad”, we should not pay too much attention to the definitions > which Baha’u’llah cites in “The Seven Valleys”. “Sarmad” from his pen, as besides from the pen of > ‘Abdu’l-Baha299, is generally a strict synonym of “abad”. It thus designates the eternity of the > contingent world. > > If we now refer to the metaphysical conceptions of Baha’u’llah, and in particular to his conception > of the three worlds —the World of the divine Essence, the World of Revelation and the World of > the creature— it would be logical to expect that there exist three principal archetypes of time which > would correspond to these three worlds. However, we find only a very few indications of such a > > Arabic “Hidden Words,” Shoghi Effendi translation, #3. > R. Hernandez, article, “Qidam” in Encyclopedia of Islam. > “Munajat,” No. 36, p. 36; English: PM, No. 36, p. 46. > In Arabic: “Abad al-la-nihayya”. > R. Hernandez, op.cit. > For example, “Makatib,” volume I, pp. 444-456, where the two words appear several times in a perfectly > synonymous manner. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > correspondence in the writings of Baha’u’llah, no doubt because the question would have appeared > futile to him. As we have seen, the archetypes of time do not relate to duration, but to ontological > causality. The World of Revelation must then have its own time, distinct from the eternity of the > divine Essence, and distinct from the eternity of the created spiritual realities. However, to discuss > the eternity of the divine Manifestations appears to be totally fruitless. We can at least speak of the > eternity of God taking the apophatic path, but this apophatic path is of no usefulness to us when > speaking of the divine Manifestations, because to speak of such a subject supposes that man is > capable of understanding the relations which link God with His Manifestations, and this is totally > impossible. We sometimes find the word “sarmad” associated with the World of Revelation, which > shows that its employment is far from being exclusive. It seems then that in the estimation of > Baha’u’llah, neither Persian nor Arabic was able to furnish an adequate term. We may note that > ‘Abdu’l-Baha, in speaking of his father, employed the expression “Jamal-i-qidam” which is usually > translated as “Ancient Beauty”. The term “qidam” has a very precise metaphysical meaning, > designating the eternity of that which has not been engendered. Baha’u’llah is effectively described > as the One whom the Qur'an designates as “He Who is neither engendered nor engenders”300. > Even though the divine Essence is the ontological cause of the Manifestations and of the Holy Spirit > in general, to say nothing yet of the Most Great Spirit, nevertheless the ontological relationship > which links the World of Revelation to the divine Essence is not the same as the relationship which > links the World of creation to the divine Essence. It is this difference of relationship which underlines > the expression “Ancient Beauty”. > > As ‘Abdu’l-Baha indicates in “Some Answered Questions”, from a human point of view, the World > of Revelation has neither beginning nor end.301 He points out that the divine Manifestations possess > three stations: the physical station, the human station which is also the station of the soul endowed > with reason, and the divine state of Manifestation. The state of Manifestation appears to the human > observer to be submitted to various terrestrial conditions, but actually that which is manifested in the > mirror of the Manifestation is the divine light which was not engendered, the illumination which > results from the total unity of the essence of the Manifestation with the divine Essence302. > > Note that the three states of the divine Manifestation correspond respectively to Nasut, Malakut — > which are the two parts of the created world— and Jabarut which is identified with Revelation. > > 6. The Time of the Soul > > Finally, the only kind of time which is truly important for the human being is the time of Malakut, > the time of the eternity of the soul. To answer the question of how time is experienced in the > Kingdom of Abha can singularly enlighten us regarding the reality of the soul in the spiritual world. > Baha’u’llah affirms that after death, the soul conserves its self-consciousness and also its > consciousness of the other souls which surround it.303 However, in the terrestrial world self- > consciousness is inseparable from the uninterrupted movement of thoughts, and this flux of thought > > Discussed in 'Ali-Murad Davudi, “Uluhiyyat va Mazhariyyat,” pp. 170-172. Translator’s Note: Qur’an 112:3. > “Some Answered Questions,” XXXVIII, pp. 173-176. > 'Ali-Murad Davudi, op.cit., p. 171. > Translator’s Note: GL:LXXXVI. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > governs the interior perception of time. It is inseparable from our sense of duration and this sense is > characterized always with the possibility of segmentation. If we affirm that the soul after death is a > spiritual reality outside of time this implies that the consciousness that this spiritual reality would > have of itself would be singularly different from our terrestrial consciousness because that > consciousness would no longer be characterized by a flux of thoughts fixed in duration and > segmentable in the midst of this duration. Yet, this is the form whereby most religions represent the > life after death. Do we say that the consciousness of the soul is situated outside of time and therefore > is congealed in its own eternity? Such a view is also incompatible with what Baha’u’llah tells us of > the life in the spiritual worlds. He tells us that the soul after death will adopt the form most suitable > to its state, which implies already a different state of consciousness, and that subsequently it will > experience an evolution throughout the different divine worlds which will result in it taking infinite > steps of becoming perfect, permitting it to reconcile itself ever increasingly with divine perfection. > This evolution implies thus a sort of kinetic movement interior to the soul the like of which it must > have some consciousness. > > Finally, we can imagine that this movement of becoming perfect must be discovered at the source of > the consciousness which the soul has of itself. How are we to conceive of a movement of becoming > perfect independently from time, as it is eternal, and from the feeling of duration? There is a > problem here which seems to be without response given the limitations of human understanding. > Nevertheless, this problem has the merit of attracting our attention to the fact that the Baha’i > writings are far from conceiving the life after death as a simple prolongation of our states of > terrestrial consciousness. Upon entering Malakut, not only does the soul lose its psyche (nafs), that is to > say the part of its consciousness which contains our psychological unconscious and the > characteristics of our terrestrial “me”, but it also loses what we are habituated in this world to > consider as the determinant elements of our self-consciousness, that is to say the flux of thoughts > inscribed in duration. Hence we think of how frightful it would be to spend an eternity in the lonely > contemplation of ourselves in the mirror or our self-consciousness. For such an eternity to be, on the > contrary, unimaginable in blessedness, it is necessary that this consciousness shed the “me” to > become a pure identity and a pure individuality existing in communion with souls animated by the > same movement of progression along the degrees of their possible perfection. In this way we may > better comprehend why the shedding of ego is a primordial necessity in the totality of spiritual life. > The Baha’i Faith does not conceive of life after death as a simple prolongation of terrestrial life. > Rather, it is made up of a radical transformation of the soul in a world which, as Baha’u’llah > emphasized in the “Tablet of Haqqun-Nas” must be totally different from this world, notably in its > mode of existence. Here we are very far from the traditional representation of Paradise which the > Western world inherited from Swedenborg.304 > > 7. The three metaphysical worlds > > To comprehend the meaning of the nomenclature of the divine worlds in the “Tablet of All Food” > we have adopted a twofold course. On the one hand, we have collected from the writings of > Baha’u’llah all the indications that relate directly to this nomenclature, and we have attempted to > reconstruct the image of each one of the divine worlds. On the other hand, we have conducted an > historical investigation to establish the origin and the evolution of this nomenclature with the aim of > McDannel, Collen and Lang, “Heaven: A History,” New Haven and London, 1988. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > seeking to become apprised of the relation between this system in its mature phase and the manner > in which Baha’u’llah alludes to it in his writings. This has permitted us to recognize that the > significance of the nomenclature of the divine worlds in the writings of Baha’u’llah is not > metaphysical, but hermeneutical. He himself affirms this very clearly in the “Tablet of All Food” > when he declares that the significance of the expression “all food” must be sought in relation to each > of these worlds. This does not however mean that this nomenclature is deprived of all metaphysical > contents. But if we wish to know the metaphysical thought of Baha’u’llah, our purpose should not be > to seek it in this system. > > There are other texts of Baha’u’llah, with extensive commentaries by ‘Abdu’l-Baha, which utilize a > completely different nomenclature. This nomenclature is not founded upon the four or five worlds > which we find in the “Tablet of All Food”, but upon three worlds that are much more clearly > delineated—the World of the unmanifested Essence, the World of Manifestation (also called the > World of Command), and the World of Creation. > > It is difficult to reconcile this nomenclature of three worlds with that which we have earlier > described. It is better to consider them in a totally independent manner. > > Nevertheless, we may note that the World of the unmanifested Essence corresponds clearly to Hahut, > even though it embraces certain aspects of Lahut. It is the “Absconditum”, the world of the Hidden > Treasure, the world of the injunction “Never wilt thou contemplate My countenance” and of “The > way is closed, seeking it is forbidden”305. > > The World of the Manifestation is a world entirely distinctive to Baha’i metaphysics. It is this World > which gives Baha’i metaphysics its particular character and which, from many points of view, > renders it totally incompatible with Islamic theology. The concept of Manifestation plays the same > role in Baha’i thought as that of incarnation in Christian theology. The two concepts are not > without relation. It is for this reason that the teaching of Baha’u’llah often appears to be closer to > Christian than to Islamic theology. > > The World of the Manifestation is the world of the divine Messenger, that is to say, of the Prophet. > For Baha’u’llah, the Prophet is not a man like other men—it is a cosmic principle. This is why, > following the example of the Bab, he entirely abandons the vocabulary of Islamic prophetology and > does not speak of the “messenger” (rasul) or of the “prophet” (nabi) when referring to the “divine > Manifestation” (mazhar-i-ilahi). There is an ambiguity in the English word “manifestation” for this > word can have signify at the same time the active and the passive, while in Arabic there are two > words that distinguish these two aspects of one condition: “zuhur” and “mazhar”. “Mazhar” to be > precise is not “Manifestation” but the “place of Manifestation”, in this case of God, for if God as > Essence is unknowable, then the only way for man to approach knowledge of Him, is through the > knowledge of these “places of Manifestation”, that is to say, His Prophets. > > The “divine Manifestation” is described as similar to a pure mirror having the capacity to perfectly > reflect the light of the divine sun. It is the incarnation of all the names, attributes and qualities, of the > unknowable Essence of God; names, attributes and qualities which it emanates upon all the world of > creation. It is thus through these “divine Educators”, and only through them, that man can have an > Celebrated utterance of Muhammad (hadith): “Al-sabilu masdudun wa al-talabu mardudun.” > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > idea of Divinity. They are the channel through which the Holy Spirit passes, susceptible to enkindle > the “spirit of faith” in the human soul, which is the result of the illumination of the soul when it is > endowed with the true and intimate knowledge of the Manifestation. We will return more > expansively to this World of Manifestation in Chapter XIV. > > After the World of Manifestation comes the World of Creation ('alam-i-khalq). This World is not only > the physical world (Mulk), nor even the human world (Nasut), but also the world of souls (Malakut). It > includes all of the spiritual worlds with their infinite diversity of creatures as well as the Imaginal > World which serves as the interface between the worlds of spiritual realities (haqa'iq) and the physical > world. There as well, we will return to all of these notions. > > This metaphysical conception has as its consequence the suppression of every possibility of dualism > and the considerable reduction of opposition between the sensible and the intelligible which so > characterized Greek, and later Christian and Islamic, philosophy. We will return in the last part of > this study to the philosophical consequences of this conception. What is important to underline, is > that the World of Manifestation is not a simple “inter-world” as the Imaginal World was in the > Illuminative Theosophy of the Ishraqis and Shaykhis. One must take account of the existence of this > independent world in order to comprehend the mystical and philosophical vocabulary of > Baha’u’llah, for it induces a profound semantic sliding. > > 8. The condition of servitude and of lordship > > Traditional Islam contrasts the rank of the servitude of man to the absolute power of God to which > man owes total submission. The word “'abd” signifies at the same time “servant” and “slave”, but > beyond this, in its form “'ibad” meaning “worshipper”, it is the term par excellence depicting the > human condition. To man is reserved the condition of servitude ('ubudiyya) and to God the condition > of lordship (rububiyya). The title of “Lord” (rabb) is contrasted with that of “servant” ('abd). Shi'i > theology has refined this terminology in distinguishing two conditions in God: the inaccessible > Essence, the “Absconditum” also called “Invisible of the invisibles” (Ghayb al-ghuyub), which is the > condition of the Deity (uluhiyya), and the condition of the manifestation of this essence, which > corresponds to the deployment of His attributes in the condition of lordship (rububiyya). We find a > very good example of this theology in the “Text of texts” of Haydar Amuli306, where these three > conditions are depicted as three “theophanies” (tajalli). Nevertheless, this theosophy is still very > marked by the Platonism of Ibn Sina, which totally disappears in Baha’u’llah. For Haydar Amuli, > the divine Essence constitutes the henadic unity (ahadiyya) which contains in itself all the spiritual > realities (haqa'iq). For Baha’u’llah, this position is incompatible with the absolute affirmation of divine > transcendence. The unknowable Essence contains nothing in itself but itself, excluding everything > else, be it in the form of thoughts, images, traces or potentialities. The first emanation is engendered, > but never was it contained in the Essence. Furthermore, this Essence being by definition > unknowable, it can not be understood either in terms of theophany or in terms of emanation. For > Haydar Amuli, on the contrary, the henadic unity constitutes the first theophany, from which > emanates the second theophany which constitutes the “primordial determination” (ta'ayyun awwal). It > is this second theophany which renders possible the passage of the one to the multiple. The > contemplation by the divine Essence of its eternal attributes brings it to the condition of monadic > Haydar Amuli, “The Text of texts,” 1966, p. 451. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > unity (wahidiyya) from which are derived the seminal reasons (a'yan thabita), which are the archetypes > of all the potential essences. The third theophany is produced in the condition of lordship (rububiyya). > Being manifests itself therein like light capable of engendering the multiplicity of the contingent > creatures. It is the emanation of “the testimonial existence” (wujud shuhudi) which carries the > revelation of the divine names and attributes of which the contingent creatures will become, in the > condition of servitude ('ubudiyya), the “attestations” (shuhud). > > In the metaphysic of Baha’u’llah, this language assumes a completely different character. > Baha’u’llah situates the divine Essence beyond all conditions. One cannot even attribute to Him the > condition of Deity, for this condition is an image which men have formed of their Creator, and like > every image of the inaccessible Creator, it is unfailingly deficient and false. To the great scandal of > the Muslim “doctors”, Baha’u’llah does not hesitate to accord the condition of Deity (uluhiyya) and > lordship (rububiyya) to the divine Manifestation, that is to say to the Prophet307. > > In the “Book of Certitude” (Kitab-i-Iqan), Baha’u’llah explains that the three conditions of Deity, > Lordship and Servitude belong to the divine Manifestations308. The condition of Lordship > corresponds to the World of Command or the World of Revelation; and the condition of Servitude > to the created World309. It is for this reason that Shoghi Effendi often translates “rububiyya” > (Lordship) by expressions such as “Voice of Divinity” or “domain of Divinity”310. For the Baha’is, > the affirmation of the divine unicity (tawhid) does not consist merely through affirming, like Muslims, > that God is one, but resides in the affirmation that God and His Manifestation form but one and the > same entity. Thus in the station of unicity (tawhid) and of differentiation (tajrid), the Deity and > Lordship are identified in the henadic unity (ahadiyyat) and in the divine ipseidy (huvviyyat), that is to > say in the unknowable Essence311. Otherwise put, the henadic unity (ahadiyyat) and the monadic > unity (wahidiyyat) are identified with that Essence. To the henadic unity corresponds the condition of > Deity, and to the monadic unity corresponds the condition of Lordship. But these two conditions are > identified for the sake of man's comprehension. The Prophet is the Lord (rabb) of man, but he is also > the Servant of God and his condition of Servitude is even greater and more perfect than the > servitude of man312. It is because his condition of Servitude in relation to God is perfect that the > divine Manifestation can claim the rank of Lord of man for the human condition of servitude is in > comparison totally deficient. > > Between the condition of unicity (tawhid)313 and the condition of differentiation (tafsil)314 on the one > hand, and the metaphysical problem of the passage of the one (tafrid) to the multiple (tafsil) on the > > “Kitab-i-Iqan,” p. 139; English: “Book of Certitude,” pp. 178-179. > “Kitab-i-Iqan,” pp. 136-140; English: “Book of Certitude,” pp. 175-180. > “Kitab-i-Iqan,” p. 140; English: “Book of Certitude,” p. 180. > For example, “Book of Certitude,” p. 181. > “Kitab-i-Iqan,” p. 137; English: “Book of Certitude,” p. 177. Shoghi Effendi translates here “rububiyyat” by > “Godhead,” “uluhiyyat” by “Divinity”, “wahidiyyat” by “Singleness”, and “huvviyyat-i-batinih” by “Inmost > Essence”. > “Kitab-i-Iqan,” p. 139; English: “Book of Certitude,” p. 179. > “Kitab-i-Iqan,” p. 136; English: “Book of Certitude,” p. 176. > “Kitab-i-Iqan,” p. 137; English: “Book of Certitude,” p. 178. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > other hand, there exists a purely homological relation, and not a relation of causality. In the plan of > creation, there exists but one Manifestation which is the universal Manifestation from which are > engendered the individual Manifestations. The homological relation ends there. > > Baha’u’llah here deconstructs the traditional frameworks of scholastic thought by separating two > problems: that of the operation of the divine Verb, which he treats upon a theological level, and the > purely ontological problem of the engenderment of Being. The divine Essence is at once beyond > Being and beyond singularity (Ahad, tafrid). Of God, it is not even possible to say that He is one. To > introduce singularity is to introduce limitation. Everything that man can think has a relationship > only with the World of Revelation. Consequently, it is neither at the level of the divine Essence, nor > at the level of the World of Revelation that one should pose the problem of the passage of the one to > the multiple, but on the level of the created World. Baha’u’llah brings metaphysics back to earth, > and in doing so, he makes renews the possibility of a dialogue between metaphysics and physics > thereby making possible the existence of a comprehensive philosophy of Nature, the aim of which is > to embrace and to link together the noetic, epistemological, heuristic, physical and metaphysical > aspects of reality. This is a veritable philosophical revolution. > > SECOND PART: > THEOSOPHY > > CHAPTER SEVEN: > GNOSIS AND THE INTERIOR TRANSFORMATION OF MAN > > The preceding chapters enabled us to see that the Baha’i conception of the divine worlds reveals > a true metaphysical system, the major lines of which we have already described. We have > repeatedly alluded to the hermeneutical character of this hierarchy of worlds, without however > applying ourselves to exploring the inner meaning thereof. This and the following chapters will > aim to clarify the link which exists between metaphysics and hermeneutics on the one hand, and > between theosophy and the philosophy of nature on the other hand. It will be our objective to > demonstrate that the teaching of Baha’u’llah is presented before all else as a theosophy, that is to > say a gnosis that aspires to bring about the total transformation of the individual, linked to an > interpretation of the cosmos which establishes a tie between the universe and the revealed Word. > We will begin our exposition examining the tie between the universe and the revealed Word by > studying the specific character of Baha’i gnosis, and subsequently the relations between > Revelation and its hermeneutical interpretation. > > 1. Gnosis and Reality > > The Western reader often has difficulty accepting that in order to understand the writings of > Baha’u’llah, as in the case with those of most of the Oriental mystics, one must first abandon > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > most of one's reading habits and one's preconceptions about the relations between the contents > and the form of a literary text. We are used to considering style as a secondary element of > discourse, as a simple ornament. But manifest in the writings of Baha’u’llah we should not expect > to find the Cartesian rules of discourse, nor the counsels of Boileau upon the clarity of style. The > writings of Baha’u’llah refuse to fit into any conventional form. They are closer to poetry than to > philosophical discourse, because they aim at communicating the ineffable. The conception which > underlies them is based on the principle that it is not possible to separate the spiritual from the > material, the intelligible from the sensible, the imagined from the empirical. Not one physical > being can be reduced to its sensible dimension, for every object, be it the most prosaic, contains > also a spiritual dimension. The world possesses therefore various levels of reality. Beyond the > empirical reality, there exists a spiritual reality, itself composed of various levels of reality, which > altogether form not another world, but a higher reality (haqiqat) within the world of creation. > The writings of Baha’u’llah aim at giving us access to this higher reality, and it is in this manner > that they constitute a gnosis. > > By gnosis in this instance, we must not suppose that this refers to a commonplace variety of > esoteric knowledge, nor even to an initiated teaching which conventicles claim to dispense with > more or less avowed purposes. Rather here the word “gnosis” should be comprehended in its > strongest, most elevated and most noble sense: a knowledge which is acquired only through the > gradual transformation of our inner being. The writings of Baha’u’llah are interspersed with > warnings to the effect that no one will be able to understand his teaching without having first > detached himself from the world and all that it contains, without having purified his eyes, his ears > and his heart. There are entire Tablets which are consecrated to his methods for the acquisition > of this state of spiritual judgment. > > We will easily comprehend that the “gnostic” purpose of this teaching conditions its form. Also, if > Baha’u’llah does not neglect to address the mind, he also speaks to the heart, to that spiritual > “sense” that is a form of intuition linked to the experience which our soul has of the higher > spiritual worlds and of their analogical and homological relations with the world below. For this > purpose Baha’u’llah adopts a style which addresses itself directly to this intuition, by means of a > language of symbols drawn from the common patrimony of the human collective unconscious, of > which the world of dreams sometimes gives us a furtive glimpse. This aspect of his writings is > without doubt the most perplexing for the Occident reader who habitually considers metaphors > as primitive artifices, from which the rational discourse of modern man should divest itself, and > who sees in the trees, the wind, the birds evoked by Baha’u’llah, the excesses of a superannuated > Oriental style from which one must remove the husks in order to arrive at the substantive pith of > true meaning. The danger of such an attitude would be to assume that when the writings of > Baha’u’llah speak of roses and nightingales they are merely charming allegories, and to imagine > that these are only the accessories of a style which addresses itself to simple souls, the symbolism > of which is easy to decipher. It is because of this that Baha’u’llah says that worldly knowledge is > the thickest of all veils which obscure our spiritual judgment, our capacity to recognize the truth. > > Thus, for Baha’u’llah the words which Revelation utilizes are the vehicles of an infinite force > which has the capacity to transform both man and the world. This force can not be reduced to > the semantic content of mere words, even as he writes in His “Commentary on the Surah of > Wa'l-Shams: > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > “Know assuredly that just as thou firmly believest that the Word of God, exalted be His > glory, endureth for ever, thou must, likewise, believe with undoubting faith that its > meaning can never be exhausted.”315 > > We have thus been informed that the words of Baha’u’llah cannot be reduced to a single > meaning, even in their most literal and obvious sense. On the contrary, there is an abundance of > meanings. In fact, not only is there a personal meaning for each reader, but for every reader > there exist a multitude of significances each one of which is adapted to the spiritual state which > he is destined to traverse. > > 2. The Veiled Reality > > Not only is the meaning of the words inexhaustible, but furthermore the words themselves > cannot imprison reality. This is one of the fundamental themes of Baha’i epistemology: the > universe is only partially accessible to reason. Not only is reason unable to reach the ultimate > reality of the cosmos, but there exists, beyond the cosmos, a spiritual universe which in its > greatest measure escapes reason altogether. Even this world is only partially intelligible. > Baha'u'llah writes, in the same Tablet cited above: > > “How great the multitude of truths316 which the garment of words can never contain! > How vast the number of such verities as no expression can adequately describe, whose > significance can never be unfolded, and to which not even the remotest allusions can be > made!”317 > > Baha’u’llah however does not fall into the thesis of solipsism318. To affirm that rational language > cannot grasp the ultimate reality of the universe does not signify that reason is deprived of > meaning and of definiteness, but that the ultimate reality of the universe does partially escape the > grasp of human understanding. To attain to this extra-rational meaning requires a transcendence > of reason, a spiritual knowledge, thus, a gnosis. > > Here we encounter the problem which is posed by every attempt to communicate a mystical > experience: how to explain in words what is, in its very essence, ineffable? What is particularly > interesting, is that Baha’u’llah extends this problem to the whole of reality. We will see this > question come up when we try to encompass the Baha’i notion of “Nature” for Baha’u’llah says > that Nature is a reality similar to the spirit of manxiv, and ‘Abdu’l-Baha defines Nature as an > “intelligible reality”, that is to say, a reality that is not sensiblexv. The essence of the sensible is not > sensible—hence the empirical perception of reality can only be partial. The apprehension of the > ultimate reality of the physical universe is of the same nature as the mystical experience of the > > GL:LXXXIX:175. Translator’s Note: Surat ash-Shams is Qur’an chapter 91, which, after the > Bismillah, begins “w’ash-shams”. > Haqiqat; pl. haqa'iq; that is to say, “truth” but also “reality”. > GL:LXXXIX:176 > 318Translator’s Note: Solipsism represents the triumph of subjectivism, the perspective or theory that the > > self is all that can be known to exist. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > supernatural realms. It is a mystical experience in itself! > > To consider these matters we will borrow the terminology of Bernard d'Espagnat, who defines > the universe as a veiled reality which escapes all realistic interpretation. It is striking to see > Baha’u’llah utilizing a vocabulary very close to this, taking up the image of the veil (hijab) which > separates the observer of fundamental reality (haqiqat) from the creation situated outside of > sensible experience. Empirical reality, which d'Espagnat also calls “weak reality”, is but the > manifestation of an infinitely greater reality. Thus, this greater reality, the “strong reality”, a > term which we might translate as “surreality”, which Baha’u’llah calls haqiqat, is a non-physical > reality about which we can have only an approximate comprehension, through an anagogical > knowledge, be it by means of the natural intuition of man which perceives the nature of the real > through his spiritual experience as a constitutive part of this universe, or through the complex > noetic processes, such as the concepts constructed following the operation of mathematical > algorithms, but of which the human spirit does not succeed in arriving at a concrete > representation. In a certain fashion, these mathematical expressions do not function in a very > different manner from anagogical spiritual knowledge319. Nevertheless, the perception of reality > can not be reduced to a simple noetic process. Baha’u’llah informs us that spiritual asceticism > does not suffice to obtain this gnosis (ma'rifat, 'irfan); one must also be endowed with divine > election and special grace: > > “Of these truths some can be disclosed only to the extent of the capacity of the > repositories of the light of Our knowledge, and the recipients of Our hidden grace.”320 > > This gnosis is not one, but multiple, for not only does it have the capacity to multiply itself as a > function of all the spiritual states which the seeker traverses, but there exist various ways whereby > the seeker undertakes this journey, such as the way of the heart, the way of the spirit and the > illumination of the soul. > > 3. The conditions of the true seeker > > In order that the reader might understand the nature of the three kinds of gnosis spoken of by > Baha’u’llah, we must return to “the conditions of the true seeker” which constitute a recurrent > theme throughout the writings of Baha’u’llah. These conditions, variable in their number and in > their form, are a coherent whole which reflects an anthropological and psychological conception > of man that is entirely original. These “conditions” had, in the eyes of Baha’u’llah, such an > importance that he placed them in the opening paragraphs of his most important writings as a > warning to the reader. One of the most clear expositions of the conditions of the true seeker is > that found in the “Book of Certitude” (Kitab-i-Iqan): > > “But, O my brother, when the true seeker [mujahid] determines to take the step of search > in the path leading to the knowledge of the Ancient of Days, he must, before all else, > cleanse and purify his heart, which is the seat of the revelation of the inner mysteries > Regarding the questions of weak reality and strong reality see Bernard d'Espagnat, “A la recherche du > reel” (Paris, 3rd ed., 1991, pp. 132-168) > GL:LXXXIX:176 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > of God, from the obscuring dust of all acquired knowledge, and the allusions of the > embodiments of satanic fancy321. He must purge his breast, which is the sanctuary of the > abiding love of the Beloved, of every defilement, and sanctify his soul from all that > pertaineth to water and clay, from all shadowy and ephemeral attachments322. He must > so cleanse his heart that no remnant of either love or hate may linger therein, lest that > love blindly incline him to error323, or that hate repel him away from the truth.”324 > > This text begins by defining the scope and nature of search. The “true seeker” is a mujahid, that is > to say someone who has entered into jihad which is the effort (jahd) of man to arrive at the > knowledge of God. > > We clearly see three conditions described which are preliminary to this search: > > -purification of one's heart > -sanctification of one's soul > -refinement of one's feelings > > These three preconditions appear elsewhere with only a slight variation on the first page > introducing this same “Book of Certitude”, where Baha’u’llah cites them in this orderxvi: > > -sanctification of one's soul > -turning one's ears away from human sayings > -turning one's heart from terrestrial attachments > -turning one's spirit from worldly preoccupations > -turning one's eyes from viewing perishable things > > Innumerable Tablets begin with this kind of preliminary enumeration of preconditions. The > number of the preconditions is of little significance, for one can easily demonstrate that it is > possible in all cases to reduce them to three fundamental conditions. > > In the three preconditions of the true seeker, we find the three organs which constitute the > psychology of Baha’u’llah: the heart (qalb; dil), the spirit (nafs) and the soul (ruh). Here we discover > a great imprecision of vocabulary that is not attributable to Baha’u’llah, but which derives > originally from the Hebrew Scriptures325. Muslim theologians always had difficulty distinguishing > between the soul and the spirit, so some employ the word nafs in the sense of the soul, while > others in the sense of the spirit, and the same is true of ruh. The terminology of Baha’u’llah also > fluctuates, and to such a degree that one must always rely upon the context in order to be sure of > > The word “satanic” refers to the inferior nature of man, that is to say to his ego and to the heritage of > his animal nature in contradistinction to his divine self which is his spiritual nature. > The things of the sensible world are without reality in comparison with the surreality which constitutes > the spiritual world. > By “love”, we should understand here affection for sensible things and for created beings. > KI:#213:192; GL:CXXV:264 > 325Translator’s Notes: Denominated by Jews as the Tanakh – Torah, Neviim, Ketuvim; called the Old > > Testament by Christians. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > the meaning he intends by using the words nafs and ruh. The same unconsistency exists as much > in French as in English because of the inherent difficulties of the Greek and Latin root languages > in rendering the Hebraic terminology of the Bible. Ruh in the sense of the Holy Spirit is always > translated into Latin by Spiritus, but it is not the same as ruh in the sense of the eternal principle > which survives in man after death. Inasmuch as in French and English, this eternal reality is > called “the soul”, we will hold to this principle and will translate ruh and nafs by “soul” each time > these words designate that eternal reality. We will reserve the word “spirit” to designate the > psychical reality of man, which we will soon attempt to define. > > The vocabulary of Baha’u’llah is not limited though to these three words. The word “heart” can > serve to translate the Arabic qalb and the Persian dil which Baha’u’llah sometimes used as > synonyms, sometimes with differing definitions. The Arabic fu'ad is also used as a synonym for > qalb and dil. Finally, we encounter the word sidr which literally means “chest” and which is > susceptible of multiple meanings. The passage that we cited above from Kitab-i-Iqan is not a literal > translation from the Persian but rather an interpretative translation. When we read the original > text, we find three terms, qalb (heart in Arabic), sidr (chest) and dil (heart in Persian), which > Shoghi Effendi rendered respectively by “heart”, “breast” and “soul”326. The only thing which > we can divine from this terminology is that there seem to exist three elements in the psychology > of Baha’u’llah which can assume multiple appearances. If we delve more deeply into the writings > of Baha’u’llah, we find that underlying this fluctuating vocabulary is hidden a great consistency of > doctrine. The heart (qalb) is, for Baha’u’llah, the seat of intuition. It is also a mirror which must > be purified from the dust of the world in order to reflect the divine realities. The heart is “the seat > of the revelation of the inner mysteries of God”327, “the habitation of My beauty and glory”328. It > is compared with Mt. Sinai329, that is to say with the place where the Prophet Moses received his > divine calling. It is through his heart that man can understand the essence of the Sacred Books, > and hence the heart is where the spiritual hermeneutic (ta'wil) is unfolded. It is, according to the > terminology of the Ishraqi philosophers, the organ of the creative imagination. The heart being a > mirror, it is constantly in need of being cleansed; without this daily maintenance, it risks being > covered over by the dust of daily life and thereby lose its reflective properties. The heart thus puts > man in contact with higher mysteries. Detachment is the process that results in the purification of > the heart. In effect, the heart is actually a cognitive organ, the seat of gnosis and this gnosis is not > the product of an accumulation of knowledge, but rather the fruit of the interior transformation > of man. And, the key of this transformation of the heart is detachment: > > “No man shall attain the shores of the ocean of true understanding except he be detached > from all that is in heaven and on earth.”330 > > We will note here that detachment concerns things both terrestrial and celestial. To act with the > > We should remark here that “soul” and “spirit” do not correspond exactly to “ame” and “esprit” in > French, which does not facilitate the clarity of translations from one language to the other. > KI:#213:192; GL:CXXV:264 > Persian Hidden Word, #27: “…the human heart…the habitation of My beauty and glory…” > Persian Hidden Word, #63: “The light hath shone on thee from the horizon of the sacred Mount and > the spirit of enlightenment hath breathed in the Sinai of thy heart.” > KI:#1:3 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > hope of being recompensed in the other world, is to show evidence of an attachment to celestial > things. To be detached means much more than renouncing the good things of this world. In the > “Tablet of the Foundations of the Sovereign Good” (Lawh-i-Asl-i-Kullu'l-Khayr), also called the > “Words of Wisdom”, Baha’u’llah writes: > > “The essence of detachment is for man to turn his face towards the courts of the Lord, > to enter His Presence, behold His Countenance, and stand as witness before Him.”331 > > The nafs is the vital principle of man. It is at the same time his psyche. The nafs is the envelope > which contains the animal self, with all the instincts which we have inherited from our animal > nature, and the ego which is in fact the fruit of an illusion. Reinterpreted in modern terms, the > nafs is the organ of our psychical life. It contains all the elements of our personality, our > unconscious, our subconscious and our neuroses. It is nafs, and not the soul, which can be > affected by mental illness. The nafs is the organ of intellectual knowledge, and it is for this reason > that Baha’u’llah often compares the nafs to the eyes that see and the ears that hear. Two things > can impede our nafs from becoming conscious of the nature of the world. The first is its > subjectivity, what we call its egocentricity, which propel each man to see the world in the > manner which best suits him and which agrees with the opinion he has of himself; the second are > prejudices and acquired knowledge. It is because of these two impediments that Baha’u’llah > writes: > > “The true seeker hunteth naught but the object of his quest…Nor shall the seeker reach > his goal unless he sacrifice all things. That is, whatever he hath seen, and heard, and > understood, all must he set at naught…”332 > > This is what Baha’u’llah means in saying that man must “cleanse” his nafs “from all that is > earthly”.333 He must first renounce himself, his sense of personal identity, in order to find his > “divine self” which is the expression of the true spiritual nature of man, and he must subject his > passions and his instincts to this superior and divine nature (lahuti or ilahi). > > Ruh is something different from nafs. It is an essence (dhat) and “a spiritual reality” (haqiqat) the > function and attributes of which we have already largely described. This ruh constitutes the > authentic individuality of man and contains his true identity and personality, which have nothing > to do with the psychological characteristics which are the attributes of the psyche (nafs). The true > function of the ruh is to know his Creator, and through this knowledge to receive His grace (fayd), > and to grow and develop thereby. In fact, the ruh is endowed with a special faculty which is > reason ('aql). It would be dangerous to confuse this “reason” with the rational faculty of Western > philosophy in the 17th and 18th centuries. For Baha’u’llah, 'aql is that which distinguishes man > from the animal. It is thus spiritual, like the nature of man. Baha’u’llah writes, in the Tablet to > Hadi: > > “…this rational faculty…should be regarded as a sign of the revelation of Him Who is the > > TB:155 > SV:7 > KI:#2:3 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > sovereign Lord of all. Through its manifestation all these names and attributes have been > revealed, and by the suspension of its action they are all destroyed and perish.”334 > > “This same relationship bindeth this faculty with whatsoever hath been the recipient of > these names and attributes within the human temple. These diverse names and revealed > attributes have been generated through the agency of this sign of God.”335 > > Whereas the animal is the prisoner of Nature and its cognitive faculties do not permit it to > transcend the sensible world, 'aql permits man to access the intellectual and intelligible worlds, > that is, to understand the reality hidden in nature and to conceive of the spiritual realities. 'Aql is > thus the faculty which gives access to the spiritual world. Sometimes it is called the “creative > imagination”, given the relationship which exists between 'aql and the world of images ('alam-i- > mithal) and to distinguish it from the calculating reason defined by the philosophers of the > Enlightenment. > > It is now important to define the link which exists between ruh and nafs, which we will henceforth > characterize respectively as the soul and the psyche. > > The psyche is a transitory element which recapitulates various aspects of man. It is comprised in > part of what ‘Abdu’l-Baha calls “the animal spirit”, that is to say the vital principle which > animates the physical body and which permits us to perceive the world through our senses. The > animal spirit is mortal. ‘Abdu’l-Baha explains: “The animal spirit is the power of all the senses, > which is realized from the composition and mingling of elements; when this composition > decomposes, the power also perishes and becomes annihilated.”336 But the psyche is more than > the animal spirit. It is composed of a large part of our psychological characteristics, which we > habitually consider as determinating elements of our personality. Inasmuch as the soul cannot act > directly in this world, the relations of the soul with the sensible world take place through the > psyche. This psyche acts however not as a clear channel but as a distorting prism for it is > dominated by the subjectivity of the ego. The more the psyche depends upon “terrestrial > contingencies”337, the more our perception of the world is distorted. In order to see the world the > way it is in reality we must strip the psyche of the subjectivity of the ego. It is this subjectivity of > the ego which Baha’u’llah identifies with “the vain imaginations”338. For this reason, the essential > work of the transformation of the inner being requires the stripping of the ego and the > annihilation (fana) of the psyche. At the moment of death, the psyche disappears, thus at the same > moment the subjectivity of the ego disappears. The soul can then become conscious of itself and > of the world as they exist in their objective reality. Baha’u’llah says that the effect produced by > the disappearance of the psyche is like the sudden tearing of a veil. As soon as the veil disappears, > the soul can not take refuge in “the vain imaginations” and cannot have illusions about itself. It > becomes conscious of its rank and of its spiritual accomplishment, along with the value of all the > actions it committed in this world, so that Baha’u’llah writes: > > GL:LXXXIII:164 > GL:LXXXIII:165 > SAQ:LV:243 > Arabic: shu'unat-i'ardiyyih. > See, for example: GL:6,12,34,42,82-83,93,156,196,203-204,219,291,307,324,326,337-338 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > “It is clear and evident that all men shall, after their physical death, estimate the worth of > their deeds, and realize all that their hands have wrought.”339 > > The psyche is thus a transitory phenomenon which is born of the interaction of the soul and the > body. As soon as the tie between the soul and the body is broken, the illusion of the psyche > disappears. The veil of the “vain imaginations” is torn, and the subjectivity of the ego vanishes. > Therefore, the purpose of the soul in this life is to bring about the purification of the psyche from > the domination of illusion and temporality. A truly spiritual man is he who sees with the eyes of > the soul and not through the eyes of the psyche. The divine intention is that the soul be illumined > by the divine light and, like a mirror, to reflect this light in the heart of man so that his entire > being will be illumined. > > Regarding the soul and the heart, Baha’u’llah writes: > > “Cleanse thy heart with the burnish of the spirit [ruh, that is to say the soul], and hasten to > the court of the Most High.”340 > > “O son of being! Thy heart is My home; sanctify it for My descent. Thy spirit (ruh) is My > place of revelation; cleanse it for My manifestation.”341 > > “O son of man! The light hath shone on thee from the horizon of the sacred Mount and > the spirit (ruh) of enlightenment hath breathed in the Sinai of thy heart. Wherefore, free > thyself from the veils of idle fancies and enter into My court, that thou mayest be fit for > everlasting life and worthy to meet Me. Thus may death not come upon thee, neither > weariness nor trouble.”342 > > We see in these passages that the heart as much as the psyche (nafs) are subjected to the soul, > which demonstrates the interdependency of the three conditions of the true seeker: purify his > heart, release his psyche (nafs) and sanctify his soul (ruh). The soul being an essence, it is already > perfectly pure and can not be sullied, for terrestrial things have no effect upon it. It must > nevertheless receive the illumination of the divine light in order that it may become the mirror of > the Countenance of God, and so that the spiritual potentialities which form “the divine deposit” > in it may be activated. This illumination of the divine light constitutes what ‘Abdu’l-Baha calls > “the spirit of faith” (ruh-i-imani) or “the celestial spirit” (rúh-i-ásimaní), which comes from the > breaths of the Holy Spirit and, which, through the divine power, is the cause of eternal life. It is > this power which makes “the earthly man heavenly, and the imperfect man perfect. It makes the > impure to be pure, the silent eloquent; it purifies and sanctifies those made captive by carnal > > GL:LXXXVI:171 > Persian Hidden Words. #8; Majmu'ih, p. 385. The word ruh can have here a double meaning. It can > designate the soul, but also the Holy Spirit. However, in either case, the soul is the mirror of the Holy > Spirit. We are here in the presence of an illuminative metaphysic. > Arabic Hidden Words, #39 > Arabic Hidden Words, #63 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > desires; it makes the ignorant wise.”343 > > 4. The three kinds of gnosis > > In the writings of Baha’u’llah there is a close relationship established between psychology, > epistemology and the prerequisites of the true seeker. Baha’u’llah uses four terms in reference to > spiritual knowledge: 'ilm, ma'rifat, 'irfán and hikmat. The richness of this vocabulary implies a > specialized meaning for each of these words and conceals a complete gnoseology. Among the > four enumerated terms, 'ilm is a generic word in Arabic which designates all forms of science and > of knowing. In the writings of Baha’u’llah, this word designates either the knowledge of God in a > general sense, or it may substitute for any and all of the remaining three terms of the gnoseology. > It is for this reason that we find expressions such as “'ilm va ma'rifat”, “'ilm va 'irfan”, “'ilm va > hikmat” in which, each time, the word 'ilm serves to recall the other terms in the series. Shoghi > Effendi has most often translated ma'rifat with “divine knowledge” or “true knowledge” and 'irfan > with “true understanding.”344 These are arbitrary expressions which are used because of the lack > of a precise equivalent in the Western languages which would be capable of transmitting the > subtleties of the gnoseology of Baha’u’llah. Ma'rifat is susceptible of receiving multiple meanings > in Arabic and Persian. The term serves to describe more often the object than the process of > intellection. However, Baha’u’llah gives it a particular meaning which is rarely grasped prior to > long acquaintance with his writings. > > As for 'irfan, it is a technical term of the Sufis, adapted from Arabic to Persian, which perfectly > designates gnosis, the esoteric knowledge which is acquired through the transformation of the > inner being and the intuitive and direct awareness of the hidden meaning of words. 'Irfan is a > noetic process which permits one to apprehend “allusions” (ishárát) and penetrate mysteries (ásrár) > in order to arrive at the spiritual meaning (ma'ání) of the revealed Word through the deciphering > of its analogical symbols. 'Irfan is thus the perfect instrument for hermeneutics. Nevertheless, as > we shall see, Baha’u’llah considerably enlarges the meaning and the technique of 'irfan. Hikmat is > generally rendered as “wisdom”, for it is the special attribute of the sage (hakim) and thus the aim > of all gnoseology. There is no real wisdom without “true knowledge” (ma'rifat) and without “true > understanding” ('irfan). > > The vocabulary of the gnoseology of Baha’u’llah presents the same difficulties as that of his > psychology. The terminology which he has inherited is the fruit of long evolution and the vehicle > of ancient tradition. One cannot understand it by referring to dictionaries and encyclopedias. > One must penetrate the interior meaning of the texts. And, Baha’u’llah, once more refuses to > take a dogmatic stance. It is thus, probably by intention, that he does not permit complex truths > to be circumscribed in a reductionist phraseology. Thus, when we seek to determine the meaning > of the vocabulary of his gnoseology, we must at every step examine our results and accept that > one term may have multiple definitions which can only be clarified for us by the specific contexts > in which they are found. In the study of texts, it is evident that Baha’u’llah refers not only to > various levels of knowledge, but especially to several types thereof. It is these types of knowledge > which one must directly grasp notwithstanding the fluctuations in the usages of vocabulary. As > > SAQ:XXXVI:165 > KI:3,100. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > always, it is the law of context which must be imposed. This is without doubt one of the points > upon which Oriental logic contrasts most markedly with Western logic, and it is thus an > important source of misunderstandings. > > Several passages of the “Book of Certitude” (Kitab-i-Iqan) seem to suggest a close tie between the > different types of gnosis and psychology. At the end of the passage concerning the prerequisites of > the true seeker, Baha’u’llah writes: > > “Only when the lamp of search (talab), of earnest striving (majahidih), of longing desire > (dhuq), of passionate devotion (shuq), of fervid love ('ishq), of rapture, and ecstasy (valih, > judhb, hubb),345 is kindled in the seeker's heart (qalb), and the breeze of His loving-kindness > is wafted upon his soul, will the darkness of error be dispelled, the mists of doubts and > misgivings be dissipated, and the lights of knowledge ('ilm) and certitude (yaqin) envelop his > being. At that hour will the mystic Herald (bashir-i-manavi), bearing the joyful tidings of the > Spirit, shine forth from the City of God resplendent as the morn, and, through the > trumpet-blast of knowledge (ma'rifat), will awaken the heart (qalb), the soul (nafs), and the > spirit (ruh) from the slumber of negligence. Then will the manifold favours and outpouring > grace of the holy and everlasting Spirit (ruh-i-samadani) confer such new life upon the > seeker that he will find himself endowed with a new eye, a new ear, a new heart (qalb), > and a new mind (fu'ad).”346 > > This text clearly indicates that the purpose of the knowledge ('ilm) of God, the summation of all > forms of gnosis, is to awaken the heart (qalb), the psyche (nafs) and the soul (ruh) to a new life.347 It > is thus clearly established that these three elements of human psychological composition are not > only the components of the personality of man, but also constitute distinct organs of cognition. > We would thus be tempted, basing ourselves upon study of the texts, to establish a relatively close > link between the three psychological components of man and the three types of gnosis — true > knowledge (ma'rifat), true understanding ('irfan) and wisdom (hikmat). Of course, as the > psychological and gnoseological vocabulary of Baha’u’llah fluctuates, this association is suggested > more clearly by an analysis of the contents of these texts than by a purely semantic study of the > terms employed. With all of these preconditions, it seems that we can affirm the existence of > three kinds of knowledge—a knowledge of the psyche, a knowledge of the heart and a knowledge > of the soul. > > The first degree of gnosis, which Baha’u’llah often denotes with the term ma’rifat, is associated > with the purification and transformation of the psyche (nafs). It is this kind of knowledge which > one discovers by entering the “Valley of Search”348, that is to say through renouncing all that one > We have enumerated here some of the most important mystical states (hal) which the seeker is destined > to traverse before attaining to the station (maqam) of the “seventh valley” of “absolute nothingness” (fana). > This phrase merits a long commentary, not possible in this context, in order to more precisely describe > these states. > KI:#216:195-196; Cairo edition in Persian, p. 151. Fu'ad is another Arabic word for “heart”. Shoghi > Effendi translates it by “mind” while we have rendered it in French as “consciousness.” > The translation of these terms is unfortunately very ambiguous. It is only through reference to the > Arabic terms that we can protect ourselves from misunderstandings. > SV:5 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > has learned in accordance with the formula which Baha’u’llah often repeats—”The most > grievous of all veils is the veil of knowledge.”349 This knowledge, which is a veil, is what > Baha’u’llah calls “the exoteric sciences” (‘ulum-i-zahirih) and has no connection with the station > attained by true knowledge (ma’rifat).350 The veils which interpose themselves between > consciousness and true knowledge are of two kinds: those which come from acquired knowledge > and those which come from the passions (hawa), that is to say from the animal nature of man and > his ego. Thus, Baha’u’llah explains that knowledge (‘ilm) is of two kinds: divine and satanic. > Divine knowledge is received as an inspiration (ilhamat) coming directly from the spiritual realms > and is proportionate to the degree to which man makes himself ready to receive. Satanic > knowledge is derived from the suggestions of the ego, and results in one taking as real what is > nothing but the product of man’s perverted imagination (takhayulat) under the influence of the > “obscure self” (nafs-i-zalimani). These are the lowest aspects of the psyche, deriving directly from > our animal heritage, and it whispers egotistical desires in our ears and inspires terrestrial passions > in us.351 > > To recapitulate, on the one hand, Baha’u’llah tells us, we have satanic knowledge. Its source > resides in the suggestions of the egoistical desires, its principle operates like a veil between the > creature and his Creator; its result is arrogance (kibr), pride (ghurúr), and presumption (nakhvat) > which constitute a deadly poison resulting in destroying the life of the soul. On the other hand, > we have divine knowledge, the source of which is God Himself, and the principle of which is > “fear God and God will teach you.” This fear of God is above all a reverential fear. It proceeds > from the recognition of the subordination of the creature to his Creator, and is indispensable that > man may receive divine inspirations (ilhámát). Its result is manifested in man through the quality > of patience so characteristic of the “Valley of Search”, and the ardent desire (shúq) which > conducts man to the second degree of gnosis, true comprehension (irfán) and love (mahabat).352 > > The suggestions of the animal part of man are not the only obstacles between his consciousness > and the apprehension of true knowledge. Prejudices and thoughtless attachment to the opinion of > others [taqlid] also constitute veils which are difficult to tear through. Baha’u’llah affirms that in > order to attain true knowledge, one must forget what one has learned and renounce all > attachment to the heritage of one’s forebears.353 Likewise, other certitudes—ideological, > theological or even of clan and nation—constitute pseudo-identities which impede man from > arriving at the knowledge of the new Manifestation354, which is the source of all knowledge. > > True knowledge [mar’ifat] naturally leads to the second degree of gnosis which is “true > comprehension” (‘irfán). While true knowledge depends upon an effort of will and rationality, true > > KI:#206:188 > KI:#206:188; #237:214 > See KI:#76:69-70. This passage has remarkable similarities to the doctrine of Carl Jung. The “dark > self” of Bahá’u’lláh corresponds to what Jung calls “the shadow”. The expression nafs-i-zalimani is > contrasted with the expression nafs-i-rahmani (divine self) about which we will speak. > Ibid. We give here a commentary in the form of a paraphrase which combines this passage from the > “Book of Certitude” with others from the same book and from the “Seven Valleys”. > SV:5 > See KI:#16:16-17; #111:105-106. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > comprehension is a process which is even more intuitive and concerns the quintessential organ of > intuition, this is to say, the heart, which must be purified through detachment from terrestrial > things. It must be delivered from the prison of the psyche (nafs) and from the passions (hava).355 > The heart is like a mirror. Even when it is turned towards the spiritual kingdom (Malakút), there is > still a danger that the dust of the terrestrial world will collect upon it and enfeeble its power. This > is why the heart must be purified daily. > > When the heart is delivered from all attachment (ta’aluqát), it becomes the site of understanding > (idrák) and of inspiration (ilhámát), having contact with the invisible world (ghayb). Through a > process of inspiration and illumination, into the heart are deposited the secrets (asrár) of the divine > sciences (‘úlum-i-rabbání).356 > > The purification of the heart from the dust of malice (ghard) makes man capable of > comprehending the meaning of the symbolic terms revealed by the divine Verb in every > Dispensation.357 Here we recognize the traditional and technical sense of ‘irfán in the Persian > mystical tradition, but considerably enlarged. The difference relies essentially upon the fact that > the Sufis and mystics in general think that the acquisition of intuitive knowledge depends upon > their asceticism and their self-abnegation, while for Baha’u’llah intuitive knowledge is a grace > which is bestowed upon man according to the good-pleasure of God, totally dependent upon > influence of the divine Manifestations, Who are like the suns of science (‘ilm) and of true > comprehension.358 This true comprehension is manifested in the heart as an illumination (tajallí) > which causes man to become the locus of the manifestation (zuhúrát) of the graces (fuyúdát) > emanating from the infinite invisible world (ghayb-i-muntanahí).359 This true comprehension works > like a fire, which, the fire of the burning bush, destroying the veils which obscure spiritual > vision.360 Thereby the divine mysteries (asrár) and spiritual knowledge (‘ilm) appear to the seeker > divested of all veils.361 > > Man cannot arrive at this intuitive knowledge, without having already acquired true knowledge, > that is to say the purification of his understanding. The eye and the heart work together. The one > and the other are both sensitive to the seductions of the terrestrial world. Once the suggestions > (ishárát) of the material world are rejected, man attains true comprehension (‘irfán). This true > comprehension is equivalent to the knowledge of the truth (haqq), which requires no proof nor > testimony362, the truth of divine revelation, the ultimate reality of the universe and finally, God > (al-Haqq). The seeker thus traverses the different degrees of true comprehension (‘irfán) until he > ascends to the “heaven of the spirit” (rúh) in which he sees nothing but God in all things, and > knows all things only through the knowledge of God and of His Manifestations. Here we touch > > KI:#56:52 > KI:#77:70 > KI:#66:62 > KI:#2:3 > KI:#2:3 > KI:#57:53 > KI:#56:52 > KI:#100:91 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > upon an important point in Baha’i epistemology. Science communicates from the sensible world > to the intelligible world, gnosis communicates from the spiritual world to the terrestrial realm, > and theosophy brings about the synthesis of these two processes. True comprehension > participates in this dual process. It represents the knowledge which descends from the invisible > world, but it is not exclusively permit comprehension of the secrets of táwíl or of spiritual realities, > but rather it embraces all terrestrial realities as well. ‘Irfán makes accessible the knowledge of the > reality of things, not as independent entities, but as traces (áthár) of the Kingdom of Names, as > mirrors of the attributes of God, as realities dependent upon the divine reality of which they are > emanations. The knowledge of God is indispensable to arrive at comprehension of the ultimate > reality of creation, while to know God, we have need of nothing other than Him. > > The third degree of gnosis is constituted by wisdom (hikmat). Wisdom is the knowledge of the soul. > It is manifested in the soul when the seat of the soul is “sanctified” (taqdís). This “sanctification” > describes the process by which the soul acquires divine qualities, and it is the objective of the > entire process of the spiritual life. It does not merely require detachment, but also the > manifestation of positive qualities such as justice, compassion and especially love of the other. > The sanctified soul is the soul which manifests in this world the divine attributes which would > otherwise exist in it only in a state of potentiality. Wisdom is the highest manifestation of the > spiritual nature of man. > > The word “wisdom” designates two things in the Baha’i writings—on the one hand it is the > manifestation of divine qualities—wisdom thus becomes knowledge in action; and on the other > hand, it represents clear understanding of the mysteries (asrár) of God. While true comprehension > (‘irfan) is still a human level of knowledge, the sage participates in the knowledge of God. > > In the first sense, of wisdom in action, ‘Abdu’l-Baha is the perfect exemplar. Each and every one > of his actions was the manifestation of his perfect nature and of an absolute spirituality. All trace > of the ego having been effaced, ‘Abdu’l-Baha attained and adhered to the knowledge of > Baha’u’llah. His actions were the expression of the totality of his knowledge, and hence, they > manifested wisdom. This wisdom is thus not a literary knowledge or a science of words, but a > grammar of action—the science of just action at the just moment, the incarnation of absolute > love. > > Baha’u’llah alludes to another meaning of the word which is in fact closely dependent upon the > first. He speaks of the “mysteries of knowledge (‘ilm) and wisdom (hikmat)”363 and the “secrets of > divine wisdom” (asrár-i-hikmat-i-rabbání).364 He furthermore suggests that these “secrets” and these > “mysteries” are nothing other than the comprehension of the nature of the divine names. This > directs us to his speculative theology, which presents the creation as the reflection of the names > and attributes of the divine Essence. Thus, we find it written that whosoever meditates upon the > manifestation of the divine Names in the realities of all created things, will see open before him > the doors of wisdom (hikmat) and the portals of divine knowledge (‘ilm). There is thus a close link > between wisdom and the knowledge of the spiritual worlds. When man attains to the horizon of > divine science (‘ilm-i-rabbání), he obtains this divine vision (basírat-i-iláhíyyih) which, through the > > KI:#26:28 > KI:#106:100 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > intermediation of the perfect and eternal Verb (kalámat-i-támiy-i-samadáníyyih), makes him capable > of comprehending the mysteries (asrár)365 of spiritual wisdom (hikmat-i-rúhíyyih) and to contemplate > them without veils, behind the tabernacle of absolute grace (fadl wa afdál).366 Wisdom culminates > this power of spiritual vision which puts us into contact with the divine Verb, guardian of the > secrets of revelation and, permits us thereby to contemplate things hidden from the eyes of > mortals men. Elsewhere, Baha’u’llah declares that science (‘ilm) and wisdom (hikmat) act like fire > and that they are accessible only to those who possess spiritual vision (basírat) and divine nature > (fitrat).367 And he adds that wisdom does not appear except in the stainless heart.368 Finally, > wisdom is nothing other than the apprehension of revelation, not of the revealed Word but of > Revelation as cosmic law. > > 5. Gnosis as the knowledge of the divine Manifestations > > Even before the acquisition of divine virtues such as honesty and love, there is an even more > fundamental condition which the seeker must fulfill in order to obtain divine knowledge—he > must first recognize the Manifestation of God for the age in which he lives. > > This recognition of the Manifestation constitutes the first degree of gnosis, that is to say, the > object of “true knowledge” (ma'rifat). It is only through the attainment to this first degree that one > may arrive at a “new life” and acquire a “new spirit” (ruh)369, for the Prophets are the essences of > knowledge ('ilm) and comprehension ('aql)370. As explained above, 'aql is that intellectual power of > man which enables him to conceptualize divine mysteries and grasp intelligible realities. It is not > calculating, mechanical rationality, as is too often believed. This spiritual reason is at the same > time an imaginative faculty, capable of deciphering the symbols, an intuitive faculty, capable of > receiving impressions from the spiritual worlds, and a rational faculty, capable of correlating > these two powers of the soul and rendering their perceptions into terms which can be > comprehended by others. The true knowledge arrived at by this faculty through its recognition of > the Manifestation forms the veritable science of the divine unity (tawhid) and constitutes the > fundamental and supreme aim of creation371. This knowledge of the Manifestation, that is to say, > of the Prophet, is equivalent to the knowledge of God, for God is in Himself unknowable, > knowable only through His Manifestations. The only thing that we can know of Him, are His > names and attributes, of which the divine Manifestations constitute the most perfect mirror. > Their Countenance is nothing other than the divine knowledge372. The divine Manifestations are > > KI:#26:28 > KI:#16:16 > KI:#27:28 > KI:#211:191 > KI:#127:120 > KI:#158:149. Shoghi Effendi has here translated “'aql” by “understanding” whereas usually the word is > taken to connote “reason”. This is the spiritual intelligence that is also called the active imagination and > which permits us to comprehend spiritual realities. We will speak further of this active imagination in > relation to the imaginal world. > KI:#27:28 > KI:#151:142 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > themselves manifestations of the world of the “invisible” (ghayb). They are the “essences of > knowing” (jawhar-I-'ilm) and the “symbols of wisdom” (lata'if-I-hikmat).373 They constitute the > heaven of knowing and knowledge of which they are also the emanation. They are the cause of > the faith of “the tree of unity” (tawhid) which manifests the “fruits of its absolute singularity” > (tafrid), “the leaves of detachment” (tajrid), “the flowers of divine knowledge” ('ilm) and of > “certitude” (iqan), “the breezes of wisdom” (hikmat) and of “elucidation” (bayan).374 > > The knowledge of the divine Manifestations is one and undivided, even as the knowledge of God > is one and unique. It is the expression of all the divine names and attributes. It is thus much more > than a knowing. In order to descend to the level of humanity, this knowledge appropriates the > vehicle of Revelation which incarnates itself in human language. It is for this reason that > Baha’u’llah describes the Manifestation as a sun shining above knowledge ('ilm) and spiritual > sense (ma'ani).375 The Prophets are the depositories of this spiritual sense. They are the only ones > who know the true hermeneutic (ta'wil). True comprehension ('irfan) is that which permits man to > enter into contact with the spiritual sense, but he can not do this without the guidance and > spiritual intermediation of the Manifestation. This knowledge of the Manifestation is the only > means which can confer upon the soul (ruh) a new life376, and this new life is the spirit of faith. > This spirit of faith constitutes the purpose of the creation of man. In this sense, the spirit of faith > is identical to knowing the divine.377 > > 6. The unity of the spiritual knowing > > There is a danger in attempting to present the three kinds of gnosis that we have identified > independently of each other. The process of the spiritual awakening of man is unique, and these > three divine gnoses form a unity, even if divers pathways lead to this unity. Baha’u’llah writes: > > “Therefore, O brother! kindle with the oil of wisdom (hikmat) the lamp of the spirit (ruh) > within the innermost chamber of thy heart (fu'ad), and guard it with the globe of > understanding ('aql), that the breath of the infidel may extinguish not its flame nor dim its > brightness. Thus have We illuminated the heavens of utterance (bayan) with the > splendours of the Sun of divine wisdom (hikmat) and understanding ('irfan), that thy heart > (qalb) may find peace, that thou mayest be of those who, on the wings of certitude (iqan), > > KI:#45:44 > KI:#30:33-34. The sequence of Persian terms which we find here do not form an accidental series, but > constitute different characteristic techniques of Bahá’í spirituality. Unfortunately, English cannot render > the great richness of this vocabulary. Tajrid for example indicates the privation of the self which is > reduced to its pure spiritual nature. > 375Translator’s Note: KI:#26:28: “…they surely would have been guided to the light of the Sun of Truth, > > and would have discovered the mysteries of divine knowledge and wisdom.” KI:#151:142: “The > knowledge of Him, Who is the Origin of all things, and attainment unto Him, are impossible save > through knowledge of, and attainment unto, these luminous Beings who proceed from the Sun of > Truth.” > KI:#124:118 > KI:#26:28 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > have soared unto the heaven of the love of their Lord, the All-Merciful.”378 > This citation recapitulates all that we have said regarding Baha’i psychology and Baha’i gnosis. > At the same time, it shows the unity of this spiritual knowledge. > > In another text, Baha’u’llah writes that it is by the grace of the “waves of mercy” (ghamam-i- > rahmat), that is to say that by virtue of a particular grace, that the heart may become a fertile soil > for the growth of divine knowledge (ma'rifat) and wisdom (hikmat).379 This mercy, he says, descends > from the “heaven of Revelation” by grace “of the breezes of generosity” and the “breaths of > unity”. The unity which is here referred to is the knowledge of the tawhid, that is to say, for > Baha’u’llah, the comprehension of the nature of the divine Manifestation. It is through the power > of this grace that divine knowledge and wisdom expand their illumination within the heart.380 > This grace has the capacity to transform the most ignorant of men, as the example of the > Prophets of the past shows us—their disciples were, for the most part, simple people and without > formal education. It is these simple and uneducated people who were able to recognize the new > Manifestation while the priests and other educated people were unable to do so, blinded by their > worldly knowledge. It is these same simple people who have grasped better than their educated > counterparts, the meaning and implications of the prophetic message and who have transmitted > it to the wider society. Baha’u’llah says that the simple people were moulded in “the clay of the > eternal knowledge” ('ilm-i-laduni)381, and that true knowledge is “a light which God sheddeth into > the heart of whomsoever He willeth”382 In order to acquire mystical knowing, one must first take > leave of the knowledge which is abroad amongst men, which is transmitted and exchanged. > Mystical knowing is not bartered, nor is it traded, for it is incommensurable. It is a pure > experience which proceeds from a pure illumination (tajalli) coming from the “heaven of the > divine knowledge” ('ilm) and from the “spiritual sense” (ma'ani). It is by this means alone that the > “mysteries of the divine wisdom” (asrar-i-hikmat-i-laduni) can be communicated to man. > > 7. Certitude > > The purpose of spiritual knowing and its result is certitude.383 Having arrived at true knowledge, > one realizes that the life of the body is not the true life; that the true life is that of the heart (hayat- > i-qalb), which belongs only to those who have a pure and radiant heart, the result of faith (iman) > and certitude (iqan).384 This life of the heart is immortal. This faith and this certitude are the sum > > KI:#65:61 > KI:#48:46 > KI:#48:46 > The expression laduni is unfortunately untranslatable, as it contains a Qur'anic allusion. Ladun literally > means “close to,” “in the presence of.” In the Qur'an the word refers to the divine presence symbolized > by the “Throne”. Laduni thus means “close to God”, “attained the presence of God”. A laduni knowledge > is knowledge given directly by God through the means of mystical intuition. > Famous Islamic tradition (hadith); cited in KI:#48:46; #202:184 > Bahá’u’lláh speaks of the “knowledge of certitude” as a condition of the true seeker > Translator’s Note: KI:#128:120: “Wert thou to attain to but a dewdrop of the crystal waters of divine > knowledge, thou wouldst readily realize that true life is not the life of the flesh but the life of the spirit. > For the life of the flesh is common to both men and animals, whereas the life of the spirit is possessed > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > total and the recapitulation of all divine knowing. However, the quality of this certitude in the > individual heart depends upon the spiritual condition of the believer. In order to describe the > various spiritual states, Baha’u’llah uses an old Sufi tradition which distinguishes three ascending > levels of certitude — the certitude of one who has known ('ilmu'l-yaqin), the certitude of one who > has seen ('aynu'l-yaqin) and the certitude of one who has experienced (haqqu'l-yaqin).385 The passage > from the certitude of one who has seen to the certitude of one who has experienced is the most > delicate and perilous transition. Many have known and many have seen but have refused to go > further for fear that they would not be able to handle the sacrifices and renunciations this would > require of them. Baha’u’llah describes the passage to haqqu'l-yaqin as the true “sirat”, that is to say > the bridge which crosses over hell. This sirat is as narrow as the blade of a spear, and it permits > the righteous who tread the “straight and narrow” to access paradise whereas it conducts the > impious who tread the “convoluted and broad” into the flames of hell. The state of haqqaqu'l-yaqin > requires the disappearance of every trace of self-consciousness and a total privation of the psyche. > In this state, all traces of self-consciousness represent a danger for the spiritual survival of the > soul. Baha’u’llah also speaks, in another context, of another threesome—the certitude of the one > who has seen, the certitude of the one who has experienced and the certitude of the light (nuru'l- > yaqin).386 This certitude of the light corresponds to the state of the believer once he will have > become a pure mirror reflecting the divine names and attributes. Baha’u’llah says that the > believer who has attained this state benefits from a special gnosis whereby the atoms of all things > become guides which conduct him to the object of his quest, and wherein truth becomes as easy > for him to discern from error as it is for most people to distinguish day from night. > > CHAPTER EIGHT: > HERMENEUTIC AND THEOSOPHY OF THE DIVINE WORLDS > > 1. Symbols and analogical language > > After having established that the ultimate reality of the universe can not be directly apprehended > by the intellect, we more easily understand why language must assume a different course in its > attempt to communicate our experience of this reality. This explains why the language of > Baha’u’llah is essentially symbolic. However, we must not be mistaken as to the meaning of the > symbols and metaphors he employs, and we would be wrong to perceive them as purely > allegorical. > > only by the pure in heart who have quaffed from the ocean of faith and partaken of the fruit of > certitude.” > KI:#127:120. Translator’s Note: The passage cited by the author does not seem to refer to the three > stages, either in the Persian or in the English translation. Al-Suhrawardi seems to have authored a work > on the three stages of certitude. It is cited by Idries Shah, “The Sufis”, p. 273: “The knowledge of > certitude, in which it is known, verified and evident; the Essence of Certitude, manifest and witnessed; > the Truth (Reality) of Certitude, in which there is a conjoining of the witnesser and the witnessed.” > Translator’s Note: We have been unable to locate this passage, as of October 2015. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > In the analogical language of Baha’u’llah, the symbol acquires its own ontological existence as an > intermediate stage between the spiritual reality that is sought after and our conceptual > intelligence. It is not a literary technique, for, in literature, the symbolic expression always leads > us to a conceptual reality, whether it is sensible or intelligible, for which a representation already > exists. This is not the case when Baha’u’llah uses expressions such as “the Tongue of Grandeur” > or “the Supreme Pen”. In the famous “Tablet of the Celestial Huri” (Lawh-i-Huriyyih) Baha’u’llah > describes his “summoning” to a prophetic mission in the prison called Siyah-Chal by the Holy > Spirit in the form of a celestial maiden (huri). Subsequently, ‘Abdu’l-Baha explained that this huri > was a purely metaphorical expression of his father's experience. The purpose of the metaphor in > this case was to describe a reality in a purely intelligible manner because the representation of > this reality is impossible for the human spirit. In this case, and many others, the symbolic form > does not correspond to any sensible reality. > > To each expression corresponds a multitude of symbolic levels and only a personal enquiry can > travers these degrees. The “book” thus reveals a multitude of significances and man never > finishes discovering their meanings. > > 2. Man-macrocosm and the anthropic spirit > > Baha’u’llah begins by affirming that knowledge of this world depends upon the consciousness of > man. He affirms: > > “The All-Merciful hath conferred upon man the faculty of vision, and endowed him with > the power of hearing. Some have described him as the “lesser world,” when, in reality, he > should be regarded as the “greater world.” The potentialities inherent in the station of > man, the full measure of his destiny on earth, the innate excellence of his reality, must all > be manifested in this promised Day of God.”387 > > By insisting that man is the macrocosm and the universe is the microcosm, Baha’u’llah reverses > the perspective of all the gnostics, hermetics and theosophists who have succeeded one another > since antiquity. But what is he really saying? > > We can understand this affirmation in various ways that are doubt complementary rather than > mutually exclusive. The first meaning of the concept of “man-macrocosm”, is that the universe > was created with the appearance of man as its purpose. The man-macrocosm is thus the > application of a teleological principle, and an anthropic principle. Teleological principle is an > essential element, even an indispensable one, of all theosophy. It affirms that the evolution of the > universe obeys a pre-established plan. The order of the world is thus an order in becoming and > this becoming obeys a divine or cosmic law which leaves nothing to accident, or which makes use > of accident to arrive at its ends. According to this principle, the meaning of the universe is to be > found in the existence of man. We know how Baha’u’llah conceives of this question: man was > created so that in the creation there would exist a creature capable of knowing his Creator. > Baha’u’llah writes: > GL:CLXI:340 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > “Having created the world and all that liveth and moveth therein, He, through the direct > operation of His unconstrained and sovereign Will, chose to confer upon man the unique > distinction and capacity to know Him and to love Him—a capacity that must needs be > regarded as the generating impulse and the primary purpose underlying the whole of > creation...”388 > > Deprived of this purpose, the existence of the universe would lose its meaning. By 'man' we do > not need necessarily to understand humankind, but rather an intelligence. This intelligence > existed before the terrestrial man, for Baha’u’llah says that at all times, in a creation which has > never known a beginning, there has existed one who knows the Creator. This intelligence > constitutes a sort of cosmic principle, an anthropic spirit able to take on diverse forms, for we are > not the only agents with consciousness in the universe389, and furthermore, in every age, this > consciousness capable of knowing its Creator must have existed in one form or another. We are > not even sure that the material form that this consciousness assumes in this world is unique and > the possibility that it may be manifest in a purely spiritual form cannot be excluded. > > Man is thus the crown of creation. We will return to this point in speaking of the ontology of the > spirit, for, if he occupies this position, it is because he is the highest manifestation of the spirit in > this universe and it is because of this position that he is found at the junction of the material > world and the spiritual world. > > Consequently, in the Baha’i perspective, the teleological principle is inseparable from the > anthropic principle: > > “The universe is such as it is because if the universe was different, man would not > exist.”390 > > To this well known principle, Baha’u’llah adds: “And if man did not exist the universe would be > impossible.” > > The principle of the man-macrocosm thus signifies that man is the measure of all things in the > sense that it is in man that is found the key of the universe. Only through knowing himself can > > GL:XXVII:65 (also see GL:XXIX:70) > Bahá’u’lláh writes: “Know thou that every fixed star hath its own planets, and every planet its own > creatures, whose number no man can compute.” (GL:LXXXII:163) It is certainly not necessary to > emphasize that in the epoch that Bahá’u’lláh wrote these words, this point of view was singularly in > advance of its time, and was opposed to the Ptolemaic system then established in Islamic culture. > The anthropic principle is based on the observation that the existence of the universe, such as it is, is > based on the existence of a certain number of fundamental physical constants, extremely narrow and > precise, which maintain the universe in equilibrium. If but one of these constants were to take on a > different value the existence of this universe would become impossible and thus also impossible > observation of this universe, for we could not be there to see it. The presence of observers in the universe > assumes that these observers are compatible with their own existence. It imposes a priori a certain > number of constraints upon the conditions which governed at its origin the moment of the appearance > of the first singularity. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > man know the world. > > 3. The theophany of the divine Names > > The principle of the man-macrocosm has a second meaning that is related to the theology of the > divine Names—everything is a manifestation of the divine names, and creation is thus a > theophany. Baha’u’llah constantly affirms that the sky, the sun, the sea, the desert testify to the > grandeur of God: > > “Whatever is in the heavens and whatever is on the earth is a direct evidence of the > revelation within it of the attributes and names of God, inasmuch as within every atom > are enshrined the signs that bear eloquent testimony to the revelation of that Most Great > Light. Methinks, but for the potency of that revelation, no being could ever exist. How > resplendent the luminaries of knowledge that shine in an atom, and how vast the oceans > of wisdom that surge within a drop!”391 > > The universe in its totality testifies of its Creator and reveals His signs: > > “He Who is the Eternal Truth is the one Power Who exerciseth undisputed sovereignty > over the world of being, Whose image is reflected in the mirror of the entire creation.”392 > > Elsewhere, Baha’u’llah writes: > > “He is really a believer in the Unity of God who recognizeth in each and every created > thing the sign of the revelation of Him Who is the Eternal Truth, and not he who > maintaineth that the creature is indistinguishable from the Creator.”393 > > All these citations show that Baha’u’llah considers every created thing as a manifestation of the > divine attributes. However, every thing manifests these attributes according to its own rank and > capacity. From this is derived the order of the universe, and this order implies a hierarchy which > is not organized according to the superiority of one thing over another, but rather by virtue of > the function of its role and capacity for “service”. Ultimately all created things are created for the > “service” of the Creator. This idea that things are distinguished according to the resplendency of > the divine attributes reflected in them, is attested by this citation: > > “From the exalted source, and out of the essence of His favor and bounty He hath > entrusted every created thing with a sign of His knowledge, so that none of His creatures > may be deprived of its share in expressing, each according to its capacity and rank, this > knowledge. This sign is the mirror of His beauty in the world of creation. The greater the > effort exerted for the refinement of this sublime and noble mirror, the more faithfully will > it be made to reflect the glory of the names and attributes of God, and reveal the wonders > > KI:#107:100-101; GL:XC:177 > GL:LXXXIV:166 > GL:XCIII:188 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > of His signs and knowledge. Every created thing will be enabled (so great is this reflecting > power) to reveal the potentialities of its pre-ordained station, will recognize its capacity > and limitations, and will testify to the truth that 'He, verily, is God; there is none other > God besides Him.'...”394 > > These verses incline us take note of the extraordinary density characterizing the thought of > Baha’u’llah. To attempt an exhaustive commentary on these few lines would require pages and > indeed chapters which would far exceed the boundaries of our modest study. The interpretation > of this passage relies upon the meaning of the expression “all things”. The concept of “all things” > (kullu shay) is found throughout the writings of the Bab, who gives this expression an esoteric and > mystical meaning.xvii Without doubt, these words have a dual value: the obvious meaning that > relates “all things” to the totality of creation, and the spiritual meaning that makes of “all things” > a recapitulation of creation. Here we see the appearance of a concept of rank which distinguishes > things amongst themselves, and we also see in the linking of these things with each other both the > theology of Names and the speculative theology to which we have already made allusion in > previous chapters. > > It seems to us that this text includes a third idea which up to the present seems to have been > totally neglected: the entire universe, and not man alone, is animated by its movement towards > perfection. The world in itself as creation of God is perfect, but this is only a perfection of > potentiality. This concept of the movement towards perfection reconciles the two fundamental > ideas of Baha’u’llah regarding Nature: on the one hand Nature is the incarnation of the Names > of God; on the other hand Nature is imperfect and has need of a guardian (vali), a gardener (man) > to bring it to its state of perfection, even as man has need of a divine educator in order to develop > his spiritual nature. This concept indicates that the position of man in relation to the world of > Nature is similar to that of the Manifestation of God in relation to the human world. Man is the > divine manifestation for the world of Nature. He is its prophet. He has been made the Regent of > this world. To recapitulate, this movement towards perfection is universal. It affects the cosmic > forces at work in the galaxies just as much as the secrets of evolution concealed in the DNA. > These considerations regarding a universal evolutionary law toward infinite perfection are > surprising, and philosophy and science have no yet measured their depth. > > Here we see the second meaning of identifying man with the macrocosm. If every created thing > has a rank and if this rank depends upon the measure to which this thing reflects the names and > attributes of God, then man, as the manifestation of the anthropic spirit, is found at the summit > of creation and he is the macrocosm. He reflects a greater measure of the divine names and > attributes than all the rest of the universe. He is the recapitulation of the universe and that which > gives it meaning. He is the universal hermetic principle. > > 4. Hermetics and anagogical interpretation > > To affirm that the writings of Baha’u’llah are written in a symbolic language immediately poses > the question of how these symbols are to be interpreted. It has often been believed in the past > that Baha’u’llah rejected all forms of hermetic interpretation (ta'wil), but in fact rather than > GL:CXXIV:262 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > rejecting them, he merely limited their usage. It is true that Baha’u’llah treats ta'wil with much > reserve. The reason is that during his lifetime, the excessive frequency and the lax character of > the employment of ta'wil had virtually ruined every serious form of Islamic exegesis. Thus, in the > “Book of Certitude”, he states: > > “And yet, they have sought the interpretation of the Book from those that are wrapt in > veils, and have refused to seek enlightenment from the fountainhead of knowledge.”395 > > It is true that ta'wil plays an important role in Ithna 'Ashari Shi'i Islam. Let us trace the roots of > that role. We know that the so-called “hermetic” methods of exegesis were born in Greece in the > fifth century before the Common Era in the Pythagorean schools. In that era, the Greeks > apparently became scandalized by the behavior of the gods and the heroes of the Homeric age, > and they wished to interpret their behavior according to a hidden symbolic meaning which had > to be deciphered. Theogenes of Rhegium was the first to suggest a symbolic interpretation of the > Homeric poems. After him, Anthistenes made of Ulysses the prototype of a sage, and Metrodore > of Lampsaque invented an interpretive key in which the heroes and the gods incarnated either > forces of nature or states of the human soul. These methods acquired considerable success in > antiquity and were applied subsequently to the Annaeus of Virgil, to the Sibiline Oracles and to > the Chaldaean Oracles. It is in the city of Alexandria in Egypt that the method was transmitted > from Greek philosophers to Jewish rabbis who found the same problems in the Bible which the > Greeks had earlier discovered in Homer. For example, how were they to admit that Lot could > have committed incest with his daughters, or that David could have stooped to adultery? Philo of > Alexandria was the first Jewish commentator to make use of the hermetic methods in order to > resolve such difficulties, and it is through his intermediation that these methods penetrated into > Christianity and then Islam. In Christianity the introduction of this method was not without > problems and resulted in the third century violent opposition between the School of Alexandria > (Clement and Origen) and the School of Antioch (Theodore of Mopsueste and Theodoret of > Cyr). While it may have owed its initial inspiration to Christian transmission, Muslim taw'il gives > every indication of being wholly independent of Christian hermetics. These methods were used > with much reserve by the Sunni Muslim theologians. It was mostly the Sufis and then the > Isma'ilis who gave taw'il such importance that it became, in Iranian Shi'ism, virtually the only > exegetical method. > > The concept of ta'wil is itself a Qur'anic concept, as indicated in the Surat al-'Imran: > > “He it is Who hath sent down to thee the Book; in it there are verses that are clear > [muh.kamat] in meaning—they are the basis of the Book—and there are others that are > ambivalent (mutashabihat]. Those whose hearts are inclined towards deviation follow the > ambivalent verses because of their love of sedition and out of desire to interpret for > themselves (itighaa ta'wilihi). But none knows their interpretation (ta'wilahu) except God > and those who are firmly grounded in knowledge (rasikun). They say, 'We believe in it; > the whole is from our Lord.' And none heed except those gifted with understanding.”396 > > KI:#16:17 > Qur'an, Suratu'l-'Imran, III:7 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > The Qur'an does not disallow ta'wil. Nevertheless, it is possible that ta'wil in the Qur'an did not > have the meaning that was given to it by Islamic exegetes in later centuries. > > 5. The active imagination in the spiritual vision > > In Ithna 'Ashari and Isma'ili Shi'i practice, ta'wil became an interpretive exercise which > increasingly distanced itself from the literal meaning of words, and ended in considering the > “letter” as of negligible importance. Its adepts believed that the Qur'an descended from heaven > through the axis of revelation (nubuwwa) and that is must, in order to be understood, be returned > to heaven through the axis of ta'wil. According to them, the word ta'wil comes from the Arabic > word “first” (awwal) and signifies “to return to its source”. In order to return the Qur'an to its > source, one must elevate oneself to the heavens. Ta'wil thus takes on the allure of an initiatory > journey. In Persia, ta'wil was particularly influenced by the theory of imagination of Ibn Sina > (Avicenna) and generally by Ibn al-'Arabi. In their conceptual universe, the purpose of Ta'wil is > to give access to Malakut, conceived as the “interworld” (barzakh) and the Imaginal World ('alam-i- > mithal). The imaginative faculty must elevate itself above the terrestrial realm (mulk) in order to > transcend the senses and attain the point of consciousness in which corporeal beings are > spiritualized into autonomous forms and images. > > Now the problem is to be able to distinguish the true imaginative faculty, which is pure > intellectual perception of the spiritual realities, from the bitter fruits of terrestrial imagination, > which is distorted by the subjectivity of the ego, often pluralized by Baha'u'llah in the expression > “vain imaginations” (awham). Shi'ism stumbled upon this problem without ever being able to > resolve it. The fantastical usage of ta'wil, linked to a no less fantastical usage of ijtihad (juridical > interpretation of texts), resulted, by the 18th century CE, in the disappearance of any norm in the > Islamic religious sciences and the emergence of a crowd of local “mujtahidun” (learned interpreters > of the law) all of whom claimed a share of illumination. This precipitated the progressive > disappearance of every form of religious orthodoxy and the installation of the system of taqlid > (imitation). This system enjoined upon each believer the obligation to identify himself as the > imitator (muqalid) of a mujtahid who became thereby the “focal point of initiation” (marja'-i-taqlid) > and all of whose decisions he was obliged to follow. The installation of this system took place > during the course of the 16th and 17th centuries, during the rivalry between the Akhbari and Usuli > schools of jurisprudence. The Akhbari school based its legal rulings on the unambiguous verses of > the Qur'an and hadith (oral teachings traditionally associated with the prophet Muhammad and > the Twelve Imams), leaving matters that were not covered by these two divine sources to civil > courts. The Usulis evolved a very elaborate system called ijtihad to arrive at legal decisions (fatwas), > and their rulings pertained to every conceivable matter, public or private, secular or religious. > From that period on, the organization of the Shi'i clergy took on a quasi-feudal character, as each > mujtahid was obligated to become the imitator of a mujtahid greater than himself. At the summit of > these mujtahidun, were placed the Ayatu'llah-i-'Uzma (great Ayatu'llah). This system of imitation > (taqlid) was severely condemned by Baha’u’llah in the “Most Holy Book” (Kitab-i-Aqdas) and other > writings. It was in reference to this practice that Baha’u’llah frequently reiterates this cardinal > principle of his teaching—whoever wishes to follow him must forget everything he has learned > from his masters and from his forefathers, and break all attachment to any human doctrine > whatsoever in order to undertake his own personal and individual investigation of the truth. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > The psychology of Baha’u’llah is very different from the systems which preceded it. Contrary to > what certain ones have believed, Baha’u’llah does not negate the role of the imagination—he > simply disapproves of a certain expression of that faculty and asserts a redefinition of its meaning. > If by “imagination” we mean the faculty of grasping the spiritual realities which exist in the > superior worlds and particularly in Malakut, either directly, or through the intermediation of the > divine Word contained in the sacred writings, then this faculty exists. It is what Baha’u’llah calls > the “heart” in some contexts, and in others, “spiritual vision” (basira). There is however a > fundamental difference between the creative imagination of Ibn Sina or Ibn al-'Arabi and the > kind of imagination depicted by Baha’u’llah. Whereas the visionary imagination aims at grasping > the global verities for which hermeneutics (ta'wil) must have a universal bearing, the “spiritual > vision” defined by Baha’u’llah aims at grasping the verities which hermeneutics can not have in > itself, a personal understanding commensurate with the degree of development of the individual > who produce hermeneutics, and this negates all universal bearing. > > This is the deeper meaning of the “Tablet of all Food” in particular. Not only is there an > hermeneutical meaning for each word in every world, but the perception of this world, and of the > meaning of the divine utterance, is conditioned by the spiritual state in which the seeker finds > himself at any given moment. We will see that this position has important philosophical > consequences which link the spiritual expansion of man with the establishment of his > psychological autonomy. > > To understand the meaning of the sacred writings it is regarded as indispensable that one elevate > oneself from one's terrestrial condition and ascend into the heavens of spiritual meaning (ma'ani). > The spirit of the visionary is thus described by Baha’u’llah as a spirit soaring in infinite spaces. > > 6. Esoteric and Exoteric > > Baha’u’llah carefully distinguishes between the exoteric (zahir) and the esoteric (batin) meanings > of Scripture, even though he rarely uses this particular terminology. There is correspondence > between the exoteric meaning and the exegetical commentary (tafsir). And there is > correspondence between the esoteric meaning and the hermeneutical commentary (ta'wil) which > one can only understand through the purification of the heart. Tafsir is permitted without reserve, > ta'wil must have a limited usage. But above all, what matters to Baha’u’llah, is that the exoteric > meaning not be sacrificed for the esoteric meaning. He treats this theme directly in Surat wa'l- > Shams397. He begins by affirming that the exegetes of the Qur'an are of two kinds: Those who > have neglected the exoteric in order to devote themselves exclusively to esotericism, and those > who have neglected the esoteric in order to consecrate themselves uniquely to the exoteric. The > two are both in error. Those who do not satisfy the exoteric are “ignorant” (jahil), while those > who have abandoned the exoteric for esotericism are “negligent” (ghafil). Only he who has > neglected neither of these two meanings and who has grasped the divine Word in its totality can > be considered a true believer ('ibad). > > How are we to understand his reference to the “exoteric” and the “esoteric”? It seems that in the > writings of Baha’u’llah the word “exoteric” (zahir) refers to two things: the literal meaning of the > Majmu'ih, p. 11 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > text and the observance of the religious laws. These are matters which are within the grasp of > anyone with a minimum of intelligence. > > Baha'u’llah asserts that no one can grasp the esoteric meaning of the Word if he has not already > understood the literal import of the text. Ta'wil can not annul the obvious meaning. The former > is a stepping-stone destined to move us to traverse the first degrees of the ascension. It represents > the formal aspect of religion and in particular the laws of personal status (tashri') such as prayer, > fasting and other spiritual observances, as well as all the subsidiary laws which aim at preserving > the dignity of man and securing for him a mode of behavior which conforms to divine ethics. His > criticism of those who have abandoned the exoteric for the esoteric was initially aimed at certain > categories of Sufis who believed that the practice of their spiritual exercises (dhikr, for example) > exempted them from the obligation to observe the religious laws binding on all other Muslims, > and who for this reason did not fear to indulge in a dissolute life, consuming alcohol and using > drugs. Other religious leaders, especially among the orthodox clergy of Islam, imagined that they > had arrived at such a high degree of religious attainment, that they were justified in requiring > extraordinary demonstrations of devotion from their followers and in exempting them from > revealed laws at their beck and call. > > In the opening paragraph of the “Most Holy Book”398, Baha’u’llah gives his “first” teaching, > which is that the basis of spiritual life rests upon twin indispensable obligations—the recognition > of the divine Manifestation, and the observance of whatsoever is revealed by himxviii. Baha’u’llah > insists that these twins are without value without each other. Recognition of the Manifestation of > God does not bring any spiritual benefit if one does not conform to his teachings. This approach > challenges the conviction of most Christians and Muslims who are persuaded that it is sufficient > to simply believe in Jesus the Christ or in Muhammad the Seal of the Prophets in order to be > saved, and that faith is superior to acts. > > On the other hand, no one can claim to live a pious life if he has not, personally, recognized the > divine Manifestation. We touch here upon the meaning of esoteric (batin) as the term is employed > by Baha’u’llah. Recognition of the Manifestation of God is not synonymous with claiming the > religious title of Christian, Muslim, or Baha’i. Rather it signifies having established a personal > and intimate liaison with the Prophet similar to the familiarity one would have after having lived > with someone for a long time in a committed, intimate relationship. It is only through this > intimate relationship that one can gain access to the esoteric (batin) meaning of texts and thus to > their hermeneutic (ta'wil). > > 7. The limits of spiritual hermeneutic > > Baha’u’llah fixed three limits to hermeneutic (ta'wil). The first two limits exclude two domains— > the realm of the Prophets and the promulgation of the laws (tashri') of personal behavior. The > third limit corresponds to the individual authenticity rather than to the normative character of all > unconstrained hermeneutic meanings. In the “Book of Certitude”, Baha’u’llah declares: > > “It is obvious and manifest that the true meaning of the utterances of the Birds of Eternity > is revealed to none except those that manifest the Eternal Being, and the melodies of the > > 398Translator’s Note: Kitab-i-Aqdas. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Nightingale of Holiness can reach no ear save that of the denizens of the everlasting > realm.”399 > This text indicates the great reserve of Baha’u’llah towards ta'wil, such reserve as reminds us of > what we have discovered in the Qur'an. This condemnation of rampant ta'wil refers essentially to > the interpretation of Scriptural prophecies, one of the principle objectives if the “Book of > Certitude”. It can also be extended to other domains. The only true ta'wil is that which emanates > from the pen of the Manifestations of God. Each revelation is composed of a direct and exoteric > teaching and a veiled and hidden teaching. It belongs to each Prophet to reveal the ta'wil of His > own revelation as well as the ta'wil of preceding revelations. Baha’u’llah writes in the “Book of > Certitude”: > > “It is evident unto thee that the Birds of Heaven [huwiyyih] and Doves of Eternity > [azaliyyih] speak a twofold language. One language, the outward language [zahir], is > devoid of allusions [ramz], is unconcealed and unveiled; that it may be a guiding lamp and > a beaconing light whereby wayfarers may attain the heights of holiness, and seekers may > advance into the realm of eternal reunion. Such are the unveiled traditions and the > evident verses already mentioned. The other language is veiled and concealed, so that > whatever lieth hidden in the heart of the malevolent may be made manifest and their > innermost being be disclosed. Thus hath Sádiq, son of Muhammad, spoken: “God verily > will test them and sift them.” This is the divine standard, this is the Touchstone of God, > wherewith He proveth His servants. None apprehendeth the meaning of these utterances > except them whose hearts are assured, whose souls have found favour with God, and > whose minds are detached from all else but Him. In such utterances, the literal meaning, > as generally understood by the people, is not what hath been intended.”400 > > The signs of the “final judgment”, of the great parousia, of the “resurrection” which are described > in the New Testament and in the Qur'an were not meant to be among the exoteric teachings. > Their true meaning was veiled and impenetrable, “sealed” (makhtum) even as precious wine is > sealed in the camphor flasks until it matures. Alone, the hand of the Prophet is endowed, as in > the Apocalypse of John, with the power to break the seals and to reveal that which was hidden > from the consciousness of men. Even when a few perspicacious spirits with the permission of God > are able to approach the true meaning of the prophecies, all other men remained deprived of the > awareness of how they may distinguish truth from error. It is in order to alleviate this > heedlessness that the writings of the Bab constitute a single ta'wil. > > Baha’u’llah likewise consecrated a portion of his writings to ta'wil. The “Book of Certitude” is > essentially a long ta'wil. We will give only a few examples from it to demonstrate the > characteristics of his interpretation. Included therein is a commentary upon a passage in the > Gospel which says: “…the sun shall be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light, and the > stars shall fall from heaven…”401 Baha’u’llah begins by explaining that the word “sun” has > various meanings. Sometimes it means “those Suns of Truth Who rise from the dayspring of > > KI:#16:17 > Literally this reads: “…this latter language excludes the exoteric.” KI:#283:254-255 > Gospel of Matthew 24:29 (see also Mark 13:24-25; Luke 21:25) > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > ancient glory, and fill the world with a liberal effusion of grace from on high”402, referring to the > Manifestations of God. Baha’u’llah then develops this idea by comparing the influence of the > physical sun upon earthly life with the influence of the divine Manifestations upon the hearts of > men. “It is the warmth that these Luminaries of God generate, and the undying fires they kindle, > which cause the light of the love of God to burn fiercely in the heart of humanity.”403 Through > them, “the Spirit of life everlasting is breathed into the bodies of the dead.”404 Baha’u’llah then > proceeds to explain a more philosophical meaning of the same word: > > “That these divine Luminaries seem to be confined at times to specific designations and > attributes, as you have observed and are now observing, is due solely to the imperfect and > limited comprehension of certain minds. Otherwise, they have been at all times, and will > through eternity continue to be, exalted above every praising name, and sanctified from > every descriptive attribute. The quintessence of every name can hope for no access unto > their court of holiness, and the highest and purest of all attributes can never approach > their kingdom of glory.”405 > > Then, Baha’u’llah explains that in other texts, the word “sun” has a different meaning. In the > “Prayer of Nudbih”, which commemorates the martyrdom of the Imam Husayn, the word “sun” > designates the holy Imams.406 Baha’u’llah summarises the multiple meanings cited thus far: > > “Thus, it hath become evident that the terms “sun,” “moon,” and “stars” primarily > signify the Prophets of God, the saints, and their companions, those Luminaries, the light > of Whose knowledge hath shed illumination upon the worlds of the visible and the > invisible.”407 > > Later on in the text, he gives another meaning to the words “sun” and “moon”, indicating that in > some contexts they designate religious leaders, for it is they who, after the death of the Prophet, > are entrusted with illumining the heaven of religion. Thus, when the sacred writings speak of the > “darkening of the sun” this designates the end of great religious leaders such as the caliphate > (khalifat) or the abasement of the pontifical power. This explains the verse of the Qur'an: “Verily, > the sun and the moon are both condemned to the torment of infernal fire.”408 Baha’u’llah > continues: > > “In another sense, by the terms “sun', 'moon', and 'stars' are meant such laws and > teachings as have been established and proclaimed in every Dispensation, such as the > laws of prayer and fasting.”409 > > KI:#31:33 > KI:#31:34 > KI:#31:34 > KI:#20:21 > KI:#33:35 > KI:#33:36 > Qur'an 55:5; cited in KI:#36:37 > KI:#38:38 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Further on, he adds: > > “Moreover, in the traditions the terms “sun” and “moon” have been applied to prayer > and fasting…”410 > > Finally, he concludes: > > “This is the purpose underlying the symbolic words of the Manifestations of God. > Consequently, the application of the terms “sun” and “moon” to the things already > mentioned hath been demonstrated and justified by the text of the sacred verses and the > recorded traditions. Hence, it is clear and manifest that by the words “the sun shall be > darkened, and the moon shall not give her light, and the stars shall fall from heaven” is > intended the waywardness of the divines, and the annulment of laws firmly established by > divine Revelation, all of which, in symbolic language, have been foreshadowed by the > Manifestation of God. None except the righteous shall partake of this cup, none but the > godly can share therein. “The righteous shall drink of a cup tempered at the camphor > fountain.”411 > > “It is unquestionable that in every succeeding Revelation the “sun” and “moon” of the > teachings, laws, commandments, and prohibitions which have been established in the > preceding Dispensation, and which have overshadowed the people of that age, become > darkened, that is, are exhausted, and cease to exert their influence.”412 > > In the “Tafsir Surat wa'l-Shams”, Baha’u’llah takes up the same theme and here he elaborates on > the various meanings of the word “sun”, addressing questions which are more metaphysical than > exegetical in nature. In speaking of the “sun of divinity” (uluhiyya), the “sun of guardianship” > (wilayya), the “sun of will” (mashiyya), and the “sun of volition” (irada), Baha’u’llah explains also the > meaning of the word “night” and the word “heaven”. To give some examples, he cites the > “heaven of the symbolic sense” (ma'ani), the “heaven of knowledge” (ma'rifat), the “mystical > heaven” ('irfan), the “heaven of religion” (din), the “heaven of science” ('ilm), the “heaven of > wisdom” [hikmat], the “heaven of grandeur” ['aZamat], the “heaven of elevation” ['ala], the > “heaven of splendor” (ijlal), and so forth.413 > > We have only reported these several examples of Baha’u’llah's ta'wil in order to give illustrations > of his method. It is the same method which we have earlier encountered in the “Tablet of all > Food” regarding the divine worlds. Thus we can say that in the writings of Baha’u’llah the word > “world” has three types of meaning: an empirical meaning which is addressed to the independent > reality of man; an ontological meaning which we have already explored at length; and a > hermeneutical meaning. In this fashion, it is possible to say that for every world there is a heaven > and a sun. We will point out what this hermeneutical method has in common with the > > KI:#40:39 > Qur'an 76:5 > KI:#41-42:41 > Majmu'ih, p. 12 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > anagogical reading developed in a Christian context by the School of Alexandria. Certain > exegeses of Baha’u’llah would not have been rejected by Clement of Alexandria or by Origen. > Nevertheless, Baha’u’llah takes care never to break the link between the ontological description > and the hermeneutical description. They are as inseparable as the exoteric is from the esoteric > and vice versa. We also begin to see that for Baha’u’llah, there is always a corresponding > hermeneutical aspect in all the universe, whether the physical or the spiritual world. > > We see thus what importance ta'wil has in the work of Baha’u’llah. But this ta'wil does not stand > alone. His ta'wil is always linked to an eschatological thought. The primordial function of ta'wil is > to explain the signs of the new Manifestation and to demonstrate his power. Through ta'wil the > sacred Books are revealed anew. This is notably the case with the Qur'an through the very > numerous commentaries (tafsir) given it by the Bab. It is important to comprehend this concept of > 'second revelation', otherwise it becomes impossible to grasp the link which can unite the tafsir of > the Bab and of Baha’u’llah. Certain Islamicists have been astonished by the extremely relaxed > link with which their commentaries are related to primary texts. This is to entirely misunderstand > the hermeneutical function of these commentaries. Their purpose is not to unveil a secret and > esoteric meaning, but to make manifest a sense of “actualization” in the new Revelation. > > If ta'wil is a function of Revelation, we understand why Baha’u’llah reserves the usage thereof to > Prophets and their chosen interpreters. If he rejects human ta'wil, it is not in order to contest the > value of taw'il in itself, but because all human ta'wil can have but a secondary standing before the > divinely revealed ta'wil. > > 8. The legitimacy of the outward meaning > > The second domain from which Baha’u’llah excludes ta'wil is that of the religious laws (shari'a; > tashri'). Perhaps no use of ta'wil in religious practice receives a more severe condemnation, for the > application of ta'wil to this domain engenders turning away from the observance of religious laws, > the loss of orthodoxy, and the introduction of a subjectivism which risks bringing about the > breaking up of all social norms. This critique goes in two directions: on the one hand, as we have > already indicated, it refers to those Sufis who have employed ta'wil to free themselves from > religious laws, and, on the other hand, it points to the mujtahidun, the doctors of law, who by their > loose and subjective interpretations have turned the sacred law to their personal profit. > Baha’u’llah insists that the laws must be understood and obeyed in their most evident and clear > outward meaning. This does not mean that these laws do not contain hidden meanings, but that > these hidden meanings cannot subsist except through dependence upon the outward meaning. > > Do these two limitations upon ta'wil so narrow its domain that it should be considered as > definitively forbidden? Far from this! But perhaps this allowance merely a concession to human > weakness. The only verses which are open to the subjective interpretation of the individual > believer are the purely spiritual texts which concern the development of the interior life. > Nevertheless, here again, Baha’u’llah cites restrictions. The interpretation of the individual can > not have any normative capacity—it must remain personal to each believer, even if he has a right > within certain limits to express himself in public. This personal interpretation, which represents > the only legitimate form of human ta'wil, is based upon the idea that there is an understanding of > the sacred writings which corresponds to each spiritual state traversed by the believer. In > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > proportion to and according to the measure of our progress in spiritual development, new > meanings are illumined for us, but these meanings are personal and it would be erroneous for us > to believe that these meanings have a universal application. Their only value is in their > correspondence with the lived state. To share our vision of the writings from the standpoint of > our spiritual state can be enriching, but to wish to give to these interpretations a normative power > would be dangerous, for this would interfere with the spiritual development of other believers. > ‘Abdu’l-Baha expressed this principle in the following words: > > “The text of the Divine Book is this: If two souls quarrel and contend about a question of > the Divine questions, differing and disputing, both are wrong.”414 > > The texts which remain open to personal interpretations are those like the “Hidden Words” or > the “Seven Valleys” which depict the mystic states. A practice, which is no doubt destined to > assume an important place in the development of Baha’i mysticism, consists of assembling a > group to read a passage from the “Hidden Words” which is then liberally commented upon by > each member of the group, taking care to avoid all opposition of point of view and all debate > because, by definition, the interpretation has only value for the person who voices it but might > nevertheless contribute to the enrichment of others. > > We return finally to this fundamental principle, affirmed in the “Seven Valleys”, that the > differences which the voyager perceives in the different divine worlds derive from the condition > of the seeker himself: > > “It is clear to thine Eminence that all the variations which the wayfarer in the stages of his > journey beholdeth in the realms of being, proceed from his own vision.”415 > > 9. A Baha’i Theosophy > > We have examined the hermeneutical influence of the hierarchy of divine worlds in the writings > of Baha’u’llah. However, we must not suppose that in developing his metaphysical system, > Baha’u’llah is aiming only to address the hermeneutical aspect of gnosis or that he entirely > renounces any attempt to depict the empirical reality of the universe. This empirical reality is as > much present in the work of Baha’u’llah as an enquiry into spiritual realities, and indeed, he aims > at creating a bridge between the two. It is in this sense that we affirm that the thought of > Baha’u’llah presents itself as a true theosophy. Of course we use the word theosophy in its > technical sense.416 > > Three elements must be brought together to constitute a theosophy: a gnosis, a hermeneutic and > a philosophy of Nature. Theosophy is thus the search for the ultimate reality of man and the > > ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, “Tablets of the Divine Plan”, p. 56; “Bahá’í World Faith”, p. 428. > Bahá’u’lláh, “Seven Valleys”, p. 18. > For the technical sense of the word “theosophy” we invite the reader to peruse the remarkable article > entitled “Theosophie” by Antoine Faivre in the “Encyclopedia Universalis”, volume XVII, pp. 1118- > 1120. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > universe through an initiatory voyage involving the metamorphosis of the human soul and the > transformation of the interior being. This gnosis, as the acquisition of the knowledge of divine > things, can not be based upon anything other than the transformational power of the revealed > Word. This power is experienced in exposure to the Word through prayer and meditation. > Theosophy aims at establishing a rapport between the sacred Books, the celestial hierarchies and > the empirical reality of Nature in its aspect as the manifestation of the divine signs. This rapport > cannot be effected except by means of a hermeneutic which links the natural manifestations to > spiritual meanings reflecting the general laws of the creation and the hidden order of the world. > This theosophical enterprise relies upon an interior illumination associated with a rational > process which permits the exploration of the links between the different material and spiritual > worlds. > > Theosophy starts from the principle that the reality of the universe is not limited to a single > empirical reality. A hidden reality, more vast than this empirical reality, exists which can be > divined through its signs in the empirical world. However, a simple speculative or experimental > experience does not suffice to access this hidden reality. Its comprehension requires of man a > whole-scale uprooting from his terrestrial condition, so as to reformulate his knowledge of > sensible nature, and to leave behind his acquired earthly knowledge so that he might discern > through the signs of the real the traces of a much more vast reality. It is in this sense that > theosophy assumes a true philosophy of nature, for it is the natural order which permits us to > glimpse the celestial order. > > 10. The supreme Talisman > > Baha’u’llah affirms that “man is the supreme Talisman.”417 This phrase is generally > misunderstood due to ignorance of the technical meaning of “talisman” (tilism).418 The word in > Arabic and in Persian may designate a magical object which is seen as attracting or repulsing > fate, and it can also reveal another meaning. In Persian the talisman is the chalice, the goblet of > King Jamshid (jam-i-jam). In a legend it is stated that his desire to possess this chalice impelled > Alexander the Great to undertake his conquest of the world. The chalice of Jamshid had a special > characteristic—upon looking into it one could see anything of the world. Thus when Baha’u’llah > asserts that man is “the supreme Talisman” the meaning implied is that by looking into man one > can see the recapitulation of the whole of creation, that is to say, the most perfect manifestation > of the divine Names and attributes. This is what is affirmed by Baha’u’llah in numerous Tablets: > > “Upon the inmost reality of each and every created thing He hath shed the light of one of > His names, and made it the recipient of the glory of one of His attributes. Upon the > reality of man, however, He hath focused the radiance of all of His names and attributes, > and made it a mirror of His own Self. Alone of all created things man hath been singled > out for so great a favor, so enduring a bounty.”419 > TB:161; GL:CXXII:259 > The Arabic word tilism, pronounced telesm in Persian, comes from the Greek telesma, meaning “rite”. > The word seems to have been transmitted to the Islamic world through the intermediation of the great > magicians of the second and third centuries CE and perhaps by Proclus (411-485 CE). > GL:XXVII:65 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > “Whatever is in the heavens and whatever is on the earth is a direct evidence of the > revelation within it of the attributes and names of God, inasmuch as within every atom > are enshrined the signs that bear eloquent testimony to the revelation of that Most Great > Light. Methinks, but for the potency of that revelation, no being could ever exist. How > resplendent the luminaries of knowledge that shine in an atom, and how vast the oceans > of wisdom that surge within a drop! > > “To a supreme degree is this true of man, who, among all created things, hath been > invested with the robe of such gifts, and hath been singled out for the glory of such > distinctions. For in him are potentially revealed all the attributes and names of God to a > degree that no other created being hath excelled or surpassed. All these names and > attributes are applicable to him.”420 > > “Man, the noblest and most perfect of all created things, excelleth them all in the intensity > of this revelation, and is a fuller expression of its glory.”421 > > 11. Man as the foundation of knowledge > > It is as the manifestation of the divine glory in the created world that man expresses his > macrocosmic function in the world of creation, and it is because he is the creature which has the > greatest capacity to reflect the divine Names that he can be considered the recapitulation of the > entire creation and the one creature who gives it meaning as its universal hermeneutical > principle. There is another significance of the concept of the “supreme Talisman”. In Persian > tradition, a talisman is a magical instrument which, like the chalice of Jamshid cited above, > permits one to access universal knowledge (symbolic knowledge of what is happening in every > place and at every moment). To say therefore that man is the “supreme Talisman” reaffirms that > universal knowledge is found in man, that he is the source thereof, even if this knowledge remains > hidden and seems inaccessible to him. We find ourselves face to face with a fundamental concept > of Baha’i epistemology. The foundation of knowledge is found in man himself. Nothing outside > of man can guarantee the total intelligibility of the universe. There does not exist, in objective > reality exterior to man, a principle that guarantees the foundation of knowledge. That fact that it > is man who is the foundation of knowledge and not an exterior reality follows directly from the > idea that man is the macrocosm in relation to the universe as microcosm, and that he is the > universal hermeneutical principle of this microcosm. This is a phenomenological approach all the > implications of which have yet to be studied. However, this phenomenological concept of > knowledge and the world does not resemble the phenomenology of Husserl, in that it aims at > avoiding certain consequences of idealism and that does not renounce the discovery of reality in > the human self. > > 12. Knowledge of self and knowledge of God > > KI:#107:100-101; GL:XC:177 > KI:#107:101; GL:XC:177 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > We see how the knowledge of the essence of man leads us to the knowledge of the world, but we > also see how this knowledge of the world and of the universe is inseparable from the knowledge > of God. Baha’u’llah often took up and interpreted the famous tradition (hadith) of Muhammad: > “He has known God who has known himself.” 422 It was furthermore affirmed by ‘Abdu’l-Baha > in one of his Tablets423, that it is impossible for a man who does not know God to know himself, > for the knowledge of God is like the light of the sun which permits us to see. To wish to know > oneself without knowing God, is like wanting to recognize an object in the dark; in order to see > anything, one must first find a source of light. > > This self knowledge is not identical to psychological knowledge. It is knowledge of true human > nature. And all Baha’i spirituality is based upon this tirelessly repeated fundamental principle: > “the nature of man is spiritual.” It is thus that to know oneself one must recognize the “divine > deposit” in oneself. The whole stake here is to understand the meaning of the word “spiritual”. > > As Davudi pointed out, the idea that the knowledge of God is inseparable from the knowledge of > self implies that it is not possible for man to arrive at a complete and total knowledge of himself, > any more than it is possible for him to understand God in His plenitude.424 It is because perfect > knowledge of God and of ourselves is impossible that the universe cannot be totally intelligible to > us, that it will always contain mysteries. But it is also because man can not ever arrive at a total > knowledge of himself that it is possible to envision that the progress of the soul lasts for eternity. > The foundation and source then of all knowledge is hidden in obscurity. Man can approach this > foundation, but he can never master or control it. > > 13. The alchemy of the divine Elixir > > No theme is more “theosophical” than that of alchemy and the transubstantiation of metals, > symbolic as they are of the interior transformation of man. The fact that this theme appears in > the writings of Baha’u’llah indicates the “gnostic” character of his teaching, and constitutes an > evidence that his thought must necessarily be interpreted as comprising a vast philosophy linking > the spiritual and psychological laws of the interior transformation of man to a philosophy of > Nature. > > The alchemical tradition appears in the writings of Baha’u’llah as a theosophical theme, without > a direct link to the pragmatic enterprise which has occupied most alchemists, for whom the > “Great Work” was limited to the trans-substantiation of metals.425 > > In the civilization of Islam, the history of alchemy followed the same development as that of Neo- > Platonism. The first known alchemist is Bolos of Mendes who lived in the second century BCE, > and tradition derives his teaching from Democrites. Alchemy was joined to hermeticism in the > > KI:#107:102-103; GL:XC:179 > Makatib, volume I. > 'Ali-Murad Davudi, “Uluviyyat va Mazhariyyat,” p. 88 > 425Translator’s Note: Dr. Keven Brown told me that Baha’u’llah wrote over forty Tablets about alchemy. > > A few alchemically-themed passages are found in Gleanings and Kitab-i-Iqan. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > syncretic Hellenistic culture of Alexandria in Egypt, and a prolific, hermetically-inspired > alchemical literature developed from this association. Zozim of Panopoles (circa third-fourth > century CE) was the first writer to closely link the acquisition of alchemical knowledge with a > philosophical and mystical search, establishing a whole series of symbolic concordances between > the two processes.426 The work of Zozim became the basis of alchemy to which all later > alchemists referred, including the Greeks, the Arabs and Persians, and finally, Europeans. > Alchemy was introduced into Islamic culture from the seventh century CE, and from the > eleventh century CE onwards the great works of the Greek alchemists were translated into > Arabic. This epoch is entirely dominated by the great alchemist Jabir ibn Hayyan, an 'Iraqi > Shi'ite born at the start of the eighth century CE who became the disciple of Imam Ja'far as- > Sadiq in Medinah. What the Islamic world regards as the work of Jabir is in fact a vast literature > which is the fruit of an entire school, the formulation of which was not completed until the tenth > century CE, with the establishment of the famous theory of balances.427 The influence of this > literature was considerable, both upon the development of Islamic science, or that of Islamic > mysticism. The ideas of Jabir, completed by Razi and a long lineage of alchemist scholars, would > remain dominant until the end of the nineteenth century CE, at which time they were still being > taught in the theological schools. > > Alchemy was part of the common culture and was the subject of passionate debate. This explains > why one finds a certain number of passages in the work of Baha’u’llah concerning alchemy. It is > in this context that Baha’u’llah speaks about the nature of alchemy. > > Three ideas upon this subject are found in the writings of Baha’u’llah. First of all, Baha’u’llah > does not reject the possibility of the transubstantiation of metals. He affirms the unity of matter > composed of atoms, the combinations of which determine the properties of substances. For > example, that which we perceive as gold or sulphur is but the properties of certain states of > matter. > > The second idea which Baha’u’llah advances is that the transsubstantiation of metals is only a > theoretical possibility the practical application of which may remain forever outside the capacity > of man. From this perspective, he indicates that those who devote themselves to alchemical > studies are wasting their time, and those who claim to have completed the “Great Work” are > impostors. Baha’u’llah mocks the Shaykhi leader Haji Mirza Karim Khan-i-Kirmanixix, who, in > his book “Guidance unto the Ignorant” (Irshadu'l-'Awwam)xx, claims that one needs to be master of > no less than twenty sciences in order to understand the ascension of Muhammad, alchemy being > one of those twenty. Karim Khan lets it be understood that he possesses this knowledge of > alchemy to perfection and that he has himself accomplished the “Great Work”. Baha’u’llah > writes: > > “Among the sciences which this pretender hath professed is that of alchemy. We cherish > the hope that either a king or a man of preeminent power may call upon him to translate > this science from the realm of fancy to the domain of fact and from the plane of mere > pretension to that of actual achievement. Would that this unlearned and humble Servant, > > Please see: A. J. Festugiere, “La Revelation d'Hermes Trismegiste,” tome I, 2eme edition, Paris, 1983 > Please see: Pierre Lori > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > who never laid any pretension to such things, nor even regarded them as the criterion of > true knowledge, might undertake the same task, that thereby the truth might be known > and distinguished from falsehood.”428 > > The third idea which is found in the writings of Baha’u’llah, and which rejoins Jabir and his > school, is that alchemy has a metaphorical value in its description of the interior transformation > of man. There exists on this point a passage in the “Book of Certitude” which treats of the > spiritual transformation which is experienced by the disciples of the Prophets: > > “It is evident that nothing short of this mystic transformation could cause such spirit and > behaviour, so utterly unlike their previous habits and manners, to be made manifest in the > world of being. For their agitation was turned into peace, their doubt into certitude, their > timidity into courage. Such is the potency of the Divine Elixir (ikthir-i-ilahi), which, swift as > the twinkling of an eye, transmuteth the souls of men! > > “For instance, consider the substance of copper. Were it to be protected in its own mine > from becoming solidified, it would, within the space of seventy years, attain to the state of > gold. There are some, however, who maintain that copper itself is gold, which by > becoming solidified is in a diseased condition, and hath not therefore reached its own > state. > > “Be that as it may, the real elixir (ikthir-i-kamil)429 will, in one instant, cause the substance > of copper to attain the state of gold, and will traverse the seventy-year stages in a single > moment. Could this gold be called copper? Could it be claimed that it hath not attained > the state of gold, whilst the touchstone is at hand to assay it and distinguish it from > copper?”430 > > It is of course a metaphor. Copper represents the soul of man and the seventy years represent the > terrestrial duration of human life. The mine is his body, representing the terrestrial world. If the > copper man does not succumb to the attachments of this world (solidification), then in him will be > manifested the divine qualities, that is to say, he will be transformed into gold. > > “Likewise, these souls, through the potency of the Divine Elixir, traverse, in the twinkling > of an eye, the world of dust and advance into the realm of holiness; and with one step > cover the earth of limitations (makan-i-mahdud) and reach the domain of the Placeless (la- > makan-i-ilahi)431. It behooveth thee to exert thine utmost to attain unto this Elixir which, in > one fleeting breath, causeth the west of ignorance to reach the east of knowledge, > illuminates the darkness of night with the resplendence of the morn, guideth the wanderer > in the wilderness of doubt to the wellspring of the Divine Presence and Fount of certitude, > > KI:#208:189-190 > That is to say “the perfect elixir” (kamil). We know that the Manifestation of God is also called “the > perfect man” (insan-i-kamil). > KI:#164-166:156-157 > La-makan is Utopos, the Land of Nowhere, the Na-kuja-Abad of Suhrawardi. It is the world of spiritual > intuition where the spirit discovers the hidden dimension of things. It is the vision of Malakut. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > and conferreth upon mortal souls the honour of acceptance into the Ridván432 of > immortality. Now, could this gold be thought to be copper, these people could likewise be > thought to be the same as before they were endowed with faith.”433 > > CHAPTER NINE: > PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF BAHA’I THEOSOPHY > > We have shown that the teaching of Baha’u’llah corresponds to the technical exigencies of a > theosophy, but we may still question whether this teaching also possesses the spirit thereof. We > might be troubled by the insistence of certain Western historians and Orientalists who negate this > theosophical character. It is true that these ones generally have had only a very superficial > knowledge of the Baha’i writings, but we find in Iran a very similar critique, particularly coming out > of the mouths of the Shaykhis and certain Sufi orders. These Islamic testimonies are important > sources of misunderstandings which we must attempt to remove. > > In the preceding Chapter we have set forth the positive elements which indicate to us that Baha’i > thought presents itself as a theosophy. This does not signify however that this Baha’i theosophy must > present itself in the same forms as the traditional theosophies. In the present Chapter we will show > the radical originality of the philosophy of Baha’u’llah by setting forth a certain number of essential > points in which Baha’i theosophy diverges fundamentally both in its organization and in its > expression from earlier theosophies. Far from being scandalized by this, we think that Baha’u’llah > revived theosophical thought in such a way as to provide the only means for its survival. This > affirmation obviously leads us to ask why there has been a divorce between philosophy and > theosophy in the West, a divorce that has led to a quasi-extinction of the latter, even though, until > the end of the Middle Ages, all the Western philosophical Schools were at the same time > theosophical Schools. It would also be seemly that we inquire regarding the destiny of theosophy in > the East. Eastern theosophy is today far less brilliant than is said, for this theosophy presently admits > itself incapable of resisting the disenchantment of the world and the desacralization of the cosmos > which is brought about through the modes of social organization imported from the West. > > 1. Revelation and tradition > > Here we encounter the unfolding of a battle. Some can not envision the Baha’i Faith as anything > other than a purely Iranian phenomenon, notwithstanding its universal message and its global > expansion. For them, the Baha’i Faith represents the last cutting blow to the bleeding edifice of > > Ridvan is one of the names of Paradise. It is the name of the period of twelve days during which > Bahá’u’lláh announced his prophetic station for the first time to a small group of his followers. The > commemoration of this period is an annual occurrence for Bahá’ís. This announcement took place just > prior to Bahá’u’lláh's departure from Baghdad, and in the Najibiyyih garden on an island in the midst of > the Euphrates River, “subsequently designated by his followers as the Garden of Ridvan.” (Shoghi > Effendi, “God Passes By”, chapter IX, p. 151) > KI:#167:157-158; Persian text, Cairo version, pp. 122-123 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Iranian metaphysics. These ones accuse the Baha’is of wishing to give the coup de grace to a > masterpiece in danger of disappearing and they implore them to renounce their spiritual and > philosophical ambitions and to join their forces to those of the traditionalists, in order to preserve a > nondenominational work and thereby to oppose the triumph of Western rationality. Not hearing the > response they had hoped for to their plea, they accuse the Baha’is of treason. But the Baha’is do not > stop affirming that their objectives are, ultimately, the same as those defended by the conservators of > tradition. They state however that humanity is in the midst of living a profound mutation. This > mutation is the result of a double process announced by Baha’u’llah: a process of disintegration and > a process of reintegration into a new world order. In our time, these traditionalists and humanity as > a whole see only the process of disintegration. Many deplore the ruin of the family, the burgeoning > of drug addiction and violence, the impasse in economic development, the collapse of the social > order, the weakening of its institutions, the progress of materialism, and other ailments. However, > according to the Baha’i writings which, over a century ago, announced the onset of this catastrophic > process, the disappearance of the order of the world masks the emergence of a new order, the > appearance of a new consciousness and the evolution towards a new thinking. Baha’u’llah writes: > “Soon will the present-day order be rolled up, and a new one spread out in its stead…The day is > approaching when We will have rolled up the world and all that is therein, and spread out a new > order in its stead.”434 If the world has become so chaotic, it is because the old religions, the old > philosophies and even the new ideologies, do not have adequate responses to the problems of our > epoch. This does not diminish their merit and efficacy in the past. This general obsolescence, at the > dawn of a great transition towards a new cycle of civilization, naturally touches upon every religious > tradition. Certainly there are still numerous men who remain persuaded that these traditions retain > their value, men who derive a great profit therefrom, but we must admit that these traditions no > longer attract the masses and that they have lost their social authority.435 This is unassailable fact. > There is no point in lamenting that society has lost its sense of the sacred, that materialism has > removed itself from spirituality, that the new ideas have destroyed the ancient beliefs. If such things > have happened, it is because for a long time now the religious traditions have lost their guiding role. > We must renounce the antiquary's mentality which would have us regret the present and wish for > the past. The solution to our dilemma is not to be found in the scrupulous conservation of ancient > teachings, or the celebration of a lost unanimity, in the hope of bringing about a return to the past. > Rather than ceaselessly repairing the old house, which is ramshackle and on the verge of collapse, it > would be better to construct a new house, loftier, more spacious and responding more immediately > and consistently to the exigencies of the time. But, declares Baha’u’llah, the construction of this > greater habitation cannot be the work of man alone—only a divine Revelation can bring this into > existence. We must not forget that it is Revelation that is at the source of all these religious > traditions, and that Revelation alone can guide us in the present and into the future. > > This does not mean that Baha’u’llah repudiates all tradition. According to him, in religion there is a > central core which is the foundation of all the Revelations and which never changes. Only the > comprehension that men have of this core changes. He declares in the Hidden Words: > > GL:IV:7; WOB:161…CXLIII:313; WOB:161-162 > Here we utilize the word “tradition” in its philosophical sense. Tradition is that by which we realize the > naturalization of man, which is to say his inscription into a particular society and culture and in history. By > “spiritual tradition” we understand not revelation but the totality of the values by which a religion has > sought to accomplish its process of historicization. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > “This is that which hath descended from the realm of glory, uttered by the tongue of > power and might, and revealed unto the Prophets of old. We have taken the inner essence > thereof and clothed it in the garment of brevity, as a token of grace unto the righteous, > that they may stand faithful unto the Covenant of God, may fulfill in their lives His trust, > and in the realm of spirit obtain the gem of divine virtue.” 436 > > ‘Abdu’l-Baha also recognized that tradition constitutes one of the four fundamental sources of > human knowledge.437 But this does not signify that Revelation must remain the prisoner of tradition. > This principle is illustrated by an anecdote that is reported of Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i. One day one > of his disciples asked him what was the word that the Promised One must speak on the Day of the > Resurrection, a word which, according to the traditions (hadith) would set in flight three hundred and > thirteen of the chiefs and powerful ones of the earth. The Shaykh replied to him it would be very > presumptuous to claim to be capable of bearing the weight of a word destined to plunge the greatest > sovereigns of the world into consternation. When the disciple insisted, the Shaykh asked him: “Were > you to attain that Day, were you to be told to repudiate the guardianship of 'Ali and to denounce its > validity, what would you say?”438 The disciple exclaimed that such a thing was impossible, for it was > inconceivable that the Promised One would pronounce such words. The Shaykh replied that his > faith was not sufficient, because it is written in the Qur'an: “God commandeth whatsoever He > willeth…and God doeth whatsoever He willeth.”439 The Shaykh added that “Whoever hesitates, > whoever, though it be for the twinkling of an eye or less, questions His authority, is deprived of His > grace and is accounted of the fallen.”440 This anecdote shows the relations between Revelation and > tradition. It replies in advance to those who would reject the teachings of the Bab and Baha’u’llah > because certain aspects of these teachings are not in accord with tradition. Most pointedly, it would > answer those who would make such arguments while adhering to the Shaykhi tradition, the > teachings of Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i and Siyyid Kazim Rashti. > > The teaching of Baha’u’llah constitutes a Revelation of divine teaching. It is his role as the revealer > to confirm or invalidate tradition. In the preceding Chapters we have seen many allusions to the > Muslim, Greek and even Zoroastrian traditions in the writings of Baha’u’llah. Baha’u’llah could be > conceived as continuing the great project of al-Ghazali and al-Suhrawardi, both of whom wished to > demonstrate that the philosophers of Greece and the sages (magi) of Persia derived their inspiration > from the same source as the Prophets. In this way they wished to unite the three great traditions of > their time. But this union, without a Scriptural foundation and a normative authority could not be > achieved in Islam. It is only in the writings of Baha’u’llah that it is openly realized on that basis. > > 2. The age of maturity > > We have discussed the mutation of psychological structures announced by Baha’u’llah and we will > now attempt to clarify the meaning of this mutation and to explore its spiritual consequences. > > AHW: Prelude > SAQ: LXXXIII > DB:15 > Qur'an 5:2, 14:27; paraphrased in DB:15 > DB:15 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > This mutation of psychological structures corresponds to what the Baha’i writings call “the age of > maturity” which is described by Shoghi Effendi in these terms: > > “The Revelation of Baha’u’llah, whose supreme mission is none other but the > achievement of this organic and spiritual unity of the whole body of nations, should, if we > be faithful to its implications, be regarded as signalizing through its advent the coming > of age of the entire human race. It should be viewed not merely as yet another > spiritual revival in the ever-changing fortunes of mankind, not only as a further stage in a > chain of progressive Revelations, nor even as the culmination of one of a series of > recurrent prophetic cycles, but rather as marking the last and highest stage in the > stupendous evolution of man's collective life on this planet.”441 > > Shoghi Effendi continues in giving as the signs of this maturity: > > “The emergence of a world community, the consciousness of world citizenship, the > founding of a world civilization and culture—all of which must synchronize with the > initial stages in the unfoldment of the Golden Age of the Baha’i Era—should by their very > nature, be regarded, as far as this planetary life is concerned, as the furthermost limits in > the organzation of human society, though man, as an individual, will, nay must indeed as > a result of such a consummation, continue indefinitely to progress and develop.”442 > > Then he adds: > > “That mystic, all-pervasive, yet indefinable change, which we associate with the stage of > maturity inevitable in the life of the individual and the development of the fruit must, if > we would correctly apprehend the utterances of Baha’u’llah, have its counterpart in the > evolution of the organization of human society. A similar stage must sooner or later be > attained in the collective life of mankind, producing an even more striking phenomenon > in world relations, and endowing the whole human race with such potentialities of well- > being as shall provide, throughout the succeeding ages, the chief incentive required for > the eventual fulfillment of its high destiny.”443 > > The evolution of humanity as a social entity obviously depends upon the evolution of individuals. > Thus the advent of a spiritual civilization is not possible without a spiritualization of human beings. > This spiritualization is the purpose of Revelation. Baha’u’llah writes in Lawh-i-Muhammad Ibrahim > Khalil: > > “It hath been decreed by Us that the Word of God and all the potentialities thereof shall > be manifested unto men in strict conformity with such conditions as have been > > WOB:163. We must understand this global community in the sense the concept was given by the Stoics, > which is to say, a spiritual and universal brotherhood. > WOB:163. This global citizenship must depend upon the consciousness that “all humanity” descends > “from the same stock” (Bahá’í Prayers, Wilmette, 1991, p. 101) > WOB:163-164 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > foreordained by Him Who is the All-Knowing, the All-Wise. We have, moreover, > ordained that its veil of concealment be none other except its own Self. Such indeed is > Our Power to achieve Our Purpose. Should the Word be allowed to release suddenly all > the energies latent within it, no man could sustain the weight of so mighty a Revelation. > Nay, all that is in heaven and on earth would flee in consternation before it. > > “Consider that which hath been sent down unto Muhammad, the Apostle of God. The > measure of the Revelation of which He was the bearer had been clearly foreordained by > Him Who is the Almighty, the All-Powerful. They that heard Him, however, could > apprehend His purpose only to the extent of their station and spiritual capacity. He, in > like manner, uncovered the Face of Wisdom in proportion to their ability to sustain the > burden of His Message. No sooner had mankind attained the stage of maturity, than the > Word revealed to men's eyes the latent energies with which it had been endowed — > energies which manifested themselves in the plenitude of their glory when the Ancient > Beauty appeared, in the year sixty, in the person of `Alí-Muhammad, the Bab.”444 > > ‘Abdu’l-Baha has discussed this question of the maturity of humankind in the following manner: > > “All created things have their degree or stage of maturity. The period of maturity in the > life of a tree is the time of its fruit-bearing...The animal attains a stage of full growth and > completeness, and in the human kingdom man reaches his maturity when the light of his > intelligence attains its greatest power and development... Similarly there are periods and > stages in the collective life of humanity. At one time it was passing through its stage of > childhood, at another its period of youth, but now it has entered its long-predicted phase > of maturity, the evidences of which are everywhere apparent... That which was applicable > to human needs during the early history of the race can neither meet nor satisfy the > demands of this day, this period of newness and consummation. Humanity has emerged > from its former state of limitation and preliminary training. Man must now become > imbued with new virtues and powers, new moral standards, new capacities. New > bounties, perfect bestowals, are awaiting and already descending upon him. The gifts and > blessings of the period of youth, although timely and sufficient during the adolescence of > mankind, are now incapable of meeting the requirements of its maturity.”445 > > We must not however confuse however the potential collective maturity of humanity with the > maturity of each individual human being. If the 20th century was an age of monstrous horrors and > tribulations, it is precisely because the individual man has not yet arrived at the spiritual level of > development which is required by the potential collective maturity of humanity. It is only once the > individual human being will be fulfilling his potential that this stage of maturity may become a > concrete reality and that the new civilization announced by Baha’u’llah may blossom. > > 3. The process of individuation and the process of spiritualization > > GL:XXXIII:76-77; partially cited WOB:164 > WOB:164-165 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > This leads us to a trait which is altogether distinctive to Baha’i spirituality—it addresses itself as > much to the individual as to the masses. It even establishes a dialectical support between the > development of the one and the development of the other. Through this dialectical support, the > Baha’i Faith has invented a new way of defining the status of the spiritual seeker in society. > > Louis Dumont, a leading French thinker on religion, has clearly indicated that in all societies that > have existed until now, the man who wished to consecrate his life to the spiritual quest could not do > so without totally renouncing the world and placing himself along the margins of society.446 This is > the case, to different degrees, of the Hindu sanyasin, the Buddhist and Christian monk, the Muslim > Sufi dervish. > > The reason for this social marginalization is that the one who embarks upon the spiritual quest must > first attain to interior freedom, which is to say he must become an autonomous individual. This > requirement of attaining freedom and this entry into the process of individuation was, until the > appearance of modern Western culture, in contradiction with the holistic foundations of all > traditional societies. These societies certainly establish a link between the process of individuation > and the process of spiritualization, but they wanted to remain in control of individuation, and so > they codified its exercise, and above all they socially circumscribed the candidates deemed > acceptable for spiritual emancipation by first defining the framework of their social role. The > imposition of celibacy was often a mark of this social marginalization. Furthermore, the churches > and other places of worship, being institutions by definition, defended these holistic foundations of > society, resulting in the numerous conflicts between the great mystics and their corresponding > religious authorities. > > In the West there was developed a unique phenomenon. The process of individuation was separated > from the process of spiritualization, a separation which had both positive and negative aspects. On > the positive side, this separation permitted the emancipation of man and the winning of his > psychological autonomy, an indispensable step in the process of the maturation of humanity. On the > negative side, this process of individuation was accompanied by a corresponding movement > resulting in the progressive desacralization and secularization of society. This movement has led > humanity to its present immersion in materialism and to a narcissistic form of individualism which > aims exclusively to satisfy the ego, the inferior self (nafs). On one side, humanity has seen the opening > up of extraordinary perspectives for development. On the other, it has been incapable of mastering > these perspectives, and thus has become engaged in a self-destructive process of social disintegration. > > One of the purposes of Baha’u’llah is to reestablish equilibrium between the two processes of > individuation and spiritualization. Humanity must become more spiritual, if man wishes to master > the consequences of his own interior autonomy. > > The process of individuation has permitted us to acquire qualities such as psychological autonomy, > consciousness of self and identity, as well as moral self-determination and social independence. Thus > the individual has become conscious of his need of expansion and of the fact that he is endowed with > largely unexploited potentialities. According to Baha’u’llah, all these positive elements must be > encompassed in a larger process, the process of spiritualization, which is the submission of the > Louis Dumont, “Le Renoncement dans les religions de l'Inde,” in Homo Hierarchicus, appendix B. Also see > Essais sur l'individualisme une perspective anthropologique sur l'ideologie moderne, p. 35 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > individual to divine transcendence. Whereas the modern individual proclaims that he is the source > of his own values, Baha’u’llah teaches that the values of every human society are spiritual, because > human nature is spiritual. Its values are consequently transcendental. The adjective > “transcendental” here signifies that the laws of human nature are inscribed in the universe. They are > part of the divine worlds! Man can only learn and live by these spiritual values in a relative and > progressive manner. Human progress essentially consists in acquiring a better intelligence > inclusive of these spiritual values. > > Baha’i gnosis thus cannot be the lot of a small number of “true believers”. There are certainly > always elites who transform society, but in Baha’u’llah's conception, these elites are duty bound > towards the entire human race to assist them to master their new liberty and to elevate their level of > spirituality. Baha’u’llah does not address himself to a small number but to humanity in its entirety. > His aim is not to transform a handful of disciples, but the entire human race. This imperative > conditions numerous aspects of Baha’i theosophy. > > We now see what meaning to give to those injunctions of Baha’u’llah which call upon us to abandon > the ideas bequeathed to us by our forefathers, to renounce all human learning, and to become > detached from all that we have seen, heard and understood. This is an effort to establish the > conditions of true liberty and of the autonomy of the subject that are so indispensible to our > spiritualization. This is the purpose and meaning of the “conditions of the true seeker” that we have > studied in the preceding Chapter. > > 4. Meditation and spiritual hermeneutic > > We have explained the personal character of ta'wil in the Baha’i Faith, the exercise of ta'wil being a > fundamental element in the process of individuation and spiritualization. This ta'wil relies upon a > daily practice of meditation on the sacred texts, which, along with daily prayer, is given by > Baha’u’llah as one of the fundamental obligations of the believer. This meditation is made the > specialized location of the active imagination and spiritual hermeneutic. But, as Jung showed, the > process of individuation is inseparable from a symbolic exploration of the world. The symbolic > expression of Revelation is intended to introduce a new equilibrium into the archetypal chaos of > man. This is why meditation upon symbolic language leads to what Baha’u’llah calls “the revelation > of the inner mysteries of God”447 and through this intermediary to mastery of the inferior self (nafs) > and knowledge of the divine Self. This is a process of interiorization and appropriation in the sense > that its purpose is to fuse the inner being with the divine Word so that it will be transformed by that > Word to such an extent that the inner being and the meaning of the Word are no longer two but > one. Such a process cannot be other than personal and its result can not have a normative > implication for other persons, even though it is always of the highest interest as an indicative > qualification. One of the errors of the West has been to reduce ta'wil entirely to its written form and > to see in this form the exceptional product of an uncommon mystical intelligence. In reality, ta'wil is > a function of the soul given to every human being who desires to undertake the spiritual quest. > Hence, no ta'wil is superior to any other. > > Besides, written ta'wil always runs the risk of foundering in verbal delirium, of becoming a play of > KI:#213:192; GL:CXXV:264. Cf. G. Durand, L'imagination symbolique, 2nd edition, 1989, p. 68 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > words and syllables, logorrhe. > > Ta'wil must go beyond the confines of language in order to permit a direct identification of the > individual consciousness with the symbol, and thereby to arrive, according to the famous expression > of Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i, “at the secret which alone can teach the secret.” > > We must take care not to reduce Baha’i hermeneutic to an explanatory process. This hermeneutic > explains nothing. It is an interiorization of the divine Word, the purpose of which is synonymous > with the transformation of the self. > > 5. Reason and the re-enchantment of the world > > Baha’i theosophy is willingly innovative. It is not tied down by the weight of old traditions and its > avowed aim is to transform the world by giving us a new representation of all things. It aims at no > less than a respiritualization of man and a resacralization of the world. It is this process that, in > paraphrasing Max Weber, we call the “re-enchantment” of the world. All theosophy begins from > the principle that the material world is a symbolic expression of the spiritual world. The material > world is perceived as such through the mediation of the revealed Word of the Prophets. There is > therefore a function of correspondence between this revealed Word and its symbolic language on > the one hand and the symbols of nature on the other. It is by means of this path that the re- > enchantment of the world can occur, which will lead us to recognize the world as a hierophany. > > Furthermore, knowledge of the revealed Word need not conflict with or cancel out knowledge of > nature. Nature is accessible to us by two paths, that of science and that of theosophy. Baha’u’llah > proclaims strongly that there is no science without theosophy and no theosophy without science. It is > one of the employments of the analogy of the two wings of a bird developed by ‘Abdu’l-Baha. To > fly, a bird needs two wings. In order to develop, humanity needs equilibrium between the wing of > science and the wing of religion. If the wing of religion weakens we fall into the mire of materialism; > if the wing of science weakens we fall into the swamp of superstition. Gnosis must be accompanied > by science, for it is science which permits us to take the measure of the universe, to explore its > complexity, to unveil its harmony, and thereby to appreciate the grandeur of the Creator of the > worlds. > > This leads us to affirm the necessity of an equilibrium between reason and the heart. To engage > oneself in the spiritualization of the world does not mean to renounce reason. The progressive > development of rationality is the motor of the process of individuation while the cultivation of > mystical knowledge is at the heart of the process of spiritualization. > > The vertical symbolic hierarchies must be reflected on the horizontal plan. The re-enchantment of > the world takes place through the resacralization of space, the erection of signs and of testimonies, of > monuments which are not simple “vestiges' such as monuments to the deceased, but rather the > translation of the celestial order onto the terrestrial plan. Nothing reflects this conception better than > the Baha’i holy places, and particularly the most holy among them, in Israel, located upon Mt. > Carmel, and in the vicinity of the tomb of Baha’u’llah at Bahji.448 The pilgrimages which take place > > Translator’s Note: Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 306: “…twin holy Shrines, in the plain of ‘Akká > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > there are conceived of as initiatory voyages the guides of which are the monuments dispersed in the > gardens, themselves the representation of a spiritual world. The translation into horizontal language > of the vertical hierarchy of spiritual symbols has been nowhere explained better than in the > description by Shoghi Effendi of the nine concentric circles around the mortal remains of the Bab, > who was described by Baha’u’llah as “the point around which turn the reality of the Prophets and > Messengers”:449 > > “The outermost circle in this vast system, the visible counterpart of the pivotal position > conferred on the Herald of our Faith, is none other than the entire planet. Within the > heart of this planet lies the “Most Holy Land,” acclaimed by ‘Abdu’l-Baha as “the Nest of > the Prophets” and which must be regarded as the center of the world and the Qiblih of > the nations. Within this Most Holy Land rises the Mountain of God of immemorial > sanctity, the Vineyard of the Lord, the Retreat of Elijah, Whose return the Bab Himself > symbolizes. Reposing on the breast of this holy mountain are the extensive properties > permanently dedicated to, and constituting the sacred precincts of, the Bab’s holy > Sepulcher. In the midst of these properties, recognized as the international endowments > of the Faith, is situated the most holy court, an enclosure comprising gardens and terraces > which at once embellish, and lend a peculiar charm to, these sacred precincts. > Embosomed in these lovely and verdant surroundings stands in all its exquisite beauty the > mausoleum of the Bab, the shell designed to preserve and adorn the original structure > raised by ‘Abdu’l-Baha as the tomb of the Martyr-Herald of our Faith. Within this shell is > enshrined that Pearl of Great Price, the holy of holies, those chambers which constitute > the tomb itself, and which were constructed by ‘Abdu’l-Baha. Within the heart of this > holy of holies is the tabernacle, the vault wherein reposes the most holy casket. Within > this vault rests the alabaster sarcophagus in which is deposited that inestimable jewel, the > Bab’s holy dust. So precious is this dust that the very earth surrounding the edifice > enshrining this dust has been extolled by the Center of Baha’u’llah’s Covenant, in one of > His Tablets in which He named the five doors belonging to the six chambers which He > originally erected after five of the believers associated with the construction of the Shrine, > as being endowed with such potency as to have inspired Him in bestowing these names, > whilst the tomb itself housing this dust He acclaimed as the spot round which the > Concourse on high circle in adoration.”450 > > 6. The divine worlds and the angelic hierarchies > > Some have been disquieted when they discovered that all reference to the angelic hierarchies so > popular in Shi'i writings is absent from the writings of Baha’u’llah. In such references they see not > only the concretization of the hierarchical structure of the world, but they regard the angels as the > incarnations of the hermeneutic function and consider the angelic hierarchies as a necessary > safeguard against the destruction of theosophy by Western rationality. Gilbert Durand writes: > “These angels, which we find in other Oriental traditions are good…the very criterion of a symbolic > > and on the slopes of Mt. Carmel…” > Shoghi Effendi, The Citadel of Faith, pp. 95-96. > Ruhiyyih Rabbani, The Priceless Pearl, pp. 246-247. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > ontology. They are symbols of the symbolic function itself which is—like them!—the > mediator between the transcendence of the signified and the world manifested in concrete, > incarnate signs, which signs thereby become symbols for it.”451 > > To tie the destiny of theosophy to an angelology derives from a deformation of perspective resulting > from the immense influence of Avicenna (Ibn Sina), be it in Latin or Arabic, and more widely of the > systems of Neoplatonic thought that appropriated the hierarchy, linked to a concept of process to > which we will return, to frame a system in explanation of the world. In the next several Chapters of > this book, we will examine the relations between the thought of Baha’u’llah and Neoplatonism. This > will lead us to affirm that the important points of contact which are attested by both of these two > visions of the world derive from the fact that the one and the other are both philosophies of > emanation. Notwithstanding this, Baha’u’llah excludes any system of emanation by procession, > while offering us very original descriptions of the engenderment of being and the hierarchization of > the worlds. For the thought of Baha’u’llah aims at avoiding a fundamental stumbling-block of > Neoplatonism which consists in regarding matter and the sensible world as a sort of degeneration of > the spiritual and the intelligible, entailing a downfall of the spirit, and with it the downfall of man. > The problem, which we will treat subsequently in a more complete manner, consists in explaining > why God did not create a purely spiritual world, and why He imposed upon the human being this > sojourn of the spirit in matter, with the retinue of sufferings that accompany it. Christian > theologians, adopting the perspective of Augustine (Aurelius Augustinus), resolved this problem > through the dogma of original sin. Islamic theologians (mutakalimun) remained closer to the > Neoplatonism of Plotinus and of Proclus as most Muslim theologians imagined that the procession > of the Spirit, bringing about the engenderment of successive hypostases, led to a weakening of the > original emanation resulting in its imprisonment in matter. Baha’u’llah, by eliminating all reference > to the fall, and in showing that matter is one of the ways in which the Spirit evolves and a means > that the Spirit employs in order to effect its expansion and diversification, considerably modifies the > meaning of the traditional hierarchies in the universe and thus renders the problem of the > angelologies secondary. However to understand the significance of the concept of hierarchy in the > metaphysic of Baha’u’llah, we must further clarify the role of the angelic hierarchies in the > Avicennian systems. > > Antoine Faivre expresses the same fears as Gilbert Durand regarding the disappearance of the > angelic hierarchies, and is more precise regarding the functions attributed to these hierarchies. In > the 14th century in the West the great disturbance of Western theosophy took place under the > increasing influence of nominalism and of Latinized Averroism. For Faivre, the primary > consequence of the introduction of Averroism, namely the disappearance of these angelic > hierarchies had as its secondary effect of bringing about the disappearance of spiritual hermeneutic, > the foundation of the theosophical complementarity of the exoteric and the esoteric.452 He writes > notably that the cosmology of Ibn Rushd “ends in destroying a part of the Avicennian angelology, > that of the intermediary worlds which represent the “angeli” or “Animae coelestis”, the domain of > Malakut, of the World of autonomous Images perceived in themselves by the active imagination. In > posing a fundamental homology between “Anima coelestis” and “Anima humana”, Avicennism taught > the existence of an instrumental Intelligence, “dator formarum” ramified in a plurality of possible > > G. Durand, L'imagination symbolique, p. 29 > A. Faivre, Acces de l'esoterisme occidental, pp. 114-116 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > intellects. This also indicates, as traditional esotericism teaches, that our intellect is related to a > supra-individual source of light and of knowledge.”453 > > Here we are encountering a fear that the disappearance of these hierarchies brings about the > disappearance of ta'wil, and thus provokes a rupture between the esoteric and the exoteric. There is > close link between the destiny of ta'wil and that of esotericism in the philosophy of Ibn Sina > (Avicenna). He also points out that the “animae coelestis” possess active imagination in a pure and > perfect state, and that man is also capable of exercising this faculty, no matter how imperfectly, > because of the relationship he can have with these angelic or intellective hierarchies. Their > disappearance, in Averroes [Ibn Rushd] and in Averroism, is represented by the reducing of the > Imaginal to the status of “simple imaginary.”454 > > This is squarely in the realm of Avicennism, and it is not difficult to see that the positions that are > presented here were strongly influenced by Henri Corbin. He regarded the disappearance of > Christian Platonism and of Latin Avicennism under the influence of Averroism and of Orthodox > Scholasticism as a catastrophe for Western thought. Notwithstanding this, he had the lucidity to > recognize that a synthesis between Christianity and Avicennism was to some degree impossible.455 > In effect, because of the dogma of the Trinity, it was impossible in Christian theology to identify the > instrumental Intelligence with the Holy Spirit, as was accomplished by Suhrawardi, and thereby to > develop a true “prophetic philosophy”456. Corbin reminds us that this instrumental Intelligence is… > > “…the tenth in the hierarchy of the Cherubim or pure Intelligence separated (Angeli > intellectuales), and this hierarchy are doubled by the secondary hierarchy of the Angels, > which are the motivating souls of the celestial spheres; at every degree of these > hierarchies, in every habitation of the hierarchy of being, are formed between these ones > and the others many couples or syzygies”.457 > > Corbin recalls the role of these soul-angels as the motor-force of the celestial spheres, then refers to > their role as supports of the active Imagination: > > “…they are even the Imagination in a pure state…They are to perfection the Angels of > this intermediary world in which the prophetic inspirations and theophanic visions take > place; their world is in itself the world of symbols and of symbolic knowings…As for > Intelligence or the Holy Spirit, it is from it that our souls emanate; it is at the same time > the existentiatrix and the illuminatrix. All knowledge and all reminiscence are an > illumination projected by it upon the soul. By it, the individual human is attached directly > to the celestial Pleroma, without needing the mediation of a magister or of an ecclesiastic > reality…”458 > > Ibid., p. 114 > Ibid., p. 115 > Henri Corbin, L'imagination creatrice dans le soufisme d'Ibn 'Arabi, p. 16 > The attempts of this kind by Abelard were a complete failure. > L'imagination creatrice dans le soufisme d'Ibn 'Arabi, p. 17 > Ibid. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > For Corbin, the mediation of the angelic hierarchies replaces all terrestrial mediations, and this is of > course opposed to Christian dogma, which sees in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the earthly reflection > of the celestial hierarchies, from whence comes this “fear of the angel” that is found in traditional > Scholasticism. The “fear of the angel” brings about the degeneration of spiritual symbolism into > simple allegory, and the reduction of hermeneutic to exegetical commentary. Beyond that, for > Corbin, only the existence of these hierarchies is capable of guaranteeing the spiritual autonomy of > the individual and making possible “the prophetic psychology upon which the spirit of symbolic > exegesis depends”459, resulting not in a simple philosophy of the spirit, but in “a theosophy of the > Holy Spirit”460. Averroes certainly did not reject the angelic hierarchies, but he stripped them of > their mediatory role, and in his Aristotelian critique of Neoplatonism he rejected the theory of > Emanation. This resulted in the materialization of human intelligence and the corporalization of the > soul. > > The question that we must pose is whether we must so closely link the fate of metaphysics and > theosophy as a whole with Avicennism. We find here a question regarding the true relationship > between tradition and Revelation. The reader who will have followed us up to now will perfectly > understand why Baha’i philosophy is altogether detached from this debate between Avicennism and > Averroism. It does not derive from the same metaphysical presuppositions and is affirmed more in > the form of an ontology of the spirit, while remaining a philosophy of emanation. > > We must nevertheless examine the preoccupations of such a system. If we were to make a detailed > list of the functions that the angelic hierarchies are supposed to assume in the Avicennian system, we > will find that we have no difficulty whatsoever in identifying these functions in the hierarchy of the > divine worlds of Baha’u’llah. This hierarchy of the divine worlds is thus clearly substituted for the > angelic hierarchies of the Islamo-Platonic systems such as we find in Ibn Sina, Ibn al-'Arabi, al- > Suhrawardi, the Ishraqiyyun and the School of Isfahan. It assumes the same hermeneutic, > theosophical and metaphysical functions. This is a theme that we will develop further. > > The translation of the angelic hierarchies into a hierarchy representing ontological modes is not > without philosophical consequences and these merit exploration. First we must ask about the > meaning of the resurgence of Avicennism in contemporary Western philosophical thought, a > resurgence which is altogether curious after so many centuries of dormancy, and which is perhaps > not a stranger to the influence of Heidegger and to his attempt to give to ontology a predominant > role in philosophy. This resurgence unquestionably translates a new thirst for spirituality, and a > desire to reconnect with sources and ancient tradition. Secondly, we may ask if this modern > Avicennism is not disloyal to historical Avicennism. We may even suspect that certain of its > contemporary defenders are making their mark by developing a philosophy of immanence foreign > both to the spirit of Christianity and to that of Islam. For to reduce the Holy Spirit to the > instrumental Intellect, is in a certain fashion to cut its connection to God and to render it an element > among many others, quasi-autonomous in a celestial mechanism that obeys a law of necessity. This > concept is very different from the transcendence affirmed by all the great religions and emphatically > by Baha’u’llah as well. This tendency is however coherent with the whole spiritualist movement of > our epoch which adheres to a philosophy of immanence in which the idea of God is emptied of its > > L'imagination creatrice dans le soufisme d'Ibn 'Arabi, pp. 17-18 > Ibid., pp. 17-18 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > contents. This development responds to a profound need, which is that of affirming the autonomy of > the subject. We have noted this tendency in all of the authors cited. Corbin clearly affirms that the > existence of an instrumental Intelligence to which the soul of man can be related is a condition of his > liberty and assures his autonomy on the psychological plan— in establishing a metaphysic of > prophetic and imaginal liberty, and on the social plan in becoming free of any need for temporal > mediation or of an ecclesiastic magister. One can not affirm more clearly than this that spirituality > cannot be lived except on the individual plan, and that any search for spirituality which would take > the form of a collective movement, would lose it authenticity. Again, we must repeat that this > confuses the principle of individuation with the principle of spiritualization and substitutes the one > for the other. Baha’u’llah, taking up again the great concepts of Christian spirituality, affirms the > necessity that the celestial order be reflected in the terrestrial order. This does not mean that this > reflection is effected to such an extent that its movement must lead to a spiritual brigading. > Conscious of the problem, Baha’u’llah has removed all of the ecclesiastical hierarchies, the > priesthood and other human intermediaries, from the spiritual path. But this does not mean that he > leaves their role empty. He has founded his magister upon the notion of “covenant” or “alliance”, > representing first and foremost the relation of fidelity and intimate adhesion that each believer must > establish with the divine Manifestation. He has wished that this relation of fidelity and of intimate > adhesion be broadened to include the depositories of this covenant (mithaq) and of this alliance ('ahd), > which are the Institutions that his writings have engendered. At the crowning apex is the Universal > House of Justice, the guardian of his writings, the supreme legislature, the primary purpose of which > is to translate the spiritual values and divine laws articulated by Baha’u’llah into norms that enable > the celestial order to be clearly reflected in the terrestrial order. He put in place an Institution which > resembles not the Roman Pontificate, nor the Imamat, nor the caliphate, and from which emanates > a permanent authority, that will shelter his community of faith from schisms and divisions, the like of > which have so torn up the religions of the past. > > The third danger which the modern neo-Avicennism represents, after the loss of transcendence and > the reduction of the process of spiritualization to a process of individuation, seems to us to come > from confusing theosophical illumination with prophetic inspiration. The illumination of the soul > which results from gnosis has nothing to do with prophetic revelation because prophetic revelation > can not be made an expression of the Imaginal World. If theosophical illumination is carried out in > the world of Malakut, prophetic inspiration comes from Jabarut, from the world of Revelation and of > Command ('alam-i-amr). The one and the other cannot ever be on the same existential level. Man > will always remain in submission to the law of God. It will always be impossible for him to become > the equal of the Prophet. The product of his active Imagination only has value if his spirit is > detached and purified from vain imaginations, and if his interior being is transformed through the > influence of the divine Word. The active Imagination must always remain in submission to the > control of the divine Word. It is thus clear that man and the Prophet are different both in nature > and in status. > > This process should not however be regarded as inherently opposed to Avicennism. On the contrary > we can demonstrate that more than one of the its objectives is at the heart of the concerns and > objectives of Baha’u’llah. Avicennism had, as one of its ambitions, the affirmation of the autonomy > of the subject in the context of a spiritual movement. We have demonstrated how this objective was > attained in the teaching of Baha’u’llah. All the functions of the Avicennian angelology are preserved > in the metaphysic of Baha’u’llah, commencing with the symbolic function. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > 7. New aspect of the cosmo-anthropic principle > > It is clear that the function of the divine worlds such as are described in the “Tablet of Wisdom” > (lawh-i-hikmat), is above all hermeneutic. This hermeneutic function tied to gnosis leads to the > unveiling of spiritual realities. However, there is no need for an “instrumental Intelligence” which > would explain how man can, in his own soul, have knowledge of these realities. This is because the > nature of man is divine, and he himself is the reflection of the highest Names of God, and thereby he > can grasp the structure of the spiritual and sensible worlds. We here arrive at a new aspect of the > cosmo-anthropic principle. If the Spirit is at the origin of creation and if man is one of the highest > manifestations of this Spirit, then it is natural that we find a unity of structure between man and the > world. But this circularity is not explained except by means of a third element, which is the Creator. > Man is the mirror of God and the world is the mirror of man. Another aspect of the anthropic > character of Baha’i gnosis resides in the conviction that we cannot know God independently of His > creation and therefore independently of our own selves. Even as man is created in the image of God, > God is likewise in the image of man. We cannot think of God independently of the fact that He is > the Creator of the universe in which we live. > > From this point of view, all knowledge contains an important part of the anthropic principle. There > is no need to refer here to an “instrumental Intelligence” to explain the human perception of > spiritual realities. This intermediation of the “instrumental Intelligence” between the intellect of man > and the spiritual realities is replaced by the imaginal function of Malakut. However, distinct from > Ishraqi concepts of this Imaginal World, Baha’u’llah depicts no absolute separation between the > knowledge of sensible realities and the knowledge of spiritual realities. The unity of the creaturely > world (pleroma) establishes the unity of knowledge. It is thus that Baha’u’llah's thought avoids a > contradiction between science and religion. Even as there exists in gnosis an anthropic principle > which assures that the Imago Dei deposited in man permits him to know his Creator, so also modern > physics has shown that the closing of a quantum phenomenon is assured by the observer, which > implies that the quantum phenomenon is itself structured as the function of a law of intelligibility > which it shares with the human spirit. The transposition of the anthropic principle from the domain > of cosmogenesis to the domain of quantum mechanics shows that the heuristic methods of science > are not so far from the gnoseologic and noetic methods of religion. > > 8. Pleroma and holistic knowledge > > It is precisely this kind of movement which makes Baha’i thought a theosophy. This theosophy has > however no pretensions to substitute for science. Its role is only to establish unity between the > knowledge resultant from the mystical experience, from metaphysics and science. Each of these > three domains must remain autonomous. The affirmation of their complementarity in Baha’i > thought has been lengthily developed by ‘Abdu’l-Baha in multiple venues. He affirms in particular > the complementarity of tradition, reason and intuition. In no case should science step on religion or > religion on science. It is nonetheless necessary to furnish a philosophical endeavor in a sustained > manner in order to harmonize the results of the two. It is because of not having furnished this work > that the ancient theologies have disappeared, or that they have been marginalized, having lost all > power to explain the global reality of the world. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > The unity of the creaturely world ('alam al-khalq) establishes what we could call the Pleroma461, which > is to say a cosmic vision based upon the inseparability of the sensible and the intelligible, the physical > and the spiritual, the empirical and the imaginal. Isolated spiritual gnosis is thus without value as > much as it does not result in a knowledge of man, of psychology, of social mechanisms and physical > reality. It is for this reason that Baha’u’llah affirms that the best way to transform oneself is to > become a “servant of humanity” and to join one's forces to all those who have already accepted his > “Covenant” in order to accomplish the “Divine Plan” which aims at a radical transformation of > society and the establishment of a new civilization. The holistic character of Baha’i epistemology > based on the Pleroma is perfectly coherent with the political and social ideas of Baha’u’llah. The > interior transformation of man as an individual is inseparable from his efforts to transform social > reality. > > 9. The Pleroma and the active imagination > > At the same time, the holistic knowledge of the Pleroma explains how the great mystics, 'Attar and > Rumi for example, could have had the intuition of the structure of the sensible world, and seemed to > have clearly perceived the reality of the atom. The unity of the heuristic processes established by the > unity of the Pleroma explains the complementarity of science and religion. The unveiling of this unity > is not possible except through the “imaginal” faculty of man, that which gives him access to spiritual > realities, and which we prefer to call the “active imagination” rather than the “creative imagination” > as was proposed by Henri Corbin.462 > > The “creative imagination” of Islamic philosophy is totally disconnected from reason, which is not at > all the case with the “active imagination” of Baha’u’llah. From this perspective, it is this “active > imagination” that attempts in science to grasp the empirical reality of the universe and which, > through faith and mysticism, attempts to grasp spiritual realities. This holistic approach pays close > attention to the often intuitive character of scientific discovery as has been demonstrated by > Feyerabend.463 > > 10. Heuristic consequences of the transparent theology of the divine Names > > The unity of the creaturely world as Pleroma and the unity of the heuristic processes together assure > > We are borrowing the expression from Theillard de Chardin, who himself borrowed it from the early > gnostic Christians. The Greek word “pleroma” associates the ideas of totality and perfection. > We must warn the reader here that the term “active imagination” does not exist in the writings of > Bahá’u’lláh and that we are using the concept of imagination here in reference to the philosophical > tradition. This does not mean that we do not find in the Bahá’í writings a theory of the imagination and of > the imagined. That which the philosophers call “imagination”, that is, the capacity to represent intelligible > realities, is called by Bahá’u’lláh “reason” ('aql). Reason is what permits us to go beyond phenomena and to > discover the hidden laws of the universe. Of course, we must not confuse this “imagination” which describes > the intellective and heuristic power of the soul endowed with reason with the “vain imaginations” (awham, > zunun) about which Bahá’u’lláh speaks in certain places. > P. Feyerabend, Contre la methode: Esquisse du'une theorie anarchique de la connaissance, Paris, 1979. Sometimes the > ideas of Feyerabend have a provocative aspect that one must be aware of in order to appreciate them fully. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > the unity of empirical and spiritual knowledge, without having recourse to a supra-individual > mediating source of knowledge. This unity of knowledge is based upon the transparent character of > the creaturely world as the reflection of the divine Names. > > Moreover, we must draw attention to a fundamental aspect of this transparent theology. It is not the > divine Essence that is reflected in creation, but rather the divine Names. Thus man can never arrive > at the knowledge of the Essence of God, but only relative knowledge of His countless Names and > Attributes. This explains why the world is only partially intelligible. To arrive at the absolute > knowledge of the Names and Attributes of God in their fundamental unity would be to know the > divine Essence. These Names and Attributes as we know them have an intellectual existence, > dependent upon the human spirit. They are structured according to an anthropic principle. > > In order to more clearly appreciate the heuristic consequences of this transparent theology, we must > further elaborate the Baha’i conception of the divine Names as the manifestation of the Attributes of > God. In appearance, Baha’u’llah takes up the usual vocabulary of Islamic theology which > distinguishes between the Essence and Attributes of God. We will later see regarding the > “Commentary on the Hidden Treasure” of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, that this traditional distinction is not > established as a reality in itself. The distinction between the Essence and Attributes of God is purely > conceptual. We must take care that we do not become confused with the terminology. We do not > speak of the Essence of God like the essence of any thing created by Him. The essence of things > (jawhar) represents a suprasensible dimension of an independent reality. It is not in this sense that we > can speak of the Essence of God. The divine Essence (dhat) has no sensible dimension, nor any > suprasensible dimension. The only thing we can say is that it exists, but we cannot attribute “Being” > to Him because this would already define Him according to a precise ontological category. The > “Being” of God is a “nature” (kaynuna) which teaches us nothing about Him. There is thus a radical > difference in ontological modality between what we call the divine Essence and the divine > Attributes. The Attributes or divine Names are not understandable except through their effects > which we observe in creation, for it is from the contemplation of these effects that we infer the > existence of something more fundamental, which we call the divine Essence. The term dhat makes > no reference to Platonic or Aristotelian conceptions of the essence as esse. The word derives from the > Arabic dhu, meaning “who possesses”. This word, it should be noted, is not a substantive but a > preposition, a sort of word tool, which serves to construct composed expressions. The word dhat > could characterize a pure existence, capable of receiving all predications. The divine dhat is “the In- > self” of God. It would be better to translate it as such so as to avoid all confusion with precise > ontological notions. We can thus inquire about the pertinence of a distinction between essence and > attribute, in which one of the terms is totally unknown. In fact, only the Names of God exist for us, > and they have a reality which is not independent of man. > > 11. The transcendence of the discursive and the intuitive > > We thus affirm that the theory of knowledge based on the unity of the Pleroma, such as we see it > deriving from the Baha’i cosmic vision, effectively removes the difficulties concerning our study of > the theosophical character of Baha’i thought.464 Does this mean that all of the philosophical > > In speaking of a “Bahá’í cosmic vision”, we take care here not to attribute to Bahá’u’lláh what is uniquely > the result of our comprehension of his writings. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > problems which derive from a theosophy are here resolved? > > Antoine Faivre attributes the decline of theosophy in the West not only to the influence of > Averroism and thus Aristotelianism, but also to nominalism. It may be rash to suggest this radical of > an epistemological break in the 14th century, because the development of Averroism and of > nominalism proceeded from a rationalism which had much earlier antecedents in medieval thought. > The confrontation between two visions of the world, the one descending from Plato, the other from > Aristotle, seems to be characteristic of Western thought, perhaps going back even further than Plato > and Aristotle, to the pre-Socratics. The fact that it so extraordinary in the thought of Baha’u’llah, is > that it entirely escapes these oppositions, and it seems to have found a way whereby, without > foundering in Averroism, one nevertheless finds no trace of Avicennism. This radical rejection of > Avicennism, which is carried out in the framework of a philosophy of emanation, leads to a just as > radical a rejection of Aristotelianism. It seems possible then to define, based on the writings of > Baha’u’llah, a new philosophical path which rises above all of the traditional oppositions, on the one > hand, between discursive philosophy of the Aristotelian type and intuitive philosophy of the Platonic > type; and on the other hand, between nominalism and realism, and between the positions which > were defined by Augustinianism, Scotism and Ockamism. > > In Western thought, this confrontation derives from a radical opposition between the rational and > the irrational, and is indicated in an attempt to reduce the rational to the sensible and the irrational > to the intelligible. In Baha’i thought, these categories are not superimposable. We can not reduce the > irrational to an absence of rationality. The irrational is the domain of the spiritual par excellence. It > is in this that the Baha’i concept of “spiritual” is clearly distinguished from the classical concept of > “intelligible”. The West has never known how to rise above the antinomy which results from a > discursive approach and an intuitive approach to the world in concurrence. Finally, it is the > discursive approach which has carried the West away and it is probably that it is to this “victory” > that we owe the development of modern science and technology, but also, the disenchantment of > the world. In the East, it is the intuitive approach which has predominated. This has resulted in an > expansion of mysticism and a decline in the physical and practical sciences. But until the present the > great moments of civilization have always taken place when a tension existed between these two > approaches, which actually complement one another. > > From a Baha’i point of view, the discursive approach and the intuitive approach are both of them > insufficient. On the one hand, Platonism has discerned in an abstract manner the fundamental > principle of the cosmos from which it derives secondary principles from the intelligible, to thus > descend again to the sensible world. Aristotle starts from the sensible world attempting to define the > principles of the intelligible world based on which we can inductively apprehend the nature of the > original principle. For Aristotle, the sensible world is the world of certitude while for Plato this is an > opaque world destined to change, upon which the physicists enunciate contradictory opinions > without ever arriving at any certitude. The progress of modern science has undoubtedly taught us > that the physical world could be a source of certitude. However, the certitudes that we obtain from > the sensible world are not pure certitudes. No certitude can be entirely founded upon reason. Our > reason permits us access to intelligible realities, which are the hidden realities of the universe, but it is > our faith which leads us to spiritual realities. Without the illumination of the soul which faith > engenders, never, teaches Baha’u’llah, will we be able to attain the knowledge of the ultimate reality > which is at the origin of the world. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > The unity of the Pleroma implies that we stop opposing the rational to the irrational, the discursive to > the intuitive. The true knowledge of the world must be at the same time discursive and intuitive. > These two aspects must coexist in a dialectical process which works on itself and nourishes itself. We > must not be mistaken. It is not that we meant to arrive at a synthesis of the discursive and the > intuitive but rather a transcendence in a process which produces a unified and holistic knowledge > which would be something other than the simple addition of the one and the other.xxi > > This implies that Baha’i theosophy would not be intuitive alone, but also discursive; which is to say > that the philosophy of nature which inspires it would have a scientific character. > > At the philosophical level, this signifies that we can not think of the metaphysical without thinking of > the physical. The great ages of philosophical decadence are generally periods in which the most > complex metaphysical theories have been constructed. The philosophies of Proclus and of Mir > Damad Shirazi give us very good examples. Their metaphysical theories resemble very beautiful > cathedrals, but they are based on nothing, because they have lost all tie with empirical reality. These > are, as Baha’u’llah says, sciences “which begin with words and end with words.”465 This expression > clearly indicates that for Baha’u’llah philosophy can not be a simple language game. Metaphysics > must be rooted in empirical reality. Its explanatory capacity should not be limited by an abstraction > produced by the human spirit, but must also impact the physical world as much as the spiritual > world. A metaphysic which disconnects from the physical is a metaphysic which explodes and loses > every self-regulating mechanism. Thus if Baha’i theosophy must have a discursive and scientific > aspect, it is also necessary that science stop ignoring the great metaphysical questions. > > 12. Excursion in Scholasticism > > Inductive and rationalist thought has always been present in Western philosophy. The triumph of > nominalism and Averroism in the 14th century only represents the culmination of a long process that > began with the incapacity of Greek thought to conceive of the spiritual except in the category of the > intelligible. Thereafter, the definition of relations between faith and reason was one of the most > important tasks of medieval philosophy. Intuitive philosophy did not predominate except between > the Carolingian Renaissance to the end of the 10th century. From the 10th century onwards a strong > dialectical movement already began to develop under the influence of Aristotelian treatises such as > the “Organon”, the “Categories”, and the “Introduction” of Porphyry. Fulbert would give an > important place to the study of Aristotelianism during this period. The application of dialectical > methods to theology engendered insurmountable contradictions that the Christian world tried to > resolve principally by forbidding the application of dialectic to questions of “faith”. The problem > however is that what was defined as a question of “faith” by the Church had nothing to do with > what Baha’u’llah calls “faith”, which proceeds from intuitive knowledge, accessible to every human > being. For the Church, the question of “faith” refers to the articles of dogma that have already been > defined. The result is that “faith” covers for the Church a good portion of what is philosophy for > Baha’u’llah. The philosophers of the 11th century such as Enselme, or those of the 12th century > including Abelard, tried to remove this contradiction by showing that what “faith”—that is, > “dogma”— had defined can be demonstrated to be true by the use of dialectic. It is for this reason > > Tajalliyat, third Tajalli, TB:52 and Lawh-i-Maqsud, TB:169 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > that nominalism appeared in this epoch with Roscelin.466 We must however refrain from making a > scarecrow out of nominalism. Nominalism revealed real problems in the Scholasticism of this epoch > such as—Upon what basis can we affirm the existence of universals? What is the value of the > distinction between the essence and the accidents? What is the reality of the existence of the parts of > a whole? It is interesting to find that these questions are at the very heart of Baha’i metaphysics and > that they are resolved in a manner that is not that of Platonic Augustinianism, nor that of > nominalism, nor that of Avicennism. In fact, medieval philosophy could not resolve such problems > for lack of reflection upon the role of language. > > CHAPTER TEN: > PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF BAHA’I PSYCHOLOGY > > 1. Metaphysics and psychology > > If we analyze certain of the difficulties which have come to light in the theosophical thinking of > the West, we will see that most of them derive from the fact that Christianity never succeeded in > assimilating the heritage of ancient Greek thought. From the encounter between Hellenism and > Christianity it was fated that incompatibilities would come into existence that were only partially > detected. Hellenism, even in its neo-platonist form was never able to attain to a complete > spirituality. In Greek thought we always find the traces of an original materialism. These > problems were transposed into Western theosophy, which explains its incapacity to resolve > certain problems, and particularly that of the spirituality of the soul. The solutions retained by > the West in order to establish this spirituality of the soul would result in the radical separation of > the soul from the body, masking the separation of the intelligible from the sensible. It can be > shown that from the Greek Fathers up until Descartes there is a perfect line of continuity. Their > incapacity to place sensation, in a satisfactory manner, in the soul would transport Western > psychology to the slope of materialism, which would result in the negation of the spirituality of > the spirit. > > The psychology of Baha’u’llah avoids this peril because it is trichotomous. We describe as > trichotomous a psychology that distinguishes in the whole human not two entities (dichotomy) > such as the soul and the body, but three entities, that is to say, the soul, the spirit and the body. > We have seen in the preceding chapter how this trichotomy is established in the writings of > Baha’u’llah. It now remains to see the philosophical consequences thereof. > > In founding his psychology upon trichotomy, Baha’u’llah is faithful to a long tradition. The > The excellent work of P. Alferi upon the philosophy of William of Ockham (“Guillaume d'Ockham le > singulier”, Paris, 1989) has recently shown us the interest and originality of this conception. To think of the > individual and of singularity is just as important as to think of the universal. Once more we must arrive at a > synthesis of the two. This is precisely what was lacking in Scholasticism. William of Ockham is the first > Western philosopher who asked about the limits of language to describe reality. Certain of his conclusions > agree on this point with those of Bahá’u’lláh. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > psychology of the Bible as well as that of the Qur'an is clearly trichotomous and we seen traces > thereof even in St. Paul.467 It can thus seem astonishing that this doctrine was totally condemned > by Western Christianity, and since the Council of Calcedonia. One must without doubt see in > this a tragic misunderstanding whereby the Hellenized (Western) Church mistook trichotomy as > conforming to the categories of Greek thought while the Churches of the East remained faithful > to the trichotomous Judaic teaching. > > 2. Psychology of the Judaic Scriptures (TANAKH) > > The TANAKH distinguishes three elements in the human composite: nefesh, neshamah and ruah. > However, the same difficulties which exist in Arabic also exist in Hebrew for distinguishing these > terms from each other. It does not seem that these distinctions are intrinsic to Semitic languages, > or that their nature is purely linguistic, but it seems that they were imposed at a distant time in > the past by means of a true psychological reflection. All these terms evoke the breath. > > Nefesh represents in the TANAKH the vital spirit. It is common to man and to the animals. As a > principle of life, nefesh is sometimes associated with blood. It dies with the body. Nevertheless, > nefesh is not reducible to a simple biological principle. It embodies an important psychological > aspect. Certain Scriptural verses make of it the seat of thoughts, of sentiments, of knowledge and > science. It is sometimes judged negatively, as responsible for the passions, and sometimes > considered in its positive aspect, as a carrier of wisdom. > > Ruah is like nefesh a breath, but it is a divine breath because it is the breath which God breathed > into the nostrils of Adam in order to confer life upon him. Ruah distinguishes man from the > animal. In Arabic, there are many other terms which designate the elements of the whole > human. These terms are probably survivals from an epoch in which the psychical unity of man > had not yet been perceived. Neshamah is hard to distinguish from nefesh and from ruah, with which > it is interchangeable. It is also a vital breath principle of life. Levav signifies “heart”. It is the seat > of the sentiments, good or bad, of thoughts and resolutions. Moreover, in the wisdom literature, > these expressions seem to have been used above all for their metaphorical value. > > The Christian translators translated nefesh with psyche in Greek and anima in Latin. Ruah was > habitually rendered as pneuma in Greek and spiritus in Latin. As for Neshamah, it was generally > translated by pnoe in Greek and spiraculum in Latin. Here we see the first difficulty, for pneuma is > neither the equivalent of spiritus in Latin, nor of Ruah in Hebrew, and psyche is certainly not the > equivalent of anima or of nefesh. The sliding of meaning is thus inevitable. These semantic slidings > explain why we do not find in the Western languages a vocabulary adequate to describe the > psychology of Baha’u’llah. > > 3. The soul according to the Fathers of the Church > > In the Writings of the Greek Church Fathers, psyche was the word chosen to designate the soul of > the deceased, as the eternal principle which survives this life. This gave rise to many exegetical > > St. Paul: 1 Thessalonians V:23; 1 Corinthians II:14; 1 Corinthians XV:45; Hebrews IV:12. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > and doctrinal contradictions, because this word was thought from the beginning to translate > nefesh, which is a mortal principle. To this first difficulty was added the fact that the Greek Nous > was introduced in a totally independent manner to designate a reality which is not actually found > in the thought of either the Old and or the New Testament. This word, in the terminology of the > Fathers of the Church, designated the Spirit in general, but also the thought of man. It was > rendered into Latin sometimes as Sensus and sometimes as intellectus. The rare use of the word > Nous in the Septuagint served as the basis for a neo-platonic interpretation of the Bible by > affirming the equivalence of the Biblical Nous and the Plotinian Nous. This word, generally > rendered into English as “intellect” or “intelligence” and in Arabic by “'aql”, also designated > Reason, from which came a new source of misunderstandings.468 > > The earliest Fathers of the Church and the first Christian exegetes, who did not know Hebrew, > were thus faced with an anomalous vocabulary for which they had entirely lost the key. The > distinction, actually fairly fluid, between a principle of the bodily life (nefesh) and a principle of > spiritual life (ruah), completely escaped them, while it was evident to them that the thought of > man was identical to his soul (psyche) as was his soul identical with the principle of life. The > Greek Fathers saw a contradiction in the fact that nefesh could be the seat of a consciousness > independent of the psyche, the author of thought, and principle of spiritual operations.469 > > The Christian doctrine of the spirituality of the soul took three centuries to be established. It was > naturally to Plato and Aristotle that the Fathers turned as they sought to illuminate the Sacred > Scriptures while all the while being conscious that neither the one nor the other had a doctrine > compatible with Christianity. > > To the semantic difficulties were added conceptual difficulties. The Greek Fathers, and following > them the Church of the West, would prove themselves incapable of thinking of the soul in any > other way than in the category of substance.470 They were thus obliged to distinguish between two > types of substances, the bodily substances and the spiritual substances. But in making soul a > substance, one runs the risk of making it corporeal. This is notably the case with Tertullian, who > stated that the soul is a body. This opinion was rejected by most of the Fathers, but they > nevertheless considered that the soul had a reach, and that this reach coincided with the human > body. > > The Epistle to Diogenes affirms that “the soul permeates all the members of the body…”471 > Irenaeus wrote that “the souls have the form of the body they receive, they adapt themselves as > the water to the vase”472. Certain Fathers would find this image to be too fluid and would say > that the relation of the soul to the body is that of frozen water in a pail. > > The Fathers of the Church did not completely ignore the trichotomy of the human whole as it is > > The Council of Calcedonia… > Proverbs IX:10; Proverbs XIC:2; Psalms LXXXV:4; Psalms CIII:1,35. > This is, it is well known, because of the Aristotelian influence which penetrated all of Greek thought > and thereafter Christian thought. > Patrologie grecque, vol. II, col. 1176. > Ireneus, Adversus haeresis, II, C. XIX, n. 7. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > found in the Judaic tradition. Many passages of Scripture are so manifestly trichotomic that one > must accommodate them. Justin tried to resolve the problem in saying that the soul (psyche) is > vivified by the spirit (pneuma). In fact, Justin wanted above all to demonstrate that the soul does > not possess life in itself, that its immortality is not an immortality by nature, but an immortality > conferred by God. Notwithstanding this, Justin everywhere links the unity and identity of the > thinking principle with the soul. > > Tatian proposed another solution. He distinguishes in the soul an inferior part and a superior > part which constitute two distinct kinds of spirits. The spirit is thus a subdivision of the soul even > as the inferior spirit is generally assimilated to the soul itself and the superior spirit is described as > “the image and the likeness of God”473 which is added to the soul. The inferior soul is linked to > matter, because for Tatian, the fundamental distinction is between matter and spirit. This brings > him to conclude that the human soul is composed and not simple; the inferior soul being > composed with the body. The soul serves as the link between the body and the image of God, but > the soul is in the body. We thus see the difficulty for Tatian to think of the soul independent of > the body and to arrive at explaining in a dichotomic manner that which is essentially trichotomic. > > Irenaeus said that the spirit is a gift from God given to the soul and is that which makes man > perfect. He gives an ethereal body to the soul. It is this ethereal body which impenetrates the > physical body which is its form. He thus considers the soul as a fluid substance. Many Fathers of > the Church after him would have great difficulties in thinking of the soul, or of any other spiritual > creature, without a body, even if it be an ethereal body. The difficulty which is brought up by this > kind of interpretation is that if we make of the soul a corporeal reality, it becomes difficult for it to > retain its spiritual qualities. Hence, there was a great temptation in Christianity, as in Islam, to > corporealize the soul, as this permitted the explanation of the sufferings of hell. How could on > imagine that the fire of hell could have an effect upon the soul if it was not a body? Origen > attested that he was incapable of understanding how a spiritual substance could exist without a > body, and he gave bodies even to the angels. > > 4. First considerations on Origenism > > It is nonetheless in Origen that we find the first systematic exposition of the trichotomic > psychology.474 Origen brings together all of the disparate elements which he finds in the > Scriptures and among his predecessors, and he attempts to combine them into a general theory. > He thus returns to Biblical trichotomy in a form which associates the spirit (pneuma) with the soul > [psyche] and the body (soma). Like Tatian, he nonetheless distinguishes an inferior from a superior > part in the soul. The superior element is the Nous which we could render equally as “Spirit” and > as “Intelligence”, but which some have assimilated to the Stoic hegemonikon in order to render it in > Latin by principia cordis, mentis or animae. > > The inferior element of the soul was added to man at the moment of the fall. It represents the > Genesis I:26-27. > Henri Crouzel, Origene, Paris-Namur, 1984, pp. 123-137, and, by the same author, L'anthropologie > d'Origene dans la perspective du combat spirituel,” in Revue d'Ascetique et de Mystique, 31, 1955, pp. 364, > 385. See also J. Dupuis, L'Esprit de l'homme: Etude sur l'anthropologie religiouse d'Origene, Bruges 1967. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > temptation of the soul to turn away from the spirit in order to be of service only to the body. > > The soul thus has the possibility of turning either towards the spirit or towards the body, in this > sense towards the seat of free choice and human personality. If it gives itself over to the spirit, the > soul spiritualizes itself and liberates itself from the confinement of the inferior element. On the > contrary, if it turn towards the body it becomes carnal. In practicing the Christian virtues, the > soul elevates itself in increasingly higher degrees of spirituality, bringing it closer and closer to the > image of God which it holds within itself. > > The spirit (pneuma) is the divine element in man. It is thus the breath of God. It is this element > which possesses understanding of spiritual things, and it is thus this which, knowing the spiritual > order of things, can dictate to the soul its conduct. It is this element which receives divine grace > and in particular the gifts of the Holy Spirit and which permits man to participate in the divine. > When the soul is reduced to the carnal, it does not disappear but it enters into torpor and loses its > hegemonic power. It is this hegemonic faculty which Origen also calls “heart”. > > The psychology of Origen contains striking similarities to that of Baha’u’llah. These similarities > are explained in part, but only in part, by the fidelity of Origen to Judaic tradition. It would be > interesting to devote a comparative study to the two systems which would not only focus on the > problem of sources but would study the responses derived from those sources to problems of the > spirituality of the soul. For if Origen has the merit of leaving behind the ambiguity of his > predecessors, he is far from being able to resolve all the problems he addresses. > > We can see for example that pneuma and psyche in the writings of Origen do not correspond > exactly with nafs in the Writings of Baha’u’llah. For Origen pneuma is the divine element of man; > in this sense it is close to the ruh of Baha’u’llah and it is a prolongation of the Biblical ruah. But the > pneuma of Origen does not possess a clearly defined ontological existence. Furthermore, we do not > understand the connection it has with Nous or with the hegemonic element which preexisted > before the appearance of the soul in the body. The psyche of Origen remains the eternal principle > in man at the same time that it is the support of physical life. Origen has considerable difficulty in > preserving the unity of this psychical life which is apportioned between the spirit and the soul. To > the degree to which the ethereal body is a reproduction of the physical body, the soul explains > sensations, from whence there is a difficulty in explaining the difference between sense perception > and spiritual perception. Origen resolves this problem in part through his theory of the five > spiritual senses.475 Nevertheless, despite these difficulties, the concepts of Origen open > magnificent perspectives for the development of a gnosis which, in itself, presents many > resemblances with that of Baha’u’llah. Without this anthropology, Origen probably could not > have established his theory of mystical exegesis which, in all of Christianity, is that which presents > the most similarity to Muslim ta'wil. > > The conceptions of Origen had only a subterranean influence in Christianity because they were > condemned by the Church. It is certain that Origen did not know how to regulate the > relationship between faith and reason and that he rejected all control of the discursive over the > intuitive. His exegesis sometimes takes extraordinary liberties with the language of Scripture. > However, without doubt, Origen was the greatest Christian thinker before Augustine. The > K. Rahner, Le debut d'une doctrine des cinq sens spirituels chez Origene. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Church, while all the while utilizing him, nevertheless denied him all recognition. Without doubt > he aroused the “fear of the Angel”, and his condemnation by the Church is already a > condemnation of all theosophical thought. > > 5. The doctrine of the Syrians > > Trichotomic conceptions do not however disappear with the condemnation of Origen and his > Alexandrians. They were conserved in the Syrian Church, which doubtless played an important > role in the spiritual history of the East, but which is today totally ignored. The Syrians, because of > their utilization of a Semitic language, were able to retain a terminology close to that of the Bible, > all the while evolving its contents in a manner which prefigured the reflections of the great > Muslim theologians. The Hebrew nefesh is rendered by the Syriac nafsha which leads to the Arabic > nafs. This is a breath which is at the same time a vital principle. The Hebrew neshamah is rendered > by the word neshma which may have simply been borrowed. As for the Biblical ruah, it becomes > ruh. In opposition to the Greeks, the Syrians have always understood the immaterial character (la > hulanayta) of the soul.476 > > Aphraate, for example, is clearly trichotomic.477 The terminology of Aphraate shows the same > fluctuations that we will later encounter in Arabic. Ruh and Nafsha are for him easily > interchangeable. Aphraate was not interested in this type of metaphysical question478. In general, > the Syrians remained faithful to the teaching of the Judaic schools, particularly those of > Babylonia and Nineva. This fidelity does not signify however that they ignored the Greek > teaching, but that they arrived at a much happier synthesis than that achieved by the Hellenized > Church Fathers of the West. > > Aphraate assimilates the soul, in the sense of the psyche, to “the spiritual soul” (ruha nafshanayta)479 > as principle of the immortal life. The third element is defined as a grace. But his difference from > Justin or Tertullian is that he gives to the spirit a true ontological existence, because at death the > spirit ascends into heaven, while the soul is “buried in its nature”, “all sense is removed from > it”480, and it is plunged into sleep in expectation of the resurrection481. Those who have lived a > pious life sleep a peaceful slumber while the slumber of the wicked ones is populated by > nightmares, for they know that they are condemned. At the moment of resurrection, the spirit > comes down from the heaven to the body to resuscitate it along with the entombed soul. The > reunion of the spirit and the body leads then to the entire spiritualization of the soul. > > We recognize in the adjective la-hulanayta, the Greek word hyle (matter) which shows to what point the > Syrians were penetrated by Greek thought. Hyle would become in Arabic hayula. > Aphraate, Les Exposes, VI, 14. > For complementary information on Aphraate, the [reader] may refer to the note which we have > consecrated to him at the opening of chapter IV. > The combination of the two terms shows the imprecision of the vocabulary and to what extent it is > difficult to distinguish in the texts ruh and nafsha. > Les Exposes, VI, 14. > Ibid., VIII, 18; and XXII, 6. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > As for the sinners, they will only be revived by their souls and will thus live enshrouded in their > inferior nature. This doctrine contains striking resemblances with those which were later > developed in Islam. At the same time, we see that the principal difficulty which is opposed to the > construction of an operational psychology that could take up the problems of conscience and the > relations between thought and the body upon a trichotomic base, was that these theories had to > be compatible with the dogma of the physical resurrection. In the teaching of Baha’u’llah, the > question of the resurrection having been surmounted, nothing was opposed to the constitution of > a true trichotomic psychology in agreement with modern psychology and epistemology. > > 6. The spirit and the breath > > The psychology of Ephraim is quite similar to that of Aphraate, although less subtle. He defines it > in a celebrated formula “the soul prevails over the body; the spirit (re'yana) is more than the soul. > The soul adorns the body and the spirit gives its beauty to the soul.”482 > > The Syriac term re'yana was used to render either the Greek Nous or the [Greek] word pneuma. > The term passed into Arabic under the form of rayhan, by assimilation to the root of Ruh (RWH > or RYH). It is interesting to note that we also find this term in the writings of Baha’u’llah and in > those of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, often in the form “ruh wa rayhan” which is sometimes translated by “the > spirit and the breezes”. We must never lose sight of the analogy that the Semitic languages have > between “the spirit” and “the breath”. Ruh wa rayhan thus designates something in the writings of > Baha’u’llah which seems to be a divine emanation, probably an effect of the divine Verb, which > penetrates this world order to revive the human spirits and to confer upon them a new spiritual > life. But when we translate rayhan by “breeze” or by “breath” we must nevertheless never forget > that this term has a kinship with the Greek Nous. This breath is a grace and a confirmation by the > Spirit. > > 7. The spirit of faith > > The Greek author often wishes to assimilate the spirit to the superior part of the soul, and > denoted it as grace or charisma. To the degree to which a trichotomic psychology opens upon > the theory of divine intuition through the illumination of the soul, “grace” or “light”, in other > words “breath” is required to produce this illumination. We can show that Augustine's theory > that divine knowledge may be acquired through the illumination of the soul has a hard time > functioning in a resolutely dichotomist framework, and that it would be much more at ease in a > trichotomic framework. In the Baha’i writings, the spirit of faith plays the same role. ‘Abdu’l-Baha > explains that the spirit of faith (ruh-i-imani) is a grace or a divine emanation (the two terms are > mingled) which produces effusions (nafathat)483 of the Holy Spirit, and which, through a divine > power (qurat-i-ilahiyyih) confers eternal life upon the soul.484 Let us not become confused here > > Ephraim, Paradis, sermon IX, t. III, p. 591 > The Arabic nafatha signifies “exhale”, “expectorate”, “breath”. Naftha pl. nafathat can be rendered by > “exhalation”, “breath”, “expectoration”, “saliva”, “emission”, “effusion”. > Mufavadat, XXXVI:109; SAQ:XXXVI:165. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > regarding the meaning of this eternal life. He does not mean to say, as Justin did, that the > immortality of the soul is not an immortality by nature but rather a grace conferred by God upon > the soul. For the Baha’is, the soul is eternal in essence, but there are degrees in eternity. There is > the eternity of the stone even as there is the eternity of the spirit and the two are not equivalent. > The souls which do not receive the eternal life (hayat-i-abadiyyih) continue to exist in the kingdom > of Abha, but at an attenuated level of consciousness that will impede them from entering into the > contemplation of the most elevated spiritual realities. The eternal life thus designates the state of > superior consciousness which implies a union or a communion with God and His Manifestation. > But this divine power (rahmani), emanating from this divine grace (ilahi), does not have effects only > in the other world. In this world it transforms the human being and makes of “the terrestrial > man” (insan-i-ardi) a “celestial man” (insan-i-samavi). In the language of Origen, we may say that it > makes the “pneumatic” man “hylic”. “It makes the impure to be pure, the silent eloquent; it > purifies and sanctifies those made captive by carnal desires; it makes the ignorant wise.”485 > > This doctrine of the spirit of faith as a grace is not without a relationship to Aphraate. But, > differing from Aphraate, ‘Abdu’l-Baha does not make the ontological status of the soul dependent > upon this grace. In Aphraate, it is the spirit which receives this grace, and that is its principal > function. In Baha’i psychology, it confers upon the immortal soul, to supplement its immortality, > an eternal character having an entirely spiritual meaning. Baha’i psychology permits us to > distinguish clearly between the grace which produces illumination, and the soul as mirror. > > 8. The tribulations of the soul from Plato to Origen > > One of the difficulties which the Greeks had in understanding the true meaning of the > trichotomic psychology derives from the fact that they could not prevent themselves from > interpreting it in Platonic, that is to say Pythagorean terms. But there are traces in Plato of > archaisms which result in a true impossibility of conceiving the unity of the soul. This > impossibility was detected by most of the Fathers of the Church, which is why, even the most > Platonist among them, always rejected Platonic psychology. Plato identifies the concupiscent soul > (epithymia) upon which depends the satisfaction of vital needs. This concupiscent soul easily > slumbers in the immoderate (Hybris), which is why it must without respite be brought to > temperance. The second soul is the heart (thymos) which is the seat of the passions. It swings > constantly between the choleric (orge) and the courageous (andreia). For this reason, this heart is > also called the irascible soul. Both the concupiscent soul and the irascible soul are mortal. The > only eternal one is the Spirit (Nous) which is the seat of thought and which permits man to elevate > himself to the intelligible. As we see, this Platonic trichotomy has little in common with the > Judaic, Syrian or Origenist trichotomy. It is moreover upon the basis of this radical and abusive > assimilation that theologians have critiqued trichotomic psychology and that certain ones > believed that they could distinguish Pythagorean influences in Origen. > > The condemnation of Origen resulted in a certain distrust of the Fathers who preceded him, and > notably towards Clement of Alexandria, notwithstanding his having remained much more > measured in his exegesis. This distrust would prepare for the character of Latin Patristics, which, > after Augustine, broke with Greek Patristics. Already with Gregory of Nyssa there begins the > Ibid. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > establishment of the dichotomist doctrine which would become the orthodoxy of the Church. > Gregory is one of the first who saw in the soul the image of the Trinity, which shows that the > Trinitarian quarrels were not without effect even in this domain. The doctrine of Gregory of > Nyssa is furthermore not without value, for the soul therein is much more spiritualized than in > the doctrine of the first three centuries and its unity is better established. It is furthermore without > doubt its intention to establish this unity and the unity of the thinking subject that favored the > dichotomist doctrine from the start. > > From Gregory of Nyssa to Augustine, Christian theology introduced numerous refinements in its > doctrine, on the origin of the soul, on liberty and the fall, on the idea of that the body is the > prison of the soul, etc. But these developments do not really interest us. The soul is now defined > as immortal, immaterial, spiritual, simple and not composed. Scholasticism will do no more than > take up these givens, especially from Augustine, in order to progressively intermingle them with > Aristotelian elements. For Augustine, the fundamental problem was the transmission of the > original sin to the soul. Augustine without doubt had a very negative influence upon the > evolution of Christianity, because of his pessimistic vision of man which motivated him to > formulate the dogma of original sin and the doctrine of predestination. He was nevertheless a fine > psychologist and a philosopher of consequence. The triumph of his ideas over those of Pelagiusxxii > nevertheless marks another defeat for the Christian spirit. > > As we see, Christian psychology was unfortunately defined by dogmas which had nothing to do > with psychology, such as the sufferings of hell, the resurrection, the Trinity and original sin. > Psychology was always treated as a secondary and inferior problem. This was an error which > produced numerous inconsistencies. These are the same reasons which will result, in the 13th > century, in the rejection of Augustinianism for Aristotelianism. > > 9. New tribulations from Thomas Aquinas to Descartes > > For Thomas Aquinas, only Aristotelian categories permitted one to think about the spirituality of > the soul. The Fathers of the Church, under the influence of Greek materialism, considered the > soul as a spiritual substance. Thomas, conscious of this inconsistency, thought he could happily > resolve this problem in making the soul the Aristotelian form of the body.486 This doctrine, > thought Thomas, would permit a better treatment of the resurrection. If the resurrection of the > body is necessary, it is because it is only the union of the soul and the body which form a > complete being. There is thus in man only one complete substance which results in this union. > The soul must be regarded as an incomplete substance which does not find its completion except > in unity with the body. Nevertheless, the union of the soul and the body, in order to be operative, > must be substantial. This is why the soul and the body must each one possess the character of a > substance, that is to say, form for the one, and matter for the other. Thomas believed that in this > way he could avoid the snare of Augustinianism, which saw in the soul a substance altogether > separate from the body, as well as the danger of corporealizing the soul. He thus delimits the > scope of the soul and believes that this operation is sufficient to affirm its spirituality. He is also > preoccupied with affirming the contingent character of the soul. This is why he makes the soul a > metaphysical composition. The soul is composed of essence and attributes (Avicennian influence), > We could also say “substantial form”. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > of act and power, of subject and accident (Aristotelian influence). This metaphysical composition > distinguishes the soul from God, for only God is without composition. He is the Being in Itself, in > Him one can not distinguish Being from Existence. > > If we study the transition between Origen and Augustine, then that to Thomas Aquinas and to > Descartes, we can not fail to be struck by the logic of this evolution. Thomas refuses to make of > the soul a reality in itself independent of the body. Instead of corporealizing the soul in giving it a > subtle body, and in making an independent substance, he corporealizes the soul in subjugating it > to the body, in conserving its existence solely through its close relation to the body. In doing so, > he opens the way for Descartes who, believing himself to have advocated for the reverse of this > system, wished to establish an absolute separation of soul from body, and to reduce the soul to > thought. Materialistic thinkers had fun showing that if the soul is thought and if thought is a > cerebral function, then the soul and the body form one and the same reality. Thomas and > Descartes saw the danger, but they did not know how to avoid it, because they were weighted > down with the constraints of Christian dogma, especially in eschatological matters, and because > they were the prisoners of a dichotomist thought. > > Descartes sees himself in particular to be obliged to affirm the substantial character of the union > of the soul with the body, which appears to be in total contradiction with his theory. But to affirm > the contrary would have reduced man to a ens per accidens, an accidental being, which would have > opposed Christian dogma. Because of this fact, he affirmed that thought is really and > substantially united to the body: “mentem corpori realiter et substantialiter esse unitam, non per situm aut > dispositionem”.487 Descartes found himself obliged to define the soul and the body as two distinct > substances, posing then the problem of the union of these two substances, the one material, the > other spiritual. It is thus that he makes of the body an extension, the soul a thought, thought > being defined as that which has no extension. To distinguish extension from thought obviously > derives from the Thomist distinction between matter and form which, itself, derives from the > corporeal nature of the soul of the Fathers of the 3rd century, such as Irenaeus and Tertullian. > These saw the soul as among the contents of the body, a vital fluid itself composed of parts, > introducing a duality between the inferior and the superior. > > For Thomas Aquinas, the union of the soul with the body was effected by the vegetative powers > which connect it with matter. Thus, the soul is defined as a substantial, simple principle without > accepting any composition other than metaphysical composition, unexpected, incorporeal, > intrinsically united to the body, in organic life and sensitive life, but possessing an existence and > an action in the intellective life. > > Thomas conceived of knowledge as the product of human composition.488 The body participates > with the soul in the acquisition of knowledge. The senses are related to the soul inasmuch as the > soul serves as the vital principle of the body. For Descartes, only the soul thinks and it has no role > in the vital and elementary functions of the body. When Descartes adopted the theories of > Harvey on the movement of the heart, it was not for pure scientific interest, but also for > metaphysical reasons: he hopes thereby to demonstrate that the heart pumps the warmth of the > > 487Translator’s Note: Descartes’ letter to Regius, later January 1642, CSMK, p. 206, AT III, p. 493. > Thomas Aquinas, Somme theologique, I, 75.2. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > air and that thus the warmth of the body has nothing to do with the soul as a vital principle.489 > > On the one hand, we see the poverty of the notion of the spiritual of the soul in the Thomist > view, its absence of autonomy, the confusion between the intelligible and the intellectual, because > in renouncing the Augustinian theory of knowledge, he abolishes all power of direct intellection > by the soul, and thus all imaginative faculty. On the other hand, Descartes with his theory of > innate ideas and clear and distinct ideas returns to a more Augustinian conception of knowing. > However, in establishing a rigorous separation between the soul and the body and in reducing > the soul to thought, he ended up with a system in which it becomes impossible to explain the > relations between the soul and the body and in which the separation between thought and > sensation result in absurdities such as the animal-machines. Thus Descartes opened the way to > the immanentist philosophy of Spinoza and the idealism of Kant. From them derives the destiny > of all modern Western philosophy. The Patristics and Scholastics, never came out of the traps > which were tendered to them by Greek materialism; from which it results that Western > philosophy is afflicted with a veritable blindness towards the spiritual fact. > > 10. The spirituality of the soul > > All of this brings us to a first testimony: which is that the spirituality of the soul does not have the > same meaning in Western philosophy as in Baha’i thought. In Western philosophy, “spiritual” > means “having the qualities of the spirit”, but “spirit” is a category which is defined negatively in > relation to matter in the framework of a bipolarity which is in fact a disguised dualism. > “Spiritual” thus essentially means immaterial, incorporeal, stripped of extension. Of a certainty, > essences are spiritual, in this sense, but also the thought of man is spiritual. This leads rapidly to > an intellectualization of the spirit; and finally the term can not serve other than to describe the > interior and affective life of man. > > In his “Dissertation on the spirituality of the soul”, the Cardinal of Lucerne explains that among > the proofs of the spirituality of the soul is included the fact that matter is composed, while > thought is simple and without admixture, which implies a strict separation between thought and > matter, and that matter must be without effect upon thought, for otherwise thought would be an > attribute of matter.490 In this little treatise, we see clearly the appearance of confusion between > the soul, the self, consciousness and thought. The soul is described therein as a spiritual thinking > substance, the seat of sensation, of representation and of reflexive thought. Given this point of > view, in proportion and according to the degree to which science will penetrate the mechanisms > of sensation and the role of the brain, all the theological proofs for the spirituality of the soul will > collapse. > > We are observing a degeneration of the intelligible, which itself was a warped conception of the > spiritual. This progressive reduction of the spiritual to the intellectual appears to be a more > fundamental drama than the loss of angelic hierarchies or the reduction of the imaginal to the > imaginary. > > E. Gilson, Etude sur le role de la pensee medievale sur la formation du system cartesien, pp. 51-100. > Cardinal of Lucerne, Dissertation sur la spiritualite de l'ame, Paris, 1823. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > In the Baha’i writings, the word “spiritual” has a different meaning. Of course, it always > designates something which has the qualities of the spirit, but the word reveals something else. > That man is “spiritual” who expresses his true nature, that is to say, his divine nature. That > which denotes the spirituality of the soul, is its capacity to reflect the divine Names and thus to be > an image of its Creator. This image constitutes the divine deposit (amana). Spirituality thus exists > in the soul only in the state of potentiality, even as intelligence is also potential in man. If a child > never receives any education, his intelligence will not be developed; he may perhaps not even > learn to speak. So also, the spirituality of the soul has need of exercise and practice to develop > itself. It necessitates a work of purification and of transformation of the interior self. By > approaching its Creator, it receives more fully the divine light which illumines it and permits it to > radiate the divine Names in a more perfect manner. The spiritual qualities which are the > reflection of these Names are thus perfections, even if they existed in latency at the beginning. > > Thus Baha’i psychology avoids all possibility of confounding spirituality with thought. To deepen > spirituality is to discover the true nature of man independently of any cognitive process. > Inversely, the knowledge of gnosis derives from this spirituality. The spiritual man is thus a > gnostic man in the sense in which Clement of Alexandria employed this term.491 But we must not > mistake this meaning—if man were to consecrate his life to the study of gnosis, never would this > study make him more spiritual, inasmuch as spirituality is acquired through meditation > accompanied by action. It is in acting upon the world in order to transform it that man > transforms himself. > > 11. The nature of the soul and theory of knowledge > > The determination of the nature of the soul and its relations with knowledge and the body is not > just a metaphysical problem—it is above all an epistemological problem because it conditions the > entire theory of knowledge. In the developments which will follow, we will only to sketch this > problem, as our aim here is not to define a complete theory of knowledge, but only to show how > this knowledge of the spiritual worlds, which sustains all of Baha’i metaphysics, is possible. It is > thus in this sense that the nature of the soul interests us here, and in this sense only. > > One of the requirements of this problem consists in determining if knowledge is an autonomous > activity of the soul, or a simple determination of consciousness by means of sensory or > imaginative perception; the intellective does not intervene in this case except to organize the > givens produced thereby. > > To affirm that knowledge is an autonomous activity of the knowing spirit is a seductive concept > for the development of a theory of the imaginal, but it has metaphysical implications regarding > the nature of the world which may be thought to be incompatible with the metaphysic of > Baha’u’llah. Inversely, a theory of knowledge as simple determination of consciousness easily > arrives at nominalism. > > In the Stomates, Clement of Alexandria declares: “Gnosis is the noetic intelligence of prophecy” (St. II, > 54, 1.), which signifies that gnosis is the fruit of intuition who leads to spiritual hermeneutic, to ta'wil. > Elsewhere, he adds: “Faith in Christ and the gnosis of the Gospel are the exegesis and the following of > the law” (St. IV, 134, 3.). > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > If we relate these problems to the thought of Baha’u’llah, we see that it is not easy to resolve > them, and it is sometimes astonishing to find how much his philosophy appears to participate in > two systems, or to be in relation to them. In fact, neither in Baha’u’llah, nor in ‘Abdu’l-Baha is > there a complete theory of knowledge, but only a collection of givens which define the possible > theories, and which in turn exclude other models. Elsewhere, we know to what extent every > theory of knowledge is linked to a philosophy of language and thus to logic, and we also know to > what point both have made considerable progress in the past century. In order to establish a > theory of knowledge, it would be necessary to compare the Writings of Baha’u’llah with all those > of the philosophers who have also treated this question, a task which surpasses our more modest > ambitions. > > In Platonism, the soul has direct access to the ideas which fill it, and hence it is in itself that it > finds the elements of knowledge of the sensory, starting from the intelligible. It grasps the > knowledge of individualities because of its knowledge of the totality, because in Platonism, the > particular is contained in the universal. > > For Aristotle, on the contrary, it is the particular which conducts to the universal. The human > spirit grasps ideas, which are the immutable essences in objects. The individual precedes the kind > which is deduced therefrom. The apprehension of Aristotelian forms like Platonic ideas is above > all intuitive because for Aristotle it is only through the intuition that we return to unity, while for > Plato this unity is transcendental. > > Ibn Sina wished to construct his system upon different bases. It is because the individual soul > participates in the universal soul, also called the instrumental intellect, that it has access to the > world of essences upon which it establishes its knowledge of individual realities. > > Baha’u’llah turns away from these three systems and takes a diagonal which traverses all the > oppositions and transcends all of their contradictions. Also, his thought is neither nominalist nor > realist. > > We must remember that for him there is not a separation between the sensory and the intelligible > as strict as in classical philosophy. Every sensory thing contains in itself an intelligible part, > because the laws of the universe, upon which the existence of all things is based, are intelligible in > nature. The sensory is thus more of a particular kind of the intelligible. It is thus starting from the > intelligible that man understands the sensory, because of the power of reason ('aql) which is a > function of the soul. > > Reason is not a part of the soul. It is a faculty endowed with the capacity to reflect itself in the > spirit of man, and thereby to discover that which is hidden in nature, that is, the intelligible. Thus > to understand the intelligible is a spiritual faculty which belongs neither to the spirit nor to the > body. It is however the spirit which makes usage of this faculty of the soul. Reason being that > which distinguishes man from the animal, the capacity to have access to the intelligible is the > right of man. It is for this reason that science, like religion, is inseparable from man. For as long > as man has been man, there has been science, even if it was a proto-science colored with magic. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Science is a characteristic of the anthropic Spirit. Science always existed because the anthropic > Spirit always existed, because there needed to be a creature which could recognize the Creator. > The soul directly grasps the spiritual realities by connaturality; not that the soul can carry ideas in > itself, either the kinds or the species, but because there exists between the soul and the spiritual > world a “resemblance”, an identity of structures, an analogical relation, which is that of the > divine Names. It is thus through these divine Names that we grasp spiritual realities and the > relationship which distinguishes between the spiritual and the intelligible. > > But spiritual knowledge is different from sensory knowledge. Sensory knowledge is the right of > the spirit (nafs) which is in relationship with the senses and in which is found “the common > faculty”492, also called the “discriminating faculty”493, which enables the five physical senses to > communicate with the five intellectual faculties.494 In a certain fashion, spiritual knowledge is a > noetic and intuitive process, while sensory knowledge is an epistemological and discursive > process. Nevertheless, both end in reason, which is neither discursive, nor intuitive. > > One could object that such a system has a hard time preserving the psychological unity of the > subject. But for Baha’u’llah, this unity of the subject is assured simply by consciousness (damir) > and by reason. This unity would be very difficult to maintain in a world founded upon the > dualism of the sensory and the intelligible, the material and the spiritual. But its existence is > established eo ipso in the world of the Pleroma. Nevertheless, it should be seen that the unity of the > subject which we find affirmed in the Baha’i texts is of a very different nature from the Cartesian > unity of subject. The unity of subject based upon cogito is an illusion as was demonstrated by > Nietzsche and Freud. For Baha’u’llah, not only is the subject shared between the obscure self and > the divine self, between the exigencies of the psyche (nafs) and of the spiritual soul (ruh), between > the external meaning and the internal meaning, but even its manner of arriving at knowledge of > the world and of self is founded upon a collection of functions which must cooperate amongst > themselves, and which are able to do so because of the “common faculty”. Consciousness must > thus make an effort so that the unity of perception of the self and of the world is not the result of > the predominance of one of the elements of our spiritual and intellectual faculties to the > detriment of the others, as this would circumscribe our knowledge of reality. It is here that we > realize that the knowledge of the exterior is founded upon the knowledge of the interior, and vice > versa. Finally, recognition that consciousness is the product of a composition which is capable of > speaking with several voices is far from the idea of the dissolution of the subject as is found in > contemporary philosophy. > > This conception of the unity of the subject and its participation in the world of the Pleroma has > different levels with important consequences. Of a certainty, man begins from the sensory to > elevate himself towards the spiritual through the analogical and homological relationship > between the two worlds. But this does not involve the habitual consequences of a pure idealism, > because the spiritual realities are well established as realities in themselves. These realities in > themselves are individual realities, and this implies that the physical individual is the image of the > > 492SAQ:LVI:245-246. > > 493See footnote 192. > > 494See SAQ:LVI. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > spiritual individual. There can not be a dissociation of one from the other. The essential realities > are individual essences, and not participations in one of the same kind as in the Platonic system. > On this point, Baha’u’llah is closer to Thomas than to Ibn Sina, even if his thought is > incompatible with Aristotelianism. > > 12. The union of the soul and the body > > The modality of the union of the soul and the body is a question that is found at the heart of all > Christian Scholasticism, whereas Muslim Scholasticism seems to have been little concerned with > this problem. > > We have seen that the Fathers of the Church considered this union to be of two substances, the > one material and the other spiritual. This superposition of substances posed many problems > which Thomas thought himself able to resolve by saying that the soul is the form of the body, > with all the consequences which that imposes. Christian Scholasticism always wanted the union > of the soul and the body to be of substance, on the one hand because of the dogma of the bodily > resurrection, and on the other hand because to set aside a union of substance led directly to the > soul being considered an accident of the body; which became easy as soon as the soul was > deprived of its autonomy and when it was made the seat of consciousness, of thought and of > sensations. > > To now understand the fashion in which Baha’u’llah resolves the problem, we must first make > some clarifications in terminology. Scholasticism speaks of “substance” where we are used to > speaking of “essence” and where Baha’u’llah speaks of “reality” (haqiqat). Shoghi Effendi says > “essential reality.” The word “substance” (ousia) comes from Aristotle, and has a sense fairly close > to that of essence. Aristotle defines substance as “that which is not the predicate of a subject, but > of which other things are predicates”495. A little later, he adds that in a second sense, substance > can be defined as “the immanent cause of the existence of the beings of a nature such that they > are not affirmed of a subject”496. Substance is thus none other than an essence considered as > immanent to a subject and constituting its limit and its quiddity.497 The primal substance (prote > ousia) is the individual identical to the essence (to ti esti), in this sense that the essence is that which > permits one to pass from the individual to the universal. In Scholasticism, Thomas refines these > definitions and gave them a more systematic compass. In particular he made of the quiddity the > nature existing in a corporeal nature as object of the intellect. These terms have their exact > counterpart in Muslim scholasticism and we will see, when we arrive at his “Commentary on the > Hidden Treasure”, that ‘Abdu’l-Baha also employed this terminology.498 For this reason, it is not > without usefulness here to introduce this vocabulary. > > According to this approach, one can give a substance to every level of reality. The soul is a > > Aristotle, Metaphysique, Livre D, 8, 10-15; translated by J. Tricot, Vrin, ed. 1991, pp. 182-183. > Ibid. > Ibid., Livre D, 17.5-10, p. 205. > Tafsir-i-Kuntu Kanzan Makhfiyyan, in Makatib-i-’Abdu’l-Bahá, volume II, pp. 4-55. Provisional translation > by Moojan Momen, published in Bahá’í Studies Review, III:4. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > substance, the body is a substance, but we are also obligated to give to the atoms which compose > the body a substance independent of the body, so that man becomes an entanglement of > substances. This difficulty was already perceived by Aristotle who spoke of a “multitude” of > substances. It is to avoid this difficulty that Thomas posited the unity of the substance in the > human composition by making the soul the substantial form which can be neither a substance > nor an essence for form is not a reality in itself, but an intellectual reality ('aqli) which does not > exist independently from the spirit of man. At the minimum, this is what we think we can deduce > from his system of thought and it is found confirmed in the “Commentary on the Hidden > Treasure” of ‘Abdu’l-Baha. > > The soul must be an essence, that is, a reality which transcends the body, not an immanent > reality like the substantial form. So how are we to avoid having the human whole become a > confusion of essences? It is here that Baha’u’llah envisions a radical solution, totally coherent with > his system, which doubtless would have struck with terror, at an epoch in which men were > burned at the stake for less than that, our Scholastic theologians shut up in their scriptorium. He > reduces the body to a simple accident of the soul.499 > > It is here that we see the reappearance of the spiritual hierarchies and the divine worlds. We can > speak in the Thomist sense of the essence of man or of the essence of the atoms of the body, > because these essences are intelligible realities: but these essences do not have the same > ontological modality. They are not in the same world. The soul belongs to Malakut, which makes > it a spiritual reality (haqiqat), while the essence (jawhar) of the atoms belongs to the world of Mulk, > and this is nothing but an intelligible reality. A spiritual reality cannot be linked in substance to a > material reality, even through its essence. The link which exists must be other than substantial. > For Baha’u’llah, it is transparent. The body is a mirror which must be illumined by the light of > the soul. The soul is reflected in it but does not descend into it. Such is the nature of their > relationship without the intervention of any substance. But we must not forget that in this > transparent theology it is the image which, in projecting itself, causes the mirror to appear. > > Let us note that this conception of the soul maintains the transcendental character of the essence, > with the existence of the individual being considered the first reality. Thus the metaphysic of > Baha’u’llah escapes the terrible antinomy of Platonism and Peripatetism which has weighted > down Western philosophy like death. Henceforth, nominalism is no more to be feared, for the > existence of individual subjects is affirmed in transcendence. > > In summary, the soul is a spiritual reality which is transcendental in its relation to the body— > which is an accident thereof—and with which it carries on a transparent relation which is the > only relationship possible between two realities of different ontological degrees. > > SAQ:LXVI:277: “If the accident, that is to say the body, be destroyed, the substance, the spirit > remains.” The translation here must certainly be corrected so that we speak of the soul rather than the > spirit in order to translate the word ruh of the Persian text. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > 13. Consciousness and the divine self > > This new solution brought to the old problem of the union of the soul and the body helps us to > better understand the value of a trichotomic psychology. The transcendental character of the > soul renders it inappropriate as the seat of thought, of sentiments and of sensations. All of these > psychological modalities fall into the category of the spirit (nafs). > > The spirit is born from the interaction of the soul and the body, and in particular the animal > spirit with the soul endowed with reason. Our conscious thought is at the same time the reflection > of the spirituality of our soul and of the contents of our spirit, which, at the start, is essentially > preoccupied with sensation, because it must satisfy the appetites of the body. Thus, we would say > that, the opposite from Descartes, Baha’u’llah renders thought closely dependent upon the body; > this is underlined by the fact that thought is the product of consciousness and that consciousness > is precisely that which assures the unity of the human composition. This consciousness is the > product of the body, the spirit and the soul, for when I think of “me”, I think of myself as a > whole. This consciousness is dependent upon numerous contingent elements, the first of which is > language, without which discursive thought would not exist. We can thus say that all thought > having recourse to language is a thought pertaining to the spirit (nafs), while intuitive thought > which directly grasps the relation between things comes from the soul (ruh), without our being > able to entirely exclude the mediation of the spirit. > > One of the proofs advanced by Baha’u’llah to establish the distinction between the spirit and the > soul, is found in the example of mental illness. Madness is the result of an obstacle being > interposed between the rational faculty of the soul and the spirit. Hence, if man loses his mind, he > does not lose his thought. > > The appearance of the rational faculty in the spirit depends however on the body. For the > reflection of the spirit in the mirror of the body, which creates the transitory phenomenon of the > soul, is not possible except if the body has attained a sufficient degree of maturity and if its > composed contents are in harmony. Thus ‘Abdu’l-Baha declares: “when these existing elements > are gathered together according to the natural order, and with perfect strength, they become a > magnet for the spirit, and the spirit will become manifest in them with all its perfections.”500 > > At the time of death, the spirit disappears with the body. This cannot happen without a profound > transformation of consciousness. It finds itself expanded because it now has direct access to > spiritual realities, but at the same time it is brutally stripped of all the idiosyncrasies that one is > used to consider as determining elements of the individual personality. This shows how much our > personality and our human identity are illusory. Only our divine self will subsist, that is to say the > soul as essence reflecting the divine Names. The eternity of the soul is thought of as a radical > modification of consciousness, a modification which will be at the same time an enlargement. > > SAQ:LII:234-235. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > THIRD PART: > METAPHYSICS > > CHAPTER ELEVEN: > THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND TECHNICAL VOCABULARY OF BAHA’U’LLAH > > 1. A unique problem in religious history > > The emergence of the Baha’i Revelation can be considered a phenomenon which is, in many > regards, unique in the history of religions. For the first time, a religion appears in the context of a > developed civilization, and, as a consequence of this context, from the very commencement of its > history, is in contact with an established religion, with a culturally rich environment in which we find > the interpenetration of highly developed philosophical, political and social movements. Moses and > Muhammad preached to tribes in the desert with cultures limited to their indigenous traditions. > Zoroaster lived in an environment which was not much different from this. Buddha appeared in a > country that certainly had a long religious tradition, and in which several philosophical schools were > competing, but this philosophical culture was the lot of a tiny minority while the masses remained > far removed from all intellectual subtleties. Jesus appeared in a country with a deep rabbinical > tradition and showed on many occasions that he had perfectly mastered this culture. However, this > culture was often regarded as strange and unfamiliar by the people, and besides had but little > influence upon the subsequent development of Christianity. Christianity and Islam later > encountered Greek culture, but this was only after the death of their Founders, Jesus and > Muhammad, and their assimilation of Greek culture posed enormous problems. It is thus the first > time in the religious history of humanity that we see a new religion appear in a society which has > attained a high cultural level. This of course poses specific problems which no other Founder of > religion had to resolve. Before entering in more detail upon the analysis of Baha’i texts in order to > distinguish the elements of a metaphysic, we should attempt to look at some of these problems in > greater depth. > > 2. Cultural heritage > > The first problem is that of vocabulary and what we could call the level of language of the > Revelation. Muhammad, in order to express the new concepts of Islam, and because of the poverty > in abstract vocabulary of the Arabic of the Hijaz, had to have recourse to borrowings from foreign > languages such as Hebrew, Aramaic, Yemenite and Pahlavi. Baha’u’llah, in comparison, expressed > himself in Arabic and Persian, languages which already had a long existence, a rich cultural past, > and which abounded with mystic, metaphysical and philosophical terms. Baha’u’llah could not have > ignored the richness of his Arabo-Persian culture. Not only did he inherit the Qur'anic language and > the vast Persian literature, but he also had to take account of the cultural contributions of the various > Muslim mystical movements and of numerous philosophical schools the teaching of which had been > transmitted to his very epoch. Not only could he not avoid having recourse to a vocabulary which > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > they bequeathed to him, but nor could he ignore the problems which had been nourished during > numerous centuries. > > Faced with this situation, Baha’u’llah chose to assume his linguistic heritage in its totality. He had > recourse to the collection of vocabulary which Persian and Arabic could supply him, and the words > that he employs, are borrowed from horizons of the most divers thoughts. We find also in him very > numerous terms which are used in the Qur'an as well a vocabulary borrowed from Hellenistic > philosophy501, from the Scholastic mutakalimin, from Neoplatonism502, from the metaphysic of Ibn al- > 'Arabi, from Sufism and from different mystical schools, from the illuminative theosophy of the > Ishraqis, from Shaykhism, etc. We must not forget the fundamental influence of the Bab, who, in his > numerous commentaries on the Qur'an, appropriated a part of the Qur'anic vocabulary in giving > the words new and generally metaphorical definitions, sometimes far distant from the original > meaning. The Bab did not hesitate to forge new concepts with an altogether new vocabulary. The > very concept of “divine Manifestation” was largely elaborated in the “Persian Bayan” before being > taken up again by Baha’u’llah in the “Book of Certitude”. > > 3. The technical aspects of the vocabulary of Baha’u’llah > > To grasp the meaning of this technical vocabulary is sometimes difficult, because the Arabo-Muslim > philosophical vocabulary is fairly poor and, in any case, was not developed in the same fashion as > the European philosophical vocabulary. In the West, when a philosopher invented a new concept, > he took care to underline his originality in creating a new expression whether it be a new word > created from the Greek or Latin, or be it an expression composed of several words apt to convey his > thought. In the East, the philosophers rarely invented words or expressions. The major linguistic > inventory took place in the first three centuries of Islam once the principal works of Hellenistic > philosophy had been translated from Greek and from Syriac, which required the creation ex nihilo > of the necessary Arabic vocabulary. After this period of translation, the philosophical language was > not much enriched. Every time a philosopher was brought to the creation of a new concept or to the > transformation of an ancient concept in a significant manner he had to have recourse to the use of > an ancient term without being able to modify it nor to create a new word from a root as the Western > languages themselves did based on Latin and Greek. It results that the philosophical terms > constantly change in meaning according to the schools and according to the authors. This is > explained by the fact that the Muslim thinkers did not accord any value to originality. Their > philosophical quest is the study of an Urphilosophie, of a pure truth, atemporal, in which the > expression of the individual has no place, and which is not, as in the West, the search for a meaning > in life. The problem is complicated when the authors have themselves hidden the definition of > certain terms which they used so that these would not be known except by their disciples, as is the > case for Shaykhism. Sometimes, they even voluntarily sought to lead the profane reader into error > upon the meaning of certain of their expressions, so as to protect themselves from any accusation of > heresy. > > Certain problems pose themselves when the vocabulary is clearly of Greek origin, or when it has > > Such as, for example, 'unsur (element), hayula (matter), zarra (atom), illa (cause). > Such as, for example, fayd (emanation), 'alam al-mithal (imaginal world). > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > a Latin equivalent which can itself come from the Greek by means of Arabic, in order to translate > an equivalent Arabic expression. Must one truly translate mahiyya by quiddity? The Arabic word > comes from the same Greek expression as the Latin quiditas. The question “Ma huwa?” is the > exact translation of the Greek “Ti to on?” to which one responds with “To ti en einai”.503 Quiditas, > from “quid?”, “what is that?”, was elsewhere wrought to translate Ibn Sina into Latin. But the > history of this word in the West diverges thereafter profoundly from that of its representation in > the East. In Persia, the word took on a great diversity of significances according to the Schools. It > is why we can ask ourselves if the word mahiyya should be translated by quiddity. Faced with these > problems, Shoghi Effendi took an option which could not be ours for purely philological reasons. > He concentrated upon the spiritual meaning of the writings of Baha’u’llah and he often > renounced the rendering of the philosophical sense. We lose in the English translations multiple > allusions to the ambient culture which it would have been impossible to render into a foreign > language. It often happens that Shoghi Effendi had to transpose images which in English would > have lost all significance, thereby rendering a member of a phrase by one word or a word by a > complete phrase. In all the cases, it was impossible for him to render the richness of the mystical > and philosophical contents of the Arabic or Persian language. > > The philosophical vocabulary which Baha’u’llah inherited is thus extremely fluid and every word > calls for a study in order to arrive at its precise meaning. Baha’u’llah furthermore never tried to > make this vocabulary precise. He never gives the definition of a word. It is ‘Abdu’l-Baha who > most often brought forth the indispensable precisions. One can sometimes give several > interpretations to a text based on whether one gives to a word the meaning derived, for example, > from the Shaykhi or Ishraqi vocabulary. The vocabulary of Baha’u’llah fluctuates greatly and it > can vary in different texts based on those for whom they were revealed, as can be seen sometimes > in the same text. For example, as we have already seen, in certain Tablets the word ruh signifies > “soul” and nafs signifies “spirit”, while in other Tablets, it is nafs which signifies “soul” and ruh > which signifies “spirit”. It seems that it was Baha’u’llah who consciously chose this form of > writing, underlining thereby that what he wanted to say was found beyond words and must be > directly grasped by the intuition. Furthermore, to utilize a philosophical vocabulary carefully > defined would have certainly resulted in his formulation of a philosophical and metaphysical > system, and this above all he did not want to do. For the role of a divine Manifestation is not to > found a philosophical school. This role must be left to the thinkers of future generations. > > We find in the writings of Baha’u’llah philosophical and metaphysical conceptions, but these > conceptions do not form a system in the sense in which a system is completed by itself. Divine > Revelation does not allow itself to be imprisoned in any system. Hence we do not find in > Baha’u’llah a single didactic treatise. The mission of a divine Manifestation does not consist in > resolving philosophical problems, nor more than it is to resolve the problems of physics or of > biology. On the other hand, we find in ‘Abdu’l-Baha and notably in “Some Answered > Questions”, a certain number of didactic treatises in which ‘Abdu’l-Baha uses, with much > dexterity, the vocabulary of the old Muslim scholastics much impregnated with Aristotelianism > and Platonism, in order to happily clarify the writings of Baha’u’llah. This explains why we have > often been moved to found our views on the writings of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, more than on those of > Baha’u’llah, in order to explain the great themes of the ontological thought of the founder of the > Baha’i Faith. > E. Gilson, “L'Etre et l'Essence”, Paris, 1987, pp. 56-64. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > 4. The implicit character of the metaphysic of Baha’u’llah > > The philosophical and metaphysical concepts of Baha’u’llah appear more often in an implicit > than in an explicit manner. This is what we have seen in the preceding chapter in the very > precise study of the vocabulary of the divine worlds, notably in the compilation of the Munajat. > Our study in this chapter was essentially philological. We will now try to give it a philosophical > and metaphysical sense. As Buddha did formerly, Baha’u’llah sought to stay apart from the > philosophical and theological disputes of his time. Baha’u’llah often cites and mentions the great > Persian poets, but he only very exceptionally cites the Muslim philosophers and theologians. > When then Baha’u’llah takes on a philosophical problem, it is never through the different > elements of a battle of schools, but at their most general and universal level. Never does > Baha’u’llah respond to an argument. He contents himself always with exposing the problem and > its solution in making an abstract of the battles. The best example of this method is the book > “Seven Valleys” which gives exposition to the Baha’i concept of the union of man with God and > which is indirectly a refutation of pantheism and of the concept of existential monism of the > school of Hallaj and of Ibn al-'Arabi. > > In the “Tablet upon the Uncompounded Reality” (Lawh-i-Basitu'l-Haqiqat)504, Baha’u’llah gives > and exposition of the two ontological conceptions of his epoch: that of the existential monism of > Ibn al-'Arabi and that of the testimonial monism of the Orthodox school. However the two > statements are slanted. Neither is a statement which is faithful either to existential monism or to > testimonial existentialism, because on the one hand Baha’u’llah wished to retain from these two > systems only what seemed compatible to him with his thought, and on the other hand, he takes > care to present them as two complementary points of view and not as two opposing theories. > Thus he takes shelter from all polemic. Even though Baha’u’llah is far removed from the position > of Ibn al-'Arabi, he never allows an abrupt condemnation to surface and he always puts forward > what is most positive in the teaching of the Shaykh. That can sometimes be fairly confusing, for > when Baha’u’llah reports the opinion of a school or of a master, it is often in order to express his > own ideas in a disguised manner so as not to offend the consciousness of his public. ‘Abdu’l-Baha > uses the same processes in his “Commentary on the Hidden Treasure”. > > The understanding of the mystical and philosophical concepts of Baha’u’llah results from a very > precise study of the texts and thus of their vocabulary, without ever forgetting that the same word > may receive several definitions. We can distinguish three large classes of vocabulary: the Qur'anic > vocabulary, the philosophical and theological vocabulary, and the mystical and poetic > vocabulary. > > Each of these classes is subdivided into numerous sub-classes. It is not sufficient for example to > assert that a [particular] term is of Qur'anic origin, for one must also know the interpretations > [thereof] by the principal exegetes. We have seen that the word Malakut is Quranic, but we would > not understand its meaning in the writings of Baha’u’llah if we did not know its history in the > exegetical and philosophical literature of Islam. Furthermore, the Bab himself wrote a very large > number of commentaries on the Qur'an in which he gives a totally new meaning to Qur'anic > terms, to which Baha’u’llah constantly makes reference. > > Iqtidarat, pp. 105-116; Ma'idiy-i-Asmani, volume VII, pp. 140-147. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > The mystical and poetic vocabulary of Baha’u’llah is much more simple in approach. It is > founded upon what we could call the culture of the “genteel man” of his epoch, a culture > essentially nourished by poetry with the great poets whom he cites the most frequently: Rumi, > 'Attar, Hafiz and Sa'adi. Once more one must be careful [with regard to the interpretation] of > this vocabulary which contains numerous twistings and turnings of meaning. Baha’u’llah often > proceeds through veiled allusions which are neither easily nor immediately accessible. > > 5. The Neoplatonic influence upon Persian culture > > But the vocabulary which poses the most problems is surely the philosophical and theological > vocabulary of Baha’u’llah. It is less abundant than the Qur'anic vocabulary, but it does not > present the advantage [as does this latter one] of having a standard text and a single source. This > vocabulary is essentially Neoplatonic. By Neoplatonic we must understand [that this refers to] the > Muslim Neoplatonism, which is the synthesis of Platonism, Aristotelianism and the Neoplatonism > of Plotin and Proclus, upon which are superimposed the personal contributions of Abu Nasr al- > Farabi and of Ibn Sina. It also includes the contributions of the Ishraqiyyun, the School of > Isfahan, and the Shaykhis. > > This implies that certain texts of Baha’u’llah cannot be well understood without a good > knowledge of Islamic Neoplatonism, and that Islamic Neoplatonism cannot be known except > through a good knowledge of the totality of Greek philosophy. We will see very exact examples of > this. For this reason, before considering the essential metaphysical problems which are posed by > the Baha’i concept of the divine worlds, and more particularly the relations between the spiritual > worlds and our physical world, we will examine the elements of Greek and Muslim philosophy > which are related to that which interests us. > > Of course, this poses the question of whether Baha’u’llah was himself a Neoplatonist, as some > have affirmed. The fact that Baha’u’llah used Neoplatonic vocabulary poses complex questions > which touch upon philology, metaphysics and even the philosophy of history. This brings us to > pose the problem of the status of the Greek philosophers in the history of revelation. > > Baha’u’llah knew the history of Greek philosophy very well. In the “Tablet of Wisdom”, he cites > Empedocles, Hippocrates, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.505 For him, it is manifest that the most > important of all is Socrates, whom he calls “the most distinguished of all philosophers”506, and he > says of him that he not only mastered the sciences courant among men [of his time], but also > “those which were veiled from their minds.”507 For him, Socrates was very close to divine > inspiration, and he attributes to him the essence of the philosophical merits of Plato. It is > astonishing that Baha’u’llah consecrated such an important development to Greek philosophy > and that he speaks so little of the Muslim philosophers. But without doubt he was keenly > conscious of the dependency of Muslim philosophy upon Greek philosophy. > > He also cites under the Arabized name Balinus a philosopher who is probably Appolonius of Tyana. > TB:146. The Arabic says “siyyid al-falasafa” which is to say “master”, “lord”, “chief” of the > philosophers. > TB:146. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Baha’u’llah does not content himself with using a Neoplatonic vocabulary. His thought > sometimes takes a clearly platonic turn, and this upon at least three points. The metaphysic of > Baha’u’llah is presented as a philosophy of emanation. In certain of his Tablets, he seems to > confirm the idea of a world of archetypes [as an] intermediary between the physical world and > the spiritual worlds. It is this intermediary world which the philosophers call “Imaginal World”. > Finally, certain texts of Baha’u’llah seem to confirm a division of reality into an intelligible world > and a sensible world. We will attempt to respond to these questions in the chapters which follow > our general exposition on Neoplatonism. > > This vaguely Neoplatonic allure has misled numerous Islamicists who have not seen the > originality of the thought of Baha’u’llah. Our study will show that if the metaphysic of > Baha’u’llah is a philosophy of emanation, the expression of the concept and the metaphysical > conceptions which underlie it are totally original. > > If we had to attach Baha’u’llah to a school of thought, it would be less to the Neoplatonism of > Plotin or Proclus than to Platonism itself. And this is not astonishing because it was Socrates and > Plato who opened for antiquity the only possible path between personal investigation of Nature > and the Cosmos and the discovery of a transcendent God. For Baha’u’llah, there is a religion of > Socrates and Plato, but this religion is inspired and not revealed. In this, he moreover follows Al- > Ghazali and Suhrawardi. This also explains why in many respects Baha’i thought is often closed > to the solutions retained by Christianity than to those of the principal schools of Islam. > > There is however a fundamental point upon which Baha’u’llah diverges from Plato and > approaches Aristotle. Plato adopted certain ideas of Democritusxxiii on change and he thought > that the sensible world is a moving and ungraspable world about which man cannot establish any > certitude. Certitude could not come except from the Intelligible World. For this reason, for Plato, > it is only when man has truly understood the nature of the One that he can descend into the > understanding of the multiple. It is thus, as in Descartes, the metaphysical which conditions the > physical. For Aristotle, on the contrary, only the study of the multiple can, in permitting us to > follow the chain of causality, enable us to comprehend the intelligible world. Without certain > [knowledge] of the sensible world, never could man elevate himself to the contemplation of the > intelligible. In Baha’u’llah we find the same doubt regarding the capacities of human intuition to > elevate itself directly to the knowledge of spiritual realities. Man by himself cannot have any > certitude regarding spiritual realities, while as for knowledge of the sensible world, reason permits > him to attain an acceptable degree of certitude. This explains why Baha’u’llah amply validates > science in general, and especially Western science. It is only through the power of Revelation and > the teaching of the divine Manifestations that man can attain certitude with regard to the > spiritual worlds. Nevertheless, the metaphorical character of the sensible world permits us to > elevate ourselves towards the spiritual world according to a certain measure. When man wishes > to grasp the nature of spiritual realities, he is the prisoner of the language [in place in his > environment], which exists only as a function of the realities of the sensible world. The only way > open thus consists in relying upon the revelation to elevate it from the sensible to the spiritual, > from the multiple to the Cause of causes. Baha’u’llah however diverges from Aristotle in that he > does not place complete confidence in reason. For him, Revelation reason, tradition and > intuition are four modes of knowledge which must be used in a complementary manner. Even > Revelation must be validated by reason. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Christianity also makes of Neoplatonism its philosophical language, not without this bringing > about a grave crisis, the Origenist crisis of the 3rd century. But the Fathers of the Church, such as > Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyassa, Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianze totally > revised this philosophical doctrine in order to make it a critical and tempered reception which > would permit its adaptation to the doctrine of the Gospels. During almost one thousand years, > from Pseudo-Denis the Areopagite until Bonaventure, Neoplatonism was the philosophical > language of the expression of Christianity, until Thomas Aquinas replaced it with Aristotelianism > which in his eyes had the advantage of being able to explain trans-substantiation. > > During a millennium Neoplatonism was the lingua franca of the philosophical world. Not only did > it impose itself from the 3rd century onwards among the Greek pagans, not only was it adopted > by Christians, but it extended even among the Semitic populations of Syria and in the Persian > empire. In the East, it was promoted with Greek medicine, which was the best of its epoch, and > thus benefited from the prestige which was recognized even among the Arabs. > > Neoplatonism was thus a universal language of the great revealed religions. It is perhaps this > universality which resulted in Baha’u’llah adopting its vocabulary. We must nevertheless take > care not to draw the thought of Baha’u’llah towards Platonism. Borrowings of vocabulary can > sometimes translate a kinship of thought, nothing more. If Baha’u’llah conserved the central > concept of emanation, we will see that upon most of the other points, his thought enters into > conflict with Platonism, as will all of the philosophical systems of his time. Nonetheless, it seems > to us that it is not possible to understand the philosophical thought of Baha’u’llah without having > first situated it in relation to the principle philosophical schools of his epoch. This is why we will > consecrate an entire chapter to Neoplatonism which seems to us a fundamental point of > reference. > > CHAPTER TWELVE: > THE EVOLUTION OF NEOPLATONISM > FROM ITS ORIGINS TO BAHA’U’LLAH > > Neoplatonism was born of the specific needs of man in the 3rd century, tied to the Greek crisis of > individualism, to the dissolution of the city in the cosmopolitan empire, and to the aspiration for a > new rational religion capable of giving a new meaning to life. > > 1. The Neoplatonism of Plotinus > > Neoplatonism has a complex history. We must not forget that at the moment in which Plotinus > founded what it is convenient to call the Neoplatonic School, the doctrine of Plato had already > existed for more than six centuries.508 It had followed over the course of time a long evolution > > Plato was born c. 427 B.C.E. and died c. 347 B.C.E. Plotinus was born in 205 C.E. and died in 270 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > which passed through the Megarite and Cyrenaite Schools, the new Academy of Arcesilas, to end > in Middle-Platonism, which is a doctrine already mixed liberally with Stoicism and > Pythagoreanism, to which were added heterogenous influences, perhaps some having come from > the East, which Festugere regrouped under the name of “cosmic religion”.509 However, in the 3rd > century, Middle-Platonism no longer had any vigor. It had completely dissolved into an eclectic > doctrine in which the Stoic elements dominated increasingly, even as they dominated the > intellectual life of this epoch. Precisely at this epoch, when Christianity had become a religion > solidly rooted and that it had begun to touch the intellectual elites, Plotinus, born at Lycopolis in > Egypt, encountered Alexander Amonius Saccas who, probably born into a Christian family, had > renounced Christianity to find what he considered the pure religion of his ancestors and to teach > philosophy. Amonius initiated Plotinus to the doctrine of Plato, and this one was to give upon this > base a completely new reading of the platonic philosophy. This new reading was to take its rank > in the history of philosophy under the name “Neoplatonism”. > > What characterizes Neoplatonism above all, is its extraordinary metaphysical coherence and its > adaptation to the spiritual needs of the 3rd century man. In contrast to Platonism, Neoplatonism > has profound mystical dimension which demands of man a true transcendence of oneself in order > to permit one to find again one's true nature. He asks man to uproot himself from the sensible > world in order to seek the “unveiling” of superior things and to thus know the ecstasy of union > with the One. At the same time, Neoplatonism presents itself as a theodicy permitting, through > the rational path, to apprehend the nature of the suprasensible worlds. Neoplatonism considers > itself to be a global doctrine which explains the origin of the world and clarifies the destiny of > man in an epoch which was the prey of metaphysical doubt in which cultivated men, as the > Memoirs of Marcus Aurelius show us, attempted to combat an existential anguish that the > classical age did not know, and who fled the crowd in order to find outside of the city a new > meaning in life and in death. Plotinus brought to this new responses which were partly mystical > and partly rational. He arrives at formulating a system which is perfectly closed within itself in > order to give a global response to the nature of the universe and the destiny of man because of > concepts which were totally new and revolutionary for the epoch, such as emanation and the > procession of the hypostases. > > In a certain fashion, Neoplatonism resulted in a dualism which opposes matter to the intelligible > world (we would call it spiritual today). The desire of Plato to avoid for the One, the principle of > all things, all contact with the sensible world excluded all act of volition in the creation and thus > all relation between a Creator and His creature. The One does not intervene in the destiny of > men; it is for the human soul to come out of himself in order to elevate himself towards the divine > only by means of his efforts. The meeting between the one and the other is made in an act of > “participation” which is at the same time an act of knowledge. The genius of Plotinus did not > only contain heterogeneous elements as in Middle-Platonism; he linked them profoundly among > themselves to the means of totally new concepts such as the idea of procession and of emanation, > which for the epoch appeared not as philosophical speculations, but as incontestable scientific > truths capable of engendering a new paradigm of science, replacing the Aristotelian model. But > > C.E. > Festugiere, “La Revelation d'Hermes Trismegiste”, in particular volume II, “Le Dieu cosmique,” and > volume III, “La doctrine de l'Ame, le Dieu inconnu et la gnose”. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Plotinus, more than anything else contributed to the reconciliation of pagan philosophy with > Christianity. He considerably amplified a phenomenon of convergence, which without doubt > already existed, and which resulted from this Zeitgeist which so well marked the 3rd century.510 > > 2. The problem with Neoplatonism > > We do not seek to present here the whole of the doctrine of Plotinus, and we will be content with > simply giving exposition to certain points which could be useful in a comparison with the thought > of Baha’u’llah. But before entering into his system, we must explain some elements of its genesis. > > At the origin of the system is found the universal problem which is found in all religious and > philosophical thought: that of the uprising of the existent from the non-existent. This cosmogonic > problem is found at the heart of the pre-socratic writings, which progressively rendered > philosophy to the form which Plato received as an heritage. This problem is posed in the > Hellenistic culture in very original terms because the Greeks had come to the conclusion that the > universe could not be born except in a first and essential singularity, which is to say, a unique > principle, the alpha point, source of all things. It is this singularity which Plotinus will specifically > call the “One”. Already for the presocratics, the fundamental problem posed by the existence of > the universe resided in the passage of the one to the multiple; how could a unique principle, > whether it be water, air or fire, be able to engender all of the other elements? Plato and Aristotle > took up the problem again, not from the physical angle like the Eleatics, but from the > metaphorical and especially the ontological angle. It is this perspective which Plotinus inherits. > Posed in these terms, the problem changes in nature, for it opposes on one side all that is singular > in the universe, that is to say in the world of multiplicity. Another traditional fashion of posing > the same problem in other terms, consists in affirming that the first singularity is established in > permanence and immutability, while the physical universe represents to him the world of change, > of impermanence and of mutability. This approach is found already in Empedocles with the > question of being and non-being, and in Heraclitus with that of movement and change. > > We remember that Plato treated these problems in masterful manner. He brought back the > change of movement and he had found the cause of this in the Soul which at the same time > communicates the order of the cosmos because of the Intelligence which is in it.511 The Soul of > the world is the cause of the movement of the world and the Intelligence which is in the soul > contemplates the eternal ideas which communicate to him the cosmic order which it transmits to > the world through movement. The system of Plato is extremely complex, for on the side of Ideas, > of the Soul and the Intelligence, he introduces multiple concepts such as the Good, the Beautiful, > the Same and the Other, the Being or the Chora. Good, identical to Beauty, is the principle which > penetrates all and prevails over all; it is from this that the cosmic order is derived, and it is this > which loans its properties to the universe, and in particular Intelligence, Being, life, unicity and > incorruptibility. The Same and the Other form the divisible and the indivisible substance of the > Soul which assures the ontological link between the world of Ideas and the sensible world. The > Same is of the same substance as the ideas—it is the principle of determination—while the Other > As for the concept of Zeitgeist in late Antiquity, cf. our study “Les paradigmes caches de l'Histoire,” in > “Actes de l'Association Europeene Francophone pour les Etudes Bahá’ís”, 1987. > Plato, Timaeus, 30b5. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > represents the principle of indetermination.512 The Chora itself is a limit to the order which > transposes the influence of the Other in the sensible domain and thus finds itself [able] to be the > cause of the appearance of the multiple. The chora is neither being, nor space, nor matter. It > does not have form, for it is a pure intelligible, a place limited to the junction of the sensible and > the intelligible which permits the final Cause to communicate its action and in this way to > organize the Cosmos. Thus, the Chora introduced to the world the change and mutability which > are at the origin of the multiple, for if on the one hand the existence of the essences restores from > the Same like a principle of identity, on the other hand, the essence appears just like the Other, > for it is by this that differentiation appears. > > We have simplified here what in Plato is very complex, to the point that his doctrine sometimes > appears to be confused and difficult to grasp. This exposition was nevertheless necessary in order > to comprehend to what extend Neoplatonism can be different from the Platonism of Plato. It is > important to understand the originality of Plotinus, but also because on certain points the > thought of Baha’u’llah appears, as we see, sometimes closer to Plato than to Plotinus. > > The genius of Plotinus was to simplify the doctrine of Plato while giving it a new coherence. This > simplification never appears to be an impoverishment, but on the contrary, it permits because of > the introduction of some new concepts to demultiply the explanatory power of the system. In a > certain fashion, the system of Plotinus, passing through the razor of Ockham, appears more > aesthetic and more elegant, and from this fact it more easily motivated the adhesion of the heart > and of the spirit. > > Plato was more interested in the principle of the universe than in its true origin. The emergence > of the Cosmos is a problem which Plato does not resolve except at the level of Myth in making > the Demiurge intervene. Plotinus supercedes the intervention of the Demiurge and situates the > emergence of Existence outside of time in a domain of abstract causes. He brings together the > disparate entities which are, for Plato, Beauty, Good, Being and Life and fuses them into a > unique principle which he calls “the One”. > > 3. The One > > The One is the principle of all things. It is eternal, outside of time, unengendered, immobile, > immutable, self-subsisting and entirely enveloped in itself. It is beyond being513, but being > proceeds from it. It is from it that all beings ultimately have their existence. It produces the forms > but it is not engaged in any act as creator. It has no movement, does not know alteration, it is > anterior to movement and thought.514 > > There is a certain similitude between “the Same” and “the Other” in Plato, and the two great forces, > active (fa'il) and receptive (munfa'il) about which Bahá’u’lláh speaks in the “Tablet of Wisdom” (Lawh-i- > Hikmat) in saying that it is by the energy generated by their interaction, we would say their union, that > the universe has come into existence. Similar similarities are explained by the theory of “the active > imagination” ('aql) as a property of the soul. > Enneads, V.1,10. > Ibid., VI.9,6. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > The problem which Plotinus next poses is that of the passage from transcendence to immanence. > The One is situated in such a degree of transcendence that we cannot imagine that there could > be the least contact between it and the world. Hence the world must proceed from it without > compromising this transcendence. This requires on the one hand the existence of intermediaries, > and, on the other hand that these intermediaries themselves proceed from the One, without this > implying any act of will on its part, no engagement in a creative activity. > > The only activity of the One is the contemplation of itself. In this contemplation it understands > itself and the appearance of its own image. In its consciousness are born the elements of a duality > which will permit the appearance of a second hypostasis which is Intelligence.515 > > 4. Intelligence > > It is Intelligence which is truly responsible for the passage of the One to the multiple. In it is > found the principle of the One, a principle which is constantly reactualized in the contemplation > in which Intelligence is found to be engaged. It is thus “incapable of containing the power that it > receives from the One, fragmenting and multiplying it so as in this way to be able to sustain it bit > by bit.”516 Thus appears a principle of differentiation which establishes that it contains all the > potential intelligibilities, and as a consequence, all beings. The Plotinian Intelligence corresponds > in form to the platonic world of Ideas, and it is thus from Intelligence that the Muslim > philosophers constructed the Imaginal World. Intelligence is the form of forms (la datur formarum > of Scholasticism), and thereby it is the model of the sensible world. > > The principal characteristic of Intelligence is its psychic activity, for it is from this activity that the > multiplicity of intelligibilities are born. Intelligence contemplates the One and contemplates itself; > this contemplation in itself and upon itself changes into action and hence is born the Soul, the > third hypostasis. > > 5. The Soul > > If Intelligence possesses in itself the archetype of the world and of its order, the mode of being of > Intelligence, while permitting the appearance of a duality with the One and a multiplicity of > intelligibles, nonetheless forbids him all relation with the sensible world. The passage from the > intelligible to the sensible takes place through the intermediary of the Soul. The Soul is > differentiated from Intelligence by the fact that it does not have its immobility. The Soul is an > active and mobile principle which is the organizing force of the sensible world which it suffuses > and penetrates. From the Soul emanate the seminal reasons (logos spermatikoi) of the world, which > themselves are, in some way, fragmentation. The seminal reasons represent the intermediary > between the Soul and the living beings which are engendered by the act of the Soul. They hold > in themselves all of the potentialities which are called upon to develop in the sensible being; they > contain its program of development and the laws of its evolution; and it is through their > Certain ones call Intelligence “the Intellect”. We here prefer to follow the usage of Brehier for the same > reasons that he explains in his book on Plotinus and his philosophy. > Enneads, VI.7,15. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > intermediation that the link between the Soul and the beings of the sensible world is > effectuated.517 > > 6. The procession > > The scheme which goes from the One to the Soul, and from the Soul to the sensible world > constitutes what Plotinus calls the procession (kathados). The concept of progression replaces the > concept of creation in Plotinian thought. For the Greeks, ex nihilo creation is impossible. Plotinus > also rejects the idea of a Demiurge God. Creation is an act, while the procession explains the > world by a scheme which establishes the ontological link between the different modes of being. > This point would be the principal stumbling-block to the integration of Neoplatonism with > Christianity and Islam. Despite this difficulty, we must not underestimate the importance of the > idea of the procession. The concept will impose itself because of its explanatory power in the > absence of any idea of evolution. The idea of procession thus constitutes a true paradigm which > will determine all the philosophical and scientific thought at least until the 18th century in the > West and until the 20th century in the Islamic [realms]. Brehier had good reason to write that the > idea which the procession evokes “is comparable, in its universal generality and its historical > importance, to the idea of evolution; men at the end of Antiquity and from the Middle Ages > thought of things in the category of the procession as those of the 19th and 20th century thought of > them in the category of evolution.”518 > > The concept of procession thus explains not only how the forms depend upon each other, but > also the meaning of the hierarchy which derives therefrom and what we could call the laws of > “mutation” to avoid the modern term evolution. The procession contains in itself its own > principle of determination; nothing is left to change. > > 7. Emanation > > The explanatory force of the concept of procession is elucidated through the complementary > concept of emanation (aporroia). If the concept of process aims at establishing the ontological > chain which originates in the One in order to arrive at the sensible world, the concept of > emanation purposes to set forth the conditions of that procession in explaining why the existence > of inferior degrees of being is necessary. The idea of emanation must respond to the exigencies of > the transcendence of the One which we have already enumerated: emanation must not imply > any action, any volition from the One. The procession must at the same time come forth by > > The concept of “seminal Reason” went through an evolution in Christian philosophy through the > influence of Augustine. In the 17th century, Roger Bacon defined the seminal reasons in the following > manner: Seminal reason is the incomplete essence of matter in such measure as it tends towards its > culmination, hence the seed tends to become a tree.” (Communia naturalium, edited by Robert Steele, > Oxford, Liber Primus, p. 84) For Augustine, the seminal reasons or seminal virtues are the germs which > God has deposited in matter and which are at the origin of the substantial forms which constitute the > principle of individuation, which makes the individual emerge from indeterminate matter. > E. Brehier, “La Philosophie de Plotin”, p. 35. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > nature from the One519, be spontaneous without affecting the source, without weakening or > diminishing it in any way. > > Plotinus find the paradigmatic scheme of procession in the image of the light which emanates > from the sun520, which was suggested to him by a passage of Plato, in which this latter one > compares the Good and the Sun, or another of Phedon which speaks of the cold and the hot.521 > Plotinus finds many images to explain to us the nature of emanation: emanation is like the lines > which come from the center of the circle in order to engender it [the circle]; it is like the light > which emanates from the sun, the heat of the flame, the cold of snow or of ice, the odor of > perfume, the stream that flows from the spring; the life that projects the roots of a great tree. We > see thus that the concept of emanation not only aims at explaining the ontological relation > between the hypostases, but that it has a paradigmatic value which seems to be born of the direct > observation of the phenomena of nature, and which thus poses itself as a universal law. > > In a general manner, the Plotinian scheme of the procession and emanation convey a certain > pessimism, for the various hypostases correspond to a degradation of being from the One to the > sensible world. This deployment is hence also a fall. Between simple deployment and the fall, the > thought of Plotinus always hesitates, as did Plato, for he himself saw in matter the limit to order. > Plotinus was influenced by the pessimism of the Hellenistic world, by its ascetic and stoic > tendencies, its fear of pleasure and of delight. Porphyry wrote about Plotinus: “He seems to have > been ashamed of being in a body.”522 This rejection of the body and of delight would be one of > the principal tendencies which the Hellenistic world would transmit to Christianity, and for > which we unjustly hold the latter responsible. Plotinus presents matter as a “mire” in which the > individual soul imprisoned in the prison of the body would be irremediably sullied. But the > problem of the fall is surmounted by the desire for ascension. Each hypostasis aspires, through a > kind of nostalgia, to lose itself in the contemplation of they superior hypostasis. In this way, the > individual soul aspires to return to the universal soul. In order to accomplish this, he must detach > himself from matter in stripping off its qualities in order to attempt, through a personal effort, to > rediscover the memory of his original being, the traces of which subsist in the depths of his > interior being. This ascension is a return to oneself. Its aim is to rediscover the original purity > (archaia katastasis) through this spiritual purification. This process results in the loss of individuality > through the suppression of all the determinations of the soul, in order to attain thus the state of > contemplative union which is, not a symbiosis, but an unveiling of intelligible realities, and > through them, of the true being. > > We will conclude this exposition of the ideas of Plotinus with this citation from Brehier, which > admirably summarizes the position of that philosopher: > > “What there was new (in Plotinus) was not the letter, but the spirit; it was to abolish > > Enneads, VI.8,7,50 and VI.8,8,15. > Ibid., V.1,6. > Plato, Phaedo, III, translated by E. Chambry (into French), ed. Garnier Flamarion, 1965, pp. 163-164. > Translator’s Note: Porphyry, On the Life of Plotinus and the Order of His Books, first > sentence:http://www.loebclassics.com/view/porphyry- > life_plotinus_order_his_books/1969/pb_LCL440.3.xml?rskey=YKwQBF&result=1 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > eternal realities as fixed objects, the [Platonic] Ideas, or, more or less, to make of them, to > the astonishment of Porphyry, entering in the school, modes or ways of being of > Intelligence, and not things; it was to enable the individual subject itself to enter into the > intelligible world, with concrete richness and the infinity of all its determinations; it was, > finally, to consider them hypostases themselves, and not as things, but as spiritual > attitudes.”523 > > Plotinus had numerous successors among the most important we can cite Porphyry, Iamblicus, > Proclus and Damacius. But the innovative contribution of these philosophers is of little > importance. In the 5th and 6th century, Neoplatonism even entered into a certain decadence to > the extent that, under the influence of Iamblicus, theurgy had an increasing influence and in > which the intermediary hypostases were multiplied by the philosophers.524 > > From that time onwards, Neoplatonism continued only as a sort of auxiliary doctrine in > Christianity and in Islam, and thus became the lingua franca of the Mediterranean and > European world until its overturning accomplished by Thomas [Aquinas] in favor of > Aristotelianism. Averroes [Ibn Rushd] tried to bring about a similar operation in the Islamic > world, without however succeeding in doing so. > > In the Eastern Christian world, very early on the Fathers of the Church, Clement of > Alexandria525 and Dennis the Areopagite526 in particular, adopted Neoplatonism as the medium > to express and transmit the Christian doctrine. > > This adaptation was not without problems and was impacted by the Origenist crisis of the 4th > century, which was surmounted through the contributions of Gregory of Nyassa, Basil of > Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianze. From that time on, we can admit that the Church had > surpassed the principal incompatibilities between Neoplatonism and the message of the > Gospel.527 It was not the same with Islam, which did not have the same concern for doctrinal > purity. Especially after Avicenna [Ibn Sina], the Neoplatonic doctrines invaded theology and > metaphysics to such an extent that they profoundly altered the doctrinal bases of the Qur'an. > > Two works played an essential role: the “Pseudo-Theology of Aristotle” and the “Book of > Causes”. > > Brehier, op. cit., p. 182. > It is interesting to note that, with the exception of Appolonius of Tyana, at the same time a myth and a > common ground of Islamic culture, Baha'u'llah refuses to take into consideration the philosophers > subsequent to Plotinus, as if after him none was worthy of being mentioned. > “Le Platonisme des Peres de l'Eglise”. > Rene Rocque, “L'Univers dyonisien, Structures hierarchiques du monde selon le Pseudo-Denys”, > Paris, 1983. > Endre von Ivanka, “Plato Christianus; la reception critique du platonisme chez les Peres de l'Eglise”, > trad. E. Kessler, Paris, 1990. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > 8. The Pseudo-Theology of Aristotle > > We know the “Pseudo-Theology of Aristotle”528 in two manuscript versions in Arabic and a > Latin version translated from the Arabic version. The work was translated by 'Abd al-Masih al- > Himsi and was collected by the philosopher al-Kindi529. The history of the manuscript is very > complex, for even though we have known for a long time that it was not the work of Aristotle, it > is only recently that we have been able to demonstrate that the text is based upon a paraphrase of > the Enneads IV, V and VI, of Plotinus. > > The influence of this work was immense, for it was considered the epitome of wisdom and of > Greek sagacity, and it served as the basis of the philosophy of al-Farabi, as also that of Ibn Sina. > Certain authors were conscious of the differences between the thought of “Pseudo-Theology” > and the rest of the works of Aristotle, but the work of al-Farabi was precisely to harmonize the > two philosophies in order to present the result as “the true philosophy of Aristotle”. [We should > also] say that the Aristotle of the Muslim world is far removed from the one known to the > Western world, very platonic, even in Ibn Rushd, who nonetheless tried to take the opposite path > in order to discover the authentic Aristotle. > > “Pseudo-Theology” is essentially a treatise on emanation of which it lengthily explains the > principle. The text of the Enneads was touched up on numerous points. It was intermixed in > passages with Proclus, or at least with proclusian doctrinal elements, and reorganized in order to > be presented in a more systematic manner than the original. Its doctrine sometimes departs > substantially from that of Plotinus and in certain passages evinces Christian influences. > > At the summit of the procession is found the divine Nature which is the first Cause, or the Cause > of causes, absolutely transcendent, without movement and outside of the Aeon (dahr). But the > divine Nature is the Instigator (mubdi') of the world through the luminous power which emanates > from itself. It is this luminous power which engenders Intelligence. The divine Nature then > employs Intelligence in order to radiate upon the Soul, the Soul to radiate upon Nature, and > Nature to radiate upon all things destined to generation and to corruption. > > The Soul is itself an image of Intelligence, under the form of Desire, which constitutes in itself a > kind of movement which animates and which represents its active nature, for thus moves from > high to low, directed by Intelligence, and penetrates all beings, giving to each its own spirit. The > Desire can take two orientations—that of the universal and it is thus by this desire that the Soul > governs the world of forms; or that of the particular, and it is thus that the Soul governs the world > of particular beings. > > In penetrating the beings, the Soul fragments and divides itself into an animal, [an] appetitive, > [and an] irascible, and [a] cognitive soul. Notwithstanding, this divisibility of the Soul constitutes > an accident resulting from the union of the Soul and the body. The text [of “Pseudo-Theology”] > presents the Soul as being the origin of distinction between the sensible world and the intelligible > > 528Henceforth “Pseudo-Theology”. > A. Badawi, La transmission de la philosophie grecque au monde arabe, Paris, 1987, pp. 100-101. Also see: > Badawi, Plotinus apud Arabes, pp. 1-164; and Kraus, “Plotin chez les arabes,” Bulletin de l'Institut d'Egypte, 23 > (1941). > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > world, and attributes this distinction to Plato. Thus, if the Soul knows all through connaturality, > the particular beings can elevate themselves to knowledge of the intelligible world by uniting > themselves to the universal Soul. The intelligible world is the location of the forms which are the > prototypes of all sensible beings and, at the same time, a world of perfection and harmony. Only > the Soul possesses movement, and this for the reason that it is an effect of effect. It is by this > movement that the sensible world is born, which is like an image of the intelligible world. But the > Soul is fated to a certain degeneration, because in order to produce the interior beings it must > lower its glance upon the world of Nature, and thus, it descends the degrees of being to the > human soul, the animal soul and the vegetable soul. > > 9. The Book of Causes > > The “Book of Causes” knew a derivation fairly similar to that of “Pseudo-Theology”. The book > must have been composed before the Fihrist [bibliography] of Ibn Nadim, that is before 987 > [C.E.], by a late disciple of Proclus; it was later translated into Arabic, perhaps by the great > translator Ishaq ibn Hunayn.530 In fact, the “Book of Causes” is a sort of Compendium taken > from the “Elements of Theology” of Proclus, but attributed subsequently to Aristotle. The Latin > version was itself translated from Arabic, as is attested by numerous words left in this language. > This text had a great influence upon Ibn Sina, and became in a certain sense canonical for > Islamic thought. > > The “Book of Causes” thus represents the thought of Proclus, which is distinct from that of > Plotinus. Proclus multiplies the hypostases in order to avoid any repetition in his system, which > gives it a very high degree of complexity. The whole is organized around the notion of orders > conceived as emanating each one from the One by a process which effects that the One > determines itself in each one of them. To the Plotinian triad, Proclus substitutes a tetrad which > includes the One, Existence, Intelligence and the Soul. Furthermore, parallel to the fundamental > tetrad, he multiplies the parallel triads to exhaust all of the virtualities of Being in a highly > hierarchied universe. It is well understood that the link which Proclus established between his > metaphysics and the pagan gods through the system of the Henads disappears in the Arabic > version, which explains many of the distortions in the “Book of Causes” in relation to the true > doctrine of Proclus. > > The process of the translation of the Greek works began in the 8th century and was expanded in > the following century with the great translators al-Bitriq and Hunayn ibn Ishaq. The first > important thinker to have exploited these materials was al-Kindi. The assimilation of > Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism by al-Farabi was measured and prudent. He constrained > himself to remain always within the framework of orthodoxy and does not hesitate when > necessary to set himself apart from Aristotle. Al-Farabi was nevertheless the first to adapt in > Arabic a portion of the Neoplatonic vocabulary and its concepts. > > Our aim here not being to write the history of Islamic philosophy but only to follow the great > steps in the introduction of Neoplatonism, we will restrict ourselves to summarizing the positions > of al-Farabi and Ibn Sina upon the exact points which occupy us; for with Ibn Sina we can > Badawi, op. cit., pp. 60-73. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > consider that the system is definitively formed. The developments which follow him are nothing > more than minor variations. > > 10. Al-Kindi > > The philosophy of al-Kindi is difficult to access and still little known.531 His work has only > partially come down to us, and we do not have access to a systematic exposition, but to a series of > little treatises, sometimes contradictory, which must have been inserted in an oral teaching > destined for a small group of disciples already well aware of the large lines of their master's > philosophy. > > For al-Kindi, God is “producer” (muhdith) of the world. By this title, He can be considered the > first Principle of all things and can be called the Eternal, or the True One [True-One]. The True > One is the cause of Himself. That is then the necessary Being, not the cause beyond all categories > of thought because it is the first category, the first principle from which we think [of] all the > principles. It is beyond time, movement and space. Notwithstanding his knowledge of the “Book > of Causes”, al-Kindi does not seem to have been seduced by the emanationist philosophy. The > reason is that this emanationist conception seemed to him to be incompatible with the concept of > creation ex nihilo such as we find in the Qur'an. In order to resolve this difficult point he had > recourse, like other thinkers of his generation, to the treatises of the Christian theologian John > Philopon of Alexandria, who had written a systematic refutation of the Hellenistic theses on the > eternity of the world.532 > > 11. Al-Farabi > > The first Muslim philosopher who can be called Neoplatonic is al-Farabi. He had an ample > knowledge of the collection of Arabic translations of Greek works, and the contradictions > between Plato and Aristotle had not escaped his notice. However, he dreamed of a synthesis > which would unite the two philosophies and drew up for this purpose, a “reconciliation of the > two sages” in which the Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic and Neoplatonic positions are imbricated in > order to effectively constitute a fairly coherent whole.533 Perhaps al-Farabi succeeded in realizing > this synthesis which the ancient world had sought for in vain. Nevertheless, it is the Neoplatonic > theses, without doubt because they are more eclectic, which dominate in him.534 > > The work of al-Kindi was published in Cairo under the title Rasa'il al-Kindi al-Falsafa (two volumes, 2nd > edition 1978). His metaphysic was translated into English by A.I. Ivy and published with an interesting > commentary under the title Al-Kindi's Metaphysics (Albany, 1974). > “John Philoponus as a source of medieval Islamic proofs of creation,” in Journal of American Oriental > Sociology, volume 89, 1969, pp. 357-391. > Al-Farabi, Deux traites philosophiques: L'harmonie entre les opinions des deux sages, le divin Platon et Aristote, et le De > la Religion, introduction, translation and notes by Dominique Mallet, Damascus, 1989. > For a more complete exposition of the philosophy of al-Farabi we can consult Ibrahim Madkour, La > place d'al-Farabi dans la philosophie musulmane, Paris, 1934. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > In his principal book, “The Opinions of the Inhabitants of the ideal City”535, which is inspired by > “The Republic” of Plato, al-Farabi expounds some of his metaphysical concepts. He begins by > identifying God as the first Being in a clearly Proclusian tradition.536 And, this first Being is none > other than the eternal One and the first Cause537, the indivisible and totally undefinable > substance.538 Up until here, al-Farabi is very close to al-Kindi, with the difference that his > description of the first Being follows much more closely “Pseudo-Theology” and the “Book of > Causes” than the Qur'an. The One is the Living and Life539, it is Beauty and Perfection540, Truth > and Reality541. Totally self-subsisting, the universe emanates from Him through a necessity > which, nevertheless, adds nothing to His perfection. This emanation is an overflowing of being— > which is superabundant in God. This superabundance is engendered by the only activity possible > to God, the contemplation of Himself, which permits Him to make Himself the object of > intellection and to conceive of an essence without intermediary. For the One is, at the same time, > Intelligence ('aql), Intelligible (ma'qul) and Intelligent ('aqil).542 By His substance, He is Intellect in > action543. By Intellect in action we must understand a pure Intelligence which is a form (sura) > stripped of all matter, for matter is an obstacle to the act of intelligibility, that is to say, of > contemplation544, even as the One is an Intelligible by its substance, as an Intelligible is also a > substance stripped of all matter.545 Finally, it is in contemplating its own substance that the One > becomes Intelligent and Intelligence in action (bi'l-fi'l)546. From this thinking activity is thus > > Al-Farabi, Traite des opinions des habitants de la cite ideale, introduction, translation and notes by Tahani > Sabri, Paris, 1990. We refer to this translation by the abbreviation “City”. There exist several editions of > the Arabic text. The edition to which we referred is that of Dr. A. Nasir Nadir, Kitab Ardi Ahl al-Madinat > al-Fadila, Beirut, 1973. We cite this edition under the abbreviation “Madina”. > The expression used is al-Awwal, which is to say, “the First”, and more rarely “al-Wahid”. Cf. Cite, p. 43 > and Madina, p. 38. In order to conserve a coherent vocabulary, and to better place in evidence the > continuity of thought from Plotinus until Ibn Sina, we prefer to translate al-Awwal by “the One”. > City, pp. 43-44. > City, p. 49 and Madina, p. 44. > Al-Hayy and al-Hayawa. City, p. 52 and Madina, p. 48. > City, p. 53 and Madina, p. 50. > Al-Haqq and al-Haqiqa. Al-Farabi defines reality (haqiqa) as the existence of that which pertains to a > thing. God is thus reality because He is the first Being and that in Him Being is confounded with > essence. We must not confuse this definition of haqiqa with that which is utilized by Bahá’u’lláh. The > definition of al-Farabi is, at the same time, ontological and logical because reality is returned to the > Being and not to the essence. In the framework of the metaphysic of Bahá’u’lláh, haqiqa is a reality of > spiritual nature and not substantial. > City, p. 50 and Madina, p. 48. > Madina, p. 46; “Fa-innahu bi-jawharihi 'aqlun bi'l-fi'l…” > Here we have translated the verb 'aqala by “contemplate” instead of “intellectualize” as does Tahani > Sabri, and this in order to maintain a unity of vocabulary throughout the length of this chapter. The act > of intellectualizing in the sense of al-Farabi and of Ibn Sina is furthermore not altogether equivalent to > Plotinian contemplation. > City, p. 50 and Madina, p. 47: “Wa huwa idan ma'qulun bi jawharihi…” > Madina, p. 47: “Bal huwa bi-nafsihi ya'qilu dhatahu fa yasiru bima ya'qilu min dhatihi 'aqilan wa 'aqlan bi'l-fi'l”. > This passage is in its totality less than clear in its construction and in its implications even as the concern > for symmetry is evident and the chain of logic. Al-Farabi adds thereafter this final proposition: “but also > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > engendered the first separated Intelligence. > > From this point onwards, al-Farabi innovates in relation to Plotinus and Proclus. In appearance, > he returns to the first idea of Plato, which tied movement to a soul and thus associated a soul to > each star. Al-Farabi fusions the collection of the attributes of the Soul and of Intelligence which > correspond to the ten cosmic spheres in order to constitute the second Beings or separated > Intelligences. Each Intelligence has two forms of possible activity: the contemplation of the > essence of the One, and the contemplation of itself. In entering into the contemplation of itself, > the first separated Intelligence engenders the first heaven, and in contemplating the One it > engenders the third Intelligence, which in its turn engenders the sphere of the fixed stars and the > fourth Intelligence, and continuing thus to the tenth Intelligence which engendered the Moon.547 > Thus we find ten separated Intelligences, nine celestial bodies and eleven heavens. > > The model of al-Farabi has the advantage of linking together, through Intelligence, the > metaphysical, cosmological and epistemological aspects, which effectively results in a more global > model than that of Plotinus. > > To the perfection of the intelligible world, al-Farabi opposes the imperfection of the sensible > world, subject to the disorganized movements of combinations and of disintegrations of elements > under the influence of the celestial bodies. At the heart of the disorder of matter gradually > emerges, under the influence of the stars and of their Intelligence, an order which progressively > moves towards a greater perfection, culminating in man. Man, through his rational faculties, > manifests certain qualities of the intelligible world. His soul has the capacity to elevate itself to the > intelligible realities and to know them, which constitutes in actuality the purpose of human > existence, for the descending process of the procession corresponds to an ascending noetic > process. > > 12. Ibn Sina > > Avicenna (Ibn Sina) wished to summarize at the same time his thought and all the philosophy of > his time, of which he considered himself the culmination, in his great encylopedic work, the > “Book of Healing” (Shifa).548 We will limit ourselves to recalling here his theses concerning the > metaphysical structure of the world.549 > > The metaphysic of Ibn Sina much resembles that of al-Farabi. He himself writes that in his > > as His essence intellectualizes, He becomes intelligible in action.” We have here the embryo of the Avicennian > system. > City, X, p. 61 and Madina, p. 62. > We refer to the translation of Georges Anawati, La metaphysique du Shifa, two volumes, Paris, volume I, > 1978 and volume II, 1985. We also refer to the Danish-Namih which is a Persian summary of the Shifa > and which was translated under the title Le livre de la science by Mohammed Achena and Henri Masse (2nd > edition, Paris, 1986). We cite the translation of Anawati under the abbreviation “Shifa”. > We here employ the word metaphysic, conforming to Western usage, in a very different sense than the > Avicennian sense. For Ibn Sina, metaphysics (ilahiyyat) uniquely treats the separated entities of matter. Its > subject is existence of that kind (Shifa, volume I, p. 93). > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > youth, he read The Theology, which ever being able to understand it, until the day in which he > read the commentaries of al-Farabi which brought to him a true revelation. The thought of Ibn > Sina will then inscribe itself in the straight line of philosophies of emanation built upon > Aristotelian-ptolemaic cosmological premises linked to a Neoplatonic ontology.550 > > Like al-Kindi, Ibn Sina identifies God with the necessary Being551 which has no cause and which > is Perfection, pure Good and Intelligence.552 In Him, the essence and existence are > confounded.553 The perfection of the necessary Being manifests itself in the fact that it is pure > intellect. The necessary Being in recognizing Himself in an act of knowledge, grasps at the same > time all that emanates from Him and hence the procession of all beings. In contrast to al-Farabi, > it is thus, in Ibn Sina, the entire creation which emanates directly from the necessary Being, > which reinstates a perspective which is more compatible with the Qur'an. We can nevertheless > ask whether it is a necessity of the system or an accomodation destined to satisfy orthodoxy. > Whichever [the case may be], Ibn Sina endeavors to render compatible the Qur'anic exigencies > of a creation directly engendered by God and in contact with Him, with the maintenance of the > procession of a series of hypostases. Hence, as in al-Farabi, the necessary Being engenders by > emanation a first Intelligence which is responsible for the movement of the utmost sphere. The > first Intelligence in contemplating itself as necessary engenders the Soul of the utmost heaven. In > contemplating itself as contingent, it engenders the Body of this heaven of which the Soul, by the > movement of its desire for the Intelligence from which it emanates, will become the motor. From > the contemplation of the first Intelligence by the necessary Being, this one engenders the second > Intelligence. Thus, the process reproduces itself through reiteration until the tenth Intelligence.554 > > Only the instrumental Intelligence (al-'aql al-fa'al) is in contact with this world. It is this which is at > the origin of the Imaginal World in giving forms to matter. Ibn Sina was however very critical > towards the platonic theory of ideas. He conceived of the platonic ideas as universals or collective > kinds subsisting in a totally independent manner and representing the prototypes of individual > beings and of sensible realities. Ibn Sina adopted a position fairly close to nominalism and > affirmed that it is only through abstraction of particulars that the human spirit reconstitutes kinds > and species such as all the categories of the universal. These universals cannot thus exist > independently from the individuals who composed them. “Furthermore,” Majid Fakhry explains, > “when we attribute unity to the universal, we do not mean that it resides in action in all the > particular beings which participate therein, but rather that there is an inherent potentiality to be > in numerous substrata disposed to receive it; all the while remaining numerically unitary, it is > > The works on the metaphysic of Ibn Sina are innumerable. We will limit ourselves to citing here: > Djemil Saliba, Etudes sur la metaphysique d'Avicenne, Paris, 1926; Parviz Morewedge, The metaphysica of > Avicenna, London, 1973; Louis Gardet, La pensee religieuse d'Avicenne, Paris, 1951; and the Arabic work of > Shaykh al-Ard, Al-Mudkhul ila Falsafati Ibn Sina, Cairo. > Shifa, I, p. 113. > Shifa, VIII, Chapter VI. > Shifa, VIII, Chapter IV, volume II, p. 80. Ibn Sina writes: “necessary Being is the first”, and “There is no > distinction in Him between quiddity (mahiyya) and existence for there is not quiddity other than His Being in itself > (anniyya)”. Cf. Livre des Sciences, p. 198. > Shifa, IX, Chapter II, volume II, p. 126 on the process of emanation; and Ibid., p. 135 on the > engenderment of the celestial spheres. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > thus multiple in power.”555 > > We consider the critique as fundamental. All the post-Avicennian thinkers have attempted to > respond to this. The construction of the Imaginal World and of Malakut in the Ishraqi > philosophers would attempt to take stock of many of these points. The modern neo-Avicennians, > particularly those of the school of Henri Corbin, would do well to meditate upon these positions > of Ibn Sina when they attack nominalism or when they make it responsible for the decline of > theosophy, as in the case of Faivre. Not all theosophy is necessarily platonic. > > Nevertheless, Ibn Sina maintained the Aristotelian concept of form, and he makes this concession > to Neoplatonism, that the form must preexist matter and that its origin must thus be found in the > instrumental Intelligence.556 > > With Ibn Sina, we can consider that this part of Muslim metaphysics has come to its culmination. > It general economy was never challenged before the end of the 19th century. Of course, > numerous philosophers attempted to construct their own systems, but in doing so, they remained > always dependent upon him. Their relation to Ibn Sina resembles that of Proclus, Sirianius or > Simplicius to Plotinus. Even if the Ishraqiyyun introduced numerous refinements, the metaphysic > of Ibn Sina, eventually mixed in with some elements borrowed from Ibn al-'Arabi, is that which > totally dominated the epoch of Baha’u’llah. We cannot comprehend the originality of his > message if we do not ceasingly remind ourselves of this fact. > > We will not return here to Ishraqi or Shaykhi metaphysics, considering that we have treated this > question sufficiently in the chapter consecrated to the divine Worlds in the Islamic tradition. In > Iran, the ideas of Ibn Sina still remained very much living until the 19th century, which is not the > case in the Arab world. However, these ideas were influenced by the illuminative theology of > Suhrawardi, and notably his angelology and sustained an inflection suitable to Shi'ism. Because > of this, the cosmological aspect became less important, and the discussions were concentrated > upon ontological questions and notably upon the status and the function of the Imaginal World. > > Having thus defined the Neoplatonic framework of Muslim philosophy, this will permit us to > make a rigorous comparison thereof with the thought of Baha’u’llah, to determine points of > contact, to grasp the axis of divergencies and to cease the force and the originality of this thought > beyond a language which can sometimes seem conventional and which often hides great > audacities. Such a picture, in order to be complete, should include also a comparison with Sufi > thought, notably that of Ibn al-'Arabi, and the authors of existential monism. For practical > reasons, we have however preferred to provisionally limit our study. But the reader may be > assured that the result will be quite similar, and that he will find in the writings of Baha’u’llah a > multitude of borrowings of vocabulary and images, of common themes, but finally of serious > divergencies upon fundamentals. In the work of Baha’u’llah, in which form plays such an > important role, it is always necessary to reside a text in its most general context and not to > content oneself with a superficial reading, for we can be sure that every word has its weight. > Majid Fakhry, Histoire de la philosophie islamique, trad. Marwan Nasr, Paris, 1989, p. 174. > Shifa, II, Chapter V, volume I, p. 80. For Ibn Sina matter remains always the principle of individuation > (Shifa, IC, Chapter IV, volume II, p. 139). See Osmane Chahine, Ontologie et Theologie chez Avicenne, Paris, > 1961, pp. 61-65. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > 13. Baha’u’llah and Hellenistic philosophy > > The following chapter will be consecrated to a comparison of the teaching of Baha’u’llah with > the doctrine of Neoplatonism which will show that despite certain appearances the philosophy of > Baha’u’llah has nothing Neoplatonic about it. This brings us to extend our search to a larger > framework which is that of Hellenistic philosophy (Falsafa) in general. > > Al-Ghazali in “Annihilation of the philosophers” (Tahafut al-Falasifa) examined twenty theses of > Falsafa. which he adjudged to be incompatible with Muslim orthodoxy. Notwithstanding all of > the contradictions of Averroes (Ibn Rushd), al-Ghazali certainly had good reason to underline that > Hellenistic philosophy was, in its Greek form, unassimilatable by Islam, and that all the efforts of > adaptation which one could make would have no consequence other than to deform the one or > the other. According to al-Ghazali, Falsafa resulted in three theses striking in their impiety (kufr). > The first was regarding the eternity of the world, the second upon the negation of the > resurrection and the third upon the limited knowledge which God had of particulars. > > The first statement which could be made is that if the philosophers had be confronted not by the > Qur'an, but with the work of Baha’u’llah, most of the objections of al-Ghazali would not have > existed. In annulling the dogma of the ex nihilo creation and that of the resurrection, Baha’u’llah > transcended all of the obstacles which are opposed to an harmonious synthesis between > philosophy and religious thought. Also, his theology and his psychology resolve the contradictions > in which al-Farabi and Ibn Sina had fallen in order to try to explain why a God which could > have no knowledge except of universals could remain an omniscient God. Baha’u’llah resolves > the problem this time in turning his back on the philosophy of necessity in which Falsafa was > enclosed, in order to affirm the total transcendence of God, in a very Cartesian sense, and his > total independence with regard to the world of contingencies. Let us note as well that this attitude > was the only which could have liberated scientific investigation from the constraints of theological > dogmatism. > > In a general manner, one could thus conclude that there is a certain kinship between the > philosophical approach of Falsafa and the thought of Baha’u’llah. If this kinship exists, it should > be sought not in the theses of Falsafa, but more appropriately in its spirit, which is perhaps the > spirit of the first Greek philosophers; for otherwise Baha’u’llah differs from that which was the > foundation of its teaching. For there is incompatibility between the teaching of Baha’u’llah and > that of Falsafa on at least two fundamental points, that of cosmology and that of ontology. > > Upon the cosmological plan, Baha’u’llah undoes the work of al-Farabi and of Ibn Sina. He > rejects the system of Ptolemy upon which it was founded, and all the system of the procession of > intelligences and of the motive souls of the heavens. In doing so, he once more separates > ontology, cosmology and psychology, which had been abusively associated and unified. This > categorical rejection of the Avicennian onto-cosmology which impregnated all Muslim and > Persian thought until his epoch, is an act of great courage but which brings down the entire > edifice of Muslim physics and metaphysics. This is a revolution the amplitude of which we today > have difficulty appreciating. It is not only the system of Avicenna which is at stake, but also that > of Ibn al-'Arabi and of Suhrawardi. In this sense, Baha’u’llah anticipated the Western scientific > revolution which, introduced into Persia some decades later, was to ruin the cosmological bases > of theology. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > The consequences of this abandonment are immense. They imply the disappearance of > Avicennian and Suhrawardian angelology about which we have already had occasion to explain. > It implies also the disappearance of prophetology such as it was conceived by the philosophers. > Let us remember that Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi identified Gabriel, the angel of revelation, with > the instrumental Intellect. Thus the whole relation of the prophet to God, his mode of knowing > revelation which must be rethought. > > On the ontological plan, Baha’u’llah rejects the eclectic ontology crafted on the basis of Plato and > Aristotle by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. Two aspects of this ontology are aimed at. The first refers to > the supremacy of Being in the whole of the system, and its relation to the philosophy of essences. > The second concerns Aristotelian dualism, of form and matter, which is totally abandoned. > > Baha’u’llah seems to implicitly consider that the derailing of traditional ontology has occurred > ever since the first attempts of the synthesis of al-Kindi, when he assimilated God to the necessary > Being, implying thereby a dualism between necessary Being and possible Being, from which al- > Farabi was to derive his secondary beings which are the separated Intelligences. There is a > problem with this already perceived by Plotinus, who refused to assimilate Being to the One and > who considered that Being must proceed from the One and not be confused with It. For > Baha’u’llah as well, Being is a strictly contingent notion, which prohibits its confusion with God. > This ruins, it is well understood, all the speculations of Ibn Sina and of Thomas Aquinas on the > distinction between Being and Essence in the contingent creatures and their coincidence in God. > The ontology of Baha’u’llah is neither a philosophy of essence, nor a philosophy of existence; it is > a philosophy of reality (haqiqat), in which reality is considered a spiritual nature without substance > admitting diverse modalities of being. > > Baha’u’llah also abandons the Aristotelian distinction between form and matter. Ibn Sina had > suggested that form can exist independently of matter in constituting a substance apart [from it]. > Thus the separated Intelligences were pure forms. Thomas Aquinas adopted this point of view in > order to make of the human soul the form of the body. For Baha’u’llah, spiritual realities (haqa'iq) > are not substantial realities. Thus they cannot have a form. From this radiates an entirely new > plan from that of Muslim physics and metaphysics, for from this duality of form and matter, > doubled by the duality of being and essence, was derived a whole collection of principles and > consequences upon the nature of intelligible and sensible realities. For Aristotle, everything that > was not matter was intelligible, which results in confusing all the modalities of being. For if, for > example, thought is an intelligible, thought is then of a different nature from the soul. > Furthermore, Ibn Sina created of matter the principle of the individuation of being. This > problem of individuation, which so troubled medieval philosophy, was made inevitable if one > admitted that the kind and the species preceded the individual in the order of existence, which > seemed to be necessary if one wished to make the Aristotelian form or the platonic idea > preexistent. In the ontology of Baha’u’llah, these questions no longer have much meaning, > because the kinds and species disappear as universals. Baha’u’llah is not far from the metaphysic > of Duns Scot and the nominalist theses of William of Ockham. It would nevertheless be absurd to > make him a nominalist inasmuch as his ontology is based upon a concept of essence and > existence which is altogether different. Nevertheless there is a totally unexplored domain there > which should be seriously studied one day and which promises to be very fruitful philosophically, > for we are convinced that a renaissance of modern philosophy must pass through a complete > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > reformulation of ontology outside of the Aristotelian or platonic categories. > > We could without doubt enumerate many other points upon which the teaching of Baha’u’llah > diverges from the Falsafa, but these other points seem entirely secondary to us in comparison to > the two fundamental questions of cosmology and ontology which we have evoked here. This > done, not only has Baha’u’llah abrogated the chasm of several centuries which seemed to have > separated Eastern philosophy from Western philosophy; he returned philosophy to the domain of > ideas so as to leave the field free to science in order to explain the sensible universe outside of all > metaphysics, and He opened to philosophical investigation avenues about which 20th century > philosophy had an intuition, notably on the relative and progressive intelligibility of reality and > the relation between language, reality and psychological interiority, and others as well. These > paths are still far from being explored. > > CHAPTER THIRTEEN: > THE EMANATIONIST METAPHYSIC OF BAHA’U’LLAH > > 1. The divine Verb as Being > > In the Lawh-i-Hikmat, Baha’u’llah explains that God has not directly created the world, but that he > did so through the Holy Spirit, or more exactly, the divine Verb (kalama)[kalimati'llah] “which is the > Cause of the entire creation”557, what he calls, in other Tablets, “the Primal Will” (al-mashiyyat al- > awwaliyya). Baha’u’llah follows this declaration with the following commentary: > > “Know thou, moreover, that the Word of God [kala:ma'llah]—exalted be His glory—is > higher and far superior to that which the senses can perceive, for it is sanctified from any > property (literally: nature, tabi'a) or substance (jawhar). It transcendeth the limitations of > known elements ('unasir) and is exalted above all the essential and recognized substances > (ustuqusat). It became manifest without any syllable or sound and is none but the Command > (amr) of God which pervadeth all created things [al-muhaymini 'ala'l-'alami:n]. It hath never > been withheld from the world of being ('a:lam). It is God's all-pervasive grace558, from which > all grace doth emanate559. It is an entity (kawn) far removed above all that hath been and > shall be.”560 > > This passage thus situates the Holy Spirit as the first engendered. Baha’u’llah says elsewhere that “It > is an entity”, which can also be translated as “It is the Being (Kawn) sanctified from all that was and > > TB:140 > We would prefer to translate it as “the emanation of God”. > Ibid. > TB:140-141 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > all that will be”.561 It is in way the Being which preceded existence and hence that which confers > being upon all the entities of creation. At the same time, it is the “Command of God” (amru'llah), > which is to say, the expression of the divine Will and the transmitter of Its designs, for the Command > of God aims at establishing an order in the cosmos which results that the universe is the expression > of this divine Will. > > 2. The Baha’i concept of emanation > > In “Some Answered Questions”, ‘Abdu’l-Baha developed certain ideas regarding the Holy Spirit > which take up the terms employed by Baha’u’llah. He declares: “The Holy Spirit is the Bounty of > God (fayd-i-ilahi) and the luminous rays which emanate from the Manifestations…”562 > > We must question the meaning of the word “fayd” (pronouned “feiz” in Persian), which is translated > into French by Hippolyte Dreyfus as “bonte” and by Laura Clifford Barney by “bounty”. “Fayd” > generally has the meaning of “grace”, which is fairly close to the English “bounty” but fairly > different from the French “bonte”. Should we thus understand that the phrase should have been > translated as: “The Holy Spirit is a divine grace”? In appearance, the translation of Taherzadeh of > the passage from the “Tablet of Wisdom” cited above seems to make reasonable this hypothesis > because we read: “It is God's all-pervasive grace [huwa'l-faydu'l-a'Zamu], from which all grace doth > emanate [al-ladhi: ka:na 'illaTa'l-fuyu:Za:ti].”563 Here the word “fayd” is translated by “grace”. There is > however another possibility in translation. If “grace” is the current meaning of the word “fayd” in > Persian, it is not the same in Arabic. Most of the Arabic dictionaries ignore “fayd” in the sense of > “grace”. The word comes from the root FYD which signifies “to overflow”, “to inundate”, “to flow” > and “to emanate”. In Arabic, “fayd” is the vehicle of the idea of abundance and of overflow, and it is > because of this that the first Arab translators used it to translate the Greek “emanation” and the > word has always kept this meaning in the philosophical language, no doubt under a proclusian > influence which must go back to the “Book of Causes”, for we know that Proclus conceived of the > first emanation as an overflowing of Being beyond the One. Thus we can translate the phrase of > ‘Abdu’l-Baha in the following manner: “The Holy Spirit is an emanation from God.” Let us > recognize that the phrase translated in this way has a much more limpid meaning than if we use the > words “bounty” or “grace”. Furthermore, this translation has the advantage such as we will see, of > remaining coherent with the text that follows as well as with the whole of the philosophy of > Baha’u’llah. > > But if we decide to translate “fayd” by emanation, that is equally valid for the already mentioned > passage of the “Tablet of Wisdom”: > > In Arabic: “wa huwa al-kawnu'l-muqadasu 'amma kana wa ma yakun”; cf. Majmu'iy-i-Matbu'iy-i-Alwah-i- > Mubarakih, p. 41. It is difficult to determine if kawn should be translated by “being” or by “having been”. > Certain ones could be tempted to see in this kawn the esse of Western metaphysics. The two readings seem to > be possible upon a purely semantic ground, but to see in this kawn the esse of the [Western] metaphysical > tradition does not seem to conform to the thought of Baha'u'llah. > SAQ:XXV:124 > In Arabic: “wa huwa al-faydu'l-a'Zamu'ladhi kana 'illata'l-fuyudat”; cf. Majmu'iy-i-Matbu'iy-i-Alwah-i-Mubarakih, p. > 41. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > “It [the Word of God] is the greatest emanation which is the cause of the other > emanations.”564 > > Of course, it is not through a simple error that Taherzadeh translated “fayd” by “grace”. It seems > that he has relied upon the example of the translations of Shoghi Effendi, who often considered that > it was not always necessary to enter into all the subtleties of philosophical vocabulary and who > himself confessed the impossibility of rendering into English the richness of the metaphysical > terminology of Baha’u’llah. Nevertheless, conscious of the problem, Taherzadeh wished to correct > an inevitable semantic slide by reintroducing the concept of emanation in a verbal form. He has > translated “from which all graces doth emanate” where literally the Arabic says only that it is “the > cause” ('illa) of the other graces. > > The idea that we are indeed face to face with the Neoplatonic concept of emanation is confirmed > when we read the following text of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, for here we see him utilizing in a strikingly exact > manner the same images as Plotinus in the Enneads. After having established that the Holy Spirit is > “an intellectual condition” (haqiqat-i-ma'qul)565, he writes: “Therefore, as it is evident and clear that > the intellectual realities do not enter and descend, and it is absolutely impossible that the Holy Spirit > should ascend and descend, enter, come out, or penetrate, it can only be that the Holy Spirit > appears in splendour, as the sun appears in the mirror.”566 The same image is employed in a text > concerning the Trinity, in which he says that the divine reality is like a sun, the radiance of which is > reflected in the pure and polished mirror of the Christ.567 In the same vein, ‘Abdu’l-Baha declares in > another text: “As the pure mirror receives light from the sun and transmits this bounty to others, so > the Holy Spirit is the mediator of the Holy Light from the Sun of Reality, which it gives to the > sanctified realities (the divine Manifestations).”568 > > 3. Transparent theology > > We rediscover here the elements of this transparent theology which plays such an important role in > the writings of Baha’u’llah. God is presented therein as akin to a sun from which emanate the rays > which are the Holy Spirit. And this image of the light and of the sun is precisely the same that > Plotinus made use of in order to explain his concept of emanation. We find the best example of this > in the 4th Ennead, in which Plotinus wishes to explain how it is possible that the Soul can be present > everywhere in the universe while being nonetheless “indivisible and unextended” and without it [the > Soul] being an accident in a body. Plotinus finds the solution of this problem in affirming that the > presence of the Soul in the universe is similar to the light which radiates from a lamp or to the rays > which emanate from the sun: > > “So also, if we can say from when comes the light of the sun, no less do we see the same light > > Majmu'a min Alwah-i-Hadrat Baha'u'llah, p. 120; TB:141. > SAQ:XXV:124. The text reads “intellectual”. We would [adjust] this to “intelligible” in order to [point > out] the philosophical terminology in usage. > SAQ:XXV:124-125. > SAQ:XXVII:130-131. > SAQ:XXXVI:165 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > in all places and, it is not divided…If the sun, instead of being a body, was a power separated > from a body and if it thereby produced its light, this light would not have a point of > departure; we could not say from whence it came; there would be everywhere but one light > without beginning or origin.”569 > > Plotinus also uses the images of the lamp: > > “…let us take as center a little luminous mass; let us place around it a spherical and > transparent body, in such manner that the light propagates itself from the center throughout > the sphere…The inner luminous center is not affected at all; but even as it remains > immovable, it extends itself throughout the whole spherical mass and the light which we see > shining in this little luminous mass fills the entire mass of the sphere. But the light is not > derives from this little corporal mass itself; this mass possesses the light not because it is a > body, but because it is a luminous body, because of a power which is different from a > material power.”570 > > Without doubt, for we who understand the nature of light and its mode of propagation, the > reasoning of Plotinus seems very alembic. But we must not forget that he was explaining a totally > new and unpublished concept for his epoch and thus difficult for his readers to understand. But if we > look at them carefully, the images which Plotinus employs are not different from those of ‘Abdu’l- > Baha. It is thus the concept of emanation which we find in both the one and the other. The concept > of emanation is thus an integral part of this transparent theology of which we are speaking, but it > does not summarize it entirely. The theology of Baha’u’llah is a “speculative” theology, in the literal > sense of the term, before being a theology of emanation. In Baha’i thought the transparent relation > completes emanation even as procession in the Neoplatonism which it replaces. There would be a > grave danger in confounding the transparent relation with Plotinian procession, from which it > distinguishes itself radically through the appearance of the notion of “manifestation” so fundamental > and so appropriate to Baha’i metaphysics. > > The image of the mirror and the light which is reflected therein is utilized with a great abundance in > the Baha’i writings and characterizes diverse levels of relation. The Prophet is a mirror in which is > reflected “the Son of Reality”, the divine Essence, or the Holy Spirit. The soul of man is a mirror > which reflects the spiritual worlds or the divine Manifestation. The heart of man is a mirror which > reflects spiritual knowings or the spiritual qualities of the soul in its relationship with the lower world > [in which we dwell]. The physical world is itself a mirror which reflects the spiritual worlds, and, > more particularly, the spiritual and intelligible realities of Malakut. In seeing the manner in which > this image is taken up in multiple circumstances, we might be tempted to see in this a literary theme, > a simple metaphor, an artifice of language, a commodity of speech to refer to something so vague as > to be ineffable. This would be to underestimate the depth of the writings of Baha’u’llah. There is a > hidden relation between all of these mirrors. The image of the mirror intervenes in a very particular > context. It depicts the relation which exists between two realities of a different ontological level. God > and His Manifestation are of different ontological degrees. The Manifestation of God and the soul of > man are of different ontological degrees, and this is also the case with the soul and the body of man, > > Enneads, VI.4, pp. 185-186. > Ibid., VI.4., p. 185. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > or the soul of man and his psyche (nafs). We have already seen how the transparent character of the > relation between the soul and the body permitted us to avoid all of the philosophical problems which > derived from a “union of substance” and the multiplication of confused [entangled] essences which > results therefrom. > > 4. Emanation and Manifestation > > There is thus a complementary relation between the concepts of emanation and of manifestation. > From God emanates the spirit which contains in itself the capacity to manifest all of His Names, > attributes and qualities. But creation in itself is neither an emanation of God, nor of an intermediary > hypostasis, and that is a fundamental distinction between Baha’i thought and all Neoplatonic > systems. Nonetheless, while God is far above all relation with His creation, through the emanation > of the Holy Spirit He is reflected (tajalli) in creation. This reflection is totally immaterial. It is even > above any relation of substance or essence. ‘Abdu’l-Baha compares this relation to that of the artist > and his painting. The painting manifests the qualities of the painter, it emanates from him. But > never could we say that the spirit of the painter has incarnated itself in the painting. This painting > can represent a landscape or a still life. The pictorial expression communicates to us something of > the spiritual state of its author, but in no case will it inform us about his true appearance. In the > same way the divine essence remains unknowable. In the “Words of Paradise”, Baha’u’llah writes: > > “…while God is immeasurably exalted above all things. Every created being however > revealeth His signs which are but emanations from Him and not His Own Self.571 All these > signs are reflected and can be seen in the book of existence, and the scrolls that depict the > shape and pattern572 of the universe are indeed a most great book…Consider the rays of the > sun whose light hath encompassed the world. The rays emanate from the sun and reveal its > nature573, but are not the sun itself.”574 > > Hence, we have that which manifests qualities, which are not intrinsic to itself. The divine > Manifestation manifests the divine qualities, notwithstanding that it is not Divinity. In the same way, > the spiritual qualities of man manifest his inner nature. But the inner nature of man must strip itself > of its own qualities in order to acquire the divine qualities, even as a bar of iron which is plunged > into the forge of the blacksmith acquires the qualities of [fire] in becoming [hot] and radiant like the > fire. These qualities are not intrinsic to iron; what is intrinsic to iron is to acquire the qualities of > [fire]. If we plunge a piece of wood into a forge, far from acquiring the qualities of fire, it will be > consumed and will be destroyed. The forge, is the contact of man with the divine Manifestation; the > Majmu'iy-i-Ishraqat, p. 116. The Persian text says simply: “Dar kull ayyat-i-u-zahir. Ayyat az u, na u.” This > means, literally, “In all are manifested His signs. The signs are from Him (come from Him), but are not > Him.” (The Arabic text of this passage says: “wa Ayatuh Zahiratun fi'l-kulla wa minhu'l-Ayatu wa laysat nafsahu”, > in Majmu'a min Alwah-i-Hadrat Baha'u'llah, p. 78.) > A single word in Persian, naqsh means “appearance”, “plan”, “structure”. It is understood that this is not > “form” in the Aristotelian sense. > Literally the Persian text means: “Consider the radiation (tajaliyyat) of the sun [later: it]. Its rays envelop the > world, nevertheless the radiance [later: he] (comes) from it and manifests it (zuhur-i-u'st) through his own self > (nafs) without being its own self. > Majmu'iy-i-Ishraqat, p. 116; TB:60-61. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > fire, are the spiritual qualities which he acquires in his contact therewith and which he becomes > capable of manifesting (zahir karban). > > 5. Function of the concept of emanation > > The principal characteristic of the metaphysic of Baha’u’llah, common with the majority of the > Persian metaphysics which preceded it, is in being a philosophy of emanation. But does the concept > of emanation have in Baha’u’llah the same role and the same function as in other systems? We think > not, and the differences found therein are at the same time negative and positive. > > If the metaphysic of Baha’u’llah is a metaphysic of emanation, it does not put into play either the > concept of procession or that of hypostasis. Baha’u’llah is ten thousand [leagues] from the onto- > cosmology of Ibn Sina which he considers to be pure fantasy. Baha’u’llah breaks the line which for > ten centuries linked metaphysics to cosmology. He places ontological problems in their [proper] > context, that is to say, in the domain which is that of pure thought, totally distinct from cosmogony. > Ontology is only one of the ways of seeing the universe. It is necessary, because it alone can permit > the human spirit to understand the problems of the realities situated outside the sensible world. But > it constitutes a rationalization of that which is difficult to rationalize. In this sense it can only be a > partial description of the ultimate reality of the universe. Thus, ontological questions have for > Baha’u’llah a very relative meaning, as he affirms in the “Seven Valleys”575, in saying that the > distinction between the divine worlds depends upon the differences of the condition of the observer, > or when he says in the “Tablet of Wisdom”576 that the affirmative or negative response to the > question of whether or not the universe has or has not had a beginning depends above all on the > perspective from which it is perceived. > > Thus differing from all of the systems which were constructed after the Enneads of Plotinus, Baha’i > metaphysics separates ontological questions from cosmological questions in rejecting the idea of the > procession. But we could ask whether the Holy Spirit, as the Primal Will does not constitute in itself > a hypostasis. And here we will see the appearance of the third radical distinction between the Baha’i > and Neoplatonic concepts of emanation. > > 6. The refutation of the system of hypostases > > If Plotinus set up the first entity emanating from the One as a hypostasis, and does the same with the > Soul, was because he could not conceive that the One could have any relation whatsoever with the > sensible world. This was a frontal hit upon the dogmas of Hellenistic philosophy as well as later > those of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. So much so that, as we have seen, it is upon this point that > were based the principal adaptations which permitted the transposition of Neoplatonism in the > theology of Christianity and Islam. Nevertheless, the status of Intellect in the writings of the Islamic > Neoplatonists is very different from the status of the Holy Spirit in the writings of Baha’u’llah. > > For Baha’u’llah, the Holy Spirit is not an entity separated from God. If the Holy Spirit is the agent > > SV:18-29. > TB:140; cf. TB:145. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > of creation, it is even as the instrument is the agent of the artisan. To say that it was the Holy Spirit > which created the universe does not mean that it was the origin thereof. The Holy Spirit does not > have the status of a hypostasis. The Neoplatonists hypostatized the Intellect or the Soul in order to > make autonomous Beings endowed with their own will. But if Baha’u’llah takes up the same images > as those developed by Plotinus, in order to speak of emanation, it is in an entirely opposite manner. > For Plotinus, it is necessary to explain how the similar can engender the dissimilar, while all the > while leaving a trace of its resemblance; for heat is not the fire, even if it resembles it. At the same > time, he tries to show that the repetition of emanation does not result in a degradation of Being, > while all the while explaining how each degree of Being can be independent of the One. For > Baha’u’llah, what is necessary on the contrary is to show dependency. The Holy Spirit has no > existence independent of God, no more than the light has an existence independent of the lamp. > The Holy Spirit is nothing other than the expression of the divine Will. > > 7. The divine Verb as the ontological cause > > However, when Baha’u’llah says that the Holy Spirit is “the Cause of the entire creation”577, he does > not speak of the material cause but of the ontological cause. In one sense, Baha’u’llah affirms the > continuity between the spiritual universe and the physical universe, because he says that the divine > Verb is an emanation which is the (ontological) cause of all the other emanations.578 He also says > that the divine Verb “is none but the Command of God”579, even as he says that Nature (tabi'a), > which is to say the physical and sensible world is “the embodiment of My Name, the Maker, the > Creator” and “Nature is God's Will and is its expression in and through the contingent world.”580 > > This distinction between the ontological cause and the physical cause is clearly established by > Baha’u’llah because he says that in a sense, and it is this sense that we interpret as ontological, the > universe is eternal. He says then that this is a “beginning that hath no beginning, apart from its > being preceded by a Firstness [awwaliyya] which cannot be regarded as firstness and originated by a > Cause inscrutable even unto all men of learning.”581 This ontological cause here described as “a > Firstness [awwaliyya] which cannot be regarded as firstness”, without doubt because it is situated in > the Aeon outside of time, is distinct from the physical cause, because Baha’u’llah says a little later > that the universe was created by two forces, one active and the other receptive: > > “That which hath been in existence had existed before, but not in the form thou seest today. > The world of existence582 came into being through the heat generated from the interaction > between the active force (al-fa'il) and that which is its recipient (al-munfa'il).583 These two are > TB:140. > TB:141. > Ibid. > Both phrases from TB:142. For the Names of God, please see the section on the Theology of the Names in > the preceding chapter. > Majmu'iy-i-Matbu'iy-i-Alwah-i-Mubarakih, p. 40; TB:140. > Baha'u'llah says simply “wa ma kana”, which means “and that which is”. Perhaps we must establish a > distinction between existence in the sense of wujud, which can encompass the modes of intelligible existence, > and sensible being, which implies a less comprehensive concept. > Translated into French as “agent recepteur”, which might be rendered “receptive agent”. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > the same584, yet they are different.”585 > > This text makes one think immediately of the Big Bang [theory] of modern astrophysics. We know > that the universe was born of a great concentration of energy which, in a space reduced to a size > inconceivable to the human spirit, concentrated all the matter and energy of the universe. The > expansion of this singularity of infinite grandeur generated a heat of more than one hundred million > degrees centigrade, such that in the first seconds of the universe, the energy could not exist except in > the form of photons, and at this moment the four fundamental forces of the universe—the > electromagnetic, the weak interactives, the strong interactives, and gravitation—formed but one and > the same force.586 Upon this point the text of Baha’u’llah is remarkably precise for if he supposes > two agents at the origin of the universe, one is qualified as the “active force” (fa'il), but the other > agent is not described as a passive force, but more as the receiver of the action which is thus situated > on a different ontological and physical plan. > > However, one detail which has escaped the attention of commentators up to the present is found in > the last phrase of the passage: “These two are the same, yet they are different.” The Arabic text > literally says, are we must begin earlier in the passage in order to understand it: “That which came > into being (takwana) through the heat generated by the encounter (imtizaj) of [the] active force (al-fa'il) > with its receptive agent (al-munfa'il) which is the same as it ('aynuhu) and other than it (ghayruhu).” That > which is the same and other applies to munfa'il because the relative pronoun (hu) is singular, which > signifies that this munfa'il is simultaneously the same as the active force, fa'il, and nevertheless > different. It appears very probable that Baha’u’llah was making allusion here to the theory of > Sameness ('ayn) and of Otherness (ghayr) of Plato, for we are in the presence of terms in usage of the > Arabic Platonic tradition. We could also see in this a principle of retroaction. The first force has > retroacted upon itself. It is this retroaction which has produced in creation the first element of > differentiation which is at the origin of the universe. > > We see here how Baha’u’llah can utilize an ancient language in a totally new context in order to > give it an expanded meaning. On the one hand, he expresses himself in a totally new manner upon > the way in which the universe appeared and gives us a description which strikingly resembles that of > modern physics. On the other hand, he underlines that this way of seeing has a kinship with the > concepts of Plato on the mixture of the Same and the Other, for if he once more takes up the > expression, it is to give it an expanded meaning which conforms to that which he has just said about > the active force and its object. > > 8. The world of the Aeon > > All of this goes to show that Baha’u’llah distinguishes between the creation of the universe in [the > dimension of] time, and in this sense alone it is possible to say that the universe has had a beginning > in time; and creation in the Aeon (dahr), in which the concept of time has no place and where the > notion of the past can not be understood except according to a sequence of ontological causality. > > In Arabic: “lathi huwa 'aynuhu wa ghayruhu.” > Majmu'iy-i-Matbu'iy-i-Alwah-i-Mubarakih, pp. 40-41; TB:140. > Steven Weinberg, Les trois premieres minutes de l'univers, Paris, 1980, p. 15f. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > The world of the Aeon (dahr) is situated thus outside of space and time, that is to say, in the [world] > of Malakut, in the sense in which this word encompasses the totality of the spiritual and intelligible > world. The world of the Aeon is a purely ontological level the beings of which can only be > understood in their relation to the First Cause. The Aeon is thus different from divine eternity, in > which not only the concepts of space and time do not exist, but in which also disappear those of > causality, anteriority, and firstness (awwaliyya). > > This world of the Aeon can also be an allusion to this reality which in itself is outside of the > phenomenal world, but the existence of which is manifested by the physical phenomena. The point > of coalescence (taqyid) of the spiritual realities and the junction of Malakut with the physical world > must be found in the world of the Aeon, which is a world of duration outside of chronological time. > We can thus infer that probably the Aeon is the time appropriate to the Imaginal World. > > But how is one to pass from the spiritual world to the sensible world? Let us note that if Baha’u’llah > tells us that the divine world is the cause of creation, he does not say how the emanation of the Holy > Spirit results in other realities. Should we imagine that following a platonic scheme, a second > emanation derives from the Holy Spirit? In no place does Baha’u’llah affirm this, and furthermore > he discourages all speculations upon this subject, in affirming that the cause of the appearance of the > universe is inscrutable to man. He furthermore says that the Holy Spirit “is God's all-pervasive > grace, from which all grace doth emanate”587 which we translate literally as “the first emanation, > which is the cause of the other emanations”. The phrase is formulated in such a way that we can as > easily understand that the other emanations emanate from the divine Verb or that they emanate > from God. Nowhere is the question clearly explained. Nevertheless, after a long study of the > metaphysic of Baha’u’llah, we have leaned in favor of the second solution: that the Holy Spirit is the > first emanation and the ontological cause of creation, but that the universe emanates directly from > God. > > 9. The transparent theology and the divine Verb > > However, how can we maintain such a solution without ruining all that we have said preceding this, > and what role will then be reserved to the Holy Spirit? It is here that the transparent theology > intervenes. The Holy Spirit is the light which illumines all realities, spiritual and physical, intelligible > and sensible; that which gives them life. For Baha’u’llah does not cease to affirm that realities are > mirrors the function of which is to reflect the divine Verb. Thus does he write in [Kitab-i-Iqan]: > > “Whatever is in the heavens and whatever is on the earth is a direct evidence of the > revelation within it of the attributes and names of God588, inasmuch as within every atom > are enshrined the signs that bear eloquent testimony to the revelation of that Most Great > Light. Methinks, but for the potency of that revelation, no being could ever exist. How > resplendent the luminaries of knowledge that shine in an atom, and how vast the oceans of > wisdom that surge within a drop!”589 > TB:141. > Here we see the appearance of a very strong tie between the transparent theology of Baha'u'llah and the > theology of divine Names. > KI:#107:100-101; GL:XC:177. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > We understand now why the divine Verb can not be a hypostasis; its role can not be limited to a > single ontological sphere. It radiates upon all the spheres of Being, upon all its modes and upon all > the worlds. It assures the close link between the universal Manifestation (Jabarut as the world of the > Manifestation) and the divine Essence (Lahut), then between the universal Manifestation and the > individual Manifestations, that is to say the Prophets when considered in their “Malakutian” reality. > The divine Verb descends [through] all the degrees of Being from the world of the Manifestation to > the world of Nasut and Mulk. Thus it is the First Cause of creation. > > Here as well, the transparent theology of Baha’u’llah, even if it takes up anew a portion of the > Ishraqi vocabulary, has nothing to do with their illuminative theosophy. Once more we must be > know how to go beyond the appearance of the words in order to attain to the new meaning which > Baha’u’llah gives to concepts. > > We have come to see that the concept of emanation is entirely renovated by Baha’u’llah, but the > differences between the thought of Baha’u’llah and that of the principal philosophical schools of his > time do not stop there. Baha’u’llah does not give any place whatsoever to non-being in his > metaphysic. He makes no distinction between form and matter and he rejects the old scholastic > apparatus inherited from Avicennian Aristotelianism. > > It does not seem that we can find in Baha’u’llah the concept of the unity of Being. For the > Neoplatonics, the One is Being and it is from this [One] that absolute Being emanates, which > fragments itself in all existing things. Being is thus divine. In the thought of Baha’u’llah the mode of > being of the divine Essence is completely different from the mode of being of the other realities. And > Being is always Being. In descending into different degrees of creation, it does not undergo any > weakening; it only differs in its mode of manifestation. Being is in some way the essential attribute of > the Holy Spirit, but it has no existence outside of Him. Being is a notion which is, above all, > conceptual. > > CHAPTER FOURTEEN: > THE WORLD OF THE MANIFESTATIONS > > The concept of “divine Manifestation”, tied to that of the “World of the Manifestation”, is perhaps > the most characteristic concept of Baha’i metaphysics, and that which differentiates it the most from > all of the great monotheistic metaphysical [systems]. Also, before studying the World of the > Manifestation, we must first analyze the concept of the “divine Manifestation”. > > 1. The divine Manifestation as mirror of the Essence of God > > The concept of “Manifestation” aims at resolving the fundamental problem in theology of the > relation between God and His terrestrial mouthpiece, be it an Avatar, an incarnation or a Prophet. > Two natural ways open to resolve this problem: either to affirm, as in Christianity, their identity > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > [that they are the same], or to say, as in Islam, that the Prophet is “a man like other men”590, simply > the transmitter of the divine Revelation. Between these two paths, the Baha’i Faith holds a totally > original position which, however, is not without analogy with the incarnationist Christian theology > in the solutions which it brings to this old problem, all while avoiding the [pitfalls]. On the one hand, > Baha’u’llah forcefully affirms that the divine Essence cannot incarnate itself, while on the other, he > affirms with the same force the divinity of [God's] terrestrial mouthpiece. > > Baha’u’llah resolves the problem of the relation between God and His human mouthpiece in the > body of what we have called his “transparent theology”, that is to say, this catroptic science which > explains creation as the effect of a theopany (tajalli) of the divine Names in the mirrors of different > spiritual and material worlds. This catroptic relationship between God and His Manifestation is > furthermore the only domain in which we it is legitimate to use the word “theology”, for, we have > understood that in the Baha’i Faith, a discourse on God, or a “science of God” is totally > inconceivable, inasmuch as God is “the Absolutely Unknowable” (Majhul al-mutlaq). We do not know > God except through the manifestation of His Names and Attributes in the mirror of His creation. > Even a discourse upon these Names and Attributes is impossible because they themselves proceed > from an anthropic illusion which makes us see as multiple what is fundamentally one. The word > “theology” can not thus be used except in the context of this transparent metaphysic, in order to > explain the relation between God and His first Mirror, the universal Manifestation. Baha’u’llah > writes in “Kitab-i-Iqan”: > > “The door of the knowledge of the Ancient of Days being thus closed in the face of all > beings, the Source of infinite grace, according to His saying: “His grace transcendeth all > things; My grace hath encompassed them all” hath caused those Gems of Holiness to > appear out of the realm of the spirit, in the noble form of the human temple, and be > made manifest unto all men, that they may impart unto the world the mysteries of the > unchangeable Being, and tell of the subtleties of His imperishable Essence.”591 > > The divine Manifestations thus are pure mirrors which have the full capacity to reflect “the Sun of > Reality” (shams-i-haqiqat), and it is only through them that we can perceive the divine light. From this > very simple transparent relationship at least three principles are forthcoming. The first is that true > comprehension of the unicity of God consists in affirming the unicity of God and His Manifestation. > The second principle derives from the first, and consists in affirming that the divine Manifestations > form but one and the very same person. The third is called by Baha’is “the principle of progressive > revelation”. It indicates that the divine Manifestations give to men a relative and progressive > teaching adapted to their comprehension and to social, historical and cultural conditions of the place > and epoch in which they are manifested. > > 2. The true divine unicity > > The concept of unicity (tawhid), as we know, is the central concept of Muslim theology. It consists in > affirming that God is unique, uncreated and inaccessible, and that He has no associate, no partner > > Qur'an IX:109 > KI:#106:99; GL:XIX:47 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > (sharik), and that nothing can limit His Omnipotence. This theology aims at establishing in first place > the divine transcendence in reaction to Semite polytheism. However, just like the incarnationist > Christian theology, this theology rapidly encountered dilemmas difficult to resolve: how to reconcile, > for example, this affirmation of the absolute divine unicity with the theology of the divine attributes > contained in the Qur'an. Do not the attributes become associates of the divine Essence? Facing these > problems the Mu'tazili did not hesitate to negate the existential reality of the divine attributes in > order to make thereby pure distinctions of thought. Baha’i thought, on its part, very simply resolves > these problems in the framework of its transparent theology. Moreover this leads very directly to > affirm the unicity of God and of His Manifestation, or rather, their inseparability. Baha’u’llah writes: > > “The essence of belief in Divine unity (tawhid) consisteth in regarding Him Who is the > Manifestation (mazhar) of God and Him Who is the invisible, the inaccessible, the > unknowable Essence as one and the same.”592 > > The divine Manifestations thus have but one will which is the divine Will. Everything that emanates > from Them emanates from God. Their word is the Word of God. Their own self is totally > annihilated in order to leave this place to the divine Self (nafs-i-rahmani). Thus it is that Baha’u’llah > writes in “Kitab-i-Iqan”: > > “These sanctified Mirrors, these Day Springs of ancient glory, are, one and all, the > Exponents on earth of Him Who is the eternal Orb of the universe, its Essence and > ultimate Purpose. From Him proceed their knowledge and power; from Him is derived > their sovereignty. The beauty of their countenance is but a reflection of His image, and > their revelation a sign of His deathless glory. They are the Treasuries of divine knowledge, > and the Repositories of celestial wisdom. Through them is transmitted a grace that is > infinite, and by them is revealed the light that can never fade.”593 > > “These Tabernacles of holiness, these primal Mirrors which reflect the light of unfading > glory, are but expressions of Him Who is the Invisible of Invisibles. By the revelation of > these Gems of divine virtue all the names and attributes of God, such as knowledge and > power, sovereignty and dominion, mercy and wisdom, glory, bounty and grace, are made > manifest.”594 > > These citations illustrate very well this transparent theology of which we have spoken, for we see > here that the divine Manifestation is called the “primal Mirror”. It is thus from his radiation, which > is in fact an emanation from the divine Verb, upon which depends the existence of the world of > creation. > > This transparent theology was the source of much incomprehension in the Muslim world, > habituated as it was to considering the Prophet only as a man who was endowed with a divine > election. The Muslim cleric accused Baha’u’llah to have taught that he was God Himself, or that > > GL:LXXXIV:167 > KI:#106:99-100; GL:XIX:47 > KI:#109:103; GL:XIX:47-48 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > God was incarnated in him595, which is an absurdity. > > Baha’u’llah affirms that the divine Manifestations retain their human rank, but to this is > superimposed the prophetic Spirit which confers upon them “the attributes of Godhead, Divinity, > Supreme Singleness, and Inmost Essence”596. And he adds: “Through their appearance the > Revelation of God is made manifest, and by their countenance the Beauty of God is revealed. Thus > it is that the accents of God Himself have been heard uttered by these Manifestations of the divine > Being.”597 > > Thus, the divine Manifestations have two aspects, “the station of distinction”598 and that of > “essential unity”599. In the first aspect we see that these Manifestations have each “a distinct > individuality, a definitely prescribed mission, a predestined Revelation, and specially designated > limitations”600, which correspond to their human rank, in which we can attest that “they manifest > absolute servitude, utter destitution and complete self-effacement. Even as He saith: 'I am the > servant of God. I am but a man like you.'“601 The station of distinction is thus also that of servitude > ('ubudiyya) which the Prophet shares with all the creatures. However, in the rank of “essential unity” > the Prophet no longer manifests the station of “absolute servitude”, but rather that of “Divinity” > (uluwiyya)602. Baha’u’llah writes in “Kitab-i-Iqan”: > > “Were any of the all-embracing Manifestations of God to declare: 'I am God!' He verily > speaketh the truth, and no doubt attacheth thereto. For it hath been repeatedly > demonstrated that through their Revelation, their attributes and names, the Revelation of > God, His name and His attributes, are made manifest in the world.”603 > > 3. The Alpha and the Omega > > The unity of the divine Manifestation with the Essence of God supposes a second unity which is that > of all of the divine Manifestations with one another. All are the manifestations of the same Spirit > (nafs-i-rahmani), all reflect the same light and demonstrate the same qualities, even as Baha’u’llah > writes in “Kitab-i-Iqan” that “these Birds of the Celestial Throne are all sent down from the heaven of > the Will of God, and as they all arise to proclaim His irresistible Faith…”604 For each manifestation > is but the particular manifestation of the universal Manifestation (mazhar-i-kulli),which is the degree > of “essential unity” in which it forms but one and the same reality with the divine Essence. It is thus > > This is the doctrine of hulul (incarnation) which is explicitly condemned by Baha'u'llah. > KI:#193:177; GL:XXII:53 > KI:#193:177-178; GL:XXII:53 > KI:#191:176; GL:XXII:52/KI:#194:178 > KI:#161:152; GL:XXII:51/KI:#191:176 > KI:#191:176; GL:XXII:52 > KI:#194:178; GL:XXII:53-54 > KI:#193:177; GL:XXII:53/KI:#198:181; GL:XXII:55-56 > KI:#196:178; GL:XXII:54 > KI:#161:152; GL:XXII:50 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > that Baha’u’llah writes, continuing that same sentence: “…they therefore are regarded as one soul > and the same person.”605 This is elaborated in a subsequent passage: “For they are all but one > person, one soul, one spirit, one being, one revelation. They are all the manifestation of the > 'Beginning' and the 'End,' the 'First' and the 'Last,' the 'Seen' and the 'Hidden'—all of which pertain > to Him Who is the Innermost Spirit of Spirits and Eternal Essence of Essences.”606 In the same > Book he writes: “Through the manifold attributes of these Essences of Detachment, Who are both > the First and the Last, the Seen and the Hidden, it is made evident that He Who is the Sun of Truth > [shams-i-haqiqat] is 'the First and the Last, the Seen and the Hidden.'607 “608 It was in order to > express this reality that Jesus said, “I am the Alpha and the Omega” 609 and Muhammad declared, > “I am all the Prophets”.610 > > From this point of view, each Prophet can be considered the return of his predecessor, for he > manifests the same qualities. Baha’u’llah uses the image of the sun.611 The ascends and descends > every day. Each rising and setting represents one [prophetic] Dispensation, and nonetheless it is the > same setting as in the past. Moreover, the people remain turned towards the West where they > perceived the last rays of the sunset, thus without seeing the dawning light which arises in the East. > In another image, Baha’u’llah compares the station of differentiation to the lamp and the station of > unity to the light.612 Certain ones, instead of adoring the light, adore the lamp. This is why, when > the same light appears in a different lamp, they do not recognize it, because they only know the > lamp and see only the exterior appearance of the form without discerning the interior reality of the > light. > > 4. Progressive Revelation > > From the unity of God and the unity of His Manifestations comes forth a third principle which > we might call the unity of Revelation, but which the Baha’is prefer to call “the principle of > progressive revelation”. This principle is, without doubt, the most original element in the thought > of Baha’u’llah, for it comes out of the domain of metaphysics in order to open up a theory of the > evolution of civilizations and a philosophy of history in general. > > The central idea of the entire concept of progressive revelation is that man has only a relative > knowledge of religious truth. God, from age to age, sends divine educators to humanity, > Prophets, Avatars or Manifestations, depending on the terminology we might wish to adopt, who > give to men a religious teaching corresponding to the capacities of comprehension of an epoch, > determined by the spiritual, social and historical conditions of a given culture. > > Ibid. > KI:#196:179; GL:XXII:54 > Qur'an LVII:3 > KI:#151:142-143 > Book of Revelation I:8,11; XXI:6; XXII:13 > KI:#161:153; GL:XXII:51/KI:#172:162 > KI:#20:21; GL:XIII:22/KI:#171:161 > SAQ:77,134,155,168,288/TAB:III:643; BWF:392/PUP:152,168/PT:137 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > This religious teaching is composed of two parts. In one part we find a spiritual teaching which is > eternal, but which must nevertheless be adapted to the human capacities of comprehension in > relation to the given culture and epoch. This teaching is thus adapted to the exigencies of time > and place. In the other part we find the social laws which change over time in order to adapt > themselves more readily to historical and social conditions and which aim to remedy problems of > an essentially social nature. Such are, for example, the laws of marriage and divorce, inheritance > and abstinence from certain foods. > > In this way, the differences between religions are explained. But never are these differences > fundamental, for the spiritual message is one. It is always a message of love which aims to > establish peace and concord upon the earth and to enable man to discover his true spiritual > nature. > > However, Baha’u’llah goes further. He ties the continuous process of Revelation to that of > civilization. If the nature of man is spiritual, civilization must also become spiritual. Thus > spiritual civilization is contrasted with material civilization. The divine Revelations are the > founders of civilization, for civilization is defined above all by a system of values. We speak of > Hindu civilization, Christian civilization, Islamic civilization, but we do not know any atheist > civilization. All civilizations are born in the sacred and have a spiritual spark, no matter how > feeble, at their origin. > > The process of civilization is a quasi-biological process. At the moment at which a new revelation > appears there begin, after a gestation period of more or less length, to appear signs of a new > civilization established upon new spiritual values. The dynamism of the new civilization is based > upon the pertinence of the new revelation and of its teachings which permit social maladies > which were hitherto incurable to heal. Then this [old] civilization runs out of breath. At the > moment at which it attains its apogee, a new social problem appears with numerous maladies for > which religion no longer has any response. Dogmatism replaces the spiritual teachings, the > theologians render fundamental truths obscure, the priests corrupt the religious institution, and > thus religion and civilization are found to be in a process of inexorable decline until a new > Revelation appears which starts up the process again. > > The Book of revelation and the cycles of human civilization are closely linked. But, Baha’u’llah > teaches that there is a directing principle which ties together all of the revelations. This directing > principle is that of Unity. Each revelation has sought to construct a large social unity. There was > a time when the Prophets addressed only a tribe, as in the case of the Judaic Prophets, or to a > specific people, as [in the case of] Zoroaster or Krishna. When Jesus came, he preached a > religion which was addressed to multiple peoples, during an epoch in which the dominant > political system, be it of the city-state, be it of the Roman Empire, was founded upon a unity of > culture. With Islam there appeared the first nation-state founded upon a religious identity, which > permitted the encompassing of very divers peoples and which aspired to universality. Religion > thus influenced the process of civilization by transcending the particularisms in order to create an > ever-increasingly universal social identity. But this process, Baha’u’llah tells us, should not stop > there. Humanity is placed at a new turning place in its history. The dangers which threaten it are > so great that it can bring about its own destruction. This is why the need of a new Revelation is > felt, [one] which would establish new spiritual values upon the basis of which we might construct > the first universal civilization of humanity. This civilization founded upon the unification of > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > political and social structures at a planetary level is the only way to banish war, through a system > of collective security upheld by a global parliament, and thus to establish the peace the vision of > which the Prophets like Isaiah and Jesus never stopped giving to us. > > We see thus that the prophetology of Baha’u’llah opens up upon a philosophy of history already > very complicated and that it is in direct relation to his political thought. > > 5. Progressive Revelation and axiological hermeneutics > > The concept of “progressive revelation” leads to a fourth form of hermeneutic which we will call > “axiological hermeneutic”. The aim of the teaching of the divine Manifestations is to enable man > to progressively discover the world of spiritual values which are nothing other than the totality of > the laws which govern the universe. These values, of laws, exist in the sphere appropriate to each > spiritual world. In descending the hierarchy of the divine worlds, they take in each one the form > adapted to that world. The role of the Manifestation is to translate these transcendental values > into a language accessible to human hearing. Baha’u’llah here resolves one of the difficulties > inherent in every philosophical system established upon transcendence: how to affirm on the one > hand the transcendence of spiritual values and on the other hand the liberty of man. The concept > of “progressive revelation” explains how, on the one hand there exist transcendent and absolute > values, and on the other hand why man has only a relative knowledge thereof. This is a > historicization of ethics and even of spiritual comprehension. The progressive and relative > discovery of this world of spiritual values constitutes what we call an axiological hermeneutic. > The role of the axiological hermeneutic goes far beyond problems of values. It furnishes the key > to a philosophy of history which alone can give meaning to a universal hermeneutic. The > historicist hermeneutic of Boeckh613 and of Droysen614 and in particular post-modernist > hermeneutics, in particular that of Gadamer615, are very critical of an axiological hermeneutic, > because it assumes that there is an objective meaning to history. But, if historicist hermeneutics > proclaims the relativity of ethical and social values, it must apply this relativity to the very points > of view of the historian and the hermeneutist; at least to suppose that these have truly discovered > the universal principle which gives the definitive key to human becoming, even as Hegelism and > Marxism [claimed]. It is this same reproach which was addressed to Baha’i philosophy. That > which Baha’u’llah assumes with the principle of progressive revelation, is that there exist in > certain epochs of history, those in which a new religious message is revealed, a principle of > legitimation which permits them to affirm that the meaning of history which is proclaimed is > relatively superior and permits a reinterpretation of universal history as the function of a new > comprehension of the spiritual destiny of humanity. The teleological principle of this axiological > hermeneutic resides in the fact that the meaning of history is accomplished in man's discovery of > his humanity. The humanity of man being his spiritual nature, which is accomplished > A. Boeckh, Enzyklopaedie und Methodenlehre des Philogischen Wissenschaften, text established by E. Bratuschek, > 1877, 2nd edition, Leipzig, 1886. Also see Jean Grondin, L'universalite de l'hermeneutique, Paris, 1993, pp. > 101-106. > J. G. Droysen, Historik, text established by R. Huebener, Munich, 1937. Also see J. Grondin, op. cit., > pp. 106-115. > Translator’s Note: For a biography and bibliography for Hans-Georg Gadamer please see: > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gadamer/ > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > progressively through the discovery and the interiorization of spiritual values which become the > only true progress of man. The will to give meaning to human destiny, be it individual or > collective, is an inherent endowment of man and is part of his spirituality. To oppose this will to > give meaning in the name of a new Stoicism is to proclaim a philosophy of despair. The purpose > of the message of Baha’u’llah is to bring about the rediscovery of this individual and collective > destiny without which no projected civilization can exist. > > 6. The World of Revelation > > If we return to the divine world of the “Tablet of All Food”, we will see that the world of > “Revelation” corresponds more or less to Jabarut. We say more or less, because on the one hand > we have encountered in Lahut the Universal Manifestation in a state of nondifferentiation from > the divine Essence, and we have seen on the other hand that it is in the plan of Malakut that the > individual reality of the divine Manifestations exists. In fact, even as we have already said, these > two nomenclatures of the divine worlds do not function in the same manner, and to wish to > establish between them exact correspondences is a hazardous enterprise. This shows in any case > that the nomenclature of the five worlds of Islamic tradition is not adapted to the theology of > manifestation of Baha’u’llah, and, by this fact, this explains its essentially hermeneutic value. > > The World of Revelation is not a simple intermediary world between God and the creature. It is > a world in itself, existing for itself. We must thus try to clarify its characteristics. This world is at > the same time that of Spirit, that of the divine Verb, and that of Revelation. > > The World of Manifestation begins with the Primal emanation. It is first the world of the Holy > Spirit, even though the Holy Spirit also belongs to the divine sphere. But the World of Revelation > is a world of pure spirit no matter what form this takes. By the intermediary of the World of > Revelation, the Holy Spirit incarnates itself in the first mirrors of the divine Manifestations. It is > thus that the Holy Spirit becomes the divine Verb, the Logos, the Creative Word. The divine > Manifestations are all the incarnations of the divine Verb. It is by this title that they reflect the > power of God, that they are invested with His sovereignty, that they manifest His knowledge. As > the divine Verb, they manifest all the Names and Attributes of God in their perfection, perfection > which cannot but be glimpsed imperfectly in their terrestrial manifestation and limited while > these perfections appear without limitation in the World of Revelation. > > The divine Manifestations are spirits created by God before the world of creation. They are thus > preexistent in relation to the world of creation, but of course they are not preexistent in relation > to the divine Essence. They are simply outside of contingent time. > > This preexistence makes that the divine Manifestations are the first spirits to know God. In > relation to this world they play the same role which the anthropic spirit plays in relation to the > World of Creation. Thereby the divine Manifestations become the direct cause of the existence of > the world of creation, even though the first cause is of God. Because of this fact, we can write, as > Paul says of Christ616, that they created the world. > > Ephesians 3:1; Colossians 1:16 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > 7. The divine Word > > The divine Manifestations are the channels through which revelation descends to the World of > Creation. Revelation is a force which works in this world and which determines the evolution > thereof—it is thus not confounded with the revealed Word. The force which guides human > history, like that which determines the evolution of the spiritual worlds is the force of Revelation. > The spiritual man who has arrived at a true gnostic comprehension can see the force of > revelation in the work of every thing, in every event of life. > > 8. The Primal Will and the Countenance of God > > The divine Manifestation constitutes the last limit of human consciousness617, the Sadratu'l- > Muntaha, the Tree beyond which there is no passing. Everything that we are used to report of > God actually reports only of His Manifestations, who are the “Primal Mirrors” of the divine > Essence.618 But, in these Mirrors, it is not the divine Essence which is reflected, but the Primal > Will, for the Primal Will is the manifestation of all the perfections and all the divine Names and > Attributes.619 This Primal Will is thus the First emanation (sadir) of God620, which makes the > junction between the divine Essence and the Primal Mirror. It is in this sense that we can identify > the Manifestation of God with this same Primal Will.621 For God can not have Attributes.622 > These proceed from the anthropic illusion, even as it is said in the “Long Obligatory Prayer” > (salat-i-kabir): “I testify that Thou hast been sanctified above all attributes and holy above all > names.”623 The divine Attributes thus have no existence in the world of the divine Essence, but > derive their source from the World of Command ('alam-i-amr), and the Manifestation of God is > their most perfect theophany. It is for this reason that Baha’u’llah teaches that the divine > Manifestation constitutes “the Countenance of God” (Laqa Allah), and interprets all of the verses > of the Qur'an which contain this expression as references to the next prophetic manifestation, > that is to the Bab or to himself. > > Davudi, Uluhiyyat va Mazhariyyat, pp. 138-141 > Translator’s Note: KI:#109:103. > (578) Davudi, op. cit., p. 177 > (579) Ibid., p. 100 > (580) Ibid., p. 45 > (581) Ibid., pp. 23, 61-69, 99-103 > (582) This is the translation of Shoghi Effendi, as found in “Baha'i Prayers” (Wilmette: Baha'i Publishing > Trust, 1991, p. 12). The Arabic text is: “Ashhadu innaka kunta muqadasan 'an al-sifati wa munazahan 'an al- > ism”. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > CHAPTER FIFTEEN: > THE NATURE OF THE SENSIBLE UNIVERSE > > An aspect which can seem particularly platonic in the language of Baha’u’llah is found, on the one > hand, in the classical distinction he establishes between the sensible world and the intelligible world, > and, on the other hand, in his evocation of non-empirical realities, which pose the problem be it of > the existence of Ideas which populate the intelligible world, or be it the existence of an intermediary > world, which the philosophers call the “Imaginal World”, and in which exist the archetypes of > terrestrial things. We have encountered many examples of the first case in Chapter Five, notably > with the development which we have consecrated to “the visible and invisible world” (Malakut al- > ghayb wa'l-shuhud). We have encountered an example of the second [case] in the Tablet of Varqa in > which Baha’u’llah defines the Imaginal World. However, we must restrain ourselves from reaching > hasty conclusions regarding the utilization of this vocabulary. Baha’u’llah, like the Muslim > philosophers, takes up the ancient philosophical vocabulary while giving new meanings to the > words. In the following pages we will attempt to clarify the nature of the “realities” which populate > the spiritual worlds in the metaphysic of Baha’u’llah, and then we will examine the relations which > the world of the invisible ('ama) can have with the physical world. > > 1. The primal nature of the universe > > Baha’u’llah knew the Platonic origin of the theory of Ideas, but not only does he give all the credit > for it to Socrates, but he gives it also a definition which has as its consequence a considerable > enlargement of the concepts as articulated by Plato, and to bring them considerably closer to the > perspective of modern science. Baha’u’llah writes about Socrates [in Lawh-i-Hikmat]: > > “He it is who perceived a unique, a tempered, and a pervasive nature in things, bearing the > closest likeness to the human spirit, and he discovered this nature to be distinct from the > substance of things in their refined form. He hath a special pronouncement on this weighty > theme. Wert thou to ask from the worldly wise of this generation about this exposition, thou > wouldst witness their incapacity to grasp it.”624 > > There is no doubt that in the ages to come these few lines will bring forth numerous commentaries. > Baha’u’llah affirms that behind sensible realities, there is “a nature” which resembles the human > spirit, hence intelligible, which possesses the qualities he enumerates. In order to understand this text > well, we must now return to the original Arabic. A literal translation of the text is simply impossible, > because Western languages do not make use of an equivalent technical vocabulary. > > Baha’u’llah says that Socrates recognized “the nature” (with the definite article in the original and > without the definite article in the English translation). He describes this nature by three qualifications, > which are: makhsusa, mu'tadila and mawsuf bi'l-ghabala. Makhsusa signifies “particular,” “special”, > “specific”. The word comes from the root KHSS which has very extensive meanings which are > > Lawh-i-Hikmat, in Majmu'at min Alwah Hadrat-i-Baha'u'llah, p. 125; TB:146 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > related to “distinguish”, “separate by lot”, “confer”, “assign”, etc. The word makhsus was adopted > into Persian with most of the words of its family, that of khass, which has the meaning “special”, > “belonging”, “noble”, “elevated” and “pure”. We should also note the Arabic word Khassa which > means “exclusive property”, “particularity”, “attribute”, “essence”, “intrinsic nature”. > > Our problem is to understand here [in this text,] in what sense this nature is “special”, or rather to > identify in what way the word makhsusa can have a more subtle meaning than the English word > “unique”. The etymological study leads us to understand by “special nature” a nature the properties > of which are intrinsic, that is to say, belonging to itself, not dependent except upon itself (or upon its > first cause) to the exclusion of other exterior realities, not accidental; which is to say the properties > which are directly the manifestation of its own essence. > > The second qualification is mu'tadila, which the English translator has rendered as “tempered”, > which we [might also translate] as “soft”. The Arabic dictionaries give [multiple meanings to this > word, including] “straight”, “equal”, “united”, “proportioned”, “symmetrical”, “harmonious”, > “moderate”, “tempered”, “soft” and “clement”. The word combines at least two concepts. The first > is that of “straight” and “united”. This signifies that the nature in question is made of a substance (if it > is permitted to utilize the word substance) [which is] simple, unified, in which one can distinguish > neither form nor parts. The second concept is that of equilibrium. The “unified” character of the > nature in question results from its mode of existence which is based upon its self-sufficient internal > equilibrium, from whence in the second degree, the idea of harmony and symmetry which leads to > aesthetic considerations. > > The third qualification is more difficult to explain. “Mawsuf bi'l” signifies “describable according > to”. “Ghalaba” can be translated by “superiority”, but also means the fact of imposing > domination. The idea here is that this “nature” is insinuated in all things, or that all things are > dependent upon it. > > Baha’u’llah then clarifies that this “nature” is distinct from the “subtle body” (al-jasadi'l-jawwani). > This is a direct allusion to the doctrine of the Ishraqiyyun who believed that the realities of > Malakut were made of a “jassad” (body) more subtle than matter, but the existence of which was > nevertheless not purely spiritual. It was some kind of an essential substance, if this pleonasm is > possible. In saying this, Baha’u’llah wishes to entirely avoid the list of corporalizing this nature. At > the same time, we better understand the word “nature”, which is employed here by default. It is > not a reality (haqa'iq) because realities are multiple and the only absolute reality (haqiqat) is God > (Haqq). It is not an essence (dhat) because the essence manifests itself in the attributes. Nor is it a > substance (jawhar) nor even less so a body or material. We are thus faced with the most essential > reality of the universe. It is the reality which is found outside of sensible matter but which is not a > spiritual being (like the divine Verb for example). But this nature is like the human spirit; thus it > manifests itself through intelligible qualities. We thus find ourselves at the junction between the > intelligible world and the sensible world. It is without doubt the first degree of substantification > and of coalescence (taqyid).625 > > In reading the description of Baha’u’llah, we cannot restrain ourselves from thinking of the > theory of quantum void in modern physics. This [theory] shows that beyond matter and energy, > Lawh-i-Hikmat, in Majmu'at min Alwah Hadrat-i-Baha'u'llah, p. 126; TB:146 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > not only do there exist objects that have but a virtual existence, but that these objects can be > nothing other than fluctuations of fields. This text on the “nature” can be related to other texts > by Baha’u’llah and ‘Abdu’l-Baha upon ether and the existence of a reality outside of matter > which does not have a single corporeal attribute and which is similar to the nature of the human > spirit. It is this nature which is similar to the human spirit which Baha’u’llah calls “ethereal”, > which means simply non-corporeal, in a usage which one finds elsewhere, in many of the > philosophers of the School of Isfahan. The existence of ether as it was formulated in antiquity > was totally contradicted by modern physics. The physicists from the 17th to the 19th century > postulated that space must be filled with a subtle fluid. The existence of this subtle fluid, more > subtle than air, was to permit the propagation of light. Physics showed that there existed in space > no subtle substance capable of being apprehended with an means of measurement, and ether was > ranks in the museum of obsolete theories along with phlogiston and many others. It is not in this > direction that we should search for the ether about which Baha’u’llah speaks. However, even as > we have recalled, in evoking the theory of the quantum void, we now know that emptiness as a > pure state does not exist. Two facts oppose this: the first is that a portion of the void is always a > portion of space and with space are associated a certain number of characteristics, such as the > curvature of space and a number n of dimensions; the second reason relates to the property of > some quantum objects to manifest themselves where before there was nothing measurable, and > to the fact that the quantum void can be analyzed in terms of fields. Finally, all of these particles > can be analyzed as a fluctuation of fields and a localization of information. In this way ‘Abdu’l- > Baha can be understood, when he affirms that “the light of the lamp exists through the vibration > of the etheric matter”.xxiv ‘Abdu’l-Baha says that this ethereal matter “is an intellectual > [intelligible] reality, and is not sensible”626, and he adds that “In the same way, nature, also, in its > essence is an intellectual reality and is not sensible; the human spirit is an intellectual, not sensible > reality.”627 > > 2. Sensible reality and intelligible reality > > This invites us to look into the difference between sensible realities and intelligible realities. But, > curiously, ‘Abdu’l-Baha does not give a positive definition of intelligible realities. He proceeds by > exclusion to affirm that everything which is not sensible is intelligible. The sensible (mahsus) > realities are those about which our senses inform us.628 He cites for example the sun, sounds, > perfumes, foods, heat, cold. The intelligible (ma'qulih) realities have “no outward form and no > place and [are] not perceptible to the senses.”629 He cites as examples intellect, love, ethereal > matter, nature, and the human spirit. For Him, the principal characteristic of the intelligible > realities is that they are beyond language: > > “So the symbol of knowledge is light, and of ignorance, darkness; but reflect, is knowledge > sensible light, or ignorance sensible darkness? No, they are merely symbols. These are > only intellectual states, but when you desire to express them outwardly, you call > > SAQ:XVI:83-84; cf. SAQ:XLVIII:190-191 > SAQ:XVI:84 > SAQ:XVI:80 > Ibid. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > knowledge light, and ignorance darkness. You say: “My heart was gloomy, and it became > enlightened.” Now, that light of knowledge, and that darkness of ignorance, are > intellectual realities, not sensible ones; but when we seek for explanations in the external > world, we are obliged to give them a sensible form.”630 > > The intelligible realities have two principal properties. They can not be detected by the senses > and they are beyond language. This definition of intelligible realities is very different from a > platonic definition. For Plato, the intelligible realities can not be grasped by the senses, but they > can be understood by the intelligence. Intelligence alone can escape the sensory illusion, hence its > superiority. This is, for Plato, the basis of the theory of Ideas, because one must suppose that > beyond the world which can be perceived by the senses there is a purely intelligible world. For > Plato, the ideas which populate this intelligible world are realities in themselves which become > the norms or the eternal types of things. In the thought of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, intelligence in the sense > of the capacity to reason does not see itself able to recognize the same efficaciousness [as in > Plato,] because it is too dependent upon language. We must thus have recourse to intuition > which is the capacity of man to directly apprehend certain realities without having recourse > either to sensible representations or to language. > > Here is posed the problem of certain realities which participate in the two modes, the intelligible > and the sensible. This problem is not directly approached by ‘Abdu’l-Baha, but we will see that it > is essential to understand the nature of the imaginal realities. An example is that of numbers. > Numbers are at the same time sensible realities and intelligible realities. We can say that it is > possible tat the concept of each number was born of the empirical experience of man. We can > imagine that the concept of the digit 3 was directly born of the perception of that which a set of > three apples and a set of three pebbles have in common. This experience represents the sensible > reality of the number. But this does not inhibit the number 3 having an existence independent of > the spirit of man, because it is contained in the architecture of the universe. The problem > becomes more complex when we imagine the case of mathematical objects having an increasing > complexity. We understand very well that man can have an empirical experience of the digit 3 > but it becomes more difficult to derive this experience in relation to the number 1239, because > we cannot grasp empirically, by the senses, what a set of 1239 apples and one of 1239 pebbles > have in common. The empirical experience of the number 3.141592653…631 is even more > difficult to imagine, like all of the complex mathematical expressions, or the formulas as for > example those which describe the wavelike function of a particle. We could thus say that the > number TT (pi) exists independently of the spirit of man, like the constant of Planck, and that it is > the same for all of the mathematical expressions. Unfortunately, all the mathematical expressions > are not inscribed in the universe. Mathematicians of a fertile spirit have invented all sorts of > mutually exclusive mathematical systems which have no relation to any reality whatsoever. We > can thus say that all mathematical objects have an existence independent of man. > > If we return to the definition of intelligible realities of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, we will see that it > encompasses two kinds of realities, those which have an existence independent of man and those > which exist only in the human spirit. This is a fundamental distinction from classical Platonism. > > Ibid. > Translator’s Note: TT (pi). > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > CHAPTER SIXTEEN: > THE WORLD OF SPIRITUAL REALITIES > > What then can be the mode of existence of the sensible realities and can they be considered identical > with the archetypes of the Imaginal World? > > 1. Commentary on the Hidden Treasure > > Unfortunately, we do not have a single text from Baha’u’llah upon this question, but only a bundle > of allusions dispersed throughout all of his writings. We possess, on the other hand, a metaphysical > treatise drawn up by ‘Abdu’l-Baha which is a fairly complete work. This treatise, which we have > already made use of in the opening chapters of this study, is a commentary upon a Sunni tradition > (hadith qudsi), well known in Islam, in which God says to the Prophet: “I was a Hidden Treasure, I > wished to be known and toward this end, I created the creation, that it might know Me.” When > Baha’u’llah was in Baghdad, a Pasha versed in the mystical sciences asked him to explain this > tradition.632 For reasons that are unknown, Baha’u’llah did not wish to author this commentary and > he asked ‘Abdu’l-Baha, who must have been about seventeen years old, to do so in his place. The > Commentary of ‘Abdu’l-Baha has taken its place in literature under the name “Commentary on the > Hidden Treasure” (Tafsir-i-Kuntu Kanzan Makhfiyyan), and we will refer to it in the following pages > under the name Tafsir. > > This Tafsir testifies to an extraordinary mastery of philosophical and metaphysical questions in an > adolescent of seventeen years. ‘Abdu’l-Baha shows himself to be familiar therein not only with the > technical language of the different philosophical and theological schools, but moreover, he deploys a > remarkable knowledge of the vast diversity of their opinions and their theories. It seems that ‘Abdu’l- > Baha aimed at concision above all things. This Tafsir thus has a very collected and sometimes > elliptical character which does not facilitate its reading. ‘Abdu’l-Baha does not hesitate to have > recourse to logical arguments taken from Muslim scholasticism, as he will later in “Some Answered > Questions”. The Tafsir is very structured and follows a rigorous order. We are astonished at the > facility of ‘Abdu’l-Baha at summarizing in a few words a complex philosophical position, then to > analyze it and to subject it to critique. > > The treatise has two “sides” so to speak: one turned towards Neoplatonic thought and the other > turned towards Sufism. The Neoplatonism to which it refers is not that of Ibn Sina, but a later > version which seems to be that taught in the theological schools of the time and thus strongly > influenced by the thought of Mulla Sadra. The Sufism to which ‘Abdu’l-Baha makes allusion is that > of Ibn al-'Arabi, and notably the philosophical positions which he summarized in his book “The > wisdom of the Prophets” (Fusus al-Hikma). However, ‘Abdu’l-Baha does not name a single author > even though we find some textual citations from Ibn al-'Arabi. Questions are treated with much > subtlety and reserve, without doubt in order not to offend the intended reader of the Tafsir, who > > GPB:241; Letter written to an individual believer on behalf of Shoghi Effendi by Ruhi Afnan, dated 18 > January 1932, with note by Shoghi Effendi appended; in Messages to Canada, pp. 34-35; Adib > Taherzadeh, “The Revelation of Baha'u'llah,” Volume II, Chapter 18, pp. 390-391 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > must have had Sufi predilections. Therefore we must sometimes take care not to attribute to > ‘Abdu’l-Baha a position which he does nothing other than cite. > > The Tafsir is written in a very technical and probably untranslatable language. The specialists have > paid much attention to this text, but they are not all in agreement about the meaning of certain > passages. The definition of all the terms which ‘Abdu’l-Baha employs is known neither with > precision, nor with certitude. Everything that we have already said about the technical vocabulary of > Baha’u’llah applies equally to the Tafsir. > > Our aim here will not be to discuss the Tafsir in its entirety, but only to extract the information > which relates to the question of the deployment of Being and the ontology of the divine worlds. > Nevertheless, in order not to complicate things too much, we will constrain ourselves to follow each > time it is possible the order of ‘Abdu’l-Baha's text, which is divided into four chapters treating > successively the Hidden Treasure, Love, Creation and Knowledge. > > Greek Neoplatonism posed the question of the passage from the One to the multiple. It resolved this > problem as we have seen in the concepts of emanation and of procession and affirmed the existence > of hypostases the successive deployment of which explained the passage of the intelligible to the > sensible. We have seen that Baha’u’llah fundamentally rejects the idea of a hypostasis and > furthermore the idea of their procession in order to explain their deployment. We can then think > that if ‘Abdu’l-Baha relies in part on Ibn al-'Arabi, it is because Ibn al-'Arabi manifested the same > scruple, which permits ‘Abdu’l-Baha to situate himself in a perspective different from that of the > ontology of Ibn Sina. However, if we remove from Muslim Neoplatonism the concepts of hypostasis > and procession, this poses two fundamental problems – 1)How to explain the relation of the > intelligible realities with God? 2)And how to explain the passage of the intelligible world to the > sensible world from the ontological point of view? This is the problem which is found at the heart of > the Tafsir. > > 2. The station of the Hidden Treasure and the Absconditum > > The first chapter of the Tafsir pertains essentially to the first aspect of this question. ‘Abdu’l-Baha > exerts himself to begin, with clarifying the relations which exist between the divine Essence and Its > Attributes. This is what he calls “the station of the Hidden Treasure” which we have studied in > detail in the second Chapter of this work. We will not return to this, except to highlight some > nuances. ‘Abdu’l-Baha then deals with the problem of the knowledge of God. Can we consider this > knowledge distinct from the divine Essence? Is divine knowledge a simple attribute of the Essence at > the same level as such attributes as justice and compassion, or should one consider that its existence > precedes the deployment of the attributes outside of the Essence? If we consider divine knowledge as > an independent reality, can we then say that the ontological entities of Muslim scholasticism, like the > archetypes (a'yan), the quiddities (mahiyyat), the spiritual realities (haqa'iq), and the eidetic forms > (qabiliyyat) have an existence in the knowledge of God? > > All of these questions have posed a problem since the beginning of Islam. We may recall that > already, the Mu'tazili kalam (scholasticism) considered that the conditions of the unicity of God > implied that the attributes of God were identical to His Essence and did not have a real existence. > The Jahmists went further in purely and simply negating the existence of these attributes. Such a > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > position influenced the way in which the problem of the existence of a God distinct from the world > could be dealt with. The Mu'tazili deduced that the knowledge that God has of the world is a new > knowledge (hadith), which is to say, subsequent to creation. Louis Gardet explains: “The Mu'tazili > asked if the knowledge which God has of things preceded them in existence or was born with them, > and they concluded that the whole had a “contingent” or “created” divine knowledge of free and > possible futures in general”633 We see that as to the point of the divine attributes, the positions of > ‘Abdu’l-Baha are very close to those of the Mu'tazili, but that they deviate altogether on the > knowledge of God. > > The questions which the Mu'tazili brought up became thereafter the touchstone of Muslim > philosophy and, until al-Ghazali, all the schools were defined in relation to them; which essentially > signifies that they critiqued them or that they sought to introduce nuances [to their conclusions]. All > the effort of ‘Abdu’l-Baha thus consists in disengaging himself from this scholasticism. The most > radical critique of the Mu'tazili will come from the Ash'ari, which will reproach him for having led to > “a total stripping of the notion of God”634. They attempted to suppress the doctrine of the Mu'tazili > on the existence of the attributes of God, by affirming on the one hand their existence, all the while > affirming on the other hand the incompatibility of their existence with the existence of God.635 Their > effort thus consisted in defining the narrow path between these two points. This led them to reject > Hellenistic Neoplatonism, but to accept a version moderated, inspired, according to certain authors, > by Christian theology. These borrowings refer notably to the notion of hypostasis (qudama)636, which > they adapted to Muslim theology. This is one of the points which ‘Abdu’l-Baha insistently refutes in > the Tafsir. Finally, the Ash'ari concluded that the knowledge of God is co-eternal with His Essence. > We only continue with these reports in order to show that the problems evoked by ‘Abdu’l-Baha > were found at the heart of Muslim theology and that it can be very useful in order to follow the > development of the thought of the author [of the Tafsir] to place it in the framework of these > theological battles which were present in the spirit of his interlocutor. > > However, ‘Abdu’l-Baha will treat these questions with much subtlety and does not bring a strong > attack upon one thesis, nor total agreement with another. For ‘Abdu’l-Baha, theological questions > are reduced essentially to questions of language. And the world of Hahut, the Hidden Treasure, is > beyond words and numbers.637 Consequently, to disassociate God from His knowledge is only a > problem of language and it is of no profit to wrangle infinitely about problems which are born of the > necessity of reasoning by analogy (tamthil) and by metaphor (tamsil). ‘Abdu’l-Baha thus declares that > the only way to progress in comprehension of such problems, is to detach oneself from the > limitations of analogy and metaphor638, which are unfortunately necessary in order to speak of > intelligible realities. In one way, He probably means to say that discursive reason can not alone > arrive at the understanding of these phenomena which necessitate having recourse to intuition. > > Louis Gardet and M.M. Anawati, Introduction a la theologie musulmane, 3rd edition, Paris, 1981, p. 48 > Ibid., p. 57 > Henri Laoust, Les Schismes de l'Islam, Paris, 1965, p. 128 > Ibid., p. 305 > Tafsir, pp. 8-9 > Tafsir, p. 11 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > 3. The mirror of divine knowledge > > After having recalled the limitations of language, ‘Abdu’l-Baha concludes that the distinction of a > divine knowledge is a purely conceptual question and that consequently this knowledge can not exist > except in a transparent manner in the consciousness of God. We can not thus make any distinction > between the Essence of God and His knowledge. As we see, it is a fairly radical way of treating > almost ten centuries of debate. > > This first point having been arrived at, ‘Abdu’l-Baha passes to the second, which concerns the mode > of existence of the archetypes, the quiddities, the realities, the potentialities and other scholastic > entities, concluding that these can only be “distant” (ba'id) from the divine knowledge, otherwise said > that they can not exist in this form in the ontological sphere of the Hidden Treasure.639 As we see, > this is another radical conclusion. > > Before arriving at these conclusions, ‘Abdu’l-Baha follows a very rigorous reasoning. He begins by > recalling the positions of the Sufis, which is to say of Ibn al-'Arabi. For the Sufis, the unmanifested > Essence (ghayb-i-huviyyih) considered in the station of unicity (ahadiyyat) is without names and > attributes. We can just as well say that the names and attributes are in this station, intermingled with > the divine Essence, without one being able to make the least distinction between them, or between > them and the Essence. If it is thus for the names and attributes, ‘Abdu’l-Baha adds, then a fortiori [it is > the same] for the potential spiritual realities (haqa'iq-i-shu'unat-i-ilahiyyih).640 The archetypes (a'yan), the > spiritual realities (haqa'iq) and the quiddity of things (mahiyyat-i-ashya) cannot but exist in union with > the Essence and at the interior therein, for otherwise this would be a negation of the station of > unicity. These entities are contained in the Essence as the letters of the alphabet are contained in the > point, or like all the digits and the numbers are contained in One. These intelligible realities can not > exist in the Essence except in this potential form which is called “potential distinctions” (shu'unat-i- > dhatiyyih)or “seminal reasons” no trace of which we find. In the second part of this exposition, > ‘Abdu’l-Baha takes a clear stand. Then, He returns to the exposition of the conceptions of Ibn al- > 'Arabi. > > This exposition integrates numerous Neoplatonic elements. At the summit is found the > unmanifested Essence of God (ghayb-i-huviyyih). In the Essence is produced a double movement. The > first is a movement of love, the second is a movement of desire. The movement of love corresponds > to the projection of divine light (jala). This projection is the manifestation (zuhur) of the divine reality > (haqq) in the form of the archetypes (a'yan). The movement of desire corresponds to reflection (istijla) > which is the return of light to its source, that is, the emanation (tajalli) of the divine beauty (jamal) in > the mirror of the spiritual realities (haqa'iq) and archetypes (a'ayn).641 The existence of the spiritual > realities and archetypes derive from the Most Holy Emanation (Fayd-i-aqdas) which cause these > entitites to pass from the station of the Essence to the station of existence in the divine knowledge. > This existence of eternal archetypes would be a purely intelligible existence, but nevertheless > sufficient to permit each archetype to be differentiated in the mirror of the divine knowledge. > > Tafsir, p. 12 > Tafsir, p. 6 > Tafsir, p. 11 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > This process would permit distinguishing between two states of the Hidden Treasure, or said > otherwise, two states of the divine Essence, corresponding in reality to two different perceptions of > man: the Hidden Treasure before the manifestation of the divine knowledge and the Hidden > Treasure afterwards, which is to say this state which some describe as “the first manifestation” or > “the second invisible” (ghayb-i-thani).642 > > ‘Abdu’l-Baha refrains from refuting this exposition. He considers it a valid description of reality on > condition that a certain number of nuances are introduced which lead to the conclusion which we > have already described. We cannot introduce into the divine Essence any distinction whatsoever. > Thus if we say that the archetypes exist in the Essence, this can not be a real existence, no more than > we can speak of two or three “existing” in One. Then, we must avoid introducing any element into > the divine Essence which would be co-eternal with God. Thus we cannot say that the archetypes > have always existed in God, for this would return to the theory of the hypostases (qudama). It must > therefore be admitted that the archetypes are created (hadith), and if they are created, they cannot > pertain to the ontological sphere of the Essence. > > All reasonings end in an impossibility of language. On the one hand, the series of propositions lead > us to admit that the archetypes have always existed in the mirror of the knowledge of God, because > knowledge is one of the eternal (qadim) attributes of God. Also, it is not possible to conceive of > knowledge without an object of knowledge (ma'lumat).643 On the other hand, to affirm that the > archetypes exist in God is to affirm that the divine Essence becomes the location of accident > (hawadith), which is also impossible. We thus arrive at contradictory exigencies. If the problem can > not be solved in this fashion, we must then conclude that it was poorly posed. That is what ‘Abdu’l- > Baha attempts, with much obligingness and subtlety, to have his interlocutor understand. > > For the moment, ‘Abdu’l-Baha has demonstrated nothing. But he makes a clean sweep [tabula rasa] > of the past, and, most of all, he establishes the limits of language, of the scholastic methods and of > formal logic to resolve such problems. He has prepared his reader to accept conclusions which will > leave behind all the frameworks of traditional thought. > > 4. Love as the manifestation of the divine Essence > > The manner in which the Baha’i writings arrive at the passage of the world of the divine Essence to > the intelligible world is essentially apophatic. We can say what the process is not, but it is difficult to > say what it is. In multiple places, Baha’u’llah and ‘Abdu’l-Baha affirm that in the origin of the world > is found an unfathomable mystery which man will never penetrate. > > The doctrine of Ibn al-'Arabi has an interesting aspect in that it superposes certain Neoplatonic > elements to Christian elements. We have already seen in the preceding Chapters that, according to > Plotinus, emanation was born of the desire which the One had to contemplate Its own essence. In > Ibn al-'Arabi we also find desire and contemplation. But to the movement of desire, he superposes > the movement of love, which is a specifically Christian adaptation of Neoplatonic theses. For > > Tafsir, p. 10 > Tafsir, p. 11 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Plotinus, the movement of desire is circular in the interior of the One. In order the preserve the One > from all contact with an exterior entity. For the Christians, this thesis is not acceptable, because it > posed a God totally exterior to creation. In replacing the Plotinian desire with the Christian love, > they wish to make God plainly responsible for His creation. It is interesting to see Ibn al-'Arabi > seeking a synthesis of these two visions. This synthesis does not hold because it leads to the > contradictions put into evidence by ‘Abdu’l-Baha. It is these two contradictions which will be > resolved in the second Chapter of the Tafsir consecrated to love. > > This chapter on Love is an essentially mystical chapter which describes, in particular, how man can > be transformed within by divine love. This aspect of the chapter is altogether outside the field of our > study, so we will not speak of it. Nor will we speak of the different aspects, or “stations” of Love > distinguished by ‘Abdu’l-Baha, except to say that he does no other than to represent very classical > theses of Muslim mysticism which distinguish four aspects in love: the love of the divine essence for > the divine essence (az jam' bi jam'), the love of the divine Essence for the creatures (az jam' bi-tafsil), the > love of the creatures for the creatures (az tafsil bi-tafsil), and the love of the creatures for the divine > Essence (az tafsil bi-jam'). This theme is also very briefly treated by Baha’u’llah in the “Seven > Valleys”. To this classical exposition, which is but a report, ‘Abdu’l-Baha adds a complement which > is the love which man has of the Beauty which is at the interior of himself. ‘Abdu’l-Baha uses this > theme in order to undermine the absolute monism of Ibn al-'Arabi and a party among the Sufis — > monism which tended towards a modified form of pantheism. ‘Abdu’l-Baha defends what he calls > “the unity of experience” (tawhid-i-shuhudi)644 which is a unity of “state” between God and man and > not a unity of essence. > > Two aspects of this chapter can nevertheless retain our attention to explain the deployment of Being > and the mode of existence of the spiritual realities. The first aspect, is the role which ‘Abdu’l-Baha > gives to love as the organizing principle of the cosmos. This is a well-known theme in the Baha’i > writings, and what ‘Abdu’l-Baha says can be supported and corroborated by many other texts. Also, > we will treat this question from a general point of view without following the exposition step by step. > The other aspect concerns the indications, which are relatively isolated and dispersed throughout > the interior of the text, of the spiritual realities and entities of the Scholastics.645 > > 5. Love, the principal organizer of the cosmos > > Once more, ‘Abdu’l-Baha begins by insisting on the problem of language. Love is an intelligible > reality, [and hence] it is found “beyond language” (fawq-i-'alam-i-ahsa va bayan).646 The distinction of > four or five “stations” of love proceeds from a pure game of the spirit. One could also very well say > > Tafsir, p. 18. The Persian expression tawhid-i-shuhudi is equivalent to the Arabic wahdat al-shuhud, which > Massignon translates by “testimonial monism” in contrast to “existential monism” (wahdat al-wujud). > Here for the sake of simplicity we refer to all these distinctions in the reality of beings which Persian > philosophy of the 19th century inherited from Avicennian Aristotelianism, such as the archetypes (a'yan), > quiddities (mahiyyat), eidetic forms (qabiliyyat), determinations (shu'unat) and so forth, as Scholastic entities. > We wish to avoid posing the question of the mode of being of these entities, for we might ask whether > they have an existence outside of the human spirit. This terminology is totally unsuited to describe > Baha'i philosophy, and if 'Abdu'l-Baha uses it, it is only in order to satisfy his interlocutor. > Tafsir, p. 15 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > that the stations of love are of infinite number, or, from another point of view, that the rank of love is > pure unity (vahdat).647 > > Love is not a simple attribute of God but constitutes His very nature. From this fact, the Love of > God can not be distinguished from His Essence. The problem of love and its links to the divine > Essence is in a way identical to the problem of the knowledge [of God] which ‘Abdu’l-Baha > approached in the preceding chapter [of the Tafsir]. This does not surprise us, because Baha’u’llah > explained in the “Seven Valleys” that once one has passed beyond “the world of the relative and the > limited” ('alam-i-nusbat tuqdid)648, love and knowledge do not appear except as two forces of the same > phenomenon and that their duality is transcended in the vision of unity. > > Concerning this identity between love and the divine Essence, ‘Abdu’l-Baha affirms that the > manifestation of love in the divine Essence precedes the reflection of the “essential distinctions” > (shu'unat-i-dhatiyyih), which are the attributes when they are invisible, in the state of potentialities in > the Essence in the mirror of the archetypes.649 This means that, ontologically, the manifestation of > love precedes the deployment of the divine attributes. > > Elsewhere, ‘Abdu’l-Baha employs the word emanation (fayd; tajalliyat) regarding love.650 We can thus > understand that love is but an aspect of the divine Verb, that is, of the Holy Spirit. > > It is thus affirmed that love is a unique principle which is at the base of creation, because it was > because He wanted to be loved and known that God created the world. Furthermore, we can affirm > that love is the organizing and structuring principle of the cosmos. All the relations between the > elements and ultimately the laws of the universe, can be interpreted as a manifestation of the unique > [and] fundamental law which is universal love. ‘Abdu’l-Baha says, in occurrence, that the force > which maintains the unity of the particles of an atom, the force of gravity which attracts objects to > the center of the earth, are nothing other than manifestations of this universal law. > > This leads ‘Abdu’l-Baha to define love in non-psychological terms. Love is something other than a > simple expansion of the heart. Love is the effect which results from the force of attraction between > things. ‘Abdu’l-Baha employs the word “magnetism” (maghnatis) to describe it.651 This magnetism is > the fruit of the divine Beauty (jamal) which is, at the same time, perfection (kamal).652 The principle of > the world is that all things must tend towards perfection and all things must aspire to Beauty. God is > the supreme Beauty; it is for this reason that everything on the surface of the earth is attracted > towards the center of the planet by the law of gravity. Love is thus the organizing principle of the > universe.653 > > Tafsir, p. 12 > AQA:III:120; SV:27 > Tafsir, p. 12 > Tafsir, p. 14 > Tafsir, p. 15 > Tafsir, p. 16 > This conclusion is a synthesis between what 'Abdu'l-Baha says about Love in the Tafsir and what he > says in Some Answered Questions as well as in his talks in North America. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > At the same time, the duality born of the movement of love and desire of the theories of Ibn al- > 'Arabi disappears. Love leads everything to unity. ‘Abdu’l-Baha speaks of a “magnetism of unicity” > (maghnatis-i-ahadiyyih).654 > > The love which God has of His own beauty is the source of all other forms of love.655 The essence of > love is one. The difference between the love of God and the other forms of love is that this does not > have need of a place (majali) of of the mirror of the contingent (ka'inat) creatures in order to manifest > itself.656 > > 6. The mode of existence of the essences and their transparent character > > In order to precisely identify the mode of existence of the Scholastic entities, we must return to the > framework of transparent theology which we evoked in the preceding chapters. ‘Abdu’l-Baha > indicates that one of the ways to resolve this problem consists in considering the Essence of God as a > mirror for Himself and that this mirror represents the divine knowledge as the seminal purpose of > things (shu'unat-i-dhatiyyih). This divine knowledge is reflected in its turn in the mirror of the > archetypes (a'yan).657 This is a very elegant way of resolving the problem of divine knowledge which > so troubled the Muslim philosophers. In this context, we can understand divine knowledge like a > simple human perspective, a metaphorical expression, a problem of human language and of hearing > which is condemned by its own mode of functioning to establish this kind of distinction. However, > that which is reflected in the archetypes is not the Essence of God, but rather His knowledge, which > is to say the image which exists in the mirror of Himself. Following ‘Abdu’l-Baha, the link which > unites the “distinctions” and the “archetypes” is a transparent bond of light — light being the > metaphorical expression of the capacity of divine knowledge to project itself in things. And he adds > that this light is nothing other than the manifestation of Love, which is to say of the divine Verb, the > Holy Spirit. We find here once more this equation which in all of the metaphysic of Baha’u’llah > poses a fundamental equality between the Love and the Knowledge of God, and which implies that > in man love and knowledge must become unified in order to arrive at the true knowledge that one > finds in what Baha’u’llah calls the “Valley of Unity”.658 > > Beneath these archetypes (a'yan) are found other entities which are the quiddities (mahiyyat)xxv and the > spiritual realities (haqa'iq). Little does ‘Abdu’l-Baha evoke the problem of quiddities and we can sense > that he regards these artificial distinctions as a burdensome heritage from the scholasticism from > which he hopes to disengage himself. Here again, he resolves the problem with much elegance. > > The quiddities [mahiyyat], if we restrict ourselves to the meaning of the word such as it was defined > by Scholasticism, are part of the intelligible realities which only have an existence in the human > spirit, like the mathematical entities of which we spoke at the beginning of this Chapter. But this > word takes on multiple meanings in the writings of Baha’u’llah which does not reflect the usages of > > Tafsir, p. 15 > Tafsir, p. 13 > Tafsir, p. 16 > Tafsir, p. 12 > AQA:III:109-122; SV:17-29 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Aristotelian Scholasticism. It happens that ‘Abdu’l-Baha speaks of the quiddities as an intermediary > category between the archetypes (a'yan), which are but an aspect of the divine attributes considered > in the sphere of Lahut, and the spiritual realities (haqa'iq) which belong to the sphere of Malakut. Thus, > ‘Abdu’l-Baha speaks of the quiddities in association with Jabarut659, which has nothing to do with the > original philosophical meaning of the word. In our view, the distinction between the Essence and > the quiddity of things plays no role whatsoever in the metaphysic of Baha’u’llah. It is a term > borrowed from peripatetic philosophy which ‘Abdu’l-Baha uses here, in a sense inflected by Ibn > Sina and Ibn al-'Arabi, simply in order to respect the vocabulary in usage in the theological schools. > In no case do we need to regard the quiddities as having an existence distinct and separable from > the reality of things. > > To take up again the thread of the Tafsir, that which distinguishes the archetypes (a'yan) from the > spiritual realities (haqa'iq) is that the spiritual realities only exist in association with a contingent > reality. With every contingent creature is associated a spiritual reality, which in fact constitutes its > deepest nature.660 The spiritual reality of man, for example, is symbolized by his heart. > > Spiritual realities are transparent entities which have the capacity to be illumined by divine love. It is > upon the spiritual reality of man, the reality which inhabits Malakut, that divine love exercises its > power of magnetic attraction.661 > > 7. The question of the adventitiousness of the essential realities > > The remainder of the Tafsir affords little supplementary information. The third chapter treats > creation, but in fact, it approaches the question of the foundations of a theory of the spiritual noetic. > The last chapter, entitled “Of knowledge” concludes that because knowledge of the divine Essence is > impossible, then man can not know Divinity except through divine revelation.662 > > The chapter on creation begins with the question of whether the Scholastic entities are eternal or if > they were created. But ‘Abdu’l-Baha refuses to settle the question and declares that to reply with > “yes” or “no” is but a question of point of view. This is a purely formal question which essentially > depends upon the perspective in which one places oneself and which, in any case, can not be > resolved through dialectic663. Here, ‘Abdu’l-Baha remains faithful to the phenomenological > principle enunciated by Baha’u’llah in the “Seven Valleys” according to which the differences which > the wayfarer perceives between the divine worlds derives from the condition of the wayfarer and not > from these worlds.664 Consequently, the contradictions which we note between the declarations of > the mystic saints (awliya) come from the differences which are engendered among the different divine > attributes when they are reflected in them.665 > Tafsir, p. 19 > Tafsir, p. 16 > Tafsir, p. 15 > Ibid. > Tafsir, pp. 39-40 > SV:18,19,21,28 > Tafsir, p. 40 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > However, before arriving at this conclusion, ‘Abdu’l-Baha reviews the arguments of the different > schools concerning the created or uncreated character of the Scholastic entities (thesis of > adventicity). Probably he was not convinced of the pertinence of the question, but before arriving at > his very relativistic conclusion he demonstrates a perfect knowledge of the arguments of the different > schools. We do not follow ‘Abdu’l-Baha through this terrain, and we content ourselves with > summarizing the essentials of his argument. > > ‘Abdu’l-Baha begins with the arguments of those who believe in the eternity of the Scholastic > entities, which is to say, essentially al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. These ones advanced two arguments. > The first is that a knowledge without object of knowledge is impossible. But knowledge is an > attribute of God. Consequently the realities which are reflected in the mirror of divine knowledge > are eternal, even as divine knowledge is eternal; otherwise there would have been a moment in > which the knowledge of God could not have been perfect.666 > > The second argument is taken from the Mu'tazili doctrine upon the free will and justice of God. If > God is just, the universe is not governed by any determinism and choice exists between good and > evil. Consequently, God created all realities with equal potentialities, without any pre-established > determinism (ijbar), no compulsive force (ikrah).667 > > But, as it is stated that realities occupy different ranks, either this difference is explained by a > determinism or a compulsive force—which has just been excluded—or it is explained by the fact > that realities have not been created equal, which has also been excluded. Consequently, ‘Abdu’l- > Baha concludes that we must deduce that it is the idea of creation of these realities which is contrary > to the justice of God and the liberty of creation. > > This kind of problem can seem to be completely surpassed today. But we must not forget that here > we are touching on the theses and the problems which constitute the foundations of classical Muslim > philosophy. Addressing them is thus an important step in the constitution of an autonomous Baha’i > philosophy. ‘Abdu’l-Baha altogether joins modern philosophy when he expresses his doubts on the > possibility of finding satisfactory responses to such problems through logic as our only resource. We > must not forget that classical Muslim philosophy had absolute confidence that metaphysical > questions could be resolved through logical reasoning. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, pointing to the circular > reasoning of the Scholastics, attempts to demonstrate that the philosophical problem resides less in > the logical methods which are utilized than in the manner in which the problem is posed. And, > every problem posed in relation to the Essence of God can only receive a relative response. The > theorem of Godel does not say otherwise. If we pose God as an absolute, the rules of logic would > have to be defined in relation to a rationality founded upon a larger absolute, capable of > understanding in itself the reality of God, if we were to wish that these [rules] might teach us > anything about the divine reality. This approach explains the method of ‘Abdu’l-Baha which > consists in demonstrating that the two opposed theses are based upon equally valid logical > reasonings. > > It is thus that ‘Abdu’l-Baha turns to the examination of the Adventist thesis, which affirms that the > > Tafsir, p. 24 > Tafsir, p. 25 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Scholastic entities were created. And he demonstrates with the same aplomb the theses which are > contrary to those just discussed. He advances four arguments, which we will not [cite in] detail. > These arguments are based on the postulate that divine knowledge does not reside in an object > (ma'lumat).668 Here we recognize the thesis of Ibn al-'Arabi. > > To demonstrate this thesis, ‘Abdu’l-Baha uses two arguments which must be his own, because we > find them elsewhere, be it in the Tafsir, be it in other works. The first argument is that of the unicity > of the [divine] attributes. There is no Essence without knowledge and no knowledge independent of > the Essence, an consequently to associate with [divine] knowledge a co-eternal object of knowledge > is to return to the thesis of the hypostases (qudama). The other argument relates once more to > language. To speak of the “knowledge” of God is a purely metaphorical use of the word > “knowledge”. The divine Essence with which [divine] knowledge is identified is far beyond human > language and comprehension. To speak of the “knowledge” of God supposes that there exists at > least relation of similarity between this “knowledge” and the process of human comprehension, > which is not the case here. In the world of contingency, we cannot conceive of knowledge without > an object of knowledge, but in the world of transcendence, the divine knowledge is free from such > limitations. The transparent character of the knowledge of God conceived of as a mirror of the > divine Essence excludes all relation between this knowledge and an object exterior to this > knowledge. Man cannot picture to himself the knowledge of God. He can not even have an idea of > it, for to know or imagine the knowledge of God would imply knowing His Essence. We would say > that knowledge is inherent to the anthropic Spirit; it constitutes a particularity thereof. But as it > unites man to God, we attribute it also to God for we must suppose that there is something in > common between the creature and its Creator, even if it is a distant and essentially homological link. > Said otherwise, we ascribe knowledge to God, for otherwise it is we who could not know Him. > > Following the proofs of the adventicity (hadith) of the Scholastic entities, ‘Abdu’l-Baha takes up the > theses of Aristotle on form and matter. Of course, these are the theses of Aristotle as they were > known to classical Muslim philosophy, that is, as understood by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. ‘Abdu’l- > Baha prudently names nobody, falling back upon an impersonal plural in order to report these > positions. > > The argument essentially aims at demonstrating that form and substance were created at the same > time.669 This argument is important because it shows that in the thought of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, the > intelligible realities do not have an existence independent of the sensible realities. To distinguish > form from substance can have no ontological interest unless each can exist independently of the > other. In this sense, the thought of ‘Abdu’l-Baha goes well beyond that of Aristotle and Ibn Sina. > > Two theories of Aristotle intervene here: on the one hand the theory of being in power and of being > in act, and on the other hand the theory of form and matter. The elaboration of these ideas is made > essentially in reaction to the theses of Plato on the world of Ideas. Aristotle here wishes to show that > the essences of things, which he calls “quiddities”, are not eternal substances and that one can not > found the existence of the particular being upon the principle of the division which reduces each > being to a kind and to a class which pre-existed it. Aristotle considers that the essence (ousia) is the > > Tafsir, p. 28 > Tafsir, p. 35 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > true being; it is the first principle without there being anything above this. > > Aristotle considers that Being can manifest itself in two modes: either Being exists in power, or Being > exists in act. For example, the statue exists in power in the block of marble. The act is the work or > the function which causes the Being in power to pass to the completed form (entelechi). The passage of > the Being in power to the Being in act is effected by the union of a form to being one in power, > which is what Aristotle calls matter (hylee in Greek; hayula in Arabic). > > ‘Abdu’l-Baha here applies the theory of Being in power (ayniyyat) and of Being in action (fa'aliyyat) to > divine knowledge and he remarks that this explains the difference in point of view between those > who say that knowledge is identical with the Essence—for these ones speak of knowledge in > power—and those who speak of knowledge in its interdependency with the object of knowledge— > for they speak of knowledge in action.670 > > If ‘Abdu’l-Baha seems to take into consideration this distinction, he attributes the rest of the > development on form and substance to an impersonal “he” the true identity of whom it is difficult to > identify with precision. The ideas which are discussed here are in appearance one of the multiple > versions of the peripatetic theory of form and substance, but it is a peripatetism adapted and revised > according to platonistic elements. The development apparently does not aim at Ibn Sina, because > Ibn Sina believed in the eternity of the forms and quiddities, although it is affirmed here that the > School we are considering defends an Adventist position. Nor can it derives from Ibn al-'Arabi, > because the technical terms employed are used in a context which is situated in opposition to the > definitions given by Ibn al-'Arabi. ‘Abdu’l-Baha opposes the word qabil—which we have translated > up until now by “form”—to maqbul, which designates “that which receives form”. Qabil is thus the > active principle and maqbul the passive principle. Thus we translate the first term by the word > “receptacle”, for qabil is that which receives the divine effusion.671 For Ibn al-'Arabi, God created the > world first as a substance without form (musawwi), that is, having no qualitative determination. At > this stage, the world was like a mirror which had not yet been polished. This primordial substance is > qabil which was created by the Most Holy Emanation (al-fayd al-aqdas) which transmits with it the > eternal archetypes (al-a'yan al-thabita).672 > > If thus the development aims neither at Ibn Sina nor at Ibn al-'Arabi, it will for future writers to > identify the school aimed at here. Perhaps it is a philosopher of the School of Isfahan who will have > to be identified by name. Nor can we exclude the possibility that ‘Abdu’l-Baha had proceeded with > revisions of the vocabulary. This shows that it will be one day necessary to proceed with the > systematic comparison of the thought of Baha’u’llah and ‘Abdu’l-Baha with that of the philosophers, > such as Ibn al-'Arabi, Mulla Sadra and Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i in order to resolve a number of > problems which still persist in our comprehension of the Baha’i writings. > > Ibid. > Ibn al-'Arabi, La sagesse des prophetes, pp. 23,26,45,72 > The diversity of rendering which we encounter in translating the expression al-a'yan al-thabita illustrates > the difficulty in translating Arabic philosophical terms. A.E. Afifi, in “The mystical philosophy of Muhyid-din > ibnu'l-Arabi” translates it with “possible things”. Corbin speaks of “eternal hecceity”. Other authors, > [notably] Burckhardt, translate the expression with “immutable essence”. We translate it by “eternal > archetype” without this expression being entirely satisfactory. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > According to the votaries of this School with unknown identity, the eidetic forms (qabiliyyat) and the > receptive substances (maqbulat) were created simultaneously, inasmuch as all things are composed of > a form (qabil) and a receptive substance (maqbul)673, which is nothing other than common matter > (maddih) or the primordial substance (hayula). Qabil can then be identified with the images (surat) and > the eternal forms (hay'at).674 > > Up to here, the text is very close to Aristotle, and we discern very little platonist influence, which > relates this passage to the commentaries of Averroes (Ibn Rushd). > > Then, ‘Abdu’l-Baha introduces a distinction between the particular form (hay'at-i-makhsusih), and the > particular substance (maddiy-i-makhsusih), which he contrasts with the general substance (maddiy-i- > kulliyyih). If, for example, with a pen and ink, we write a letter, this letter is composed upon the paper > in a form which is distinct and particular to itself, and in a substance, ink, which is also distinct and > particular. However, if we recognize the letter and if we are capable of reading it, it is because we > relate the particular form to the general form which is contained in the alphabet. The general form > thus preexisted in the alphabet, even as the substance, that is to say the ink, preexisted in the ink > well. ‘Abdu’l-Baha then takes up the same argument of Being in power and Being in action which > he applied to the knowledge of God. When the pen traces the letter on the paper, the form and > substance are created, in the same manner that the Scholastic entities were created for the partisans > of the Adventist theory. But when we consider the ink in the ink well and the letters of the alphabet, > we then see that the form and substance preexisted as is affirmed by the partisans of the eternal > existence of the Scholastic entities. Here ‘Abdu’l-Baha entirely parts company with Aristotle, > because for Aristotle, on the one hand, the general does not proceed from the particular, and on the > other hand, the act is ontologically anterior to the power. Thus, Being undefined could not exist. All > these considerations permit ‘Abdu’l-Baha to arrive at the conclusion that the eidetic forms (qabiliyyat) > and the receptive substances (maqbulat) were necessarily created simultaneously.675 But if undefined > Being cannot not independently exist, the bases of classical ontology, be they Greek, Muslim or > Christian, are thereby ruined. Indeed, we are not far from nominalism, but it would be an error to > assimilate this position to Ockamist nominalism, for neither its bases, nor its consequences, are the > same. > > 8. Ontology and language > > Having thus assembled all the elements of the Tafsir which relate to ontology, we must now attempt > to make a synthesis from them. > > The first element which comes forth, is the role which ‘Abdu’l-Baha gives to language in general, > and the particular utilization which he makes of logic. Language is a product of the sensible world. > But, of the sensible world language permits us only to understand mathematical realities (ahsa) and > certain intellectual realities, such as Nature, but it does not permit us to understand spiritual realities > [haqa'iq], as, for example, Love. Among these spiritual realities, there are some the intuitive > > Once more we must renounce an exact translation of the Arabic terms. > Tafsir, pp. 36-37 > Tafsir, p. 37 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > perception of which is immediate, but others are themselves beyond the intuition of man, because > intuition remains based on empirical experience. To speak of these spiritual realities, man has no > other recourse than to take on the way of analogy (tamthil). Thus, our comprehension of the spiritual > world is limited by experience of the sensible world. ‘Abdu’l-Baha has no more confidence in logic. > Logic can sometimes produce an irreproachable reasoning, without this necessarily being a gauge of > truth, from the moment that the givens which are put into play are no longer empirical givens. > > His refusal to settle things between the positions of the different Schools, is it a real refusal? It is > probably only so in part. In affirming that the differences of opinions between the philosophical and > mystical schools are derived from differences of perspective, he shows at the same time the worthless > character of their debates and the absence of real stakes. > > Did ‘Abdu’l-Baha consider the Scholastic entities enumerated as the archetypes, the essential forms, > the quiddities, the spiritual realities and the qualifications as having a real existence independent of > man, or only as distinctions between the logical categories of the human spirit? It seems to be > difficult to reply to this question, without doubt because there is not a comprehensive response, and > that we would have to take up all of these terms in order to carry out a specific study of each one of > them. If ‘Abdu’l-Baha uses these terms, it is above all because these are the terms in usage in the > theological schools of his time, and because these are those which his interlocutor uses, who > probably furnished him with a written list of questions and thus already partially predetermined the > vocabulary. If we now turn to the writings of Baha’u’llah, we will find that he himself employed all > of these terms. In the same fashion, all the terms are not employed with the same frequency. Haqiqat > (reality) and haqa'iq (spiritual realities) are expressions which are employed with a great frequency. > A'yan (archetypes), shu'unat (potential qualities, qualifications) and mahiyyat (quiddities) are very rarely > used in the rest of the works of Baha’u’llah and ‘Abdu’l-Baha. It is probable that for him, only the > spiritual realities constitute independent realities. The others are purely intellectual distinctions, if we > hold to the definitions of Scholastic philosophy. However, in Baha’u’llah we find another usage of > these terms which is totally distinct from the Scholastic definitions and which employs this > vocabulary be it to distinguish different ontological modes among the spiritual realities, or be it to > qualify certain hermeneutic functions when we are in the context of the “divine worlds”. > > 9. The essential degrees > > What is very striking, is the very imprecise character of the vocabulary of ‘Abdu’l-Baha. At one > moment he speaks as if the archetypes (a'yan), the spiritual realities (haqa'iq) and the quiddities > (mahiyyat) constitute one and the same category, itself contained in the larger category of the potential > qualities (shu'unat). But, if we collect all of the information which the Tafsir gives us on the shu'unat, we > must define them as the latent or virtual state in the essence of an idea, of a form, or of an intelligible > reality which constitutes an attribute or a property of this essence and a potential differentiation of > the first reality. > > Based on this definition, even for a philosopher, it is difficult to determine so as to know if the > shu'unat have a purely intellectual existence, or if they constitute intelligible beings independent from > the human spirit. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > In another place676, ‘Abdu’l-Baha tells us that the mahiyyat (quiddities), qabiliyyat (eidetic forms), and > a'yan (archetypes) are [all] part of the same category of spiritual realities (haqa'iq), leaving it to be > understood either that all these terms designated a single reality, or that these are related realities all > of which can be grouped together in the category of “spiritual realities”. Is there a contradiction > here, or should we understand that the haqa'iq and shu'unat are synonymous terms? Once more, we > note the fluid character of vocabulary in the work of ‘Abdu’l-Baha as in the work of Baha’u’llah, and > we have already explained the reasons for this. > > In fact, if we refer to the usage of this vocabulary by Baha’u’llah, we see that only two terms have a > real importance: the shu'unat and the haqa'iq. > > Indications about the shu'unat are furnished for us by Baha’u’llah in the collection of the Munajat. An > attentive study of the vocabulary shows us that he utilizes the word in different contexts. On the one > hand, he speaks of the divine power (shu'unati qudratika).677 The term then seems to characterize the > deployment of divine power, [and] we could render it “exemplification”. It qualifies the process by > which divine power, in power within the divine Essence, passes into action in the reality of things > through its descent into the different divine worlds. > > Another usage is that which links the shu'unat to the sensible world. Baha’u’llah speaks of the shu'unat > of creation (khalq)678, or the shu'unat of Nasut 679. By this, it seems that he wishes to designate the ranks > and the degrees by which the sensible creatures are distinguished from one another. But, these ranks > and these degrees are nothing more than the passage into action of what was contained in the > Essence, which is to say, the manifestation in the sensible world (mulk; nasut) of their reality in > Malakut. > > These two uses have one thing in common. They mark the passage of one ontological sphere to > another. In one case, it is the divine power which, emanating from the world of Lahut, is manifested > in the worlds of Jabarut and Malakut. In the second case, it is the manifestation of the attributes of the > Essence, that is of the passage from the intelligible world to the sensible world. > > 10. The spiritual realities > > The word haqiqat (pl. haqa'iq) covers a concept which is much easier to define. The term is generally > rendered by “reality” or “essence”. The usage of the word “essence” has the inconvenience of being > mistaken for the Aristotelian term, or to reintroduce the definitions of medieval Scholasticism. > Hence we must also advance with a great deal of prudence in our attempts at definition. > > What appears to be certain is that the spiritual realities (haqa'iq) are found in the hierarchy of the > divine worlds between the Essence of God (Lahut) and the sensible world (mulk). Should we > understand that the spiritual realities are only intelligible realities (ma'qulat)? It is here that our > > Tafsir, p. 26 > See for example Munajat, #32, p. 36; #56, p. 61; #63, p. 73 > Munajat, #44, p. 48 > Munajat, #38, p. 40 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > concept of “intellectual” ('aqli) realities intervenes. Intellectual realities are intelligible realities which > do not exist independently of man. The distinction between essence and existence is an example of > intellectual realities. Spiritual realities (haqa'iq), [on the other hand], exist independently of man, such > as for example, the charge of the electron or the love of God. > > We see here that the conception of “spiritual realities” cannot be understood in the framework of > duality which opposes the intelligible worlds to the sensible world. All the spiritual realities are > intelligible realities (but not intellectual). However, not all have the same relation of spiritual > independence from the sensible world. > > 11. The unity of the creaturely world > > In order to understand well the notion of spiritual reality, we must stop opposing the intelligible > world to the sensible world, so as to grasp the unity of the “creaturely world” ('alam al-khalq).680 It is > this unity which we have defined as Pleroma. In fact, only God and His creation exist, and the > creation of God must be understood like a entelechi, a perfect transparent reality, embracing all of the > infinite worlds. The sensible world is but a small part of the creaturely world which is infinite in > itself. > > The soul is a spiritual reality. In the course of our terrestrial life, [the soul] is linked to the sensible > world, even though its reality never leaves Malakut. Furthermore, the soul survives the disappearance > of the body, which signifies clearly that its existence can have a character independent from the > sensible world. This survival is the sign that the creaturely world encompasses all of the worlds and > all of the ontological spheres which are outside of the divine Essence, as well as this intermediary > world which Baha’u’llah calls the World of Revelation of the World of Command (amr). The > spiritual world of Malakut like the sensible world is a part thereof, along with Jabarut, when it is not > identified with the World of Revelation. > > Certain spiritual realities seem to be attached to the sensible world. In fact, to each sensible reality > there correspond one or several spiritual realities. The spiritual reality of a thing constitutes its > eternal principle which is beyond the accidents of form and matter. However we must not confuse > the world of spiritual realities with the world of essences. The metaphysic of Baha’u’llah is neither a > metaphysic of essence, nor a metaphysic of existence. Essence and Being constitute one and the > same reality. We can not consider Being outside of the Existence of a contingency (mumkina) attached > to a contingent (ka'in) entity. Being is the property of that which is engendered. Never does > Baha’u’llah rank Existence (wujud) at the rank of the divine attributes.681 > > If the spiritual realities can be attached to the sensible world, is it possible that the spiritual realities > may be the forms and the images which populate the Imaginal World? We will now try to respond > to this question. > > Baha'u'llah calls “the creaturely world”, “the contingent world” ('alam al-mumkinat). > Munajat, #38, p. 38. Baha'u'llah distinguishes Being or Existence (wujud), which is the property of > “beings” (mawjudat), which is to say the creatures, from the mode of Being of God, which he designates > by the term “kaynuna” which unfortunately is untranslatable. Perhaps we could speak of “existentiality” > or of “essentiality” (from the Latin esse, to be). > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: > THE IMAGINAL WORLD > > Now that we have examined the “Commentary on the Hidden Treasure”, we have been able to > note the extreme reserve of ‘Abdu’l-Baha towards what we have called the vocabulary of the > Scholastic entities. It is visible that this vocabulary seemed to be inappropriate to describe his > thinking; its definitions were too imprecise, its distinctions too numerous. In speaking of the relation > between the form (qabil) and the receptacle of that form (maqbul), ‘Abdu’l-Baha remarks, seemingly in > order to distance himself from an overly Aristotelian concept which is inappropriate to describe > Baha’i thought, that this terminology of form (qabil) and of the receptacle (maqbul), and the theory > which is subjacent to it, are equivalent to the images (hay'at) and to the forms (suwar) which permit > the undifferentiated matter to pass from this state of undifferentiation to the sensible state.682 We will > take this remark as the point of departure for our investigation of the Imaginal World. > > Baha’u’llah defined the Imaginal World as the first degree of “substantification” or of “coalescence” > (taqyid), and we also know from the “Tablet of Wisdom” that this Imaginal World is close to the > “primordial Nature” which Socrates discovered in the reality of things. We will make use of these > first elements as the live wire to attempt to define what Baha’u’llah calls “the Imaginal World” and > the place of this Imaginal World in his metaphysic. > > 1. The images, the forms and the spiritual realities > > The elements which we have collected on the Imaginal World from the writings of Baha’u’llah > are unfortunately too few to permit us to determine the exact place of this world in his thought, > and its relation to the Imaginal World in the Ishraqi School. However, if we accept the > hypothesis of an “Imaginal World”, we must determine what it is. And there is no doubt that the > images (hay'at) and the forms (suwar) that, according to ‘Abdu’l-Baha, populate this Imaginal > World, belong to a category of spiritual realities (haqa'iq) or at least to that of intelligible realities > inasmuch as they are conceptual realities. This implies that these spiritual realities must be > hierarchized in function of their ontological status in the world in which they are found. > > In fact, if we return to what seems to be the most profound thought in the writings of Baha’u’llah, > there exists a continuum from the world of Lahut to the world of Nasut. The distinction that we > establish between them is purely human. Each one of these worlds interpenetrates all of the > others. The indissoluble relations that tie [together] the Pleroma render them indissociable; even > as, for example, we can not dissociate the Love of God from His Knowledge or from His Will. > Each of these worlds is at the same time the mirror which receives the light of the world which is > found above it, and the luminary which illumines, through the Holy Spirit, the world which is > found below it. The spiritual realities of each one of these worlds are all the mirrors which reflect > the light appropriate to each world. Finally, there exists in the creaturely world but one reality > which is that of the attributes of God. The spiritual realities are but the degrees which permit the > > Tafsir, pp. 35-36 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > divine attributes to reflect themselves from mirrors in mirrors [ultimately] to the sensible world. > Consequently, to distinguish between the archetypes (a'ayn), the eidetic forms (qabiliyyat), and the > quiddities (mahiyyat), is nothing but a pure game of the spirit, which dissimulates the unicity of > these spiritual realities. Each of these entities is but the particular manifestation, on a specific > ontological plan, of the divine attributes. Each one constitutes a sha'an, a “degree”.683 We must > not confuse this thesis with that of Ibn al-'Arabi on the unicity of Being (wahdat al-wujud). Being is > not a concept which can be applied to God. God is beyond Being and Existence. All existential > concepts are appropriate to the creature, as Plotinus already noted, who took care to place the > One above the Being that it engendered. This is a point about which the Muslim philosophers > were generally unaware. The existence of the divine attributes is also infinitely distanced from the > existence of beings (mawjudat). Consequently, when we say that in creation only the attributes of > God exist, this does not at all imply the existential fusion of the [divine] attributes with the > beings. The beings are like the shadow of the divine attributes and Names. Between the shadow > and the object there exists an almost infinite difference of nature. The shadow can be considered > as non-existent in relation to the object, but in relation to our consciousness its existence is no less > objective, for it [our consciousness] is not free from the domain of illusion. In the same way, the > existence of the beings is contingent to such a point that it can, from a certain point of view, be > considered non-existence. Nevertheless, from the objective point of view that is that of our > consciousness their existence is no less real. > > This idea is suggested in the Tafsir, which seems to link each of the three existential terms to a > particular ontological and spiritual plan. > > The employment of this vocabulary in the Tafsir presents the same characteristics as in the work > of Baha’u’llah. There we find all of the lexical levels which we have described in the first > Chapters of our study, as, for example, the opposition of the couple Lahut-Nasut or Malakut > conceived as the expression of the divine “power” as in the Qur'an, or as the hegemony of things. > Thus ‘Abdu’l-Baha speaks of the “Malakut of the names” (Malakut al-asma) which does not > designate Malakut itself, but the deployment of the divine attributes in the whole of the spiritual > worlds.684 In the prologue to the Tafsir, ‘Abdu’l-Baha speaks of the fulfillment (mukamal) of the > Verb at the level of Lahut and then its descent by the station of unicity (tardid) to the level of the > “eternal Jabarut”.685 He adds that from this level [Lahut], the spiritual realities (haqa'iq) and the > archetypes (a'yan) are manifested at the level of the “Malakut of creation” (bada'iyya).686 > > In the chapter which ‘Abdu’l-Baha consecrates to Love, which is, we must not forget, the cause > of divine creation, he distinguishes five “stations” (maqamat) of Love. This question was long > debated by the Muslim mystics. But these ones distinguished four stations and not five. Love is > the link which unites man to God as much as men to each other. Love does not manifest itself > except in the plan of human creation. For this reason, it is because of the love of God for man > that He created the world. The Love of God for man, which supposes the existence of the > anthropic Spirit, thus preexisted the creation of man. In the “Hidden Words”, God declares to > > Tafsir, p. 5. Sha'an is the singular of the double plural shu'unat (sing. sha'an; plur. shu'un). > Tafsir, p. 5 > Tafsir, p. 5 > Tafsir, n.p. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > man: > > “O son of man! Veiled in My immemorial being and in the ancient eternity of My > essence, I knew My love for thee; therefore I created thee, have engraved on thee Mine > image and revealed to thee My beauty.”687 > > ‘Abdu’l-Baha, distancing himself from tradition, distinguishes a fifth station of Love, which is the > love of the Lover for the divine beauty which is in himself.688 Man carries within himself the trace > of his Creator, Imago Dei689 which is the divine deposit constituted by the reflection of the divine > Names and attributes in his soul. ‘Abdu’l-Baha says that this station, that is to say this Imago Dei, > was created from elements ('unsur) coming from Lahut.690 Probably he means to say that it is a > pure manifestation of the divine attributes. This image of God in man thus constitutes an element > that attaches man not to Malakut, as we could have expected, but directly to Lahut, to the world of > the divine Essence. Man is thus never cut off from his Creator notwithstanding the infinite > transcendence of God. ‘Abdu’l-Baha continues in saying that the spiritual realities (haqa'iq) of > Malakut and the quiddities (mahiyyat) of Jabarut have never themselves breathed the breezes of the > Paradise of Unicity (ahadiyyat), nor the breaths of ipseity (huviyyat: which is the say the Essence of > God).691 A little further on, he returns to the world of Lahut which He describes as the world of > reality or of the divine Essence (haqiqat).692 The spiritual realities and quiddities are thus realities > which are situated outside of the sphere of the divine Essence and His attributes. > > Finally, returning to the problem of creation, ‘Abdu’l-Baha once more situates the archetypes > (a'yan) and the spiritual realities (haqa'iq) at the level of Malakut.693 All of these indications can > appear to be contradictory. We will show that they correspond to a fairly precise scheme. > > 2. The hermeneutic scheme of the deployment of the essences > > Based on the citations we have encountered, we can outline a scheme which probably only has a > metaphorical and hermeneutic value, even if these metaphysical implications are not negligible. > To the world of Lahut corresponds the divine Verb (kalamat) in its undifferentiated aspect (tamat). > This divine Verb is nothing other than the perfect Love or the divine Essence manifested in His > attributes. > > To the world of Jabarut correspond the quiddities (mahiyyat). This word is mysterious. We must > probably forget the literal meaning, which designates the qualities that belong to an essence, > > AHW: #3 > Tafsir, pp. 14, 19 > Genesis 1:26,27 > Tafsir, p. 19 > Tafsir, p. 20 > Tafsir, p. 21? Baha'u'llah distinguishes ipseity (huwiyya), which is the unmanifested Essence of God, > corresponding to Hahut, from the Essence manifested in His attributes (haqiqat), which corresponds to the > level of Lahut. > Tafsir, p. 24 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > qualities which makes this essence what it is. The word no doubt indicates, in this context, that at > the interior of this reality is already manifested a state of differentiation which is the sign of latent > multiplicity (kithra). The quiddity is nothing but the reflection of the divine attributes in a mirror > that permits this greater degree of differentiation and multiplicity. > > Finally, Malakut is the world of archetypes (a'yan) and of spiritual realities (haqa'iq). It is probable > that we should not pay too much attention here to the use of two words. These two words are a > doublet which we may consider as synonymous terms. We can summarize this system by the > following table: > > Lahut — Verb; Love; manifested Essence (haqiqat) > Jabarut — Quiddities (mahiyyat) > Malakut — Spiritual realities (haqa'iq); Archetypes (a'yan) > > It is interesting to compare this table with the one we have placed at the end of Chapter V and > which derived from a text of Baha’u’llah. The differences which we distinguish therein are > perfectly explained in the framework of the definitions that we have given in the present Chapter. > It shows that the term “spiritual reality” can be employed with two different meanings. In the > text of Baha’u’llah cited in Chapter V, the word is used in its hermeneutic sense. Haqa'iq thus > designates the product of gnosis, the result of the intellection of man when he seeks to apprehend > the divine Essence. Not being able to directly perceive the Essence, he perceives the “haqa'iq” > (“verities”). It is these “verities” that illumine the soul of man and produce “true knowledge” > (ma'rifat). Of course, these haqa'iq have a close relation with the divine attributes, because it is > from the Imago Dei, from the reflection in him of the attributes and thus their illumination, that > man “understands” these divine “verities”. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, on the other hand, uses the word in its > metaphysical sense. This is why the haqa'iq descend from the level of Lahut to the level of Malakut. > We cannot emphasize enough the importance of context for understanding the meanings of > words in this kind of literature.694 > > 3. The spiritual realities of the Imaginal World > > This brings us to the conclusion that we cannot identify the spiritual realities with the Imaginal > World except in very particular cases, and that generally the expression “spiritual realities” > designates either the intelligible entities that populate Malakut, or the intelligible realities that > populate the divine worlds as a whole and which correspond to the deployment of the attributes > of God. > > Nevertheless, a re-reading of the Tafsir together with the Tablet of Varqa permits us to better clarify > the status of the “images” (hay'at) and the “forms” (suwar) as particular realities of the Imaginal > World. That which characterizes these forms, is that they were created at the same time as > matter. We can thus say that their existence is indissociable from the sensible reality they > accompany. They only constitute a hidden “dimension”. This concept of the Imaginal World is > totally different from that of Ibn Sina, of Suhrawardi, of the Ishraqis like Mulla Sadra, or even of > Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i. That is a fundamental problem for the history of philosophy that it would > PUP:459,460 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > be fitting one day to examine. > > 4. The imaginal realities and the cosmic laws > > The second aspect that we can denote in our texts, is that these forms intervene in the state of > substantification or of coalescence (taqyid) at the point of junction between the sensible world and > the intelligible world. These forms must therefore be an intelligible reality distributed in matter, > and this intelligible reality is none other than the exemplification of the divine attributes. And, if > we recall what ‘Abdu’l-Baha said about Love as the law of the cosmos, thus as the nature of > intelligible realities, we can now glimpse that these forms of the Imaginal World are nothing but > the laws of the universe, as much of the physical universe as the spiritual universe, because we > have seen that the two worlds are ruled by the same body of laws which are manifested upon > different levels. They are the “abstractions” which underlie the reality of things and rule the > universe, and which are themselves the expression of the first Nature of things, spiritual principles > which are born of the Primal Will in order to descend throughout all the degrees of the divine > worlds. We should remember how ‘Abdu’l-Baha explains that the law of love takes a form > particular and adapted to each of the worlds of creation, and that he gives the example of the > mineral world in which the law of love is transformed to become the power of attraction which > links together the molecules and the atoms; which is to say in modern language the strong and > weak atomic forces.695 This example can furnish us with a paradigm which can be generalized in > order to understand the passage between intelligible and spiritual reality and sensible reality. > When ‘Abdu’l-Baha speaks of the intelligible realities which constitute heat, light, electricity or > magnetism696, he does not wish to speak of the molecular agitation which produces a source of > energy, or of the emission of photons which are in fact sensible realities; but of the inner reality of > these phenomena. We know that beyond matter, which forms a first level of reality, is found > energy which forms a second. Energy manifests itself in many different forms in the particles, and > when we seek to go beyond these particles, on the one hand we have an increasing difficulty at > making distinctions between real beings and virtual beings, and on the other hand we see that > these particles are the manifestation of a subjacent reality which is even more ungraspable. > Finally, the reality of the fundamental particles is no more than the expression of the laws of the > universe which are but the product of the diversification of the manifestations of the four great > forces of the universe, which themselves are reduced to a single force that is sought by the theory > of a great unification. In this way we can better understand Baha’u’llah when, in the “Tablet of > Wisdom”, he says that there is a simple nature at the origin of the physical world and that this > nature is similar to the human spirit. This nature designates the most fundamental level of > sensible reality, that which is situated just after the first degree of substantification and of > coalescence and which is in direct contact with the Imaginal World. > > 5. The Imaginal World as interworld > > Finally, the Imaginal World of Baha’u’llah is an “interworld”, a barzakh to return to the > expression of Ishraqi philosophy. Here the word “world” is not utilized in the normal sense in > PUP:255 > SAQ:XVI:83-84 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > which Baha’u’llah understands it. A “world” is for him an ontological modality. To speak of an > imaginal “world” would suppose that this can have an ontological modality proper and distinct > from that of spiritual realities or physical realities. But it is not certain that we can isolate the > Imaginal World in one discrete ontological sphere. This is more likely an “interface”, a sieve > which separates the spiritual world from the material world. Thus, its status seems to participate > in the two worlds, spiritual and material.697 > > We have already explained that the Imaginal World can be the world of the laws of the cosmos, > but we can also say that this world is perhaps the world of “reality in itself”, which is to say, of the > reality which is beyond the phenomenon, or something very close to it. By the expression > “phenomenal reality” we can define the reality which can be grasped by the physical means and > which can be described by means of a mathematical formalism. However, science shows us that > the phenomenal reality is not all the reality. Beyond the phenomenal reality there exists a > subjacent reality which is more fundamental [and] which we call “the veiled reality”.698 This > reality in itself is not measurable. It is situated outside of space and time. It is not describable in > mathematical algorithms. Nonetheless, we know that it exists because it influences physical > phenomena as is shown by certain experiments. This non-phenomenal reality in itself is however > not a spiritual reality. It is situated close to the first point of substantification and it is for this > reason that we consider that it is an imaginal reality which thus becomes a kind of noumenal > reality. > > This reality in itself, is it the first degree of coalescence and of substantification? Probably not, but > it must be infinitely close to it. Baha’u’llah speaks of a “first degree” which supposes that the > process of coalescence passes through multiple degrees or phases, the last resulting in the first > singularity which is perhaps the origin of the universe. Considered from this perspective, the > Imaginal World is no more than a simple abstraction, the result of metaphysical speculations. We > know how much Baha’u’llah detested metaphysical speculations based alone upon Scholastic > reasonings. [While] science can knock on the door of the Imaginal World, it cannot not step over > the threshold. The Imaginal World is a world part of which is beyond language and that herein > escapes discursive knowledge. It is a world of pure intuition, but what is important, is that this > intuition can in some cases be rationalizable. > > 6. The place of the active imagination > > We see the reappearance here of the difference between the concept of spiritual realities (haqa'iq) > and that of intelligible realities. The Imaginal World is a world of the intelligible, but it is not the > world of spiritual realities. At the same time, certain spiritual realities are intelligible but are not > imaginal. The Imaginal World is also the place of these realities which we have sometimes called > “intellectual”, [and] sometimes in order to better distinguish them from intelligible realities,” > conceptual”. The intellectual or conceptual realities are thus realities which do not have an > existence independent of the physical reality. For example, the number TT does not have an > existence independent of the cosmos, like also the quantum of energy or the law on the square of > This brings to mind another “interface” between the sensible and the spiritual, called the “common > faculty” and depicted in SAQ:LVI:245-246 > A la recherche du reel, especially pp. 147-162 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > the hypotenuse. It is thus an intermediary reality with an indistinct ontological status. These > conceptual realities do not exist independently of empirical reality. Nevertheless, their existence > seems to have preceded that of the universe, we could even say “preexistent” in the sense of a > purely causal and ontological preexistence and not a temporal preexistence. Another aspect of > these conceptual realities resides in the fact that they exist in the human spirit. Certain > philosophers even think that they cannot exist independently of the human spirit, which can be > interpreted in two ways: be it in the framework of a though founded upon the solipsism but > which would be fundamentally opposed to the thought of Baha’u’llah; be it in the framework of > our concept of the anthropic Spirit. Because an anthropic Spirit to know the Creator has always > existed, then this spirit ontologically preexisted the universe and contributes in determining its > laws of intelligibility. This principle explains why the universe is not intelligible and why a > mysterious relation seems to exist, between the laws of the functioning of the human spirit, which > constitutes rationality, and the laws of the universe. This mysterious relation is particularly > evident in mathematics and in geometry where it is frequently the case that at the start > mathematicians construct a theory based on a universe that appears like a pure play of the spirit > without relation to any known reality, and from which we learn some decennials later that it > forms an indispensable instrument for constructing a physical theory founded itself upon a > concrete reality. All these points bring up multiple questions which we only lightly touch upon > here and which we do not at all pretend to resolve. > > Thus, the Imaginal World seems to have two sides: a side turned towards empirical reality which > is open to discursive knowledge and constituted by conceptual realities, and a side turned towards > the spiritual world, situated outside of language and only accessible by intuitive thought. > > We see that the Imaginal World, such as it seems to be found in the philosophy of Baha’u’llah699, > little resembles the Imaginal World of Mir Damad or Mulla Sadra Shirazi. Nevertheless, > between the two conceptions, there remains something in common. In both cases the Imaginal > World remains a world of imagination. And we must understand the meaning of the word > “imagination”. By the way, neither Baha’u’llah nor ‘Abdu’l-Baha ever uses this expression, > although the latter lengthily describes the process. The imagination which is being considered > here is not the visionary power which permitted certain illumined Shi'is to enter into communion > with the world of the Imams. It is not a visionary imagination, which is why instead of the > expression “creative imagination” conceived by Henri Corbin we prefer the expression “active > imagination” because this imagination creates nothing—it only discovers. In fact, this active > imagination is nothing other than reason ('aql), about which ‘Abdu’l-Baha speaks in “Some > Answered Questions” and about which we have already said that it must not be confused with > the rationalizing reason of the Western classical philosophers, for it is a spiritual reason > permitting the synthesis of intuitive knowledge with discursive knowledge. It is this active > imagination, or this spiritual reason, which distinguishes man from the animal, permitting him to > penetrate the mysteries of creation and to elevate himself above nature in discovering its laws. > On the other hand, it is this same rational and imaginative faculty which permits man to > understand the mysteries of divine revelation. Here we rediscover the two sides of the Imaginal > World. > > We wish to greatly emphasize the caution with which we advance upon this terrain. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > 7. The nature of Nature > > All this permits us to understand that the Baha’i writings do not radically oppose the physical > world to the spiritual world, or the sensible world to the intelligible world. This dualism is foreign > to the Baha’i spirit. The two worlds constitute the Pleroma; they are the expression of the divine > attributes and the universe is but the manifestation of the same Will. This is the meaning of all > that Baha’u’llah says about Nature. For example: > > “Nature in its essence is the embodiment of My Name, the Maker, the Creator. Its > manifestations are diversified by varying causes, and in this diversity there are signs for > men of discernment. Nature is God's Will and is its expression in and through the > contingent world. It is a dispensation of Providence ordained by the Ordainer, the All- > Wise. Were anyone to affirm that it is the Will of God as manifested in the world of being, > no one should question this assertion.”700 > > CONCLUSION > > Our study as been essentially oriented towards questions of a metaphysical order, and because of > this we have been obliged to apply to the writings of Baha’u’llah the methods of historical and > philosophical criticism. This approach poses a real problem because Baha’u’llah does not present > himself as a thinker and a philosopher, but as a Prophet and a divine Manifestation. His thought > thus has a foundational function, and it can not be reduced only to its philosophical and > metaphysical elements. The writings of Baha’u’llah aim less at communicating a message than to > producing a shock in the consciousness of the reader which will be the point of departure for a > process of spiritual transformation. Thus there is a semantic content which does not exactly > correspond to the spiritual (ma'ani) meaning which must be extracted from the text as a precious > stone must be extracted from its vein-stone. Furthermore, this spiritual meaning is not a universal > meaning. The meaning is individualized in each mystical seeker and depends upon a sort of > personal resonance. It is this search for this individualized meaning that constitutes the finality of > psychological hermeneutic about which we spoke in the Introduction. The term “psychological” > indicates that we are not in the presence of a cognitive science, but of a knowledge of the soul, the > acquisition of which depends closely upon a personal spiritual practice the prodedeutique of which > we have explained in the Chapter consecrated to the “conditions of the true seeker”, and to the > three kinds of gnosis. This gnoseology, as we have named it, is a hermeneutic, we would even say a > hermeneutic of a phenomenological character. It is its gnostic aspect which results that the thought > of Baha’u’llah is not reducible to a simple philosophy and it is for this reason that we have proposed > to speak of [his] theosophy. While philosophy seeks a rational and universal knowledge, theosophy > seeks a spiritual and individual knowledge. To go further, theosophy does not exclude philosophy. It > is rather a transcendence. This theosophy is not conceived without an important philosophical > application, which is to say without a mastery of rational thought, a comprehension of the world > that implies a dialogue with science, [and] a knowledge of oneself and others. We have encountered > > Lawh-i-Hikmat, TB:142 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > all along our study the three fundamental elements that constitute all theosophy: a hermeneutic, a > gnosis and a philosophy of nature. But in this totality it is gnosis which, as a theory of spiritual > knowledge, establishes the unity of Baha’i theosophy, for, in itself, the union of a sacred hermeneutic > and a philosophy of nature would lead more likely to a theology. Let us remember one more time > that we understand the word “gnosis” in its technical sense, in the sense of a knowledge which is > acquired through the interior transformation of man. This interior transformation is the fruit of a > spiritual practice which ‘Abdu’l-Baha calls simply “the Baha’i life” and which is composed on the > one hand of spiritual exercises and on the other hand a praxis which is incarnated in the idea of > “service” (khidmat). This praxis indicates that every Baha’i must become a “servant of humanity”. > The spiritual exercises of course put emphasis on prayer, but this prayer must, to have value, be > accompanied by the reading of the sacred texts and meditation upon them. Through this meditation > the consciousness becomes saturated by the divine Word. It becomes totally imbued therewith, and > thus this Word becomes the agent of the transformation of the interior being. The action of the > divine Word in the consciousness constitutes the true sacred hermeneutic. We thus conceive that it is > gnosis that is found at the origin of the hermeneutical process which characterizes an entire section > of the thought of Baha’u’llah. > > However, we would not reduce the theosophy of Baha’u’llah to these three elements which > constitute its foundation, gnosis, hermeneutic and philosophy of nature. This theosophy embraces > many other domains such as psychology, anthropology, epistemology, cosmology and ontology. > This is why, in order to simplify, rather than the word theosophy, which can have an extremely > broad meaning, we have spoken of “metaphysics”. It is not easy to define what can be the > metaphysic of Baha’u’llah, for even though it embraces certain elements of the classical framework, > it is organized according to a totally different economy, and apart from certain aspects which are > voluntary interruptions [in this pattern], it is totally implicit. > > In the thought of Baha’u’llah, the opposition between a physical science of the sensible, and a > metaphysical science of the supra-sensible has no meaning. Furthermore, contrary to classical > metaphysics, the concept of God, or the idea of a first Motive, is totally rejected outside of the sphere > of this metaphysic. God is found in an inscrutable domain, where even the words “Existence” and > “Being” have no meaning, according to the measure that they are related to human experience. > > This is a point which seems so important and fundamental to us that we will return to it once more > once we will have better covered the contents of this metaphysic. > > If neither God, nor Being is the point of departure for the metaphysic of Baha’u’llah, then only man > is left, and we have seen how the image of the divine is constructed based on man. This construction > would be doomed to an irremediable check if man was confined to the solitary contemplation of this > Absconditum that is impenetrable to the human intelligence. This image of the divine must be related > to something other than God, and it is related to the Perfect Man (insan-i-kamil), to the divine > Manifestation. The fundamental element of this metaphysic is thus the anthropology that includes > on the one hand psychology, the science of the soul, of its nature, of its capacities and of its > becoming, and, on the other hand, gnoseology, upon which we have already discoursed. This > psychology and this gnoseology do not encompass the anthropology of Baha’u’llah in its totality, and > there remains a residual core, for which we have not yet found a designation, but which is organized > around the fundamental question of human nature and of the humanity of man, the finality of > existence and even of his becoming as a species. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > The second shutter of the metaphysic of Baha’u’llah concerns that which we have named “the > transparent theology”. We see very well that this transparent theology is very structured. > Unfortunately, we do not have available a terminology appropriate to define its parts. We have > shown that this transparent theology is based upon a Philosophy of Emanation, but to this > Philosophy of Emanation is added a Philosophy of Manifestation, for emanation and manifestation > in Baha’u’llah are two complementary and inseparable concepts. This transparent theology is not a > science of the supra-sensible because it descends to the level of matter and the phenomenal world, > and must take into account also the Imaginal World, about which we have seen that it resembles the > program (software) of our universe, and the passage of spiritual or intelligible realities to sensible > realities through their point of coalescence. This coalescence supposes a great unity between the > physical phenomena and the spiritual phenomena and justifies that for Baha’u’llah they form but > one world, without any trace of duality, duality being only an illusion created by the situs [stance] of > the human consciousness. This non-duality is at the same time a realism, for in no case does it imply > that the phenomenal world is but an illusion. It is real even though dependent upon a spiritual “sur- > reality” (haqiqat). This is why we qualify this metaphysic as “non-dualistic realist”. > > This transparent theology serves at the same time as a cosmogony, or rather we should say a > noogony. For Baha’u’llah distinguishes two levels: on the one hand the creation of the spiritual > world, and on the other hand the creation of the material world from the spiritual world. It is the > Spirit that is considered as the “creator” of the spiritual realities, even though this concept > necessitates further development. The Spirit that is a divine emanation (fayd; sudur) acts in > manifesting itself (zuhur) in the mirror of the spiritual realities. The relation between emanation and > manifestation is not clearly explained in the writings of Baha’u’llah. It seems that it was intentional > for these concepts are not, we must not forget, but metaphors the realism of which we must not > exaggerate. The true noogony is found far beyond human comprehension. This transparent > theology is thus susceptible to receiving several interpretations. We could say for example that it is in > manifesting itself that the Spirit creates the mirror. But we could admit that the mirror is created > directly by God, or the Holy Spirit, as an independent emanation, or as a potentiality. The role of > the Spirit would thus be to give it life and to animate it and it is in this way that it would be the > Creator. > > The double process of emanation and manifestation explains how the world must be considered as a > continuous and unique emanation and not as a series of hypostases which are linked in a procession. > This double process assures the unity of the Pleroma. > > Finally, in the metaphysic of Baha’u’llah, all is related to the Spirit. The Spirit occupies the place > that the classical metaphysics accorded to Being. It unites the creation to the Creator. It assures the > unity of the Pleroma, for it is the same Spirit which is reflected in each mirror. Being the creative > agent, everything it created is spirit, [and] thus all the spiritual realities and the essence of things are > spirit. We must be careful not to interpret this scheme in an Avicennian sense in which the > multiplicity of spirits and souls results in the fragmentation of the instrumental Intelligence. Here the > Holy Spirit manifests the Spirit, or better yet the spirits, for the created Spirit assures diverse > ontological modalities. It is these ontological modalities that enable us to speak of “divine worlds” or > of “spiritual worlds”. The Spirit manifests itself in a particular form in each world, and we know that > these worlds are infinite in number. We could represent the Spirit as a universe in perpetual > expansion. The Holy Spirit is perfect, [so] it cannot evolve in its perfection. The only way that is > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > open to evolution is that of infinite diversification. > > Thus if we seek to analyze the structure of the transparent Theology of Baha’u’llah, we would first > say that it is a noology, a science of the spirit, even though the word “science” here does not has no > meaning and is only employed in a purely metaphorical sense. After the noology comes the science > of the mirrors which are at the same time the modalities of being—thus we have on one side an > ontology which is an ontology of the Spirit, and on the other side something, which for want of a > better term we will call a “philosophy of transparent realities” in order to avoid at all cost speaking of > a philosophy of essences, because the word “essence” comes from the Latin esse, “Being”, and has a > whole history in Scholasticism and in classical philosophy which brings us back to concepts which > can no longer be our own. > > Beyond the transparent Theology there must be established a Prophetology, which is not a simple > science of prophetic inspiration, but which develops the metaphysical character of the prophetic > Spirit considered as an ontological modality in itself. > > With these three elements, which are Anthropology, transparent Theology and Prophetology, we > have almost made a tour of the whole metaphysic of Baha’u’llah, without being able unfortunately > to detail all of the parts. If now we would wish to situate this metaphysic in the totality of his > philosophy, other than of hermeneutics which is already a very complex subject, we would at least > have to speak of his philosophy of nature, his philosophy of history and his social and political > philosophy—a vast program which opens an immense field to research. > > What opposes Baha’u’llah most to the spirit of Scholasticism, whether European or Muslim, is his > refusal to discourse on God. The position of Baha’u’llah regarding this question is complex because > on the one hand the depth of his thought on this point is anti-tradition, and moreover, it is in the > language of this tradition that he has confided this anti-tradition. An example [of this] is given by the > theology of the divine Names. Baha’u’llah in several important works has negated all possibility of > ascribing attributes to God. Nevertheless, we can not open a single one of his books, not even one of > his Tablets, be it the most brief, without encountering the invocation of these attributes. He is “the > Most Holy, the Most Luminous, the Most Mighty, the Most Great, the Most Exalted, the Most > Glorious”701, “the Governor, the Ordainer, the All-Bountiful, the Ever-Forgiving, the Most > Generous”702, “the One, the Incomparable, the All-Knowing, the All-Wise”703, “the Almighty, the > All-Subduing, the Unconditioned”704, and so forth. We could thus have the impression of finding > oneself altogether in the framework of Qur'anic theology, and numerous Tablets could be read in > this way without ever giving the impression of derogating to the orthodoxy. However all the > meaning of these Tablets completely changes when one poses the principle that these attributes do > not refer to the divine Essence, but to the Manifestation. Numerous prayers of ‘Abdu’l-Baha begin > with the invocation “He is God” (Huwallah); even this invocation refers not to the intrinsic Essence > but to His Manifestation. In the expression “Huwallah” there exists a duality in which “Huwa” refers > to the Manifestation Who, like a mirror, reflects the image of Allah. In certain prayers, the > > P&M:CLXXVII:288-289f passim. > P&M:CLXXVI:288 > P&M:CLXXV:266 > P&M:CLXXI:263 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > invocation is abbreviated to “Huwa”705 for we can say of the Manifestation that “He is” without > however being able to say what He is nor designate Him by another name. > > Probably nobody has collected all the Names and attributes that Baha’u’llah has ascribed to the > divine Manifestation, and indirectly to God, as numerous as they are. And moreover there is one > which is traditional in Falsafa as in numerous other Schools, which is that of “the Being” (wujud), > which we never find in the Baha’i Writings. The God of Baha’u’llah is transcendent to such a degree > that even “Being” can not be attributed to Him, and no word can adequately arrive at Him. His > nature (kaynuna) totally escapes human understanding. It is precisely the experience of Being that > separates the creature from his Creator, because it is in the form of contingency that Being presents > itself to our consciousness, and this Being is a Being-there, a Being in the world. If “Being” is a > presence in the world of Spirit, infinitely modulable in order to [diversify throughout] the infinity of > the divine worlds, then God can not exist in an ontological modality that would place Him in His > creation. It is the mystery of the Ipseity (huwiyyat). Huwiyyat, term which comes from Huwa, “He”, is > the term which permits the description of God without having recourse to the vocabulary of > essences. Huwiyyat is the hidden Identity; that which is beyond Names and attributes, the > impenetrable Hahut. > > This particular status, of the divine Essence, results in the Names and attributes [of God] acquiring a > sort of autonomous existence. Very logically, there is total disjunction between the divine Essence > and the attributes. This is why Baha’u’llah created the World of Command for them, which is also > the World of the Manifestation, sometimes identified with Jabarut as the World of the divine Will. > There also, the vocabulary of Baha’u’llah can be very disorienting and can hide its originality under > the appearance of an Orthodox vocabulary. For one must have already profoundly penetrated the > thought of Baha’u’llah in order to recognize behind the word Jabarut, so much in conformity with a > certain tradition, the World of Command ('alam-i-amr) that overturns this tradition. > > We can give two divergent interpretations of this World of Command, both of which were perhaps > wished for by Baha’u’llah. The first makes of this an autonomous world, with a quasi-hypostatic > status. It is in this world that is found the origin of all the worlds. The other interpretation makes of > the World of Command an “interworld” (barzakh), and intermediary world between the world of the > divine Essence and the world of particular essences. However, this second interpretation, as > seductive as it may be, presents various difficulties. The first is that if the World of Command is an > intermediary world, we are then required to inquire regarding the status of the Imaginal World, for > this should be included therein. The intermediaries of the Imaginal World would thus become > projections of the divine attributes, which immediately brings up a series of questions. > > One of the difficulties which appears is the status of the divine Verb in the world, and, as a > consequence, the imperative theology concerning the different forms of the divine Will when it > manifests Itself in the different spiritual worlds. If the World of Command recapitulates the divine > attributes, of which It is the only plain and complete expression, then how can the divine Verb, or > the Holy Spirit, sustain their autonomy? > > This difficulty determines a third concept, which makes of the World of Command the > personification of the Holy Spirit, its total manifestation, we might almost say its incarnation. The > 'Abdu'l-Baha, Majmu'ih-yi Munajat, Tihran, 1967, pp. 21,23 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > metaphysic of Baha’u’llah does not consist in stringing syllogisms, and in piling up speculative > arguments in order to arrive at the most economic and most convincing construction possible. > Rather it multiplies partial and complementary points of view, because in any case the spiritual > worlds transcend human language and logic. The danger is always that we might fall back into the > old Scholastic habits which wish that all should bend to our logic, and to pour the new wine into the > old skins of Arabo-Hellenistic tradition. The problem posed here is to affirm the absolute > transcendence of the divine Essence and thus to assure the autonomy of the world of Its attributes > which making a hypostasis of this world. The solution of this problem is found in the transparent > character of each world. In being a mirror, the World of Command is totally independent of the > world of the divine Essence, on the ontological plan. In being the divine image and the image of the > divine attributes present in the mirror, the World of Command is an interworld, on the > phenomenological plan. The World of the Essence is the only world that is a world of pure unicity. > All the other worlds contain an element of duality, but this duality is not ontological but > phenomenological. > > We should not believe that the metaphor of the image and of the mirror suffices to consume the > reality of the creaturely worlds. We must never lose sight [of the fact] that these are simple > metaphors. To go beyond this would furthermore constrain us to leave behind the philosophical > field, for the closest knowledge of essential realities (haqa'iq) necessitates a transcendence of discursive > and analytical knowledge. The divine worlds are worlds of intuition that depend upon our personal > experience of the divine. This knowledge necessitates that we attain the station of “haqqu'l-yaqin”, of > the “certitude of the fire” that is accessible to the one who burns in the fire and who experiences the > transformative effect thereof even as the piece of iron acquires in the forge of the blacksmith the > qualities of the fire. However, the iron never becomes the fire. We understand in this way why the > World of Command is not a hypostasis. In this case the mirror can not exist without the image. It is > the image that creates the mirror. On the ontological plan, each world is an emanation (fayd; sudur) > direct from God without there being a process from one world to another, and there is but one > divine light and but one manifestation (zuhur). At the phenomenological plan, the divine light, the > illuminative “ishraq”, is reflected from mirror to mirror. This is the modality of the light that, in > diversifying itself, creates the modality of the mirrors that, notwithstanding the different ontological > modes that are specific to them, remain one. For there is only one light, even as is shown by the fact > that white light possesses in itself the entire variety of the chromatic spectrum, but these colors do > not appear except when this light encounters different materials. As a mirror reflecting the image of > the divine attributes, each world is an effusion of light (tajalli) that permits them to become manifest > through the double process of the mirror, which receives the image (jala) and which sends it out > (istijla). Emanation and Manifestation are two complementary and inseparable processes. It is for this > reason that the World of Command can appear at the same time as an autonomous world and as an > intermediary world. > > As the first manifestation of the divine attributes in their station of differentiation, the World of > Command appears to be the prototype of the perfect Manifestation (zuhur) of the divine Names and > attributes, even as the universal Manifestation (mazhar) appears as the prototype of the Perfect Man, > the model of the anthropic Spirit. The World of Command is thus the model of absolute perfection > to which all of the other worlds aspire, and this is why Baha’u’llah sometimes calls the station of the > universal Manifestation “the greatest vision” (al-manzar al-akbar). > > In professing the autonomy of the divine names, Baha’i theology finds its simplest expression, which > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > is to say the affirmation of a “Nature” (kaynuna) from which all of creation proceeds, inaccessible in > Itself to the spirit of man, but distinguishable by Its effects upon creation. > > Considering the insistence with which Baha’u’llah affirms the divine transcendence, we might ask if > this unknowable God can still be a personal God, and if we do not ultimately approach a system > close to Indian Vedanta. What personal relation can the believer have with this unknowable God? > > This is a question that is far from being resolved. The first generations of Baha’i thinkers, who were > essentially of Persian extraction and thus familiar with Shi'i culture, completely ignored the problem. > It began to be asked with acuity when the Baha’i teaching first penetrated into [the West] at the end > of the 19th century, and later in India. In order to arrive at some clarifications upon this subtle > question, it is appropriate to consider the very notion of a personal God. Is God a Person? This > brings us to ask the question, “What is a person?”, a question that can receive a diversity of > responses. > > Let us first note that this problem is particular to Christianity and to Christian civilization and that it > has remained fundamentally foreign to Muslim culture. This explains why Baha’u’llah seems never > to have directly addressed this problem. The idea of the Person has two sources: the one in Stoicism > with the notion of the “role” that the human being plays, and the other in Latin juridicalism, which > endeavored to define the relations of the individual subject with the social community.706 This is the > transposition of the Latin notion of “persona” upon Greek Trinitarian theology and the concept of > “hypostasis” which created the notion of person inherited by the Middle Ages.707 We will not enter > here into the very complex history of this concept, and will content ourselves with saying that the > first definitions which go back to Boece make of the “person” a substance that is opposed to > nature—a subsistence708—while Richard de St. Victor eliminated all reference to substance from > the definition. Thomas Aquinas returned to the Boecian definition with certain arrangements709. It > is not in this theological sense that we can consider the God of Baha’u’llah as a “person”, because > God is not a substance and probably not an Essence. Richard de St. Victor introduced a > psychological concept of the “person” by making it “an individual existence of a reasonable > nature”710. Kant711 and Hegel712 would place rationality at the very center of the concept of > “person”. This brings out a new question: Is the God of Baha’u’llah reasonable? This is also a > difficult debate to settle. We are inclined to think that the notion of reason is appropriate to man, > and that it is precisely this which determines the “inscrutability” of the hidden Identity (huwiyyat) of > God. There is however in human reason something like a resemblance with divine reason, a > reflection that opens a narrow channel to spiritual understanding. > > M. Bergson, “Les structures du concept latin de persona,” in Etudes d'Histoire litteraire et doctrinale au XIIIe > siecle, second series, 1932, pp. 121-161 > A. de Halleux, “Hypostase et personne dans la formation du dogme trinitaire,” in Revue d'Histoire > ecclesiastique, volume 79, 1984, pp. 313-369, 625-670 > Boece, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, under the title of De duabus naturis et una persona, Patrologie latine, volume 64, > columns 1337-1354 > A. Mallet, Personne et Amour dans la Theologie trinitaire de St. Thomas d'Acquin, volume 1, Paris, 1956 > Richard de St. Victor, De Trinitate, volume 4, Chapters 22-23 > E. Kant, Fondement de la Metaphysique des Moeurs, Chapter 2 > Hegel, Principes de la Philosophie du droit, pp. 34-39 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > The more modern definitions of the concept of “person” insist upon self-consciousness, self-will, > reason, personality—understood as the sum of psychological characteristics, singularity, the separate > consciousness which is distinguished from the world, conscience, etc. The problem resides in this, > that our idea of the “person” derives from the human “person”. It is thus the vehicle of a psychology > that is fundamentally foreign, like all anthropomorphism, to the thought of Baha’u’llah. > > Of course, certain psychological elements do exist in the Baha’i concept of God: these are essentially > Will and Love. But there can be two interpretations of these, one that is realist and takes these terms > in their literal sense, and the other which considers these expressions as metaphorical and > corresponding to a reality that transcends human understanding. > > It remains that Baha’u’llah never describes God as a being endowed with personality and > psychological characteristics such as, for example, “the Father” in the Gospels. We believe that we > can thus conclude that the God of Baha’u’llah is not a “person”. > > However, to say that God is not a “person” is not to totally exclude a personal relation between the > Creator and the creature. We can understand the personal relation as a relation between one person > and another, but we can also understand it to be a presence. Here appears a fundamental > characteristic of Baha’i spirituality. God is present in all of His creation, because He reflects Himself > in every atom; how much moreso is He present in man. He is so much present in him that He > sometimes seems to inhabit him, even as Baha’u’llah says so himself: “thy heart is My home”.713 It is > difficult to determine the modalities of the personal relationship of the believer with his God, > because the entire relationship is materialized by the divine Manifestation, that is to say, by > Baha’u’llah Himself. Certainly, everything is not reducible to the Manifestation. The purpose of > terrestrial life is to know and love God. But this knowledge and this love obligatorily pass through > the divine Manifestation. If the distinction continues to exist upon the theological plan, in the > spiritual life is seems to disappear completely. > > To make this relation explicit could be the object of a great study on Baha’i spirituality, little studied > until now. We cannot elaborate this question here, but it has nevertheless seemed important to us to > bring up the problem in order to show that we are far indeed the point where everything about the > thought of Baha’u’llah has been said. Regarding this there are strongly contrasting views among the > Baha’is themselves and it is likely that, in the future, different schools of mysticism will be delineated. > As for ourselves, what we see is that the writings of Baha’u’llah give us a double image: that of an > unknowable and infinitely transcendent God that perfectly suits the philosophers, and that of a > loving God present in man that is the God of mystics. This “presence” is susceptible of receiving > various interpretations, including that of a “personal” God as He has been understood by > Christianity or Islam, and that of a “Something Else” that it is perhaps too early to try to define, but > that might bring the message of Baha’u’llah closer to the mysticism of India and that of certain > Buddhist schools. Even as Christianity of the first centuries had difficulties in detaching itself from a > Judaic interpretation, so also the Baha’i Faith is facing the same difficulty in tearing itself away from > a vision inherited from Islam and Christianity. The great religious messages are always the deliverers > of universality. They never develop through a return to sources, but always through an expansion > which, in the Baha’i Faith, is only at its beginning. > AHW:#59 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > We would like to close this rapid survey of the philosophy of Baha’u’llah by sketching out [a view of] > its reconciliation with Western philosophy. In the Introduction we have seen with regard to the > letters addressed to the sovereigns of the his epoch, that Baha’u’llah anticipated the majority of the > political and social problems of the 20th century. In his philosophical thought we will again find this > same anticipation. Furthermore, we think that this exercise can prove to be fruitful, for it permits us > to study the texts of Baha’u’llah outside of their internal evidence, and this will show us to what > degree these texts are able to speak to different levels; it also permits us to question our own tradition > and perhaps to discover another way of looking at the world. > > The comparison that we have made between Greek and Muslim Neoplatonism and the > emanationist philosophy of Baha’u’llah enabled us to discover a parallelism between the > development of philosophy in Islamic culture and in Christendom. This parallelism was maintained > until the 12th century, at which point the divergencies appeared that deepened in the 13th century > and resulted in the social divorce which had become pronounced by the 14th century. This divorce > coincided with the crisis of Scholasticism and the appearance of new philosophical methods. > > The achievement of a certain kind of philosophy, today rejected by some, inspired a passionate > debate in the West in search of causes and consequences. As for causes, we have seen that some > invoke the introduction and then the exclusive reign of Aristotelianism, the development of > Ockamism and of nominalism. Other theses resulted from the sclerosis of Scholasticism that was > incapable of reforming its methods in order to become adapted to a new vision of the world, and the > rebirth in the 15th century of humanism, a distant consequence of the fall of Constantinople. We will > not enter into this debate. The reasons for the end of medieval philosophy are no doubt so complex > that it will probably never be possible to inventory and weigh all of them. Aristotelianism can be > considered one of the causes of the sterilization of Scholasticism because of the absolute belief that > truth must emerge from the usage of logic, and its taxinomic vision of the sciences and of reality that > turned away from the observation of reality. On the contrary, we can see in it the emergence of a > new rationality and the establishment of a methodological rigor, in contradistinction to Augustinism, > that opens the way to Descartes and Leibnitz. On the other hand, the humanistic movement of the > Renaissance was often allied to Neoplatonism as is seen in the philosophy of Marcile Ficin and > Nicolas de Cues. To wish to systematically contrast Aristotelianism with Platonism seems to us a > false debate resulting from an understanding of Aristotle and of Plotinus that could only be that > pertaining to the erudite of the 12th to the 14th centuries, not that of al-Farabi, Ibn Sina or Ibn > Rushd. We think that Aristotle and Plotinus represent the opposition of two movements, > diametrically opposed, within the same philosophy, that was born with Parmenides and which > neither the West nor the Islamic world have [altogether] left ever since. To have uncritically > assimilated into one Aristotelianism, Scotism, Ockamism and nominalism, [not only] marks a > supposed fidelity to Platonism, but especially a distrust of reason. It is finally the place of reason in > philosophy and in hermeneutic that is at the heart of the debate. However, those who like Corbin > hold Scotism and nominalism for the decline of theosophy and who contrast this decline with the > brilliance of the Ishraqi School too easily forget that Ibn Sina held views that were very close to > nominalism. And in condemning Scotism and Ockamism it would close for several centuries the > only way that permitted philosophy to escape the influence of Thomism. > > The crisis of Christian Scholasticism was not only caused by internal problems. It came to the fore > because the problems that society found itself confronted with were totally new in nature and could > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > not be resolved without a change of paradigm. Also we should ask why Islam did not know a similar > crisis prior to the 20th century and if this constituted either a strength or a weakness. > > It is one thing to investigate the causes of a crisis, and another to envision its consequences. But the > causes and consequences obviously cannot be disassociated from each other. We will soon say why it > seems to us that the crisis of leaving behind Scholasticism, with the advent of Cartesianism and > rationalism through the Spinozan, Leibnitzian and finally Kantian variations, was fated to > culmination in the crisis of the 20th century, and in that which our contemporaries call the end of > metaphysics. We will see how, finally, the thought of Baha’u’llah seems to us to bring a remedy to > this situation. The problem in our eyes is not to condemn this or that school or tendency, but rather > to ask ourselves why Christian theosophy was not capable of surviving the advent of rationalizing > reason. For example, Scholastic Thomism was far from condemning the usage of reason—on the > contrary. The passage to modern philosophy less marks the advent of reason than a certain usage of > reason which effectively results in the disappearance of theosophy. > > Why then such a mortal blow? Without doubt because medieval theosophy was an incomplete > theosophy. It is precisely this incompleteness of Christian and Muslim theosophy that separates it > from the Baha’i concept of theosophy, and this incompleteness results from the incapacity to > articulate the individual to the universal. From this, among others, derives the nominalist debacle, > the repudiation of the philosophy of essences, and finally, the proclamation of the end of > metaphysics or the death of the subject. > > Scholasticism sinned through an excess of synthesism to the detriment of analysis. Its method, be it > in religious sciences or in natural sciences consists in collecting facts, superposing them, > amalgamating them in such fashion that the theory makes sense of all of the known facts, especially > the most extraordinary among them, but never to analyze them individually. The rules come from > generalization. This explains why everything becomes the business of theology and hermeneutic. > The Sacred Book is supposed to contain the synthesis and of all the knowledge of the universe. > Analysis does not consist in recognizing the fact for what it is, but only to recognize in it a sign of the > divine. The knowledge of the sensible comes from the supra-sensible, and not the inverse. Because of > this, the philosophy of nature that we find in master Eckart or in Hugues de St. Victor is not an > independent branch of theosophy, but is subjugated to hermeneutic. Gnostic intuition operates > without the control of reason, without an underlying theory of epistemology. Hermeneutic itself > becomes a purely intuitive science, without methodology, and finally culminates only in the > superposition of collated individual points of view, without critical spirit, to attempt to form an > image of reality. In the form of theology, hermeneutic has invaded the entire field of philosophy, > thus preparing the way to dogmatism. > > In the Scholastic concept, reason is the Logos, that is, something totally transcendental, incapable of > descending into individual realities. Universal reason only reflects itself imperfectly in the sensible > world but it never descends. Reason is the perfect expression of the universal. It is normative. But > individuals are too imperfect to incarnate it. They can only try more or less to approach it. > > The humanism of the Renaissance was to turn everything upside down. Reason became immanent > in things. The analytical method was restored, particularly through the development of Alexandrian > methods. At the same time the relation of the individual to the universal was inverted, without the > problem being resolved. The new philosophy distinguished itself from the old theosophy in the sense > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > that it affirmed that all knowledge can only come from reason and exclusively from reason. Mystical > intuition completely exits the field of knowledge. The task of philosophy becomes that of assuring > the foundations of knowledge, a task formerly devolved upon theology. The retained model was that > of geometry, considered the most intelligent expression of universal Reason. Thus there was the idea > of a Mathesis Universalis that was for philosophy what the philosophical stone was for Alchemy. > > Theosophy disappeared because of its failure to understand the role that Reason plays in > articulating between the field of spiritual knowledge and empirical knowledge. It did not know how > to preserve an equilibrium between hermeneutic and a philosophy of nature, and did not > understand that gnosis can not limit itself to mystical intuition and must unify all the fields of > knowledge through reason. Theosophy thus lost its philosophical character and hence the > emancipation of philosophy could only take place in opposition to it. > > We could make practically the same analysis of Muslim theosophy, with this difference that it never > knew a rationalist crisis and on the contrary that it was always nourished by much more important > and ceasingly renewed mystical currents. In Islam, as in Christianity, theology suffocated the > empirical sciences, and spiritual hermeneutic invaded the entire field of knowledge. > > We must then understand what those who speak today of the disappearance of theosophy are > speaking about. We have seen that the theosophical project was never taken to its culmination and > that it never succeeded in constituting a Mathesis Universalis which the West always dreamed of > [attaining]. This is why this project left the theological domain in the 16th century to become that of > philosophy. The crisis that resulted shows why empirical sciences cannot be based upon a mystical > foundation. > > This long analysis [may] permit us to better comprehend the specificity of Baha’i theosophy, the > declared aim of which is to transcend the crisis of reason. For Baha’u’llah, theosophy is not what it > was for the Scholastics, the foundation of knowledge upon which the development of the empirical > sciences must be based. On the contrary, he proclaimed the autonomy of science and reason. But > science and reason cannot presume to themselves alone a universality of knowledge. > > All human knowledge is based upon empirical givens and thus individual realities. It is clear that in > the thought of Baha’u’llah, the knowledge of the universal depends upon the knowledge of the > particular. Thus we are very close to the nominalist theses, but we must make clear which > nominalism we are speaking about, for this nominalism, like also that of Ibn Sina, is far from leading > to the catastrophic consequences that Henri Corbin and Antoine Faivre denounced. Oriental > nominalism is so subtle that often it has escaped the Western critics who did not even recognize it > because this nominalism is perfectly inserted into a Platonic framework, and thus does not present a > contradiction with a philosophy of sciences. It should be noted that if we can speak of a nominalism > of Baha’u’llah, this is not that of Roscelin nor that of the disciples of Dun Scot, but is closer to the > Eastern tradition. It is from this that it is borrowed, because it offers the only practical way for a > philosophy of Emanation. > > Because of this fact, to speak of a Baha’i theosophy takes on a new resonance. This theosophy is not > substituted either to science or to philosophy. On the contrary, science and philosophy, as universal > [modes of] knowledge, constitute the foundation thereof. But in many places Baha’u’llah shows that > neither science, nor philosophy, nor the religious sciences, nor any form of theological dogmatism, > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > can suffice to render the world intelligible to man, for the world is a personal experience. Science > and philosophy furnish us with previous instruments for this intelligibility, but it is never attained in > a purely theoretical manner. Beyond the communal experience that is born of inter-subjectivity, > there exists an intelligibility more profound, moving and ungraspable that is unique to each > individual and that results from his personal spiritual experience. This spirituality is the > indispensable element which is added to empirical and theoretical knowledge to constitute > theosophy. But, as this spiritual does not come from the domain of inter-subjectivity, it is thus > beyond language, incommunicable, pertaining to each individual. Each station, each degree of the > spiritual life, possesses its own vision (manzar). None can see what another has seen, nor comprehend > what another has comprehended. The secret can not be taught. The secret cannot be divulged. No > one can grasp the secret of each spiritual degree, unless he has attained this degree. > > Scientific and philosophical knowledge is born of the particular in order to rise toward the universal > while theosophical and gnostic ('irfani) knowledge that completes it descends from the universal to > the individual. In the domain of spirituality only the inner (batin) exists, only pure subjectivity, > spiritual knowledge and thus a kind of phenomenology in which knowledge transcends the world > and consciousness. > > In the thought of Baha’u’llah, it is clear that we cannot find a Mathesis Universalis, nor even a logico- > mathematical language, that would guarantee the foundation of the sciences. This does not mean > that the sciences cannot claim objective knowledge, but only that the domain of this objective > knowledge is limited and can not exhaust all of reality. What we call reason is in fact nothing but > human rationality. But Baha’u’llah establishes a very close link between the modalities of Being and > the modalities of rationality. It is a fundamental principle of his thought, that was greatly developed > by ‘Abdu’l-Baha, but the consequences of which we have not seen enough. Being is a purely abstract > reality which is born of the modalities of existence which characterize each existing thing, as we > know that the fundamental unity of Reality (basitu'l-haqiqat) resides in the Spirit, which is, at the same > time, the Logos-Verb. Each degree of reality, that is to say each ontological modality, possesses a > structure of intelligibility that pertains to it alone and that is hierarchical. Each existing thing is > limited by this structure of intelligibility that permits it only to know, as a function of his particular > rationality, the inferior ontological modalities, but which veils the superior modalities. Human > rationality thus is but a mode of Universal Reason that incarnates itself in the Spirit, the Logos- > Verb. Thus man cannot comprehend either God, or the intermediary realities between him and the > divine Essence. However, there is a difference between comprehension and knowing. If man cannot > comprehend God, he can know Him. Comprehension is a purely intellectual act, subjected to a > structure of intelligibility, while knowing is a cognitive process that is born of experience and that > can escape rationalization. Furthermore, as there is an homological relation between the modalities > of rationality and all the structures of intellibility, man can, in a very narrow limit, discourse upon > the ineffable, for human rationality is part of universal rationality which is deployed in all of > creation, and it thus possesses something in common with It. > > This explains why there is a rational core to Baha’i theology. Some have even thought that the > entire thought of Baha’u’llah can be restored to this rationalism. This rationalism explains for > example the control He establishes over the usage of spiritual hermeneutic (ta'wil) or upon mystical > experience. This rational core corresponds to what we have called throughout the length of our > study, “the philosophy of Baha’u’llah” without him having, himself, used this term. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > The hierarchy of the structures of intelligibility determines the hierarchy of hermeneutics. Ta'wil, or > spiritual hermeneutic, is the hermeneutic of Revelation. The only true ta'wil is that which the > Prophet accomplishes himself in commenting upon the Scriptures of preceding Revelations, as did > the Bab with the Qur'an. The Commentary is in fact a second Revelation having returned to the > “Preserved Table”. This is the science of Jabarut, the World of Command, the doors of which are > closed to men. The science of Jabarut is only acquired from the mouth of the Prophet. All ta'wil > conceived by man is but an imitation, an act that can become an act of corruption and of > interpolation (tahrif) if it goes beyond the mystical domain and is applied to positive and normative > religion (shari'a). Never can human ta'wil become a teaching. All dogmatic value is refused to it. > Exegesis has played no role in the development of Baha’i thought. Spiritual hermeneutic (ta'wil) is > thus called upon to be moulted into a psychological hermeneutic ('irfan), that is the science of Malakut > to perfection. This psychological hermeneutic mobilizes the entire gnostic knowledge in its diverse > components—true knowledge (ma'rifat), true understanding ('irfan), and wisdom (hikmat). > > But gnosis, in order to arrive at Malakut, must depend upon the sensible reality, on the world (Mulk), > and upon man (Nasut). This is the deep meaning of the hadith: “We will show them Our signs in the > world and in themselves.” It is in this articulation that the heart of all theosophy is found. In this > scaling of Jacob's Ladder, science is an indispensable element. It is [science] that has revealed to us > the complexity of the world, its incommensurable extent, its true phenomenological nature beyond > the appearance of matter. This is what makes all the difference between Baha’i theosophy and that > of St. Bonaventura, of Hugues de St. Victor or Jacob Boehme. In this sense, it is closer to the > theosophical project of Schelling and his Naturphilosophie. > > The idea that God speaks through His creation is already found in St. Paul. The Fathers of the > Church saw therein the explanation of certain Christian dogmas, to which the pagan philosophers > seemed to have arrived at through intuition. St. Augustine approached this point in De Doctrina > christiana and in De Trinitate. The number three that is that of the Trinity plays a role in creation as > Nature offers multiple examples to us. It is the same for all of the numbers, all of which have > spiritual significance. To the first intuitions of St. Paul, St. Augustine mixes in the Pythagorean and > Platonic teachings. God is reflected in His creation, and thus each creature can be transformed into > a sign or a testimony of his Creator. Every thing then returns to the divine intention. Every thing is > signum. There is only God Who is the sign of nothing and is content to be Himself. Here we also > find hermetic and thus Eastern influences, that were introduced into Christianity by Pseudo- > Dionysius the Areopagite, for whom Scot Erigen was an important link in its transmission to the > medieval world. This theory of natural symbolism would find its full expansion in the philosophy of > Hughes de St. Victor, who would systematize the Augustinian and Dionysian ideas and who would > culminate in a true sacralization of Nature become Revelation and the divine Book. Nature itself > sings the praise of the Creator as St. Bernard said. It carries in itself a message addressed directly to > man. The Romantics and Baudelaire are not far off. We are here in the presence of a semiology of > Nature, but we also see why this semiological hermeneutic cannot result either in a philosophy of > nature or in a mature theosophy. No science can be established upon the medieval natural > symbolism. Reason as discursive thought has no place in it. We swim in a holistic atmosphere in > which the individual had plenty of trouble finding his place, in which the individual is confused > always with the universal. This does not entail leaving my consciousness as an individual in order to > attempt to derive universal verities from my experience, but on the contrary to pose in a dogmatic > manner equivalences in affirming a priori the meaning of celestial things in order to project them > thereafter into nature as St. Augustine did with the Trinity. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > The Baha’i movement is exactly inverted and it is worth emphasizing this, for we might fear that the > development of a symbolism of nature of the medieval type marks the return of a certain > anachronism of thought. The Baha’i semiological hermeneutic inserts itself altogether in the > framework of the psychological hermeneutic ('irfan), which is to say that it has no dogmatic value and > remains personal to the spiritual seeker. Creation is the vehicle of a meaning, not in the absolute > sense, but one that resonates with the inner being of the seeker. This meaning progressively elevates > itself beginning with empirical science and in order to rise to the heaven of mystical meaning. It > consists first in the search for a global meaning to Nature, not of a bilateral correspondence between > objects and their symbolic referent. This global meaning is what makes the difference between a > symbolism of nature of the medieval type and a Philosophy of Nature. In the framework of a > Philosophy of Nature, the relation between things becomes as important as the things themselves. > Science explains the phenomenal reality of things while Philosophy of Nature searches out the > teleological meaning of creation. It must tell us why things exist, what is the purpose of evolution. > > In medieval symbolism, it is God Who is reflected in Nature and Who uses things as a signum. In > Baha’i thought, it is not God Himself, but the spiritual worlds and to begin with the closest among > them, Malakut. This completely reorients the nature of the meaning sought. In Baha’i thought this > meaning is metaphysical and teleological. It consists in imagining the infinitude of creation with its > infinite number of worlds, in considering nothing but the miniscule specimen of but one of these > worlds. The nature of man alone, at the same time material and spiritual, makes this wager possible. > > The search for a global meaning for creation does not exclude the created objects from individually > taking on a symbolic meaning. We have seen multiple examples of this in the first two Chapters of > our study when we spoke of the soul and of Malakut. Baha’i thought does not result in a > resacralization of nature alone, but in a resacralization of the world, which thus includes the human > sphere. Here is a return to a fundamental verity brought to light by psychoanalysis. Well before > rational thought, the inner man is a universe of symbols and archetypes. In order for our spiritual > life to develop, it is necessary that this symbolic world be living. Our inner world is composed of a > multitude of symbolic functions associated with our spiritual qualities. These symbolic functions > have need of permanent solicitation so that our intuition might remain awakened. The prayers of > Baha’u’llah are constructed entirely on the basis of this symbolic universe and there is a whole study > to be undertaken thereon. For example, one of the symbolic functions that exists in the inner man is > Life. We should be able to study the whole value of the notion of Life for the human psyche. Erich > Fromm spoke of it very well when he elaborated the concept of “biophile”. The symbolic function of > Life is one of the most pregnant [symbols] which is why we find it evoked in all spiritualities. But > when Baha’u’llah wishes to evoke Life, he does not evoke Life in itself, Life that would be like a > Platonic idea, with an independent existence. He speaks of the symbolic function that exists in the > soul of man in evoking nature. He does this the most often through the image of the water of the > source and of the fountain, or by the image of the tree or plants that grow, flowers or buds. If we > were to study the prayers of Baha’u’llah from this angle, we would see delineated there an entire > symbolic universe. This symbolic universe establishes a double correspondence: a correspondence > between Nature and the inner man on the one hand, and a correspondence between nature and the > spiritual world on the other hand. Nature is that which serves as a link between man and Malakut. > > The destruction of our symbolic universe was one of the causes of the dehumanization of > civilization. The promulgation of a new spirituality passes through a resacralization of Nature and > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > the World. It is only for a century at most that, thanks to the progress that we have made in the > knowledge of the human psyche that we can comprehend the importance of this stake for the > spiritual future of humanity. In the thought of Baha’u’llah there is a clear intention to restore > metaphysics. > > If Baha’u’llah restores metaphysics, it is not, as we have understood, in the sense in which one > restores an old tradition that has fallen into disuse. Baha’i metaphysic opens to study a totally > original avenue, unfortunately practically unexplored. Baha’u’llah has broken with the classical > metaphysical tradition and he seems to have anticipated some of the greatest philosophical intuitions > of our century, that gives to his thought an undeniable character of modernity for the one who > knows how to go beyond an Eastern language deprived of most of the technical vocabulary to which > we are habituated. > > In order to understand why it is necessary to restore metaphysics, it is necessary to comprehend why > its end was so quickly proclaimed. It is because manifestly, after having shown proof of a great > fecundity throughout several centuries, metaphysics had arrived at an impasse at the end of the 19th > century. The reader will understand that the causes and the consequences of this impasse are very > complex and that it is not possible to summarize them all here in a few lines without leading to > outrageous simplifications and omissions. Nevertheless we should be content with aiming our > projectors in some directions, those a comparison of which with Baha’i positions appears to us to be > particularly fecund. > > We will recall that we have seen in the Chapter consecrated to psychology and to the question of the > spirituality of the soul, that the West never arrived at a harmonious synthesis between the > philosophy of essences inherited from the Greek world and the psychological givens furnished by the > Judeo-Christian [Scriptures], in which there are many contradictions. The destruction of what was > fundamentally a Greek philosophy seemed so closely tied to Christian dogma that the fall of the one > entailed the fall of the other. The task of reconstructing a metaphysic that would be relatively > independent from Christian dogma appeared from the end of the Scholastic period and was > essentially the work of Descartes and of Leibnitz, even though their apologetic intention was clear. > In doing so, they reconstructed the edifice with the same stones, contenting themselves with lightly > altering the design. It is singular to note to what extent metaphysic, and especially ontology, has little > evolved, from Aristotle to Wolf. In the 13th century two great currents were constituted: the monists > who affirmed that there exists in the world but a single substance qualified through the means of > diverse attributes and of diverse modes; and the monadists who considered that there is an infinite > number of substances, each one qualified by an infinite number of properties. The classicists had the > habit of making the whole rest of their philosophy depend upon metaphysics. The first dissonances > appeared when Locke and Hume elaborated theories of knowledge, autonomous from metaphysics, > and even unsettling its foundations. > > But the true crisis in metaphysics took place in the 19th century when it appeared that it was more > and more difficult to give an epistemological basis to the exact sciences. Some decades later with the > failure of the Hilbertian program, the powerlessness of metaphysics seemed to have been > consecrated. In effect, in the space of 20 years was to affront a whole series of crises. First came the > crisis of logicism which critiqued the exact sciences, then the crisis of psychoanalysis that impacted > the social sciences. We have already attested to the impasse in which Hegelian metaphysics found > itself and the sterility of neo-Kantism, which sought to succeed it in the German universities. The > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > case of Russel is particularly characteristic of this crisis. He first was under the influence of neo- > Hegelianism and the Platonism of Meinong714, and then the works of Frege, he carried out a > complete axiomatization of mathematics through the assistance of a formalized language the rules of > which were so clearly formalized that they rendered useless all recourse to intuition and that they > excluded all possibility of error by permitting the description of the totality of the world. The logicist > fifth of Russel would be shaken when he discovered that all propositions could not be reduced to the > subject-predicate form, which led him to abandon the Platonic concept he was profaning. He > considered that this discovery was the striking proof of the vain hopes of metaphysics. The logicist > program would be a little further compromised when Godel demonstrated that all of logic must by > necessity subsist upon undemonstrable propositions. The work of Wittgenstein also was to show the > difficulties with surmounting the ambiguities of natural language. > > The Tractatus Logico-philosophicus of Wittgenstein would undoubtedly have permitted the > reconstruction of a metaphysic. This work had an enormous impact because of the sureness of its > demonstration, but his “mysticism” was totally rejected, notably by Russel in his book Mysticism and > Logic, which objected to four propositions of the Tractatus: [1] that intuition was an efficacious > method for penetrating reality and that it could not be distanced either from the experimental > process or from the logico-mathematic approach715; [2] that reality was essentially one716; [3] that > time was a pure illusion717; [4] that good and evil are only appearances718. > > It is interesting to note that these four propositions are found in the metaphysic of Baha’u’llah, who > also shares with the Tractatus a very similar approach to language and to its relation to reality. The > principal points of divergence between the two systems resides in the return of Wittgenstein to a > Kantian inspiration that indicated that mathematical beings do not have an existence in themselves, > but are constructed in the human intuition. It is in the study of this question that we can > comprehend the importance of the Imaginal World as Baha’u’llah depicts it, for this Imaginal > World, while it is not clearly defined and which should above all not be confounded with the > Imaginal World of the Muslim Schools of the past, is one of the rare paths that presents itself in > order to avoid the snares of a radical Platonism like that of Meinong and of Frege. For Baha’u’llah, > this kind of reality is totally foreign to the world of spiritual realities: it supposes the existence of a > separate world that has no ontological status in itself because it is an interface world. This is a very > important path for Baha’i metaphysics to explore. > > The works of Wittgenstein are too close to us to be understood. We will content ourselves with > attempting their synthesis with those of his successors. From this is born the logical empiricism and > the multiple derivatives on the one hand and the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of language on the other > hand. The logical empiricism of Carnap, Reichenbach and Hempel would be the more implacable > > 714Translator’s Note: Alexius Meinong Ritter von Handschuchsheim (17 July 1853 – 27 November 1920) > > was an Austrian philosopher, a realist known for his unique ontology. He also made contributions to > philosophy of mind and theory of value. > [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexius_Meinong] > Tractatus, 6.522 > Tractatus, 6.45 > Tractatus, 6.4311, 6.45 > Tractatus, 6.4. The thought of Baha'u'llah is somewhat more nuanced on this point. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > adversary to metaphysics. Basing himself on the theory of types of Russel, Carnap attempted to > demonstrate that metaphysical statements violate the rules of logical syntax. His book “La > construction logique du monde” is a whole program in itself. Even ethics must be deduced from the > scientific approach to things. [For our present purposes,] it would be useless for us to follow this very > complex argument. We have only wished to show that the classical philosophers were not armed to > respond to the questions of this new type of philosophy. It is a whole system of the world that is > collapsing. What is as much a factor in the philosophies derived from logical empiricism and the > philosophies of language, is the notion of truth. The notion of truth depends upon our conception of > reality and the adequacy of language [in relation] to this reality. If the nature of the world is elusive > and if language is a veil that we can tear, we enter into a relativist world. It suffices to superpose this > relativism to individualism in order to understand the crisis of modern thought. > > The 20th century did not lack for attempts to surmount this crisis. The two most important > [attempts] were those of Husserl and Heidegger. Husserl returned to the problem of consciousness > and its relations with the world. Because the foundation of knowledge is not found in this world, we > must look in man, which is to say in cogito. Thus, we can surmount the opposition between realism > and idealism. The conscious being is the being conscious of some thing. Consciousness is thus > inseparable from the world. It is [consciousness] that constructs the world. All becomes a question of > representation. Ontology becomes phenomenology. Husserl returns to the Cartesian program. In > order to construct his philosophy he required a certitude that would be its foundation. He found this > certitude in cogito, that is, in consciousness and in the self. He envisioned consciousness as an > irreducible core. But psychoanalysis questioned the unity of consciousness and the self. To know > who is the self who is speaking is not a clear question. Phenomenology surmounted this crisis very > well. But it did so by aligning itself to the relativist program of contemporary philosophy. > > There is a great number of agreements between phenomenology and the thought of Baha’u’llah. > Each of these two programs goes beyond the opposition between realism and idealism. Each of the > two affirms that the sensible world cannot be the source of certitude and proclaims the sovereignty > of consciousness. Each of them affirms the existence of a transcendental truth, autonomous of the > subject. Husserl was one of the first philosophers to have understood that in order to save philosophy > of the subject in the framework of a theory of knowledge it was necessary to abandon classical > ontology, as did Baha’u’llah. Phenomenology, in opposition to the logicist and empiricist program, > affirms the intuition as impossible to outline. “The eidetic intuition” of Husserl, by which a mental > eye can have the vision of logical or mathematic universals, is certainly close to [the Baha’i concept > of] the Imaginal World. The psychology of Baha’u’llah also shows us that the objectivity of > consciousness, that is, of the nafs, does not exist; that the direct grasp of the real without veil and > without intermediary also does not exist, even though this is an ideal towards which it is necessary > for us to approach, unceasingly, through an effort of purification and detachment from the self. The > difference between Phenomenology and Baha’i thought resides in the fact that it always believed in > an objective and rational foundation to consciousness, while for Baha’u’llah the fundamental > objective of consciousness, what he calls “the roots of knowledge” is not found in this world, but in a > purely intuitive spiritual dimension that is born of the relation of man to the divine. > > The Husserlian notion of the “Epoch”, of the suspension of judgment, is very close to what > Baha’u’llah calls the abandonment of prejudices and the purification of the self, for in this case as in > the other it consists in the same questioning of all knowledge, the employment of consciousness in > the contemplation of the past in relation to the world, the search for a maximal distancing between > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > the self and the world of representations. We must begin with the same return to oneself in attempt > to begin to find in man the irreducible core of his self in its privation and its absolute nudity (tajrid). > > As in psychoanalysis, [likewise] in Baha’i psychology consciousness is not a monolithic phenomenon. > Fundamentally, unity of consciousness does not exist, because on the one hand exists the soul (ruh) > and the psyche (nafs) and on the other hand the psyche is made up of two “natures” or two “selves”, > the animal nature and the divine nature. Even the notion of ego is not unitary, because the ego > supposes different levels of consciousness veiled by what Baha’u’llah calls the “vain imaginations”. > The concept of “vain imaginations” explains that all representations of the world suffer from > deviation through subjectivity. The problem of spiritual consciousness becomes that of correcting > this subjectivist deviation. > > Heidegger proceeded from a phenomenological position in order to elaborate a much more radical > philosophy. He also proclaims the end of metaphysics, while nevertheless preaching [in favor of] a > return to [one of] the fundamental questions of philosophy, the question of Being. Heidegger would > in fact revolutionize ontology, for there are only two possible ontologies: that of Plato and Aristotle > who consider Being as a first principle, irreducible, and anterior to things in themselves; and that > which considers that Being is simply what is found in the existent. In Western philosophy the first > path was imposed in a crushing manner, and we can count upon the fingers of one hand the > attempts to offer an alternative thereto. The most important of these was that of Dun Scot, which > Heidegger referred to in elaborating his system. Heidegger understood in a certain fashion > understood what had been the cause of the impasse of metaphysics, which was that at its foundation > it had poorly posed the problem of Being. It is this conviction that pushed him to borrow the only > way that seemed to be open. > > The ontology of Heidegger presents astonishing similarities with that of Baha’u’llah. But of course > the comparison stops there, for they diverge upon all of the consequences derived therefrom. > Heidegger and Baha’u’llah are in agreement in affirming that Being is that which is present in > things, and not a principle anterior to things. Thus if proclaiming the death of metaphysic is > proclaiming the death of Aristotelian ontology, the one and the Other are in agreement. It is even > the death of a whole tradition that nourished both Western and Eastern thought. Furthermore, > Heidegger and Baha’u’llah are also in accord on certain aspects that they give to Being. First, the > Being of man is incommensurable with the Being of things; further that the Being of man is > consciousness and exists only in his presence in the world; and finally tat Being is the meaning, that > Being is inseparable from the question of meaning and as Gadamer would say “to be is to know”. > Let us remember that Baha’u’llah assimilates “a world” to an ontological modality, and places the > world of man (nasut) above the world of nature, the one and the other being characterized by > different “spirits”. By this fact man exists in a plenitude characterized by a reflexive consciousness. > Furthermore, to the world of man corresponds a particular hermeneutic. Every world possesses its > own level of meaning. Finally, the meaning of the world is individualized in every human being. > Consciousness only exists in a process of spiritual development always searching for a superior > degree of intelligibility of the world. Of course the language [of the two philosophies] is very > different, but these very real similarities are striking. These similarities can be explained by the > Scotist inspiration of Heidegger. We have seen that one of the points that opposes the thought of > Baha’u’llah to the Arabic Hellenistic philosophy is that this latter identified God with Being. Dun > Scot is one of the rare philosophers who clearly saw the peril in this [view]. For Scot, as for > Baha’u’llah, Being is a reality that is actualized in the existing things and which is inseparable from > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > them. Being thus can not be in God, whereas for Thomas Aquinas God is an essence in which Being > and Existence are confounded. > > However Heidegger would lead philosophy to a much more serious crisis. In reducing Being to that- > being, Heidegger thought he had ruined the possibility of elaborating a metaphysic upon the notion > of Being. But he wished to go further in applying this to the philosophy of knowledge and to > humanism. What he wished was no longer to think of man as a subject, but only as a Dasein. His > ontology is thus an ontology of subjectivity that is opposed to the metaphysic of the subject which > cultivates a culture of Weltloses Ich, of “Me-without-world”719. > > Heidegger was thus not content with proclaiming the death of metaphysics, [for he] also proclaimed > the death of the subject. For us it seems to be a logical consequence, and, at the same time, a drama > which is [quintessentially] that of the 20th century. Heidegger is without doubt not responsible for > this. He was nothing other than the mirror of his time. > > The intention pursued by Baha’u’llah is to restore metaphysic, which is not to restore an ancient > order, but to restore the subject. But, it is not possible to establish a philosophy of the subject without > a metaphysic. Nonetheless, a philosophy of the subject must tolerate a minimum of nominalism. > The metaphysic of Being does not permit the construction of a philosophy of subject the autonomy > and self-determination of which are assured while conserving a link between the kind of species and > in giving a meaning to history. It is for this reason that Baha’u’llah removed the question of Being > from the center of his metaphysic. We have seen that Being was replaced [therein] by Spirit as the > first principle. This substitution would not make sense if the economy of the system had not been > profoundly transformed. In the philosophy of Baha’u’llah, the first question is not “How does the > universe exist?, a primordial question posed by the ancient Eleatic physicists, but which today is > relegated to the domain of science. It is rather “Why does the universe exist?” If we reply to this > question: “So that a consciousness might know God” then we immediately see that the question of > metaphysics is transferred from the problem of Being to the problem of consciousness, that is, > ultimately, man. Metaphysics is not constructed in a descending manner from the first principle to > the individual entities, but in an ascending manner, taking man and human nature as its point of > departure. > > We believe that we can thus affirm that the message of Baha’u’llah is fundamentally a “humanism”. > But this word “humanism” must be taken here in a particular sense, for it refers neither to classical > humanism nor to contemporary critical humanism. It is a humanism that refutes both the anti- > humanism born of Heidegger and the humanism called “post-metaphysical” or “post-modern”. > > Perhaps the whole meaning of the message of Baha’u’llah can be summarized in his wish to enable > man to discover his real nature. We think that the entire drama of our epoch, is that it has lost the > true notion of man. If we no longer know what man is, then no society is possible, no culture, no > spirituality, no charity and no humanity, no love. All that is left is the law of the market. In order to > come out of this impasse supposes that we re-endow man with a direction and humanity with a > project, not in the political framework, but this would be once more the utopian search for a new > social contract, but in a spiritual framework, that is, by breathing into the body politic new [and] > regenerative values through the power of a therapeutic utterance. > Heidegger, Etre et temps, paragraph 63 > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > We have already demonstrated how the announced death of the subject is the consequence of the > announced death of metaphysics. By reducing man to Dasein, Heidegger and his followers wish to > demonstrate that man has no essence. The destruction of metaphysics thus results in the > deconstruction of the subject. Without essence, man is also without definition. He is not a fact of > nature. He is not motivated by any cultural determinism. Nor is he led by any teleological principle > that would traverse history and lead the species towards an historical or social accomplishment. For > Heidegger, the only finality of man is to manifest the truth of Being as presence in the world. Man is > thus but a project and this project can not but be individual, after the necessary concessions to a > social organization that must remain at a minimum in order not to be contrary to the blossoming of > each one. > > We see what this philosophy leads to: it is first of all an exasperation of individualism that makes > man the source of values in the world, from whence the importance of the problem of liberty. This > ends in an absolute social nominalism. Man reduced to his individualism contains not one > universality, or [at least] it is minimal. This is what Levy-Strauss sought to demonstrate. It is thus the > loss of all transcendence and of the referent of a morality the legitimacy of which is to be found in > itself. Social norms do not exist except because individuals accept to adhere to them. But if the > individuals, through despair and through their spiritual incapacity to assume this liberty choose > marginality, the powerless society is condemned to disintegration. With the loss of values comes the > loss of meaning, first the meaning of the collective life, and then the meaning of life itself. The > philosophy of history has been the object of attack at least as much as metaphysics. To denounce the > absurdity of seeking a meaning in the human adventure has become as much a commonplace as > anti-humanism such as was incarnated in Heidegger or Foucault, and the post-metaphysical > humanism that we find in Sartre. Finally, in removing the metaphysical base in the search for > humanity, the philosophers of deconstruction render all definition of inter-subjectivity impossible, > and thus also the construction of an ethic that would the translation of social and spiritual values and > the meaning of life. > > Finally, from the Baha’i point of view, anti-humanism and post-metaphysical humanism are not far > separated from one another. After having seen the radicalism of the metaphysic of Baha’u’llah, we > would not be surprised [to find] that he distances himself also from classical humanism. Baha’i > humanism does not derive from a hypothetic essence of man, that is, from one of the universals that > would be the intemporal man such as he existed in the world of ideas. In this, Baha’i thought > accords with contemporary humanism in saying that man is a project. But for [Baha’i thought] this > project is not totally free. It is obedient to laws that transcend humanity. These transcendental laws > relate in part to the limits that were fixed to the human condition, but above all they relate to the > potentialities which characterize the nature of man. > > The notion of “human nature” is fundamentally distinguished from that of “essence”, because the > notion of human nature incorporates in itself the idea of evolution. The true liberty of man is to > progress upon the path of the discovery of his humanity, and it is to develop the rich intellectual and > spiritual potentialities with which he has been endowed. That is precisely the meaning of history. > > Baha’u’llah affirms that man is a sum of infinite potentialities that will never be completely realized. > It is for each age to discover the humanity that is appropriate to him, as is shown to us by the > concept of “progressive Revelation”. Humanity is thus a relative notion, to be rediscovered > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > unceasingly and which does not take its meaning except in an historical context. Not only has man > evolved and will he continue to evolve biologically, but his psychological structures as [also] his > spiritual being will also continue to evolve. The meaning of spiritual life is thus for each to discover > his humanity in the limited and relative framework of the collective evolution of his epoch, and to > thus assume as his personal duty the progressive discovery of his own inner richness, which > Baha’u’llah affirms to be infinite. Man does not have the choice of ends, but he has the choice of > means. The progressive discovery of the humanity of man takes place through the discovery, also > progressive but especially relative, of the values that are, as we have seen, the spiritual laws of our > world. > > This survey of a vast subject has shown us many things. The first is that Baha’u’llah has made a > complete rupture with the thought of his time and seems to have had an intuition of a great number > of the philosophical ideas of the 20th century. The second is that he goes beyond them to open up > perspectives that are totally original. His thought has nothing to do with the Scholasticism of the > theological schools of his time. It is presented as the high ranking commentary of Aristotle, Ibn Sina > or Mulla Sadra. It is addressed to a situation that is still that in which we live and which is not an > abstract problem, but a problem that places in question the future of humanity. From this point of > view, Baha’u’llah is capable of dialoguing with all the great philosophers of our epoch. From one > side, his thought ratifies a great number of the intellectual perceptions of the 20th century. From > another side, it is a very great force of criticism and of proposition. The interest in studying this > thought is not then purely historical. There is in this work a power of questioning that leads to the > reconsideration of an entire part of our culture, but which is, at the same time, a message of > immense spiritual hope. > > BIBLIOGRAPHY > > ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Abbas. > > In English: > -Abdu'l-Bahá on Divine Philosophy, Boston, 1917. > -Some Answered Questions, Wilmette, Illinois,1981. > -The Promulgation of Universal Peace, Wilmette, Illinois, 1982. > -The Secret of Divine Civilisation, Wilmette, Illinois, 1975. > -Tablets of ‘Abdu’l-Baha 'Abbás, Vol. I., II, III., New-York, n.d. > -Selections from the Writings of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Haifa, 1978. > -Paris Talks, London, 1969. > -Memorial of the Faithful, translated by Marzieh Gail, Wilmette, Illinois, 1971. > > In French: > -Séléction des écrits d’Abdu’l-Baha, trad. P. Coulon, Bruxelles, 1983. > -Les bases de l'unité du monde,trad. A.-M. Dupeyron, Bruxelles, 1981 > -Lettre d’Abdu’l-Baha au professeur Auguste Forel, 2nd ed., Bruxelles, 1968. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > -Les causeries d’Abdu’l-Baha à Paris, Bruxelles, n.d. > In Arabic and Persian: > > -Makátíb-i-’Abdu’l-Baha, 7 vol, Téhéran. > -Muntakhibátí az Makátíb-i-Hadrat-i-’Abdu’l-Baha, vol I, Haïfa, 1978 > -Muntakhibátí az Makátíb-i-Hadrat-i-’Abdu’l-Baha, vol II, Haïfa, 1984 > -Muntakhibátí az Makátíb-i-Hadrat-i-’Abdu’l-Baha, vol III, Hofheim-Langenhein (H-L), 1992. > -Risáliy-i-Madaniyyih, 4th ed., H-L, 1984. > -Mufawadát, Leyden 1908, reproduction of the edition from the Netherlands, Téhéran, n.d. > -Majmú'iy-i-Khatátát-i-’Abdu’l-Baha dar safar-i-avval-i-Urúpá, H-L, 1984. > -Khatábát-i-Hadrat-i-’Abdu’l-Baha fí Urúbá wa Amríká, 1st ed., Cairo, 1921, 2nd ed., Karachi, > 1980. > -Alváh va Visáyáy-i-mubarakiy-i-Hadrat-i-’Abdu’l-Baha, Karachi, 1960. > > ABU YA'QUB SEJESTANI > > -Le Dévoilement des Choses cachées, (Kashf al-Mahjúb) translated by Henry Corbin, Paris,1988. > > ABU'L-FADL GULPAYGÁNÍ > > -Rasá'il, Téheran, 1977. > -Fasl al-Khitáb, Cairo, Egypt, n.d. > > AFIFI > > -al-Tasawwuf: al-Thawra al-rúhíyya fí'l-Islám, Alexandria, Egypt, 1963. > AFNAN, M. > > “Tafsír-i-Bismi'lláh ar-Rahmán ar-Rahím”, in Áhang-i-Badí', 24. 5-6 (126 E.B.) > > AHSÁ'Í, SHAIKH AHMAD. > > -Shahr al-Zíyárat al-jámi'at al-kabira, Téhéran, 1859. > > ALQUIE, F. > > -”Conscience et signes dans la philosophie moderne et le cartésianisme”, in Polarité du Symbole, > Etudes carmélitaines, 1960. > > AMANAT, Abbas. > > -Resurrection and Renewal; The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran, 1844-1850, Ithaca, > 1989. > > AMOLI, Haydar-i > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > -La philosophie shî'ite; le Texte des textes, prolégomènes du commentaire des Fusús d'Ibn 'Arabí, > edited and translated by H. Corbin in collaboration with Osman Yahya, Bibliothèque Iranienne > vol. 16 et 22, 1969-1975. > > ANAWATI, M. M. and GARDET > > -Introduction à la théologie musulmane, Paris, 1970. > > APHRAATE > > -Les Exposés d'Aphraate le sage persan, translated by J.-M. Pierre, n.p., n.d. > > ARNALDEZ, R. > > -”Láhút-Násút”, article in Encyclopédie de l'Islam, 2nd ed., n.p., n.d. > -”Qidam”, art. in Ibid.. > > THE BAB > > In English: > > -Selections of the Writings of the Bab, translated by H. Taherzadeh, Haifa, 1976. > > In French: > > -Extraits des Ecrits du Bab, trad en fr. à partir de la version anglaise de Taherzadeh, Bruxelles, > n.d. > -Le Beyan, trad. A. L. M. Nicolas, 4 vol., Paris, 1908-1911. > -Le Livre des sept preuves, trad. A. L. M. 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A. > > -Closer than your Life Vein; An Isight in the Wonders of Spiritual Fulfilment, Anchorage, 1978. > > WINTERBURN, G. > > -Table Talks with ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Chicago, 1908. > > ZOHOORI, E. > > -The Throne of the Inner Temple, Jamaica, 1985. > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > ENDNOTES > > i > Shoghi Effendi (1897-1957) was the great-grandson of Bahá’u’lláh. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, the eldest son of > Bahá’u’lláh, designated by his father as the perfect exemplar of his teachings and as his only and > unique interpreter designated Shoghi Effendi in his Will and Testament as “Guardian of the Faith” > (Vali Amru'llah) and bequeathed to him his function as unique interpreter of the Writings of > Bahá’u’lláh. Shoghi Effendi exercised his functions as Guardian, from the death of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá in > 1921 until his own death in 1957. He did not have a successor. Shoghi Effendi has himself > bequeathed to us a vast corpus consisting of several tens of thousands of letters in which he replied to > questions which were posed by the believers upon the texts of his great-grandfather (Bahá’u’lláh) > and his grandfather (‘Abdu’l-Bahá), and several works among which is “God Passes By”, a history of > the Bábí and Bahá’í movements from 1844 to 1944. > ii > ‘Abdu’l-Bahá (1844-1921) was the eldest son of Bahá’u’lláh. Nine years of age at the moment of > Bahá’u’lláh's first exile, he was always to follow his father who during his life designated him as “the > Greatest Branch” (Ghusn-i-a'zam) issued from his tree and designated him as the head of the > household. It is from this epoch which dates the habit of calling him “the Master” (Agha). In his will > and testament [Kitab-i-'Ahd], Bahá’u’lláh designates him as “the center of his covenant” (markaz-i- > mithaq) with men and the only and unique interpreter of his writings. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá assumed the > direction of the Bahá’í community upon the death of Bahá’u’lláh in 1892. He remained however a > prisoner of the Ottoman Empire until 1910. From the time of his liberation, he undertook the > propagation of the message of his father by voyages to Egypt, then to Europe and North America > until the beginning of the first World War the onslaught of which he had predicted. He made two > long visits to Paris in 1911 and 1913. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá has bequeathed to us numerous writings > including numerous “Tablets”. cf. M.-M. Balyuzi, “‘Abdu’l-Bahá: The Centre of the Covenant of > Bahá’u’lláh,” London 1971 and S. Le Maitre, “Une grande figure de l'unite ‘Abdu’l-Bahá,” Paris, > 1952. > iii > Translator’s Note: > > “Say: Glory be to Thee Who hast caused all the holy Ones to confess their helplessness before the > manifold revelations of Thy might, and every Prophet to acknowledge His nothingness at the > effulgence of Thine abiding glory.” (GWB, XXIII, p. 59) > > Wert thou to ponder in thine heart, from now until the end that hath no end, and with all the > concentrated intelligence and understanding which the greatest minds have attained in the past > or will attain in the future, this divinely ordained and subtle Reality, this sign of the revelation of > the All-Abiding, All-Glorious God, thou wilt fail to comprehend its mystery or to appraise its > virtue. Having recognized thy powerlessness to attain to an adequate understanding of that > Reality which abideth within thee, thou wilt readily admit the futility of such efforts as may be > attempted by thee, or by any of the created things, to fathom the mystery of the Living God, the > Day Star of unfading glory, the Ancient of everlasting days. (GWB, LXXXIII, p. 165) > > From eternity Thou hast, in Thy transcendent oneness, been immeasurably exalted above Thy > servants' conception of Thy unity, and wilt to eternity remain, in Thine unapproachable > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > singleness, far above the praise of Thy creatures. No words that any one beside Thee may utter > can ever beseem Thee, and no man's description except Thine own description can befit Thy > nature. All who adore Thy unity have been sore perplexed to fathom the mystery of Thy > oneness, and all have confessed their powerlessness to attain unto the comprehension of Thine > essence and to scale the pinnacle of Thy knowledge. The mighty have all acknowledged their > weakness, and the learned recognized their ignorance. (PM, No. 79, pp. 129-130) > > The Bab expressed the same concept in many of his writings, including these excerpts: > > He is exalted above the comprehension of all things, and is inscrutable to the mind of every > created being; none shall be able to fathom the oneness of His Being or to unravel the nature > of His Existence. No peer or likeness, no similitude or equal can ever be joined with Him. > (Selections from the Writings of the Bab, p. 154) > > The signs which the sanctified essences reveal and the words which the exalted realities > express and the allusions manifested by the ethereal entities all proclaim that Thou art > immeasurably exalted above the reach of the embodiments of the realm of being, and all > solemnly affirm that Thou art immensely high above the description of such as are wrapt in > the veils of fancy. (Selections from the Writings of the Bab, p. 206) > > Men of wisdom, who had but a notion of the revelation of Thy glory, conceived a likeness of > Thee according to their own understanding, and men of erudition, who had gained but a > glimpse of the manifold evidences of Thy loving-kindness and glory, have contrived peers for > Thee in conformity with their own imaginations. > > Glorified, immeasurably glorified art Thou, O Lord! > > Every man of insight is far astray in his attempt to recognize Thee, and every man of > consummate learning is sore perplexed in his search after Thee. Every evidence falleth short > of Thine unknowable Essence and every light retreateth and sinketh below the horizon when > confronted with but a glimmer of the dazzling splendour of Thy might. (Selections from the > Writings of the Bab, p. 207) > > The Jewish mystics referred to the unknowable essence as “Ein Sof” (Hebrew: without end), and > quote the famous words of YHWH to Moses: > > 33:18 And he [Moses] said, I beseech thee [YHWH], shew me thy glory. 33:19 And he said, I > will make all my goodness pass before thee, and I will proclaim the name of the LORD before > thee; and will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will shew mercy on whom I will shew > mercy. 33:20 And he [YHWH] said, Thou canst not see my face: for there shall no man see me, > and live. 33:21 And the LORD said, Behold, there is a place by me, and thou shalt stand upon a > rock: 33:22 And it shall come to pass, while my glory passeth by, that I will put thee in a clift of > the rock, and will cover thee with my hand while I pass by: 33:23 And I will take away mine > hand, and thou shalt see my back parts: but my face shall not be seen. (King James Bible, > Exodus) > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > There are also the words of Jesus in the Gospels that point to the inability of human beings to > know the essence of God: > > Jesus saith to him: I am the way, the truth, and the life; no man cometh unto the Father but > by me. (Gospel of John, 14:6) > > …neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will > reveal him. (Gospel of Matthew, 11:27) > > …and no man knoweth…who the Father is, but the Son, and he to whom the Son will > reveal him. (Luke 10:22) > > But of that day and hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels of heaven, but my Father only. > (Gospel of Matthew, 24:36) > > But of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, > neither the Son, but the Father. (Gospel of Mark, 13:32) > iv > “Mother-Book” (“Umm al-Kitab”) is generally interpreted by Muslims as designating the celestial > prototype of the Qur'an. Certain traditions (hadith) also speak of the “Original-Book” (Asl al-Kitab). > It is of course a Qur'anic expression very close to that of “preserved Tablet”, and the commentators > have long argued in order to know whether these two expressions are synonymous. They have > generally concluded with subtle distinctions that we cannot reproduce here. We read in the Sura of > the thunder [suratu'r-ra'd](Qur'an XIII:39): [yamhuwa allahu mayashaa'u wa yushbitu wa 'indaha > ummu'l-kitabi] “God effaces that which He wishes and establishes that which He wishes for He > witholds the Mother-Book”. The “Mother-Book” appears thus here as linked to the divine decrees. > But, paradoxically, this passage, far from speaking of the immutability of the divine decrees, as we > could understand from it, insists on the contrary upon their possible alteration. A second passage in > the Sura of the family of 'Imraan [suratu'l-'imraan](Qur'an III:7): [huwa'l-lladhii anzala 'alaika'l- > kitaba minhu ayatun muhkamatun hunna umma'l-kitaabi] “He is caused to descend upon you the > Book in which are found the well established verses of the Mother-Book” [wa-ukharu > mutashabihatun faamma'-lladhiina rii quluwbihim zayghun fayattabi'uwna maatashaabaha minhu > bitighaa'a'l-fitnati wa-bitighaa'a taawiylihi wa maaya'lamu taawiylaha illaa allahu wa'lr-rasikhuwna > fii'l'ilmi yaquwluwna amannaabihi kullun min 'indi rabbinaa wa-maa yadhdhakkaru illaa uwluw'l- > laalbaabi] “and others who are doubtful (mutashabihat, that is to say ambivalent). Those who in > their heart have a penchant towards error follow only their own will and interpret them. But nobody > knows their interpretation except for God, and those who distinguish themselves by knowledge who > say: 'we believe in the Book and that all that it contains comes from God'. Thence think those who > are gifted with intelligence.” This verse establishes then a distinction between the verses which are > “well established” which proceed directly from the Mother-Book, and the verses which are subject > to interpretation and inspire doubt in men. The Bab writes in his Commentary on the Sura of > Joseph [Qayyumu'l-Asmaa']: “In truth, we have revealed to you this Book with truth to our servant > ('abd: that is to say to the Bab), and we have given all the clear verses (muhkamat) and without an > ambiguous verse (mutashabihat). And none knows their interpretation except for God and those > whom we have chosen among the sincere servants of God. Consequently ask from the Dhikr (the > remembrance, the mention, i.e. the Bab) their interpretation.” This verse would suggest that the > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Mother-Book contains the spiritual laws and that the ambiguous verses are the prophecies and the > metaphorical teachings the interpretation of which changes in every Dispensation. Only in the > Revelation of the Bab is there no ambiguous verse on the condition that one ask for the > interpretation from the Bab. Bahá’u’lláh utilizes on many occasions the expression Mother-Book. > For example he speaks of God as “He with Whom is the Mother Book” (English: GWB, XIV, p. 34; > French: EEB, XIV, p. 32). In a Bahá’í context one could say that the Mother-Book represents the > immutable aspects of Revelation such as the spiritual laws of creation, while the social laws and the > prophetic or metaphorical teachings are subject to change and to reinterpretation. > v > “Preserved Tablet” (al-lawh al-mahfuzh). Even though the word “lawh”, usually translated by > “Tablet”, can be found in an Arabic root, the word was almost certainly borrowed from Hebrew or > Aramaic in the specific sense which it is given by the Qur'an (cf. “The foreign vocabulary of the > Qoran,” Baroda, 1938, pp. 253-254). The term “lawh” appears in several places of the Qur'an with > different meanings. It served to describe the Ark of Noah (Qur'an LIV:13), without doubt because it > was made of planks. It seems also that in the Arabic of Mecca or the Hijaz the term meant plank, > and it is also possible that the plural (alwah) served to designate the two small planks of wood which > served to fasten the pages of a book, from whence the association which certain commentators made > from the first centuries onwards between this word and the Qur'an. In the Sura of al-A'raf the term > designates the Tables of Laws [alwah] (Qur'an VII:145,150,154) which Moses brought back from > Mount Sinai. The expression “preserved Tablet” only appears but once in the Qur'an in the Sura of > the signs of the zodiac [suratu'l-buruuj] which ends with these words: [bal huwa qur'aanun majiidun > fii lawhin mahfuuzhin] “In truth this is the glorious Qur'an in the form of a preserved Tablet.” One > could have understood in a very prosaic manner that the Qur'an is preserved between two planks of > wood. But the commentators have made it noted that the word “lawh” is here in the singular and > that it is even the only time in all the Qur'an in which it appears in the singular, which could not be > the fruit of hazard. It is probable that they are right and that the word “lawh” in the singular is > charged with a technical meaning which must be sought in the Hebrew or Aramaean language. > Certain commentators, to be truthful rather rare, have proposed to link the adjective “preserved” to > the word Qur'an and suggest to read the verse: “this is the glorious Qur'an which is preserved in a > Tablet”; it suffices for this to change the vocalization of the vowels as follows: bal huwa qur'Anun > mmajiydun fiy lawhun mmahfuzhun. But one must recognize that this reading forces the customs of > syntax a little and seems unnatural. Thus the Qur'an gives but few clarifications upon the meaning > of this “preserved Tablet” which was going to make much ink run. The term certainly has a Biblical > origin for if the root LWH is attested in all the Semetic languages (Amharic, Yemenite, Hebrew, > Aramaic), including Arabic, we do not know in this language this particular meaning which links the > Tablet to writing while this meaning is attested in Hebrew which perhaps was here subject to a > Babylonian influence which research in Sumerian and Akkadian literature could confirm. The > origin of this “Tablet” perhaps may be found in the tablettes of clay which the inhabitants of > Mesopotamia used to write; from which the association of the tablet and the “qalam” [pen] , which > is found even in the Writings of Bahá’u’lláh (the supreme pen, al-qalam al-a'la; the qalam in Arabic > is nothing other than the calamus in Latin), as we say today “a pen and ink”. The word is attested in > Hebrew in the apocryphal texts. In the “Book of Jubilees” (II:10), it is said that the laws concerning > the rites of purification of the bedridden are written upon a tablet in the heaven. We find the same > affirmation concerning the law of the Tabernacles (Leviticus XXII; Jubilees XXII:5) and the law of > the tenth (Leviticus XXVII), from whence Judaism developed the idea that all the laws are > transcribed from a “Tablet” which is found close to God. In the pseudepigraphical literature, the > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > celestial Tablets are considered as the original text of the revelation. It is because of the knowledge of > these Tablets that the Prophet Hanoch (Enoch) had precognition of the future. We see thus appear > a second idea which is that the Tablets contain all the divine decrees, and thus fix the destinies of > men. These ideas passed into Islam which gave them a considerable amplification. Thus the > “Qalam” was to become the symbol of the complete power of the divine. The commentators on the > Qur'an substituted a fertile imagination in absence of all objective information concerning the > “preserved Tablet”. They made of it an instrument of a providential order, the proof of the > determinism of the universe, the sign of the election of the faithful and of the damnation of the > infidels, the mirror of the divine knowledge, the first intelligence (al-'aql al-awwaliyya), the universal > soul of the universe, the first motive, the philosophical stone, the symbol of divine omniscience, the > instrument of the substantification of the sensible universe, the first cause of the existence of > individual beings created by the divine decree, and still other things as well. Ghazali affirmed that > the preserved Tablet contains the collection of the intelligible realities of Malakut (Ihya III:18; > IV:428-429). Certain mystics assimilated the preserved Tablet to the heart of man. The > controversies over the nature of the “preserved Tablet” had a great theological importance in > determining if the Qur'an had been created or if it had always existed in the science of God. This > question was tied to that of the liberty of man and of predestination in general. > > Translator’s Note: There is a reference to the meaning of “the preserved Tablet” (lawh-i-mahfuzh) > as found in Bahá’u’lláh's “Kalimat-I-Makunih Farsi,” #64, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá wrote: “Thou hast asked > about the “Tablet of Chrysolite” and the “Preserved Tablet”. By the “Chrysolite Tablet” is > meant the Book of Bahá'u'lláh's Covenant which is the Preserved Tablet. It was hidden and > preserved, now it is made manifest and resplendent. The Chrysolite Tablet is recorded and > enshrined in the inmost recesses of the Book of the Covenant.” ('Abdu'l-Bahá, from a Tablet— > translated from the Persian by the Research Department and included in an unpublished > compilation, found at http://bahai-library.com/compilation_hidden_words_bwc . Shoghi > Effendi wrote: “The “Preserved Tablet” is a spiritual expression and has no actual existence. It > sometimes refers to the Manifestation Himself, Whose knowledge encompasses the knowledge of > the former and the latter generations.” (In the handwriting of Shoghi Effendi on the margin of an > incoming letter dated 8 July 1929, instructing his secretary—translated from the Persian by the > Research Department, and available at: http://bahai-library.com/compilation_hidden_words_bwc > vi > Translator’s Note: “Tablets of Chrysolite”, an expression found in GWB, CIV, p. 210/136 > (Persian original: alwah zabarjad); in TB, p. 147/126/77 (Persian and Arabic texts: alwahihi'l- > zabarjadiihi, from www.bahai.com); in Persian Hidden Words, #63 (Persian text: alwahi zabarjadii, > from www.bahai.com). “Thou hast asked about the “Tablet of Chrysolite” and the “Preserved > Tablet”. By the “Chrysolite Tablet” is meant the Book of Bahá'u'lláh's Covenant which is the > Preserved Tablet. It was hidden and preserved, now it is made manifest and resplendent. The > Chrysolite Tablet is recorded and enshrined in the inmost recesses of the Book of the Covenant.” > ('Abdu'l-Bahá, from a Tablet—translated from the Persian by the Research Department, and > included in an unpublished compilation, found at http://bahai-library.com/compilation_hidden > _words_bwc . Chrysolite derives from Greek, where it means “gold stone”. According to > www.gemtraders.com/research/peridot.html, prior to the advent of modern chemistry, gem > stones were classified only by color. All green gems were called emeralds [zumurrudii in Persian > and Arabic, as found in Persian Hidden Word #77] at one time, and these included chrysolite > gems. In fact, the so-called emeralds so beloved of the Egyptian pharaohs and of Queen > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > Cleopatra were actually chrysolite gems. Chrysolite, now called peridot, a gem variety of the > mineral olivine, was mined on what is now called St. John's Island or Zebirget, in the Red Sea, > from 1300 B.C. In ancient times the island was called Topazios, and the chrysolite gems were > known as topaz. In Persian, “zabarjad” means “emerald; a chrysolite” and “zabarjadi hindii” is a > “topaz” while “zabarjadii” indicates “the colour of the emerald or topaz” (Steingass, p. 610). > According to www.geocities.com/andreacrisco/page004.html, St. John's Island is also called > Zabargad, and “The olivine gems found in Zabargad were improperly called emeralds because > of their absolutely peculiar green-leaf color.” The fact that Zabargad, the Persian word for > chrysolite, is the name of this island, indicates a probable connection with Iran. We know there > was an earlier connection with the Pharaohs. There also may be a link to the Hermetic tradition, > inasmuch as the keystone of that tradition is the Emerald Tablet(s), regarded as containing the > most important teachings of Hermes Trismegistus. Bahá’u’lláh refers to Hermes in “Lawh-i- > Basitu'l-Haqiqa” as “The first person who devoted himself to philosophy…After him Balinus > [Appollonius of Tyana] derived his knowledge and sciences from the Hermetic Tablets and most > of the philosophers who followed him made their philosophical and scientific discoveries from his > words and statements.” (TB, p. 148, n. 1) > vii > We think particularly of the example of Thomas Breakwell, one of the disciples of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá > who became a Bahá’í in Paris in 1902, died at the age of twenty-nine years, some months only after > having embraced the Faith and encountered ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. See: “La vie de Thomas Breakwell,” > Rajwantee Lakshman-Lepain, Paris, 1992. In a Tablet which he revealed on the occasion of > Thomas Breakwell's decease, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá says that he left the world of Nasut to rise to the world of > Malakut, then having received the confirmation of the grace of the world of Lahut, he arrived at the > threshold of the Lord of Jabarut. (Muntakhabaati az Makaatib-i-Had.rat-i ‘Abdu’l-Bahá'“, volume I, > extract #158). The French translation of the Arabic text says simply: “Tu as quitté ce monde > térrèstre (Nasut) pour atteindre le Royaume (Malakut), tu es parvenu à la grace du monde invisible > (Lahut) et tu t'es offert au seuil de son Seigneur (Rabb).” [This translation follows the English: “Thou > has quit this earthly world and risen upward to the Kingdom, and hast reached unto the grace of the > invisible realm, and offered thyself at the threshold of its Lord.” (SWAB, #158, pp. 187-188)] This > translation seems to be faulty in more than one aspect. “Bi-fayd” should be translated by “by the > grace” and not “unto the grace”. “Wafada” signifying “to attain, to voyage, to visit,” probably was > confused with “fada” signifying “to sacrifice oneself,” since it is translated by “offered thyself”. As for > the word “Jabarut,” it was simply omitted in the translation. (SEAB, p. 186) One must recognize > that this terminology of the divine worlds is ultimately impossible to translate. Once we have > restored the original terms and we have arrived at the comprehension, even slight, of the meaning of > each of these worlds, the Tablet is illumined in an entirely different sense than any translation could > convey. Shoghi Effendi conveyed this conception with regard to the writings of Bahá’u’lláh in a > prefatory note to his translation of the “Book of Certitude”: “We understand that Thomas Breakwell > arrived at the highest station which it is permitted for man to attain: the threshold of Jabarut, there > where one can contemplate the divine Manifestation, not in his Malakutian aspect, but in all the > splendour of his rank as Lord of Jabarut. It should be noted that the Arabic text does not indicate > that Thomas Breakwell actually entered the realm of Jabarut, but rather that he attained (wafadat) > the threshold ('atabaT) of the Lord of Jabarut (rabbu'l-jabarut).” > viii > Translator’s Note: Sources for this metaphysical scheme can be found in the writings of the > Bab: Kitáb-i-Asmá', XVI:17; “Selections from the Writings of the Báb,” p. 131; “Selections from > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > the Writings of the Báb,” p. 178. In the writings of Bahá’u’lláh: “Prayers and Meditations” (PM), > XXXVIII, pp. 48-49; PM, LXXX, pp. 132-133. In the writings of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá: “Some Answered > Questions, “ Chapter LXII, p. 230; “Some Answered Questions,” Chapter LXXXII, pp. 295-96; > Makatib-i-’Abdu’l-Bahá, volume II, p. 141; Sharh Wahdat-i-Wujúd, in Makatib-i-’Abdu’l-Bahá, > volume III, pp. 354-358; and in Min Makatib-i-’Abdu’l-Bahá, pp. 274-277 with provisional > translation by Keven Brown published in “Journal of Bahá’í Studies,” II:3, p. 24; Ma'idiy-i-Asmani, > volume II, p. 102; translated in Bahai Scriptures, #914, p. 479. In letters written on behalf of Shoghi > Effendi: Letter written on behalf of Shoghi Effendi dated 29 November 1929, published in > #1724, p. 510, “Lights of Guidance,” compiled and edited by Helen Hornby; New Delhi: Bahá'í > Publishing Trust, 1988, second revised edition; letter written on behalf of Shoghi Effendi dated > 28 February 1938, published in #909, p. 269, “Lights of Guidance,” compiled and edited by > Helen Hornby; New Delhi: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1988, second revised edition. > ix > The word “MalkUt” in Hebrew comes from the verb “malaka” which signifies “to reign” and is > found employed in numerous uses in the Bible. Wilhelm Gesenius has identified three principle > meanings: the meaning of “Royalty” (keonigtum; keonigswurde) as in 1 Samuel 20:31; 1 Kings 2:12; > Psalm 45:11 [?], 47:7 [?]; 1 Chronicles 12:23, with, for example, “the royalty of Saul”. The word is > later employed in the sense of “Kingdom” (koenigreich), as when one speaks of the “Kingdom of > Judah” (2 Chronicles 11:17) or of the “Kingdom of the Chaldeans” (Esther 1:11,19 [?]; 2:17 [?]). (cf. > Wilhelm Gesenius, “Hebraische und Arameische Handwortebuch,” 2nd edition, Berlin, 1962.) > Other authors have distinguished a fourth meaning in which MalkUt designates the reign > considered in its duration (1 Chronicles 26:31) (cf. Philippe Raymon, “Dictionnaire d'Hebreux et > d'Armeneen biblique,” p. 214). As we see, in the Old Testament [Bible] the word MalkUt does not > have a metaphorical sense and applies only to political royalty. [How about the references to God as > the King?] It is apparently the Essenes who gave to the word a more mystical and metaphorical > meaning. But the elaboration of the Judaic concept of Royalty was particularly labored. The > Hebrews belonged to the nomadic Semites of the desert to whom these notions are foreign. The > installation of a monarchy which replaces the ideal of government of the Patriarchs was above all > the work of David. The notion of “royalty,” to which is attached the concept of “Kingdom” and of > MalkUt, is thus foreign to Judaic culture and must be considered as a borrowing. But, the Jewish > people knew in the course of its history two great royalties, that of Egypt and that of Mesopotamia. > It is probable that the linguistic schemes of the concept of royalty were borrowed from the Assyrian > culture. One notes in any case a very close kinship between the Hebrew MalkUt and the Assyrian > MalkUtu; a word which was perhaps also vocalized as MalikUtu. According to Friedrich Delitzch, > the Assyrian MalkUtu had the meaning of “principality” (Furstenthum), in the sense of the > appanage of a prince or of a sovereign, of a reign, of royalty (Herrschaft). Delitzch cites as an > example the expression “mal-kut la sha-na an”, “a reign without parallel” (from the Assyrian > Koenigsherrschaft IR 35, Nr. 1, 1; Nr. 3, 3) He cites other examples of texts such as: “eli sharrAni > malkut UtU sharru-tU kish-shu-ta lIpu-ush” and III. R. 66. Rev. 24c: “ana ma-lik-tu-tim lul-ta-ta > napkher that”. The interest of the Assyrian texts is that they link royalty to the God Marduk, > opening thereby the way to the spiritualization of the concept. One finds in the Book of Creation > IV. 2: “Marduk a-na ma-li-ku-tum ir-ma”; expression in which Marduk clearly depicted as a “ma- > lik” (king) who has sovereign authority (Eintscheidung) that is to say, the counsellor (Berather), he > who determines (Entscheider) and not the prince (BAl et Ea. K. 2107 Obv. 8). One finds in Assyrian > numerous derivatives of the same family such as “malAku,” “imlik” and “imallik” with the meaning > of expert, of counsellor (berathschalgen, beraten) and in consequence, the term designates the means > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > by which sovereignty is exercised (cf. Friedrich Delitzch, “Assyrisches Handworterbuch,” Leipzig, > 1896). It is probable that this Assyrian influence was determinating in the evolution of the concept of > Royalty in Israel and for its late spiritualization among the Essenes. The MalakUt of Al-Makki > Suhrawardi and finally of Bahá’u’lláh could not perhaps have had its day without this fundamental > Assyrian contribution. > x > The root GBR or JBR is found attested in numerous Semitic languages including Hebrew, > Assyrian, Syriac and Arabic. It denotes in Hebrew and in Aramaic the idea of force and of power. > The verb “gebar” signifies “to be strong,” “to dominate”. It is first of all the virile power for the > word “geber” also signifies “man” as the Syriac “gebr”. The term serves in Genesis to qualifying the > waters of the deluge (Genesis 7:18 [?]) and in the Exodus the enemies of Israel (Exodus 17:11 [?]). > Afterwards the concept is spiritualized and becomes an attribute of God, as in the name of Gabriel. > (cf. Wilhelm Gesenius, “Hebraische und Arameische Handworterbuch,” p. 128). The Assyrian does > not contribute illumination here for in this language the root GBR evolved differently and serves to > mark opposition. The word “GabrU” (GAB. RI) has a first meaning of “response” and of > “example” in matters of written documents, and a second meaning in which it serves to qualify a > person or a thing which is confronted to another. (cf. Friedrich Delitzch, “Assyrische > Handworterbuch,” [p. 128]). > xi > The “Targumim” [plural form of Targum] are the adaptations of the Torah in Aramaic which > was the spoken language in Palestine about the time of the Christian era. The texts of the > Targumim were not literal translations of the Old Testatment [Biblical] texts but rather a free > adaptation into which were admixed commentaries, scolies [?], amplifications and developments > most often taken from the oral tradition. The word Targum comes from an old Hittite word > signifying translation which was borrowed by the Egyptians. It is through this intermediary that the > word penetrated into the Semitic languages, giving targum in Hebrew and tarjUma in Arabic. The > Arabic takes from it the root TRJM which serves to compose numerous words such as “mutarjim” > (interpreter; translator) which gave to French “truchement” [interpreter] as well as “drogman” > [interpreter, dragoman] having the same meaning in passing into Italian as “drogomanno” which > was itself borrowed from Byzantine Greek. The history of words underlines sometimes certain > aspects of the unity of the Mediterranean cultures. > xii > The name Aphraate remained alive in tradition because of a series of twenty-three treatises or > “Expositions” which, until the discovery of Syriac manuscripts of his work in 1855, were known only > through partial translations in the Armenian and Ethiopic languages. We know very little about the > life of Aphraate, and even his true name is subject to controversy. The reader could refer profitably > to the article “Aphraate” of J. Parisot in “Dictionnaire de Theologie catholique” (Paris, 1923, tome > I, 2e partie, col. 1457-1463). This somewhat antiquated work can be updated by consulting the > thesis of J.-M. Pierre, “Les Exposes de Aphraate le sage persan,” unfortunately unpublished > (Bibliotecque de l'Institut Catholique, 3 vol. in-4*, cote 09099 th 504), which contains a French > translation of the “Expositions” of Aphraate with abundant notes. The few elements which are > known about the life of Aphraate were reconstituted based on the interpretation of certain passages > of his “Expositions”. We know with certitude that these were composed in the Occidental provinces > of the Persian Empire in the reign of Shapur between 336 and 345 of the Common Era [A.D.]. > Aphraate was born into a “pagan” family, for it is thus that he describes his forefathers, without it > being possible to indicate whether they adhered to the Zoroastrian religion or to a Mesopotamian > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > cult. It was during his maturity that Aphraate converted to Christianity and subsequently decided to > consecrate his life to God. We do not know whether he received ecclesiastical orders or if contented > himself to follow an ascetic life. It is generally thought that he was vested with the episcopal dignity. > Tradition makes of him the superior of the monastery of Bar Mattai, located north of Mosul, which > was the seat of the bishops of the province of Ninevah-Mosul. Aphraate is designated by the name > Mar James in the colophon of a manuscript, and it is generally inferred therefrom that James was > the name which he assumed be it from his baptism, or more probably when he was elevated to the > episcopate. The name Aphraate, a deformation of the Persian name Farhad, does not appear except > late in the 10th century in the “Lexicon of Bar Bahlul” and in other sources of the same epoch. > Nevertheless, the “Lexicon” may be the echo of a much older tradition, even if most of the later > sources do not know the author of the “Expositions” except by the name of “Persian sage”. > Meanwhile, we know another with the name of Aphraate (Farhad), a martyr who was a > contemporary of our author, and three bishops from later centuries who likewise bore this name, a > clear indication that the name was employed by Christians. The Armenian translation of the > “Expositions” gives its author the name of James of Nineveh, which seems to be justified by the very > particular affection which he shows in his “Expositions” to the Ninevites and which would be well > understood if he was their bishop; conversely, George of the Arabs, without doubt erroneously, > attributes to him the name James of Nisibe. The “Expositions” show that Aphraate had a very > advanced knowledge of the Bible and that he was animated by a profound and authentic spirituality > founded above all upon the study of the Gospels, of which he had a prodigious knowledge as well as > erudition, clarity of expression and humility. His doctrinal positions are considered by the Church to > have been orthodox for his time, considering that the Church has since abandoned a number of the > teachings of the Fathers of this epoch, these positions having been censored by later councils. Eleven > of the twenty-three expositions are texts defending Christianity or and proselytizing polemic, of > which nine are intended for the Jews and two are directed against heretics. Aphraate must have > studied Judaic theology closely, this religious environment being represented in his province by the > old theological schools founded in the first centuries, a characteristic which is not without interest for > our study. Malkuto is the term he readily makes use of to designate the “kingdom” of the Gospel. It is > interesting to find that it was this Persian and Christian subject that appears as an important link in > the transmission of this word. This presence of the word in his writings can be taken to support the > hypothesis that it is in 'Iraq that the transmission of this term to the Muslim mystics was most likely > effected. Nevertheless, one must admit that such speculations rest on extremely fragile bases. > xiii > There has been much discussion as to whether Ibn 'Arabic was or was not a pantheist. We > believe that it is a false debate for there are various ways of defining pantheism, which is a term used > in Occidental philosophy. This term is inappropriate when it is projected upon Muslim or Indian > philosophy. On the other hand, we are not in agreement with the rejection of the expression > “existential monism” because this term effectively translates the Arabic “wah.dat al-wujuud” which we > consider to be altogether appropriate to describe the thought of Ibn 'Arabi, on the condition that > certain nuances are introduced. Of course there are various ways to interpret Ibn 'Arabi, and certain > Sufi sects which made use of his teaching, particularly in the epoch of Bahá’u’lláh, were clearly > pantheists, not in saying that God is present in all sensible realities, which is one thesis, but in saying > that in the sensible realities there exists nothing but God, which is another thesis. Bahá’u’lláh very > explicitly refuted this point. It is true that Ibn 'Arabi taught the unity of Being (wujuud), but not the > unicity of Being (mawjud) or of the beings. However, Being present in the being, one falls rapidly > upon difficulties which are practically impossible to surmount and upon which we will not extend > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > ourselves here. > > xivTranslator’s Note: Baha’u’llah, “Lawh-i-Hikmat”, in Tablets of Baha’u’llah revealed after the > > Kitab-i-Aqdas: “Say: Nature in its essence is the embodiment of My Name, the Maker, the > Creator. Its manifestations are diversified by varying causes, and in this diversity there are signs > for men of discernment. Nature is God’s Will and is its expression in and through the > contingent world. It is a dispensation of Providence ordained by the Ordainer, the All-Wise. > Were anyone to affirm that it is the Will of God as manifested in the world of being, no one > should question this assertion. It is endowed with a power whose reality men of learning fail to > grasp. Indeed a man of insight can perceive naught therein save the effulgent splendor of Our > Name, the Creator. Say: This is an existence which knoweth no decay, and Nature itself is lost > in bewilderment before its revelations, its compelling evidences and its effulgent glory which have > encompassed the universe.” > > xvTranslator’s Note: ‘Abdu’l-Baha, “Some Answered Questions”, Chapter 16: “The other kind of > > human knowledge is that of intelligible things; that is, it consists of intelligible realities which have > no outward form or place and which are not sensible. For example, the power of the mind is not > sensible, nor are any of the human attributes: These are intelligible realities. Love, likewise, is an > intelligible and not a sensible reality. For the ear does not hear these realities, the eye does not see > them, the smell does not sense them, the taste does not detect them, the touch does not perceive > them. Even the ether, the forces of which are said in natural philosophy to be heat, light, > electricity, and magnetism, is an intelligible and not a sensible reality. Likewise, nature itself > is an intelligible and not a sensible reality; the human spirit is an intelligible and not a > sensible reality.” > > xviTranslator’s Note: Baha’u’llah, “Kitab-i-Iqan”, pp. 1-2: “No man shall attain the shores of the > > ocean of true understanding except he be detached from all that is in heaven and on earth. > Sanctify your souls, O ye peoples of the world, that haply ye may attain that station which > God hath destined for you and enter thus the tabernacle which, according to the dispensations of > Providence, hath been raised in the firmament of the Bayán. The essence of these words is this: > they that tread the path of faith, they that thirst for the wine of certitude, must cleanse > themselves of all that is earthly—their ears from idle talk, their minds from vain > imaginings, their hearts from worldly affections, their eyes from that which perisheth. They > should put their trust in God, and, holding fast unto Him, follow in His way. Then will > they be made worthy of the effulgent glories of the sun of divine knowledge and understanding, > and become the recipients of a grace that is infinite and unseen, inasmuch as man can never > hope to attain unto the knowledge of the All-Glorious, can never quaff from the stream of divine > knowledge and wisdom, can never enter the abode of immortality, nor partake of the cup of > divine nearness and favor, unless and until he ceases to regard the words and deeds of mortal > men as a standard for the true understanding and recognition of God and His Prophets.” > xvii > The expression “kullu shay” in the numerological system of abjad (arithmology, also called > gematria and jafs), has for its value 361, which is the number of the infinite because it is composed > of 19 times 19. The number 19 is named by the Bab a “unity” (vahid), for in this arithmological > system a number is always reducible to the sum of the digits of which it is composed, only 9 > taking the value of 0, as in the proof by 9. Thus 9 is, at the same time, the greatest unity which > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > recapitulates in itself all the digits, thus the power of infinity; and the hidden digit which effaces > itself in the arithmological result. Nineteen (19) is thus equal to 1 (the unity), for 1 plus 9 is 1 plus > 0 which is 1. Nineteen (19) is thus equal to the unity, while at the same time containing all the > power of infinity which permits it to engender other monads equal to itself. The first unity was > that of the Letters of the Living (huruf-i-hayy), made up of the Bab and his first eighteen disciples. > The word “hayy” has the value 18 and the Bab was the 1 which completed the Vahid (Unity)— > thus 18 plus 1—or the “point” (nuqtih) which identifies the B in the first verse and invocation of > the Qur'an (the B of Bismi'llah). This first Unity constituted the “manifest Unity” (Vahid-i-mubin) or > the “model Unity” (Vahid-i-mubayin), which might also be called “explanatory,” “paradigmatic,” > or “archetypal,” depending on the manner in which one vocalizes the letters MBYN. This first > Unity, in a metaphorical manner, had for its function the transmission of new life to all things by > multiplying itself, 19 by 19. Thus, “the secret” of “all things” is hidden in the first “vahid”, and > this secret is nothing other than the “Countenance of God”, alluding to the Qur'anic verse: “All > things shall perish except for His Countenance (wajhahu)…” (Qur'an 28:88) For more details on > these numerological calculations, see Abbas Amanat, “Resurrection and Renewal: The Making > of the Bábí Movement, 1844-1850” (Ithaca and London, 1989, pp. 191-193). The expression “all > things” appears among the first verses of the Persian Bayan (Bayan-i-farsi, I:1:1), and is found > thereafter in an incalculable number of the Bab's verses. The not altogether satisfactory > explanation given to this expression by Nicolas is found in the first volume of his translation of > the Persian Bayan (Le Bayan persan, tome I, pp. 7-9). The Persian Bayan is itself divided into 9 > units called Vahid, each one subdivided into 19 chapters (abwab), with the exception of the last, > composed of 10 abwab, which “Him Whom God shall manifest” must complete. To be complete, > reflecting the principle of “kullu shay “, the Persian Bayan should have 19 Vahid each composed of > 19 abwab. Bahá’u’lláh completed the Persian Bayan in substance through the revelation of the > Book of Certitude, but in an entirely different form, containing neither the Vahid nor the abwab. > The purpose of this number symbolism is for the divine Word to recapitulate in a symbolic > manner the entire creation of which it is the motive power. The Badi' calendar, revealed by the > Bab in the Persian Bayan, and adopted and elaborated by the Bahá’ís, is composed of 19 months > of 19 days, to which are added the intercalary days, either four or five depending on the year. > > xviiiTranslator’s Note: As far as I know, the only authoritative Baha’i interpretation of the opening > > verses of Kitab-i-Aqdas is the reference to them by 'Abdu'l-Baha in “Some Answered Questions” > (chapter 65, p. 149): > > Question: It is said in the Kitáb-i-Aqdas: “…whoso is deprived thereof, hath gone astray, though he be the > author of every righteous deed”. What is the meaning of this verse? > > Answer: The meaning of this blessed verse is that the foundation of success and salvation is the recognition of > God, and that good deeds, which are the fruit of faith, derive from this recognition. > > When this recognition is not attained, man remains veiled from God and, as he is veiled, his good works fail to > achieve their full and desired effect. This verse does not mean that those who are veiled from God are all equal, > whether they be doers of good or workers of iniquity. It means only that the foundation is the recognition of God > and that good deeds derive from this knowledge. Nevertheless, it is certain that among those who are veiled from > God there is a difference between the doer of good and the sinner and malefactor. For the veiled soul who is > endowed with good character and conduct merits the forgiveness of God, while the veiled sinner possessed of > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > bad character and conduct will be deprived of the bounties and bestowals of God. Herein lies the difference. > > This blessed verse means, therefore, that good deeds alone, without the recognition of God, cannot lead to > eternal redemption, to everlasting success and salvation, and to admittance into the Kingdom of God. > > First of all, 'Abdu'l-Baha clearly does not state that the theme of this verse is that every person is > required to recognize Baha'u'llah as a Manifestation of God...he says that it refers to “the > recognition of God”, which could be the recognition of any of the Manifestations of God, or, for > that matter, of other signs and evidences of God in other created beings. He doesn't dwell on this > though, and then goes on to make some remarkable statements. Secondly, he says that good > deeds are the fruit of the recognition of God. It follows that bad deeds are not. To quote: “...while > the veiled sinner possessed of bad character and conduct will be deprived of the bounties and bestowals of God.” > “Conduct” is the evidence of “character” and not avowals of belief. Thirdly, he states that “This > verse does not mean that those who are veiled from God are all equal, whether they be doers of good or workers of > iniquity.” Again, the standard is whether a person does good or not. Fourthly, the unbelievers > (hear! hear!) are not cut all from the same cloth: “among those who are veiled from God there is a difference > between the doer of good and the sinner and malefactor.” What we do is what we are. Fifthly, it is better if > we believe and do good, because that way we not only reap benefits in this life and world but also > in the kingdom of God: “good deeds alone, without the recognition of God, cannot lead to eternal redemption, to > everlasting success and salvation, and to admittance into the Kingdom of God.” Interesting that Baha'u'llah > uses the word ['irfan] to refer to the “recognition” of the Manifestation of God, and that 'Abdu'l- > Baha refers to this as “the recognition of God”. It is in this context that the principle might be > viewed in its philosophical significance for the present study. > xix > Please see: Chapter V of this work, in which we write about Shaykhism. Haji Mirza Karim > Khan-i-Kirmani was profoundly opposed to the Bábís and Bahá’ís, and he encouraged > persecution of them. He traveled upon the same boat as the Bab when the latter was making his > pilgrimage to Mecca, and is reported to have behaved towards the Bab in a particularly offensive > manner. He made himself generally so unsufferable towards the passengers that they wanted to > throw him overboard! It was the Bab who intervened to save his life. His arrogance was > legendary. After the passing of the Bab and the emergence of Bahá’u’lláh, he devoted much > energy to attacking Bahá’u’lláh and his teachings. Bahá’u’lláh responded to him in the Tablet of > Contentment (Lawh-i-Qana'), reproduced by 'Abdu'l-Hamid Ishraq-Khavari in “Aqlah al-Falah,” > pp. 94-104. > xx > The word 'awwam designates people without instruction and without social distinction. One can > also translate it as “ignorant ones”. Certain writers have wished to depict Karim Khan-i-Kirmani > as a precursor of modernism because, in the introduction to his book, he states that he wrote it in > Persian instead of Arabic and in a simple style so that the simple people and “even the women” > might read it. Certain ones have also believed that Karim Khan was the defender of public > education and in particular the education of women. It suffices to read his writings to see that he > shares the same prejudices as the intellectuals of his time, all of whom were in favor of the > cloistering of women. If a comparison of the “modernity” of Karim Khan and Bahá’u’lláh is in > order, we find that Bahá’u’lláh is clearly more “modern,” as he forbids the wearing of the veil, > proscribes cloistering, declares that the education of girls is more important for the future of > humanity than that of boys, and calls for equal participation of women in the administration of > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > public affairs, for women being given the right to vote, and to serve on Bahá’í institutions. > xxi > The “transcendence” that permits us to go beyond the mechanisms of intuitive and discursive > thought is not particular to mysticism, but is found at the source of all of the great scientific > discoveries. This transcendence is allied to what G. Holton calls “gushing” (cf. L'imagination > scientifique, Paris, 1981, p. 233). The transcendence permits one to go beyond the discontinuity that > exists between the intuitive and discursive processes. Only intuition permits us to break free of > logical frameworks of a tradition in order to “see” what can be thought of outside of them. The role > of the active imagination consists then of “grasping” the new object of thought in order to bring it to > the rational plan in which a new language is created in an ad hoc manner which can restore it. D. > Hofstater (cf. Godel, Escher, Bach, Paris, 1985), who systematized the ideas of G. Bateson (cf. Vers une > Ecologie de l'Esprit, Paris, volume 1-1977, volume 2-1984), spoke of a state of thought similar to this > transcendence which he calls “the U-mode” (unmode). The U-mode can not be thought, but we can > think with it. This is a mode of thought in which the subject is liberated from the constraints of > rational thought, and which permits the surmounting of paradoxes upon which the logic of logico- > mathematical systems inevitably falls (cf. L. Vernet, la Malle de Newton, Paris, 1993, pp. 281-284). > This transcendence in many ways seems to be an attempt to walk upon the void. This is why it > necessitates an act of faith. > > xxiiTranslator’s Note: Pelagius (fl. c. 390-418) was a British-born ascetic moralist, who became > > well known throughout ancient Rome. He opposed the idea of predestination and asserted a > strong version of the doctrine of free will. He was accused by Augustine of Hippo and others of > denying the need for divine aid in performing good works. They understood him to have said > that the only grace necessary was the declaration of the law; humans were not wounded by > Adam's sin and were perfectly able to fulfill the law without divine aid. Pelagius denied > Augustine's theory of original sin. His adherents cited Deuteronomy 24:16 in support of their > position. Pelagius was declared a heretic by the Council of Carthage. His interpretation of a > doctrine of free will became known as Pelagianism. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pelagius] > > xxiiiTranslator’s Note: Democritus (/dɪˈmɒkrɪtəәs/; Greek: Δημόκριτος Dēmókritos, meaning > “chosen of the people”; c. 460 – c. 370 BC) was an influential Ancient Greek pre-Socratic > philosopher primarily remembered today for his formulation of an atomic theory of the universe. > Democritus was born in Abdera, Thrace around 460 BC. His exact contributions are difficult to > disentangle from those of his mentor Leucippus, as they are often mentioned together in texts. > Their speculation on atoms, taken from Leucippus, bears a passing and partial resemblance to > the nineteenth-century understanding of atomic structure that has led some to regard > Democritus as more of a scientist than other Greek philosophers; however, their ideas rested on > very different bases. Largely ignored in ancient Athens, Democritus was nevertheless well known > to his fellow northern-born philosopher Aristotle. Plato is said to have disliked him so much that > he wished all his books burned. Many consider Democritus to be the “father of modern science”. > [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democritus] > xxiv > Mufawadat, p. 113; SAQ:XXXVII:172. The Persian text says: “anvar 'ibarat az tamavvajat-i- > maddiy-i-athiriyyih ast”. The Grand Dictionnaire Universel Larousse of 1872 defines ether in the > following manner: “an eminently elastic substance and of an excessively weak density, which would be extended > throughout space, even in the most perfect void, and would fill the pores which separate the molecules from the > > THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD > > ponderable bodies. Heat, light, electricity would no longer be substances, but the results of the vibrational movements > particularly imprinted by this universal fluid; even as sound is not [a kind of] matter but a movement impressed > upon matter”. The word comes from the Greek aither which gave us aether in Latin and athir in > Arabic. The root of the word is Indo-European and is found in the Sanskrit idh, indh, signifying > “to enflame”, “to burn”. For Anaxagoras, ether was the principle of fire. Plato made of it a > substance more subtle than air. The concept of ether played a large role in the physics of the 19th > century when, under the influence of the experiments of Young and of Frenel, the corpusculary > theory of light was abandoned for the ondulatory theory. Today we know that the photons which > constitute light have a behavior which can be described at the same time in terms of waves and of > particles. The remark of 'Abdu'l-Baha thus conforms to the science of His time. However, > modern physics has abandoned the concept of ether. We must here understand ether as a > philosophical principle and not as a physical entity, in the same way that the atoms of > Democritus were above all philosophical concepts. Furthermore, it is possible to reinterpret this > philosophical concept of ether in the framework of the mechanism of fields in considering ether > as the totality of the properties of the quantum void. The definition which 'Abdu'l-Baha gives of > ether in His Tablet to Professor Auguste Forel is very different from that of the Larousse of 1872. > While this one defines ether as “an eminently elastic substance”, 'Abdu'l-Baha ranks ether in the > category of “forces unseen of the eye…that cannot be sensed, that cannot be seen” but “from the > effects it produceth, that is from its waves and vibrations” it is “made evident.” (Tablet to Dr. Forel, > pp. 19-20) This definition seems to understand ether to be a more fundamental energy than the > energy of which particles are composed. Perhaps there is a way to establish a parallel with the > quantum fields. > xxv > The word mahiyyat, traditionally translated by quiddities, is fairly difficult to define because its > meaning fluctuates a great deal from the 16th century onwards. The term is fabricated from the > Arabic “ma huwa?” [meaning] “what is he?” which is the translation of Aristotle's question “to ti > einai?” The expression “quiddity” thus has a long history as much in Muslim as in Christian > Scholasticism. The word “quiddity” was introduced by the Latin translators of Ibn Sina, and is > formed from quid (what thing), the question quid sit? aiming to define the thing in itself; which is to > say “the essence in so far as it is distinguishable from existence” (Lalande, Vocabulaire technique et > critique de la philosophie, 9th edition, Paris, 1962, p. 873). The Grand Dictionnaire Universel du XIXeme > siecle (Paris, 1875, volume XIII, p. 541) gives the following commentary [on this term]: > “Scholasticism understood by this word the essential and distinct character, the very nature of a > thing…A being is not only being, but this being, determined, particular, concrete; the totality of > the conditions from which this character results is quiddity. Quiddity differs from quality, not > only because it is the essential and distinctive quality, but further because it encompasses > altogether, as an indivisible whole, that which constitutes this being, the being with its own > determination, the substance with its attributes, the matter with its form—matter being nothing > without form, nor form without matter.” > > — *The Archeology of the Kingdom of God (Used by permission of the curator)*